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Keeping America’s Pipelines Safe and Secure:
Key Issues for Congress
Paul W. Parfomak
Specialist in Energy and Infrastructure Policy
February 8, 2012
Congressional Research Service
7-5700
www.crs.gov
R41536
CRS Report for Congress
Pr
epared for Members and Committees of Congress
c11173008
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Keeping America’s Pipelines Safe and Secure: Key Issues for Congress
Summary
Nearly half a million miles of pipeline transporting natural gas, oil, and other hazardous liquids
crisscross the United States. While an efficient and fundamentally safe means of transport, many
pipelines carry materials with the potential to cause public injury and environmental damage. The
nation’s pipeline networks are also widespread and vulnerable to accidents and terrorist attack.
Recent pipeline accidents in Marshall, MI, San Bruno, CA, Allentown, PA, and Laurel, MT, have
heightened congressional concern about pipeline risks and drawn criticism from the National
Transportation Safety Board. Both government and industry have taken numerous steps to
improve pipeline safety and security over the last 10 years. Nonetheless, while many stakeholders
agree that federal pipeline safety programs have been on the right track, the spate of recent
pipeline incidents suggest there continues to be significant room for improvement. Likewise, the
threat of terrorist attack remains a concern.
The federal pipeline safety program is authorized through the fiscal year ending September 30,
2015, under the Pipeline Safety, Regulatory Certainty, and Job Creation Act of 2011 (P.L. 112-90)
which was signed by President Obama on January 3, 2012. The act contains a broad range of
provisions addressing pipeline safety and security. Among the most significant are provisions that
could increase the number of federal pipeline safety inspectors, require automatic shutoff valves
for transmission pipelines, mandate verification of maximum allowable operating pressure for gas
transmission pipelines, increase civil penalties for pipeline safety violations, and mandate reviews
of diluted bitumen pipeline regulation. The Transportation Security Administration Authorization
Act of 2011 (H.R. 3011) would mandate a study regarding the relative roles and responsibilities
of the Department of Homeland Security and the Department of Transportation with respect to
pipeline security.
As it oversees the federal pipeline safety program and the federal role in pipeline security,
Congress may wish to assess how the various elements of U.S. pipeline safety and security fit
together in the nation’s overall strategy to protect transportation infrastructure. Pipeline safety and
security necessarily involve many groups: federal agencies, oil and gas pipeline associations,
large and small pipeline operators, and local communities. Reviewing how these groups work
together to achieve common goals could be an oversight challenge for Congress.
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Keeping America’s Pipelines Safe and Secure: Key Issues for Congress
Contents
Introduction...................................................................................................................................... 1
Safety and Security in the Pipeline Industry.................................................................................... 1
Pipeline Safety Record........................................................................................................ 2
Pipeline Security Risks........................................................................................................ 3
Pipelines and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration ....................................................... 4
DOT Pipeline Security Activities ........................................................................................ 6
Pipeline Safety Improvement Act of 2002 .......................................................................... 7
Pipeline Inspection, Protection, Enforcement, and Safety Act of 2006 .............................. 7
Transportation Security Administration .................................................................................... 8
TSA Pipeline Security Activities......................................................................................... 8
Security Incident Investigations ........................................................................................ 11
GAO Study of TSA’s Pipeline Security Activities ............................................................ 11
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission................................................................................. 12
National Transportation Safety Board ..................................................................................... 13
San Bruno Pipeline Accident Investigation....................................................................... 13
Key Policy Issues........................................................................................................................... 15
Staffing Resources for Pipeline Safety and Security ............................................................... 15
PHMSA Inspectors............................................................................................................ 15
PHMSA Staffing Shortfalls ............................................................................................... 16
State Pipeline Inspector Funding....................................................................................... 17
TSA Pipelines Security Resources .................................................................................... 18
Automatic Shutoff Valves for Transmission Pipelines ............................................................ 19
Previous Consideration ..................................................................................................... 20
Remotely Controlled Valves for Liquids Pipelines ........................................................... 21
Valve Replacement Costs .................................................................................................. 21
SCADA and Leak Detection System Requirements ......................................................... 22
Public Perceptions............................................................................................................. 23
Natural Gas Distribution Excess Flow Valves................................................................... 24
PHMSA Penalties and Pipeline Safety Enforcement............................................................... 24
PHMSA Penalties in Perspective ...................................................................................... 26
Regulation of Canadian Oil/Tar Sands Crude Pipelines.......................................................... 27
Pipeline Security Regulations.................................................................................................. 28
Additional Issues ..................................................................................................................... 29
Accuracy and Completeness of Pipeline System Records ................................................ 29
Mandatory Internal Inspection or Hydrostatic Testing...................................................... 29
Emergency Response Plan Disclosure .............................................................................. 30
Pipeline Water Crossings................................................................................................... 31
Conclusion ..................................................................................................................................... 31
Figures
Figure 1. PHMSA Pipeline Safety Staffing, Historical and Proposed under P.L. 112-90.............. 16
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Keeping America’s Pipelines Safe and Secure: Key Issues for Congress
Tables
Table 1. TSA Pipeline Security Initiatives....................................................................................... 9
Table 2. Actual vs. Anticipated Pipeline Safety Staff in DOT Budget Requests ........................... 17
Contacts
Author Contact Information........................................................................................................... 32
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Keeping America’s Pipelines Safe and Secure: Key Issues for Congress
Introduction
Nearly half a million miles of high-volume pipeline transport natural gas, oil, and other hazardous
liquids across the United States.1 These transmission pipelines are integral to U.S. energy supply
and have vital links to other critical infrastructure, such as power plants, airports, and military
bases. While an efficient and fundamentally safe means of transport, many pipelines carry
volatile, flammable, or toxic materials with the potential to cause public injury and environmental
damage. The nation’s pipeline networks are also widespread, running alternately through remote
and densely populated regions, some above ground, some below; consequently, these systems are
vulnerable to accidents and terrorist attack. Recent pipeline accidents in Marshall, MI, San Bruno,
CA, Allentown, PA, and Laurel, MT, have demonstrated this vulnerability and have heightened
congressional concern about pipeline risks.
The federal program for pipeline safety resides primarily within the Department of Transportation
(DOT), although its inspection and enforcement activities rely heavily upon partnerships with
state pipeline safety agencies. The federal pipeline security program began with the DOT as well,
immediately after the terror attacks of September 11, 2001, but pipeline security authority was
subsequently transferred to the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) when the latter
department was created. The DOT and DHS have distinct missions, but they cooperate to protect
the nation’s pipelines. The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission is not operationally involved
in pipeline safety or security, but it can examine safety issues under its siting authority for
interstate natural gas pipelines, and can allow pipeline companies under its rate jurisdiction to
recover pipeline security costs. Collectively, these agencies administer a comprehensive and
complex set of regulatory authorities which has been changing significantly over the last decade
and continues to do so.
The federal pipeline safety program is authorized through the fiscal year ending September 30,
2015, under the Pipeline Safety, Regulatory Certainty, and Job Creation Act of 2011 (P.L. 112-90)
which was signed by President Obama on January 3, 2012. This report reviews the history of
federal programs for pipeline safety and security, key policy issues, and recent developments
leading up to P.L. 112-90. Although the act contains over 30 substantive sections, this report
focuses only on a subset of provisions of key interest in recent congressional debate.
Safety and Security in the Pipeline Industry
Of the nation’s approximately half million miles of transmission pipeline, roughly 170,000 miles
carry hazardous liquids—over 75% of the nation’s crude oil and around 60% of its refined
petroleum products, along with other products.2 Within this network, there are nearly 200
1 Hazardous liquids primarily include crude oil, gasoline, jet fuel, diesel fuel, home heating oil, propane, and butane.
Other hazardous liquids transported by pipeline include anhydrous ammonia, carbon dioxide, kerosene, liquefied
ethylene, and some petrochemical feedstocks.
2 Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration, “Natural Gas Transmission, Gas Distribution, and
Hazardous Liquid Pipeline Annual Mileage,” online table, September 21, 2010, http://www.phmsa.dot.gov/pipeline/
library/data-stats.
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Keeping America’s Pipelines Safe and Secure: Key Issues for Congress
interstate crude oil and liquid fuel pipelines, which account for roughly 80% of total pipeline
mileage and transported volume.3
The U.S. natural gas pipeline network consists of around 217,000 miles of interstate transmission,
and 89,000 miles of intrastate transmission.4 It also contains some 20,000 miles of field and
gathering pipeline, which connect gas extraction wells to processing facilities.5 Around 120
systems make up the interstate gas transmission network; another 90 or so systems operate
strictly within individual states.6 These interstate and intrastate gas transmission pipelines feed
around 1.2 million miles of regional pipelines in some 1,400 local distribution networks.7 Natural
gas pipelines also connect to 113 liquefied natural gas (LNG) storage sites, which augment
pipeline gas supplies during peak demand periods.8
Pipeline Safety Record
Taken as a whole, releases from pipelines cause few annual fatalities compared to other product
transportation modes. According to the DOT, hazardous liquid pipelines reported an average of
1.8 deaths per year from 2006 through 2010. During the same period, natural gas transmission
and distribution pipelines reported an average of 3.0 and 9.8 deaths per year, respectively.9
Accidental pipeline releases result from a variety of causes, including third-party excavation,
corrosion, mechanical failure, control system failure, and operator error. Natural forces, such as
floods and earthquakes, can also damage pipelines. There were 120 hazardous liquid pipeline
accidents, 81 natural gas transmission (including gathering) pipeline accidents, and 54 natural gas
distribution accidents in 2010.10
Although pipeline releases have caused relatively few fatalities in absolute numbers, a single
pipeline accident can be catastrophic in terms of deaths and environmental damage. Notable
pipeline accidents in recent years include:
• 1999―A gasoline pipeline explosion in Bellingham, WA, killed three people and
caused $45 million in damage to a city water plant and other property.
• 2000―A natural gas pipeline explosion near Carlsbad, NM, killed 12 campers.
3 Richard A. Rabinow, “The Liquid Pipeline Industry in the United States: Where It’s Been, Where It’s Going,”
Prepared for the Association of Oil Pipe Lines, April 2004, p. 4.
4 Energy Information Administration, “Estimated Natural Gas Pipeline Mileage in the Lower 48 States, Close of 2008,”
online table, 2011, http://www.eia.doe.gov/pub/oil_gas/natural_gas/analysis_publications/ngpipeline/mileage.html.
5 Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration, “Natural Gas Transmission, Gas Distribution, and
Hazardous Liquid Pipeline Annual Mileage,” Web table, March 15, 2011, http://www.phmsa.dot.gov/portal/site/
PHMSA/menuitem.7c371785a639f2e55cf2031050248a0c/?vgnextoid=
3b6c03347e4d8210VgnVCM1000001ecb7898RCRD&vgnextchannel=
3b6c03347e4d8210VgnVCM1000001ecb7898RCRD&vgnextfmt=print.
6 Energy Information Administration, “About U.S. Natural Gas Pipelines,” June 2007, pp. 1, 29,
http://www.eia.doe.gov/pub/oil_gas/natural_gas/analysis_publications/ngpipeline/fullversion.pdf.
7 Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration, September 21, 2010, http://www.phmsa.dot.gov/pipeline/
library/data-stats.
8 There are also approximately 6,300 miles of offshore gathering pipelines. Gathering pipelines in the Outer
Continental Shelf regulated by the Department of the Interior are outside the scope of this report.
9 Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration, “Significant Pipeline Incidents,” web page, February 2,
2012, http://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/comm/reports/safety/SigPSI.html.
10 Ibid.
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• 2006―Corroded pipelines on the North Slope of Alaska leaked over 200,000
gallons of crude oil in an environmentally sensitive area and temporarily shut
down Prudhoe Bay oil production.
• 2007―An accidental release from a propane pipeline and subsequent fire near
Carmichael, MS, killed two people, injured several others, destroyed four homes,
and burned over 70 acres of grassland and woodland.
• 2010―A pipeline spill in Marshall, MI, released 819,000 gallons of crude oil
into a tributary of the Kalamazoo River.
• 2010—A natural gas pipeline explosion in San Bruno, CA, killed 8 people,
injured 60 others, and destroyed 37 homes.
• 2011―A natural gas pipeline explosion in Allentown, PA, killed 5 people,
damaged 50 buildings, and caused 500 people to be evacuated.
• 2011―A pipeline spill near Laurel, MT, released an estimated 42,000 gallons of
crude oil into the Yellowstone River.
Such accidents have generated persistent scrutiny of pipeline regulation and have increased state
and community activity related to pipeline safety.
