Contemporary Developments in Presidential
Elections
Kevin J. Coleman
Analyst in Elections
R. Sam Garrett
Specialist in American National Government
Thomas H. Neale
Specialist American National Government
January 9, 2012
Congressional Research Service
7-5700
www.crs.gov
R42139
CRS Report for Congress
Pr
epared for Members and Committees of Congress
Contemporary Developments in Presidential Elections
Summary
This report considers contemporary developments in presidential elections. It emphasizes three
topics chosen for their recurring importance and notable recent developments: (1) nominating
procedures; (2) campaign finance; and (3) the electoral college. The report highlights significant
developments in these areas, particularly for the 2008 and 2012 elections. It also provides
background information about the presidential election process in general. Other CRS products
cited throughout this report provide additional information about the topics introduced here.
As the report notes, 2012 is expected to be a noteworthy election cycle for several reasons. Some
are extensions of developments that started in 2008 or before, while others are more recent. Key
themes discussed in this report include the following:
• In recent years, the two major political parties have made efforts to control the
“front-loading” phenomenon, the tendency for states to vie to be first or among
the first to hold caucuses or primary elections to select presidential nominees. As
the result of inter-party cooperation following the 2008 election, front-loading
has been significantly reduced for 2012.
• Among Republicans, the winner-take-all method that had been widely used will
be replaced with a proportional system for contests before April 1, although strict
proportional allocation has not been mandated. With an open race for the
Republican nomination, the pace of primaries and caucuses and the new
allocation rule are likely to have an important, and as yet unknown, effect.
• Significant changes in campaign finance law are expected to shape campaign
finance in the 2012 election cycle, largely as a result of the 2010 Supreme Court
decision in Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission. In the aftermath of
Citizens United, presidential candidates may face additional pressure to raise
funds to be able to compete against their opponents and outside groups,
particularly new organizations called “super PACs.”
• One of the most notable campaign finance developments in recent elections is the
decline of the public financing system for presidential candidates. The program’s
future remains uncertain for 2012, as candidates appear increasingly likely to opt
instead for private fundraising.
• After decades of inactivity, proposals to reform the electoral college are
undergoing a revival ahead of the 2012 elections.
• Various states have considered or are considering changes to their participation in
the electoral college. Moreover, a non-governmental organization, the National
Popular Vote (NPV) campaign, has proposed an interstate compact that would
achieve direct election without a constitutional amendment.
This report will be updated periodically throughout the 2012 election cycle.
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Contents
Introduction...................................................................................................................................... 1
2012: A Reversal of the Front-loading Trend .................................................................................. 3
The Origins of Front-loading..................................................................................................... 4
Why Do Iowa and New Hampshire Go First? .................................................................... 6
Democratic vs. Republican Delegate Selection Rules............................................................... 9
Types of Delegates ............................................................................................................ 12
Superdelegates................................................................................................................... 13
The Outlook for 2012 .............................................................................................................. 15
Campaign Finance in Presidential Elections.................................................................................. 16
Recent Major Changes in Campaign Finance Law ........................................................... 19
Transitioning from Public Funds to Private Funds in Recent Election Cycles ................. 20
The Public Financing Program.......................................................................................... 20
Disparate Resources: Public versus Private Funds in 2008 and Beyond .......................... 24
Outside Money: Spending by Parties, PACs, and Other Groups....................................... 27
The Outlook for 2012........................................................................................................ 30
The Electoral College System: Contemporary Trends................................................................... 31
The Electoral College System Today ...................................................................................... 32
Components of the Electoral College................................................................................ 32
How The Electoral College Functions .............................................................................. 33
Criticism and Defense of the Electoral College ...................................................................... 34
Congressional Efforts to Reform the Electoral College by Constitutional Amendment,
1948-1979............................................................................................................................. 36
Trends in Congressional Electoral College Reform Proposals................................................ 37
Current Developments in Reform Initiatives ― Activity in the States ................................... 38
Proportional Plan ― Colorado Amendment 36, 2004 ...................................................... 38
District Plan ― California, 2008....................................................................................... 39
District Plans, 2011-2012 ― Nebraska Out? Pennsylvania and Wisconsin In?................ 40
The National Popular Vote Campaign: Direct Popular Election Through an Interstate
Compact ............................................................................................................................... 42
National Popular Vote, Inc. ............................................................................................... 43
NPV Momentum? ............................................................................................................. 43
National Popular Vote: Pro and Con ................................................................................. 44
National Popular Vote: Legal and Constitutional Issues ................................................... 46
Outlook for 2012 ............................................................................................................... 48
Conclusion ..................................................................................................................................... 49
Figures
Figure 1. Number of Democratic and Republican Primaries and Caucuses by Month,
1996 – 2012 .................................................................................................................................. 5
Figure 2. Democratic Party Delegates, 2012 ................................................................................. 14
Figure 3. Taxpayer Participation in Public Financing Since 1976................................................. 23
Figure 4. Total Fundraising by Selected 2008 Presidential Campaigns......................................... 25
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Figure 5. 2012 Presidential Campaign Receipts by Candidate and Party...................................... 27
Figure 6. Selected Outside Spending in Presidential Campaigns, 1996-2008............................... 29
Tables
Table 1. New Hampshire Primary Winners Since 1952................................................................... 7
Table 2. Comparative Demographic Data for the United States and Early Primary and
Caucus States................................................................................................................................ 9
Table 3. Types of Democratic Party Delegates, 2012 .................................................................... 12
Table 4. Federal Contribution Limits, 2011-2012.......................................................................... 17
Table 5. Public Financing to 2008 Presidential Candidates........................................................... 24
Table 6. 2012 Presidential Campaign Receipts by Party ............................................................... 26
Table 7. 2012 Presidential Campaign Receipts by Candidate and Party ....................................... 26
Contacts
Author Contact Information........................................................................................................... 50
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Introduction
Presidential elections are among the most iconic events in American politics. Particularly before
the television era, campaigns for the presidency and vice presidency were relatively brief events,
involving a small band of supporters and occupying only a few months of the election-year
calendar. Today, presidential campaigns last months or years, involve thousands of professional
employees and volunteers, and are the preeminent political event of a four-year cycle. Since the
mid-19th century, certain elements of the role of political parties, money, and nomination
procedures have remained constant, but many have evolved with time.
