Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans:
Background and Issues for Congress
Ronald O'Rourke
Specialist in Naval Affairs
February 7, 2012
Congressional Research Service
7-5700
www.crs.gov
RL32665
CRS Report for Congress
Pr
epared for Members and Committees of Congress

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Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress

Summary
The planned size of the Navy, the rate of Navy ship procurement, and the prospective
affordability of the Navy’s shipbuilding plans have been matters of concern for the congressional
defense committees for the past several years.
In February 2006, the Navy presented to Congress a goal of achieving and maintaining a fleet of
313 ships, consisting of certain types and quantities of ships. In September 2011, the Navy began
briefing congressional offices on a revised 313-ship plan that altered planned numbers for certain
ship categories while staying within the overall total of 313 ships. On January 31, 2012, the Navy
announced that it had begun a force structure assessment, to be completed in several months, that
could lead to a new force structure goal for the Navy.
On January 26, 2012, the Department of Defense (DOD) announced certain program decisions
that are to be incorporated into DOD’s proposed FY2013 budget. The proposed changes include
the early retirement of nine Navy ships and the deferrals of certain ships in the Navy’s
shipbuilding plan. DOD also announced that it plans to maintain the current force of 11 aircraft
carriers and 10 carrier air wings.
The Navy’s proposed FY2012 budget requested funding for the procurement of 10 new battle
force ships (i.e., ships that count against the 313-ship goal). The 10 ships included two Virginia-
class attack submarines, one DDG-51 class Aegis destroyer, four Littoral Combat Ships (LCSs),
one LPD-17 class amphibious ship, one Mobile Landing Platform (MLP) ship (i.e., a maritime
prepositioning ship), and one Joint High Speed Vessel (JHSV). The Navy’s five-year (FY2012-
FY2016) shipbuilding plan, submitted to Congress in conjunction with the Navy’s proposed
FY2012 budget, included a total of 55 new battle force ships, or an average of 11 per year. Of the
55 ships in the plan, 27, or almost half, are relatively inexpensive LCSs or JHSVs.
The Navy’s FY2012 30-year (FY2012-FY2041) shipbuilding plan, submitted to Congress in late
May 2011, does not include enough ships to fully support all elements of the Navy’s 313-ship
goal over the long run. Among other things, the Navy projects that the cruiser-destroyer and
attack submarine forces would drop substantially below required levels in the latter years of the
30-year plan.
A June 2011 Congressional Budget Office (CBO) report on the cost of the Navy’s FY2012 30-
year (FY2012-FY2041) shipbuilding plan estimates that the plan would cost an average of $18.0
billion per year in constant FY2011 dollars to implement, or about 16% more than the Navy
estimates. CBO’s estimate is about 7% higher than the Navy’s estimate for the first 10 years of
the plan, about 10% higher than the Navy’s estimate for the second 10 years of the plan, and
about 31% higher than the Navy’s estimate for the final 10 years of the plan.
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Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress

Contents
Introduction...................................................................................................................................... 1
Background...................................................................................................................................... 1
Navy’s 313-Ship Force Structure Plan of September 2011 ....................................................... 1
January 2012 Announcement of New Force Structure Assessment .......................................... 3
Navy’s FY2012 Five-Year and 30-Year Shipbuilding Plans ..................................................... 3
Five-Year (FY2012-FY2016) Shipbuilding Plan ................................................................ 3
30-Year (FY2012-FY2041) Shipbuilding Plan ................................................................... 6
Navy’s Projected Force Levels Under 30-Year (FY2012-FY2041) Shipbuilding Plan............. 7
Late 2011 Press Reports About Possible Navy Force Structure and Procurement
Reductions.............................................................................................................................. 9
January 26, 2012, Announcement of FY2013 Budget Decisions............................................ 10
Oversight Issues for Congress ....................................................................................................... 12
Future Size and Structure of Navy in Light of Changes in Strategic and Budgetary
Circumstances ...................................................................................................................... 12
Issues Relating to Current 313-Ship Force-Level Objective................................................... 14
Sufficiency of FY2012 30-Year Shipbuilding Plan........................................................... 14
Affordability of FY2012 30-Year Shipbuilding Plan ........................................................ 15
Legislative Activity for FY2012.................................................................................................... 17
FY2012 Funding Request........................................................................................................ 17
FY2012 National Defense Authorization Act (H.R. 1540/P.L. 112-81) .................................. 17
House (Committee Report) ............................................................................................... 17
House (Floor Consideration)............................................................................................. 20
Senate (S. 1867) ................................................................................................................ 20
Senate (S. 1253) ................................................................................................................ 21
Conference ........................................................................................................................ 22
FY2012 Military Construction and Veterans Affairs and Related Agencies
Appropriations Act (H.R. 2055/P.L. 112-74)........................................................................ 25
Conference ........................................................................................................................ 25
FY2012 DOD Appropriations Act (H.R. 2219)....................................................................... 25
House................................................................................................................................. 25
Senate ................................................................................................................................ 26
Conference ........................................................................................................................ 27
CRS Reports Tracking Legislation on Specific Navy Shipbuilding Programs ....................... 27

Tables
Table 1. Navy Ship Force Structure Plans Since 2001..................................................................... 2
Table 2. Navy FY2012 Five-Year (FY2012-FY2016) Shipbuilding Plan ....................................... 4
Table 3. Navy FY2012 30-Year (FY2012-FY2041) Shipbuilding Plan .......................................... 7
Table 4. Projected Force Levels Resulting from FY2012 30-Year (FY2012-FY2041)
Shipbuilding Plan ......................................................................................................................... 8
Table 5. Recent Study Group Proposals for Navy Ship Force Structure ....................................... 13
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Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress

Table 6. Navy and CBO Estimates of Cost of FY2012 30-Year (FY2012-FY2041)
Shipbuilding Plan ....................................................................................................................... 16
Table B-1. Comparison of Navy’s 313-ship goal, Navy Plan from 1993 BUR, and Navy
Plan from 2010 QDR Review Panel........................................................................................... 32
Table C-1. Total Number of Ships in the Navy Since FY1948...................................................... 35
Table C-2. Battle Force Ships Procured or Requested, FY1982-FY2016 ..................................... 36

Appendixes
Appendix A. Using Past Ship Force Levels to Assess Proposed Force Levels ............................. 28
Appendix B. Independent Panel Assessment of 2010 QDR .......................................................... 30
Appendix C. Size of the Navy and Navy Shipbuilding Rate......................................................... 34

Contacts
Author Contact Information........................................................................................................... 36

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Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress

Introduction
This report provides background information and presents potential issues for Congress
concerning the Navy’s ship force-structure goals and shipbuilding plans. The planned size of the
Navy, the rate of Navy ship procurement, and the prospective affordability of the Navy’s
shipbuilding plans have been matters of concern for the congressional defense committees for the
past several years. Decisions that Congress makes on Navy shipbuilding programs can
substantially affect Navy capabilities and funding requirements, and the U.S. shipbuilding
industrial base.
Background
Navy’s 313-Ship Force Structure Plan of September 2011
The Navy in February 2006 presented to Congress a goal of achieving and maintaining a fleet of
313 ships, consisting of certain types and quantities of ships. The Navy in subsequent years
changed its desired quantities for certain ship types, and by mid-2011 the Navy’s desired fleet
appeared to have grown to a total of 328 ships.
In September 2011, the Navy began briefing congressional offices on a revised 313-ship plan that
incorporated some of the changes that the Navy made over the years to the 313-ship plan of
February 2006 while staying within the overall total of 313 ships. Among other things, the revised
313-ship plan of September 2011 reduced the planned number of Joint High Speed Vessels
(JHSVs) to 10, compared to a previously planned total of 21.
Navy officials sometimes refer to the figure of 313 ships as a “floor,” meaning a minimum
required number. The Navy stated that the revised 313-ship plan of September 2011 “will provide
the capability and capacity to meet projected future missions with acceptable risk.”1
Table 1 compares the revised 313-ship goal of September 2011 to earlier Navy ship force
structure plans.

1 Source: Navy briefing slide on new (2011) 313-ship plan provided to CRS by Navy Office of Legislative Affairs on
October 7, 2011.
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Table 1. Navy Ship Force Structure Plans Since 2001
Changes to
Early-2005 Navy
February
plan for fleet of 260-
2002-
Revised
2006 313-
February
325 ships
2004
313-ship
ship plan
2006
Navy
2001 QDR
plan of
announced Navy plan
plan for
plan for
September
through
for 313-
325-
375-ship
310-ship
Ship type
2011
mid-2011
ship fleet
260-ships
ships
Navya
Navy
Ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs)
12b 12b 14 14
14
14 14
Cruise missile submarines (SSGNs)
4 0c
4
4
4
4
2 or 4d
Attack submarines (SSNs)
48 48 48
37
41
55
55
Aircraft carriers
11e 11e 11f 10 11
12 12
Cruisers and destroyers
94 94g 88 67
92
104
116
Frigates
0 0 0
0
0
0
Littoral Combat Ships (LCSs)
55 55 55
63
82
56 0
Amphibious ships
33 33h 31 17
24
37 36
MPF(F) shipsi
0j
0j 12i 14i 20i
0i
0i
Combat logistics (resupply) ships
30 30 30
24
26
42
34
Dedicated mine warfare ships
0 0 0
0
0
26k 16
Joint High Speed Vessels (JHSVs)
10l 21l 3 0
0
0 0
Otherm
16 24n 17 10
11
25 25
Total battle force ships
313
328
313
260
325
375
310 or 312
Sources: Table prepared by CRS based on U.S. Navy data. Source for revised 313-ship plan of September 2011:
Navy briefing slide on new (2011) 313-ship plan provided to CRS by Navy Office of Legislative Affairs on
October 7, 2011.
Note: QDR is Quadrennial Defense Review.
a. Initial composition. Composition was subsequently modified.
b. The Navy plans to replace the 14 current Ohio-class SSBNs with a new class of 12 next-generation SSBNs.
For further discussion, see CRS Report R41129, Navy Ohio Replacement (SSBN[X]) Ballistic Missile Submarine
Program: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
c. Although the Navy plans to continue operating its four SSGNs until they reach retirement age in the late
2020s, the Navy does not plan to replace these ships when they retire, and the 328-ship presentation
reflected the post-2020s force level of zero SSGNs.
d. The report on the 2001 QDR did not mention a specific figure for SSGNs. The Administration’s proposed
FY2001 Department of Defense (DOD) budget requested funding to support the conversion of two
available Trident SSBNs into SSGNs, and the retirement of two other Trident SSBNs. Congress, in marking
up this request, supported a plan to convert al four available SSBNs into SSGNs.
e. With congressional approval, the goal wil temporarily be reduced to 10 carriers during 33-month period
between the retirement of the carrier Enterprise (CVN-65) in November 2012 and the scheduled entry into
service of the carrier Gerald R. Ford (CVN-78) in September 2015.
f.
For a time, the Navy characterized the goal as 11 carriers in the nearer term, and eventually 12 carriers.
g. The 94-ship goal was announced by the Navy in an April 2011 report to Congress on naval force structure
and missile defense.
h. The Navy acknowledges that meeting a requirement for being able to lift the assault echelons of 2.0 Marine
Expeditionary Brigades (MEBs) would require a minimum of 33 amphibious ships rather than the 31 ships
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Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress

shown in the February 2006 plan. For further discussion, see CRS Report RL34476, Navy LPD-17 Amphibious
Ship Procurement: Background, Issues, and Options for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
i.
Today’s Maritime Prepositioning Force (MPF) ships are intended primarily to support Marine Corps
operations ashore, rather than Navy combat operations, and thus are not counted as Navy battle force
ships. The MPF (Future) ships, however, would have contributed to Navy combat capabilities (for example,
by supporting Navy aircraft operations). For this reason, the ships in the planned MPF(F) squadron were
counted by the Navy as battle force ships.
j.
The Navy no longer plans to acquire an MPF(F) squadron. The Navy, however, has procured or plans to
procure six ships that were previously planned for the MPF(F) squadron—three modified TAKE-1 class
cargo ships, and three Mobile Landing Platform (MLP) ships. These six ships are now included in the total
shown for “Other” ships.
k. The figure of 26 dedicated mine warfare ships includes 10 ships maintained in a reduced mobilization status
cal ed Mobilization Category B. Ships in this status are not readily deployable and thus do not count as
battle force ships. The 375-ship proposal thus implied transferring these 10 ships to a higher readiness
status.
l.
Totals shown include 5 ships transferred from the Army to the Navy and operated by the Navy primarily
for the performance of Army missions.
m. This category includes, among other things, command ships and support ships.
n. The increase in this category from 17 ships under the February 2006 313-ship plan to 24 ships under the
apparent 328-ship goal includes the addition of one TAGOS ocean surveillance ship and the transfer into
this category of six ships—three modified TAKE-1 class cargo ships, and three Mobile Landing Platform
(MLP) ships—that were previously intended for the planned (but now canceled) MPF(F) squadron.
January 2012 Announcement of New Force Structure Assessment
On January 31, 2012, the Navy announced that it had begun a force structure assessment, to be
completed in several months, that could lead to a new force structure goal for the Navy. The Navy
stated that the force structure assessment will reflect a new strategic guidance document released
by the Administration on January 5, 2012.2
Navy’s FY2012 Five-Year and 30-Year Shipbuilding Plans
Five-Year (FY2012-FY2016) Shipbuilding Plan
Table 2 shows the Navy’s FY2012 five-year (FY2012-FY2016) shipbuilding plan.

