Navy Nuclear Aircraft Carrier (CVN)
Homeporting at Mayport: Background and
Issues for Congress
Ronald O'Rourke
Specialist in Naval Affairs
February 9, 2012
Congressional Research Service
7-5700
www.crs.gov
R40248
CRS Report for Congress
Pr
epared for Members and Committees of Congress
Navy Nuclear Aircraft Carrier (CVN) Homeporting at Mayport
Summary
The Navy’s five Atlantic Fleet nuclear powered aircraft carriers (CVNs) are all homeported at
Norfolk, VA. The Navy wants to establish a second Atlantic Fleet CVN home port by
homeporting a CVN at Mayport, FL. Navy plans call for having Mayport ready to homeport a
CVN in 2019. Transferring a CVN from Norfolk to Mayport would shift from Norfolk to
Mayport the local economic activity associated with homeporting a CVN, which some sources
estimate as being worth hundreds of millions of dollars per year.
The Navy’s proposed FY2012 budget requests $14.998 million in military construction (MilCon)
funding for the Massey Avenue Corridor Improvements project, a roadway construction project
that is part of the Navy’s plan for establishing a CVN home port at Mayport. In addition, the
Navy states that of the $84.36 million in funding requested by the Navy for FY2012 for MilCon
planning and design activities, about $2 million is requested for the project to establish a CVN
home port at Mayport.
The Navy’s proposal to homeport a CVN at Mayport is an issue of strong interest to certain
Members of Congress from Florida and Virginia. Certain Members of Congress from Florida
have expressed support for the Navy’s proposal to homeport a CVN at Mayport, arguing (as do
DOD and the Navy) that the benefits in terms of mitigating risks to the Navy’s Atlantic Fleet
CVNs are worth the costs associated with moving a CVN to Mayport. Certain Members of
Congress from Virginia have expressed skepticism regarding, or opposition to, the proposal,
arguing that the benefits in terms of mitigating risks to the Navy’s Atlantic Fleet CVNs are
questionable or uncertain, and that the funding needed to implement the proposal could achieve
greater benefits if it were spent on other Navy priorities.
A March 2011 Government Accountability Office (GAO) report on the Navy’s proposal to
homeport a CVN at Mayport stated:
GAO’s independent cost estimate suggests that the total one-time cost of homeporting a
nuclear-powered aircraft carrier at Naval Station Mayport is expected to be between $258.7
million and $356.0 million, in base year 2010 dollars. The Navy’s estimate of the one-time
cost is $537.6 million—also in base year 2010 dollars—which is outside the upper range of
GAO’s estimate…. For recurring costs, GAO’s independent cost estimate suggests that the
total is expected to be between $9.0 million and $17.6 million per year. The Navy’s estimate
of $15.3 million per year is within GAO’s estimated range.
In October 21, 2011, letters to three Members of Congress from Florida, and in letters of the same
date to six Members of Congress from Virginia, Admiral Jonathan Greenert, the Chief of Naval
Operations, commented on the issue of homeporting a CVN at Mayport in the context of the
ongoing Department of Defense strategic and budget reviews.
Congressional Research Service
Navy Nuclear Aircraft Carrier (CVN) Homeporting at Mayport
Contents
Introduction...................................................................................................................................... 1
Background...................................................................................................................................... 1
Navy’s Aircraft Carrier Force.................................................................................................... 1
Norfolk and Mayport Home Ports ............................................................................................. 2
Norfolk ................................................................................................................................ 2
Mayport ............................................................................................................................... 2
Navy’s Desire to Establish a CVN Home Port at Mayport ....................................................... 3
Navy’s January 2009 Announcement, DOD Review, and QDR Endorsement ................... 3
October 21, 2011, Navy Letters to Members of Congress from Florida
and Virginia...................................................................................................................... 3
Navy’s Planned Timeline .................................................................................................... 5
Navy Rationale in Brief....................................................................................................... 5
Strategic, Environmental, and Cost Analyses Informing Navy’s Desire............................. 6
Navy Summary of Its Comparison of Mayport and Norfolk .............................................. 9
Local Economic Value of Homeporting a CVN........................................................................ 9
FY2010 Funding for Dredging................................................................................................ 11
FY2011 Funding Request for CVN Home Port....................................................................... 12
FY2012 Funding Request for CVN Home Port ...................................................................... 12
Issues for Congress ........................................................................................................................ 12
Navy’s Basing Decision Process ............................................................................................. 13
Strategic Laydown Analysis .................................................................................................... 14
Nonrecurring and Recurring Costs .......................................................................................... 14
March 2011 GAO Report .................................................................................................. 15
Transit Times ........................................................................................................................... 19
Port Vulnerability .................................................................................................................... 20
Natural Disaster................................................................................................................. 20
Man-Made Disaster........................................................................................................... 20
Other Factors That Might Differentiate Norfolk and Mayport................................................ 22
December 2010 Navy Report on Private Ship-Repair Firms ............................................ 22
March 29, 2011, GAO Report on Private Ship-Repair Firms ........................................... 23
March 3, 2011, GAO Report on Navy’s Traveling Workforce.......................................... 23
Final Environmental Impact Statement (FEIS) ....................................................................... 24
Mayport Homeporting Options Other Than Those Studied .................................................... 24
Alternative Uses of Funding.................................................................................................... 25
Legislative Activity for FY2012.................................................................................................... 25
FY2012 Funding Request........................................................................................................ 25
FY2012 National Defense Authorization Act (H.R. 1540/P.L. 112-81) .................................. 25
House................................................................................................................................. 25
Senate (S. 1867) ................................................................................................................ 26
Senate (S. 1253) ................................................................................................................ 27
Conference ........................................................................................................................ 28
FY2012 Military Construction and Veterans Affairs and Related Agencies
Appropriations Act (H.R. 2055/P.L. 112-74)........................................................................ 29
House................................................................................................................................. 29
Senate ................................................................................................................................ 29
Conference ........................................................................................................................ 29
Congressional Research Service
Navy Nuclear Aircraft Carrier (CVN) Homeporting at Mayport
Figures
Figure D-1. Navy Briefing Slide on Relative Hurricane Risk ....................................................... 58
Tables
Table 1. Estimated Non-Recurring Cost To Transfer a CVN to Mayport........................................ 8
Table 2. Navy Table Comparing Mayport and Norfolk ................................................................... 9
Table 3. Transit Times To Key Destinations .................................................................................. 20
Appendixes
Appendix A. Additional Background Information from May 2010 GAO Report ......................... 30
Appendix B. Prior-Year Legislative Activity................................................................................. 38
Appendix C. Excerpts from January 2009 Navy Record of Decision (ROD) ............................... 51
Appendix D. Navy Data on Hurricane Risk .................................................................................. 57
Appendix E. Examples of Views from Members .......................................................................... 63
Contacts
Author Contact Information........................................................................................................... 66
Congressional Research Service
Navy Nuclear Aircraft Carrier (CVN) Homeporting at Mayport
Introduction
This report provides background information and issues for Congress on the Navy’s proposal to
homeport a nuclear-powered aircraft carrier (CVN) at Mayport, FL. Transferring a CVN from
Norfolk, VA, to Mayport would shift from Norfolk to Mayport the local economic activity
associated with homeporting a CVN, which some sources estimate as being worth hundreds of
millions of dollars per year.
The Navy’s proposed FY2012 budget requests $14.998 million in military construction (MilCon)
funding for the Massey Avenue Corridor Improvements project, a roadway construction project
that is part of the Navy’s plan for establishing a CVN home port at Mayport. In addition, the
Navy states that of the $84.36 million in funding requested by the Navy for FY2012 for MilCon
planning and design activities, about $2 million is requested for the project to establish a CVN
home port at Mayport.1
The Navy’s proposal to homeport a CVN at Mayport is an issue of strong interest to certain
Members of Congress from Florida and Virginia. The issue for Congress is whether to approve,
reject, or modify the Navy’s proposal to transfer a CVN to Mayport. Congress’s decision on the
issue could affect Navy capabilities and funding requirements, and the local economies of
Mayport and Norfolk.
Background
Navy’s Aircraft Carrier Force
The Navy operates 11 aircraft carriers, all of them nuclear powered. The five CVNs assigned to
the Atlantic fleet are all homeported at Norfolk, VA. The six CVNs assigned to the Pacific Fleet
are homeported at San Diego, CA (two ships);2 Everett, WA, and Bremerton, WA, which are both
located on Puget Sound (two ships and one ship, respectively);3 and Yokosuka, Japan (one ship).4
The Navy since the 1960s has been replacing its older conventionally powered carriers (CVs) as
they have retired with new CVNs. The Navy achieved an all-CVN carrier force on January 31,
1 Source: Navy Office of Legislative Affairs telephone conversation with CRS on May 12, 2011.
2 The three CVNs homeported at San Diego include Carl Vinson (CVN-70), which had been homeported at Newport
News, VA, while it underwent a mid-life nuclear refueling overhaul. Following completion of the overhaul, CVN-70
departed Newport News on January 12, 2010, and arrived at San Diego on April 12, 2010.
3 Everett and Bremerton are located about 32 nautical miles from one another, on opposite sides of Puget Sound, which
leads to the Pacific Ocean. The figure of about 32 nautical miles is the straight-line distance between the two locations,
as calculated by the “How Far Is It?” online distance calculator, available at http://www.indo.com/cgi-bin/dist.
4 These Pacific Fleet CVN homeporting arrangements reflect a December 9, 2010, Navy announcement that the home
port of the carrier Nimitz was being transferred from San Diego to Puget Sound. The Nimitz in December 2010 was
moved from San Diego to Bremerton for a year-long overhaul and is scheduled to be permanently homeported at
Everett when the overhaul is completed in December 2011. (“Navy Announces USS Nimitz Homeport Change to
Everett, Wash.,” Navy News Service, December 9, 2010.)
Although the Navy states that the CVN based at Yokosuka is forward deployed to (rather than homeported at)
Yokosuka, the ship is commonly referred to as being homeported or forward-homeported there. The Navy includes
Yokosuka on lists of Navy home ports, and does not show an alternate U.S. location as the home port of the ship.
Congressional Research Service
1
Navy Nuclear Aircraft Carrier (CVN) Homeporting at Mayport
2009, with the retirement of its last operational CV, the Kitty Hawk (CV-63). Prior to being
decommissioned, the Kitty Hawk operated in the Pacific Fleet and was homeported in Yokosuka.
The last operational CV in the Atlantic Fleet was the John F. Kennedy (CV-67), which was
decommissioned on August 1, 2007. Prior to being decommissioned, the Kennedy was
homeported at Mayport.
Norfolk and Mayport Home Ports
Norfolk
In terms of numbers of ships homeported, Norfolk (known formally as Naval Station [NAVSTA]
Norfolk) is the Navy’s largest Atlantic Fleet home port. As of early-February 2009, 56 ships of
various types—CVNs, attack submarines (SSNs), cruisers (CGs), destroyers, (DDGs), frigates
(FFGs), large-deck amphibious assault ships (LHAs/LHDs),5 and other amphibious ships
(LPDs)—were homeported at Norfolk. The home port at Little Creek, VA, is roughly 7 nautical
miles to the east of Norfolk (depending on the exact points used to measure the distance),6 on the
same side of the Hampton Roads waterway,7 and is sometimes referred to as Norfolk (Little
Creek). Nine amphibious ships (LSDs) and patrol boats (PCs) were homeported there as of early-
February 2009.
Mayport
Mayport is located in northeast Florida, on the Atlantic Coast, near Jacksonville. It is roughly 469
nautical miles south-southwest of Norfolk.8 In terms of numbers of ships homeported, Mayport
(known formally as NAVSTA Mayport) is the Navy’s second-largest Atlantic Fleet home port. As
of early-February 2009, 20 CGs, DDGs, and FFGs were homeported at Mayport. Some of these
ships, particularly the FFGs, are scheduled for decommissioning over the next few years. The
Navy reported to Congress in February 2010 that the service envisages Mayport as the primary
Atlantic Fleet homeporting location for the Navy’s new Littoral Combat Ships (LCSs). (The
report identifies Little Creek, VA, as the Navy’s envisaged secondary Atlantic Fleet LCS
homeporting location, and Norfolk as the Navy’s envisaged tertiary Atlantic Fleet LCS
homeporting location.)9
In addition to homeporting CGs, DDGs, and FFGs, Mayport has also served as a CV home port at
various times since the 1950s, and most recently was the home port for the Kennedy, until that
5 LHAs and LHDs resemble medium-sized aircraft carriers and are sometimes referred to as helicopter carriers or (in
British parlance) commando carriers.
6 This is the straight-line distance measured from maps.
7 The home ports of Norfolk and Little Creek are separated by the downtown portion of Norfolk itself.
8 This is the straight-line distance between the two locations, as calculated by the “How Far Is It?” online distance
calculator, available at http://www.indo.com/cgi-bin/dist.
9 Department of the Navy, Report on Strategic Plan for Homeporting the Littoral Combat Ship, February 2010, p. 5.
See also Zachary M. Peterson, “Navy Report Outlines Notional Littoral Combat Ship Homeporting Strategy,” Inside
the Navy, March 8, 2010; Christopher P. Cavas, “Mayport To Get First East Coast Littoral Ships,” NavyTimes.com,
March 10, 2010; and Timothy J. Gibbons, “Mayport Lands Combat Ships,” Florida Times-Union (Jacksonville), March
11, 2010: 1. For more on the LCS program, see CRS Report RL33741, Navy Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) Program:
Background, Issues, and Options for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
Congressional Research Service
2
Navy Nuclear Aircraft Carrier (CVN) Homeporting at Mayport
ship was decommissioned in 2007. Navy records dating back to 1979 indicate that Mayport
served as a home port for two CVs (the Forrestal [CV-59] and the Saratoga [CV-60]) in 1979-
1980, 1985-1987, and 1989-1991. (During the period 1980-1985, first CV-60 and then CV-59
underwent Service Life Extension Program (SLEP) overhauls at the Philadelphia Naval
Shipyard.)10 Homeporting of Navy ships at Mayport reached recent peak of more than 30 ships,
including two CVs, in 1987, when the Navy as a whole reached a recent peak of 568 ships,
including 15 CVs and CVNs.
Although Mayport has previously serviced as a CV homeport, it has not previously served as a
CVN home port, and would require certain facility upgrades to be capable of homeporting a
CVN, including dredging and the construction of CVN nuclear propulsion plant maintenance
facilities.
Navy’s Desire to Establish a CVN Home Port at Mayport
Navy’s January 2009 Announcement, DOD Review, and QDR Endorsement
The Navy announced that it wants to establish a second Atlantic Fleet CVN home port by
homeporting a CVN at Mayport in a Record of Decision (ROD) document dated January 14,
2009.11 Later that month, following the change in administrations, Obama Administration
officials testified that they would review the proposal.12 On April 10, 2009, the Department of
Defense (DOD) announced that it had decided to delay a final decision on whether to propose
transferring a CVN to Mayport until it reviewed the issue as part of its 2010 Quadrennial Defense
Review (QDR).13
DOD’s final report on the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), released on February 1,
2010, endorsed the Navy’s desire to establish a second Atlantic Fleet CVN home port by
homeporting a CVN at Mayport, FL. The report states: “To mitigate the risk of a terrorist attack,
accident, or natural disaster, the U.S. Navy will homeport an East Coast carrier in Mayport,
Florida.”14
October 21, 2011, Navy Letters to Members of Congress from Florida
and Virginia
In October 21, 2011, letters to three Members of Congress from Florida, and in letters of the same
date to six Members of Congress from Virginia, Admiral Jonathan Greenert, the Chief of Naval
10 Source: Navy Listing of U.S. Naval Ship Battle Forces for 1979 to the present. CV-59 underwent SLEP overhaul in
1983-1985; CV-60 did so in 1980-1983.
11 Department of the Navy, Record of Decision for Homeporting of Additional Surface Ships at Naval Station Mayport,
Florida, January 14, 2009, pp. 1-2.
12 Secretary of Defense Robert Gates testified on January 27, 2009, that both he and the new Secretary of the Navy
would review the issue; and William J. Lynn III, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, made a similar commitment in
testimony at his confirmation hearing on January 15, 2009. (Source: transcripts of hearings.)
13 DOD News Release No. 233-09 of April 10, 2009, entitled “Quadrennial Defense Review To Determine Aircraft
Carrier Homeporting In Mayport,” available at http://www.defenselink.mil/releases/release.aspx?releaseid=12600.
14 Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review Report, February 2010, p. 69. The report does not make any
other comments about the issue.
Congressional Research Service
3
Navy Nuclear Aircraft Carrier (CVN) Homeporting at Mayport
Operations, commented on the issue of homeporting a CVN at Mayport in the context of the
ongoing Department of Defense strategic and budget reviews.
In the letters to the three Members of Congress from Florida, Greenert stated the following, with
the portions shown here in bold indicating the text that differs from that of the letters to the six
Members of Congress from Virginia:
Thank you for your letter of October 5, 2011 regarding the decision to homeport a Nuclear-
Powered Aircraft Carrier (CVN) in Mayport. I appreciate your thoughtful and constructive
inputs on the strategic dispersal of our CVN Fleet.
From a strategic standpoint, the rationale supporting the decision to disperse our East Coast
Carrier Fleet remains sound, as validated in the Secretary of Defense-led 2010 Quadrennial
Defense Review. Within the context of the ongoing Department of Defense strategic and
budget reviews, the size of the fiscal adjustments compels us to take a comprehensive
strategic review, examining every program element, including the timing and impacts of
the decision to homeport a CVN in Mayport. You can be assured our strategic review will
look to balance the merits of strategic dispersal with the challenges associated with
current fiscal realities.15
In the letters to the six Members of Congress from Virginia, Greenert stated the following, with
the portions shown here in bold indicating the text that differs from that of the letters to the three
Members of Congress from Florida:
Thank you for your letter of September 23, 2011 regarding the decision to homeport a
Nuclear-Powered Aircraft Carrier (CVN) in Mayport. I appreciate your thoughtful and
constructive inputs on the current fiscal challenges in relation to the strategic dispersal of
our CVN Fleet.
From a strategic standpoint, the rationale supporting the decision to disperse our East Coast
Carrier Fleet remains sound, as validated in the Secretary of Defense-led 2010 Quadrennial
Defense Review. Within the context of the ongoing Department of Defense strategic and
budget reviews, the size of the fiscal adjustments compels us to take a comprehensive
strategic review, examining every program element, including the funding required to
homeport a CVN in Mayport. You can be assured I will include your concerns in the
Navy’s strategic calculus.16
15 Source: October 21, 2011, letters from Admiral Jonathan Greenert to Senators Bill Nelson and Marco Rubio and
Representative Ander Crenshaw, posted at InsideDefense.com (subscription required), November 4, 2011, and
accessed November 7, 2011. The October 5, 2011, letter from Senators Bill Nelson and Marco Rubio and
Representative Ander Crenshaw to Admiral Greenert was accessed November 7, 2011, at http://crenshaw.house.gov/?
a=Files.Serve&File_id=fca59320-e1c2-4161-8f7f-479f8d7f7fe9.
16 Source: October 21, 2011, letter from Admiral Jonathan Greenert to Representative J. Randy Forbes, posted at
InsideDefense.com (subscription required), November 1, 2011, and accessed November 7, 2011. The letter was also
accessed November 2, 2011, at http://forbes.house.gov/UploadedFiles/GreenertMayportResponse.pdf. The letter states:
“I have sent a similar letter to the co-signers of the 23 September letter.” The September 23 letter, accessed November
2, 2011, at http://forbes.house.gov/UploadedFiles/Letter_to_Admiral_Greenert.pdf, was signed by Senators Jim Webb
and Mark Warner and Representatives J. Randy Forbes, Rob Wittman, Scott Rigell, and Robert C. “Bobby” Scott.