Pipeline Security Risks
In addition to their vulnerability to accidents, pipelines may also be intentionally damaged by
vandals and terrorists. Some pipelines may also be vulnerable to “cyber-attacks” on computer
control systems or attacks on electricity grids and telecommunications networks.11 Oil and gas
pipelines, globally, have been a favored target of terrorists, militant groups, and organized crime.
In Colombia, for example, rebels have bombed the Caño Limón oil pipeline and other pipelines
over 950 times since 1993.12 In 1996, London police foiled a plot by the Irish Republican Army to
bomb gas pipelines and other utilities across the city.13 Militants in Nigeria have repeatedly
attacked pipelines and related facilities, including the simultaneous bombing of three oil pipelines
in May 2007.14 A Mexican rebel group similarly detonated bombs along Mexican oil and natural
gas pipelines in July and September 2007.15 In June 2007, the U.S. Department of Justice arrested
members of a terrorist group planning to attack jet fuel pipelines and storage tanks at the John F.
Kennedy (JFK) International Airport in New York.16 Natural gas pipelines in British Columbia,
Canada, were bombed six times between October 2008 and July 2009 by unknown perpetrators.17
11 J.L. Shreeve, “Science & Technology: The Enemy Within,” The Independent. London, UK, May 31, 2006, p. 8.
12 Government Accountability Office (GAO), Security Assistance: Efforts to Secure Colombia’s Caño Limón-Coveñas
Oil Pipeline Have Reduced Attacks, but Challenges Remain, GAO-05-971, September 2005, p. 15; Stratfor
Forecasting, Inc.,” Colombia: The FARC’s Low-Level Pipeline Campaign,” Stratfor Today, June 23, 2008.
http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/colombia_farcs_low_level_pipeline_campaign?ip_auth_redirect=1.
13 President’s Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection, Critical Foundations: Protecting America’s
Infrastructures, Washington, DC, October 1997.
14 Katehrine Houreld, “Militants Say 3 Nigeria Pipelines Bombed,” Associated Press, May 8, 2007.
15 Reed Johnson, “Six Pipelines Blown Up in Mexico,” Los Angeles Times, September 11, 2007. p A-3.
16 U.S. Department of Justice, “Four Individuals Charged in Plot to bomb John F. Kennedy International Airport,”
Press release, June 2, 2007.
17 Ben Gelinas, “New Letter Threatens Resumption of ‘Action’ against B.C. Pipelines,” Calgary Herald, April 15,
2010.
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In 2009, the Washington Post reported that over $1 billion of crude oil had been stolen directly
from Mexican pipelines by organized criminals and drug cartels.18
Since September 11, 2001, federal warnings about Al Qaeda have mentioned pipelines
specifically as potential terror targets in the United States.19 One U.S. pipeline of particular
concern, and with a history of terrorist and vandal activity, is the Trans Alaska Pipeline System
(TAPS), which transports crude oil from Alaska’s North Slope oil fields to the marine terminal in
Valdez. TAPS runs some 800 miles and delivers nearly 17% of U.S. domestic oil production.20 In
1999, Vancouver police arrested a man planning to blow up TAPS for personal profit in oil
futures.21 In 2001, a vandal’s attack on TAPS with a high-powered rifle forced a two-day
shutdown and caused extensive economic and ecological damage.22 In January 2006, federal
authorities acknowledged the discovery of a detailed posting on a website purportedly linked to
Al Qaeda that reportedly encouraged attacks on U.S. pipelines, especially TAPS, using weapons
or hidden explosives.23 In November 2007 a U.S. citizen was convicted of trying to conspire with
Al Qaeda to attack TAPS and a major natural gas pipeline in the eastern United States.24
Notwithstanding the incidents cited above, to date, there have been no known Al Qaeda attacks
on TAPS or other U.S. pipelines. The most recent U.S. federal threat assessment concludes “with
high confidence that the terrorist threat to the U.S. pipeline industry is low ... [with] no specific or
credible threat information indicating that violent transnational extremist groups or domestic
extremists are actively plotting to conduct attacks on the U.S. pipeline industry.”25 Terrorist
activities are in constant flux, however, and difficult to predict, so terrorist attacks remain a
possibility in the future. Attacks by individuals not associated with organized groups also remain
a concern, as demonstrated by the August 2011 arrest by federal agents of a U.S. citizen, acting
alone, who confessed to planting an improvised explosive device (which failed to detonate) under
a natural gas pipeline in Oklahoma.26
Pipelines and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration
The Natural Gas Pipeline Safety Act of 1968 (P.L. 90-481) and the Hazardous Liquid Pipeline Act
of 1979 (P.L. 96-129) are two of the principal early acts establishing the federal role in pipeline
safety. Under both statutes, the Transportation Secretary is given primary authority to regulate
key aspects of interstate pipeline safety: design, construction, operation and maintenance, and
18 Steve Fainaru and William Booth, “Mexico’s Drug Cartels Siphon Liquid Gold,” Washington Post, December 13,
2009.
19 “Already Hard at Work on Security, Pipelines Told of Terrorist Threat,” Inside FERC, McGraw-Hill Companies,
January 3, 2002.
20 Alyeska Pipeline Service Co., Internet page, Anchorage, AK, February 8, 2009, http://www.alyeska-pipe.com/
about.html.
21 David S. Cloud, “A Former Green Beret’s Plot to Make Millions Through Terrorism,” Ottawa Citizen, December 24,
1999, p. E15.
22 Y. Rosen, “Alaska Critics Take Potshots at Line Security,” Houston Chronicle, February 17, 2002.
23 Wesley Loy, “Web Post Urges Jihadists to Attack Alaska Pipeline,” Anchorage Daily News, January 19, 2006.
24 U.S. Attorney’s Office, Middle District of Pennsylvania, “Man Convicted of Attempting to Provide Material Support
to Al-Qaeda Sentenced to 30 Years’ Imprisonment,” Press release, November 6, 2007; A. Lubrano and J. Shiffman,
“Pa. Man Accused of Terrorist Plot,” Philadelphia Inquirer, February 12, 2006, p. A1.
25 Transportation Security Administration, Office of Intelligence, Pipeline Threat Assessment, January 18, 2011, p. 3.
26 Carol Cratty, “Man Accused in Attempted Bombing of Oklahoma Gas Pipeline,” CNN, August 12, 2011.
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Keeping America’s Pipelines Safe and Secure: Key Issues for Congress
spill response planning. Pipeline safety regulations are covered in Title 49 of the Code of Federal
Regulations.27 The DOT administers pipeline regulations through the Office of Pipeline Safety
(OPS) within the Pipelines and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA). In FY2010
the OPS was funded for 206 full-time equivalent staff based in Washington, DC; Atlanta; Kansas
City; Houston; and Denver.28 This included funding for 135 inspectors, although the agency
actually employed 110 inspectors at the end of FY2010.29 In 2011, the agency was operating
under a continuing resolution at the same funding levels. P.L. 112-90 contains provisions
authorizing up to 145 inspection and enforcement personnel if necessary (§ 31(b)). In addition to
its own staff, PHMSA’s enabling legislation allows the agency to delegate authority to intrastate
pipeline safety offices, and allows state offices to act as “agents” administering interstate pipeline
safety programs (excluding enforcement) for those sections of interstate pipelines within their
boundaries.30 Over 400 state pipeline safety inspectors are available in 2012.
PHMSA’s pipeline safety program is funded primarily by user fees assessed on a per-mile basis
on each regulated pipeline operator (49 U.S.C. §60107). P.L. 109-468 authorized annual pipeline
safety program expenditures of $79.0 million in FY2007, $86.2 million in FY2008, $91.5 million
in FY2009, and $96.5 million in FY2010. The President’s FY2011 budget request included
$111.1 million.31 P.L. 112-90 authorizes expenditures of $109.3 million annually for each of
FY2012 through FY2015, and $1.5 million annually through FY2015 for state pipeline damage
prevention programs.
PHMSA uses a variety of strategies to promote compliance with its safety standards. The agency
conducts programmatic inspections of management systems, procedures, and processes; conducts
physical inspections of facilities and construction projects; investigates safety incidents; and
maintains a dialogue with pipeline operators. The agency clarifies its regulatory expectations
through published protocols and regulatory orders, guidance manuals, and public meetings.
PHMSA relies upon a range of enforcement actions, including administrative actions such as
corrective action orders (CAOs) and civil penalties, to ensure that operators correct safety
violations and take measures to preclude future safety problems. In 2011, PHMSA initiated 237
enforcement actions against pipeline operators.32 Civil penalties proposed by PHMSA for safety
violations during this period totaled approximately $3.7 million.33 PHMSA also conducts accident
investigations and system-wide reviews focusing on high-risk operational or procedural problems
and areas of the pipeline near sensitive environmental areas, high-density populations, or
navigable waters.
27 Safety and security of liquefied natural gas (LNG) facilities used in gas pipeline transportation is regulated under
CFR Title 49, Part 193.
28 U.S. Office of Management and Budget, Budget of the United States Government, Fiscal Year 2011: Appendix,
February 2010, p. 989.
29 John D. Porcari, Deputy Secretary, U.S. Department of Transportation, Testimony before the House Committee on
Transportation and Infrastructure, Hearing on the Enbridge Pipeline Oil Spill in Marshall, MI, September 15, 2010.
30 49 U.S.C. 601. States may recover up to 50% of their costs for these programs from the federal government.
31 U.S. Office of Management and Budget, February 2010, p. 988.
32 Pipeline and Hazardous Material Safety Administration (PHMSA), “PHMSA Pipeline Safety Program: Summary of
Enforcement Actions,” Web page, January 9, 2012, http://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/comm/reports/enforce/
Actions_opid_0.html?nocache=8828.
33 Pipeline and Hazardous Material Safety Administration (PHMSA), “PHMSA Pipeline Safety Program: Summary of
Cases Involving Civil Penalties,” Web page. January 9, 2012, http://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/comm/reports/enforce/
CivilPenalty_opid_0.html?nocache=9288#_TP_1_tab_2.
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Since 1997, PHMSA has increasingly required industry’s implementation of “integrity
management” programs on pipeline segments near “high consequence areas.” Integrity
management provides for continual evaluation of pipeline condition; assessment of risks to the
pipeline; inspection or testing; data analysis; and follow-up repair, as well as preventive or
mitigative actions. High consequence areas include population centers, commercially navigable
waters, and environmentally sensitive areas, such as drinking water supplies or ecological
reserves. The integrity management approach directs priority resources to locations of highest
consequence rather than applying uniform treatment to the entire pipeline network. PHMSA made
integrity management programs mandatory for most oil pipeline operators with 500 or more miles
of regulated pipeline as of March 31, 2001 (49 C.F.R. §195).
DOT Pipeline Security Activities
Presidential Decision Directive 63 (PDD-63), issued during the Clinton Administration, assigned
lead responsibility for pipeline security to the DOT.34 These responsibilities fell to the OPS, at
that time a part of the DOT’s Research and Special Programs Administration (RSPA), since the
agency was already addressing some elements of pipeline security in its role as safety regulator.35
In 2002, the OPS conducted a vulnerability assessment to identify critical pipeline facilities and
worked with industry groups and state pipeline safety organizations “to assess the industry’s
readiness to prepare for, withstand and respond to a terrorist attack.”36 Together with the
Department of Energy and state pipeline agencies, the OPS promoted the development of
consensus standards for security measures tiered to correspond with the five levels of threat
warnings issued by the Office of Homeland Security.37 The OPS also developed protocols for
inspections of critical facilities to ensure that operators implemented appropriate security
practices. To convey emergency information and warnings, the OPS established communication
links to key staff at the most critical pipeline facilities throughout the country. The OPS also
began identifying near-term technology to enhance deterrence, detection, response, and recovery,
and began seeking to advance public and private sector planning for response and recovery.38
On September 5, 2002, the OPS circulated guidance developed in cooperation with the pipeline
industry defining the agency’s security program recommendations and implementation
expectations. This guidance recommended that operators identify critical facilities, develop
security plans consistent with prior trade association security guidance, implement these plans,
and review them annually.39 Although the guidance was voluntary, the OPS expected compliance
and informed operators of its intent to begin reviewing security programs within 12 months,
potentially as part of more comprehensive safety inspections.40 Federal pipeline security authority
34 Presidential Decision Directive 63, Protecting the Nation’s Critical Infrastructures, May 22, 1998.
35 In November 2004, the President signed the Norman Y. Mineta Research and Special Programs Improvement Act
(P.L. 108-426), which eliminated RSPA and placed the Office of Pipeline Safety under the new Pipeline and Hazardous
Material Safety Administration. This restructuring did not significantly alter the authorities or activities of the OPS.
36 Research and Special Programs Administration (RSPA), RSPA Pipeline Security Preparedness, December 2001.
37 Ellen Engleman, Administrator, Research and Special Programs Administration (RSPA), statement before the
Subcommittee on Energy and Air Quality, House Energy and Commerce Committee, March 19, 2002.