2 Frank Oliveri, “Navy Structure Study Could Alter Minimum Number of Ships Required,” CQToday, February 1,
2012: 10; Mike McCarthy, “Navy Evaluating 313-Ship Goal,” Defense Daily, February 1, 2012; Michael Fabey, “U.S.
Navy Studies Force Structure,” Aerospace Daily & Defense Report, February 1, 2012: 4; Megan Eckstein, “Harvey:
Force Structure Review Will Take Into Account Fewer Ships,” Inside the Navy, February 6, 2012. See also Dan Taylor,
“Navy: No Decision On 313-Ship Floor Yet, Despite Cutbacks In Fleet,” Inside the Navy, January 30, 2012.
The strategic guidance document released on January 5, 2012, is Department of Defense, Sustaining U.S. Global
Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense, January 2012, 8 pp. For more on this document, see CRS Report
R42146, In Brief: Assessing DOD’s New Strategic Guidance, by Catherine Dale and Pat Towell.
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Table 2. Navy FY2012 Five-Year (FY2012-FY2016) Shipbuilding Plan
(Battle force ships—i.e., ships that count against 313-ship goal)
Ship type
FY12
FY13
FY14
FY15
FY16
Total
Ford (CVN-78) class aircraft carrier

1



1
Virginia (SSN-774) class attack submarine
2
2
2
2
2
10
Arleigh Burke (DDG-51) class destroyer
1
2
2
2
1
8
Littoral Combat Ship (LCS)
4
4
4
4
3
19
San Antonio (LPD-17) class amphibious ship
1




1
LHA(R) amphibious assault ship




1
1
Fleet tug (TATF)



1

1
Mobile Landing Platform (MLP) ship
1
1



2
Joint High Speed Vessel (JHSV)
1
2
2
2
1
8
TAO(X) oiler


1
1
1
3
TAGOS ocean surveillance ship

1



1
TOTAL
10
13
11
12
9
55
Source: FY2012 Navy budget submission.
Notes: The FY2012-FY2016 shipbuilding plan also includes, in FY2012, an oceanographic ship that does not
count against the 313-ship goal.
Until FY2012, JHSVs were being procured by both the Navy and the Army. The Army was to procure its fifth
and final JHSV in FY2012; this ship was included in the Army’s FY2012 budget submission and is not shown in this
table. In May 2011, the Navy and Army signed a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) transferring the Army’s
JHSVs to the Navy. In the FY2012 DOD Appropriations Act (Division A of H.R. 2055/P.L. 112-74 of December
23, 2011), the JHSV that was in the Army’s FY2012 budget submission was funded through the Shipbuilding and
Conversion, Navy (SCN) appropriation account, along with the JHSV that the Navy had included in its FY0212
budget submission.
Observations that can be made about the Navy’s proposed five-year (FY2012-FY2016)
shipbuilding plan include the following:
• The FY2012-FY2016 plan includes a total of 55 battle force ships, or 5 more
than the FY2011-FY2015 plan. The net increase of five ships includes the
addition of six ships and the subtraction of one previously planned ship. The six
added ships include a second DDG-51 in FY2014, a fourth Littoral Combat Ship
(LCS) in FY2012, three TAO(X) oilers in FY2014-FY2016, and a TAGOS ocean
surveillance ship in FY2013. The ship that was subtracted was a second JHSV
that was previously planned for FY2016.
• The FY2012-FY2016 plan includes an average of 11 battle force ships per year,
making this the second year in a row that the Navy has presented a five-year
shipbuilding plan showing an average of 10 or more battle force ships per year.
Given the single-digit numbers of battle force ships that have were procured from
FY1993 through FY2010, shipbuilding supporters for some time have wanted to
increase the shipbuilding rate to 10 or more battle force ships per year. A rate of
10 battle force ships per year is above the steady-state replacement rate for a fleet
of 313 ships with an average service life of 35 years, which is about 8.9 ships per
year. The average shipbuilding rate since FY1993 has been substantially below
8.9 ships per year (see Appendix C).
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• Although LCSs and JHSVs account for about 21% of the ships in the Navy’s
planned force structure (65 of 313 ships), they account 49% of the ships in the
FY2012-FY2016 shipbuilding plan (27 of 55 ships). In this sense, these relatively
inexpensive ships are overrepresented in the five-year shipbuilding plan relative
to their portion of the 313-ship goal, making it easier to procure an average of 11
ships per year within available resources. Starting a few years from now, when
the LCS and JHSV programs are no longer overrepresented in the shipbuilding
plan, and particularly when procurement of next-generation SSBN(X) ballistic
missile submarines begins, procuring an average of 10 or more ships per year
will become a considerably more expensive proposition. In this sense, the
FY2012-FY2016 shipbuilding program’s average of 11 ships per year does not
necessarily imply that the Navy has solved the challenge it faces concerning the
long-term affordability of its shipbuilding plans.
• The addition of the fourth LCS in FY2012 brings planned annual LCS
procurement quantities into line with those called for in the dual-award
acquisition strategy that Congress approved in December 2010 for the LCS
program.3
• The San Antonio (LPD-17) class amphibious ship planned for FY2012 is to be
the 11th and final ship in the class. The 33-ship force-structure goal for
amphibious ships includes 11 LPD-17s.4
• The FY2011-FY2015 plan requested the first of three planned Mobile Landing
Platform ships (MLPs) in FY2011, and the second and third MLPs in FY2012
and FY2013. As part of its action on the FY2011 defense budget, Congress
funded the procurement of two MLPs in FY2011 (i.e., one more than requested).
Congress completed its action on the FY2011 budget after the Navy submitted its
proposed FY2012 budget, and the FY2012 budget submission does not account
for the funding of a second MLP in FY2011. The Navy states that since two
MLPs were funded in FY2011, the Navy no longer plans to request an MLP in
FY2013.
• The addition of the three TAO(X) oilers in FY2014-FY2016 reflects an
acceleration of the start of this program from FY2017 to FY2014. This
acceleration was one of a series of measures that the Navy announced on
September 17, 2010, for sustaining the shipbuilding capability in Louisiana.5 The
Navy plans to compete the TAO(X), so it is not certain that the program will be
awarded to a shipyard in Louisiana, such as the Avondale shipyard near New
Orleans that forms part of Huntington Ingalls Industries (HII). National Steel and
Shipbuilding Company (NASSCO) of San Diego, CA, is generally considered to
be a likely competitor for the program.

3 For further discussion, see CRS Report RL33741, Navy Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) Program: Background, Issues,
and Options for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
4 For further discussion, see CRS Report RL34476, Navy LPD-17 Amphibious Ship Procurement: Background, Issues,
and Options for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
5 For the text of the Navy’s announcement, see http://www.wwltv.com/news/Sec-of-Navy-remarks-on-shipyard-in-
Avondale-103150169.html.
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30-Year (FY2012-FY2041) Shipbuilding Plan
The Navy did not submit an FY2012 30-year (FY2012-FY2041) shipbuilding plan in February
2011, in conjunction with the proposed FY2012 budget.6 At the request of the House Armed
Services Committee, the Navy submitted the FY2012 30-year (FY2012-FY2041) shipbuilding
plan in late May 2011.7 Table 3 shows the Navy’s proposed FY2012 30-year (FY2012-FY2041)
shipbuilding plan. The first five years of this plan include the same ships as those in the FY2012
five-year (FY2012-FY2016) shipbuilding plan shown in Table 2. The FY2012 30-year (FY2012-
2041) plan includes a total of 276 ships.8

6 Section 1023 of the FY2011 defense authorization act (H.R. 6523/P.L. 111-383 of January 7, 2011) amended the law
(10 U.S.C. 231) that had required DOD to submit a 30-year shipbuilding plan each year. As amended by Section 1023,
10 U.S.C. 231 now requires DOD to submit a 30-year shipbuilding plan once every four years, in the same year that
DOD submits a Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR). Regarding the three years between each QDR, the joint
explanatory statement of the House and Senate Armed Services Committees on H.R. 6523 stated:
The committees expect that, following the submission of the President’s budget materials for a
fiscal year, the Secretary of the Navy, at the written request of one of the congressional defense
committees, will promptly deliver the Navy’s long-term shipbuilding plan used to develop the
President’s budget request for that fiscal year, as well as a certification from the Secretary of the
Navy that both the President’s budget request for that fiscal year and the budget for the future-years
defense program is sufficient to fund the construction schedule provided in that plan. The
committees expect that such a plan would include the quantity of each class of ship to be
constructed in that fiscal year and the nine following fiscal years.
7 The Navy’s cover letter for the plan is dated May 23, 2011. CRS received the plan on May 24, 2011. The Navy’s
cover letter states that the plan was submitted in response to a letter dated February 15, 2011, from Representative
Todd Akin, the chairman of the Seapower and Projection Forces subcommittee of the House Armed Services
Committee, requesting a 30-year plan.
8 The total of 276 ships includes a Mobile Landing Platform (MLP) ship in FY2013. The Navy says that, as a result of
Congress funding two MLPs in FY2011, or one more than the Navy requested for FY2011, the Navy no longer plans to
request an MLP in FY2013. Subtracting this MLP from the plan would leave a total of 275 ships.
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Table 3. Navy FY2012 30-Year (FY2012-FY2041) Shipbuilding Plan
FY CVN LSC SSC SSN SSBN AWS CLF Supt Total
12
1 4 2 1 2 10
13
1 2 4 2 4 13
14
2 4 2 1 2 11
15
2 4 2 1 3 12
16
1 3 2 1 1 1 9
17
2 3 2 1 1 3 12
18
1 1 3 1 1 3 10
19
2 3 2 1 1 1 2 12
20
1 2 2 1 2 8
21
2 2 2 2 1 9
22
1 2 2 1 1 2 9
23
1 2 2 1 1 1 3 11
24
1 2 1 1 1 2 8
25
1 1 1 1 2 1 1 8
26
2 2 1 1 1 7
27
2 1 1 1 1 1 7
28
1 1 2 1 1 1 1 8
29
2 1 1 1 2 1 2 10
30
1 2 1 1 1 2 8
31
2 1 1 1 1 2 8
32
2 2 1 1 1 2 9
33
1 2 1 1 2 3 10
34
2 2 1 2 7
35
2 2 2 1 2 9
36
3 3 1 1 8
37
2 3 2 2 2 11
38
1 2 3 1 2 9
39
2 3 2 1 8
40
2 3 1 1 7
41
2 3 2 1 8
Source: U.S. Navy data provided to CRS on May 24, 2011.
Key: FY = Fiscal Year; CVN = aircraft carriers; LSC = surface combatants (i.e., cruisers and destroyers); SSC
= small surface combatants (i.e., Littoral Combat Ships [LCSs]); SSN = attack submarines; SSGN = cruise
missile submarines; SSBN = ballistic missile submarines; AWS = amphibious warfare ships; CLF = combat
logistics force (i.e., resupply) ships; Supt = support ships.
Navy’s Projected Force Levels Under 30-Year (FY2012-FY2041)
Shipbuilding Plan
Table 4 shows the Navy’s projection of force levels for FY2012-FY2041 that would result from
implementing the FY2012 30-year (FY2012-FY2041) shipbuilding plan shown in Table 3.
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Table 4. Projected Force Levels Resulting from FY2012 30-Year (FY2012-FY2041)
Shipbuilding Plan