Congressional Research Service
4
Navy Nuclear Aircraft Carrier (CVN) Homeporting at Mayport
Navy’s Planned Timeline
Navy plans call for having Mayport ready to homeport a CVN in 2019. The Navy originally
planned on transferring a CVN to Mayport as early as 2014, but meeting that schedule would
have required funding all necessary military construction (MilCon) projects at Mayport in
FY2010.17
Navy Rationale in Brief
Then-Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) Admiral Gary Roughead summarized the Navy’s
rationale for its desire to homeport a CVN at Mayport in early 2010 testimony to Congress on the
Navy’s proposed FY2011 budget:
Hampton Roads [Virginia] is the only nuclear carrier capable port on the East Coast. A
catastrophic event in the Hampton Roads Area affecting port facilities, shipping channels,
supporting maintenance or training infrastructure, or the surrounding community has the
potential to severely limit East Coast Carrier operations, even if the ships themselves are not
affected. Consistent with today’s dispersal of West Coast aircraft carriers between California
and Washington State, the QDR direction to make Naval Station Mayport a nuclear carrier-
capable homeport addresses the Navy’s requirement for a capable facility to maintain aircraft
carriers in the event that a natural or manmade disaster makes the Hampton Roads area
inaccessible. While there is an upfront cost to upgrade Naval Station Mayport to support our
nuclear aircraft carriers, Mayport has been a carrier homeport since 1952 and is the most
cost-effective means to achieve strategic dispersal on the East Coast. The national security
benefits of this additional homeport far outweigh those costs.18
The January 2009 ROD document states:
The DON decision to utilize the capacity at NAVSTA Mayport to homeport a CVN is the
culmination of a two and a half year process involving environmental analysis under the
National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), identification of the recurring and nonrecurring
costs associated with homeporting surface ships at NAVSTA Mayport, and an assessment of
strategic concerns....
The decision reached by the DON, as further explained later in this Record of Decision, is
based upon the DON’s environmental, operational, and strategic expertise and represents the
best military judgment of the DON’s leadership. The need to develop a hedge against the
potentially crippling results of a catastrophic event was ultimately the determining factor in
this decision-making process. The consolidation of CVN capabilities in the Hampton Roads
area on the East Coast presents a unique set of risks. CVNs assigned to the West Coast are
spread among three homeports. Maintenance and repair infrastructure exists at three
locations as well. As a result, there are strategic options available to Pacific Fleet CVNs
should a catastrophic event occur. By contrast, NAVSTA Norfolk is homeport to all five of
the CVNs assigned to the Atlantic Fleet and the Hampton Roads area is the only East Coast
location where CVN maintenance and repair infrastructure exists. It is the only location in
the U.S. capable of CVN construction and refueling. The Hampton Roads area also houses
all Atlantic Fleet CVN trained crews and associated community support infrastructure. There
17 Source: April 23, 2010, e-mail to CRS from Navy Office of Legislative Affairs.
18 Statement of Admiral Gary Roughead, Chief of Naval Operations, Before the House Armed Services Committee on
February 24, 2010, p. 20. Roughead included similar a similar passage in his testimony to the other defense committees
of Congress on the Navy’s proposed FY2011 budget.
Congressional Research Service
5
Navy Nuclear Aircraft Carrier (CVN) Homeporting at Mayport
are no strategic options available outside the Hampton Roads area for Atlantic Fleet CVNs
should a catastrophic event occur.19
Additional excerpts from the ROD are presented in Appendix C.
Strategic, Environmental, and Cost Analyses Informing Navy’s Desire
The Navy states that its desire to transfer a CVN to Mayport is informed by three analyses:
• a “strategic laydown analysis” that projected the future size and composition of
the Navy, and then apportioned that Navy between the Pacific Fleet and the
Atlantic Fleet,
• a Final Environmental Impact Statement (FEIS) on alternatives for homeporting
additional surface ships at Mayport, and
• an analysis of the nonrecurring and recurring costs of homeporting ships at
Mayport.20
Each of these is discussed below.
For additional background information on the Navy’s desire to transfer a CVN to Mayport, see
Appendix A, which reprints an appendix from a May 2010 Government Accountability Office
(GAO) report on the Navy’s basing decision process.21
Strategic Laydown Analysis
The strategic laydown analysis projected a future Navy fleet of 313 ships, including 11 CVNs.
(Navy plans since early 2006 have called for achieving and maintaining a fleet of 313 or more
ships, including 11 CVNs.22) Based on an examination of projected future mission demands and
other factors, the Navy assigned 181 of these 313 ships (including 6 CVNs) to the Pacific Fleet,
and 132 ships (including 5 CVNs) to the Atlantic Fleet. This apportionment was then used to
analyze the amount of homeporting capacity that would be needed in coming years for Atlantic
Fleet ships. Homeporting capacity was measured in terms of linear feet of pier space, and
expressed in terms of cruiser equivalents (CGEs), with one CVN equaling four CGEs.
19 Department of the Navy, Record of Decision for Homeporting of Additional Surface Ships at Naval Station Mayport,
Florida, January 14, 2009, pp. 1-2.
20 Navy briefing to CRS, December 5, 2008, on Mayport homeporting. The Navy stated at the briefing that the strategic
laydown analysis began with an examination of Navy force structure requirements, meaning the numbers and types of
ships that the Navy would need in the future to perform its various missions. The force structure analysis, the Navy
stated, was followed by a global maritime posture for the year 2020 that in turn led to the Navy’s current plan for a
achieving and maintaining a 313-ship fleet. The 313-ship fleet, the Navy stated, became the baseline for the strategic
laydown The Navy stated that it then examined response times, maritime strategy, and direction from the 2006
Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) to determine the apportionment of the fleet between the Atlantic Coast, Pacific
Coast, and forward-deployed home ports.
21 Government Accountability Office, Defense Infrastructure[:]Opportunities Exist to Improve the Navy’s Basing
Decision Process and DOD Oversight, GAO-10-482, May 2010. 36 pp.
22 For a discussion, see CRS Report RL32665, Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues
for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
Congressional Research Service
6
Navy Nuclear Aircraft Carrier (CVN) Homeporting at Mayport
The analysis concluded that, given the 132 ships to be homeported on the Atlantic Coast and the
amount of homeporting capacity available at Norfolk and Little Creek, the Navy in coming years
would need 13 CGEs of surface ship homeporting capacity at an Atlantic Fleet location other than
Norfolk and Little Creek. The calculation assumed no double-breasting (i.e., side-by-side
mooring of two ships at a single pier) at Norfolk and Little Creek, and no construction of
additional pier space at Norfolk and Little Creek.
Final Environmental Impact Statement (FEIS) Analysis
A Final Environmental Impact Statement (FEIS) on Mayport homeporting alternatives was
released in November 2008. The FEIS examined 12 alternatives for homeporting additional
surface ships at Mayport. Four of the 12 alternatives involved homeporting a CVN; another four
involved making Mayport capable of homeporting a CVN, but not immediately homeporting a
CVN there; and the remaining four did not involve making Mayport capable of homeporting a
CVN. Ten of the 12 alternatives also involved transferring additional ships other than a CVN—
various combinations of cruisers, destroyers, frigates, large-deck amphibious assault ships
(LHDs), and other amphibious ships (LPDs and LSDs)—to Mayport. The FEIS also assessed a
13th alternative of homeporting no additional ships at Mayport. Homeporting a single additional
ship—a CVN—was Alternative 4.
The FEIS identified Alternative 4 as the Navy’s preferred alternative. The FEIS, like the January
2009 ROD, stated that a key reason for the Navy’s desire to transfer a CVN to Mayport is to
hedge against the risk of a catastrophic event that could damage the Navy’s CVN homeporting
facilities in the Hampton Roads area of Virginia. The FEIS stated:
Based on a thorough review of the alternatives, the Department of the Navy has determined
Alternative 4 to be its Preferred Alternative. Alternative 4 involves homeporting one CVN,
dredging, infrastructure and wharf improvements, and construction of CVN nuclear
propulsion plant maintenance facilities. Factors that influenced selection of Alternative 4 as
the Preferred Alternative included impact analysis in the EIS, estimated costs of
implementation, including military construction and other operation and sustainment costs,
and strategic dispersal considerations. Homeporting a CVN at NAVSTA Mayport would
enhance distribution of CVN homeport locations to reduce risks to fleet resources in the
event of natural disaster, manmade calamity, or attack by foreign nations or terrorists. This
includes risks to aircraft carriers, industrial support facilities, and the people that operate and
maintain those crucial assets.
The aircraft carriers of the United States Navy are vital strategic assets that serve our national
interests in both peace and war. The President calls upon them for their unique ability to
provide both deterrence and combat support in times of crisis. Of the 11 aircraft carriers
currently in service, five are assigned to the Atlantic Fleet. Utilizing the capacity at
NAVSTA Mayport to homeport a CVN disperses critical Atlantic Fleet assets to reduce
risks, thereby enhancing operational readiness. Operational readiness is fundamental to the
Navy’s mission and obligation to the Commander in Chief.23
23 Naval Facilities Engineering Command, Southeast, Final EIS for the Proposed Homeporting of Additional Surface
Ships At Naval Station Mayport, FL, Volume: Final Environmental Impact Statement, November 2008, p. ES-16.
Congressional Research Service
7
Navy Nuclear Aircraft Carrier (CVN) Homeporting at Mayport
Nonrecurring and Recurring Costs Analysis
The Navy estimated the nonrecurring and recurring costs of each of the 12 options examined in
the FEIS for homeporting additional surface ships at Mayport.
The Navy in 2008 estimated the nonrecurring (i.e., initial) cost of transferring a CVN to Mayport
at $565 million.24 The Navy has since updated this estimate, and as of February 2010 estimates
the cost at $589.7 million. Table 1 shows the breakdown of this estimate. The Navy states that the
figures shown in the table are rough order of magnitude (ROM) estimates that are subject to
change.
Table 1. Estimated Non-Recurring Cost To Transfer a CVN to Mayport
(Millions of dollars, rounded to the nearest tenth; figures may not add due to rounding)
Item Estimated
cost
Military Construction (MilCon) Costs
Planning and design (P&D)
30.0
Dredging 46.3
Parking 30.9
Road improvements
15.9
Wharf F improvements
42.1
Control ed Industrial Facility (CIF)
150.7
Ship Maintenance Facility (SMF)
174.8
Subtotal MilCon Costs
490.7
Other One-Time Costs
Initial outfitting for CIF and SMF
73.0
Personnel Change of Station (PCS)
26.0
Subtotal Other One-Time Costs
99.0
TOTAL 589.7
Source: Navy information paper dated February 25, 2010, provided to CRS by Navy Office of legislative Affairs.
Notes: The Navy information paper states that the costs shown “represent Rough Order of Magnitude (ROM)
[estimates] and will be subsequently amended prior to the annual budget submission” that “costs are subject to
change as specific projects get programmed for future execution,” and that “The projected dollars values may
adjust based on the timing of execution.”
The Navy estimated in late 2008 that, compared to the cost of homeporting a CVN at Norfolk,
homeporting a CVN at Mayport would result in an additional recurring (i.e., annual) cost of $25.5
million in constant calendar year 2010 (CY10) dollars. This estimate is a revision of an earlier
24 This figure included $456 million in Military Construction (MilCon) funding, a one-time maintenance cost of $85
million, and $24 million in personnel change of station (PCS) costs. The $456 million in MilCon funding included $30
million for planning and design work, and $426 million for dredging, infrastructure improvements, wharf
improvements, and construction of CVN nuclear propulsion plant maintenance facilities. (Source: Navy briefing
entitled “Final Environmental Impact Statement (FEIS) for the Proposed Homeporting of Additional Surface Ships at
Naval Station Mayport, FL,” November 18, 2008, presented to CRS on December 5, 2008.)
Congressional Research Service
8
Navy Nuclear Aircraft Carrier (CVN) Homeporting at Mayport
estimate of $20.4 million in recurring costs that was briefed to congressional offices following the
release of the FEIS. The Navy stated that the estimate of $25.5 million in additional recurring
costs
is based on an approximate yearly recurring cost of Base Operating Support (BOS) and
Sustainment, Restoration, and Modernization (SRM) at $8.3M, Operations at $0.8M,
travel/per-diem for transitory maintenance labor which occur two of every three 32-month
operating cycles but annualized at $12.9M, permanent on-site labor at $5M and bi-annual
maintenance dredging to maintain the depth necessary for unrestricted carrier access
averaged out to $0.1M per year. It is anticipated that Basic Allowance for Housing (BAH)
would show an annual savings of $1.6M.25
Navy Summary of Its Comparison of Mayport and Norfolk
Table 2 reproduces a November 2008 Navy table that summarizes the Navy’s comparison of
Mayport and Norfolk in terms of certain operational characteristics and risk factors.
Table 2. Navy Table Comparing Mayport and Norfolk
Transit times
Response
to Respective
times to
Training
Man-Made
Physical Force
COCOMs
Ranges Hurricane
Risk
Disaster Risk
Protection
Norfolk Slight
No Advantage
Advantage
Mayport Slight Slight
No Advantage
Slight
Slight
SOUTHCOM
Advantage
Advantage
Advantage
Advantage
(HADR/GFS)
Source: Reproduction of Navy briefing slide entitled “Norfolk vs. Mayport,” in Navy briefing entitled “Final
Environmental Impact Statement (FEIS) for the Proposed Homeporting of Additional Surface Ships at Naval
Station Mayport, FL,” November 18, 2008, presented to CRS on December 5, 2008. Emboldening as in the
original. At the bottom of the briefing slide, below the table, the slide stated: “Bottom Line: Most Compelling
Strategic Rationale to Homeport a CVN/LHA in Mayport is as a hedge against a catastrophic event in Norfolk.”
Notes: COCOMs means U.S. regional combatant commanders; SOUTHCOM means U.S. Southern
Command; HADR/GFS means humanitarian assistance and disaster response operations/Global Fleet Station. A
GFS is a Navy formation of one or more forward-deployed Navy ships that operates in an area so as to facilitate
peacetime U.S. engagement with one or more countries in that area. Amphibious and high-speed sealift ships
have served as the core ships of GFSs.
Local Economic Value of Homeporting a CVN
Serving as the home port for a CVN can generate substantial economic activity in the home port
area. This activity includes, among other things, the ship’s crew of more than 3,000 sailors
spending its pay at local businesses, the Navy purchasing supplies for the ship from local
businesses, and Navy expenditures for performing maintenance on the ship while it is in the home
port.
25 Source: Department of Defense information paper responding to questions from CRS, dated December 23, 2008, and
provided to CRS on January 6, 2009.
Congressional Research Service
9
Navy Nuclear Aircraft Carrier (CVN) Homeporting at Mayport
Various estimates have been reported of the value of homeporting a CVN to the economy of the
home port area. The FEIS estimates that transferring a CVN at Mayport would result in 2,900
more jobs, $220 million more in direct payroll, $208 million more in disposable income, and $10
million more in local tax contributions for the Mayport area.26 An August 2007 press report stated
that “some reports put the [earlier] loss of the [aircraft carrier] George Washington at $450
million in payroll and 8,200 military and civilian jobs in Norfolk.”27 A November 2008 press
report from a Norfolk newspaper stated that “The regional chamber of commerce estimates a
carrier creates 11,000 jobs and $650 million in annual economic activity.”28 Another November
26 The FEIS estimated the socioeconomic impacts of the various homeporting alternatives for Mayport. These impacts
were measured in relation to a 2006 baseline situation in which Mayport served as a home port to 22 ships, including
the carrier Kennedy. The FEIS assumed that homeporting a CVN at Mayport—Alternative 4—would result in a
situation of one CVN and 11 other surface ships being homeported at Mayport in 2014. The FEIS stated that, for the
Mayport area:
Under Alternative 4, the estimated construction impacts would total approximately $671 million
and result in 7,400 jobs. It is anticipated that the percent change for total dependents would be
-13 percent [compared to the 2006 baseline], and total school age children would be reduced by 12
percent [compared to the 2006 baseline]. Average annual growth in direct jobs would be -2.1
percent [compared to the 2006 baseline], and total change in employment would be approximately
-2,000 jobs [compared to the 2006 baseline]. Direct payroll would be reduced by $150 million
[compared to the 2006 baseline], and change in disposable income would be reduced by a total of
$141 million [compared to the 2006 baseline]. Estimated local tax contributions would be reduced
by approximately $6 million [compared to the 2006 baseline].
[Department of the Navy, Final EIS for the Proposed Homeporting of Additional Surface Ships at
Naval Station Mayport, FL, Volume I: Final Environmental Impact Statement, November 2008, pp.
ES-29.]
Under the 13th alternative—the No Action Alternative—no additional ships would be homeported at Mayport, and
Mayport in 2014 would serve as the homeport to 11 surface ships, none of them a CVN. The FEIS stated that, for the
Mayport area:
Under the No Action Alternative, the percent change for total dependents would be -35 percent and
total school age children would decline by 32 percent as compared to the 2006 baseline. Average
annual growth in direct jobs would be -5.7 percent [compared to the 2006 baseline] and total
change in employment would be a loss of approximately 4,900 jobs [compared to the 2006
baseline]. Direct payroll would be reduced by $370 million [compared to the 2006 baseline], and
change in disposable income would decline by a total of $349 million [compared to the 2006
baseline]. Estimated local tax contributions would decrease by approximately $16 million
[compared to the 2006 baseline]. The NAVSTA Mayport population would decline, resulting in a
decline in on- and off-Station housing demand and occupancy rate.
[Department of the Navy, Final EIS for the Proposed Homeporting of Additional Surface Ships at
Naval Station Mayport, FL, Volume I: Final Environmental Impact Statement, November 2008, pp.
ES-31.]
The difference between Alternative 4 and the No Action Alternative is the presence of the CVN (Alternative 4) or
absence of the CVN (No Action Alternative). Compared to the No Action Alternative, under Alternative 4 in the 2014
end state, there would be 2,900 more jobs (the difference between a loss of 2,000 jobs and a loss of 4,900 jobs), $220
million more in direct payroll (the difference between a reduction in direct payroll of $150 million and a reduction in
direct payroll of $370 million), $208 million more in disposable income (the difference between a decline in disposable
income of $141 million and a decline in disposable income of $349 million.), and $10 million more in local tax
contributions (the difference between a reduction in estimated local tax contributions of $6 million and a reduction in
estimated local tax contributions of $16 million).
27 Andrew Scutro, “Senators Lobby Mullen for Mayport Flattop,” NavyTimes.com, August 13, 2007.
28 Louis Hansen, “Use of Florida Site Vital to Carrier Safety, Navy Report Says,” Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, November
22, 2008. These figures were repeated in Dale Eisman and Louis Hansen, “Va. Senators Try New Tack On Plan To
Move Carrier,” Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, December 9, 2008; Dale Eisman and Louis Hansen, “Navy Appears To Have
Made Decision To Put Carrier In Florida,” Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, December 20, 2008; Dale Eisman and Louis
Hansen, “Navy Backs Plan To Move A Carrier To Mayport, Florida,” Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, January 15, 2009; Dale
(continued...)