38 Ellen Engleman, Administrator, Research and Special Programs Administration (RSPA), statement before the
Subcommittee on Highways and Transit, House Transportation and Infrastructure Committee, February 13, 2002.
39 James K. O’Steen, Research and Special Programs Administration (RSPA), Implementation of RSPA Security
Guidance, presentation to the National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners, February 25, 2003.
40 Office of Pipeline Safety (OPS), personal communication, June 10, 2003.
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was subsequently transferred outside of DOT, however, as discussed below, so the OPS did not
follow through on a national program of pipeline security program reviews.
Pipeline Safety Improvement Act of 2002
On December 12, 2002, President Bush signed into law the Pipeline Safety Improvement Act of
2002 (P.L. 107-355). The act strengthened federal pipeline safety programs, state oversight of
pipeline operators, and public education regarding pipeline safety.41 Among other provisions, P.L.
107-355 required operators of regulated natural gas pipelines in high-consequence areas to
conduct risk analysis and implement integrity management programs similar to those required for
oil pipelines.42 The act authorized the DOT to order safety actions for pipelines with potential
safety problems and increased violation penalties. The act streamlined the permitting process for
emergency pipeline restoration by establishing an interagency committee, including the DOT, the
Environmental Protection Agency, the Bureau of Land Management, the Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission, and other agencies, to ensure coordinated review and permitting of
pipeline repairs. The act required DOT to study ways to limit pipeline safety risks from
population encroachment and ways to preserve environmental resources in pipeline rights-of-way.
P.L. 107-355 also included provisions for public education, grants for community pipeline safety
studies, “whistle blower” and other employee protection, employee qualification programs, and
mapping data submission.
Pipeline Inspection, Protection, Enforcement, and Safety Act of 2006
On December 29, 2006, President Bush signed into law the Pipeline Inspection, Protection,
Enforcement and Safety Act of 2006 (PIPES Act, P.L. 109-468). The main provisions of the act
address pipeline damage prevention, integrity management, corrosion control, and enforcement
transparency. The PIPES act created a national focus on pipeline damage prevention through
grants to states for improving damage prevention programs, establishing 811 as national “call
before you dig” one-call telephone number, and giving PHMSA limited “backstop” authority to
conduct civil enforcement against one-call violators in states that have failed to conduct such
enforcement. The act mandated the promulgation by PHMSA of minimum standards for integrity
management programs for natural gas distribution pipelines.43 It also mandated a review of the
adequacy of federal pipeline safety regulations related to internal corrosion control, and required
PHMSA to increase the transparency of enforcement actions by issuing monthly summaries,
including violation and penalty information, and a mechanism for pipeline operators to make
response information available to the public.
41 P.L. 107-355 encourages the implementation of state “one-call” excavation notification programs (§ 2) and allows
states to enforce “one-call” program requirements. The act expands criminal responsibility for pipeline damage to cases
where damage was not caused “knowingly and willfully” (§ 3). The act adds provisions for ending federal-state
pipeline oversight partnerships if states do not comply with federal requirements (§ 4).
42 A 2006 Government Accountability Office (GAO) report found that PHMSA’s gas integrity management program
benefitted public safety, although the report recommended revisions to PHMSA’s performance measures. See GAO,
“Natural Gas Pipeline Safety: Integrity Management Benefits Public Safety, but Consistency of Performance Measures
Should Be Improved,” GAO-06-946, September 8, 2006, pp. 2-3.
43 PHMSA issued final regulations requiring operators of natural gas distribution pipelines to adopt integrity
management programs similar to existing requirements for gas transmission pipelines on December 4, 2009.
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Transportation Security Administration
In November 2001, President Bush signed the Aviation and Transportation Security Act (P.L. 107-
71) establishing the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) within the DOT. According to
TSA, the act placed the DOT’s pipeline security authority (under PDD-63) within TSA. The act
specified for TSA a range of duties and powers related to general transportation security, such as
intelligence management, threat assessment, mitigation, security measure oversight and
enforcement, among others. On November 25, 2002, President Bush signed the Homeland
Security Act of 2002 (P.L. 107-296) creating the Department of Homeland Security (DHS).
Among other provisions, the act transferred to DHS the Transportation Security Administration
from the DOT (§403). On December 17, 2003, President Bush issued Homeland Security
Presidential Directive 7 (HSPD-7), clarifying executive agency responsibilities for identifying,
prioritizing, and protecting critical infrastructure.44 HSPD-7 maintains DHS as the lead agency
for pipeline security (par. 15), and instructs the DOT to “collaborate in regulating the
transportation of hazardous materials by all modes (including pipelines)” (par. 22h). The order
requires that DHS and other federal agencies collaborate with “appropriate private sector entities”
in sharing information and protecting critical infrastructure (par. 25). TSA joined both the Energy
Government Coordinating Council and the Transportation Government Coordinating Council
under provisions in HSPD-7. The missions of the councils are to work with their industry
counterparts to coordinate critical infrastructure protection programs in the energy and
transportation sectors, respectively, and to facilitate the sharing of security information.
HSPD-7 also required DHS to develop a national plan for critical infrastructure and key resources
protection (par. 27), which the agency issued in 2006 as the National Infrastructure Protection
Plan (NIPP). The NIPP, in turn, required each critical infrastructure sector to develop a Sector
Specific Plan (SSP) that describes strategies to protect its critical infrastructure, outlines a
coordinated approach to strengthen its security efforts, and determines appropriate funding for
these activities. Executive Order 13416 further required the transportation sector SSP to prepare
annexes for each mode of surface transportation.45 In accordance with the above requirements the
TSA issued its Transportation Systems Sector Specific Plan and Pipeline Modal Annex in 2007.
TSA Pipeline Security Activities
Pipeline security activities at TSA are led by the Pipeline Security Division (PSD) within the
agency’s Office of Transportation Sector Network Management.46 According to the agency’s
Pipeline Modal Annex (PMA), TSA has been engaged in a number of specific pipeline security
initiatives since 2003 as summarized in Table 1.
44 HSPD-7 supersedes PDD-63 (par. 37).
45 Executive Order 13416, “Strengthening Surface Transportation Security,” December 5, 2006.
46 These offices were formerly known as the Pipeline Security Program Office and the Intermodal Security Program
Office, respectively.
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Table 1. TSA Pipeline Security Initiatives
Initiative Description
Participantsa
Pipeline Policy and
Coordination, development, implementation, and monitoring of
TSA, DHS, DOT,
Planning
pipeline security plans
DOE
Sector Coordinating
Government partners coordinate interagency and cross-
TSA, DOE, Other
Councils and Joint
jurisdictional implementation of critical infrastructure security
agencies, Industry
Sector Committee
Corporate Security
On-site reviews of pipeline operator security
TSA, Industry
Reviews (CSR)
Pipeline System Risk
Statistical tool used for relative risk ranking and prioritizing CSR
TSA, Industry
Tool
findings
Pipeline Cross-Border
U.S. and Canadian security assessment and planning for critical
TSA, Canada
Vulnerability
cross-border pipeline
Assessment
Regional Gas Pipeline
Regional supply studies for key natural gas markets
TSA, DOE, INGAA,
Studies
GTI, NETL, Industry
Cyber Attack
Training/presentations on Supervisory Control and Data
TSA, GTI
Awareness
Acquisition (SCADA) system vulnerabilities
Landscape Depiction
Incorporates depiction of the pipeline domain with risk analysis
TSA
and Analysis Tool
components
International Pipeline
International forums for U.S. and Canadian governments and
TSA, Canada, Other
Security Forums
pipeline industry officials convened annual y
agencies, Industry
“G8” Multinational
Multinational-sharing of pipeline threat assessment methods,
TSA, DHS, State
Security Assessment and advisory levels, effective practices, and vulnerability information;
Dept., G8 Nations
Planning
also develops a G8-based contingency planning guidance
document
Pipeline Security Drills
Facilitation of pipeline security drills and exercises
TSA, Industry
Security Awareness
Informational compact discs about pipeline security issues and
TSA
Training
improvised explosive devices
Stakeholder Conference Periodic information-sharing conference calls between key
TSA, Other agencies,
Calls
pipeline security stakeholders
Industry
Pipeline Blast Mitigation
Explosives tests on various pipe configurations to determine
TSA, DOD, Other
Studies
resiliency characteristics
agencies
Virtual Library Pipeline
Development of TSA information-sharing Web portal
TSA
Site
Sources: Transportation Security Administration, Pipeline Modal Annex, June 2007, pp. 10-11,
http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/Transportation_Pipeline_Modal_Annex_5_21_07.pdf; Jack Fox,
Transportation Security Administration, Testimony before the House Committee on Homeland Security,
Subcommittee on Management, Investigations, and Oversight, April 19, 2010
a. Key: DHS = Dept. Of Homeland Security, DOE = Dept. of Energy, G8 = Group of Eight (U.S., U.K.,
Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, and Russia), GTI = Gas Technology Institute, INGAA = Interstate
Natural Gas Association of America, NETL = National Energy Technology Laboratory, TSA =
Transportation Security Administration.
In 2003, TSA initiated its Corporate Security Review (CSR) program, wherein the agency visits
the largest pipeline and natural gas distribution operators to review their security plans and
inspect their facilities. During the reviews, TSA evaluates whether each company is following the
intent of the OPS security guidance, and seeks to collect the list of assets each company had
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identified meeting the criteria established for critical facilities. In 2004, the DOT reported that the
plans reviewed to date (approximately 25) had been “judged responsive to the OPS guidance.”47
TSA has completed CSRs covering the largest 100 pipeline systems (84% of total U.S. energy
pipeline throughput) and is in the process of conducting second CSRs of these systems.48
According to TSA, CSR results indicate that the majority of U.S. pipeline systems “continue to
do a good job in regards to pipeline security” although there are areas in which pipeline security
can be improved.49 Past CSR reviews have identified inadequacies in some company security
programs such as not updating security plans, lack of management support, poor employee
involvement, inadequate threat intelligence, and employee apathy or error.50 In 2008, the TSA
initiated its Critical Facility Inspection Program (CFI), under which the agency conducts in-depth
inspections of all the critical facilities of the 125 largest pipeline systems in the United States. The
agency estimates that these 125 pipeline systems collectively include approximately 600 distinct
critical facilities.51 TSA expects to visit 120 critical facilities each year.52
In addition to the initiatives in Table 1, TSA has worked to establish qualifications for personnel
applying for positions with unrestricted access to critical pipeline assets and has developed its
own inventory of critical pipeline infrastructure.53 The agency has also addressed legal issues
regarding recovery from terrorist attacks, such as FBI control of crime scenes and eminent
domain in pipeline restoration. In October 2005, TSA issued an overview of recommended
security practices for pipeline operators “for informational purposes only ... not intended to
replace security measures already implemented by individual companies.”54 The agency released
revised pipeline security guidelines in 2006, 2010, and 2011. The guidelines include a section on
cybersecurity developed with the assistance of the Applied Physics Laboratory of Johns Hopkins
University as well as other government and industry stakeholders.55
The President’s FY2012 budget request for DHS did not include a separate line item for TSA’s
pipeline security activities. The budget request did include a $134.7 million line item for “Surface
Transportation Security,” which encompasses security activities in non-aviation transportation
modes, including pipelines.56 The PSD has traditionally received from the agency’s general
operational budget an allocation for routine operations such as regulation development, travel,
47 Department of Transportation (DOT), “Action Taken and Actions Needed to Improve Pipeline Safety,” CC-2004-
061, June 16, 2004, p. 21.
48 Government Accountability Office (GAO), Pipeline Security: TSA Has Taken Actions to Help Strengthen Security,
but Could Improve Priority-Setting and Assessment Processes, GAO-10-867, August, 2010, Executive Summary.
49 Transportation Security Administration, personal communication, November 5, 2010.
50 Mike Gillenwater, TSA, “Pipeline Security Overview,” presented to the Alabama Public Service Commission Gas
Pipeline Safety Seminar, Montgomery, AL, December 11, 2007.
51 Department of Homeland Security, “Extension of Agency Information Collection Activity Under OMB Review:
Critical Facility Information of the Top 100 Most Critical Pipelines,” 76 Federal Register 62818, October 11, 2011.
52 Ibid.
53 TSA, TSA Multi-Modal Criticality Evaluation Tool, TSA Threat Assessment and Risk Management Program, slide
presentation, April 15, 2003.
54 TSA, Intermodal Security Program Office, Pipeline Security Best Practices, October 19, 2005, p. 1.
55 Transportation Security Administration, Pipeline Security Guidelines, April, 2011, pp. 16-19; Personal
communication, February 2, 2010.