This report considers contemporary developments in presidential elections. It emphasizes three
topics chosen for their recurring importance and notable recent developments: (1) nominating
procedures; (2) campaign finance; and (3) the electoral college. The report highlights significant
developments in these areas, particularly as they relate to the 2008 and 2012 elections. These
topics have obvious political implications that affect the race for the presidency. They are also
modern manifestations of the democratic process in the United States. Key issues include how the
party nominees are selected, which are financially able to compete in elections and how, and
whether electors or voters should ultimately be responsible for electing the nation’s chief
executive.
All these concerns may be of interest to Congress as Members continue to follow and be involved
in presidential campaigns, participate as delegates to the national conventions, and potentially
consider their own presidential candidacies, but also as the House and Senate oversee federal
elections and consider various reform proposals. The report proceeds by discussing the
nomination process, which starts the presidential contest. It then considers campaign finance, the
raising and spending of funds that are vital throughout the nomination and general election
process. The final section addresses proposed changes affecting the electoral college, the final
step in electing the president. A preview of major points appears below.
The presidential primary season is often shaped by events in the previous election cycle. That is
especially true for 2012. After years of negotiations, the national Democratic and Republican
parties reached agreement on a plan to organize the schedule of primaries and caucuses and
reduce front-loading. In recent election cycles, the Iowa and New Hampshire contests had been
pushed from February into January, under pressure from other states that sought a place at the
beginning of the process. Democratic party rules usually kept these states from jumping ahead of
Iowa and New Hampshire, but did not prevent a rush to schedule early events within the rules.
Inter-party cooperation averted a similar result for 2012, which features a significantly less front-
loaded calendar.
Another development that will shape the nominating contest is a change to the Republican rules
for awarding delegates according to the presidential vote. The winner-take-all method that had
been widely used will be replaced with a proportional system for contests before April 1, although
strict proportional allocation has not been mandated. With an open race for the Republican
nomination, the pace of primaries and caucuses and the new allocation rule are likely to have an
important, and as yet unknown, impact on this first phase of the presidential election.
Significant changes in campaign finance law are expected to shape campaign finance in the 2012
election cycle. Most prominently, this includes developments resulting from the Supreme Court’s
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2010 decision in Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission. In that case, the Court
invalidated longstanding prohibitions on corporations and unions using their general treasury
funds to make independent expenditures calling for election or defeat of specific candidates.
(Direct contributions from corporate and union treasuries remain prohibited.1) These changes
apply to both presidential elections and other campaigns. In the aftermath of Citizens United,
presidential candidates face additional pressure to raise funds to be able to compete against their
opponents and outside groups, particularly new organizations called “super PACs.” In addition to
Citizens United, the future of the presidential public financing program is in doubt, as candidates
increasingly opt instead for private funds.
The electoral college method of presidential elections has long been the subject of discussion. To
critics, it is archaic, anti-democratic, and has, on four occasions, elected Presidents who received
fewer popular votes than their opponents. To defenders, it is a pillar of federalism, promoting
inclusive candidacies and a moderate two-party system. Between 1948 and 1979, Congress
considered numerous constitutional amendments to reform the system or replace it with direct
election, but no single proposal ever gained the constitutionally required two-thirds majority of
both chambers needed to submit an amendment for state ratification. After decades of inactivity,
the issue is enjoying a revival, as various states consider reform on the sub-federal level.
Moreover, a non-governmental organization, the National Popular Vote (NPV) campaign, has
proposed an interstate compact that would achieve direct election without a constitutional
amendment. The compact would bind signatory states to award their electoral votes to the
nationwide popular vote winner, notwithstanding results within the state, and would take effect
after states controlling more than half (270) of electoral votes agree. By late 2011, eight states and
the District of Columbia, possessing a total of 132 electoral votes, had joined the compact.
To summarize, the three major areas discussed in this report—the nominating process, campaign
finance, and the electoral college—have been central elements of presidential elections for over a
century and a half. Each of those areas has experienced transition in recent decades, but each is
also facing changes particularly relevant for the 2012 election cycle.