Congressional Research Service
10
Navy Nuclear Aircraft Carrier (CVN) Homeporting at Mayport
2008 press report states that “Jacksonville mayor John Peyton said the new carrier would bring
about 3,190 military jobs and pump about $500 million a year into the north Florida economy in
salaries and spending.”29 Another November 2008 press report states that “Virginians calculate
that the economic activity related to one carrier can reach $1 billion a year.”30
The Navy estimated that the initial $426 million in military construction work at Mayport would
generate a total of $671 million in initial economic activity.31
FY2010 Funding for Dredging
The FY2010 budget provided $46.3 million in MilCon funding for channel dredging at Mayport
to support the ability of a CVN to enter Mayport on a temporary basis. The conference report
(H.Rept. 111-288 of October 7, 2009) on the FY2010 National Defense Authorization Act (H.R.
2647/P.L. 111-84 of October 28, 2009) stated:
The conference agreement includes authorization for $46.3 million for channel and turning
basin dredging at Naval Station (NS) Mayport, Florida. The Navy requested this project in
order to allow a nuclear aircraft carrier to enter Naval Station Mayport on a temporary basis
with an embarked air wing, full stores, and under any tidal conditions. The conferees
authorize funding for this project based on the Secretary of the Navy and Chief of Naval
Operations’ assurances that the dredging is needed for current operational considerations to
permit the use of Mayport as a transient dock and is “required irrespective of the final
decision on aircraft carrier homeporting at Mayport.”
The conferees emphasize that the inclusion of an authorization for dredging at NS Mayport is
not an indication of conferee support for the establishment of an additional homeport for
nuclear aircraft carriers on the east coast, or intended to influence the ongoing Quadrennial
Defense Review, which may include a recommendation on the establishment of a second
east coast homeport for nuclear aircraft carriers. Furthermore, the conferees note that this
funding is provided solely to permit use of Mayport as a transient port, and that any potential
designation of Mayport as a nuclear carrier homeport will require future authorizations from
the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives. (Page
870)
(...continued)
Eisman, “Next Defense Team To Weigh Carrier’s Florida Move,” Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, January 16, 2009.
29 Ron Word, “Fla. Officials: Do Not Delay Carrier Decision,” NavyTimes.com (Associated Press), November 25,
2008.
30 Roxana Tiron, “Nuclear Carrier Rift Expected To Spark Battle Between Dems,” The Hill, November 19, 2008.
31 The Navy states that:
The amount of $671M represents the estimated economic benefit to the region resulting from the
federal investment of military construction dollars (i.e., the “ripple effect”), not just the budgeted
construction costs. The figure is derived from [the] IMPLAN model, a regional economic modeling
program. The $671M includes direct impacts ($426M in MILCON), indirect impacts ($91M in
related economic sector expenditures), and induced impacts ($154M in additional household
spending derived from income gained through direct and indirect effects).
(Source: Department of Defense information paper responding to questions from congressional
offices, dated December 19, 2008, and provided to CRS on January 6, 2009, question/request 42.)
Congressional Research Service
11
Navy Nuclear Aircraft Carrier (CVN) Homeporting at Mayport
FY2011 Funding Request for CVN Home Port
Of the $120.05 million in funding requested by the Navy for FY2011 for MilCon planning and
design activities, about $2 million was requested for the project to establish a CVN home port at
Mayport.32
FY2012 Funding Request for CVN Home Port
The Navy’s proposed FY2012 budget requests $14.998 million in military construction (MilCon)
funding for the Massey Avenue Corridor Improvements project, a roadway construction project
that is part of the Navy’s plan for establishing a CVN home port at Mayport. In addition, the
Navy states that of the $84.36 million in funding requested by the Navy for FY2012 for MilCon
planning and design activities, about $2 million is requested for the project to establish a CVN
home port at Mayport.33
Issues for Congress
The Navy’s proposal to homeport a CVN at Mayport has become an issue of strong interest to
certain Members of Congress from Florida and Virginia. Certain Members of Congress from
Florida have expressed support for the Navy’s proposal to homeport a CVN at Mayport, arguing
(as do DOD and the Navy) that the benefits in terms of mitigating risks to the Navy’s Atlantic
Fleet CVNs are worth the costs associated with moving a CVN to Mayport. Certain Members of
Congress from Virginia have expressed skepticism regarding, or opposition to, the proposal,
arguing that the benefits in terms of mitigating risks to the Navy’s Atlantic Fleet CVNs are
questionable or uncertain, and that the funding needed to implement the proposal could achieve
greater benefits if it were spent on other Navy priorities. For examples of Member views on the
issue, see Appendix E.
Since a key reason the Navy wants to transfer a CVN to Mayport is to hedge against the risk of a
catastrophic event that could damage the Navy’s CVN homeporting facilities in the Hampton
Roads area of Virginia, potential questions for Congress to consider include the following:
• What is the risk of a catastrophic event damaging Atlantic Coast CVN
homeporting facilities, and how might that risk be altered by homeporting a CVN
at Mayport?
• If a catastrophic event were to damage Atlantic Coast CVN homeporting
facilities, what would be the operational impact on the Navy, and how quickly
could the Navy repair the damage and return to normal operations?
• Are the costs associated with homeporting a CVN at Mayport worth the benefits
in terms of hedging against the risk of a catastrophic event damaging Atlantic
Coast CVN homeporting facilities?
32 Source: Navy Office of Legislative Affairs telephone conversation with CRS on April 1, 2010. See also the spoken
testimony of Deputy Secretary of Defense William Lynn III at a March 4, 2010, hearing before the House Budget
Committee on DOD’s proposed FY2011 budget.
33 Source: Navy Office of Legislative Affairs telephone conversation with CRS on May 12, 2011.
Congressional Research Service
12
Navy Nuclear Aircraft Carrier (CVN) Homeporting at Mayport
In assessing these and other questions relating to the Navy’s desire to transfer a CVN to Mayport,
Congress may consider several specific issues, including the following:
• the Navy’s basing decision process;
• the Navy’s strategic laydown analysis;
• the Navy’s estimated recurring and nonrecurring costs for homeporting a CVN at
Mayport;
• transit times from Norfolk and Mayport to key destinations;
• the vulnerability of Norfolk and Mayport to natural and man-made catastrophes;
• other factors that might differentiate Norfolk and Mayport;
• the Final Environmental Impact Statement (FEIS) on Mayport homeporting
options;
• potential options for Mayport homeporting other than those studied in the FEIS;
and
• potential alternative uses of the funding that would be required for homeporting a
CVN at Mayport.
Each of these specific issues is discussed below.
Navy’s Basing Decision Process
One issue that Congress may consider is the Navy’s basing decision process. A May 2010 GAO
report on the Navy’s basing decision process done in response to direction in the House Armed
Services Committee’s report (H.Rept. 111-166 of June 18, 2009, pages 537-538) on the FY2010
defense authorization bill (H.R. 2647) states:
The Army, Marine Corps, and Air Force basing decision processes fully incorporate the key
elements, associated factors, and management control standards that GAO identified as
necessary in a comprehensive process; however, the Navy needs additional guidance for its
process to be complete. GAO found that while the Army, Marine Corps, and Air Force each
have issued comprehensive guidance for their basing possesses that describes the
organizational roles and responsibilities within the service, establishes links among all of the
service’s strategic and environmental guidance documents, and identifies the service’s basing
criteria, some of the Navy’s guidance documents lacked detailed information about specific
actions taken during the process and defined responsibility for completing certain types of
analyses. For example, the Navy’s Strategic Dispersal Flow Chart—one of the five guidance
documents used to implement the Navy’s process—shows that some types of analyses are
conducted to review a range of considerations, such as access to training areas, sailor and
family quality of life, and ship size, for a particular basing decision. But the document does
not describe in any detail how and by whom these analyses will be conducted. Additionally,
Navy guidance does not provide a clear explanation of how its five guidance documents are
linked together in implementing the Navy’s overall basing process. Without comprehensive
and clear guidance on all aspects of the Navy’s overall basing decision process, the Navy
may lack the completeness and management control to ensure that Navy basing decisions can
facilitate external stakeholders’ examination and scrutiny or ensure effective implementation
of the Navy’s basing process.
Congressional Research Service
13
Navy Nuclear Aircraft Carrier (CVN) Homeporting at Mayport
The Secretary of Defense has not set a policy or assigned an office a clear role for providing
management control of the services’ basing decision processes within the United States, and
as a consequence may lack reasonable assurance that certain departmentwide initiatives will
be fully supported in the services’ basing decisions. The Office of the Secretary of Defense
(OSD) officials said that OSD is promoting joint sharing of DOD facilities and seeking to
ensure that domestic basing decisions support global operations. However, OSD has not fully
promoted service consideration of the joint sharing, global operations, and potentially other
initiatives because the Secretary of Defense has neither provided a comprehensive policy for,
nor clearly assigned an office within OSD to oversee domestic service basing processes.
Without OSD guidance and an office to provide effective oversight of military service basing
decision processes, the Secretary of Defense lacks reasonable assurance that departmentwide
initiatives are adequately considered by the services in their domestic basing decision
making.34
Strategic Laydown Analysis
A second issue that Congress may consider is the Navy’s strategic laydown analysis. As
mentioned earlier, this analysis projected a future fleet of 313 ships (including 11 CVNs), of
which 181 ships (including 6 CVNs) would be assigned to the Pacific Fleet and 132 ships
(including 5 CVNs) would be assigned to the Atlantic Fleet.
On September 1, 2011, it was reported that the Navy, in response to anticipated reductions in
planned levels of defense spending, is discussing options for maintaining a fleet with
considerably fewer than 300 ships, such as a 250-ship fleet that includes 10 aircraft carriers or a
240-ship fleet that includes 8 aircraft carriers; a fleet with 9 carriers is another reported option.35
Supporters of keeping all Atlantic Fleet CVNs homeported at Norfolk could argue that if the
Navy in coming years includes fewer than 313 ships or fewer than 11 CVNs, there will be less
need to shift a CVN from Norfolk to Mayport for reasons relating to homeporting capacity.
Supporters of homeporting a CVN at Mayport could argue that if the Navy in coming years
includes fewer than 313 ships or fewer than 11 CVNs, each ship or each CVN would represent a
larger percentage of the Navy’s overall capability, making the need to hedge against a
catastrophic event in the Hampton Roads area more important.
Additional factors that Congress may consider in connection with the strategic laydown analysis
include the Navy’s projected apportionment of the fleet between the Pacific and Atlantic Coasts
(which reflects, among other things, a Navy judgment about likely potential missions for the
Navy), the potential for “breasting” (i.e., side-by-side mooring of two or more ships at a single
pier), and the cost of increasing homeporting capacity at Norfolk through construction of
additional pier space and other facilities.
Nonrecurring and Recurring Costs
A third issue that Congress may consider is whether the Navy has accurately estimated the
nonrecurring and recurring costs of homeporting a CVN at Mayport. Other things held equal, if
34 Government Accountability Office, Defense Infrastructure[:]Opportunities Exist to Improve the Navy’s Basing
Decision Process and DOD Oversight, GAO-10-482, May 2010, summary page.
35 Christopher J. Castelli, “Navy Of Tomorrow Could Have Fewer Cruisers, Aircraft Carriers,” Inside the Pentagon,
September 1, 2011.
Congressional Research Service
14
Navy Nuclear Aircraft Carrier (CVN) Homeporting at Mayport
the Navy has underestimated or overestimated these costs, it might weaken or strengthen,
respectively, the argument for homeporting a CVN at Mayport.
March 2011 GAO Report
A March 2011 GAO report on the Navy’s estimate of nonrecurring and recurring costs of
homeporting a CVN at Mayport stated:
GAO’s independent cost estimate suggests that the total one-time cost of homeporting a
nuclear-powered aircraft carrier at Naval Station Mayport is expected to be between $258.7
million and $356.0 million, in base year 2010 dollars. The Navy’s estimate of the one-time
cost is $537.6 million—also in base year 2010 dollars—which is outside the upper range of
GAO’s estimate. Unlike GAO’s estimate, the Navy did not conduct a risk and uncertainty
analysis on its one-time costs; as a result, its estimate does not include a range. The largest
difference between GAO’s estimate of one-time costs and the Navy’s estimate is the cost of
constructing new facilities at Mayport. Based on the historical costs of constructing similar
facilities, GAO estimates at the 65 percent confidence level that the cost for constructing the
controlled industrial facility will be $70.5 million, and the cost for constructing the ship
maintenance support facilities will be $45.6 million. The Navy estimates the construction
costs to be much higher at $139.1 million and $157.2 million, respectively. Navy officials
told GAO the difference is due to the increased cost involved in protecting the buildings
from a potential storm surge associated with a Category 4 hurricane. GAO included a
hurricane factor in its estimate to account for this increase, but GAO and the Navy used
different estimating methods in developing the estimates for the construction costs. GAO
used adjusted actual costs from similar construction projects, while the Navy used a detailed
engineering estimate. For recurring costs, GAO’s independent cost estimate suggests that the
total is expected to be between $9.0 million and $17.6 million per year. The Navy’s estimate
of $15.3 million per year is within GAO’s estimated range.
The Navy’s estimate did not fully meet any of the four characteristics—comprehensive,
accurate, well documented, and credible—for producing a high-quality cost estimate.
Specifically, although the estimate included almost all of the life-cycle costs related to
homeporting a nuclear aircraft carrier at Mayport, it partially met the criteria for being
comprehensive because it does not fully describe the cost-influencing ground rules and
assumptions. The estimate was only minimally accurate and well documented in that
although many elements of the estimate are based on actual experiences from other
comparable programs, it is difficult to say if the cost estimates are the most likely costs since
the Navy did not conduct a risk and uncertainty analysis. Further, the estimate contains very
little step-by-step description of how the estimate was developed so that a cost analyst
unfamiliar with the program could independently replicate it. The Navy had to recreate
several portions of the estimate in order to provide GAO with supporting documentation.
Further, the Navy’s estimate does not meet the GAO best practice for a credible estimate
because it does not include a sensitivity analysis and was not compared by the Navy to an
independent cost estimate conducted by a group outside the Navy. Without fully meeting the
characteristics of a high-quality estimate, the Navy’s ability to present a convincing
argument of the estimate’s affordability and credibly answer decision makers’ and oversight
groups’ questions about the estimate is hampered.36
Regarding nonrecurring costs, the report stated on pages 10-11:
36 Government Accountability Office, Defense Infrastructure[:] Navy Can Improve the Quality of Its Cost Estimate to
Homeport an Aircraft Carrier at Naval Station Mayport, GAO-11-309, March 2011, summary page.
Congressional Research Service
15
Navy Nuclear Aircraft Carrier (CVN) Homeporting at Mayport
Table 2 [of this GAO report] shows a comparison between our estimated range and the
Navy’s estimate for one-time costs. Specifically, the table shows our estimated range at an
80 percent confidence interval and whether the Navy’s estimate falls into that range. The low
value of the estimate range ($258.7 million) represents a 10 percent chance that the cost will
be that amount or less, and the high value of the estimated range ($356.0 million) represents
a 90 percent chance that the cost will be that amount or less. The last column in the table
identifies whether the Navy’s estimate is within our estimated range.
The report also stated on page 12:
Table 3 [of this GAO report] shows our 65 percent confidence level estimate in comparison
to the Navy’s point estimate. To facilitate comparisons against the Navy’s estimate, the one-
time costs are expressed in base year 2010 dollars, which represent amounts based on 2010
prices, with the impact of inflation removed. While useful for comparisons against the
Navy’s estimate, base year 2010 dollars should not be used as the basis for budgetary
decisions. In order to support a budgetary amount, base year 2010 dollars would need to be
converted into then-year dollars.
Congressional Research Service
16
Navy Nuclear Aircraft Carrier (CVN) Homeporting at Mayport
Regarding recurring costs, the report stated on page 14:
Table 4 [of this GAO report] shows a comparison between our estimated range and the
Navy’s estimate for recurring costs. Specifically, the table shows our estimate range at an 80
percent confidence interval and whether the Navy’s estimate falls into that range. The low
value of the estimated range ($9.0 million) represents a 10 percent chance that the cost will
be that amount or less, and the high value of the estimated range ($17.6 million) represents a
90 percent chance that the cost will be that amount or less. The last column in the table
identifies whether the Navy’s estimate is within our estimated range.
As we did with one time costs, we also compared our 65 percent confidence level estimates
with the Navy’s point estimates for a direct element-by-element comparison between our
estimate and the Navy’s, as shown in table 5.
Congressional Research Service
17
Navy Nuclear Aircraft Carrier (CVN) Homeporting at Mayport
The report made the following conclusions and recommendations:
Conclusions
The Navy’s ability to produce a comprehensive, accurate, well documented, and credible
cost estimate for homeporting a nuclear-powered aircraft carrier at Naval Station Mayport
will continue to be hampered until it makes certain fundamental changes to the process it
uses to develop, document, and update its overall estimate of Mayport homeporting costs.
Specifically, without full documentation of the data sources, assumptions, and calculation
methods it uses, the Navy cannot assure that its estimate can be validated or defended or any
differences between estimated and actual costs can be explained—an important step in
improving and updating the estimate. Additionally, without detailed documentation that
describes how the estimate was derived, the Navy can neither present a convincing argument
of the estimate’s affordability, nor credibly answer decision makers’ and oversight groups’
questions about specific details in the estimate. Further, without conducting sensitivity and
risk and uncertainty analyses on its cost estimate, the Navy is unable to identify and focus on
major cost drivers, analyze the potential for cost growth, and quantify the risk and
uncertainty associated with the cost estimate. Moreover, without a comprehensive, accurate,
well documented, and credible cost estimate, Congress cannot have reasonable confidence
that it has a complete understanding and an accurate and realistic determination of the
projected costs to evaluate and make decisions on the Navy’s planned homeporting of a
nuclear-powered aircraft carrier at Mayport.
Recommendations for Executive Action
To improve the Navy’s life-cycle cost estimate for the planned homeporting of a nuclear-
powered aircraft carrier at Naval Station Mayport, Florida, we recommend that the Secretary
of Defense direct the Secretary of the Navy to take the following three actions to incorporate
to a greater extent the best practices identified by GAO for developing a high-quality cost
estimate in future revisions of its Mayport nuclear carrier homeporting cost estimate as part
of the annual budgetary process or in response to future congressional requests:
1. To improve the comprehensiveness of its cost estimate, the Navy should
• include all potential recurring costs, and
Congressional Research Service
18
Navy Nuclear Aircraft Carrier (CVN) Homeporting at Mayport
• clearly describe the ground rules and assumptions underlying the estimation of each
cost element;
2. To improve the quality and transparency of the Navy’s estimate, the Navy should
thoroughly document the life-cycle costs associated with homeporting a nuclear-powered
aircraft carrier at Naval Station Mayport. Specifically, documentation should • identify the
source data used, their reliability, and how the data were normalized,
• describe the steps used in developing the overall estimate so that it can be clearly
understood and easily replicated, and
• describe in sufficient detail the estimating methodology and calculations performed to
derive each element’s cost; and
3. To improve the accuracy and credibility of its cost estimate, the Navy should assign a
single office with the responsibility for assembling the overall estimate into a comprehensive
and well documented package and for performing a sensitivity and risk and uncertainty
analyses on the overall estimate to identify the
• major cost drivers,
• extent to which estimates could vary due to changes in key cost assumptions, and
• level of confidence in the estimate.37
The GAO report stated that “in written comments on a draft of this report, DOD partially
concurred with two and nonconcurred with one of our three recommended actions…. DOD’s
written comments are reprinted in appendix IV [of this GAO report].”38
Transit Times
A fourth issue that Congress may consider is whether the Navy has accurately assessed the
relative merits of Norfolk and Mayport in terms of transit times to key overseas operating areas
and training ranges, as shown in the first two columns of Table 2. Transit times are a function of
transit distance and transit speed.