56 U.S. Office of Management and Budget, Budget of the United States Government, Fiscal Year 2012: Appendix,
February 2012, p. 508.
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and outreach. According to the PSD, the budget funds 13 full-time equivalent staff within the
office.57
In 2007 the TSA Administrator testified before Congress that the agency intended to conduct a
pipeline infrastructure study to identify the “highest risk” pipeline assets, building upon such a
list developed through the CSR program. He also stated that the agency would use its ongoing
security review process to determine the future implementation of baseline risk standards against
which to set measurable pipeline risk reduction targets.58 Provisions in the Implementing
Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 (P.L. 110-53) require TSA, in
consultation with PHMSA, to develop a plan for the federal government to provide increased
security support to the “most critical” pipelines at high or severe security alert levels and when
there is specific security threat information relating to such pipeline infrastructure (§1558(a)(1)).
The act also requires a recovery protocol plan in the event of an incident affecting the interstate
and intrastate pipeline system (§1558(a)(2)). TSA published this plan in 2010.
Security Incident Investigations
In addition to the above pipeline security initiatives, the TSA Pipeline Security Division has
performed a limited number of vulnerability assessments and has supported investigations for
specific companies and assets where intelligence information has suggested potential terrorist
activity. The PSD, along with PHMSA, was involved in the investigation of an August 2006
security breach at an LNG peak-shaving plant in Lynn, MA.59 Although not a terrorist incident,
the security breach involved the penetration of intruders through several security barriers and
alert systems, permitting them to access the main LNG storage tank at the facility. The PSD also
became aware of the JFK airport terrorist plot in its early stages and supported the Federal Bureau
of Investigation’s associated investigation. The PSD engaged the private sector in helping to
assess potential targets and determine potential consequences. The PSD worked with the pipeline
company to keep it informed about the plot, discuss its security practices, and review its
emergency response plans.60
GAO Study of TSA’s Pipeline Security Activities
In December 2008, the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation requested a
study by the Government Accountability Office (GAO) examining TSA’s efforts to ensure
pipeline security. GAO’s report, released in August 2010, focused on TSA’s use of risk
assessment and risk information in securing pipelines, actions the agency has taken to improve
pipeline security under guidance in the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 (P.L. 110-53), and the
agency’s efforts to measure such security improvement efforts.61 Among other findings, GAO
57 Transportation Security Administration, Pipeline Security Division, personal communication, November 5, 2010.
58 Kip Hawley, Assistant Secretary, Department of Homeland Security, Testimony before the Senate Committee on
Commerce, Science, and Transportation hearing on Federal Efforts for Rail and Surface Transportation Security,
January 18, 2007.
59 Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA), “Pipeline Safety: Lessons Learned From a
Security Breach at a Liquefied Natural Gas Facility,” Docket No. PHMSA-04-19856, Federal Register, Vol. 71, No.
249, December 28, 2006, p. 78269; TSA, Intermodal Security Program Office, personal communication, August 30,
2006.
60 Transportation Security Administration, personal communication, July 6, 2007.
61 Government Accountability Office, GAO Watchdog, “Transportation Security’s Efforts To Ensure Pipeline
(continued...)
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concluded that, although TSA had begun to implement a risk management approach to prioritize
its pipeline security efforts, work remained to ensure that the highest risk pipeline systems would
get the necessary scrutiny. GAO also concluded that TSA was missing opportunities under its
CSR and CFI programs to better ensure that pipeline operators understand how they can enhance
the security of their pipeline systems. TSA could also make better use of CSR and CFI
recommendations for analyzing pipeline vulnerabilities and was not following up on these
recommendations. GAO found that linking TSA’s pipeline security performance measures and
milestones to the goals and objectives in its national security strategy for pipeline systems could
aid in achieving results within specific time frames and could facilitate more effective oversight
and accountability.62 TSA concurred with all of GAO’s recommendations for addressing the
issues and has since been implementing them.63
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
One area related to pipeline safety and security not under either PHMSA’s or TSA’s primary
jurisdiction is the siting approval of new gas pipelines, which is the responsibility of the Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC). Companies building interstate natural gas pipelines
must first obtain from FERC certificates of public convenience and necessity. (FERC does not
oversee oil pipeline construction.) FERC must also approve the abandonment of gas facility use
and services. These approvals may include safety and security provisions with respect to pipeline
routing, safety standards and other factors.64 As a practical matter, however, FERC has
traditionally left these considerations to the other agencies.65
On September 14, 2001, FERC notified jurisdictional companies that it would “approve
applications proposing the recovery of prudently incurred costs necessary to further safeguard the
nation’s energy systems and infrastructure” in response to the terror attacks of 9/11. FERC also
committed to “expedite the processing on a priority basis of any application that would
specifically recover such costs from wholesale customers.” Companies could propose a surcharge
over currently existing rates or some other cost recovery method.66 In FY2005, the commission
processed security cost recovery requests from 14 oil pipelines and 3 natural gas pipelines.67
FERC’s FY2006 annual report stated that “the Commission continues to give the highest priority
to deciding any requests made for the recovery of extraordinary expenditures to safeguard the
reliability and security of the Nation’s energy transportation systems and energy supply
infrastructure.”68 FERC’s subsequent annual reports do not mention pipeline security.
(...continued)
Security,” Assignment No. 440768, Internet database, February 4, 2010.
62 U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO), Pipeline Security: TSA Has Taken Actions to Help Strengthen
Security, but Could Improve Priority-Setting and Assessment Processes, GAO-10-867, August, 2010, pp. 54-55.
63 Jerald E. Levine, Director, Departmental GAO/OIG Liaison Office, U.S. Dept. of Homeland Security, Letter to
GAO, July 23, 2010.
64 U.S. Code of Federal Regulations. 18 C.F.R. 157.
65 Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC), personal communication, May 22, 2003.
66 Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC), News release, R-01-38, Washington, DC, September 14, 2001.
67 Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC), Federal Energy Regulatory Commission Annual Report FY2005,
2006, p. 19. These are the most recent specific figures reported.
68 Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC), Federal Energy Regulatory Commission Annual Report FY2006,
2007, p. 23.
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In February 2003, FERC promulgated a new rule (RM02-4-000) to protect critical energy
infrastructure information (CEII). The rule defines CEII as information that “must relate to
critical infrastructure, be potentially useful to terrorists, and be exempt from disclosure under the
Freedom of Information Act.” According to the rule, critical infrastructure is “existing and
proposed systems and assets, whether physical or virtual, the incapacity or destruction of which
would negatively affect security, economic security, public health or safety, or any combination of
those matters.” CEII excludes “information that identifies the location of infrastructure.” The rule
also establishes procedures for the public to request and obtain such critical information, and
applies both to proposed and existing infrastructure.69
On May 14, 2003, FERC handed down new rules (RM03-4) facilitating the restoration of
pipelines after a terrorist attack. The rules allow owners of a damaged pipeline to use blanket
certificate authority to immediately start rebuilding, regardless of project cost, even outside
existing rights-of-way. Pipeline owners would still need to notify landowners and comply with
environmental laws. Prior rules limited blanket authority to $17.5 million projects and 45-day
advance notice.70
National Transportation Safety Board
The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) is an independent federal agency charged with
determining the probable cause of transportation accidents (including pipeline accidents),
promoting transportation safety, and assisting accident victims and their families. The board’s
experts investigate significant accidents, develop factual records, and issue safety
recommendations to prevent similar accidents from recurring. The NTSB has no statutory
authority to regulate transportation, however, so its safety recommendations to industry or
government agencies are not mandatory. Nonetheless, because of the board’s strong reputation for
thoroughness and objectivity, the average acceptance rate for its safety recommendations is over
80%.71
San Bruno Pipeline Accident Investigation
In August 2011, the NTSB issued preliminary findings and recommendations from its
investigation of the San Bruno Pipeline accident. The investigation included testimony from
pipeline company officials, government agency officials (PHMSA, state, and local), as well as
testimony from other pipeline experts and stakeholders. In addition to specifics about the San
Bruno incident, the hearing addressed more general pipeline issues, including public awareness
initiatives, pipeline technology, and oversight of pipeline safety by federal and state regulators.72
The NTSB’s findings were highly critical of the pipeline operator (PG&E) as well as both the
state and federal pipeline safety regulators. The board concluded that “the multiple and recurring
69 Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC), News release, R-03-08, Washington, DC. February 20, 2003.
70 Christian Schmollinger, “FERC OKs Emergency Reconstruction,” Natural Gas Week, May 13, 2003.
71 National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB), 2010 Annual Report, NTSB/SPC-11/01, p. iii.
72 National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB), “Public Hearing: Natural Gas Pipeline Explosion and Fire, San
Bruno, CA, September 9, 2010,” web page, March 15, 2011, http://www.ntsb.gov/Events/2011/San_Bruno_CA/
default.htm.
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deficiencies in PG&E operational practices indicate a systemic problem” with respect to its
pipeline safety program.73 The board further concluded that
the pipeline safety regulator within the state of California, failed to detect the inadequacies in
PG&E’s integrity management program and that the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials
Safety Administration integrity management inspection protocols need improvement.
Because the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration has not incorporated
the use of effective and meaningful metrics as part of its guidance for performance-based
management pipeline safety programs, its oversight of state public utility commissions
regulating gas transmission and hazardous liquid pipelines could be improved.
In her opening statement about the San Bruno accident report, NTSB Chairman Hersman
summarized the board’s findings as “troubling revelations … about a company that exploited
weaknesses in a lax system of oversight and government agencies that placed a blind trust in
operators to the detriment of public safety.”74 The NTSB’s final accident report “concludes that
PHMSA’s enforcement program and its monitoring of state oversight programs have been weak
and have resulted in the lack of effective Federal oversight and state oversight.”75
The NTSB issued 39 recommendations stemming from its San Bruno accident investigation,
including 20 recommendations to the Secretary of Transportation and PHMSA. These
recommendations included:
• Conducting audits to assess the effectiveness of PHMSA’s oversight of
performance-based pipeline safety programs and state pipeline safety program
certification,
• Requiring pipeline operators to provide system-specific information to the
emergency response agencies of the communities in which pipelines are located,
• Requiring that automatic shutoff valves or remote control valves be installed in
high consequence areas and in class 3 and 4 locations,76
• Requiring that all natural gas transmission pipelines constructed before 1970 be
subjected to a hydrostatic pressure test that incorporates a spike test,
• Requiring that all natural gas transmission pipelines be configured so as to
accommodate internal inspection tools, with priority given to older pipelines, and
• Revising PHMSA’s integrity management protocol to incorporate meaningful
metrics, set performance goals for pipeline operators, and require operators to
regularly assess the effectiveness of their programs using meaningful metrics.77
73 National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB), “Pacific Gas and Electric Company Natural Gas Transmission
Pipeline Rupture and Fire, San Bruno, CA, September 9, 2010,” NTSB/PAR-11/01, August 30, 2011, p.118.
74 Deborah A.P. Hersman, Chairman, National Transportation Safety Board, “Opening Statement, Pipeline Accident
Report – San Bruno, California, September 9, 2010,” August 30, 2011.
75 NTSB, August 30, 2011, p. 123.
76 Generally, Class 3 locations have 46 or more buildings intended for human occupancy or lie within 100 yards of
either a building or outside area of public assembly; Class 4 locations are areas where buildings with four or more
stories are prevalent. For precise definitions, see 49 C.F.R. 192.5.
77 NTSB, August 30, 2011, pp. 128-132.
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More detailed discussion of the accident findings and the NTSB’s recommendations are publicly
available in the final accident report.
Key Policy Issues
The 112th Congress reauthorized the federal pipeline safety program and enacted a number of new
pipeline safety provisions. In the context of its continuing oversight of federal pipeline safety and
security activities, and in addition to the findings of the NTSB’s San Bruno investigation,
Congress may focus on certain key issues that have drawn particular attention in recent policy
deliberations.
Staffing Resources for Pipeline Safety and Security
The U.S. pipeline safety program employs a combination of federal and state staff to implement
and enforce federal pipeline safety regulations. To date, PHMSA has relied heavily on state
agencies for pipeline inspections, with only approximately 20% of inspectors in 2011 being
federal employees. Some in Congress have criticized inspector staffing at PHMSA as being
insufficient to adequately cover pipelines under the agency’s jurisdiction, notwithstanding state
agency cooperation. In considering potential PHMSA staff increases, three distinct issues are the
overall number of federal inspectors, the agency’s historical use of staff funding, and the staffing
of pipeline safety inspectors among the states.