CVN LSC SSC SSN SSGN SSBN AWS CLF Supt Total
Goal in 313-ship plan
11
94
55
48
4
12
33
30
26
313
FY12
11 84 41 54 4 14 30 31 21 290
FY13
10 84 35 55 4 14 30 30 25 287
FY14
10 85 30 55 4 14 30 30 28 286
FY15
11 86 26 54 4 14 30 30 31 286
FY16
11 90 31 52 4 14 31 30 34 297
FY17
11 91 32 50 4 14 33 29 37 301
FY18
11 93 36 50 4 14 33 30 40 311
FY19
11 95 36 51 4 14 33 30 42 316
FY20
12 97 40 49 4 14 33 30 43 322
FY21
12 97 40 49 4 14 34 30 44 324
FY22
12 96 42 48 4 14 34 30 45 325
FY23
11 95 40 48 4 14 36 30 47 325
FY24
11 95 41 46 4 14 36 30 47 324
FY25
12 93 42 45 4 14 36 30 45 321
FY26
12 90 44 44 2 14 36 30 44 316
FY27
12 88 46 43 1 13 36 30 45 314
FY28
11 86 47 41 0 13 36 30 45 309
FY29
11 82 49 40 0 13 35 30 45 305
FY30
12 78 50 39 0 12 33 30 45 299
FY31
12 74 52 41 0 12 34 30 45 300
FY32
11 72 53 41 0 12 32 30 45 296
FY33
11 70 54 42 0 12 32 30 45 296
FY34
11 68 54 43 0 12 33 30 45 296
FY35
12 69 55 44 0 12 31 30 45 298
FY36
11 71 55 45 0 12 30 30 45 299
FY37
11 73 55 46 0 12 30 30 45 302
FY38
11 75 57 45 0 12 29 30 45 304
FY39
11 77 58 45 0 12 30 30 43 306
FY40
11 77 58 45 0 12 30 30 43 306
FY41
11 78 56 45 0 12 30 30 43 305
Source: U.S. Navy data provided to CRS on May 24, 2011.
Note: Figures for support ships include five JHSVs transferred from the Army to the Navy and operated by the
Navy primarily for the performance of Army missions.
Key: FY = Fiscal Year; CVN = aircraft carriers; LSC = surface combatants (i.e., cruisers and destroyers); SSC
= small surface combatants (i.e., frigates, Littoral Combat Ships [LCSs], and mine warfare ships); SSN = attack
submarines; SSGN = cruise missile submarines; SSBN = ballistic missile submarines; AWS = amphibious
warfare ships; CLF = combat logistics force (i.e., resupply) ships; Supt = support ships.
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Late 2011 Press Reports About Possible Navy Force Structure and
Procurement Reductions
Press reports in September and October 2011 stated that the Navy, in response to anticipated
reductions in planned levels of defense spending, was examining options for maintaining a fleet
with considerably fewer than 300 ships; for retiring certain ships in the near term, well before the
ends of their expected service lives; and for deferring or cancelling certain planned ship
procurements.9 The Administration’s January 26, 2012, announcement of selected program
decisions for the FY2013 budget (see next section) suggests that at least some of these options
were scaled back or not implemented.

9 A September 1, 2011, press report stated that the Navy was considering the following options, among others:
•
reducing the Navy to a 250-ship fleet that includes 10 aircraft carriers or a 240-ship fleet that includes 8
aircraft carriers (a fleet with 9 carriers is another option);
•
retiring (rather than performing a nuclear-refueling overhaul on) the aircraft carrier George Washington
(CVN-73), which would be one measure for reducing the size of the carrier force;
•
delaying the procurement of the aircraft carrier John F. Kennedy (CVN-79) by two years, to FY2015 (an
option that was first reported in July 2011 );
•
eliminating six aircraft squadrons;
•
retiring at least some of the Navy’s 22 Ticonderoga (CG-47) class Aegis cruisers;
•
reducing the planned number of next-generation Ohio replacement ballistic missile submarines (SSBN[X]s)
by two boats, from 12 to 10, and consequently delaying the procurement of the first SSBN(X), perhaps by
two years; and
•
maintaining funding for procurement of two Virginia-class submarines per year, and for Arleigh Burke
(DDG-51) class Aegis destroyers and Littoral Combat Ships (LCSs).
(Christopher J. Castelli, “Navy Of Tomorrow Could Have Fewer Cruisers, Aircraft Carriers,” Inside the Pentagon,
September 1, 2011.)
An October 6, 2011, press report similarly stated that the Navy was examining the option of retiring the rather than
performing a mid-life refueling on the aircraft carrier George Washington (CVN-73). (Christopher P. Cavas, “U.S.
Navy May Cut Carrier’s Life In Half To Save Money,” DefenseNews.com, October 6, 2011.) Implementing this option
would reduce the Navy’s carrier force a few years from now from 11 ships to 10.
An October 14, 2011, press report stated that the Navy is considering retiring four Aegis cruisers in FY2013, another
five Aegis cruisers in FY2014, and three Whidbey Island/Harpers Ferry (LSD-41/49) class amphibious ships in
FY2014. The report also mentioned the option of retiring rather than performing a mid-life refueling on the aircraft
carrier George Washington (CVN-73), the option of delaying the procurement of the John F. Kennedy (CVN-79) to
FY2015, and the option of shifting carrier procurement generally to seven-year intervals. (Carlo Munoz, “Navy Delays
Carrier, Cuts Cruisers, Amphibs In Draft Budget,” AOL Defense (http://defense.aol.com), October 14, 2011.) A blog
entry identified the four cruisers that would be retired in FY2013 as Normandy (CG-60), Anzio (CG-CG-68), Vicksburg
(CG-69), and Cape St. George (CG-71), the five cruisers that would be retired in FY2014 as Princeton (CG-59),
Cowpens (CG-63), Gettysburg (CG-64), Chosin (CG-65), and Hue City (CG-66), and the four amphibious ships that
would be retired in FY2014 as Whidbey Island (LSD-41), Fort McHenry (LSD-43), and Tortuga (LSD-46). (“ALT
POM Early Decommission Plans,” Information Dissemination (www.information diseemination.net), October 17,
2011.)
In a December 2011 journal article, Admiral Jonathan Greenert, the Chief of Naval Operations, stated that the Navy in
2025 “may be smaller than [it is] today as a result of fiscal constraints” and that “Budget limitations over the next 10 to
15 years may constrain the number of ships and aircraft the Navy can buy.” (Jonathan Greenert, “Navy, 2025: Forward
Warfighters,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, December 2011: 19 and 22.)
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January 26, 2012, Announcement of FY2013 Budget Decisions
On January 26, 2012, the Administration issued a 16-page document outlining selected program
decisions that will appear in the Department of Defense’s (DOD’s) proposed FY2013 budget. The
document states the following in part:
The focus on the Asia-Pacific region places a renewed emphasis on air and naval forces
while sustaining ground force presence. The Middle East has been dominated by ground
force operations over the last decade; however, as we gradually transition security in
Afghanistan and reestablish peacetime ground force presence, this region will also become
increasingly maritime. Therefore we: ...
• Maintained the aircraft carrier fleet at 11 ships and 10 [carrier] air wings
• Maintained the big-deck amphibious fleet ... 10
• Budgeted to forward station Littoral Combat Ships in Singapore and patrol craft in
Bahrain
• Funded development of a new afloat forward staging base that can be dedicated to
support missions in areas where ground-based access is not available, such as counter-
mine operations
For these forces to remain capable, we had to invest in capabilities required to maintain our
military’s continued freedom of action in the face of new technologies designed to frustrate
access advantages. Consequently, we increased or protected investment in capabilities that
preserve the U.S. military’s ability to project power in contested areas and strike quickly
from over the horizon, including:...
• Design changes to increase cruise missile capacity of future Virginia-class submarines11
• Design of a conventional prompt strike option from submarines12
• Upgraded radars for tactical aircraft and ships
To ensure sufficient resources to protect these strategic priorities, we will reduce the number
of ships by slowing the pace of building new ships and by accelerating the retirement of
some existing ships. These include:
• Retiring 7 cruisers early – 6 did not have ballistic missile defense (BMD) capability, and
the seventh with BMD capability is in need of costly hull repairs13

10 This is a reference to the Navy’s inventory of LHA- and LHD-type amphibious assault ships. These ships, which
resemble medium-sized aircraft carriers, are often referred to as big-deck or large-deck amphibious ships because their
flight decks are much larger than those of the Navy’s smaller (i.e., LPD- and LSD-type) amphibious ships.
11 This appears to be a reference to a plan to build future Virginia (SSN-774) class attack submarines to a lengthened
design that includes an additional mid-body section, called the Virginia Payload Module (VPM) containing four large-
diameter vertical launch tubes for firing cruise missiles and other payloads. For more on the VPM, see CRS Report
RL32418, Navy Virginia (SSN-774) Class Attack Submarine Procurement: Background and Issues for Congress, by
Ronald O'Rourke.
12 This appears to refer to a new, fast-flying weapon that would be launched from submarines.
13 The Navy currently has 22 Ticonderoga (CG-47) class Aegis cruisers; retiring seven early would reduce the
(continued...)
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• Slipping a large deck amphibious ship (LHA) by 1 year14
• Slipping 1 new Virginia class submarine outside the FYDP [Five Year Defense Plan]
• Reducing Littoral Combat Ships by 2 ships in the FYDP15
• Reducing Joint High Speed Vessels by 8 in the FYDP16
• Retiring 2 smaller amphibious ships (LSD) early and moving their replacement outside
the FYDP ... 17
This strategic precept puts a premium on self- and rapidly-deployable forces that can project
power and perform multiple mission types. This reinforces the need to maintain existing
numbers of aircraft carriers, large-deck amphibious ships, and bombers. Furthermore, as the
Marine Corps withdraws from the ground in Afghanistan, it will return to afloat posture, with
the capability to rapidly respond to crises as they emerge. These choices are consistent with
our strategic emphasis on the Asia-Pacific region and the Middle East, but are applicable
anywhere on the globe where U.S. national security or vital interests are threatened....
Under the new strategic guidance, we will maintain a safe, secure, and effective nuclear
deterrent.... However, we will delay the new Ohio submarine replacement by two years
without undermining our partnership with the UK.18 While this delay will create challenges
in maintaining current at-sea presence requirements in the 2030s, we believe this risk can be
managed....
Because we will continue to be engaged in counter terrorism operations around the globe, we
protected key components of the force that are adept in executing this mission:...
• Sea-based unmanned intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) systems such
as Fire Scout – important ISR assets where ground basing is not available....19
Our ability to project power is a key component of our strategic guidance. We protected...
aircraft carriers, surface combatant modernization.... We also protected capabilities that
allow us to project power in denied environments. In addition to those discussed earlier, such

(...continued)
inventory of these ships to 15.
14 Under the FY2012 budget submission, the next LHA-type ship was to be procured in FY2016; the deferral would
thus appear to be FY2017.
15 This may be a deferral of the procurement of two LCSs, but not a reduction in the planned total LCS procurement of
55 ships.
16 This may reflect a reduction in the JHSV force-level goal from 21 ships to 10.
17 The Navy currently operates 12 LSD-type amphibious ships; retiring two early would reduce the inventory to 10.
The planned replacement for these LSDs is a new ship class called the LSD(X). The Navy had previously announced
that the first LSD(X) was to be procured in FY2017; the new announcement here suggests that the procurement date for
this ship has been deferred to a later year.
18 Under the FY2012 budget submission, the first Ohio Replacement ballistic missile submarine was to be procured in
FY2019; the announcement suggests that the procurement date for this ship has been deferred to FY2021. The United
States is cooperating with the UK on the design of a common missile compartment to be used on both the Ohio
Replacement boats and a new class of UK ballistic missile submarines.
19 The Fire Scout is an unmanned helicopter that can be operated from Navy ships.
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as... increasing the cruise missile capacity of future submarines, we protected anti-submarine
warfare and counter-mine capabilities....
In support of the strategic guidance’s tenet of reversibility, this budget plan sustains, where
possible, these segments of the industrial base.... For example, adding the afloat forward
staging base addresses urgent operational shortfalls and will help sustain the shipbuilding
industry in the near-term and mitigate the impact of reducing ship procurement in the
FYDP.20
Oversight Issues for Congress
Future Size and Structure of Navy in Light of Changes in Strategic
and Budgetary Circumstances
Changes in strategic and budgetary circumstances have led to a broad debate over the appropriate
future size and structure of the military, including the future size and structure of the Navy.
Changes in strategic circumstances include, among other things, the winding down of U.S.
combat operations in Iraq, the planned winding down of such operations in Afghanistan, and the
growth of China’s military capabilities.21 Changes in budgetary circumstances center on
reductions in planned levels of defense spending resulting from the Budget Control Act of 2011
(S. 365/P.L. 112-25 of August 2, 2011).
On January 5, 2012, the Administration announced that, in light of the winding down of U.S.
combat operations in Iraq, the planned winding down of such operations in Afghanistan, and
developments in the Asia-Pacific region, U.S. defense strategy in coming years will include a
stronger focus on the Asia-Pacific region.22 Since the Asia-Pacific region is to a significant degree
a maritime and aerospace theater for the United States, this shift in strategic focus is expected by
many observers to result in a shift in the allocation of DOD resources toward the Navy and Air
Force.
As mentioned earlier (see “January 2012 Announcement of New Force Structure Assessment” in
“Background”), on January 31, 2012, the Navy announced that it had begun a force structure
assessment, to be completed in several months, that could lead to a new force structure goal for
the Navy.
Some study groups have made their own proposals for Navy ship force structure. Table 5 shows
some of these proposals. For purposes of comparison, Table 5 also shows the Navy’s 313-ship
goal of September 2011.