• Both Democrats and Republicans have amended their nomination processes to
reduce front-loading and bring more order to the nomination process. For the first
time, the two parties have agreed on a window during which primaries are
permitted—from March to June—except for the exempt states of Iowa, New
Hampshire, Nevada, and South Carolina. Those contests will again be held in
January.
• For the first time in modern history, corporations and unions are now free to
make unlimited expenditures from their general treasuries calling for defeat of
specific candidates. In addition to adapting to this new environment, presidential
candidates and outside groups must consider the decline of the presidential public
financing system. In 2008, Barack Obama became the first person elected
president, since public funds were first offered in 1976, who declined to accept
any public funds. It is possible that 2012 will make the first occasion in which
neither major-party nominee will accept any public funds.
• Debate over the current relevance of the electoral college has been a recurring
theme for decades—a topic that has reemerged ahead of the 2012 election cycle.
1 2 U.S.C. § 441b(a).
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Despite relative inactivity on the issue in recent years, several states have
proposed moving to direct election of the president. This development is not
expected to affect the 2012 election cycle, but the 2012 cycle and related
developments may suggest renewed interest in reconsidering presidential
selection in the future.
Additional discussion appears throughout this report.
2012: A Reversal of the Front-loading Trend2
For the first time in nearly 25 years, the primary and caucus calendar will not feature a crowded
series of events in early February or March. As the result of a coordinated effort between
Democrats and Republicans at the national level, both parties are expected to enforce a
sanctioned “window” for delegate selection events.3 Democrats first adopted a window in 19804
(and effectively exempted Iowa and New Hampshire),5 but Republicans were unable to garner
support for the concept until 2010.6 Previous attempts by Republicans to do so for the 2004 and
2008 elections were unsuccessful, partly because the party had to approve such changes at the
quadrennial national convention, for the following election cycle. In both cases, the plans failed
to receive the necessary support within the party to be referred to the national conventions.
However, the 2008 national convention did approve a committee—the Temporary Delegate
Selection Committee—to review delegate selection procedures and make recommendations to the
Republican National Committee (RNC), a first for a party that had traditionally deferred to the
state parties on most delegate selection matters.7
The Temporary Delegate Selection Committee made several recommendations, of which two
were adopted as important amendments to party rules and which are likely to shape the 2012
primary cycle (see the section entitled “The Outlook for 2012” for a longer discussion of these
changes). The first concerns the calendar, and specifically the imposition of a “window” during
which primary and caucus events may be held,8 such as the Democrats have had since 1980.
2 Kevin J. Coleman (x7-7878), Analyst in Elections, authored this section.
3 “Thruster v laggards; The 2012 primaries,” The Economist, April 23, 2011, available at http://www.economist.com/
node/18587538.
4 Democratic National Committee, Delegate Selection Rules for the 1980 Democratic National Convention, June 9,
1978, Rule 10, p. 10.
5 Rule 10 of the Democrat’s 1980 Delegate Selection Rules stated that no first stage determining event could be held
“prior to the second Tuesday in March or after the second Tuesday in June” of the election year and noted that “[I]n no
instance may a state which scheduled delegate selection procedures on or between the second Tuesday in March and
the second Tuesday in June 1976 move out of compliance with the provisions of this rule.” The 1976 Iowa caucuses
were held on January 19 and the New Hampshire primary was held on February 24. Democrats formalized the
exemptions in the 1984 rules by allowing Iowa to hold caucuses 15 days before the second Tuesday in March and New
Hampshire to hold its primary 7 days before that date. Democratic National Committee, Delegate Selection Rules for
the 1984 Democratic National Convention, as adopted by the Democratic National Committee on March 26, 1982,
Rule 10, pp. 11-12.
6 Stuart Rothenberg, “Can Small RNC Rule Change Affect GOP Race?” Roll Call, September 8, 2011, available at
http://www.rollcall.com/issues/57_25/can_small_rnc_rule_change_affect_gop_race-208531-1.html?zkMobileView=
true.
7 Elaine C. Kamarck, Primary Politics: How Presidential Candidates Have Shaped the Modern Nominating System,
(Washington: Brookings Institution Press, 2009), p. xii.
8 Republican National Committee, The Rules of the Republican Party, As Adopted by the 2008 Republican National
(continued...)
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Republicans have never before imposed a timing rule. The change stipulates that no delegate
selection event may be held before the first Tuesday in March (March 6, 2012), with exceptions
for Iowa, New Hampshire, South Carolina, and Nevada, which can begin the delegate selection
process on or after February 1. The window would not apply if Democrats failed to adhere to
similar timing.
The second change, also unprecedented for Republicans, requires states to use proportional
allocation of national convention delegates for any contest held before April 1.9 Democrats have
long mandated proportional allocation of delegates, based on primary and caucus results. The
intention is for states that want to retain the preferred winner-take-all system to move the primary
or caucus to a date after April 1 to comply, presumably resulting in a less front-loaded calendar as
a result. That goal was achieved to an extent.