PHMSA Inspectors
The President’s FY2012 budget request listed PHMSA’s estimated staffing in 2011 under the
continuing resolution as 206 full-time equivalent employees (FTEs). As Figure 1 shows, the
addition of 10 inspection and enforcement staff under P.L. 112-90 would be a modest
continuation of staff growth (of mostly inspectors) begun 10 years ago in response to the 1999
Bellingham accident, the terrorist attacks of 9/11, implementation of PHMSA’s integrity
management regulations, and the continued growth of U.S. pipelines.
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Figure 1. PHMSA Pipeline Safety Staffing, Historical and Proposed under P.L. 112-90
Ful -Time Equivalent Staff
250
200
150
100
50
0
994
995
996
997
998
999
000
001
002
003
004
005
006
007
008
009
010
011
012
013
014
1
1
1
1
1
1
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
Estimated
Proposed
Sources: U.S. Office of Management and Budget, Budget of the United States Government: Appendix, Fiscal
Years1996-2011; P.L. 112-90 § 31(b).
Notes: Estimated staff are staff anticipated by the agency as reported in annual budget requests. They may differ
from actual staff employed (for the same fiscal year) as reported in subsequent budget requests.
Whether an increase of 10 PHMSA pipeline safety staff by 2014, in addition to filling all
previously authorized positions, would be the optimal number remains to be seen.
PHMSA Staffing Shortfalls
One issue that complicates the PHMSA staffing debate is a long-term pattern of understaffing in
the agency’s pipeline safety program. At least as far back as 1994, PHMSA’s (or RSPA’s) actual
staffing for pipeline safety as reported in each of its annual budgets requests has fallen short of
the level of staffing anticipated in the prior year’s budget request. For example, the president’s
FY2011 budget request for pipeline safety reports 175 actual employees in 2009. However, the
FY2010 budget request stated an expectation of 191 employees (“estimated”) for 2009. On this
basis, between 2001 and 2009, the agency reported a staffing shortfall averaging approximately
24 employees every year. (Note that, due to this annual shortfall, the FTEs reported in Figure 1
are higher than the number actually employed by PHMSA.) In testimony before Congress in
September 2010, DOT officials reported that PHMSA employed only 110 of 137 inspectors for
which it was funded—a shortfall of 27 inspectors.78 In March 2011, agency officials reported 126
inspectors employed.79 As of February 6, 2012, there were no vacancies posted for a PHMSA
pipeline safety inspector position at the USAJobs website.
78 John D. Porcari, Deputy Secretary, U.S. Department of Transportation, Testimony before the House Committee on
Transportation and Infrastructure, Hearing on the Enbridge Pipeline Oil Spill in Marshall, MI, September 15, 2010.
79 Linda Daugherty, Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration, Testimony before the National
Transportation Safety Board hearing “Natural Gas Pipeline Explosion and Fire, San Bruno, CA, September 9, 2010,”
March 2, 2011.
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Table 2. Actual vs. Anticipated Pipeline Safety Staff in DOT Budget Requests
Ful -Time Equivalent Staff
Year Actual
Anticipated
Difference
1994 62 90 -28
1995 71 90 -19
1996 84 105 -21
1997 92 105 -13
1998 97 105 -8
1999 93 105 -12
2000 97 105 -8
2001 96 107 -11
2002 100 122 -22
2003 111 143 -32
2004 125 156 -31
2005 154 164 -10
2006 139 169 -30
2007 146 170 -24
2008 147 180 -33
2009 175 191 -16
Sources: U.S. Office of Management and Budget, Budget of the United States Government: Appendix, Fiscal
Years1996-2011; CRS analysis.
PHMSA officials offer a number of reasons for the persistent shortfall in inspector staffing. These
reasons include a scarcity of qualified inspector job applicants, delays in the federal hiring
process during which applicants accept other job offers, and PHMSA inspector turnover—
especially to pipeline companies which often hire away PHMSA inspectors for their corporate
safety programs. Because PHMSA pipeline inspectors are highly trained by the agency (typically
for two years before being allowed to operate independently) they are highly valued by pipeline
operators seeking to comply with federal safety regulations. PHMSA officials also cite structural
issues associated with the agency’s appropriations which can require the use of FTE salary
funding to meet other obligations.80 P.L. 112-90 requires the DOT to report on PHMSA’s pipeline
staffing shortfalls, including the reasons for such shortfalls, and actions the agency is taking to fill
the positions (§ 31(a)).
State Pipeline Inspector Funding
Because state agencies would continue to account for the majority of U.S. pipeline safety
inspectors under P.L. 112-90, another important consideration is how the number of state
inspectors might be affected by budget shortfalls and possible agency funding cuts faced by many
states due to the recent U.S. economic recession. Under P.L. 109-468 (§2(c)), PHMSA is
authorized to award grants reimbursing state governments for up to 80% of the cost of the staff,
personnel, and activities required to support the federal pipeline safety program (although
reimbursement has not reached the 80% level since the passage of the act). According to DOT,
80 Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration, personal communication, November 4, 2010.
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these grant are essential to “enable the states to continue their current programs and hire
additional inspectors ... [and] assure that states do not turn over responsibility for distribution
pipeline systems to the Federal inspectors,” among other reasons.81 Notwithstanding these federal
grants, inspector staffing at state pipeline safety agencies has been negatively affected by state
budget deficits. According to the National Association of Pipeline Safety Representatives,
pipeline safety employees in 17 states have been furloughed without pay for up to three weeks.82
PHMSA officials have also reportedly cited unfilled positions among state pipeline safety
agencies as eroding the state pipeline safety workforce.83 Senior DOT officials consider financial
problems among state pipeline safety agencies a matter of “great concern” and have granted to
states waivers from certain regulatory financial requirements to increase their access to federal
grant money.84 Nonetheless, the future availability of state pipeline safety inspectors remains
uncertain. In particular, the possibility that some states may choose to end their roles as agents for
the federal pipeline safety program—or that states may lose federal pipeline safety program
certification for performance reasons—and thereby shift a greater burden for pipeline inspections
back to the federal government, may warrant continued attention from Congress.
TSA Pipelines Security Resources
Similar to its concerns about the adequacy of federal pipeline safety staffing, Congress has long
been concerned about staff resources available to implement the nation’s pipeline security
program. For example, as one Member remarked in 2005, “aviation security has received 90% of
TSA’s funds and virtually all of its attention. There is simply not enough being done to address ...
pipeline security.”85 At a congressional field hearing in April 2010, another Member expressed
concern that TSA’s pipeline division did not have sufficient staff to carry out a federal pipeline
security program on a national scale.86
At its current staffing level of 13 FTEs, TSA’s Pipelines Security Division has limited field
presence. In conducting a pipeline corporate security review, for example, TSA typically sends
one to three staff to hold a three- to four-hour interview with the operator’s security
representatives followed by a visit to only one or two of the operator’s pipeline assets.87 TSA’s
81 U.S. Department of Transportation, Pipeline And Hazardous Materials Safety Administration, FY 2011 Budget
Request, February 1, 2010, p. 31, http://www.dot.gov/budget/2011/budgetestimates/phmsa.pdf.
82 National Association of Pipeline Safety Representatives, RE: Request for Waiver of Prior Three Year Average State
Expense Component of the Pipeline Safety Grant Program, letter to Mr. Jeffrey D. Weise, Associate Administrator for
Pipeline Safety, Pipeline And Hazardous Materials Safety Administration, October 15, 2010, http://www.wutc.wa.gov/
webimage.nsf/web+objects/CCOPS_DOCs_by_Year/$file/NAPSR%20letter%20to%20PHMSA%20dated%2010-15-
09-Waiver%20Request.pdf.
83 Stephanie Seay, “Budget Woes May Impede Local Pipe Safety Efforts,” Gas Daily, November 8, 2010.
84 The Honorable Cynthia Quarterman, Administrator, Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration,
Remarks at the Different Pathways to a Common Goal: PIPA, Damage Prevention, & Greater Public Awareness and
Involvement Conference, Pipeline Safety Trust, New Orleans, LA, November 5, 2010.
85 Senator Daniel K. Inouye, opening statement before the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science and
Transportation, hearing on the President’s FY2006 Budget Request for the Transportation Security Administration
(TSA), February 15, 2005.
86 Congressman Gus M. Billirakis, Remarks before the House Committee on Homeland Security, Subcommittee on
Management, Investigations, and Oversight hearing on “Unclogging Pipeline Security: Are the Lines of Responsibility
Clear?,” Plant City, FL, April 19, 2010.
87 Department of Homeland Security, “Intent to Request Approval from OMB of One New Public Collection of
Information: Pipeline Corporate Security Review,” 74 Federal Register 42086, August 20, 2009.
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plan to focus security inspections on the largest pipeline and distribution system operators tries to
make the best use of its limited resources. However, there are questions as to whether the
agency’s CSRs as currently structured allow for rigorous security plan verification and a credible
threat of enforcement. The limited number of CSRs the agency can complete in a year is a
particular concern. According to a 2009 GAO report, “TSA’s pipeline division stated that they
would like more staff in order to conduct its corporate security reviews more frequently,” and
“analyzing secondary or indirect consequences of a terrorist attack and developing strategic risk
objectives required much time and effort.”88 P.L. 110-53 specifically authorized funding of $2
million annually through FY2010 for TSA’s pipeline security inspections and enforcement
program (§1557(e)). It is an open question whether $2 million annually, were this funding to
continue, would be sufficient to enable TSA to meet congressional expectations for federal
pipeline security activities.
Since both PHMSA and TSA have played important roles in the federal pipeline security
program, with TSA the designated lead agency since 2002, Congress has raised questions about
the appropriate responsibilities and division of pipeline security authority between them.89
According to TSA, the two agencies have established “a 24/7 communication and coordination
relationship in regards to all pipeline security and safety incidents.”90 Nonetheless, given the
limited staff in TSA’s pipeline security division, and the comparatively large pipeline safety staff
(especially inspectors) in PHMSA, legislators have considered whether the TSA-PHMSA
pipeline security relationship optimally aligns staff resources across both agencies to fulfill the
nation’s overall pipeline safety and security mission.91 The Transportation Security
Administration Authorization Act of 2011 (H.R. 3011) would mandate a study regarding the
relative roles and responsibilities of the Department of Homeland Security and the Department of
Transportation with respect to pipeline security (§325).92
Automatic Shutoff Valves for Transmission Pipelines
In the 2010 San Bruno pipeline accident, natural gas continued to flow from the pipeline for
nearly two hours after the initial explosion—fueling the intense fire, hindering emergency
response, and increasing fire damage. The long duration of flowing gas reportedly was due to
delays in the closing of manually operated valves by the pipeline operator, and may have been
exacerbated by inadequate employee training in valve closure procedures.93 Consequently, some
advocates have called for widespread installation of remotely or automatically controlled valves
in natural gas and hazardous liquids transmission pipelines. As noted earlier, the NTSB has
recommended the installation of such valves in all “high consequence” and relatively more
populated areas. P.L. 112-90 requires automatic or remote-controlled shut-off valves, or
equivalent technology, where economically, technically, and operationally feasible on
88 U.S. Government Accountability Office, Transportation Security: Comprehensive Risk Assessments and Stronger
Internal Controls Needed to Help Inform TSA Resource Allocation, GAO-09-492, March 2009, p. 30,
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d09492.pdf.
89 For example, see Hon. William J. Pascrell, Jr., statement at the House Committee on Transportation and
Infrastructure, Subcommittee on Highways, Transit and Pipelines, hearing on Pipeline Safety, March 16, 2006.
90 TSA, Pipeline Security Division, personal communication, November 5, 2010.
91 Congressman Gus M. Billirakis, April 19, 2010.
92 The committee print is available at http://homeland.house.gov/sites/homeland.house.gov/files/documents/pdf/
091411_TS_Subcommittee%20Print.pdf.
93 John Upton, “Gas Fueled Blaze for Almost Two Hours,” San Francisco Examiner, Sept. 15, 2010.
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transmission pipeline facilities constructed or entirely replaced (§4(1)). The act also requires a
study on the ability of transmission pipeline operators to respond to a hazardous liquid or natural
gas release from pipelines located in high consequence areas (§4(2)).
Previous Consideration
The possibility of requiring remotely controlled or automatic shut off valves for natural gas
pipelines is not new. Congress previously considered such requirements in reaction to a 1994
natural gas pipeline fire in Edison, NJ, similar to the San Bruno accident in which it took the
pipeline operator 2½ hours to close its manually operated valves.94 In 1995, during the 104th
Congress, H.R. 432 and S. 162 would have required the installation of remotely or automatically
controlled valves in natural gas pipelines “wherever technically and economically feasible” (§11).
Under the Accountable Pipeline Safety and Partnership Act of 1996 (P.L. 104-304), Congress
mandated a DOT assessment of remotely controlled valves (RCVs) on interstate natural gas
pipelines, and empowered the agency to require such valves if appropriate based upon its findings
(§4(h)).