20 Department of Defense, Defense Budget: Priorities and Choices, January 2012, pp. 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 13.
21 For more on the growth in China’s military (particularly naval) capabilities and its potential implications for required
U.S. Navy capabilities, see CRS Report RL33153, China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy
Capabilities—Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
22 Department of Defense, Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense, January 2012, 8 pp.
For more on this document, see CRS Report R42146, In Brief: Assessing DOD’s New Strategic Guidance, by Catherine
Dale and Pat Towell.
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In assessing proposals for the future size and structure of the Navy, Congress may consider
various factors, such as potential future defense spending levels, U.S. interests and potential
threats to those interests, the value of naval forces in defending those interests, and the relative
cost-effectiveness of various ship types for performing various missions.23
Table 5. Recent Study Group Proposals for Navy Ship Force Structure
Center for a
Center for
Independent
New
Strategic
Panel
American
and
Navy’s 313-
Heritage
Cato
Assessment
Sustainable
Security
Budgetary
ship goal of
Foundation
Institute
of 2010
Defense
(CNAS)
Assessments
September
(April
(September
QDR
Task Force
(November
(CSBA)
Ship type
2011
2011)
2010)a
(July 2010)
(June 2010)
2008)
(2008)b
Submarines
SSBN
12 14c 6 14 7 14 12
SSGN
4 4 0 4 4 0 2
SSN
48 55 40 55 37 40 41
Aircraft carriers
CVN
11 11 8 11 9 8 11
CVE
0 0 0 0 0 0 4
Surface combatants
Cruiser 22
n/a
18
14
94 88
85
Destroyer
65 n/a
56 73
Frigate
0 14
n/a
0
0
9e
28d
LCS
55
4 n/a 25 48 55
SSC
0 0 0 n/a 0 40 0f
Amphibious and Maritime Prepositioning Force (Future) (MPF[F]) ships
Amphibious ships
33 37 23 n/a 27 36 33
MPF(F) ships
0 0 0 n/a
n/a 0 3g
LSD station ships
0 0 0 n/a
n/a n/a 7h
Other: Mine warfare (MIW) ships; Combat logistics force (CLF) ships (i.e., at-sea resupply ships), and support ships
MIW
0 14 11 0 0 0 0
CLF ships
30 33 21 n/a
31
36 40
Support ships
26 25 27 n/a
31
TOTAL battle
313 309 241 346 230 300 326i
force ships

23 Another possible method for assessing proposals for the future size and structure of the Navy is to compare them to
historical figures for total Navy fleet size. As discussed in Appendix A, however, historical figures for total fleet size
might not be a reliable yardstick for assessing the appropriateness of proposals for the future size and structure of the
Navy, particularly if the historical figures are more than a few years old, because the missions to be performed by the
Navy, the mix of ships that make up the Navy, and the technologies that are available to Navy ships for performing
missions all change over time.
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Source: Table prepared by CRS based on the fol owing sources: For Heritage Foundation: A Strong National
Defense[:] The Armed Forces America Needs and What They Will Cost, Heritage Foundation, April 5, 2011, pp. 25-
26. For Cato Institute: Benjamin H. Friedman and Christopher Preble, Budgetary Savings from Military Restraint,
Washington, Cato Institute, September 23, 2010 (Policy Analysis No. 667), pp. 6, 8-10, and additional
information provided by Cato Institute to CRS by e-mail on September 22, 2010. For Independent Panel
Assessment: Stephen J. Hadley and William J. Perry, co-chairmen, et al., The QDR in Perspective: Meeting
America’s National Security Needs In the 21st Century, The Final Report of the Quadrennial Defense Review Independent
Panel, Washington, 2010, Figure 3-2 on pages 58-59. For Sustainable Defense Task Force: Debt, Deficits, and
Defense, A Way Forward[:] Report of the Sustainable Defense Task Force, June 11, 2010, pp. 19-20. For CNAS:
Frank Hoffman, From Preponderance to Partnership: American Maritime Power in the 21st Century. Washington,
Center for a New American Security, November 2008. p. 19 (Table 2). For CSBA: Robert O. Work, The US
Navy[:] Charting a Course for Tomorrow’s Fleet. Washington, Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments,
2008. p. 81 (Figure 5).
Notes: n/a is not addressed in the report. SSBN is nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine; SSGN is
nuclear-powered cruise missile and special operations forces submarine; SSN is nuclear-powered attack
submarine; CVN is large nuclear-powered aircraft carrier; CVE is medium-sized aircraft carrier; LCS is Littoral
Combat Ship; SSC (an acronym created by CRS for this table) is smal surface combatant of 1,000+ tons
displacement—a ship similar to late-1990s Streetfighter concept; MPF(F) is Maritime Prepositioning Force
(Future) ship; LSD is LSD-41/49 class amphibious ship operating as a station ship for a formation like a Global
Fleet Station (GFS); MIW is mine warfare ship; CLF is combat logistics force (i.e., resupply) ship.
a. Figures shown are for the year 2020; for subsequent years, reductions from these figures would be
considered.
b. Figures shown are for the year 2028.
c. The report calls for a force of 280 SLBMs, which appears to equate to a force of 14 SSBNs, each with 20
SLBM tubes.
d. The report calls for a force of 28 small surface combatants, and appears to use the term small surface
combatants the same way that the Navy does in the 30-year shipbuilding plan—as a way of collectively
referring to frigates and LCSs. The small surface combatants (SSCs) called for in the November 2008 CNAS
report are separate from and smaller than the LCS.
e. Maritime Security Frigates.
f.
Plan includes 28 patrol craft (PCs) of a few hundred tons displacement each, as wel as 29 boat detachments
and seven riverine squadrons.
g. Plan shows three Mobile Landing Platform (MLP) ships that the Navy currently plans for the MPF(F)
squadron, plus 16 existing current-generation maritime prepositioning force (MPF) ships and 17 existing
prepositioning ships for Army and other service/agency equipment. Plan also shows 67 other DOD sealift
ships.
h. T-LSDs, meaning LSDs operated by the Military Sealift Command (MSC) with a partly civilian crew.
i.
The CSBA report shows a total of 488 units by including 162 additional force units that do not count
toward the 313-ship goal under the battle force ships counting method that has been used since the early
1980s for public policy discussions of the size of the Navy. These 162 additional force units include 16
existing current-generation maritime prepositioning force (MPF) ships and 17 existing prepositioning ships
for Army and other service/agency equipment, 67 other DOD sealift ships, 28 PCs, 29 boat detachments,
and certain other smal -scale units. The CSBA report proposes a new counting method for naval/maritime
forces that includes units such as these in the total count.
Issues Relating to Current 313-Ship Force-Level Objective
Sufficiency of FY2012 30-Year Shipbuilding Plan
One potential oversight issue for Congress concerns the sufficiency of the FY2012 30-year
(FY2012-FY2041) shipbuilding plan. As shown in Table 4, the plan does not include enough
ships to fully support all elements of the 313-ship goal over the long run:
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• The Navy projects that if the 30-year shipbuilding plan were fully implemented,
the fleet would grow from 290 ships in FY2012 to a peak of 325 ships in
FY2022-FY2023, decline to 296 ships in FY2032-FY2034, and then increase
back to 305 ships by FY2041.
• The Navy projects that the attack submarine and cruiser-destroyer forces will
drop substantially below required levels in the latter years of the 30-year plan.
The projected number of cruisers and destroyers drops below the required level
of 94 ships in 2025, reaches a minimum of 68 ships in FY2034, and remains
below 94 ships through FY2041. The projected number of attack submarines
drops below the required level of 48 boats in FY2024, reaches a minimum of 39
boats in FY2030, and remains below 48 boats through 2041.
• There would also be shortfalls in certain years in small surface combatants (i.e.,
frigates and LCSs) and amphibious ships.
The projected shortfalls in cruisers and destroyers, attack submarines, and other ships could make
it difficult or impossible for the Navy to fully perform its projected missions, particularly during
the latter years of the 30-year plan. In light of the projected shortfalls in cruisers-destroyers and
attack submarines, policymakers may wish to consider two options:
• increasing planned procurement rates of destroyers and attack submarines,
perhaps particularly in years prior to the start of SSBN(X) procurement, and
• extending the service lives of older destroyers to 40 or 45 years, and refueling
older attack submarines and extending their service lives to 40 or more years.
Regarding the second option above, possible candidates for service life extensions include the
first 28 DDG-51 destroyers (i.e., the Flight I/II DDG-51s), the final 23 Los Angeles (SSN-688)
attack submarines (i.e., the Improved 688s), and the 3 Seawolf (SSN-21) class attack submarines.
Whether such service life extensions would be technically feasible or cost-effective is not clear.
Feasibility would be a particular issue for the attack submarines, given limits on submarine
pressure hull life.
Extending the service lives of any of these ships could require increasing funding for their
maintenance, possibly beginning in the near term, above currently planned levels, so that the
ships would be in good enough condition years from now to remain eligible for service life
extension work. Such funding increases would be in addition to those the Navy has recently
programmed for ensuring that its surface ships can remain in service to the end of their currently
planned service lives.
Affordability of FY2012 30-Year Shipbuilding Plan
Another potential oversight issue for Congress concerns the prospective affordability of the
FY2012 30-year (FY2012-FY2041) shipbuilding plan. In assessing this issue, a key factor to
consider is the estimated cost to implement the plan. In recent years, the Congressional Budget
Office (CBO) has estimated that the Navy’s 30-year shipbuilding plan would cost more to
implement than the Navy has estimated, and this is again the case for the Navy’s FY2012 30-year
shipbuilding plan. A June 2011 CBO report on the cost of the Navy’s FY2012 30-year (FY2012-
FY2041) shipbuilding plan estimates that the plan would cost an average of $18.0 billion per year
in constant FY2011 dollars to implement, or about 16% more than the Navy estimates. CBO’s
estimate is about 7% higher than the Navy’s estimate for the first 10 years of the plan, about 10%
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higher than the Navy’s estimate for the second 10 years of the plan, and about 31% higher than
the Navy’s estimate for the final 10 years of the plan.24 Some of the difference between CBO’s
estimate and the Navy’s estimate, particularly in the latter years of the plan, is due to a difference
between CBO and the Navy in how to treat inflation in Navy shipbuilding. Table 6 summarizes
the Navy and CBO estimates of the FY2012 30-year shipbuilding plan, as presented in the June
2011 CBO report.
Table 6. Navy and CBO Estimates of Cost of FY2012 30-Year (FY2012-FY2041)
Shipbuilding Plan
Funding for new-construction ships, in billions of constant FY2011 dollars
First 10 years
Next 10 years
Final 10 years
Entire 30 years