It remains to be seen what effect the new allocation rule and the reduced front-loading has on the
2012 election itself. Effective enforcement of the new rules could be a challenge. For example,
the Florida primary date does not comply with the newly adopted timing rule, but reducing the
convention delegation by 50 percent, as called for in the Republican rules,10 will not prevent the
media from focusing on the January 31 primary results. Similarly, states that violate the new
proportional allocation rule and instead use a winner-take-all allocation before it is allowed on
April 1 could introduce complications foreseen and unforeseen. Awarding delegates on a winner-
take-all basis could potentially help a front-runner close out the race early, but it could alternately
boost the fortunes of a candidate or candidates in particular contests who might not otherwise be
able to remain in the race. It might also simply prolong the contest for the nomination, resulting
in more primary spending and party infighting. Other outcomes are possible as well. The penalty
for violating the proportional allocation rule is not specified in the Republican rules, but guidance
provided to the state parties by the RNC says that “the definition of ‘proportional allocation’ is
left to each state’s individual discretion, subject to a final determination in accordance with the
rules,” but departing from the requirement for proportional allocation “carries significant risk that
not all delegates will be seated.”11
The Origins of Front-loading
Front-loading came about largely because of the prominence of the New Hampshire primary and
the Iowa caucuses in the nominating process. The era of rules changes that Democrats initiated
after the 1968 convention encouraged state parties to adopt primaries, but the subsequent rise in
the number of primaries did not initially result in a more front-loaded calendar. Scattered efforts
to schedule early events in other states to attract candidate attention or promote a “native son,”
either individually or as part of a regional effort, only resulted in Iowa and New Hampshire
scheduling even earlier events over time to protect their “first-in-the-nation” status. (The New
Hampshire primary was held at the end of February in 1976, 1980, and 1984, and it was last held
(...continued)
Convention, September 1, 2008, (amended August 6, 2010), Rule 15, p. 18.
9 The significance of the primaries and caucuses is in choosing the delegates to the national party conventions, where
the nominees are chosen. Allocating delegates on a proportional basis, based on a candidate’s share of the primary or
caucus preferences, can yield very different results than using a winner-take-all allocation method.
10 Rule 16, The Rules of the Republican Party, p. 25.
11 Republican National Committee, “New Timing Rules for 2012 Republican Presidential Nominating Schedule,”
memorandum, February 11, 2011, p. 4.
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on January 8 in 2008 and January 10, 2012; the Iowa caucuses were held in late January and
February between 1976 and 1984; they were held on January 3 in 2008 and 2012.) In addition to
being the first to assess the candidates, the two states benefit economically from hosting the
various presidential campaigns in the months before the voting begins. One estimate noted that
New Hampshire could reap $264 million because of its early date in 2012.12
With a few exceptions, most states did not challenge Iowa and New Hampshire’s claim to being
first. Democrats continued to revise their rules after each election and the party eventually
adopted its current timing rule at the 1980 election, which provided an exemption from the party’s
sanctioned “window” for delegate selection events for Iowa and New Hampshire.13
Figure 1. Number of Democratic and Republican Primaries and Caucuses by Month,
1996 – 2012
Source: CRS figure based on Federal Election Commission data.
Notes: The data include primaries and caucuses held for one or both parties on a single date.
In 1988, when Iowa voted on February 8 and New Hampshire voted on February 16, the
organization of the southern Super Tuesday regional primary on March 8 accelerated the “front-
loading” phenomenon. The Super Tuesday event was organized by the Southern Legislative
Conference (SLC), a group of southern and border state legislators, and included primaries in 14
states on a single date.14 It was designed to increase the impact of southern voters in the
nominating process and possibly encourage and promote southern candidates who might enter the
12 Gerald D. Skoning, “Commentary: Why should Iowa and New Hampshire always go first?” Palm Beach Post,
October 6, 2011, available at http://www.palmbeachpost.com/opinion/commentary/commentary-why-should-iowa-and-
new-hampshire-always-1900137.html?printArticle=y.
13 Ibid., pp. 56-57.
14 The Southern Legislative Conference states that held primaries on March 8 included Alabama, Arkansas, Florida,
Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Mississippi, Missouri, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Tennessee, Texas, and
Virginia. In South Carolina, Democrats held caucuses on March 5 and Republicans held a primary on March 12. A
precursor southern event took place on March 13, 1984 with primaries in Alabama, Florida and Georgia, in addition to
two primaries in the Northeast and Democratic caucuses in four other scattered states.
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race. In the presidential election cycles that followed, Iowa and New Hampshire continued to vote
in February until the 2000 election, when Iowa held caucuses on January 24 and the New
Hampshire primary was on February 1.15 In the meantime, however, large numbers of states that
were not exempt from the Democratic party window began scheduling primaries or caucuses at
the beginning of the window, following the Super Tuesday model, and accelerating the
nominating season because so many delegates were at stake within the first few weeks of voting.
The last primaries traditionally have been held in early June. The front-loading phenomenon
meant that clusters of state contests on a single date dominated the early part of the calendar, but
the length of the nominating season was not shortened. This, in turn, reinforced the view that the
contest was over before voters in later state contests had cast their ballots.