With regard to transit times to key overseas operating areas, one key destination is the Strait of
Gibraltar, which is used to support operations in the Mediterranean and (via the Suez canal) the
Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf. Other key destinations include the Cape of Good Hope (a longer
route to the Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf, but one that avoids the need to transit the Suez canal),
and Puerto Rico (which might be considered a representative destination for supporting
operations in the Caribbean). Table 3 shows transit times from Norfolk and Mayport to these
three destinations at 14 knots (a typical transit speed for routine forward deployments) and 20
knots (an elevated transit speed that might be more likely for responding to a contingency).
37 Government Accountability Office, Defense Infrastructure[:] Navy Can Improve the Quality of Its Cost Estimate to
Homeport an Aircraft Carrier at Naval Station Mayport, GAO-11-309, March 2011, pp. 22-23.
38 Government Accountability Office, Defense Infrastructure[:] Navy Can Improve the Quality of Its Cost Estimate to
Homeport an Aircraft Carrier at Naval Station Mayport, GAO-11-309, March 2011, p. 23.
Congressional Research Service
19
Navy Nuclear Aircraft Carrier (CVN) Homeporting at Mayport
Table 3. Transit Times To Key Destinations
In days, as a function of transit speed
Transit speed
Destination
From
14 knots
20 knots
Strait of Gibraltar
Mayport
11.1
7.6
Norfolk
9.9 7.0
Cape of Good Hope
Mayport
34.8
24.4
Norfolk
34.8
24.3
Puerto Rico
Mayport
6.2
4.3
Norfolk
6.9 4.8
Source: Navy briefing slide entitled “Average Transit Times East/West,” in Navy briefing entitled “Final
Environmental Impact Statement (FEIS) for the Proposed Homeporting of Additional Surface Ships at Naval
Station Mayport, FL,” November 18, 2008, presented to CRS on December 5, 2008; and (for Puerto Rico)
Department of Defense information paper responding to questions from CRS, dated December 23, 2008 and
provided to CRS on January 6, 2009.
Port Vulnerability
A fifth issue that Congress may consider is whether the Navy has accurately assessed
vulnerability-related factors at Norfolk and Mayport, including the risk of a natural or man-made
catastrophic event damaging CVN homeporting facilities, and the Navy’s ability to defend against
such an event at either site. The Navy’s summary of its assessments of these factors is shown in
the third, fourth, and fifth columns of the Navy slide reproduced in Table 2.
In assessing the question of port vulnerability, one factor that might be considered is the current
degree of concentration or dispersion of Navy ships other than Atlantic Fleet CVNs. For example,
supporters of transferring a CVN to Mayport might observe that the Navy’s Pacific Fleet CVN
homeporting facilities are currently located in three widely separated areas (San Diego, the Puget
Sound area of Washington State, and Yokosuka, Japan), while supporters of keeping all Atlantic
Fleet CVNs homeported at Norfolk might observe that the Navy’s Pacific Fleet and Atlantic Fleet
ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs)—which, like CVNs, are low-quantity, high-value assets—
are homeported at a single site on each coast (Bangor, WA, and Kings Bay, GA, respectively).
Natural Disaster
As shown in Table 2, hurricanes were the principal type of natural disaster that the Navy
analyzed in comparing the relative risk of a natural disaster at Hampton Roads and Mayport. The
Navy assesses that, historically, the hurricane risk to Norfolk is similar to the risk to Jacksonville,
which is close to Mayport. Information provided by the Navy regarding the risk of hurricanes at
Norfolk and Mayport is presented in Appendix D of this report.
Man-Made Disaster
Potential man-made disasters include but are not limited to shipping accidents, conventional or
nuclear military attacks by foreign countries, and terrorist attacks.
Congressional Research Service
20
Navy Nuclear Aircraft Carrier (CVN) Homeporting at Mayport
During the Cold War, the Navy was concerned about the potential for a conventional military
attack on U.S. home ports by Soviet military forces. One possibility was a covert mining of U.S.
Navy home ports by Soviet submarines and Warsaw Pact merchant ships prior to the start of a
NATO-Warsaw Pact conflict. Another possibility was a cruise missile strike by Soviet submarines
against Navy port facilities or ships in port. Concern over the potential for a conventional military
attack on U.S. home ports by Soviet military forces was the central reason for the Navy’s strategic
homeporting program of the 1980s, which dispersed some of the Navy’s ships away from the
Navy’s major home ports.39
The end of the Cold War reduced the apparent risk of a conventional military attack on U.S. Navy
home ports by a foreign country, and led to a reconsideration of the strategic homeporting
program.40 China is modernizing its naval and other military forces,41 but any potential ability
China might have in coming years for conducting a conventional attack on U.S. home ports might
be more of an issue for Pacific Fleet home ports than for Atlantic Fleet home ports.
The terrorist attack of October 12, 2000, on the destroyer Cole (DDG-67) in the port of Aden,
Yemen,42 and the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, have led to increased focus on the
potential for terrorist attacks on U.S. port areas.
The Navy states that DOD and other U.S. government entities conducted several vulnerability
assessments for Norfolk and Mayport between 2006 and 2008.43 The contents of these
assessments are generally classified.
39 See CRS Issue Brief IB85193, The Navy’s Strategic Homeporting Program: Issues for Congress, by Ronald
O’Rourke. This issue brief is out of print and is available directly from the author.
40 See CRS Issue Brief IB90077, Strategic Homeporting Reconsidered, by Ronald O’Rourke. This issue brief is out of
print and is available directly from the author.
41 See CRS Report RL33153, China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities—Background and
Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
42 For a discussion of this attack, see CRS Report RS20721, Terrorist Attack on USS Cole: Background and Issues for
Congress, by Raphael F. Perl and Ronald O'Rourke.
43 In response to a question from CRS regarding vulnerability assessments for Norfolk and Mayport, the Navy stated
the following (which has been edited for ease of reading):
The Joint Staff sponsored a Joint Staff Integrated Vulnerability Assessment (JSIVA) on Naval
Station Norfolk that was conducted from August 6 to August 11, 2006. The team conducting the
assessment was composed of seven specialists from the Defense Threat Reduction Agency
(DTRA). The Naval Criminal Investigative Service (NCIS) conducted a Chief of Naval Operations
Integrated Vulnerability Assessment (CNOIVA) for Naval Station Mayport from January 21 to
January 26, 2007. Threat assessments conducted by NCIS through the Multiple Threat Alert Center
(MTAC) prior to specific events, such as air shows, also serve as threat updates for other
Department of the Navy commands located in the geographic area. NCIS also conducts Port
Integrated Vulnerability Assessments (PIVA) for ports and facilities that are not USN bases.
Additional vulnerability and threat assessments that were completed include the following: a
Southeast Virginia Threat Assessment that was conducted from August 27 to October 7, 2008; a
Mayport Threat Assessment dated May 30, 2008; a Jacksonville Threat Assessment dated October
1, 2008; an FBI assessment entitled “Domestic Maritime Domain Terrorist Threat Assessment”
dated March 28, 2008; an update to that assessment entitled “Domestic Maritime Domain Terrorist
Threat Assessment (Update)” dated April 17, 2008; a Department of Homeland Security
assessment entitled “Homeland Security Threat Assessment: Evaluating Threats 2008-2013” dated
July 18, 2008; a U.S. Coast Guard assessment entitled “The Terrorist Threat to the U.S. Maritime
Domain” dated March 25, 2004; and a Director of National Intelligence assessment entitled “The
Terrorist Threat to the US Homeland” dated July 2007. (Source: Department of Defense
information paper responding to questions from CRS, dated December 23, 2008 and provided to
(continued...)
Congressional Research Service
21
Navy Nuclear Aircraft Carrier (CVN) Homeporting at Mayport
The Navy states that it used statistics on shipping volumes at the ports of Norfolk and
Jacksonville (near Mayport) as one measure of the relative risk of a man-made disaster at Norfolk
and Mayport, the idea being that certain elements of the risk of man-made disaster are somewhat
proportional to the volume of shipping. The Navy states that in 2006, 2.05 million cargo
containers and 16.6 million tons of cargo passed through the port of Norfolk, while 768,200 cargo
containers and 8.31 million tons of cargo passed through the port of Jacksonville.44 The Navy
further states that the center of the shipping channel in the port of Norfolk is about 500 yards
from the carrier piers, and that the channel is separated from the piers by a line of buoys but no
fixed obstruction, while the center of the shipping channel in the port of Jacksonville is also about
500 yards from the carrier pier, but is separated from the carrier pier by a 200-yard-wide spit of
land.45
Other Factors That Might Differentiate Norfolk and Mayport
A sixth issue that Congress may consider is whether the Navy has overlooked or not given
adequate weight to other factors in evaluating the merits of Mayport and Norfolk as Navy home
ports. Possibilities might include things such as
• the ability of private ship repair firms in Northeast Florida to support the
maintenance requirements of a CVN,
• the readiness and cost impacts of the aircraft carrier homeporting and
maintenance at Mayport on the Navy’s traveling workforce,
• the interaction of the base facilities at Mayport or Norfolk with other regional
military facilities (such as naval air stations), or
• the possible effect of CVN homeporting on Navy recruiting in the area
surrounding the home port.
December 2010 Navy Report on Private Ship-Repair Firms
Regarding the first factor above, a December 2010 Navy report stated that
Mayport has a large and diverse vendor base that provides services such as maintenance,
upkeep, and servicing to fleet units and installations….
[Five] northeast Florida-based ship-repair activities have been evaluated by the Department
of the Navy (DON), as having the capabilities required to perform non-nuclear maintenance
and modernization on U.S. Navy ships….
(...continued)
CRS on January 6, 2009.)
44 The cargo containers were measured in twenty-foot equivalent units (TEUs), a standard metric for counting cargo
containers.
45 Source: Slide entitled “Shipping—Man Made Disaster Risk,” from Navy briefing entitled “Final Environmental
Impact Statement (FEIS) for the Proposed Homeporting of Additional Surface Ships at Naval Station Mayport, FL,”
November 18, 2008, presented to CRS on December 5, 2008.
Congressional Research Service
22
Navy Nuclear Aircraft Carrier (CVN) Homeporting at Mayport
Mayport private-sector shipyards have a wide range of capabilities to perform maintenance
and modernization on the majority of non-nuclear hull, mechanical, and electrical systems of
various ship classes….
Private-sector ship-repair activities in Mayport will perform the same type of work on a
nuclear-powered aircraft carrier that they currently perform on non-nuclear surface ships.
Therefore, no additional specialized capabilities are required from the private-sector in
northeast Florida to support nuclear-powered aircraft carrier maintenance. Because the Navy
does not require additional capabilities from the private-sector in Mayport, no additional
costs to the Navy are expected for the private-sector to develop additional capabilities to
support a nuclear-powered aircraft carrier….
The Mayport private-sector has experience supporting large aircraft carrier availabilities of
the magnitude of a PIA [i.e., an aircraft carrier Planned Incremental (Maintenance)
Availability].46
March 29, 2011, GAO Report on Private Ship-Repair Firms
A March 29, 2011, GAO report that assessed the Navy’s December 2010 report stated that
Private ship repair firms in northeast Florida will likely be able to support the maintenance
requirements of a nuclear aircraft carrier if one is homeported at Naval Station Mayport in
2019 as the Navy plans….
The northeast Florida area is home to three master ship repair firms certified by the Navy to
have the capabilities and capacities to support the maintenance requirements of U.S. Navy
surface ships, including aircraft carriers. Each of these firms has significant production and
administrative facilities either on or near Naval Station Mayport, and officials from these
firms told us they will maintain their presence in northeast Florida….
The tasks required of the private ship repair firms to support a nuclear carrier are the same as
those performed on conventional carriers in the past and the other types of ships currently
homeported at Mayport.
Private ship repair firms in northeast Florida have previously demonstrated the ability to
support carrier maintenance. In fact, the largest aircraft carrier availability ever performed
outside of a public shipyard was completed on the USS John F. Kennedy in Mayport in
2003.47
March 3, 2011, GAO Report on Navy’s Traveling Workforce
Regarding the second of the factor above, a March 3, 2011, GAO report stated that
In 2010, the Navy revised its original (2008) estimate of annualized workforce-related costs
from about $18 million to $8.2 million. The Navy revised its estimate as a result of
discussing its estimate with us and identifying more correct and complete assumptions than
had been used to develop the original estimate. For example, the original estimate used the
46 U.S. Navy, Report to Congress on Northeast Florida Private Ship Maintenance Industrial Base, December 2010, pp.
4, 6, and 9.
47 Government Accountability Office, Defense Infrastructure: Ability of Ship Maintenance Industrial Base to Support a
Nuclear Aircraft Carrier at Naval Station Mayport, GAO-11-388R, March 29, 2011, pp. 4-5.
Congressional Research Service
23
Navy Nuclear Aircraft Carrier (CVN) Homeporting at Mayport
more expensive travel rates for San Diego instead of [the less expensive travel rates for]
Mayport. To assess the validity of the revised estimate, we also developed an independent
cost estimate. Our independent, risk-adjusted, annualized estimate for the workforce-related
recurring costs is about $10.6 million at the 65 percent confidence interval, which means that
there is a 65 percent probability the actual cost will be $10.6 million or less. We also
estimated that these risk-adjusted costs could range from $5.5 million to $14.1 million. The
difference is attributable in part to our estimate being based on a risk analysis while the
Navy’s was not. Our assessment of the Navy’s cost-estimating procedures found that the
Navy’s procedures met best practices to various degrees. For example, the Navy’s
procedures met the requirements to comprehensively include both types of workforce-related
costs (traveling and permanently stationed employees’ costs) involved in the move.
However, the Navy’s procedures minimally met the credible criteria because they did not,
among other things, include risk and sensitivity analyses or an independent cost estimate.
The Navy has not begun to identify or document potential effects on readiness that might
occur as a result of the proposed move nor has it identified workforce-related mitigation
strategies because the move is years away. However, Navy officials indicated that the U.S.
Navy Depot Maintenance Strategic Plan outlines strategies that will be used to address
potential risks to readiness. Also, they indicated that they will begin to implement these
strategies 4 to 5 years before moving the aircraft carrier to Mayport. We found that the Navy
has processes to manage the workforce that include depot workers traveling to other
locations to perform aircraft carrier maintenance. While the move to Mayport will result in
increased travel for the workforce, Navy officials told us that they currently meet workforce
travel requirements while staffed almost entirely by workers who voluntarily elect to travel.
Navy officials do not anticipate any challenges in identifying a sufficient number of workers
with the appropriate skills to perform maintenance work at Mayport. Further, Navy officials
have indicated that the performance of the traveling workforce conducting remote aircraft
carrier depot maintenance slightly exceeds that of workers requiring no travel.48
Final Environmental Impact Statement (FEIS)49
A seventh issue that Congress may consider is the adequacy of the FEIS that the Navy prepared to
assess the potential environmental impacts of locating a nuclear carrier at Mayport. The National
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) requires all federal agencies to prepare environmental impact
statements for major actions that would significantly affect the environment. The scope of these
statements are broader than the environment per se, as agencies are required to examine not only
the potential impacts on the natural environment but also the socioeconomic impacts of a
proposed action. Some observers have questioned whether the Navy thoroughly assessed these
sets of impacts when it selected Mayport for the location of a CVN.50
Mayport Homeporting Options Other Than Those Studied
An eighth issue that Congress may consider are potential options for homeporting additional
ships at Mayport that differ from the 12 alternatives studied in the FEIS. One such possibility,
48 Government Accountability Office, Depot Maintenance: Navy Has Revised Its Estimated Workforce Cost for Basing
an Aircraft Carrier at Mayport, Florida, GAO-11-257R, March 3, 2011, pp. 2-3.
49 This section was drafted by David M. Bearden, Specialist in Environmental Policy, Resources, Science, and Industry
Division.
50 See, for example, Dale Eisman and Louis, “Va. Senators Try New Tack On Plan To Move Carrier,” Norfolk
Virginian-Pilot, December 9, 2008.
Congressional Research Service
24
Navy Nuclear Aircraft Carrier (CVN) Homeporting at Mayport
which the FEIS mentioned but did not examine in detail, would be to homeport some number of
Littoral Combat Ships (LCSs) at Mayport. LCSs, which are just beginning to enter service with
the Navy, are somewhat smaller than the Navy’s frigates, and are to have much smaller crews.51
As mentioned earlier, the Navy reported to Congress in February 2010 that the service envisages
Mayport is as the primary Atlantic Fleet homeporting location for the Navy’s new LCSs. (The
report identifies Little Creek, VA, as the Navy’s envisaged secondary Atlantic Fleet LCS
homeporting location, and Norfolk as the Navy’s envisaged tertiary Atlantic Fleet LCS
homeporting location.)52 Another possibility would be to homeport two CVNs rather than one
CVN at Mayport. As mentioned earlier, Mayport served as a home port for two CVs for several
years during the 1980s.
Alternative Uses of Funding
A ninth issue that Congress may consider are potential alternative uses by the Navy or some other
part of DOD of the funding that would be needed for homeporting a CVN at Mayport, and how
the benefits of those potential alternative uses would compare to the benefits of homeporting a
CVN at Mayport.
Legislative Activity for FY2012
FY2012 Funding Request
The Navy’s proposed FY2012 budget requests $14.998 million in military construction (MilCon)
funding for the Massey Avenue Corridor Improvements project, a roadway construction project
that is part of the Navy’s plan for establishing a CVN home port at Mayport. In addition, the
Navy states that of the $84.36 million in funding requested by the Navy for FY2012 for MilCon
planning and design activities, about $2 million is requested for the project to establish a CVN
home port at Mayport.53
FY2012 National Defense Authorization Act (H.R. 1540/P.L. 112-81)
House
The House Armed Services Committee, in its report (H.Rept. 112-78 of May 17, 2011) on H.R.
1540, recommends rejecting the Navy’s FY2012 request for $14.998 million in MilCon funding
for the Massey Avenue Corridor Improvements Project (page 471).
51 For more on the LCS program, see CRS Report RL33741, Navy Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) Program: Background,
Issues, and Options for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
52 Department of the Navy, Report on Strategic Plan for Homeporting the Littoral Combat Ship, February 2010, p. 5.
See also Zachary M. Peterson, “Navy Report Outlines Notional Littoral Combat Ship Homeporting Strategy,” Inside
the Navy, March 8, 2010; Christopher P. Cavas, “Mayport To Get First East Coast Littoral Ships,” NavyTimes.com,
March 10, 2010; and Timothy J. Gibbons, “Mayport Lands Combat Ships,” Florida Times-Union (Jacksonville), March
11, 2010: 1.
53 Source: Navy Office of Legislative Affairs telephone conversation with CRS on May 12, 2011.
Congressional Research Service
25
Navy Nuclear Aircraft Carrier (CVN) Homeporting at Mayport
The committee’s report also recommends reducing by $15 million the Navy’s FY2012 request for
$84.36 million in MilCon funding for planning and design activities (page 472). Although the
Navy states that about $2 million of the $84.36 million requested for planning and design
activities is for establishing a CVN home port at Mayport, the committee’s recommended
reduction of $15 million appears to reflect a committee view that $15 million of the $84.36
million requested for planning and design activities is for work to facilitate the homeporting of a
CVN at Mayport.
The committee’s report states:
The committee recommends reduction or elimination of funding for several projects
contained in the budget request for military construction and family housing. These
reductions include:
(1) $14,998,000 for the Massey Avenue Corridor Improvements and
[2] $15,000,000 in Planning and Design for construction activities at Naval Station
Mayport, Florida.
The budget request included $14,998,000 to construct road improvements at Naval Station
Mayport, Florida, and $15,000,000 to support planning and design efforts to facilitate the
homeporting of a nuclear-powered aircraft carrier.