(FY2012-FY2021)
(FY2022-2031)
(FY2032-FY2041)
(FY2012-FY2041)
Navy estimate
14.6
17.2
14.7
15.5
CBO estimate
15.7
19.0
19.2
18.0
% difference
7% 10% 31% 16%
between Navy and
CBO estimates
Source: Congressional Budget Office, An Analysis of the Navy’s Fiscal Year 2012 Shipbuilding Plan, June 2011, Table
2 (Page 9).
The June 2011 CBO report also estimates the cost of a revised 30-year shipbuilding plan created
by CBO that would fully meet the various force-level goals in the apparent 328-ship force-level
objective of mid-2011. Compared to the Navy’s FY2012 30-year plan, this revised 30-year plan
would include 24 additional destroyers, 5 additional attack submarines, and 2 additional large-
deck (i.e., LHA-type) amphibious assault ships. CBO estimated the cost of implementing this
revised plan at an average of $19.7 billion per year in constant FY2011 dollars, including an
average of $19.1 billion per year for the first 10 years of the plan, an average of $21.3 billion per
year for the second 10 years of the plan, and an average of $18.6 billion per year for the final 10
years of the plan.25
As mentioned earlier, the Navy was able to assemble a five-year (FY2012-FY2016) shipbuilding
plan with a total of 55 ships, or an average of 11 per year, within available resources in part
because almost half of those ships are relatively inexpensive LCSs and JHSVs. Starting a few
years from now, when the LCS and JHSV programs are no longer overrepresented in the
shipbuilding plan, and particularly when procurement of next-generation SSBN(X) ballistic
missile submarines begins, procuring an average of 10 or more ships per year will become a
considerably more expensive proposition.
The Navy wants to procure 12 SSBN(X)s, and is working to reduce the estimated unit
procurement cost of ships 2 through 12 in the program to $4.9 billion in FY2010 dollars.26 To
help pay for the SSBN(X)s without reducing other shipbuilding programs, the shipbuilding