The effort to reduce front-loading for the 2012 election has been largely successful, as
demonstrated in Figure 1. The early part of the calendar is very similar to 2008’s, with Iowa on
January 3, followed by New Hampshire (January 10), South Carolina (January 21), and Nevada
(February 4). However, while the 2008 calendar featured more February contests than any other
month—including 15 primaries and four caucuses for both parties on the first Tuesday—there are
only a handful this time, partly because of the new timing rule adopted by both parties that
established March as the starting point for non-exempt states. Budget woes caused some states to
consolidate the presidential primary with the regular state primary, as California did,16 while
others canceled the Presidential primary altogether, as did Utah17 and Washington.18 While the
2012 starting date for exempted states is the same as it was in 2008, there are very few contests in
February and the bulk of the primaries and caucuses are more-or-less evenly distributed from
March to June. It is not clear what effect the calendar will have on the Republican race. The fast
pace of early events in 2008 has been replaced with a more sequential calendar, although the
specific order of states may determine what kind of race emerges. See the “The Outlook for
2012” section for more details about the calendar.
Why Do Iowa and New Hampshire Go First?
The New Hampshire primary has been an important event since 1952, when the primary ballot
allowed a voter to mark his or her Presidential candidate preference for the first time. The
preference vote was not connected to the selection of delegates, but the results boosted the
candidacies of General Dwight D. Eisenhower and Senator Estes Kefauver at the expense of
favorites Senator Robert Taft and President Harry Truman, respectively, and captured the
attention of the media because it provided an early gauge of candidate strength or weakness.
Although New Hampshire had first adopted its Presidential primary in 1913—eventually moved
in 1915 to the second Tuesday in March to coincide with town meetings—voters in the primary
cast their ballots for unpledged delegates. It rose to prominence because of the preference vote
15 In the years between 1988 and 2008, various state parties scheduled caucus events in January and February before
Iowa or New Hampshire or both, but did not eclipse either state’s status in the Presidential nominating season.
16 See http://www.sos.ca.gov/elections/elections_cand.htm.
17 Lisa Riley Roche, “Huntsman, Romney both say they’d be competitive in earlier Utah primary,” Deseret News, June
28, 2011, available at http://www.deseretnews.com/article/705375352/Huntsman-Romney-both-say-they’d-be-
competitive-in-earlier-Utah-primary.html.
18 Washington Secretary of State Sam Reed, “Washington suspends 2012 presidential primary; regular state primary
still on,” press release, May 12, 2011, available at http://www.sos.wa.gov/office/osos_news.aspx?i=
zwm8zI6TS07Z8OKbW30dOw%3D%3D.
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that debuted in 1952.19 New Hampshire has protected its “first-in-the-nation” primary status by
legislating that it is held on the second Tuesday in March, but gives the secretary of state the
power to change the date so that it precedes any similar contest by seven days.20 The national
Democratic Party has protected, in effect, New Hampshire’s frontrunner primary status since
1980 by restricting the period during which state parties may hold contests (and exempting Iowa
and New Hampshire), and the national Republican Party recently formalized that arrangement as
well.
New Hampshire voters have successfully picked the eventual party nominees in 8 of 15
Democratic primaries and in 12 of 15 Republican primaries since 1952, including 11 from both
parties who were elected or reelected President (see Table 1 below). Criticism of New
Hampshire’s status and influence, however, has been virtually unrelenting in the intervening
decades. Given its small size, the state receives media attention that is disproportionate. Between
1988 and 1996, New Hampshire received between 17 and 23 percent of all television coverage
during the nomination phase.21 In comparison, the California primary garnered 5 percent of media
coverage in 1996, after the primary was moved up to March from its usual June date. Aside from
the obvious benefits of having a monopoly on being the first primary (the Iowa caucuses are
earlier), the New Hampshire primary has been criticized not only because of the small number of
participants who wield such influence in the first stage of the Presidential election, but also
because the state is not representative of the country’s demographics.
Table 1. New Hampshire Primary Winners Since 1952
Year Democrats
Republicans
Primary Winner
Nominee
Primary Winner
Nominee
1952
Estes Kefauver
Adlai E. Stevenson
Dwight D.
Dwight D.
Eisenhower
Eisenhower
1956
Estes Kefauver
Adlai E. Stevenson
Dwight D.
Dwight D.
Eisenhower
Eisenhower
1960
John F. Kennedy
John F. Kennedy
Richard M. Nixon
Richard M. Nixon
1964
Lyndon B. Johnson
Lyndon B. Johnson
Henry Cabot Lodge
Barry Goldwater
1968
Lyndon B. Johnson
Hubert H. Humphrey
Richard M. Nixon
Richard M. Nixon
1972
Edmund S. Muskie
George McGovern
Richard M. Nixon
Richard M. Nixon
1976
James E. Carter
James E. Carter
Gerald R. Ford
Gerald R. Ford
1980
James E. Carter
James E. Carter
Ronald Reagan
Ronald Reagan
19 William G. Mayer, “The New Hampshire Primary: A Historical Overview” in Gary R. Orren and Nelson W. Polsby,
eds., Media and Momentum: The New Hampshire Primary and Nomination Politics (Chatham, NJ: Chatham House,
1987), pp. 10-11.
20 The New Hampshire Election Code, Chapter 653:9 states The presidential primary election shall be held on the
second Tuesday in March or on a date selected by the secretary of state which is 7 days or more immediately preceding
the date on which any other state shall hold a similar election, whichever is earlier, of each year when a president of the
United States is to be elected or the year previous. Said primary shall be held in connection with the regular March
town meeting or election or, if held on any other day, at a special election called by the secretary of state for that
purpose.”