The DOT’s assessment, released in 1999, reported that installation of RCVs would provide only
“a small benefit from reduced casualties because virtually all casualties from a rupture occur
before an RVC could be activated.”95 Moreover, the DOT reported that it lacked data to compare
pipeline fire property damage with and without RCVs. Nonetheless, the DOT study advocated the
deployment of RCVs, at least in some gas pipeline locations.
We have found that RCVs are effective and technically feasible, and can reduce risk, but are
not economically feasible. We have also found that there may be a public perception that
RCVs will improve safety and reduce the risk from a ruptured gas pipeline. We believe there
is a role for RCVs in reducing the risk from certain ruptured pipelines and thereby
minimizing the consequences of certain gas pipeline ruptures.... Any fire would be of greater
intensity and would have greater potential for damaging surrounding infrastructure if it is
constantly replenished with gas. The degree of disruption in heavily populated and
commercial areas would be in direct proportion to the duration of the fire. Although we lack
data enabling us to quantify these potential consequences, we believe them to be significant
nonetheless, and we believe RCVs may provide the best means for addressing them.96
Notwithstanding this conclusion, the DOT has not mandated the use of RCVs in natural gas
transmission pipelines.
The natural gas pipeline industry historically has objected to federal mandates to install remotely
controlled or automated valves. Although pipeline operators already employ such valves under
specific circumstances, such as in hard-to-access locations or at compressor stations, they have
opposed the installation of such valves more widely throughout their pipeline systems on the
grounds that they are usually not cost-effective. They also argue that such valves do not always
function properly, would not prevent natural gas pipeline explosions (which cause most fatalities),
and are susceptible to false alarms, needlessly shutting down pipelines and disrupting critical fuel
94 National Transportation Safety Board, Texas Eastern Transmission Corporation Natural Gas Pipeline Explosion and
Fire, Edison, New Jersey, March 23, 1994, NTSB/PAR-95/01, January 18, 1995.
95 U.S. Department of Transportation, Remotely Controlled Valves on Interstate Natural Gas Pipelines, September
1999, p.22.
96 U.S. Department of Transportation, September 1999, pp. 23-24.
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supplies.97 Automatic valves, in particular, may be susceptible to unnecessary closure, potentially
disrupting critical flows of natural gas to distribution utilities and—as a result—increasing safety
risks associated with residential furnace relighting, among other concerns.98 Some operators also
claim higher maintenance costs for valves that are not manually operated.
Remotely Controlled Valves for Liquids Pipelines
The use of remotely controlled or automatic valves has also been a long-standing consideration
for hazardous liquid pipeline systems. The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) began
to address the need for rapid shutdown of failed hazardous liquid pipelines using remotely
controlled or automatic valves in the 1970s.99 In 1987, the NTSB recommended that the DOT
“require the installation of remote-operated valves on pipelines that transport hazardous liquids,
and base the spacing of remote-operated valves on the population at risk.”100 The Pipeline Safety
Act of 1992 (P.L. 102-508) required the DOT to assess the effectiveness of “emergency flow
restricting devices (including remotely controlled valves and check valves)” on hazardous liquid
pipelines, and required the DOT to “issue regulations prescribing the circumstances under which
operators of hazardous liquid pipeline facilities must use emergency flow restricting devices”
(§212). Notwithstanding this congressional mandate, the NTSB found the DOT’s efforts to
promote the use of such devices inadequate. In 1996, the NTSB stated that the DOT “has
performed studies, conducted research, and sought industry input, but has failed to carry through
and develop requirements for leak detection and rapid shutdown of failed pipelines.”101 In its
integrity management regulations, issued in December 2000, the DOT opted to leave the decision
whether to install emergency flow restricting devices up to pipeline operators.102
Valve Replacement Costs
Cost would be a major factor in a broad national program to retrofit manual valves with remotely
controlled or automatic valves. For example, in the interstate natural gas pipeline network, valves
are typically installed every 5 to 20 miles. Assuming a 10-mile separation between valves, the
nation’s 306,000 mile gas transmission system contains over 30,000 valves. The spacing of valves
can be much closer together in particular pipeline systems, however, such as systems located in
more populated areas. In October 2010 PG&E reported 300 valves that could be candidates for
automation in approximately 565 miles of high-consequence area pipelines in its California
system.103
97 Rich Connell, John Hoeffel and Marc Lifsher, “Lawmakers Move to Impose New Requirements for Pipeline Shutoff
Valves,” Los Angeles Times, September 14, 2010.
98 Christina Sames, Vice President, American Gas Association, Remarks at the Different Pathways to a Common Goal:
PIPA, Damage Prevention, & Greater Public Awareness and Involvement Conference, Pipeline Safety Trust, New
Orleans, LA, November 4, 2010
99 National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB), Pipeline Special Investigation Report: Evaluation of Accident Data
and Federal Oversight of Petroleum Product Pipelines, NTSB/SIR-96/02, 1996, p. 37.
100 Ibid.
101 Ibid. p. 39.
102 49 CFR 195.452(i)(4)
103 Pacific Gas and Electric Company, “Re: Updates on Natural Gas Transmission System,” Letter to the California
Public Utilities Commission, October 25, 2010, p. 2-2, http://www.pge.com/includes/docs/pdfs/about/newsroom/
puc_updates_oct252010.pdf.
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The potential costs of retrofitting manual valves vary greatly by pipeline and specific location. A
1998 Southwest Research Institute report estimated a cost of $32,000 (approximately $40,000 in
2010 dollars) per valve for retrofitting 30-inch pipeline valves to make them remotely
controlled.104 The DOT’s 1999 study reported an average cost of $83,000 (approximately
$100,000 in 2010 dollars) for Texas Eastern Transmission Corporation (TETCO) to retrofit 90
existing valves in a large part of its pipeline system.105 PG&E estimates the average cost of
retrofitting an automatic or remotely controlled valve on an existing large diameter pipeline at
approximately $750,000, but ranging as low as $100,000 and as high as $1.5 million.106
Applying, for illustration, a $100,000 cost to some 30,000 valves yields $3.0 billion in capital
investment required, not counting any higher future maintenance expenses. The American Gas
Association reportedly has estimated the cost of replacing manual valves with automatic valves
nationwide at $12 billion.107 Even if such valve retrofits were required only in heavily populated
areas, industry costs could still be hundreds of millions of dollars—a significant cost to the
pipeline industry and therefore likely to increase rates for pipeline transportation of natural gas.
To the extent that some pipeline systems, like PG&E’s, contain more valves then others per mile
of pipe, they could be disproportionately affected. Gas pipeline service interruptions would also
be an issue as specific lines could be repeatedly taken out of service during the valve retrofit
process. The hazardous liquids pipeline industry could face capital costs and service interruptions
of the same magnitude if required to do a widespread valve retrofit on existing lines. Additional
right-of-way costs, environmental impacts, and construction accidents associated with the valve
replacements could also be a consideration. For new pipelines, the incremental costs of installing
remotely controlled or automatic valves instead of manual valves would be lower than in the
retrofit case, but could still increase future pipeline costs.
SCADA and Leak Detection System Requirements
To effectively reduce the impact of pipeline accidents, installing remotely controlled or automatic
valves may require associated investments in supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA)
systems along with other operational changes to improve leak detection. As one pipeline expert
has stated,
The pipeline operator’s focus on keeping the pipeline system operating and the lack of
remotely-operable valves are the primary factors that control the quantity of product released
after a rupture or leak. Even with remote control valves this relationship will not change
unless the pipeline is equipped with a reliable leak detection subsystem that works with the
SCADA system and [unless] those who control pipeline operations are trained for and
dedicated to minimizing product release (safety and environmental mindset) rather than
trained for and dedicated to keeping the system operating (economic mindset).108
104 Cecil R. Sparks, Thomas R. Morrow, and John P. Harrell, “Cost Benefit Study of Remote Controlled Main Line
Valves, Final Report to Gas Research Institute,” Southwest Research Institute, San Antonio, TX, Report No. GRI-
GRI-98/0076, May 1998.
105 U.S. Department of Transportation, September 1999, p. 11.
106 Pacific Gas and Electric Company, October 25, 2010, p. 2-3.
107 John Upton, “PG&E Faces High Costs on Pipelines,” New York Times, March 3, 2011.
108 Charles H. Batten, “Engineering Analysis of Olympic Pipe Line Company’s Safety and Risk Mitigation Features for
Application No. 96-1 Cross Cascade Pipeline Project,” Batten & Associates, Inc., Locust Grove, VA, February 8, 1999,
p. 19, http://www.efsec.wa.gov/oplarchive/oplpft/Cca/chb-3.pdf.
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In its report about a 1996 pipeline accident in Tiger Pass, LA, the NTSB similarly concluded that
the operator’s “delay in recognition ... that it had experienced a pipeline rupture at Tiger Pass was
due to the piping system’s dynamics during the rupture and to the design of the company’s
SCADA system.”109 Estimates of converting manual valves may, therefore, need to account for
the costs of SCADA changes, leak detection systems, and associated training. These costs may
also include significant reliability and security components, since increasing reliance upon new or
expanded SCADA systems may also expose pipeline systems to greater risk from operating
software failure or cyberterrorism.110
Consistent with the concerns above, P.L. 112-90 requires a DOT analysis of the technical
limitations of leak detection systems as well as the feasibility of establishing standards for such
systems (§8(a)). After congressional review of this analysis, the act authorizes the DOT to issue
new leak detection standards if “practicable” (§8(b)).
Public Perceptions
Some stakeholders have argued that public perceptions of improved pipeline safety and control
are the highest perceived benefit of remotely controlled or automatic valves.111 Although the
value of these perceptions is hard to quantify (and, therefore, not typically reflected in cost-
effectiveness studies), the importance of public perception and community acceptance of pipeline
infrastructure can be a significant consideration in pipeline design, expansion, and regulation. In
2001, a representative of the National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners testified
before Congress that “the main impediment to siting energy infrastructure is the great difficulty
getting public acceptance for needed facilities.”112 Likewise, the National Commission on Energy
Policy stated in its 2006 report that energy-facility siting is “a major cross-cutting challenge for
U.S. energy policy,” largely because of public opposition to new energy projects and other major
infrastructure.113
One result of public concern about pipeline safety has been to prevent new pipeline siting in
certain localities, and to increase pipeline development time and costs in others. In a 2006 report,
for example, the Energy Information Administration (EIA) stated that “several major projects in
the Northeast, although approved by FERC, have been held up because of public opposition or
non-FERC regulatory interventions.”114 In the specific case of the Millennium Pipeline, proposed
in 1997 to transport Canadian natural gas to metropolitan New York, developers did not receive
final construction approval for nine years, largely because of community resistance to the pipeline
109 National Transportation Safety Board, Pipeline Accident Summary Report: Natural Gas Pipeline Rupture and Fire
During Dredging of Tiger Pass, Louisiana, October 23, 1996, PR98-916501, NTSB/PAR-98/01/SUM, September 28,
1998, p. 15.
110 See, for example: Tyler Williams, “Cyber Security Threats to Pipelines and Refineries,” Pipeline & Gas Journal,
November 1, 2007.
111 U.S. Department of Transportation, September 1999, pp. 19-20.
112 William M. Nugent, First Vice President, National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners, Testimony
before the Senate Energy and Natural Resources Committee hearing on Federal, State, and Local Impediments to Siting
Energy Infrastructure (May 15, 2001).
113 National Commission on Energy Policy, Siting Critical Energy Infrastructure: An Overview of Needs and
Challenges. (Washington, DC: June 2006): 1. (Hereafter referred to as NCEP 2006.)
114 Energy Information Administration, Additions to Capacity on the U.S. Natural Gas Pipeline Network: 2005 (August
2006): 11.
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route.115 Numerous other proposed pipelines, especially in populated areas, have faced similar
public acceptance barriers.116 Controversy surrounding the proposed Keystone XL pipeline
project, discussed below, is only the most recent example of how the development of major
pipeline projects may be influenced by public opinion. Even where there is federal siting
authority, as is the case for interstate natural gas pipelines, community stakeholders retain many
statutory and regulatory avenues to affect energy infrastructure decisions. Consequently, the
public perception value of remotely controlled or automatic pipeline valves may need to be
accounted for, especially with respect to its implications for general pipeline development and
operations.