24 Congressional Budget Office, An Analysis of the Navy’s Fiscal Year 2012 Shipbuilding Plan, June 2011, Table 2
(page 9).
25 Congressional Budget Office, An Analysis of the Navy’s Fiscal Year 2012 Shipbuilding Plan, June 2011, Table 2
(page 9).
26 For more on the SSBN(X) program, see CRS Report R41129, Navy Ohio Replacement (SSBN[X]) Ballistic Missile
Submarine Program: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke
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funding profile in the Navy’s FY2011 30-year shipbuilding plan included a “hump” of
approximately $2 billion per year in constant FY2010 dollars during the years (FY2019-FY2033)
when the 12 SSBN(X)s are to be procured. The Navy’s report on the FY2011 30-year plan,
however, contained little explanation of how this $2-billion-per-year hump in shipbuilding
funding would be realized, particularly if the Navy’s budget experiences little or no real growth in
coming years. If the $2-billion-per-year hump were not realized, the total number of ships of
various kinds procured in FY2019-FY2033 could be less than the figures shown in the FY2011
30-year plan. If so, the shortfalls projected for cruisers and destroyers, attack submarines, and
other categories of ships could be larger than those shown in Table 4.
Legislative Activity for FY2012
FY2012 Funding Request
The Navy’s proposed FY2012 budget requests funding for the procurement of 10 new battle force
ships (i.e., ships that count against the 313-ship goal). The 10 ships include two Virginia-class
attack submarines, one DDG-51 class Aegis destroyer, four Littoral Combat Ships (LCSs), one
LPD-17 class amphibious ship, one Mobile Landing Platform (MLP) ship (i.e., a maritime
prepositioning ship), and one Joint High Speed Vessel (JHSV). These ships are funded through
the Shipbuilding and Conversion, Navy (SCN) account, except for the MLP, which is funded
through the National Defense Sealift Fund (NDSF).
FY2012 National Defense Authorization Act (H.R. 1540/P.L. 112-81)
House (Committee Report)
The House Armed Services Committee, in its report (H.Rept. 112-78 of May 17, 2011) on H.R.
1540, recommends approving, with two exceptions, the Navy’s requests for FY2012 procurement
and advance procurement funding in the SCN and NDSF accounts for construction of new battle
force ships. (See pages 345-346 and 460 of the report.)
One exception concerns LHA-7, an amphibious assault ship that was authorized in FY2011 but is
being partially funded in FY2012. The committee’s report recommends a net reduction of $50
million from the amount requested for LHA-7 for FY2012. The recommended net reduction of
$50 million includes a $200 million reduction for “contract delay” and a $150 million increase for
“program increase.” Section 1604 of H.R. 1540 as reported by the committee provides for the
recommended $150 million increase. Section 121 of H.R. 1540 as reported by the committee
would permit the final increment of procurement funding for LHA-7 to be provided in FY2013.
Regarding LHA-7, the committee’s report states:
The delivery of the first ship of the America-class, LHA-6, has been significantly delayed.
According to the Department of Defense “Selected Acquisition Report” of December 31,
2010, the delays are “due to changing conditions in the shipyard portfolio which are driving
labor demands in various trades”. These delays have had a cascading effect on LHA-7,
which was scheduled to go on contract for detail design and construction in November 2010,
but now the Navy estimates the contract will be delayed until the end of fiscal year 2011.
Elsewhere in this title, the committee includes a provision that would authorize the Navy to
conclude funding for LHA-7 in fiscal year 2013. (page 33)
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The second exception is that the committee’s report recommends an undistributed increase of
$150 million in the SCN account for advance procurement and economic order quantity (EOQ)
funding, and an offsetting undistributed reduction of $150 million in the SCN account for
“program decrease.”
The committee’s report also states:
The committee is pleased that the Navy has turned around the downward spiral in battle
force ship quantities, and the plan to achieve the floor of 313 ships appears to be achievable.
To obtain the required capability and to provide the required stability to the fragile
shipbuilding industrial base, the committee believes the following programs are crucial.
(page 33)
The report at this points goes on to discuss the CVN-78 aircraft carrier program, the Virginia class
attack submarine program, the Ohio replacement (SSBN[X]) ballistic missile submarine program,
the DDG-51 destroyer program, and amphibious ships.
Section 1021 of H.R. 1540 as reported states:
SEC. 1021. BUDGETING FOR CONSTRUCTION OF NAVAL VESSELS.
(a) Annual Plan- Section 231 of title 10, United States Code, is amended to read as follows:
`Sec. 231. Budgeting for construction of naval vessels: annual plan and certification
`(a) Annual Naval Vessel Construction Plan and Certification- The Secretary of Defense
shall include with the defense budget materials for a fiscal year—
`(1) a plan for the construction of combatant and support vessels for the Navy developed in
accordance with this section; and
`(2) a certification by the Secretary that both the budget for that fiscal year and the future-
years defense program submitted to Congress in relation to such budget under section 221 of
this title provide for funding of the construction of naval vessels at a level that is sufficient
for the procurement of the vessels provided for in the plan under paragraph (1) on the
schedule provided in that plan.
`(b) Annual Naval Vessel Construction Plan- (1) The annual naval vessel construction plan
developed for a fiscal year for purposes of subsection (a)(1) should be designed so that the
naval vessel force provided for under that plan is capable of supporting the national security
strategy of the United States as set forth in the most recent national security strategy report of
the President under section 108 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 404a),
except that, if at the time such plan is submitted with the defense budget materials for that
fiscal year, a national security strategy report required under such section 108 has not been
submitted to Congress as required by paragraph (2) or paragraph (3), if applicable, of
subsection (a) of such section, then such annual plan should be designed so that the naval
vessel force provided for under that plan is capable of supporting the ship force structure
recommended in the report of the most recent quadrennial defense review.
`(2) Each such naval vessel construction plan shall include the following:
`(A) A detailed program for the construction of combatant and support vessels for the Navy
over the next 30 fiscal years.
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`(B) A description of the necessary naval vessel force structure to meet the requirements of
the national security strategy of the United States or the most recent quadrennial defense
review, whichever is applicable under paragraph (1).
`(C) The estimated levels of annual funding necessary to carry out the program, together with
a discussion of the procurement strategies on which such estimated levels of annual funding
are based.
`(c) Assessment When Vessel Construction Budget Is Insufficient to Meet Applicable
Requirements- If the budget for a fiscal year provides for funding of the construction of
naval vessels at a level that is not sufficient to sustain the naval vessel force structure
specified in the naval vessel construction plan for that fiscal year under subsection (a), the
Secretary shall include with the defense budget materials for that fiscal year an assessment
that describes and discusses the risks associated with the reduced force structure of naval
vessels that will result from funding naval vessel construction at such level. Such assessment
shall be coordinated in advance with the commanders of the combatant commands.
`(d) CBO Evaluation- Not later than 60 days after the date on which the congressional
defense committees receive the plan under subsection (a)(1), the Director of the
Congressional Budget Office shall submit to such committees a report assessing the
sufficiency of the estimated levels of annual funding included in such plan with respect to
the budget submitted during the year in which the plan is submitted and the future-years
defense program submitted under section 221 of this title.
`(e) Definitions- In this section:
`(1) The term `budget’, with respect to a fiscal year, means the budget for that fiscal year that
is submitted to Congress by the President under section 1105(a) of title 31.
`(2) The term `defense budget materials’, with respect to a fiscal year, means the materials
submitted to Congress by the Secretary of Defense in support of the budget for that fiscal
year.
`(3) The term `quadrennial defense review’ means the review of the defense programs and
policies of the United States that is carried out every four years under section 118 of this
title.’.
(b) Clerical Amendment- The table of sections at the beginning of chapter 9 of such title is
amended by striking the item relating to section 231 and inserting the following new item:
`231. Budgeting for construction of naval vessels: annual plan and certification’.
Regarding Section 1021, the committee’s report states:
This section would repeal an amendment made by section 1023 of the Ike Skelton National
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2011 (Public Law 111–383). This section would
require that a 30-year shipbuilding plan be delivered to Congress periodically. The section
that would be repealed changed the periodicity from an annual requirement to once every 4
years to be delivered with the Quadrennial Defense Review.
The committee believes that returning to an annual submittal of the plan would promote
stability and continuity in the planning process, both in the plan itself, and in the
shipbuilding industrial base. One aspect of the section that would be retained is the
requirement that the Director of the Congressional Budget Office, within 60 days of
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submittal of the plan, provide an assessment of the sufficiency of funds to execute the plan in
the budget year and Future Years Defense Program to the congressional defense committees.
(page 208)
Section 1094 of H.R. 1540 as reported states:
SEC. 1094. NUMBER OF NAVY CARRIER AIR WINGS AND CARRIER AIR WING
HEADQUARTERS.
The Secretary of the Navy shall ensure that the Navy maintains—
(1) a minimum of 10 carrier air wings; and
(2) for each such carrier air wing, a dedicated and fully staffed headquarters.
House (Floor Consideration)
On May 26, 2011, as part of its consideration of H.R. 1540, the House rejected, 176-241,
H.Amdt. 335, which would have deleted Section 1604, which provides for $150 million in
procurement funding for LHA-7 (see “House (Committee Report)” above).
Senate (S. 1867)
S. 1867, an original measure reported by Senator Levin on November 15, 2011, without written
report, in effect supersedes S. 1253 (see below). S. 1867 recommends approving the Navy’s
requests for FY2012 procurement and advance procurement funding in the SCN and NDSF
accounts for construction of new battle force ships. (See Sections 4101 and 4401 of the bill as
reported by Senator Levin. In the printed version of the bill, the relevant tables within these two
sections appear on pages 611 and 662.)
Section 1021 of S. 1867 states:
SEC. 1021. LIMITATION ON AVAILABILITY OF FUNDS FOR PLACING MARITIME
PREPOSITIONING SHIP SQUADRONS ON REDUCED OPERATING STATUS.
No amounts authorized to be appropriated by this Act may be obligated or expended to place
a Maritime Prepositioning Ship squadron, or any component thereof, on reduced operating
status until the later of the following:
(1) The date on which the Commandant of the Marine Corps submits to the congressional
defense committees a report setting forth an assessment of the impact on military readiness
of the plans of the Navy for placing such Maritime Prepositioning Ship squadron, or
component thereof, on reduced operating status.
(2) The date on which the Chief of Naval Operations submits to the congressional defense
committees a report that—
(A) describes the plans of the Navy for placing such Maritime Prepositioning Ship squadron,
or component thereof, on reduced operating status; and
(B) sets forth comments of the Chief of Naval Operations on the assessment described in
paragraph (1).
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(3) The date on which the Secretary of Defense certifies to the congressional defense
committees that the risks to readiness of placing such Maritime Prepositioning squadron, or
component thereof, on reduced operating status are acceptable.
Section 1022 of S. 1867 states:
SEC. 1022. MODIFICATION OF CONDITIONS ON STATUS OF RETIRED AIRCRAFT
CARRIER EX-JOHN F. KENNEDY.
Section 1011(c)(2) of the John Warner National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2007 (P.L. 109-364; 120 Stat. 2374) is amended by striking `shall require’ and all that
follows and inserting `may, notwithstanding paragraph (1), demilitarize the vessel in
preparation for the transfer.’.
Senate (S. 1253)
S. 1253 has been, in effect, superseded by S. 1867 (see above). S. 1253 as reported by the Senate
Armed Services Committee (S.Rept. 112-26 of June 22, 2011) recommends approving the Navy’s
requests for FY2012 procurement and advance procurement funding in the SCN and NDSF
accounts for construction of new battle force ships. (See Sections 4101 and 4401 of the bill as
reported by the committee. In the printed version of the bill as reported by the committee, the
relevant tables within these two sections appear on pages 606 and 647.)
Section 1021 of S. 1253 as reported by the committee states:
SEC. 1021. LIMITATION ON AVAILABILITY OF FUNDS FOR PLACING MARITIME
PREPOSITIONING SHIP SQUADRONS ON REDUCED OPERATING STATUS.
No amounts authorized to be appropriated by this Act may be obligated or expended to place
a Maritime Prepositioning Ship squadron, or any component thereof, on reduced operating
status until the later of the following:
(1) The date on which the Commandant of the Marine Corps submits to the congressional
defense committees a report setting forth an assessment of the impact on military readiness
of the plans of the Navy for placing such Maritime Prepositioning Ship squadron, or
component thereof, on reduced operating status.
(2) The date on which the Chief of Naval Operations submits to the congressional defense
committees a report that—
(A) describes the plans of the Navy for placing such Maritime Prepositioning Ship squadron,
or component thereof, on reduced operating status; and
(B) sets forth comments of the Chief of Naval Operations on the assessment described in
paragraph (1).
(3) The date on which the Secretary of Defense certifies to the congressional defense
committees that the risks to readiness of placing such Maritime Prepositioning squadron, or
component thereof, on reduced operating status are acceptable.
Regarding this section, the committee’s report states:
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Limitation on availability of funds for placing Maritime Prepositioning Ships
squadrons on reduced operating status (sec. 1021)
The committee recommends a provision that would prohibit funding to place a maritime
prepositioning ship squadron (MPSRON), or any component thereof, on reduced operating
status until: the Commandant of the Marine Corps (CMC) submits a report to Congress
assessing the impact on military readiness for placing such MPSRON on reduced operating
status; the Chief of Naval Operations describes the Navy’s plan and comments on the CMC’s
report for placing such MPSRON on reduced operating status; and the Secretary of Defense
certifies to Congress that the risks to readiness of placing such MPSRON on reduced
operating status are acceptable. (Page 175)
Section 1022 of S. 1253 as reported by the committee states:
SEC. 1022. MODIFICATION OF CONDITIONS ON STATUS OF RETIRED AIRCRAFT
CARRIER EX-JOHN F. KENNEDY.
Section 1011(c)(2) of the John Warner National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2007 (P.L. 109-364; 120 Stat. 2374) is amended by striking `shall require’ and all that
follows and inserting `may, notwithstanding paragraph (1), demilitarize the vessel in
preparation for the transfer.’.
Regarding this section, the committee’s report states:
Modification of conditions on status of retired aircraft carrier ex-John F. Kennedy (sec.
1022)
The committee recommends a provision that would amend section 1011 of the John Warner
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007 (Public Law 109–364) to allow the
Navy to dispose of the ex-John F. Kennedy. The provision would amend section 1011 to
remove the requirement that the Navy ensure the ship is maintained in a status that would
permit the Navy to return the ship to active service in event of a national emergency. (Page
176)
Conference
The conference report (H.Rept. 112-329 of December 12, 2011) on H.R. 1540/P.L. 112-81 of
December 31, 2011 recommends approving the procurement of all the ships requested by the
Navy for FY2012, but recommends reductions to the specific amounts the Navy had requested for
some of the ships (see pages 811-812 for the ships funded through the SCN account, and page
941 for the MLP ship funded through the NDSF).
Section 1011 of the conference report states:
SEC. 1011. BUDGETING FOR CONSTRUCTION OF NAVAL VESSELS.
(a) Annual Plan- Section 231 of title 10, United States Code, is amended to read as follows:
`Sec. 231. Budgeting for construction of naval vessels: annual plan and certification
`(a) Annual Naval Vessel Construction Plan and Certification- The Secretary of Defense
shall include with the defense budget materials for a fiscal year—
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`(1) a plan for the construction of combatant and support vessels for the Navy developed in
accordance with this section; and
`(2) a certification by the Secretary that both the budget for that fiscal year and the future-
years defense program submitted to Congress in relation to such budget under section 221 of
this title provide for funding of the construction of naval vessels at a level that is sufficient
for the procurement of the vessels provided for in the plan under paragraph (1) on the
schedule provided in that plan.
`(b) Annual Naval Vessel Construction Plan- (1) The annual naval vessel construction plan
developed for a fiscal year for purposes of subsection (a)(1) should be designed so that the
naval vessel force provided for under that plan is capable of supporting the national security
strategy of the United States as set forth in the most recent national security strategy report of
the President under section 108 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 404a),
except that, if at the time such plan is submitted with the defense budget materials for that
fiscal year, a national security strategy report required under such section 108 has not been
submitted to Congress as required by paragraph (2) or paragraph (3), if applicable, of
subsection (a) of such section, then such annual plan should be designed so that the naval
vessel force provided for under that plan is capable of supporting the ship force structure
recommended in the report of the most recent quadrennial defense review.
`(2) Each such naval vessel construction plan shall include the following:
`(A) A detailed program for the construction of combatant and support vessels for the Navy
over the next 30 fiscal years.
`(B) A description of the necessary naval vessel force structure to meet the requirements of
the national security strategy of the United States or the most recent quadrennial defense
review, whichever is applicable under paragraph (1).
`(C) The estimated levels of annual funding necessary to carry out the program, together with
a discussion of the procurement strategies on which such estimated levels of annual funding
are based.
`(c) Assessment When Vessel Construction Budget Is Insufficient to Meet Applicable
Requirements- If the budget for a fiscal year provides for funding of the construction of
naval vessels at a level that is not sufficient to sustain the naval vessel force structure
specified in the naval vessel construction plan for that fiscal year under subsection (a), the
Secretary shall include with the defense budget materials for that fiscal year an assessment
that describes and discusses the risks associated with the reduced force structure of naval
vessels that will result from funding naval vessel construction at such level. Such assessment
shall be coordinated in advance with the commanders of the combatant commands.
`(d) CBO Evaluation- Not later than 60 days after the date on which the congressional
defense committees receive the plan under subsection (a)(1), the Director of the
Congressional Budget Office shall submit to such committees a report assessing the
sufficiency of the estimated levels of annual funding included in such plan with respect to
the budget submitted during the year in which the plan is submitted and the future-years
defense program submitted under section 221 of this title.
`(e) Definitions- In this section:
`(1) The term `budget’, with respect to a fiscal year, means the budget for that fiscal year that
is submitted to Congress by the President under section 1105(a) of title 31.
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`(2) The term `defense budget materials’, with respect to a fiscal year, means the materials
submitted to Congress by the Secretary of Defense in support of the budget for that fiscal
year.
`(3) The term `quadrennial defense review’ means the review of the defense programs and
policies of the United States that is carried out every four years under section 118 of this
title.’.
(b) Clerical Amendment- The table of sections at the beginning of chapter 9 of such title is
amended by striking the item relating to section 231 and inserting the following new item:
`231. Budgeting for construction of naval vessels: annual plan and certification’.
Section 1013 of the conference report states:
SEC. 1013. LIMITATION ON AVAILABILITY OF FUNDS FOR PLACING MARITIME
PREPOSITIONING SHIP SQUADRONS ON REDUCED OPERATING STATUS.
No amounts authorized to be appropriated by this Act may be obligated or expended to place
a Maritime Prepositioning Ship squadron, or any component thereof, on reduced operating
status until the later of the following:
(1) The date on which the Commandant of the Marine Corps submits to the congressional
defense committees a report setting forth an assessment of the impact on military readiness
of the plans of the Navy for placing such Maritime Prepositioning Ship squadron, or
component thereof, on reduced operating status.
(2) The date on which the Chief of Naval Operations submits to the congressional defense
committees a report that—
(A) describes the plans of the Navy for placing such Maritime Prepositioning Ship squadron,
or component thereof, on reduced operating status; and
(B) sets forth comments of the Chief of Naval Operations on the assessment described in
paragraph (1).
(3) The date on which the Secretary of Defense certifies to the congressional defense
committees that the risks to readiness of placing such Maritime Prepositioning squadron, or
component thereof, on reduced operating status are acceptable.
Section 1016 of the conference report states:
SEC. 1016. MODIFICATION OF CONDITIONS ON STATUS OF RETIRED AIRCRAFT
CARRIER EX-JOHN F. KENNEDY.
Section 1011(c)(2) of the John Warner National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2007 (P.L. 109-364; 120 Stat. 2374) is amended by striking `shall require’ and all that
follows and inserting `may, notwithstanding paragraph (1), demilitarize the vessel in
preparation for the transfer.’.
Section 1093 of the conference report states:
SEC. 1093. NUMBER OF NAVY CARRIER AIR WINGS AND CARRIER AIR WING
HEADQUARTERS.
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The Secretary of the Navy shall ensure that the Navy maintains—
(1) a minimum of 10 carrier air wings; and
(2) for each such carrier air wing, a dedicated and fully staffed headquarters.
FY2012 Military Construction and Veterans Affairs and Related
Agencies Appropriations Act (H.R. 2055/P.L. 112-74)
Conference
In final action, H.R. 2055 became a “megabus” appropriations vehicle incorporating nine
appropriations bills, including the FY2012 DOD appropriations bill, which was incorporated as
Division A. The conference report (H.Rept. 112-331 of December 15, 2011) on H.R. 2055/P.L.
112-74 of December 23, 2011, approves the procurement of all the ships requested by the Navy
for FY2012, but reduces the specific amounts the Navy had requested for some of the ships (see
pages 628-629 for the ships funded through the SCN account, and page 734 for the MLP ship
funded through the NDSF).
FY2012 DOD Appropriations Act (H.R. 2219)
House
The House Appropriations Committee, in its report (H.Rept. 112-110 of June 16, 2011) on H.R.
2219, supports the procurement of the new-construction ships requested by the Navy for FY2012,
but recommends reductions to the Navy’s requested funding amounts for some of the ships.
(Pages 153-154 and, for the MLP program, page 255). As detailed on page 276 of the report,
Section 8040 of the bill as reported would rescind, among other funds, $110.351 million in
FY2011 advance procurement funding for the LCS program. Section 8072 of the bill as reported
details the use of $73.992 million in funding provided on page 153 of the committee’s report for
the completion of prior-year shipbuilding programs. The report also states:
SHIPBUILDING OVERSIGHT
The Committee understands that a number of issues related to quality have recently been
identified on Navy ships. Most recently, a failed weld joint caused structural damage to a
mast mounted antenna on an Arleigh Burke-class destroyer. Incorrect installation of key
subsystems on several Virginia-class submarines required corrections to avoid jeopardizing
the mission performance of the submarines. Faulty welds were identified on a number of
ship classes, including at least four aircraft carriers. Additionally, several issues have arisen
regarding the LPD–17 class of amphibious transport dock ships. These issues were severe
enough to cause the USS San Antonio to miss a scheduled deployment.
The Committee directs the Comptroller General to review the Navy’s process for quality
assurance in shipbuilding. This review should identify the extent to which quality assurance
processes identified known quality problems, including an examination of what analyses the
Navy has performed and what actions have been taken to address identified problems. The
review should also examine the extent to which the American Bureau of Shipbuilding plays a
role in quality assurance in Navy shipbuilding and how this role complements or duplicates
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reviews conducted by Navy Supervisor of Shipbuilding and Conversion personnel. As part
of this analysis, a comparison should be made between the Navy, commercial shipbuilders,
and commercial ship buyers’ approaches to quality assurance. The results of this review
should be provided to the congressional defense committees not later than 180 days after
enactment of this Act. (Page 155)
Senate
The Senate Appropriations Committee, in its report (S.Rept. 112-77 of September 15, 2011) on
H.R. 2219, recommends fully funding all of the Navy ships requested for procurement in the
Shipbuilding and Conversion, Navy (SCN) account (page 120), but recommends denying the
request for $425.9 million in the National Defense Sealift Fund (NDSF) for the procurement of a
Mobile Landing Platform (MLP) ship (page 221). Regarding the MLP, the committee’s report
states:
Mobile Landing Platform [MLP].—The fiscal year 2012 budget request includes
$425,865,000 to procure one Mobile Landing Platform [MLP]. The Navy has a requirement
for three MLPs, and the Committee notes that in its previous budget submission, the Navy
proposed procuring the three MLPs over the course of 5 years, beginning in fiscal year 2011.
The fiscal year 2012 budget submission proposes to condense this acquisition to 3 years,
concluding in fiscal year 2013. However, the Committee notes that the fiscal year 2012
budget submission does not take into account that Congress adjusted the MLP acquisition
profile in the Fiscal Year 2011 Department of Defense Appropriations Act by accelerating
the planned schedule by 2 years and procuring two MLPs in fiscal year 2011 instead of one.
The Committee notes that this acceleration, coupled with procuring an additional MLP in
fiscal year 2013, as the Navy has planned for the last two budget cycles, concludes the
program’s acquisition in 3 years, as the Navy proposes in its fiscal year 2012 budget
submission. The Committee believes that a further acceleration of the MLP acquisition
schedule is unwarranted and high-risk and does not allow for sufficient learning to occur, nor
cost efficiencies to be absorbed prior to initiating construction of the third and final ship of
the class. The Committee notes that Navy has already procured long lead materials for the
third ship to avoid shipyard production breaks prior to award of the fiscal year 2013 MLP.
Therefore, the Committee recommends denying the proposed additional acceleration of the
program and recommends that the Navy retain its original plan of procuring a MLP in fiscal
year 2013. (Pages 221-222)
The committee’s report also states:
Ballistic Missile Defense [BMD] Capable Ships.—The Committee notes that the Navy has
established a requirement for fiscal year 2024 of having a force of 94 multi-mission large
surface combatants (including ballistic missile defense [BMD] capability), but the Navy’s
fiscal year 2012 30-year shipbuilding plan projects that the Navy will achieve the 94-ship
goal for BMD-capable ships in 2020 and 2021, with force levels declining thereafter.
Specifically, the Navy projects that it will have, at most, 92 BMD-capable ships in 2024
before declining to 65 in 2034. The Committee is concerned about this projected shortfall
and believes that the Navy should begin to review and consider options to close this gap. The
Navy has indicated that it intends to pursue a multiyear procurement contract for DDG–51
vessels in fiscal year 2013 that could result in significant cost savings. Historic production
rates of three DDG–51s per fiscal year reflected substantial unit cost savings in the past and
would likely be realized by procuring DDG–51 ships at a more economical procurement rate
than currently planned. The Committee directs the Secretary of the Navy to provide a report,
at the same time as the President submits the budget request for fiscal year 2013, which
provides options for closing this gap. (Page 121)
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Conference
For the conference version of the FY2012 DOD Appropriations Act, see the above discussion of
H.R. 2055.
CRS Reports Tracking Legislation on Specific Navy Shipbuilding
Programs
For funding levels and legislative activity on individual Navy shipbuilding, conversion, and
modernization programs, see the following CRS reports:
• CRS Report RS20643, Navy Ford (CVN-78) Class Aircraft Carrier Program:
Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
• CRS Report R41129, Navy Ohio Replacement (SSBN[X]) Ballistic Missile
Submarine Program: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
• CRS Report RL32418, Navy Virginia (SSN-774) Class Attack Submarine
Procurement: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
• CRS Report RL32109, Navy DDG-51 and DDG-1000 Destroyer Programs:
Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
• CRS Report RL33741, Navy Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) Program: Background,
Issues, and Options for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
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Appendix A. Using Past Ship Force Levels to Assess
Proposed Force Levels
One possible method for assessing proposals for the future size and structure of the Navy is to
compare them to historical figures for total Navy fleet size. Historical figures for total fleet size,
however, might not be a reliable yardstick for assessing the appropriateness of proposals for the
future size and structure of the Navy, particularly if the historical figures are more than a few
years old, because the missions to be performed by the Navy, the mix of ships that make up the
Navy, and the technologies that are available to Navy ships for performing missions all change
over time.
The Navy, for example, reached a late-Cold War peak of 568 battle force ships at the end of
FY1987,27 and as of October 13, 2011, had declined to a total of 284 battle force ships. The
FY1987 fleet, however, was intended to meet a set of mission requirements that focused on
countering Soviet naval forces at sea during a potential multi-theater NATO-Warsaw Pact
conflict, while the October 2011 fleet is intended to meet a considerably different set of mission
requirements centered on influencing events ashore by countering both land- and sea-based
military forces of potential regional threats other than Russia, including improved Chinese
military forces and non-state terrorist organizations. In addition, the Navy of FY1987 differed
substantially from the October 2011 fleet in areas such as profusion of precision-guided air-
delivered weapons, numbers of Tomahawk-capable ships, and sophistication of C4ISR systems.28
In coming years, Navy missions may shift again, and the capabilities of Navy ships will likely
have changed further by that time due to developments such as more comprehensive
implementation of networking technology and increased use of ship-based unmanned vehicles.
The 568-ship fleet of FY1987 may or may not have been capable of performing its stated
missions; the 284-ship fleet of October 2011 may or may not be capable of performing its stated
missions; and a fleet years from now with a certain number of ships may or may not be capable of
performing its stated missions. Given changes over time in mission requirements, ship mixes, and
technologies, however, these three issues are to a substantial degree independent of one another.
For similar reasons, trends over time in the total number of ships in the Navy are not necessarily a
reliable indicator of the direction of change in the fleet’s ability to perform its stated missions. An
increasing number of ships in the fleet might not necessarily mean that the fleet’s ability to
perform its stated missions is increasing, because the fleet’s mission requirements might be
increasing more rapidly than ship numbers and average ship capability. Similarly, a decreasing