21 Harold W. Stanley and Richard G. Niemi, Vital Statistics on American Politics, 2001-2002, (Washington: CQ Press,
2001), pp. 178-179.
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Year Democrats
Republicans
Primary Winner
Nominee
Primary Winner
Nominee
1984
Gary Hart
Walter F. Mondale
Ronald Reagan
Ronald Reagan
1988
Michael S. Dukakis
Michael S. Dukakis
George H.W. Bush
George H.W. Bush
1992
Paul E. Tsongas
William J. Clinton
George Bush
George Bush
1996
William J. Clinton
William J. Clinton
Patrick J. Buchanan
Robert J. Dole
2000
Albert Gore, Jr.
Albert Gore, Jr.
John McCain
George W. Bush
2004
John F. Kerry
John F. Kerry
George W. Bush
George W. Bush
2008 Hillary
Rodham
Barack H. Obama
John S. McCain
John S. McCain
Clinton
Source: Guide to U.S. Elections, (Washington: CQ Press, 2005), various pages and, for 2008, the New Hampshire
Secretary of State website, http://www.sos.nh.gov/presprim2008/index.htm.
Notes: Candidate names in bold indicate those who were elected or reelected President.
The Iowa caucuses rose to prominence largely as the result of events in 1972, when Democrats
first held their caucuses in January (Republican caucuses were in April). Democrats were
operating under entirely new nominating rules designed to democratize the delegate selection
process. The reforms had been implemented as a result of the violence and upheaval at the 1968
Democratic National Convention in Chicago, based on subsequent recommendations from the
party’s Commission on Party Structure and Delegate Selection,22 also known as the
McGovern/Fraser Commission. Iowa was the first event of the nominating season under the new
rules. Although the results of the January 24 precinct caucuses were imprecise, presumed
frontrunner Senator Edmund Muskie was unexpectedly challenged by Senator George McGovern
(of the McGovern/ Fraser Commission), who finished third behind Muskie. “Uncommitted” was
first. Although Muskie was the leading candidate in Iowa, his campaign had performed below so-
called media expectations, to some extent, which damaged his frontrunner status. For his part,
McGovern had recognized both the importance of the new rules and Iowa’s January 24 caucuses
and had begun organizing in the state months before other candidates. 23 A closer than expected
result in the New Hampshire primary that followed on March 7, which Muskie won with
McGovern second, further slowed Muskie’s campaign.24 McGovern eventually prevailed in
winning the nomination, only to lose badly to President Richard Nixon in the general election
(520 to 17 in the electoral college).
22 Democratic National Committee, “Mandate for Reform: A Report of the Commission on Party Structure and
Delegate Selection to the Democratic National Committee,” April, 1970.
23 Hugh Winebrenner, The Iowa Precinct Caucuses: The Making of a Media Event (Ames: Iowa University Press,
1987), pp. 53-64.
24 Bill Kovach, “Balloting Heavy,” New York Times, March 8, 1972, p. 1.
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Table 2. Comparative Demographic Data for the United States and Early Primary
and Caucus States
New
South
United
States
Hampshire
Iowa
Carolina
Nevada
Population
308,745,538
1,316,470 3,046,355 4,625,364 2,700,551
White
72.4% 93.9% 91.3% 66.2% 66.2%
Black 12.6% 1.1% 2.9% 27.9% 8.1%
Hispanic 16.3%
2.8%
5.0%
5.1%
26.5%
Asian
4.8% 2.2% 1.7% 1.3% 7.2%
Union
10.9% 10.2% 11.4% 4.6% 15%
membership
Source: U.S. Census Bureau, “State & County Quick Facts,” http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/32000.html
and the AFL-CIO, “Union Members by State, 2010,” http://www.aflcio.org/joinaunion/why/uniondifference/
uniondiff16.cfm.
The 1972 Democratic caucuses had alerted the media to the pitfalls of misinterpreting pre-
election year expectations and to the practical usefulness of Iowa’s early caucus results. When
Republicans joined Democrats in setting a date for the 1976 caucuses on January 18, Iowa was
positioned to leverage its status as the first contest of the nominating season. Governor James E.
Carter scored a surprise victory in Iowa after extensive campaigning there and he was rewarded
with a windfall of press coverage. He further boosted his momentum with a win in New
Hampshire five weeks later. On the Republican side, President Gerald Ford narrowly defeated
Governor Ronald Reagan in a straw poll that was unrelated to the selection of delegates, but
which also fueled post-caucus coverage of the event. In the end, the cooperation of the parties to
extensively promote the Iowa caucuses in 1976 was successful and a second small,
unrepresentative state became a starting place for the Presidential nominating season.
Two additional states were given exemptions in 2008 to the Democrat’s timing rules. South
Carolina and Nevada were added because they were demographically more representative of the
nation—and particularly of elements in the Democratic party base—than New Hampshire and
Iowa.25 Nevada has a large union presence and Hispanic population, and South Carolina has a
substantial black population.