Natural Gas Distribution Excess Flow Valves
While the San Bruno, CA, and Edison, NJ, gas pipeline accidents focused attention on automatic
valves in large diameter transmission pipelines, this technology also applies to smaller gas
distribution lines serving individual buildings. In natural gas distribution systems, “excess flow”
valves are safety devices which can automatically shut off pipeline flow in the event of a leak. In
this way, the valves can minimize the release of natural gas during a pipeline accident, thereby
reducing the likelihood or severity of a fire or explosion. PHMSA issued new standards requiring
the installation of excess flow valves on new gas distribution lines in single-family homes as part
of its final rule for natural gas distribution integrity management programs on December 3,
2009.117 P.L. 112-90 authorizes regulation, “if appropriate,” requiring excess flow valves for new
or entirely replaced distribution branch pipelines, as well as for service lines to multi-family
residential buildings and small commercial facilities. Although smaller in scale, automatic valves
in distribution lines raise the same cost and safety tradeoffs as automatic valves in large diameter
pipelines (§22).
PHMSA Penalties and Pipeline Safety Enforcement
The adequacy of the PHMSA’s enforcement strategy has been an ongoing focus of congressional
oversight.118 Provisions in the Pipeline Safety Improvement Act of 2002 (P.L. 107-355) put added
scrutiny on the effectiveness of the agency’s enforcement strategy and assessment of civil
penalties (§8). In April 2006, PHMSA officials testified before Congress that the agency had
institutionalized a “tough-but-fair” approach to enforcement, “imposing and collecting larger
penalties, while guiding pipeline operators to enhance higher performance.”119 According to the
agency, $4.6 million in proposed civil penalties in 2005 was three times greater than penalties
115 Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC), “Commission Approves Revised $1 Billion Millennium Pipeline
Project to Bring New Gas Service to the Northeast,” Press release (December 21, 2006). See, for example: Randal C.
Archibold, “Fighting Plans for a Gas Pipeline: Not Under My Backyard,” New York Times (August 7, 2001).
116 See, for example, Samantha Santa Maria, “Energy Projects: Rockies Express Add-on Pipe Projects Face Several
Obstacles to Building in US Northeast,” Inside F.E.R.C. (October 22, 2007).
117 U.S. Department of Transportation, “DOT Issues Much-Anticipated Rules to Enhance Pipeline Safety,” Office of
Public Affairs, press release, December 3, 2009.
118 See, for example: Representative James L. Oberstar, Statement before the House Committee on Transportation and
Infrastructure, Hearing on the Enbridge Pipeline Oil Spill in Marshall, MI, September 15, 2010.
119 S.L. Gerard, Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Admin.(PHMSA), Testimony before the House Energy and
Commerce Committee, Energy and Air Quality Subcommittee hearing on Pipeline Safety, Serial No. 109-84, April 27,
2006, p. 14.
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proposed in 2003, the first year higher penalties could be imposed under P.L. 107-355 (§8(a)).120
Proposed penalties totaled $4.5 million in 2010.121 Proposed penalties in 2011 totaled $3.7
million, with an average penalty of approximately $65,500.122 P.L. 112-90 increases the maximum
civil penalty from $1.0 million to $2.0 million for a related series of major consequence
violations, such as those causing serious injuries, deaths, or environmental harm (§2(a)).
Although PHMSA’s imposition of pipeline safety penalties increased quickly after P.L. 107-355
was enacted, the role of federal penalties in promoting greater operator compliance with pipeline
safety regulations is not always clear. To understand the potential influence of penalties on
operators, it can be helpful to put PHMSA fines in the context of the overall costs to operators of
a pipeline release. Pipeline companies, seeking to generate financial returns for their owners, are
motivated to operate their pipelines safely (and securely) for a range of financial reasons. While
these financial considerations certainly include possible PHMSA penalties, the costs of a pipeline
accident may also include fines for violations of environmental laws (federal and state), the costs
of spill response and remediation, penalties from civil litigation, the value of lost product, costs
for pipeline repairs and modifications (e.g., to resolve federal regulatory interventions), and other
costs. Depending upon the severity of a pipeline release, these other costs may far exceed pipeline
safety fines, as illustrated by the following examples.
• Kinder Morgan. In April 2006 Kinder Morgan Energy Partners entered into a
consent agreement with PHMSA to resolve a corrective action order stemming
from three hazardous liquid spills in 2004 and 2005 from the company’s Pacific
Operations pipeline unit.123 According to the company, the agreement would
require Kinder Morgan to spend approximately $26 million on additional
integrity management activities, among other requirements.124 Under a 2007
settlement agreement with the U.S. Justice Department and the state of
California, Kinder Morgan also agreed to pay approximately $3.8 million in civil
penalties for violations of environmental laws and approximately $1.5 million
related to response and remediation associated with these spills. The spills
collectively released approximately 200,000 gallons of diesel fuel, jet fuel, and
gasoline.125 This volume of fuel would have a product value on the order of $0.5
million based on typical wholesale market prices at the time of the spills.
• Plains All American. In 2010, Plains All American Pipeline agreed to spend
approximately $41 million to upgrade 10,420 miles of U.S. oil pipeline to resolve
Clean Water Act (CWA) violations for 10 crude oil spills in Texas, Louisiana,
Oklahoma, and Kansas from 2004 through 2007. Among these upgrades, the
120 Ibid. These figures only reflect administrative enforcement cases. They exclude cases that PHMSA has referred to
the Department of Justice for civil and criminal enforcement under 49 CFR 190.231 and 190.235.
121 Pipelines and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration, (PHMSA), “Civil Penalty Cases: Nationwide,” Web
page, February 8, 2012, http://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/comm/reports/enforce/CivilPenalty_opid_0.html?nocache=9398;
“Colorado Pipeline Company Fined 2.3 Million After Explosion,” Clean Skies News, December 1, 2009.
122 PHMSA, February 8, 2012.
123 Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration, Consent Agreement: In the Matter of Kinder Morgan
Energy Partners, L.P., Respondent, CPF No. 5-2005-5025H, April 4, 2006.
124 Kinder Morgan Energy Partners, L.P., “Kinder Morgan Energy Partners Enters into Consent Agreement with
PHMSA,” press release, Houston, TX, April 10, 2006.
125 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, “Kinder Morgan, SFPP Agree To Pay Nearly $5.3 Million To Resolve
Federal And State Environmental Violations,” press release, May 21, 2007.
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company agreed to spend at least $6 million on equipment and materials for
internal corrosion control and surveys on at least 2,400 miles of pipeline. The
company was required to pay $3.25 million civil penalty associated with the
CWA violations.126
• Enbridge. Enbridge Energy Partners estimated expenses of $475 million to clean
up two oil spills on its Lakehead pipeline system in 2010, including the spill in
Marshall, MI. This estimate did not include fines or penalties which might also
be imposed in connection with the spills. The pipeline operator also reported $16
million in lost revenue from pipeline shipments it could not redirect to other lines
while the Lakehead system was out of service.127 The full impact of these
expenditures on the company’s business is unclear, however, as Enbridge stated
in a subsequent quarterly report that “substantially all of the costs” related to its
2010 oil pipeline spills “will ultimately be recoverable under our existing
insurance policies.”128
• Olympic Pipe Line. After the 1999 Bellingham pipeline accident, Olympic Pipe
Line Company and associated defendants reportedly agreed to pay a $75 million
settlement to the families of two children killed in the accident.129
• El Paso. In 2002, El Paso Corporation settled wrongful death and personal injury
lawsuits stemming from the 2000 natural gas pipeline explosion near Carlsbad,
NM, which killed 12 campers.130 Although the terms of those settlements were
not disclosed, two additional lawsuits sought a total of $171 million in
damages.131 However, El Paso’s June 2003 quarterly financial report stated that
“our costs and legal exposure ... will be fully covered by insurance.”132
PHMSA Penalties in Perspective
The threat of safety enforcement penalties is often considered one of the primary tools available
to pipeline safety regulators to ensure operator compliance with safety requirements. However, as
the examples above suggest, pipeline safety fines, even if they were raised to $2.0 million for
major violations, could still account for only a limited share of the financial impact of future
pipeline releases. So, it is not clear how large an effect increasing PHMSA’s authorized fines,
alone, might have on operator compliance. On the other hand, the authority of PHMSA to
influence pipeline operations directly—for example, through corrective action orders or shutdown
orders in the event of a pipeline failure—can have a large financial impact on a pipeline operator
in terms of capital expenditures or lost revenues. Indeed, some have suggested that this
126 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, “Plains Pipeline to Spend $41 Million to Prevent Oil Spills Across 10,000
Miles of Pipeline,” press release, August 10, 2010.
127 Enbridge Energy Partners, L.P., Enbridge Energy Partners, L.P. Third Quarter 2010 Earnings, Slide presentation,
October 28, 2010, p. 8, http://phx.corporate-ir.net/External.File?item=
UGFyZW50SUQ9MjY2NzE3N3xDaGlsZElEPTQwMTI5MXxUeXBlPTI=&t=1.
128 Enbridge Energy Partners, L.P., October 28, 2010, p. 8.
129“Olympic Pipe Line, Others Pay Out Record $75 Million in Pipeline Explosion Wrongful Death Settlement,”
Business Wire, April 10, 2002.
130 National Transportation Safety Board, Pipeline Accident Report, PAR-03-01, February 11, 2003.
131 El Paso Corp., Quarterly Report Pursuant to Section 13 or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Form 10-
Q, for the period ending June 30, 2002, Houston, TX, 2002.
132 El Paso Corp., 2002.
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operational authority is the most influential component of PHMSA’s pipeline safety enforcement
strategy. Therefore, as Congress continues its oversight of PHMSA’s enforcement activities, and
as it considers new proposals to increase compliance with federal pipeline safety regulations,
Congress may evaluate how PHMSA’s authorities to set standards, assess penalties, and directly
affect pipeline operations may reinforce one another to improve U.S. pipeline safety.
Regulation of Canadian Oil/Tar Sands Crude Pipelines
Canadian oil exports to the United States have been increasing rapidly, primarily due to growing
output from the oil sands in Western Canada.133 Oil sands (also referred to as tar sands) are a
mixture of clay, sand, water, and heavy black viscous oil known as bitumen. Oil sands are
processed to extract the bitumen, which can then be upgraded into a product that is suitable for
pipeline transport. Canada’s oil sands production can be exported as either a light, upgraded
synthetic crude (“syncrude”) or a heavy crude oil that is a blend of bitumen diluted with lighter
hydrocarbons (“dilbit”) to ease transport. The bulk of oil sands’ supply growth is expected to be
in the form of the latter.134 Five major pipelines have been constructed in recent years to link the
oil sands region to markets in the United States. A sixth pipeline, Keystone XL, was rejected in
January 2012 by the U.S. State Department, although the developer plans to reapply for a federal
permit with a modified route.135 If ultimately approved and constructed, Keystone XL would
bring Canada’s total U.S. petroleum export capacity to over 4.1Mbpd, enough capacity to carry
over a third of current U.S. petroleum imports.136
This expansion of petroleum pipelines from Canada has generated considerable controversy in the
United States. One specific area of concern has been perceived new risks to pipeline integrity of
transporting heavy Canadian crudes. Some opponents of the new Canadian oil pipelines, notably
the Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC), has argued that these pipelines could be more
likely to fail and cause environmental damage than other crude oil pipelines because the bitumen
mixtures they would carry are “significantly more corrosive to pipeline systems than conventional
crude,” among other reasons.137 The council has called for a moratorium on approving new oil
pipelines from oil sands regions, and a review of existing pipeline permits, until these safety
concerns are researched further and addressed in federal environmental and safety studies.
Canadian officials and other stakeholders have rejected these arguments, however, citing factual
inaccuracies and a flawed methodology in the NRDC analysis, which compares pipeline spill
rates in Canada to those in the United States.138
133 For further discussion and analysis of Canadian oil sands pipeline issues, see CRS Report R41875, The U.S.-Canada
Energy Relationship: Joined at the Well, by Paul W. Parfomak and Michael Ratner.
134 Canadian Association of Petroleum Producers (CAPP), “Crude Oil: Forecast, Markets & Pipelines,” Calgary, AB,
June 2010, p. 7, http://www.capp.ca/GetDoc.aspx?DocId=173003; CRS analysis.
135 See CRS Report R41668, Keystone XL Pipeline Project: Key Issues, by Paul W. Parfomak et al.; U.S. Department
of State, “Briefing on the Keystone XL Pipeline,” briefing transcript, January 18, 2012, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/
ps/2012/01/181492.htm; TransCanada Corp., “TransCanada Will Re-Apply for a Keystone XL Permit,” press release,
January 18, 2012.
136 TransCanada has proposed a pipeline spur from the Keystone XL pipeline to the Bakken oil shale field in Montana,
North Dakota and South Dakota, known as the Bakken Marketlink Project.
137 Anthony Swift, Susan Casey-Lefkowitz, and Elizabeth Shope, “Tar Sands Pipelines Safety Risks,” Natural
Resources Defense Council, February 2011, p. 6.
138 Canadian Energy Resources Conservation Board, “ERCB Addresses Statements in Natural Resources Defense
Council Pipeline Safety Report,” Press release, Calgary, Alberta, February 16, 2011.