27 Some publications, such as those of the American Shipbuilding Association, have stated that the Navy reached a
peak of 594 ships at the end of FY1987. This figure, however, is the total number of active ships in the fleet, which is
not the same as the total number of battle force ships. The battle force ships figure is the number used in government
discussions of the size of the Navy. In recent years, the total number of active ships has been larger than the total
number of battle force ships. For example, the Naval Historical Center states that as of November 16, 2001, the Navy
included a total of 337 active ships, while the Navy states that as of November 19, 2001, the Navy included a total of
317 battle force ships. Comparing the total number of active ships in one year to the total number of battle force ships
in another year is thus an apples-to-oranges comparison that in this case overstates the decline since FY1987 in the
number of ships in the Navy. As a general rule to avoid potential statistical distortions, comparisons of the number of
ships in the Navy over time should use, whenever possible, a single counting method.
28 C4ISR stands for command and control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance.
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number of ships in the fleet might not necessarily mean that the fleet’s ability to perform stated
missions is decreasing, because the fleet’s mission requirements might be declining more rapidly
than numbers of ships, or because average ship capability and the percentage of time that ships
are in deployed locations might be increasing quickly enough to more than offset reductions in
total ship numbers.
Previous Navy force structure plans, such as those shown in Table 1, might provide some insight
into the potential adequacy of a proposed new force-structure plan, but changes over time in
mission requirements, technologies available to ships for performing missions, and other force-
planning factors suggest that some caution should be applied in using past force structure plans
for this purpose, particularly if those past force structure plans are more than a few years old. The
Reagan-era plan for a 600-ship Navy, for example, was designed for a Cold War set of missions
focusing on countering Soviet naval forces at sea, which is not an appropriate basis for planning
the Navy today.29

29 Navy force structure plans that predate those shown in Table 1 include the Reagan-era 600-ship plan of the 1980s,
the Base Force fleet of more than 400 ships planned during the final two years of the George H. W. Bush
Administration, the 346-ship fleet from the Clinton Administration’s 1993 Bottom-Up Review (or BUR, sometimes
also called Base Force II), and the 310-ship fleet of the Clinton Administration’s 1997 QDR. The table below
summarizes some key features of these plans.

Features of Recent Navy Force Structure Plans
Plan
600-ship
Base Force
1993 BUR
1997 QDR
Total ships
~600 ~450/416a 346
~305/310b
Attack submarines
100 80/~55c 45-55 50/55d
Aircraft carriers
15e 12
11+1f 11+1f
Surface combatants
242/228g ~150
~124 116
Amphibious ships
~75h 51i 41i 36i
Source: Prepared by CRS based on DOD and U.S. Navy data.
a. Commonly referred to as 450-ship plan, but called for decreasing to 416 ships by end of FY1999.
b. Original total of about 305 ships was increased to about 310 due to increase in number of attack submarines to 55
from 50.
c. Plan originally included 80 attack submarines, but this was later reduced to about 55.
d. Plan originally included 50 attack submarines but this was later increased to 55.
e. Plus one additional aircraft carrier in the service life extension program (SLEP).
f. Eleven active carriers plus one operational reserve carrier.
g. Plan originally included 242 surface combatants but this was later reduced to 228.
h. Number needed to lift assault echelons of one Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) plus one Marine Expeditionary
Brigade (MEB).
i. Number needed to lift assault echelons of 2.5 MEBs. Changing numbers needed to meet this goal reflect in part
changes in the design and capabilities of amphibious ships.
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Appendix B. Independent Panel Assessment of 2010
QDR
The law that requires DOD to perform QDRs once every four years (10 U.S.C. 118) states that
the results of each QDR shall be assessed by an independent panel. The report of the independent
panel that assessed the 2010 QDR was released on July 29, 2010. The independent panel’s report
recommended a Navy of 346 ships, including 11 aircraft carriers and 55 attack submarines.30 The
report stated the following, among other things:
• “The QDR should reflect current commitments, but it must also plan effectively
for potential threats that could arise over the next 20 years.… we believe the
2010 QDR did not accord sufficient priority to the need to counter anti-access
challenges, strengthen homeland defense (including our defense against cyber
threats), and conduct post-conflict stabilization missions.” (Page 54)
• “In this remarkable period of change, global security will still depend upon an
American presence capable of unimpeded access to all international areas of the
Pacific region. In an environment of ‘anti-access strategies,’ and assertions to
create unique ‘economic and security zones of influence,’ America‘s rightful and
historic presence will be critical. To preserve our interests, the United States will
need to retain the ability to transit freely the areas of the Western Pacific for
security and economic reasons. Our allies also depend on us to be fully present in
the Asia-Pacific as a promoter of stability and to ensure the free flow of
commerce. A robust U.S. force structure, largely rooted in maritime strategy but
including other necessary capabilities, will be essential.” (Page 51)
• “The United States will need agile forces capable of operating against the full
range of potential contingencies. However, the need to deal with irregular and
hybrid threats will tend to drive the size and shape of ground forces for years to
come, whereas the need to continue to be fully present in Asia and the Pacific and
other areas of interest will do the same for naval and air forces.” (Page 55)
• “The force structure in the Asia-Pacific needs to be increased. In order to
preserve U.S. interests, the United States will need to retain the ability to transit
freely the areas of the Western Pacific for security and economic reasons. The
United States must be fully present in the Asia-Pacific region to protect American
lives and territory, ensure the free flow of commerce, maintain stability, and
defend our allies in the region. A robust U.S. force structure, one that is largely
rooted in maritime strategy and includes other necessary capabilities, will be
essential.” (Page 66)
• “Force structure must be strengthened in a number of areas to address the need to
counter anti-access challenges, strengthen homeland defense (including defense
against cyber threats), and conduct post-conflict stabilization missions: First, as a
Pacific power, the U.S. presence in Asia has underwritten the regional stability
that has enabled India and China to emerge as rising economic powers. The