Democratic vs. Republican Delegate Selection Rules
The two national parties are a study in contrasts with regard to the rules for nominating
Presidential candidates. The Democrats engineered the wholesale revision of the process in 1970
in the name of “democratization,” and some of those changes were enacted by state legislatures in
the years that followed. Democratic party rules are numerous, detailed, and administered at the
national level. Republicans have fewer rules and the national party has mostly deferred to the
state parties on how the delegates are selected. There are some similarities, however. Both parties
allocate delegates to the states on a congressional district and statewide (at-large) basis, as well as
allocating additional “bonus” delegates according to the strength of the Democratic or Republican
25 Chris Cillizza and Zachary A. Goldfarb, “Democrats Tweak the Primary Calendar,” Washington Post, July 23, 2006,
A 4.
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party vote for certain offices in previous elections. Each party also assigns automatic delegates to
the states for party or elected officials, although Democrats have many more such delegates
(referred to in the press as “superdelegates”). Both parties use the primary and caucus process, or
a combination of the two, to select delegates. And finally, both parties convene a national
convention in August or September to select the Presidential and Vice Presidential nominees (the
party that controls the White House usually convenes its convention last). In 2012, Republicans
will meet in Tampa, Florida, from August 27-30 and Democrats will meet in Charlotte, North
Carolina from September 3-6.
As for the differences between the parties on delegate selection, there are many. Democrats seek
to encourage the participation and representation of groups that have been “explicitly denied the
right to vote or have been subjected to discriminatory and exclusionary practices.”26 The national
party imposes affirmative action goals to achieve participation by these groups according to their
presence in the electorate, but does not allow the use of quotas. The rules instruct states to give
priority consideration to African Americans, Hispanics, Native Americans, Asian Americans and
Pacific Islanders, and women in selecting at-large delegates and alternates, if needed, to fulfill the
affirmative action goals outlined in the state’s delegate selection plan. State delegations are also
required to provide for equal numbers of men and women delegates and alternates in the state
delegation and at the district level as well, if possible. The party also seeks to include LGBT
(lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender) individuals, people with disabilities, and youth in the
delegate selection process, and party affairs generally, according to their presence in the
Democratic electorate.27 The Republican Party does not impose affirmative action goals for the
state parties, but notes that
participation in a Republican primary, caucus, or any meeting or convention ... shall in no
way be abridged for reasons of sex, race, religion, color, age, or national origin. The
Republican National Committee and the state Republican party or governing committee of
each state shall take positive action to achieve the broadest possible participation by men and
women, young people, minority and heritage groups, senior citizens, and all other citizens in
the delegate election, selection, allocation, or binding process.28
The Republican rules also note that “each state shall endeavor to have equal representation of
men and women in its delegation” to the convention.29
Voter participation in primaries and caucuses is controlled by national party rules, state laws, and
state party rules. This overlapping authority is largely the result of state laws concerning open and
closed primaries and the national parties’ efforts to restrict participation to those who are either
registered with the party or aligned with its principles. Restricting participation to “party voters”
is complicated by uneven state voter registration procedures under which a voter may not be
26 Rule 6 (A), Democratic National Committee, Delegate Selection Rules for the 2012 Democratic National
Convention, issued by the Democratic Party of the United States (recommended for adoption by the full DNC at its
meeting August 20, 2010), p. 6.
27 Rule 7, Democratic National Committee, Delegate Selection Rules for the 2012 Democratic National Convention,
issued by the Democratic Party of the United States (recommended for adoption by the full DNC at its meeting August
20, 2010), p. 8.
28 Rule 4 (a), Republican National Committee, The Rules of the Republican Party, as adopted by the 2008 Republican
National Convention, September 1, 2008 and amended by the Republican National Committee on August 6, 2010, p.
17.
29 Ibid., Rule 4 (d).
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required to declare a party. At the national level, Republicans limit participation to “persons
eligible to vote who are deemed as a matter of public record to be Republicans pursuant to state
law or, if voters are not enrolled by party, by Republican party rules of a state....”30 Two other
provisions note that “the applicable Republican party rules of a state may prescribe additional
qualifications not inconsistent with state law” and that “no state law shall be observed that
permits any person to participate in a primary ... that also permits that person at the same primary
to participate in the choosing of nominees of any other party.”31 Comparable Democratic party
rules note that “[p]articipation in the delegate selection process shall be open to all voters who
wish to participate as Democrats” and that “Democratic voters shall be those persons who
publicly declare their Party preference and have that preference publicly recorded.”32 With respect
to closed primary states, the Democratic party rules note that “nothing in these rules shall be
interpreted to encourage or permit states with party registration and enrollment ... to amend their
systems to open participation to members of other parties.”33 And, finally, the rules say that state
parties should “encourage non-affiliated and new voters to register or enroll” with the party and
that “no person shall participate or vote in the nominating process for a Democratic presidential
candidate who also participates in the nominating processes of any other party for corresponding
elections.”34
The parties’ methods of allocating delegate and alternate slots to the states and territories vary
considerably, as do the rules for conducting primaries and caucuses and awarding delegates based
on the results.