The committee notes that the Department of the Navy has located a variety of strategic assets
at one homeport for many years across the range of Navy assets to include aviation, surface,
and subsurface combatants. Furthermore, the committee notes that the Department of the
Navy has intentionally rejected the notion of strategic homeporting and has closed multiple
locations that were deemed strategic homeports through the Base Realignment and Closure
process. The committee believes that the Department of the Navy’s assertion that strategic
homeporting is required to maintain strategic access is inconsistent with previous naval
decisions. As to costs, the onetime construction costs to implement the Department of the
Navy’s recommendation exceeds $500.0 million, and the recurring costs include a
requirement to temporarily relocate nuclear capable shipyard workers from Norfolk,
Virginia, to Mayport, Florida, to complete nuclear maintenance requirements. The committee
believes that the overall costs to build a redundant carrier homeport do not appear to be in the
Government’s best interest.
Accordingly, the committee recommends no funds, a reduction of $29,998,000, for this
project. (Pages 277-278)
Senate (S. 1867)
As Reported
S. 1867, an original measure reported by Senator Levin on November 15, 2011, without written
report, in effect supersedes S. 1253 (see below). S. 1867 recommends approving the Navy’s
FY2012 request for $14.998 million in MilCon funding for the Massey Avenue Corridor
Improvements Project. (See Section 4501 of the bill. In the printed version of the bill, the relevant
table within this section appears on page 667.) The bill recommends reducing by $15 million the
Navy’s FY2012 request for $84.36 million in MilCon funding for planning and design activities.
(See Section 4501 of the bill. In the printed version of the bill, the relevant table within this
section appears on page 668.)
Congressional Research Service
26
Navy Nuclear Aircraft Carrier (CVN) Homeporting at Mayport
Floor Consideration
On November 30, 2011, as part of its consideration of S. 1867, the Senate adopted by unanimous
consent S.Amdt. 1210, which requires a Navy analysis of the costs and benefits of stationing
additional DDG-51 class destroyers at Mayport and a subsequent GAO assessment of the Navy
analysis. The text of S.Amdt. 1210 is as follows:
At the end of subtitle C of title X, add the following:
SEC. 1024. ASSESSMENT OF STATIONING OF ADDITIONAL DDG-51 CLASS
DESTROYERS AT NAVAL STATION MAYPORT, FLORIDA.
(a) Navy Assessment Required.—
(1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than one year after the date of the enactment of this Act, the
Secretary of the Navy shall conduct an analysis of the costs and benefits of stationing
additional DDG-51 class destroyers at Naval Station Mayport, Florida.
(2) ELEMENTS.—The analysis required by paragraph (1) shall include, at a minimum, the
following:
(A) Consideration of the negative effects on the ship repair industrial base at Naval Station
Mayport caused by the retirement of FFG-7 class frigates and the procurement delays of the
Littoral Combat Ship, including, in particular, the increase in costs (which would be passed
on to the taxpayer) of reconstituting the ship repair industrial base at Naval Station Mayport
following the projected drastic decrease in workload.
(B) Updated consideration of life extensions of FFG-7 class frigates in light of continued
delays in deliveries of the Littoral Combat Ship deliveries.
(C) Consideration of the possibility of bringing additional surface warships to Naval Station
Mayport for maintenance with the consequence of spreading the ship repair workload
appropriately amongst the various public and private shipyards and ensuring the long-term
health of the shipyard in Mayport.
(b) Comptroller General of the United States Assessment.—Not later than 120 days after the
submittal of the report required by subsection (a), the Comptroller General of the United
States shall submit to Congress an assessment by the Comptroller General of the report,
including a determination whether or not the report complies with applicable best practices.
Senate (S. 1253)
S. 1253 has been, in effect, superseded by S. 1867 (see above). S. 1253 as reported by the Senate
Armed Services Committee (S.Rept. 112-26 of June 22, 2011) recommends approving the Navy’s
FY2012 request for $14.998 million in MilCon funding for the Massey Avenue Corridor
Improvements Project and Navy’s FY2012 request for $84.36 million in MilCon funding for
planning and design activities. (See Section 4501 of the bill as reported by the committee. In the
printed version of the bill as reported by the committee, the relevant table within this section
appears on pages 651-652.)
The committee’s report states:
Congressional Research Service
27
Navy Nuclear Aircraft Carrier (CVN) Homeporting at Mayport
Comptroller General report on aircraft carrier homeporting on the East Coast
The committee directs the Comptroller General to conduct an independent analysis of
alternatives on the Department of the Navy’s plan to establish a second east coast homeport
for a nuclear-powered aircraft carrier. The analysis should assess, at a minimum, the
strategic, fiscal, and operational risks, requirements, and constraints the Navy’s plan seeks to
address. The committee directs that this report be provided to the congressional defense
committees by February 1, 2012. The report will be submitted in an unclassified format, with
the provision for a classified annex if necessary. (Page 241)
Conference
The conference report (H.Rept. 112-329 of December 12, 2011) on H.R. 1540/P.L. 112-81 of
December 31, 2011, recommends approving the Navy’s FY2012 request for $14.998 million in
MilCon funding for the Massey Avenue Corridor Improvements Project (page 952) and reducing
by $15 million the Navy’s FY2012 request for $84.36 million in MilCon funding for planning
and design activities (page 953). The report states:
The conferees determined that the Massey Avenue Corridor Improvements Project had merit
to support requirements at the Naval Station Mayport, Florida, whether or not a nuclear
powered aircraft carrier was home ported there. (Page 757)
Section 1017 of the conference report states:
SEC. 1017. ASSESSMENT OF STATIONING OF ADDITIONAL DDG-51 CLASS
DESTROYERS AT NAVAL STATION MAYPORT, FLORIDA.
(a) Navy Assessment Required-
(1) IN GENERAL- Not later than one year after the date of the enactment of this Act, the
Secretary of the Navy shall conduct an analysis of the costs and benefits of stationing
additional DDG-51 class destroyers at Naval Station Mayport, Florida.
(2) ELEMENTS- The analysis required by paragraph (1) shall include, at a minimum, the
following:
(A) Consideration of the negative effects on the ship repair industrial base at Naval Station
Mayport caused by the retirement of FFG-7 class frigates and the procurement delays of the
Littoral Combat Ship, including, in particular, the increase in costs (which would be passed
on to the taxpayer) of reconstituting the ship repair industrial base at Naval Station Mayport
following the projected drastic decrease in workload.
(B) Updated consideration of life extensions of FFG-7 class frigates in light of continued
delays in deliveries of the Littoral Combat Ship deliveries.
(C) Consideration of the possibility of bringing additional surface warships to Naval Station
Mayport for maintenance with the consequence of spreading the ship repair workload
appropriately amongst the various public and private shipyards and ensuring the long-term
health of the shipyard in Mayport.
(b) Comptroller General of the United States Assessment- Not later than 120 days after the
submittal of the report required by subsection (a), the Comptroller General of the United
Congressional Research Service
28
Navy Nuclear Aircraft Carrier (CVN) Homeporting at Mayport
States shall submit to Congress an assessment by the Comptroller General of the report,
including a determination whether or not the report complies with applicable best practices.
FY2012 Military Construction and Veterans Affairs and Related
Agencies Appropriations Act (H.R. 2055/P.L. 112-74)
House
The House Appropriations Committee, in its report (H.Rept. 112-94 of May 31, 2011) on H.R.
2055, recommends approving the Navy’s FY2012 request for $14.998 million in MilCon funding
for the Massey Avenue Corridor Improvements Project (page 74) and the Navy’s FY2012 request
for $84.36 million in MilCon funding for planning and design activities (page 86).
Senate
The Senate Appropriations Committee, in its report (S.Rept. 112-29 of June 30, 2011) on H.R.
2055, recommends approving the Navy’s FY2012 request for $14.998 million in MilCon funding
for the Massey Avenue Corridor Improvements Project (page 80) and the Navy’s FY2012 request
for $84.36 million in MilCon funding for planning and design activities (page 105).
Conference
In final action, H.R. 2055 became a “megabus” appropriations vehicle incorporating nine
appropriations bills, including the FY2012 Military Construction and Veterans Affairs and
Related Agencies Appropriations Act, which was incorporated as Division H. The conference
report (H.Rept. 112-331 of December 15, 2011) on H.R. 2055/P.L. 112-74 of December 23, 2011,
approves the Navy’s FY2012 request for $14.998 million in MilCon funding for the Massey
Avenue Corridor Improvements Project (page 1271) and the Navy’s FY2012 request for $84.36
million in MilCon funding for planning and design activities (page 1283).
Congressional Research Service
29
Navy Nuclear Aircraft Carrier (CVN) Homeporting at Mayport
Appendix A. Additional Background Information
from May 2010 GAO Report
This appendix reprints Appendix II from a May 2010 GAO report on the Navy’s basing decision
process.54
54 Government Accountability Office, Defense Infrastructure[:]Opportunities Exist to Improve the Navy’s Basing
Decision Process and DOD Oversight, GAO-10-482, May 2010. 36 pp.
Congressional Research Service
30
Navy Nuclear Aircraft Carrier (CVN) Homeporting at Mayport
Congressional Research Service
31
Navy Nuclear Aircraft Carrier (CVN) Homeporting at Mayport
Congressional Research Service
32
Navy Nuclear Aircraft Carrier (CVN) Homeporting at Mayport
Congressional Research Service
33
Navy Nuclear Aircraft Carrier (CVN) Homeporting at Mayport
Congressional Research Service
34
Navy Nuclear Aircraft Carrier (CVN) Homeporting at Mayport
Congressional Research Service
35
Navy Nuclear Aircraft Carrier (CVN) Homeporting at Mayport
Congressional Research Service
36
Navy Nuclear Aircraft Carrier (CVN) Homeporting at Mayport
Congressional Research Service
37
Navy Nuclear Aircraft Carrier (CVN) Homeporting at Mayport
Appendix B. Prior-Year Legislative Activity
FY2011
FY2011 Funding Request
Of the $120.05 million in funding requested by the Navy for FY2011 for MilCon planning and
design activities, about $2 million is for the project to establish a CVN home port at Mayport.55
FY2011 DOD and Full-Year Continuing Appropriations Act (H.R. 1473)
Section 2001 of Title X of Division B of the FY2011 Department of Defense and Full-Year
Continuing Appropriations Act (H.R. 1473 of the 112th Congress, introduced on April 11, 2011,
and passed by the House and Senate on April 14, 2011) provides $3,303.611 million for the
Military Construction, Navy and Marine Corps account, or $575.493 million less than the
requested figure of $3,879.104 million. The text of H.R. 1473 does not provide line-item funding
details for the military construction accounts.
FY2011 Military Construction, Veterans Affairs, and Related Agencies
Appropriations Bill (H.R. 5822/S. 3615)
House
The House Appropriations Committee, in its report (H.Rept. 111-559 of July 22, 2010) on H.R.
5822 of the 111th Congress, recommends $123.75 million—a $3.7-million increase to the Navy’s
FY2011 request—for MilCon planning and design activities (page 124). The report does not
discuss the issue of homeporting a CVN at Mayport.
Senate
The Senate Appropriations Committee, in its report (S.Rept. 111-226 of July 19, 2010) on S.
3615, recommends $124.148 million—a $4.098-million increase to the Navy’s FY2011 request—
for MilCon planning and design activities (page 102). The report does not discuss the issue of
homeporting a CVN at Mayport.
55 Source: Navy Office of Legislative Affairs telephone conversation with CRS on April 1, 2010. See also the spoken
testimony of Deputy Secretary of Defense William Lynn III at a March 4, 2010, hearing before the House Budget
Committee on DOD’s proposed FY2011 budget.
Congressional Research Service
38
Navy Nuclear Aircraft Carrier (CVN) Homeporting at Mayport
FY2011 Ike Skelton Defense Authorization Act (H.R. 6523/P.L. 111-383)
House (H.R. 5136)
Section 2201(c)(4) of the FY2011 defense authorization bill (H.R. 5136) as reported by the House
Armed Services Committee (H.Rept. 111-491 of May 21, 2010) states: “None of the funds
appropriated pursuant to this authorization of appropriations may be used for architectural and
engineering services and construction design of any military construction project necessary to
establish a homeport for a nuclear-powered aircraft carrier at Naval Station Mayport, Florida.”
H.Rept. 111-491 includes report language requiring the Navy and GAO to submit reports
concerning the costs and maintenance impacts of homeporting a CVN at Mayport.
H.Rept. 111-491 states:
East Coast Homeport Cost Assessment
The committee is concerned that the full costs associated with the planned second East coast
homeport for a nuclear-powered aircraft carrier has been underestimated, introducing a
measure of budgetary risk and potential shortfalls in future year’s defense budget
submissions. The committee directs that, not later than February 15, 2011, the Government
Accountability Office (GAO) submit to the congressional defense committees a report
containing an independent estimate of the total direct and indirect costs to be incurred by the
Federal Government in homeporting a nuclear carrier at Mayport, Florida. (Page 507)
The report also states:
Naval Station Mayport, Florida, Homeporting Alternatives
The committee directs the Secretary of the Navy to report to the congressional defense
committees, not later than December 15, 2010, on the implementation and recurring costs of
homeporting alternatives including the following homeporting options at Naval Station
Mayport:
(1) Nuclear-powered aircraft carrier;
(2) Littoral Combat Ships;
(3) Non-nuclear options considered in the “Environmental Impact Statement for
Homeporting of Additional Surface Ships at Naval Station Mayport” signed January 14,
2009; and
(4) Other options that the Secretary considers appropriate. Such a review shall include an
assessment of one-time and recurring operation and maintenance requirements and military
construction requirements associated with the various alternatives. This report shall review
the benefits to the northeast Florida ship maintenance industrial base that could result from
the homeporting of non-nuclear vessels at the installation.
The committee notes that the estimates for the costs of homeporting a nuclear aircraft carrier
at Naval Station Mayport continue to rise, and may cost as much as $1 billion in military
construction and recurring operation and maintenance costs.
The committee believes that a better assessment of these cost estimates of the various
alternatives is warranted. The committee also believes that a complement of non-nuclear-
Congressional Research Service
39
Navy Nuclear Aircraft Carrier (CVN) Homeporting at Mayport
powered surface combatants could be more compatible with the existing support structure at
Naval Station Mayport and less expensive than duplicating a nuclear maintenance capability
that already exists on the East Coast. The committee also notes that the northeast Florida ship
maintenance industrial base could be enhanced if the Department of the Navy were to base
non-nuclear-powered ships at Naval Station Mayport. Naval Station Mayport already has the
pier infrastructure necessary to homeport non-nuclear-powered surface combatant ships, and
the maintenance requirements of these alternative homeporting solutions appear to be more
closely matched to the expertise of the existing local ship repair industrial base.
Finally, the committee understands that a nuclear-powered aircraft carrier homeported at
Naval Station Mayport could undergo at the installation only two of the four types of
scheduled carrier maintenance availabilities: the Carrier Incremental Availability and the
Planned Incremental Availability. These activities would likely provide the local private
shipyards with combined yearly revenues of only approximately $20 million. Furthermore,
the Navy has indicated that the remaining two types of scheduled nuclear maintenance
availabilities can be conducted only in the Norfolk area, requiring a temporary shift in
homeport to Norfolk to complete these availabilities. The committee believes that such a
temporary shift in homeport could present an additional requirement on carrier crews and
their families that could be avoided if Naval Station Mayport were resourced with non-
nuclear-powered ships. (Pages 510-511)
The report also states:
Use of Temporary Shipyard Workforce for Nuclear Maintenance
According to the final environmental impact statement for the proposed homeporting of
additional surface ships at Naval Station Mayport, Florida, homeporting of a nuclear-
powered aircraft carrier (CVN) would result in “temporary surges of maintenance employees
associated with the three-year depot-level maintenance cycle for the CVN.” The committee
is concerned about the impact the addition of depot-level workload at Mayport would have
on the sustainability, efficiency, capabilities, and stability of the fly-away teams from the
nuclear propulsion depot maintenance workforce used under the Navy’s “One Nuclear
Shipyard” concept. The committee directs the Comptroller General of the United States to
provide an assessment to the congressional defense committees by February 15, 2011, of the
readiness and cost impacts of CVN homeporting and maintenance at Naval Station Mayport
on the U.S. nuclear power-plant depot maintenance workforce. (Page 254)
The report also states:
Ship Maintenance Industrial Base Support
The committee is concerned that the Navy’s recommendation to homeport a nuclear-powered
aircraft carrier (CVN) at Naval Station Mayport (NAVSTA Mayport), Florida, could result
in the relocation of a critical warfighting asset to a region that may lack the ship maintenance
industrial base necessary to meet the specialized repair, maintenance, and related readiness
requirements of a nuclear-powered aircraft carrier. Even though the Navy plans to build the
necessary facilities at considerable cost, no plan has been presented to address the lack of a
trained, highly skilled workforce necessary to staff those facilities and maintain these
complex systems. As a result, the committee understands that implementation of the Navy’s
recommendation would require maintenance teams from other nuclear-powered aircraft
carrier homeport locations to be sent to NAVSTA Mayport temporarily to support
maintenance requirements, potentially at significant additional cost.
Additionally, the committee is aware that the existing private ship maintenance assets
located in the Jacksonville, Florida, region has evolved to support the current fleet of non-
Congressional Research Service
40
Navy Nuclear Aircraft Carrier (CVN) Homeporting at Mayport
nuclear-powered ships at NAVSTA Mayport. Under current ship retirement plans, these
private ship maintenance capabilities will face severe work reductions, placing their
continued existence in jeopardy. The committee does not believe that placing a critical
warfighting asset at a location with inadequate maintenance support capabilities,
implementing a recommendation that could result in significantly increased ship
maintenance costs, or allowing the nation’s ship maintenance industrial base to erode are
acceptable outcomes.
Therefore, the committee directs the Secretary of the Navy to provide a report to the
congressional defense committees by December 15, 2010, on the ability of the private ship
maintenance industrial base in northeast Florida to support nuclear-powered aircraft carrier
maintenance requirements, the likely costs to the Navy that could result from establishing
such maintenance capabilities within the local industrial base, and the impacts on costs and
workforce scheduling that could result if the Navy must provide the maintenance workforce
from another nuclear-powered aircraft carrier homeport location. In addition, the Secretary is
directed to submit a copy of the report to the Comptroller General of the United States
concurrent with submission to the congressional defense committees.
The committee directs the Comptroller General to provide an assessment of the report to the
congressional defense committees within 90 days after receiving the report by the Secretary
of the Navy. The assessment should:
(1) Review the Navy’s report for thoroughness and completeness;
(2) Assess the ability of the northeast Florida industrial base to develop capabilities to
support nuclear-powered aircraft carrier maintenance requirements;
(3) Assess how, over a 10-year budget window, the construction of CVN maintenance
facilities at NAVSTA Mayport will affect CVN maintenance costs, including recurring and
non-recurring costs; and
(4) Assess whether homeporting a nuclear-powered aircraft carrier at NAVSTA Mayport
would provide sufficient workload to allow the local ship repair industrial base to remain
viable in light of current ship retirement plans. (Pages 260-261)
Senate (S. 3454)
The FY2011 defense authorization bill (S. 3454) as reported by the Senate Armed Services
Committee (S.Rept. 111-201 of June 4, 2010) does not contain a provision similar to Section
2201(c)(4) of H.R. 5136 as reported by the House Armed Services Committee (see above).
S.Rept. 111-201 does not discuss the issue of homeporting a CVN at Mayport.
Final Version (H.R. 6523/P.L. 111-383)
The joint explanatory statement of the House and Senate Armed Services Committees on H.R.