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Some in Congress have called for a review of PHMSA regulations to determine whether new
regulations for Canadian heavy crudes are needed to account for any unique properties they may
have. Accordingly, P.L. 112-90 requires PHMSA to review whether current regulations are
sufficient to regulate pipelines transmitting “diluted bitumen,” and analyze whether such oil
presents an increased risk of release (§16).
Pipeline Security Regulations
As noted earlier in this report, federal pipeline security activities to date have relied upon
voluntary industry compliance with PHMSA security guidance and TSA security best practices.
By initiating this voluntary approach, PHMSA sought to speed adoption of security measures by
industry and avoid the publication of sensitive security information (e.g., critical asset lists) that
would normally be required in public rulemaking.139 Provisions in P.L. 109-468 require the DOT
Inspector General to “address the adequacy of security standards for gas and oil pipelines”
(§23(b)(4)). P.L. 110-53 similarly directs TSA to promulgate pipeline security regulations and
carry out necessary inspection and enforcement—if the agency determines that regulations are
appropriate (§1557(d)). Addressing this issue, the 2008 IG report states that
TSA’s current security guidance is not mandatory and remains unenforceable unless a
regulation is issued to require industry compliance.... PHMSA and TSA will need to conduct
covert tests of pipeline systems’ vulnerabilities to assess the current guidance as well as the
operators’ compliance.140
Although TSA’s FY2005 budget justification stated that the agency would “issue regulations
where appropriate to improve the security of the [non-aviation transportation] modes,” the agency
has not done so for pipelines, and it is not currently working on such regulations.141 The pipeline
industry has expressed concern that new security regulations and related requirements may be
“redundant” and “may not be necessary to increase pipeline security.”142 The PHMSA
Administrator, in 2007, testified that enhancing security “does not necessarily mean that we must
impose regulatory requirements.”143 TSA officials have questioned the IG assertions regarding
pipeline security regulations, particularly the IG’s call for covert testing of pipeline operator
security measures. They have argued that the agency is complying with the letter of P.L. 110-53
and that its pipeline operator security reviews are more than paper reviews.144 In accordance with
P.L. 110-53 (§1557 (b)), the TSA has been implementing a multi-year program of pipeline system
inspections, including documentation of findings and follow up reviews.145 In its oversight of
139 GAO, Pipeline Security and Safety: Improved Workforce Planning and Communication Needed, GAO-02-785,
August 2002, p. 22.
140 U.S. Dept. of Transportation, Office of Inspector General, May 21, 2008, p. 6.
141 Department of Homeland Security (DHS), Transportation Security Administration Fiscal Year 2005 Congressional
Budget Justification, Washington, DC, February 2, 2004, p. 20; TSA, Pipeline Security Division, personal
communication, February 17, 2009.
142 American Gas Association (AGA), American Petroleum Institute (API), Association of Oil Pipelines (AOPL), and
American Public Gas Association (APGA), joint letter to members of the Senate Commerce Committee providing
views on S. 1052, August 22, 2005.
143 Barrett, T.J. January 18, 2007.
144 Sammon, John, Transportation Security Administration, Testimony before the House Transportation and
Infrastructure Committee, Railroad, Pipelines, and Hazardous Materials Subcommittee hearing on Implementation of
the Pipeline Inspection, Protection, Enforcement, and Safety Act of 2006, June 24, 2008.
145 TSA, Pipeline Security Division, personal communication, February 17, 2009.
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potential pipeline security regulations, Congress may evaluate the effectiveness of the current
voluntary pipeline security standards based on findings from the TSA’s CSR reviews, pipeline
inspections, and any future DOT Inspector General reports.
Additional Issues
In addition to the issues mentioned above, Congress may consider several issues related to
proposed legislation or otherwise raised by pipeline stakeholders.
Accuracy and Completeness of Pipeline System Records
On January 3, 2011, as a response to its initial investigation of the San Bruno pipeline accident,
the NTSB issued urgent new safety recommendations “to address record-keeping problems that
could create conditions in which a pipeline is operated at a higher pressure than the pipe was built
to withstand.”146 The NTSB issued these recommendations after it had concluded that there were
significant errors in the records characterizing the San Bruno pipeline, and that “other pipeline
operators may have discrepancies in their records that could potentially compromise the safe
operation of pipelines throughout the United States.”147 PHMSA officials have also testified that
some operators may not be collecting all the pipeline system data necessary to fully evaluate
safety and compliance with federal regulations.148 In 2006, questions were raised about the
accuracy of pipeline location data provided by operators and maintained by PHMSA in the
National Pipeline Mapping System.149 At the time, agency officials reportedly acknowledged
limitations in NPMS accuracy, but did not publicly discuss plans to address them. P.L. 112-90
authorizes PHMSA to collect additional geospatial and technical data from pipeline operators to
achieve the purposes of the NPMS (§11(a) and §12). Congress may review whether these or other
statutory measures are sufficient to verify that pipeline operator information is complete and
correct, particularly for older parts of the pipeline network.
Mandatory Internal Inspection or Hydrostatic Testing
Some proposals would increase requirements for pipeline operators to conduct internal
inspections of transmission pipelines using “smart pigs,” robotic devices sent through pipelines to
take physical measurements continuously along the way.150 In its San Bruno accident
investigation report, the NTSB has recommended that all natural gas transmission pipelines be
configured to accommodate such internal inspection tools. However, experts note that there are
different pipeline inspection techniques with overlapping capabilities and different strengths.151
While an effective technology for detecting corrosion in many applications, smart pigs have
limitations as a general tool for assessing the integrity of pipelines. For example, although smart
146 National Transportation Safety Board, NTSB Issues Urgent Safety Recommendations As A Result Of Preliminary
Findings In San Bruno Pipeline Rupture Investigation; Hearing Scheduled For March,” SB-11-01, press release,
January 3, 2011.
147 Ibid.
148 Linda Daugherty, March 2, 2011.
149 Dina Cappielo, “What Lies Beneath,” Houston Chronicle, November 12, 2006, p. A1.
150 “Pig” is the common acronym for “pipeline inspection gauge.”
151 Pete Carey, “Pipeline Inspection Not an Exact Science,” San Jose Mercury News, October 11, 2010.
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pigs may be good corrosion detectors, they are still a developing technology and may be
somewhat less effective in detecting other types of pipeline anomalies (e.g., cracks). Operators
also maintain that smart pigging may be less useful for predicting future problems with pipeline
integrity than other federally approved maintenance techniques like “direct assessment” (49
C.F.R. 192.903) wherein pipelines are examined externally based on risk data and other factors.152
Furthermore, because many older pipelines contain sharp turns and other obstructions due to
historical construction techniques, they cannot accommodate smart pig devices without
significant and costly pipeline modifications to make them more “piggable.” Consequently, some
industry stakeholders caution against unrealistic expectations for the capabilities of smart pigs as
a stand-alone pipeline inspection tool.153
As an alternative to internal inspection where such inspection cannot currently be performed,
some policy makers have called for mandatory hydrostatic testing of pipelines to verify their
integrity. Hydrostatic testing involves filling a pipeline with water under pressure greater than the
anticipated operating pressure to determine if it is structurally sound and does not leak. Such
testing is common for new pipelines that have not yet entered service. Because it uses only water,
hydrostatic testing poses relatively little direct risk to the public or the environment, but when
used for operating pipelines it necessarily interrupts pipeline service. Injecting water into
pipelines is also costly, and may create safety problems since water is corrosive and may be
difficult to remove completely from a pipeline once testing is completed.154 Nonetheless, as noted
above, the NTSB has recommended that all natural gas transmission pipelines constructed before
1970 be subjected to hydrostatic pressure tests. P.L. 112-90 requires verification of maximum
allowable operating pressure for all natural gas transmission pipelines “as expeditiously as
economically feasible” (§23(a)). The act also authorizes regulations for pressure verification that
“shall consider … pressure testing; and ... other alternative methods, including in-line
inspections” (§23(a)). As Congress examines any new federal requirements for pipeline
inspection, it may consider smart pig devices and hydrostatic testing as only two techniques in a
portfolio of maintenance practices operators may need to employ to ensure their pipelines are
physically sound.
Emergency Response Plan Disclosure
Federal regulations require pipeline operators to prepare emergency response plans for pipeline
spills and to make those plans available for inspection by PHMSA and local emergency response
agencies (49 C.F.R. 192.605). Some stakeholders have proposed that these plans also be made
available to the public to allow for additional review of their adequacy and to provide better risk
and response information to people living near pipelines.155 Operators reportedly have resisted
such disclosures on the grounds that their emergency response plans contain confidential
customer and employee information.156 They also raise concerns that the plans contain security-
152 The Pipeline Safety Improvement Act of 2002 (P.L. 107-355) directed the DOT to issue regulations on using
internal inspection, pressure testing, and direct assessment to natural gas pipelines in high consequence areas.
153 Christina Sames, Vice President, American Gas Association, November 4, 2010.
154 John Kiefner, “Overview of Hydrostatic Testing,” Presentation to the Hydrostatic Testing Symposium, California
Public Utilities Commission, May 6, 2011, http://www.cpuc.ca.gov/NR/rdonlyres/1A47C67C-4398-49CA-B52A-
A8B5CD13457B/0/HydrostaticTestingSymposiumPresentationMaterialsversiontopost.pdf.
155 For an example of such a review, see The Northern Great Plains at Risk: Oil Spill Planning in Keystone Pipeline
System, Plains Justice, Billings, MT, November 23, 2010.
156 Sharon Theimer, “Government Lacks Copies of Emergency Response Plans Developed by Gas Pipeline Operators,”
(continued...)
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sensitive information about pipeline vulnerabilities and spill scenarios which could be useful to
terrorists.157 P.L. 112-90 requires PHMSA to collect and maintain copies of pipeline emergency
plans for public availability excluding any proprietary or security-sensitive information (§6(a)).
As oversight of this issue continues, Congress may consider the tradeoffs between public
awareness and pipeline security in a general operating environment where both safety and
security hazards may be significant.
Pipeline Water Crossings
The 2011 oil spill into the Yellowstone River near Laurel, MT, appears to have been the result of
the buried oil pipeline becoming exposed due to scouring of the river bottom during unusually
heavy flooding.158 Prior to the flooding, a depth-of-cover survey by the operator verified that the
pipeline was at least five feet below the riverbed, exceeding a four-foot minimum cover
requirement in PHMSA regulations.159 Because the four-foot requirement appears to have been
insufficient to prevent riverbed pipeline exposure in this case, some policy makers have called for
a review of pipeline river crossings and associated safety requirements nationwide. P.L. 112-90
mandates a review of the adequacy of PHMSA regulations with respect to pipelines that cross
inland bodies of water at least 100 feet wide and, based on the review’s findings, requires
PHMSA to develop legislative recommendations for changing existing regulations (§28(a)).
Conclusion
Both government and industry have taken numerous steps to improve pipeline safety and security
over the last 10 years. While stakeholders across the board agree that federal pipeline safety
programs have been on the right track, major pipeline incidents in 2010 and 2011 suggest there
continues to be significant room for improvement. Likewise the threat of terrorist attack on U.S.
pipeline infrastructure remains a concern.
As Congress oversees the federal pipeline safety program and the federal role in pipeline security,
key issues of focus may be pipeline agency staff resources, automatic pipeline shutoff valves,
penalties for safety violations, safety regulations for oil sands crudes, and the possible need for
pipeline security regulations, among other concerns. In addition to these specific issues, Congress
may assess how the various elements of U.S. pipeline safety and security activity fit together in
the nation’s overall strategy to protect transportation infrastructure. Pipeline safety and security
necessarily involve many groups: federal agencies, oil and gas pipeline associations, large and
small pipeline operators, and local communities. Reviewing how these groups work together to
achieve common goals could be an oversight challenge for Congress.
(...continued)
Associated Press, October 6, 2010.
157 Andrew Black, President, Association of Oil Pipelines, Remarks at the Different Pathways to a Common Goal:
PIPA, Damage Prevention, & Greater Public Awareness and Involvement Conference, Pipeline Safety Trust, New
Orleans, LA, November 5, 2010.
158 Rob Rogers, “Photo Shows Broken Silvertip Pipeline in Yellowstone River,” Billings Gazette, September 7, 2011.
159 Cynthia L. Quarterman, Administrator, Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration, Testimony before
the House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, Subcommittee on Railroads, Pipelines, and Hazardous
Materials Hearing on the Silvertip Pipeline Oil Spill in Yellowstone County, Montana,” July 14, 2001, p. 4.
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Author Contact Information
Paul W. Parfomak
Specialist in Energy and Infrastructure Policy
pparfomak@crs.loc.gov, 7-0030
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