30 Stephen J. Hadley and William J. Perry, co-chairmen, et al, The QDR in Perspective: Meeting America’s National
Security Needs In the 21st Century, The Final Report of the Quadrennial Defense Review Independent Panel,
Washington, 2010, Figure 3-2 on page 58.
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United States should plan on continuing that role for the indefinite future. The
Panel remains concerned that the QDR force structure may not be sufficient to
assure others that the United States can meet its treaty commitments in the face
of China’s increased military capabilities. Therefore, we recommend an increased
priority on defeating anti-access and area-denial threats. This will involve
acquiring new capabilities, and, as Secretary Gates has urged, developing
innovative concepts for their use. Specifically, we believe the United States must
fully fund the modernization of its surface fleet. We also believe the United
States must be able to deny an adversary sanctuary by providing persistent
surveillance, tracking, and rapid engagement with high-volume precision strike.
That is why the Panel supports an increase in investment in long-range strike
systems and their associated sensors. In addition, U.S. forces must develop and
demonstrate the ability to operate in an information-denied environment.” (Pages
59-60)
• “To compete effectively, the U.S. military must continue to develop new
conceptual approaches to dealing with operational challenges, like the Capstone
Concept for Joint Operations (CCJO). The Navy and Air Force‘s effort to
develop an Air-Sea Battle concept is one example of an approach to deal with the
growing anti-access challenge. It will be necessary to invest in modernized
capabilities to make this happen. The Chief of Naval Operations and Chief of
Staff of the Air Force deserve support in this effort, and the Panel recommends
the other military services be brought into the concept when appropriate.” (Page
51; a similar passage appears on page 67)
In recommending a Navy of 346 ships, the independent panel’s report cited the 1993 Bottom-Up
Review (BUR) of U.S. defense plans and policies. Table B-1 compares the Navy’s 313-ship goal
of September 2011 to the 346-ship Navy recommended in the 1993 BUR (as detailed partly in
subsequent Navy testimony and publications) and the ship force levels recommended in the
independent panel report.

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Table B-1. Comparison of Navy’s 313-ship goal, Navy Plan from 1993 BUR, and Navy
Plan from 2010 QDR Review Panel
2010 QDR
Independent
Navy’s 313-ship goal of
Bottom-Up Review
Review Panel
Ship Type
September 2011
(BUR) (1993)
(July 2010)
SSBNs 12
18
14
(SSBN force was later
reduced to 14 as a result of
the 1994 Nuclear Posture
Review)
SSGNs 4
0
4
(SSGN program did not yet
exist)
SSNs
48
45 to 55
55
(55 in FY99, with a long-term
goal of about 45)
Aircraft carriers
11 active
11 active + 1
11 active
operational/reserve
Surface combatants
149
124
n/a
(114 active + 10 frigates in
Naval Reserve Force; a total
of 110-116 active ships was
also cited)
Cruisers and destroyers
94
n/a
n/a
Frigates
0
n/a n/a
(to be replaced by LCSs)
LCSs
55
0
n/a
(LCS program did not exist)
Amphibious ships
33
41
n/a
(33 needed to lift 2.0 MEBs)
(Enough to lift 2.5 MEBs)
Dedicated mine
0
26
n/a
warfare ships
(to be replaced by LCSs)
(LCS program did not exist)
CLF ships
30
43
n/a
Support ships
26
22
n/a
TOTAL ships
313
346
346
(numbers above add to
331-341)a
Source: Table prepared by CRS. Sources for 1993 Bottom-Up Review: Department of Defense, Report on the
Bottom-Up Review, October 1993, Figure 7 on page 28; Department of the Navy, Highlights of the FY 1995
Department of the Navy Budget, February 1994, p. 1; Department of the Navy, Force 2001, A Program Guide to the
U.S. Navy, 1994 edition, p. 15; Statement of VADM T. Joseph Lopez, U.S. Navy, Deputy Chief of Naval
Operations (Resources, Warfare Requirements & Assessments), Testimony to the Military Forces and Personnel
Subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee, March 22, 1994, pp. 2-5. Source for independent
panel report: Stephen J. Hadley and William J. Perry, co-chairmen, et al., The QDR in Perspective: Meeting
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America’s National Security Needs In the 21st Century, The Final Report of the Quadrennial Defense Review Independent
Panel, Washington, 2010, Figure 3-2 on pages 58-59.
Notes: n/a is not addressed in the report. SSBN is nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine; SSGN is
nuclear-powered cruise missile and special operations forces submarine; SSN is nuclear-powered attack
submarine; LCS is Littoral Combat Ship; MPF(F) is Maritime Prepositioning Force (Future) ship; CLF is combat
logistics force (i.e., resupply) ship; MEB is Marine Expeditionary Brigade.
a. The Navy testified in 1994 that the planned number was adjusted from 346 to 330 to reflect reductions in
numbers of tenders and early retirements of some older amphibious ships.
In a letter dated August 11, 2010, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates provided his comments on
the independent panel’s report. The letter stated in part:
I completely agree with the Panel that a strong navy is essential; however, I disagree with the
Panel’s recommendation that DoD should establish the 1993 Bottom Up Review’s (BUR’s)
fleet of 346 ships as the objective target. That number was a simple projection of the then-
planned size of [the] Navy in FY 1999, not a reflection of 21st century, steady-state
requirements. The fleet described in the 2010 QDR report, with its overall target of 313 to
321 ships, has roughly the same number of aircraft carriers, nuclear-powered attack
submarines, surface combatants, mine warfare vessels, and amphibious ships as the larger
BUR fleet. The main difference between the two fleets is in the numbers of combat logistics,
mobile logistics, and support ships. Although it is true that the 2010 fleet includes fewer of
these ships, they are all now more efficiently manned and operated by the Military Sealift
Command and meet all of DoD’s requirements….
I agree with the Panel’s general conclusion that DoD ought to enhance its overall posture and
capabilities in the Asia-Pacific region. As I outlined in my speech at the Naval War College
in April 2009, “to carry out the missions we may face in the future… we will need numbers,
speed, and the ability to operate in shallow waters.” So as the Air-Sea battle concept
development reaches maturation, and as DoD’s review of global defense posture continues, I
will be looking for ways to meet plausible security threats while emphasizing sustained
forward presence – particularly in the Pacific.31




31 Letter dated August 11, 2010, from Secretary of Defense Robert Gates to the chairmen of the House and Senate
Armed Services and Appropriations Committees, pp. 3 and 4. The ellipsis in the second paragraph appears in the letter.
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Appendix C. Size of the Navy and Navy
Shipbuilding Rate
Size of the Navy
Table C-1 shows the size of the Navy in terms of total number of ships since FY1948; the
numbers shown in the table reflect changes over time in the rules specifying which ships count
toward the total. Differing counting rules result in differing totals, and for certain years, figures
reflecting more than one set of counting rules are available. Figures in the table for FY1978 and
subsequent years reflect the battle force ships counting method, which is the set of counting rules
established in the early 1980s for public policy discussions of the size of the Navy.
As shown in the table, the total number of battle force ships in the Navy reached a late-Cold War
peak of 568 at the end of FY1987 and began declining thereafter.32 The Navy fell below 300
battle force ships in August 2003 and included 284 battle force ships as of October 13, 2011.
As discussed in Appendix A, historical figures for total fleet size might not be a reliable yardstick
for assessing the appropriateness of proposals for the future size and structure of the Navy,
particularly if the historical figures are more than a few years old, because the missions to be
performed by the Navy, the mix of ships that make up the Navy, and the technologies that are
available to Navy ships for performing missions all change over time. For similar reasons, trends
over time in the total number of ships in the Navy are not necessarily a reliable indicator of the
direction of change in the fleet’s ability to perform its stated missions. An increasing number of
ships in the fleet might not necessarily mean that the fleet’s ability to perform its stated missions
is increasing, because the fleet’s mission requirements might be increasing more rapidly than ship
numbers and average ship capability. Similarly, a decreasing number of ships in the fleet might
not necessarily mean that the fleet’s ability to perform stated missions is decreasing, because the
fleet’s mission requirements might be declining more rapidly than numbers of ships, or because
average ship capability and the percentage of time that ships are in deployed locations might be
increasing quickly enough to more than offset reductions in total ship numbers.

32 Some publications, such as those of the American Shipbuilding Association, have stated that the Navy reached a
peak of 594 ships at the end of FY1987. This figure, however, is the total number of active ships in the fleet, which is
not the same as the total number of battle force ships. The battle force ships figure is the number used in government
discussions of the size of the Navy. In recent years, the total number of active ships has been larger than the total
number of battle force ships. For example, the Naval Historical Center states that as of November 16, 2001, the Navy
included a total of 337 active ships, while the Navy states that as of November 19, 2001, the Navy included a total of
317 battle force ships. Comparing the total number of active ships in one year to the total number of battle force ships
in another year is thus an apples-to-oranges comparison that in this case overstates the decline since FY1987 in the
number of ships in the Navy. As a general rule to avoid potential statistical distortions, comparisons of the number of
ships in the Navy over time should use, whenever possible, a single counting method.
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Table C-1. Total Number of Ships in the Navy Since FY1948
FYa Number FYa Number FYa Number
1948 737 1970 769 1992 466
1949 690 1971 702 1993 435
1950 634 1972 654 1994 391
1951 980 1973 584 1995 373
1952 1,097 1974 512 1996 356
1953 1,122 1975 496 1997 354
1954 1,113 1976 476 1998 333
1955 1,030 1977 464 1999 317
1956 973 1978 468 2000 318
1957 967 1979 471 2001 316
1958 890 1980 477 2002 313
1959 860 1981 490 2003 297
1960 812 1982 513 2004 291
1961 897 1983 514 2005 282
1962 959 1984 524 2006 281
1963 916 1985 541 2007 279
1964 917 1986 556 2008 282
1965 936 1987 568 2009 285
1966 947 1988 565 2010 288
1967 973 1989 566 2011 284
1968 976 1990 547 2012
1969 926 1991 526 2013
Source: Compiled by CRS using U.S. Navy data. Numbers shown reflect changes over time in the rules
specifying which ships count toward the total. Figures for FY1978 and subsequent years reflect the battle force
ships counting method, which is the set of counting rules established in the early 1980s for public policy
discussions of the size of the Navy.
a. Data for earlier years in the table may be for the end of the calendar year (or for some other point during
the year), rather than for the end of the fiscal year.
Shipbuilding Rate
Table C-2 shows past (FY1982-FY2011) and requested (FY2012-FY2016) rates of Navy ship
procurement.

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Table C-2. Battle Force Ships Procured or Requested, FY1982-FY2016
(Procured FY1982-FY2011; requested FY2012-FY2015)
82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99
17 14 16 19 20 17 15 19 15 11 11 7 4 4 5 4 5 5
00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
6 6 6 5 7 8 4a
5a
3a 8 7 10 11b
13 11 12 9
Source: CRS compilation based on examination of defense authorization and appropriation committee and
conference reports for each fiscal year. The table excludes non-battle force ships that do not count toward the
313-ship goal, such as certain sealift and prepositioning ships operated by the Military Sealift Command and
oceanographic ships operated by agencies such as the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
(NOAA).
a. The totals shown for FY2006, FY2007, and FY2008, reflect the cancel ation two LCSs funded in FY2006,
another two LCSs funded in FY2007, and an LCS funded in FY2008.
b. The total shown for FY2012 includes two JHSVs—one that was included in the Navy’s FY2012 budget
submission, and one that was included in the Army’s FY2012 budget submission. Until FY2012, JHSVs were
being procured by both the Navy and the Army. The Army was to procure its fifth and final JHSV in
FY2012, and this ship was included in the Army’s FY2012 budget submission. In May 2011, the Navy and
Army signed a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) transferring the Army’s JHSVs to the Navy. In the
FY2012 DOD Appropriations Act (Division A of H.R. 2055/P.L. 112-74 of December 23, 2011), the JHSV
that was in the Army’s FY2012 budget submission was funded through the Shipbuilding and Conversion,
Navy (SCN) appropriation account, along with the JHSV that the Navy had included in its FY0212 budget
submission. The four JHSVs that were procured through the Army’s budget prior to FY2012, however, are
not included in the annual totals shown in this table.

Author Contact Information

Ronald O'Rourke

Specialist in Naval Affairs
rorourke@crs.loc.gov, 7-7610


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