6523/P.L. 111-383 of January 7, 2011, stated:
The House bill contained a provision (sec. 2201) that would authorize appropriations for the
active component military construction and family housing projects of the Navy and Marine
Corps for fiscal year 2011. This provision would also provide an overall limitation on the
cost of the fiscal year 2011 military construction and family housing projects authorized for
the active-duty component of the Navy and Marine Corps.
Congressional Research Service
41
Navy Nuclear Aircraft Carrier (CVN) Homeporting at Mayport
The Senate committee-reported bill contained a similar provision (sec. 2204).
The agreement includes the House provision with an amendment deleting a restriction on
architectural and engineering services and design funds. While the agreement imposes no
restrictions on architectural and engineering services and construction design funds, such
restrictions may be warranted in the future. The lack of restriction in this agreement for such
funds to establish a homeport for a nuclear-powered aircraft carrier at Naval Station
Mayport, Florida, should not imply a position either for or against homeporting. Such a
position will be determined should military construction projects be included in future
budget submissions. We will review carefully any such projects that may be included in
future budget requests, while closely examining evolving military construction cost estimates
needed to achieve this capability.
FY2010
FY2010 Military Construction Funding Request
The Navy’s proposed FY2010 budget requested $46.303 million in Military Construction
(MilCon) funding for channel dredging at Mayport to support the ability of a CVN to enter
Mayport. The budget also requested $29.682 million in MilCon funding to repair a wharf (Wharf
Charlie) at Mayport, but this request was not related to Mayport’s ability to support a CVN—it
was related to Mayport’s current role as a home port to CGs, DDGs, and FFGs. Together, a total
of $75.985 million was requested for channel dredging (CVN-related) and wharf repair (not
CVN-related) at Mayport.
FY2010 Defense Authorization Act (H.R. 2647/P.L. 111-84)
House
The House Armed Services Committee, in its report (H.Rept. 111-166 of June 18, 2009) on H.R.
2647, recommended rejecting the Administration’s FY2010 request for $46.3 million in MilCon
funding for channel dredging at Mayport. (Page 496) The committee’s report stated:
The budget request included $46,303,000 to support construction dredging of the Naval
Station Mayport turning basin, inner channel, and outer channel.
The committee is concerned that a decision to complete the construction dredging of Naval
Station Mayport would predispose a Quadrennial Defense Review’s determination as to an
East Coast Nuclear Aircraft Carrier basing.
Accordingly, the committee recommends $0, a reduction of $46,303,000, to support this
project. (Page 516).
The committee’s report also stated:
Comptroller General Assessment of Military Basing Decision Process
The committee directs the Comptroller General of the United States to submit a report to the
congressional defense committees by May 1, 2010, on the military services’ decision process
used in making basing determinations, such as the decision to establish a second homeport
Congressional Research Service
42
Navy Nuclear Aircraft Carrier (CVN) Homeporting at Mayport
for a nuclear-powered aircraft carrier on the East Coast of the United States. The committee
believes this decision raises significant strategic, cost, and risk questions.
It is not clear to the committee how the Navy has been determining its basing decisions. For
example, the Navy’s consideration of whether to homeport additional surface ships at Naval
Station Mayport (NAVSTA Mayport), Florida, appears to lack strategic depth. The
committee notes that homeporting a nuclear aircraft carrier at NAVSTA Mayport would cost
at least $560.0 million in military construction, require the dredging and disposal of
approximately 5.2 million cubic yards of dredge material, and increase long-term operation
and maintenance costs. The Navy does not appear to have carried out a comprehensive
process to determine the need for such expenditures with consideration for strategic
rationale, fiscal realities, environmental impacts, and personnel impacts associated with the
decision.
In light of the substantial costs and the strategic and community impacts that result from
basing decisions, the committee directs the Comptroller General to conduct a study on the
manner in which the military services consider and utilize the following in making basing
decisions: changes to military force structure, strategic imperative and risk assessment, input
from combatant commanders, cost, and environmental and socio-economic impacts.
Specifically, the review should address the following:
(1) Military force structure considerations: When rebasing military assets from one
installation to another, the processes the military services use to assess the impact
associated with the current and future home stations or homeports.
(2) Strategic imperative and risk assessment: The extent to which the military services
consider strategic shifts in force posture, such as the shift of naval assets from the
Atlantic Ocean to the Pacific Ocean, in basing decisions. When making basing decisions
related to strategic dispersal of military assets, the process used by the services to
conduct and consider risk assessments. In making the nuclear aircraft carrier
homeporting decision, how the Navy weighed the comparative risk between the
different needs of the Navy. For example, the consideration the Navy gave to building
an additional nuclear aircraft carrier homeport at Naval Station Mayport versus failing
to meet ship maintenance and repair shortfalls, or the need for a 313–ship Navy.
(3) Cost: The extent to which the military services use a cost-benefit analysis in making
basing decisions and the extent to which the budgetary requirements of the entire
military service and Department of Defense are considered; the consideration given in
the decision-making process to shortfalls in other service budgets and other internal
budget accounts; and how the services’ analyses compare the strategic benefits of
expending funds for one purpose (such as the construction of additional infrastructure)
to the use of funds for other purposes (such as meeting unfunded procurement
requirements) in determining whether to proceed with a decision. (Pages 537-538)
Senate
Section 2201 of the FY2010 defense authorization bill (S. 1390) as reported by the Senate Armed
Services Committee (S.Rept. 111-35 of July 2, 2009) recommended approving the
Administration’s FY2010 request for a total of $75.985 million for MilCon projects (including
the channel dredging project) at Mayport. (See page 753 of the printed bill.) The committee’s
report did not contain any narrative language directly discussing the issue of carrier homeporting
at Mayport.
Congressional Research Service
43
Navy Nuclear Aircraft Carrier (CVN) Homeporting at Mayport
Section 114 of S. 1390 would require the Navy to submit a report to the congressional defense
committees on a potential service life extension program (SLEP) for the Navy’s Oliver Hazard
Perry (FFG-7) class frigates. FFG-7s account for several of the surface combatants currently
homeported at Mayport, and the FFG-7s homeported at Mayport are currently scheduled to be
retired from Navy service by 2014. The text of Section 114 is as follows:
SEC. 114. REPORT ON A SERVICE LIFE EXTENSION PROGRAM FOR OLIVER
HAZARD PERRY CLASS FRIGATES.
Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of the Navy
shall submit to the congressional defense committees a report setting forth the following:
(1) A detailed analysis of a service life extension program (SLEP) for the Oliver Hazard
Perry class frigates (FFGs), including—
(A) the cost of the program;
(B) a schedule for the program; and
(C) the shipyards available to carry out the work under the program.
(2) A detailed plan of the Navy for achieving a 313-ship fleet as contemplated by the 2006
Quadrennial Defense Review, including a comparison for purposes of that plan of
decommissioning Oliver Hazard Perry class frigates as scheduled with extending the service
life of such frigates under the service life extension program.
(3) The strategic plan of the Navy for the manner in which the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS)
will fulfill the roles and missions currently performed by the Oliver Hazard Perry class
frigates as they are decommissioned.
(4) The strategic plan of the Navy for the Littoral Combat Ship if the extension of the service
life of the Oliver Hazard Perry class frigates alleviates demand arising under the current
capabilities gap in the Littoral Combat Ship.
(5) A description of the manner in which the Navy has met the needs of the United States
Southern Command over time, including the assets and vessels the Navy has deployed for
military-to-military engagements, UNITAS exercises, and counterdrug operations in support
of the Commander of the United States Southern Command during the five-year period
ending on the date of the report.
Section 112 of S. 1390 would require the Navy to submit a report to the congressional defense
committees on the Navy’s plans for homeporting Littoral Combat Ships (LCSs). Under current
Navy plans, LCSs are to replace Oliver Hazard Perry (FFG-7) class frigates in the Navy’s force
structure. The text of Section 112 is as follows:
SEC. 112. REPORT ON STRATEGIC PLAN FOR HOMEPORTING THE LITTORAL
COMBAT SHIP.
(a) Report Required- Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the
Secretary of the Navy shall submit to the congressional defense committees a report setting
forth the strategic plan of the Navy for homeporting the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) on the
East Coast and West Coast of the United States.
(b) Elements- The report required by subsection (a) shall include the following:
Congressional Research Service
44
Navy Nuclear Aircraft Carrier (CVN) Homeporting at Mayport
(1) The requirements for homeporting of the Littoral Combat ship of the commanders of the
combatant commands, set forth by geographic area of responsibility (AOR).
(2) A description of the manner in which the Navy will meet the requirements identified
under paragraph (1).
(3) An assessment of the effect of each type of Littoral Combat Ship on each port in which
such ship could be homeported.
(4) A map, based on the current plan of 55 Littoral Combat Ships, identifying where each
ship will homeport and how such ports will accommodate both types of Littoral Combat
Ships, based on the current program and a 313-ship Navy.
(5) An estimate of the costs of infrastructure required for Littoral Combat Ships at each
homeport, including—
(A) existing infrastructure; and
(B) such upgraded infrastructure as may be required.
Conference
The conference report (H.Rept. 111-288 of October 7, 2009) on H.R. 2647/P.L. 111-84 of October
28, 2009, authorized the Administration’s FY2010 request for $46.3 million in MilCon funding
for channel dredging at Mayport. (Page 633) The report states:
The conference agreement includes authorization for $46.3 million for channel and turning
basin dredging at Naval Station (NS) Mayport, Florida. The Navy requested this project in
order to allow a nuclear aircraft carrier to enter Naval Station Mayport on a temporary basis
with an embarked air wing, full stores, and under any tidal conditions. The conferees
authorize funding for this project based on the Secretary of the Navy and Chief of Naval
Operations’ assurances that the dredging is needed for current operational considerations to
permit the use of Mayport as a transient dock and is ‘‘required irrespective of the final
decision on aircraft carrier homeporting at Mayport.’’
The conferees emphasize that the inclusion of an authorization for dredging at NS Mayport is
not an indication of conferee support for the establishment of an additional homeport for
nuclear aircraft carriers on the east coast, or intended to influence the ongoing Quadrennial
Defense Review, which may include a recommendation on the establishment of a second
east coast homeport for nuclear aircraft carriers. Furthermore, the conferees note that this
funding is provided solely to permit use of Mayport as a transient port, and that any potential
designation of Mayport as a nuclear carrier homeport will require future authorizations from
the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives. (Page
870)
Section 127 required the Navy to submit a report to the congressional defense committees on a
potential service life extension program (SLEP) for the Navy’s Oliver Hazard Perry (FFG-7) class
frigates. FFG-7s account for several of the surface combatants currently homeported at Mayport,
and the FFG-7s homeported at Mayport are currently scheduled to be retired from Navy service
by 2014. The text of Section 127 is as follows:
SEC. 127. REPORT ON A SERVICE LIFE EXTENSION PROGRAM FOR OLIVER
HAZARD PERRY CLASS FRIGATES.
Congressional Research Service
45
Navy Nuclear Aircraft Carrier (CVN) Homeporting at Mayport
Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of the Navy
shall submit to the congressional defense committees a report setting forth the following:
(1) A detailed analysis of a service life extension program for the Oliver Hazard Perry class
frigates, including—
(A) the cost of the program;
(B) a notional schedule for the program; and
(C) the shipyards available to carry out the work under the program.
(2) The strategic plan of the Navy for—
(A) the manner in which the Littoral Combat Ship will fulfill the roles and missions currently
performed by the Oliver Hazard Perry class frigates as such frigates are decommissioned;
and
(B) the year-by-year planned commissioning of Littoral Combat Ships and planned
decommissioning of Oliver Hazard Perry class frigates through the projected service life of
the Oliver Hazard Perry class frigates.
(3) An analysis of the necessary procurement rates of Littoral Combat Ships if the extension
of the service life of the Oliver Hazard Perry class frigates alleviates capability gaps caused
by a delay in the procurement rates of Littoral Combat Ships.
(4) A description of the manner in which the Navy has met the requirements of the United
States Southern Command over time, including the assets and vessels the Navy has deployed
for military-to-military engagements, UNITAS exercises, and counterdrug operations in
support of the Commander of the United States Southern Command during the five-year
period ending on the date of the report.
Section 123 of the bill required the Navy to submit a report to the congressional defense
committees on the Navy’s plans for homeporting Littoral Combat Ships (LCSs). Under current
Navy plans, LCSs are to replace Oliver Hazard Perry (FFG-7) class frigates in the Navy’s force
structure. The text of Section 123 is as follows:
SEC. 123. REPORT ON STRATEGIC PLAN FOR HOMEPORTING THE LITTORAL
COMBAT SHIP.
(a) REPORT REQUIRED.—At the same time that the budget is submitted under section
1105(a) of title 31, United States Code, for fiscal year 2011, the Secretary of the Navy shall
submit to the congressional defense committees a report setting forth the strategic plan of the
Navy for homeporting the Littoral Combat Ship on the east coast and west coast of the
United States.
(b) ELEMENTS.—The report required by subsection (a) shall include the following:
(1) An analysis of how the homeporting plan would support the requirements of the
commanders of the combatant commands, by geographic area of responsibility, for the
capabilities delivered by Littoral Combat Ships, including the notional transit times to the
various geographic areas of responsibility.
Congressional Research Service
46
Navy Nuclear Aircraft Carrier (CVN) Homeporting at Mayport
(2) An assessment of the effect that each type of Littoral Combat Ship would have on each
port in which such ship could be homeported, including an identification of the infrastructure
required to support each such ship with respect to—
(A) the availability of pier space with supporting ship services infrastructure, taking into
account the largest fleet size envisioned by the long-term plan for the construction of naval
vessels submitted for fiscal year 2011;
(B) the logistical and maintenance support services required in any port chosen for the
Littoral Combat Ships; and
(C) any investment in naval station infrastructure required for homeporting Littoral Combat
Ships (including a plan for such investment).
(3) With respect to the projected force structure size of the Navy in fiscal year 2020, a
graphical depiction of the total planned ships berthing in the pier areas of any naval facility
chosen to homeport Littoral Combat Ships, including the identification of the ships berthing
plan for the maximum number of ships expected in-port at any one time.
The report required by Section 123 was submitted to Congress in February 2010.
FY2010 Military Construction and Veterans Affairs Appropriations Act (H.R.
3082/H.R. 3288/P.L. 111-117)
House
The House Appropriations Committee, in its report (H.Rept. 111-188 of June 26, 2009) on H.R.
3082, recommended approving the Administration’s FY2010 request for $46.3 million in MilCon
funding for channel dredging at Mayport. (Page 107)
Senate
The Senate Appropriations Committee, in its report (S.Rept. 111-40 of July 7, 2009) on the
FY2010 military construction and veterans affairs appropriations bill (S. 1407), recommended
approving the Administration’s FY2010 request for $46.3 million in MilCon funding for channel
dredging at Mayport. (Page 88)
Conference
H.R. 3082 was incorporated as Division E of H.R. 3288/P.L. 111-117 of December 16, 2009, a
bill that became a consolidated appropriations act. The conference report (H.Rept. 111-366 of
December 8, 2009) on H.R. 3288/P.L. 111-117 approved the Administration’s FY2010 request for
$46.3 million in MilCon funding for channel dredging at Mayport. (Page 1410)
Congressional Research Service
47
Navy Nuclear Aircraft Carrier (CVN) Homeporting at Mayport
FY2009
FY2009 Duncan Hunter Defense Authorization Act (S. 3001/P.L. 110-417)
Section 2207 of the FY2009 defense authorization bill as passed by the House (H.R. 5658;
H.Rept. 110-652 of May 16, 2008) stated:
SEC. 2207. REPORT ON IMPACTS OF SURFACE SHIP HOMEPORTING
ALTERNATIVES.
(a) Report Required- The Secretary of the Navy shall not issue a record of decision for the
proposed action of homeporting additional surface ships at Naval Station Mayport, Florida,
until at least 30 days after the date on which the Secretary submits to Congress a report
containing an analysis of the socio-economic impacts and an economic justification on each
location from which a vessel is proposed to be removed for homeporting at Naval Station
Mayport under the preferred alternative identified in the final environmental impact
statement for the proposed action.
(b) Additional Reporting Requirement- If the final environmental impact statement does not
contain a preferred alternative or if the Secretary intends to select an alternative other than
the preferred alternative in the record of decision, then the Secretary shall submit to Congress
a report (in the case where no preferred alternative is identified) or an additional report (in
the case where the preferred alternative is not selected) containing an analysis of the socio-
economic impacts and an economic justification on each location from which a vessel is
proposed to be removed for homeporting at Naval Station Mayport.
The FY2009 defense authorization bill as passed by the Senate (S. 3001; S.Rept. 110-335 of May
12, 2008) did not contain a provision similar to Section 2207 of H.R. 5658.
In lieu of a conference report, there was compromise version of S. 3001 that was accompanied by
a joint explanatory statement. The compromise version of S. 3001, which was signed into law as
P.L. 110-417 of October 14, 2008, did not contain a provision similar to Section 2207 of H.R.
5658.
FY2008
FY2008 Defense Authorization Act (H.R. 4986/P.L. 110-181)
The House Armed Services Committee, in its report (H.Rept. 110-146 of May 11, 2007) on the
FY2008 defense authorization bill (H.R. 1585), stated:
Carrier Basing
The committee understands that the Navy has unused capacity at Naval Station Mayport,
Florida, and is conducting an environmental impact statement on the feasibility of stationing
additional surface ships, including a nuclear aircraft carrier, at Naval Station Mayport. The
committee believes that Naval Station Mayport is an important defense asset that should be
fully utilized. The committee is concerned that Naval Station Mayport has not previously
served as homeport for a nuclear carrier and does not contain the considerable specialized
infrastructure necessary to sustain and maintain such a vessel. Therefore, before the
Secretary of the Navy recommends the stationing of a nuclear carrier at Naval Station
Congressional Research Service
48
Navy Nuclear Aircraft Carrier (CVN) Homeporting at Mayport
Mayport, the committee directs the Secretary to determine the full range of costs associated
with the construction of nuclear infrastructure and port improvements at Naval Station
Mayport necessary to support a nuclear carrier, including a detailed assessment of alternative
sites, and submit the results of this analysis to the congressional defense committees by
October 1, 2007. (Page 518)
FY2008 Military Construction, Veteran Affairs, and Related Agencies
Appropriations Act (H.R. 2764/P.L. 110-161)
The House Appropriations Committee, in its report (H.Rept. 110-186 of June 11, 2007) on H.R.
2642, which at that point was the FY2008 military construction, veteran affairs, and related
agencies appropriations bill, stated:
Carrier Homeporting.—The Committee understands that it is the Navy’s publicly stated
policy to maintain two nuclear carrier-capable homeports on the east coast. The Committee
further understands that the Navy is in the process of drafting an environmental impact
statement (EIS) that includes the evaluation of the necessary infrastructure and dredging
required to make Naval Station Mayport the second such homeport in addition to Naval
Station Norfolk, and that a draft EIS will be released in early 2008. The Committee directs
the Navy to provide a report to the Committee identifying the military construction
requirements and an estimated timetable for completion for making Mayport a nuclear
carrier-capable homeport no later than 30 days after release of the draft EIS. (Page 17)
H.R. 2642 later became the FY2008 supplemental appropriations act (P.L. 110-252 of June 30,
2008). The FY2008 military construction, veteran affairs, and related agencies appropriations bill
was eventually enacted as part of the FY2008 consolidated appropriations act (H.R. 2764/P.L.
110-161 of December 26, 2007).
FY2007
FY2007 John Warner Defense Authorization Act (H.R. 5122/P.L. 109-364)
The Senate Armed Services Committee, in its report (S.Rept. 109-254 of May 9, 2006) on the
FY2007 defense authorization bill (S. 2766), stated:
The committee maintains its concern, expressed in the Senate report accompanying S. 1042
(S.Rept. 109-69) of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006, regarding
the declining size of the naval force and the reduction to the number of aircraft carriers. The
committee agrees, however, with the Navy’s determination that it is not feasible to maintain
12 operational aircraft carriers by restoring the USS John F. Kennedy (CV–67) to a
deployable, fully mission-capable platform. The committee believes that it is vital to the
national security of the United States that a fleet of at least 11 aircraft carriers be maintained
to support the National Military Strategy, and has taken extraordinary action to support the
CNO’s force structure plan by authorizing increased procurement for shipbuilding and,
specific to aircraft carriers, by authorizing additional advance procurement and incremental
funding for the construction of the first 3 CVN–21 class aircraft carriers.
Further, recognizing the increased need for timeliness of surge operations that today’s
smaller force structure places on the Fleet Response Plan, the committee reaffirms the
judgment that the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Clark, provided in testimony before
Congressional Research Service
49
Navy Nuclear Aircraft Carrier (CVN) Homeporting at Mayport
the Committee on Armed Services in February 2005, that the Atlantic Fleet should continue
to be dispersed in two homeports. (Page 380)
S.Rept. 109-254 also presented additional views of Senator Bill Nelson relating to the
homeporting of aircraft carriers on the Atlantic Coast. (See pages 528-529)
The conference report (H.Rept. 109-702 of September 29, 2006) on the FY2007 defense
authorization bill (H.R. 5122) stated:
The conferees agree with the CNO statement in his letter dated August 14, 2006, to the
Ranking Member of the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate, that ‘‘Naval Station
Mayport and the many resources of the Jacksonville area remain vitally important to Navy
readiness,’’ and support the CNO commitment ‘‘to maintaining the infrastructure necessary
to support the strategic dispersal of the Atlantic Fleet at this key east coast port.’’ (Page 805)
Congressional Research Service
50
Navy Nuclear Aircraft Carrier (CVN) Homeporting at Mayport
Appendix C. Excerpts from January 2009 Navy
Record of Decision (ROD)
This appendix presents excerpts from the January 2009 Navy Record of Decision (ROD)
document announcing the Navy’s desire to transfer a CVN to Mayport. The document stated in
part:
SUMMARY: The Department of the Navy (DON), after carefully weighing the strategic,
operational, and environmental consequences of the proposed action, announces its decision
to homeport one nuclear-powered aircraft carrier (CVN) at Naval Station (NAVSTA)
Mayport. Today’s decision does not relocate a specific CVN to NAVSTA Mayport. It does
initiate a multiyear process for developing operational, maintenance, and support facilities at
NAVSTA Mayport to support homeporting of one CVN. This multiyear process includes
implementing projects for dredging and dredged material disposal, construction of CVN
nuclear propulsion plant maintenance facilities, wharf improvements, transportation
improvements, and construction of a parking structure to replace existing parking that would
be displaced by development of the CVN nuclear propulsion plant maintenance facilities.
The projects necessary to create the capacity to support CVN homeporting could be
completed as early as 2014.56 No CVN homeport change will occur before operational,
maintenance, and support facility projects are completed. Selection of the CVN to be
homeported at NAVSTA Mayport would not occur until approximately one year prior to the
ship’s transfer to NAVSTA Mayport. Selection of a specific CVN for homeporting at
NAVSTA Mayport will be based upon then current operational needs, strategic
considerations, and maintenance cycles.
The DON decision to utilize the capacity at NAVSTA Mayport to homeport a CVN is the
culmination of a two and a half year process involving environmental analysis under the
National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), identification of the recurring and nonrecurring
costs associated with homeporting surface ships at NAVSTA Mayport, and an assessment of
strategic concerns.
The DON environmental analysis included extensive studies regarding impacts associated
with dredging, facility construction, and homeport operations. The environmental analysis
undertaken by the DON included lengthy and detailed consultations with regulatory
agencies, such as the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (USFWS) and the National Marine
Fisheries Service (NMFS), regarding impacts to endangered and threatened species, and the
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
regarding dredging operations and the in-water disposal of dredged materials. Public
awareness and participation were integral components of the Environmental Impact
Statement (EIS) process. The DON ensured that members of the public, state agencies, and
federal agencies had the opportunity to help define the scope of the DON’s analysis as well
as examine and consider the studies undertaken by the DON. Public review and comment on
the DON’s interpretation of those studies and the conclusions drawn from the DON’s
interpretation of associated data were robust.
The decision reached by the DON, as further explained later in this Record of Decision, is
based upon the DON’s environmental, operational, and strategic expertise and represents the
56 As mentioned earlier, this “as early as” date may have been pushed back by DOD’s announcement to delay a final
decision on whether to propose transferring a CVN to Mayport until it reviews the issue as part of its 2009-2010
Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR).
Congressional Research Service
51
Navy Nuclear Aircraft Carrier (CVN) Homeporting at Mayport
best military judgment of the DON’s leadership. The need to develop a hedge against the
potentially crippling results of a catastrophic event was ultimately the determining factor in
this decision-making process. The consolidation of CVN capabilities in the Hampton Roads
area on the East Coast presents a unique set of risks. CVNs assigned to the West Coast are
spread among three homeports. Maintenance and repair infrastructure exists at three
locations as well. As a result, there are strategic options available to Pacific Fleet CVNs
should a catastrophic event occur. By contrast, NAVSTA Norfolk is homeport to all five of
the CVNs assigned to the Atlantic Fleet and the Hampton Roads area is the only East Coast
location where CVN maintenance and repair infrastructure exists. It is the only location in
the U.S. capable of CVN construction and refueling. The Hampton Roads area also houses
all Atlantic Fleet CVN trained crews and associated community support infrastructure. There
are no strategic options available outside the Hampton Roads area for Atlantic Fleet CVNs
should a catastrophic event occur....
ALTERNATIVES CONSIDERED: The Draft and Final EIS assessed the impacts of 12
action alternatives and the no action alternative. Consistent with the purpose and need for the
proposed action, the alternatives addressed only options for utilizing capacities at NAVSTA
Mayport for homeporting additional surface ships. Examination of homeporting options at
other geographic locations was not relevant to the established purpose and need, so no such
alternatives were considered. The 12 action alternatives evaluated a broad range of options
for homeporting surface ships at NAVSTA Mayport. The alternatives included ship types
currently homeported at NAVSTA Mayport: destroyers (DDGs), and frigates (FFGs), as well
as additional types of ships identified by the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO), including
amphibious assault ships (LHDs), amphibious transport dock ships (LPDs), dock landing
ships (LSDs), and a CVN.
In the Final EIS, the DON identified Alternative 4, as the Preferred Alternative. Alternative 4
involves homeporting one CVN at NAVSTA Mayport and included dredging, infrastructure
and wharf improvements, on-station road and parking improvements, and construction of
CVN nuclear propulsion plant maintenance facilities at NAVSTA Mayport. Factors that
influenced selection of Alternative 4 as the Preferred Alternative included impact analyses in
the EIS, estimated costs of implementation, including military construction and other
operation and sustainment costs, and strategic considerations.
Regulations implementing NEPA require the identification of the environmentally preferred
alternative. The environmentally preferred alternative for this EIS is Alternative 2,
homeporting two LHDs at NAVSTA Mayport. LHD homeporting would require no dredging
or other major construction activities compared to dredging and construction activities
required to implement the Preferred Alternative to homeport a single CVN. As such, the
Preferred Alternative (Alternative 4) would have greater environmental impact than the
environmentally preferred alternative (Alternative 2) on earth resources, water resources, air
quality, noise, biological resources, and utilities. While the environmentally preferred
alternative would have less environmental impact than the Preferred Alternative, it does not
address strategic concerns or reduce risks to critical Atlantic Fleet assets and infrastructure.
ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACTS: The EIS analyzed environmental impacts and the
potential magnitude of those impacts relative to the following categories of environmental
resources: earth resources, land and offshore use, water resources, air quality, noise,
biological resources, cultural resources, traffic, socioeconomics, general services, utilities,
and environmental health and safety. Analysis of these categories also included the
radiological aspects of CVN homeporting. Only environmental impacts to NAVSTA
Mayport and the project area were evaluated. There were no environmental impacts to the
human environment outside of NAVSTA Mayport and the project area that were interrelated
to the natural or physical environmental effects of the proposed action.
Congressional Research Service
52
Navy Nuclear Aircraft Carrier (CVN) Homeporting at Mayport
The environmental impact of implementing each alternative was evaluated against the 2006
baseline. The baseline year 2006 best represents recent and historical operations at NAVSTA
Mayport, and 2014 represents the end-state year by which all alternatives evaluated in the
EIS could be implemented. Many impacts were found to be common among the
alternatives....
DECISION: After considering the environmental impacts analyzed in the EIS, the recurring
and nonrecurring costs associated with homeporting additional surface ships at NAVSTA
Mayport, and strategic implications of a second CVN homeport on the East Coast to support
the Atlantic Fleet, the DON elected to implement Alternative 4, the Preferred Alternative.
That alternative provides for homeporting one CVN at Naval Station (NAVSTA) Mayport.
The DON decision does not immediately relocate a specific CVN to NAVSTA Mayport. It
does initiate a multiyear process for developing operational, maintenance, and support
facilities at NAVSTA Mayport to support homeporting of one CVN. This multiyear process
includes implementing projects for dredging and dredged material disposal, construction of
CVN nuclear propulsion plant maintenance facilities, wharf improvements, transportation
improvements, and construction of a parking structure to replace existing parking that would
be displaced by development of the CVN nuclear propulsion plant maintenance facilities.
The projects necessary to create the capacity to support CVN homeporting could be
completed as early as 2014.
No CVN homeport change will occur before operational, maintenance, and support facility
projects are completed. Selection of the CVN to be homeported at NAVSTA Mayport would
not occur until approximately one year prior to the ship’s transfer to NAVSTA Mayport.
Selection of a specific CVN for homeporting at NAVSTA Mayport will be based upon then
current operational needs, strategic considerations, and maintenance cycles.
The most critical considerations in the DON’s decision-making process were the
environmental impacts associated with the action, recurring and nonrecurring costs
associated with changes in surface ship homeporting options, and strategic dispersal
considerations. The need to develop a hedge against the potentially crippling results of a
catastrophic event was ultimately the determining factor in this decision-making process.
The consolidation of CVN capabilities in the Hampton Roads area on the East Coast presents
a unique set of risks. CVNs assigned to the West Coast are spread among three homeports.
Maintenance and repair infrastructure exists at three locations as well. As a result, there are
strategic options available to Pacific Fleet CVNs if a catastrophic event occurred. By
contrast, NAVSTA Norfolk is homeport to all five of the CVNs assigned to the Atlantic
Fleet and the Hampton Roads area is the only East Coast location where CVN maintenance
and repair infrastructure exists. It is the only location in the U.S. capable of CVN
construction and refueling. The Hampton Roads area also houses all Atlantic Fleet CVN
trained crews and associated community support infrastructure. There are no strategic
options available outside the Hampton Roads area for Atlantic Fleet CVNs if a catastrophic
event occurred.
Environmental impacts: Environmental impacts were identified through studies and data
collection efforts. The information culled from the studies and collected data was assessed
and conclusions were drawn regarding the significance of environmental impacts. These
conclusions, along with the underlying studies and data, were the subject of discussions and
consultations with federal/state regulators over the course of the EIS process. This
interagency process led to identification of mitigation measures, where appropriate, to
address environmental impacts. Based on these consultations with regulators and their
subject matter experts, the DON has committed to implementation of specific mitigation
measures as outlined earlier in this Record of Decision. There are no environmental impacts
associated with homeporting a CVN at NAVSTA Mayport that cannot be appropriately
Congressional Research Service
53
Navy Nuclear Aircraft Carrier (CVN) Homeporting at Mayport
addressed or mitigated, including impacts to endangered species such as the NARW, Florida
Manatee, and sea turtles.
Recurring and nonrecurring costs: The DON’s analysis and assessment of socioeconomic
impacts in the EIS associated with the range of alternatives addressed short-term and long-
term local economic impacts in the Mayport area. In addition to the socioeconomic impacts
considered in the EIS, recurring and onetime costs associated with changes to surface ship
homeporting were projected and considered in the DON’s decisionmaking process.
Recurring and nonrecurring costs for the preferred alternative are less than 10% of the cost of
a single CVN and less than 1% of the cost of the DON’s CVN assets. That investment in
homeport capacity at NAVSTA Mayport provides additional security for CVN assets and
enhances the DON’s ability to maintain its effectiveness at a time when the ability to address
contingencies and respond to the unexpected is essential. In terms of risk mitigation, DON
gains a dispersal capability and its benefits at a fraction of the cost of an aircraft carrier.
Recurring costs included costs associated with Sustainment, Restoration, and Modernization
(SRM), Base Operations Support (BOS) , training, air wing transportation, nuclear
maintenance labor, and Basic Allowance for Housing (BAH) for Sailors and their families.
Sustainment costs are for activities necessary to keep facilities in good condition and
therefore enable them to achieve their intended useful life. Restoration and Modernization
costs are life-cycle investments required to provide for recapitalized facilities that support
new missions, return facilities to good condition, and improve facilities beyond original
conditions or capabilities. BOS costs included Facilities Operations costs such as Utilities,
Facility Services, Facility Management, and Fire and Emergency Services.
Onetime costs included costs associated with MILCON projects (construction and Planning
and Design), onetime maintenance costs for management and Industrial Plant Equipment
(IPE) costs, and Permanent Change of Station (PCS) associated with the initial CVN
homeport assignment at NAVSTA Mayport. PCS costs are those costs associated with
moving the ship’s crew and dependents to NAVSTA Mayport. PCS costs were estimated
costs because the location from which crews and their families would be moved remains
undetermined.
Strategic dispersal: The strategic dispersal of surface ships, especially vital strategic assets
such as CVNs that serve our national interests in both peace and war, was assessed through
examination of potential vulnerabilities. These potential vulnerabilities were examined in the
context of operational, training and maintenance requirements of East Coast assets.
Strategic dispersal factors considered included: transit times to various deployment and
training areas; shipping traffic volumes and associated risk of a maritime accident; port force
protection postures and risk mitigation measures; integrated vulnerability and threat
assessments; historic aircraft carrier loading; physical pier capacity; nuclear maintenance
capability; homeporting options in response to a catastrophic event; geographic location of
the aircraft carrier aircraft squadrons; transit times from port to the open sea; historic sortie
rates due to hurricanes or other natural phenomena; and the risk to the ships, infrastructure
and personnel who man, service and repair aircraft carriers associated with natural or man-
made catastrophic events. In terms of these factors, the analysis concluded that the strategic
value of NAVSTA Norfolk and NAVSTA Mayport as CVN homeports essentially was
equal. The DON’s strategic analysis, however, also demonstrated the value of having both
NAVSTA Norfolk and NAVSTA Mayport as CVN homeports. Establishing CVN homeport
capacity at NAVSTA Mayport can be accomplished without any adverse impacts on
operations while at the same time providing the added strategic value of a second CVN
homeport on the East Coast.
Congressional Research Service
54
Navy Nuclear Aircraft Carrier (CVN) Homeporting at Mayport
The most significant strategic advantage offered by development of an additional East Coast
CVN homeport is a hedge against a catastrophic event that may impact NAVSTA Norfolk,
the only existing CVN homeport for Atlantic Fleet CVNs. It is difficult to quantify the
likelihood of a catastrophic event, whether natural or man-made. Nonetheless, there is a need
to plan and prepare for any such event. That planning and preparation must address CVN
maintenance and repair infrastructure as well as operational considerations. The fact that
quantifying the likelihood of a catastrophic event is so difficult underscores the need to
ensure that our planning and preparation efforts do not underestimate or overlook the long-
term effects of such event. Hurricane Katrina is a clear and recent example. The level of
devastation in New Orleans in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina was so extensive and so
pervasive that more than three years after Katrina hit, the New Orleans industrial
infrastructure, work force, and community support functions have not fully recovered.
The potential impact of similar man-made or natural catastrophic events in the Hampton
Roads area requires the DON to plan and prepare. A failure to do so presents an unacceptable
risk. The aircraft carriers of the United States DON are vital strategic assets that serve our
national interests in both peace and war. The President calls upon them for their unique
ability to provide both deterrence and combat support in times of crisis. Of the 11 aircraft
carriers currently in service, five are assigned to the Atlantic Fleet. NAVSTA Norfolk is
homeport to all five of the CVNs assigned to the Atlantic Fleet and the Hampton Roads area
is the only East Coast location where CVN maintenance and repair infrastructure exists. It is
the only location in the U.S. capable of CVN construction and refueling. The Hampton
Roads area also houses all Atlantic Fleet CVN trained crews and associated community
support infrastructure. A second CVN homeport on the East Coast will provide additional
CVN maintenance infrastructure, thereby providing added strategic value and allowing the
DON to extract the added operational value of two CVN homeports in meeting its national
defense obligations.
Homeporting a CVN at NAVSTA Mayport would provide strategic options in case of a
catastrophic event in the Hampton Roads area, and enhance distribution of CVN assets,
thereby reducing the risks to aircraft carriers and associated maintenance and repair
infrastructure supporting those crucial assets....
CONCLUSION: The decision to create the capacity to homeport a CVN at NAVSTA
Mayport represents the best military judgment of the DON’s leadership regarding strategic
considerations. In reaching that decision, the DON considered the environmental impacts
analyzed in the EIS, comments from regulatory agencies as well as those received from
members of the public, mitigation measures that would lessen the extent and severity of
environmental impacts, recurring and nonrecurring costs, and the strategic implications of
developing a second CVN homeport on the East Coast to support Atlantic Fleet operational,
training and maintenance needs.
There will be no significant adverse environmental impacts associated with the CVN
homeporting. That conclusion is based on the data collected and analyzed in the EIS, on
interagency consultations, and on the mitigation measures developed as part of that
consultation process.
The cost of developing a CVN homeport at NAVSTA Mayport was balanced against the
strategic need to create a hedge against a catastrophic event in the Hampton Roads area. The
cost of developing a CVN homeport at NAVSTA Mayport is more than offset by the added
security for CVN assets and enhanced operational effectiveness provided by the ability to
operate out of two homeports.
Ultimately, the need to develop a hedge against the potentially crippling results of a
catastrophic event was the driver behind the decision to homeport a CVN at NAVSTA
Congressional Research Service
55
Navy Nuclear Aircraft Carrier (CVN) Homeporting at Mayport
Mayport. Developing a second CVN homeport on the East Coast not only reduces potential
risk to CVN assets through dispersal of those critical assets, it provides some maintenance
and repair infrastructure and ensures access to that infrastructure by CVNs deployed at the
time a catastrophic event in Hampton Roads occurred. Mayport allows DON to obtain the
advantages of fleet dispersal and survivability without impacting operational availability. On
the West Coast DON has accepted reduced operational availability in the interest of
dispersal. By homeporting CVNs in the Northwestern U.S., DON loses operational
availability during the additional transit time required to reach operational and training areas.
By establishing a second CVN homeport on the East Coast, DON can gain the dispersal
advantage without the increased transit time. The proximity to training areas and transit time
to operating areas is about equal from Norfolk and Mayport.
West Coast CVN homeports and maintenance facilities are not viable options in planning for
Atlantic Fleet CVN assets in the event a catastrophic event occurs in the Hampton Roads
area. The nuclear powered aircraft carriers are too large to transit the Panama Canal,
requiring a 12,700 nautical mile voyage around South America to reach the closest CVN
homeport on the West Coast at [57]San Diego.
Neither the DON, nor the nation, nor its citizens can wait for a catastrophic event to occur
before recognizing the potential impacts of such an event and appropriately planning and
preparing for continuity of operations. This lesson was learned all too well in the aftermath
of recent catastrophic events such as Hurricane Katrina. The DON looked at the possible
crippling effects - immediate and long-term - of a catastrophic event in the Hampton Roads
area and recognized its responsibility to develop a hedge against such an event. That hedge is
homeporting a CVN at NAVSTA Mayport and developing the requisite operational, training,
maintenance and support facilities.
Homeporting one CVN at NAVSTA Mayport best serves the interests of the DON and the
nation, and can be accomplished in a manner that keeps environmental impacts at a less than
significant level.58
57 At this point in the text, a handwritten note deletes the word “NAVSTA.”
58 Department of the Navy, Record of Decision for Homeporting of Additional Surface Ships at Naval Station Mayport,
Florida, January 14, 2009, pp. 1-2, 5-6, 18-22, 31-32.
Congressional Research Service
56
Navy Nuclear Aircraft Carrier (CVN) Homeporting at Mayport
Appendix D. Navy Data on Hurricane Risk
This appendix presents information that the Navy has provided regarding the risk of hurricanes at
Norfolk and Mayport.
Navy Briefing Slide
Figure D-1 is a Navy briefing slide on relative hurricane risk for the port of Norfolk and the port
of Jacksonville, which is near Mayport.
Congressional Research Service
57
Navy Nuclear Aircraft Carrier (CVN) Homeporting at Mayport
Figure D-1. Navy Briefing Slide on Relative Hurricane Risk
Source: Slide entitled “Relative Hurricane Risk,” from Navy briefing entitled “Final Environmental Impact
Statement (FEIS) for the Proposed Homeporting of Additional Surface Ships at Naval Station Mayport, FL,”
November 18, 2008, presented to CRS on December 5, 2008.
Congressional Research Service
58
Navy Nuclear Aircraft Carrier (CVN) Homeporting at Mayport
Excerpt from DOD Information Paper
In response to questions and requests for information from congressional offices, the Navy in
December 2008 provided, among other things, supplementary historical data regarding hurricanes
in the Hampton Roads area and Mayport and their effect on Navy facilities and ship operations.
The questions/requests for information regarding hurricanes, and the Navy’s responses, are
reproduced below.59
QUESTION/REQUEST: How much collateral damage did Norfolk and Mayport sustain
from hurricanes that did NOT make a direct hit over the analyzed time period of 1851-2006?
RESPONSE:
a. MAYPORT:
Since 1995, 8 named storms—of which 1 was a hurricane—have had a CPA of 75 nm or
closer to NAVSTA Mayport
From 1851-2008, there were 51 tropical cyclones that were classified as hurricanes at some
point in their life that passed within 180 nm of Mayport. Of these, 22 came within 50 nm.
Collateral damage (back to 2004): $6.1M
b. NORFOLK:
Since 1995, 15 named storms—of which 4 were hurricanes—came within 75 nm or closer to
NAVSTA Norfolk
From 1851-2008, there were 54 tropical cyclones that were classified as hurricanes at some
point in their life that passed within 180 nm of Norfolk. Of these, 14 came within 50 nm.
Collateral damage (all hurricanes, direct hit and near miss back to 1999): $11.8M
c. Some ships undergoing maintenance must occasionally remain in port during hurricanes.
A review of records since the 2004 hurricane season indicated no resulting ship damage for
those ships remaining inport.
QUESTION/REQUEST: How much hurricane damage has NAVSTA Norfolk and
NAVSTA Mayport sustained over the time period analyzed?
RESPONSE: Historical hurricane damage costs available include:
Mayport:
59 Source: Department of Defense information paper responding to questions from congressional offices, dated
December 19, 2008, and provided to CRS on January 6, 2009, questions/requests 5 through 10. The reproduction here
omits the question/request numbers and incorporates some slight formatting changes to accommodate CRS report
formatting. NAVSTA means Naval Station (a home port), CPA means closest point of approach, nm means nautical
mile, M means millions (of dollars). The Navy informed CRS that this data accounts for all hurricanes that have
affected Mayport or Norfolk, including hurricanes that approached Mayport from the west. (Department of Defense
information paper responding to questions from CRS, dated December 23, 2008 and provided to CRS on January 6,
2009.)
Congressional Research Service
59
Navy Nuclear Aircraft Carrier (CVN) Homeporting at Mayport
FY04: $1.2M
FY05: $4.1M
FY08: $0.8M
Norfolk
FY99: $1.0M
FY03: $10.8M
QUESTION/REQUEST: How many evacuation orders (sorties) have been issued to Navy
ships at Norfolk and Mayport because of inclement weather? Provide historical data to the
maximum extent possible.
RESPONSE: Since 1995, ships at Mayport have sortied 6 times and ships at Norfolk have
sortied 5 times:
a. Mayport:
i. Bertha (1996)
ii. Bonnie (1998)
iii. Floyd (1999)
iv. Charley (2004)
v. Ophelia (2005)
vi. Fay (2008)
b. Norfolk:
i. Felix (1995)
ii. Bertha (1996)
iii. Bonnie (1998)
iv. Floyd (1999)
v. Isabel (2003)
Congressional Research Service
60
Navy Nuclear Aircraft Carrier (CVN) Homeporting at Mayport
Carrier Sorties due to Hurricanes
Dates
Units Affected
Type of Impact
Homeport
8-10 Sep 05
USS JOHN F KENNEDY
Dedicated sail, hurricane avoidance
Mayport
16-20 Sep 03
USS THEODORE ROOSEVELT
Extended underway, hurricane
Norfolk
avoidance
11-20 Sep 03
USS GEORGE WASHINGTON
Interrupted carrier qualifications,
Norfolk
hurricane avoidance
16-20 Sep 03
USS RONALD REAGAN
Dedicated sail, hurricane avoidance
Norfolk
22-27 Sep 02
USS HARRY S TRUMAN
Already underway for COMPTUEX,
Norfolk
hurricane avoidance
14-17 Sep 99
USS JOHN F KENNEDY
Dedicated underway 5 days prior to
Mayport
deployment
15-18 Sep 99
USS DWIGHT D EISENHOWER
Dedicated sail, hurricane avoidance
Norfolk
15-18 Sep 99
USS GEORGE WASHINGTON
Dedicated sail, hurricane avoidance
Norfolk
15-18 Sep 99
USS HARRY S TRUMAN
Dedicated sail, hurricane avoidance
Norfolk
25-28 Aug 98
USS ENTERPRISE
Dedicated sail, hurricane avoidance
Norfolk
22-26 Aug 98
USS JOHN F KENNEDY
Delayed return to homeport, hurricane
Mayport
avoidance
25-27 Aug 98
USS THEODORE ROOSEVELT
Dedicated sail, hurricane avoidance
Norfolk
15-19 Aug 95
USS AMERICA
Dedicated sail, hurricane avoidance
Norfolk
during POM
15-20 Aug 95
USS GEORGE WASHINGTON
Dedicated sail, hurricane avoidance
Norfolk
30 Aug-02 Sep
USS JOHN F KENNEDY
Dedicated sail, hurricane avoidance
Norfolk
93
24 Aug 92
USS FORRESTAL
Dedicated sail, hurricane avoidance
Pensacola
Notes:
Data prior to 1992 is incomplete for tracking of hurricane sorties.
QUESTION/REQUEST: Have any Navy ships remained pierside during past hurricane
evacuation orders? If so, what happened?
RESPONSE: No records exist that indicate any aircraft carriers were unable to sortie. Note:
Shipyards are designated “safe havens,” therefore CVNs in the shipyards are not required to
sortie. Recent examples of non-aircraft carriers remaining inport during hurricanes include:
a. In August 2005, the following ships were pierside at Northrop Grumman Shipbuilding—
Ingalls Operations and NGSB Avondale Operations during Hurricane Katrina:
i. DDG 98 (FORREST SHERMAN)
ii. DDG 100 (KIDD)
iii. LPD 17 (SAN ANTONIO)
iv. LPD 19 (MESA VERDE)
Congressional Research Service
61
Navy Nuclear Aircraft Carrier (CVN) Homeporting at Mayport
v. LPD 18 (NEW ORLEANS)
LPD 17 and DDG 98 sustained minor damage during the storm and DDG 100 sustained
more extensive hull damage. The cost of repairs is classified as “Business Sensitive.”
b. During hurricanes Gustav and Ike in 2008, the following ships were pierside at NGSB
Avondale and NGSB Ingalls and did not sustain any damage:
i. LPD 20 (GREEN BAY)
ii. DDG 103 (TRUXTUN)
iii. DDG 105 (DEWEY)
QUESTION/REQUEST: Historically, how have hurricanes negatively affected CVN
operations on the East Coast?
RESPONSE: Hurricanes can and have affected aircraft carrier operations during all phases of
the carrier schedule. CVNs inport will sortie when directed by the Fleet Commander and
conduct hurricane avoidance. CVNs underway for training will suspend or cancel training
evolutions and maneuver to avoid the hurricane’s predicted track.
QUESTION/REQUEST: Compare the amount of time required to sortie ships from Norfolk
and Mayport.
RESPONSE: Following issuance of the sortie order, ships in Mayport require approximately
1 hour to reach the open sea and ships in Norfolk require between 4 to 4.5 hours to reach
open sea.
QUESTION/REQUEST: When, if ever, has the Navy NOT been able to sortie ships?
RESPONSE: Ships in maintenance at Norfolk Naval Shipyard and Northrop Grumman
Newport News Shipbuilding do not sortie since the shipyards are considered safe havens for
ships during hurricanes. No records exist that indicate any aircraft carriers not in safe havens
were unable to sortie.
Congressional Research Service
62
Navy Nuclear Aircraft Carrier (CVN) Homeporting at Mayport
Appendix E. Examples of Views from Members
This appendix presents examples of views from Members regarding the Navy’s proposal to
homeport a CVN at Mayport. These views are presented as examples only.
Views of Members from Florida
An October 23, 2009, press release from the office of Representative Ander Crenshaw states:
WASHINGTON, DC—United States Senators George LeMieux (R-FL) and Bill Nelson (D-
FL) and Representatives Ander Crenshaw (R-Jacksonville) and Corrine Brown (D-
Jacksonville) signed and mailed the following letter to President Obama in advance of his
trip to North Florida on October 26. The letter (10/22) underscores the importance of having
two East Coast aircraft carrier homeports and calls on President Obama to reaffirm his
commitment to strategic dispersal of critical assets such as aircraft carriers. The full text of
the document reads:
Dear President Obama:
We are happy to hear you are traveling to the great state of Florida soon. While in the state,
we hope you are able to see the many military strategic strengths Florida provides this
Nation. We are home to the largest Air Force Base, Eglin, and Naval Station Mayport, the
third largest naval port in the continental United States.
Early this year, the Department of the Navy concluded an exhaustive two and a half year
study weighing the strategic, operational and environmental consequences of upgrading
Naval Station Mayport to homeport a nuclear carrier, and the upgrades must be done since
consolidating ALL nuclear carrier homeporting and maintenance in one East Coast location
greatly hampers the Navy’s strategic options.
Prior to 2007, the Navy had operational flexibility on the East Coast with carriers stationed
both at Naval Station Norfolk and Naval Station Mayport. However, the Navy lost the
flexibility with the decommissioning of the last East Coast conventional carrier in 2007. In
order to reduce risk to the Atlantic Fleet carrier force and restore the proper balance to the
Navy, Naval Station carriers and maintenance facilities are spread among three homeports.
In fact, in a December 2008 letter to Senator Jim Webb, Secretary Gates reinforced the
concept of strategic dispersal stating, “Having a single CVN homeport has not been
considered acceptable on the west coast should not be considered acceptable on the east
coast.”
The Norfolk area is the only east coast port in which nuclear aircraft carriers are repaired,
built and housed. If tragedy, man-made or nature-related, intentional or accidental, rendered
Norfolk out of reach the Navy would be forced to journey around the tip of South America to
reach another nuclear aircraft carrier maintenance facility in San Diego, CA. While some
would like to believe this is an acceptable back-up plan, common sense demands otherwise.
Time and time again, aircraft carriers have proven to be key to the execution of our national
security strategy. We believe as access to overseas land bases continues to decrease, the
Navy’s aircraft carriers will be more and more important. The Navy has alternate
homeporting and maintenance options for all ships on the East Coast except aircraft carriers,
its most valuable assets. The total cost for permanently homeporting a nuclear aircraft carrier
at Mayport is less that 1% of the cost of the nuclear carrier fleet. While the cost is not
Congressional Research Service
63
Navy Nuclear Aircraft Carrier (CVN) Homeporting at Mayport
inconsequential, when weighed against the possible risks to our carrier fleet, upgrading
Mayport to homeport a nuclear carrier is a sound national security expense. The Department
MUST make this investment in Naval Station Mayport to provide flexibility to the
Combatant Commanders and protection to some of the nation’s most valuable assets.
While you are in Jacksonville, we encourage you to reaffirm the county’s commitment to the
protection and the flexibility that strategic dispersal affords. We look forward to continuing
to provide the best homeport in the Navy.60
Views of Members from Virginia
The website of the office Representative Glenn Nye presents a March 9, 2010, letter to Secretary
of the Navy Ray Mabus and then-Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Gary Roughead on the
proposal to homeport a CVN at Mayport. The letter is signed by Senators Jim Webb and Mark R.
Warner, Representatives Glenn C Nye III, J. Randy Forbes, Robert C. “Bobby” Scott, and Robert
J. Wittman, and 27 other persons who are not Members of Congress. The text of the letter states:
Dear Secretary Mabus and Admiral Roughead:
We are the Hampton Roads Military Affairs Commission, a newly formed group from
Virginia’s Hampton Roads area, one of the largest military areas in the world. Our more than
30 members are experts and leaders in their respective fields, including elected officials,
retired military officers and business leaders. In today’s fiscal environment, we recognize
that you encounter difficult tradeoffs as you seek to balance competing priorities and ensure
necessary funding for aircraft procurement, building and maintaining our naval fleet, military
construction, and taking care of our sailors. Like you, we fully support the Navy’s goal to
build a fleet of no fewer than 313 ships.
We care deeply about national security and the future of our Navy. For this reason, we write
today regarding the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) and its recommendation to
construct facilities to support homeporting a nuclear-powered aircraft carrier (CVN) at Naval
Station (NAVSTA) Mayport. We respectfully request that you provide us with a business-
case analysis that objectively addresses the financial and operational tradeoffs of this
proposal, as well as the threat assessment that warrants such an undertaking. We believe a
more comprehensive public accounting is necessary before any change in East Coast
homeporting is considered. We hope you will provide answers to our questions in the
following areas:
Creating a CVN homeport at NAVSTA Mayport is estimated to cost between $600 million
and $1 billion when all one-time and recurring annual costs are calculated. In the current
economic climate and with today’s high operating tempo, the Navy has numerous unfunded
priorities. If the cost of homeporting is $600 million to $1 billion, what specific elements of
current year and out-year projects will be decremented from the budget to provide the
money?”
There is a pressing need for a more comprehensive strategic-risk assessment. The DoD has
extensive capabilities to quantify risk and empirically evaluate the trade-offs and cost-benefit
factors associated with any major investment. With respect to the proposed carrier homeport
at NAVSTA Mayport, we have yet to learn of a strategic assessment or rigorous risk-based
60 The press release is available at http://crenshaw.house.gov/index.cfm?p=PressReleases&ContentRecord_id=
829f1386-19b9-b4b1-1250-b4a52694f924.
Congressional Research Service
64
Navy Nuclear Aircraft Carrier (CVN) Homeporting at Mayport
analysis that would identify the specific reasons for executing what is potentially a $1 billion
decision. To date, in seeking to justify this project, the Navy has said that the risk that a
catastrophic event could close Hampton Roads is “low.”
The phrase “strategic dispersal” has been used by many as an intuitive argument to justify
the creation of an additional East Coast homeport for a CVN. However, we are concerned
this argument also creates a slippery slope akin to a “reverse BRAC”. Under Secretary for
Policy Michelle Flournoy, testifying before the House Armed Services Committee, recently
said that the logic of strategic dispersal also applies to other singularly based assets and
infrastructure, to include fleet ballistic missile submarines. The immense cost and time of
carrying out this additional dispersal would be extraordinary. What specific guidance has the
Navy received, if any, to provide for strategic dispersal of any high value assets and
infrastructure (carriers, subs, facilities)? Would this dispersal philosophy apply to other
critical infrastructure such as the Pentagon or the U.S. Capitol?
Even with one less CVN, NAVSTA Norfolk would remain the world’s largest Naval Station
and should be protected as such. Hundreds of millions of dollars have already been spent
since 9/11 to improve port and base security in the Hampton Roads region. What security
improvements are required in Mayport to accommodate a CVN and at what cost? Secondly,
the Navy has cited the concern over possible blockage (either by natural or manmade causes)
of the Norfolk channel. If harbor blockage of current CVN ports is considered a risk, are
there any plans to mitigate the risk?
Significant increases in personnel, both military and federal employees, will be required to
accommodate a new CVN homeport. Have the corresponding billets been identified for
funding? What is the manning increase required for 2013 and 2014 when the CVN is
scheduled to be home ported at Mayport? What is the overall manning plan for the CVN
move? Specifically, is there a plan detailing the station manning and the requirement for
temporary additional duty (TAD) sailors? What is this recurring cost? What is the impact of
such temporary assignments on the ability to support remaining CVN activities at Norfolk
and what will the quality of life impact be on sailors and shipyard workers who will be away
from home for additional periods of time if a CVN is homeported at NAVSTA Mayport?
When the USS Kennedy (CV 67) left NAVSTA Mayport in 2007, much of the existing
carrier-support infrastructure was decommissioned. If creating a new CVN homeport is of
strategic importance, as some have indicated, why would the Navy decommission existing
support infrastructure at Mayport only to rebuild much of it a few years later? What specific
capabilities must be re-established and at what cost?
Precisely what CVN maintenance will be supported at NAVSTA Mayport after all facilities
have been constructed? How often and for how long will the Navy need to return the CVN to
Norfolk for maintenance availabilities that are beyond the capability of fly-away teams?
The Navy’s Final Environmental Impact Statement (FEIS) proposes building nuclear
propulsion repair facilities, but there is no mention of conventional requirements such as
catapult and arresting gear maintenance. What conventional maintenance will be done by the
maintenance personnel at NAVSTA Mayport?
While the FEIS addressed possible local economic impacts at Mayport, why did the FEIS
neglect a corresponding socio-economic evaluation of Norfolk? With the decommissioning
of USS Enterprise (CVN 65) and a follow-on change in homeport for another Norfolk-based
carrier to Mayport, why didn’t the FEIS evaluate the negative impact on Norfolk’s local
housing market, schools, jobs, and small businesses?
Congressional Research Service
65
Navy Nuclear Aircraft Carrier (CVN) Homeporting at Mayport
Thank you for taking the time to look into these queries. We commend you for your
leadership. As this process evolves, we look forward to developing a better dialogue to
ensure the concerns and issues we have identified are addressed in a timely, responsive way.
The Commission’s point of contact is John Panneton, Military Liaison for Congressman
Glenn Nye, who can be reached at 757-326-6201, or 4772 Euclid Road, Suite E, Virginia
Beach, VA 23462.61
Author Contact Information
Ronald O'Rourke
Specialist in Naval Affairs
rorourke@crs.loc.gov, 7-7610
61 The letter is available at http://nye.house.gov/uploads/030910_HRMAC_Letter.pdf.
Congressional Research Service
66