In a reversal of their usual positions, the Democratic party rule on binding delegates is much
simpler than Republican rules. The rule says simply that “[d]elegates elected to the national
convention pledged to a presidential candidate shall in all good conscience reflect the sentiments
of those who elected them.”35 Republicans do not have a national party rule on whether delegates
are bound or not, and defer to the state parties on the matter. As a result, there is a great deal of
variety among the state delegations at the convention with respect to how delegates may cast their
votes.
Delegate selection procedures are based on a number of documents. For Democrats, the
documents include the Call for the 2012 Democratic National Convention, the Rules and Bylaws
of the National Democratic Party, and, most importantly, the Delegate Selection Rules For the
2012 Democratic National Convention. For Republicans, the Rules of the Republican Party and
the Call to the Convention control the delegate selection process. According to preliminary
estimates, the number of delegates to the 2012 Democratic National Convention is 5,077 (and 371
alternates)36 and the number of delegates to the Republican National Convention is 2,420.
Delegate totals are subject to change as the result of elections that may occur before the
30 Ibid., Rule 15 (c)(2).
31 Ibid., Rule 15 (c)(2) and (c)(3).
32 Rule 2 (A) and 2 (A)(1), Democratic National Committee, Delegate Selection Rules for the 2012 Democratic
National Convention, issued by the Democratic Party of the United States (recommended for adoption by the full DNC
at its meeting August 20, 2010), p. 2.
33 Ibid., Rule 2 (B).
34 Ibid., Rule 2 (E).
35 Ibid., Rule 12 (J).
36 Democratic Party of the United States, Call For the 2012 Democratic National Convention, as adopted by the
Democratic Party of the United States, August 20, 2010, p. 31.
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convention meets or other events that might affect the composition of the state delegations. State
Democratic parties are required to submit delegate selection plans to the national party for
approval by the Rules and Bylaws Committee: “State Delegate Selection Plans, Affirmative
Action Plans and Inclusion Programs shall be submitted to the DNC Rules and Bylaws
Committee for approval on or before May 2, 2011.”37
Types of Delegates
The methods the parties use to allocate delegates (and alternates) to each of the states and the
territories are characteristically different. Democrats have two categories of delegates, pledged
and unpledged, according to whether or not the delegates are required to express a Presidential
candidate or uncommitted preference as a condition of election (as shown in Table 3). Pledged
district delegates are allocated and elected at a district level (usually the congressional district, but
sometimes by state legislative district), and at-large delegates are allocated and elected at the
statewide level. Both of these types of delegates are allocated to each state according to a formula
called the “allocation factor” (discussed in greater detail below). A third type of pledged delegate
is called an “Add-on” delegate, that allows for representation by party leaders and elected
officials within the state. The number of such delegates is calculated by multiplying the number
of total base delegates for a state by 15 percent, so it is also based on the allocation factor.
Table 3. Types of Democratic Party Delegates, 2012
Pledged Unpledged
(“Superdelegates”)
Total
Total Base Delegates
3,792
DNC
Members of
Distinguished
District At-large
Add-on
Members
Congress Governors
Party Leaders
2,819 973 564
436 240
20 25
5,087
Source: Democratic National Committee, Call for the 2012 Democratic National Convention, as adopted on
August 20, 2010, p. 31.
Democrats begin the allocation process with a base of 3,700 delegate votes, which are assigned to
the states and the District of Columbia based on the allocation factor. The allocation factor is a
formula that relies on the state’s Democratic vote in the previous three Presidential elections and
the assigned number of electoral college votes, divided by the corresponding national totals, to
assign the delegates. The formula is expressed as follows:
A = allocation factor
SDV = state vote for Democratic candidate in the year indicated
37 Rule 1 (D), Democratic National Committee, Delegate Selection Rules for the 2012 Democratic National
Convention, p. 2
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TDV = total vote for Democratic candidate in the year indicated
SEV = state electoral college vote
For example, South Dakota’s allocation factor is .004012, so its base number of delegates is:
.004012 x 3,700 = 14.85, or 15 delegates. The base delegates are assigned as district level
delegates (75% of the base, or 11 delegates) and at-large delegates (25% of the base, or 4
delegates). South Dakota is also entitled to two add-on delegate slots for party leaders and elected
officials in the state. Delegates in these three categories are pledged delegates and required to
express a Presidential candidate or uncommitted preference as a condition of election. The state is
also allocated a number of unpledged delegates, including five for its members of the Democratic
National Committee, one for its Democratic Member of Congress, and one for the former Senate
Majority Leader as a Distinguished Party Leader delegate. These are the superdelegates
(discussed in greater detail in the next section). Thus, the total number of delegates for South
Dakota is 24, with two alternates, for a total delegation of 26. One alternate is allotted for every
12 convention votes.
Democrats also allocate delegates for five entities for which the allocation factor cannot be
computed because they do not participate in presidential elections: American Samoa, Democrats
Abroad, Guam, Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands. The party assigns at-large delegates to each
entity, which also receives delegate slots for its members of the DNC, Members of Congress, and
Democratic Governors.
Republicans use a simpler delegate allocation method than the Democrats. The party assigns 10 at
large delegates to each state, as well as three delegates per congressional district. In addition, the
party assigns bonus delegates to a state that cast its electoral votes (or a majority thereof) for the
Republican nominee in the preceding election, and also assigns a single at-large delegate to states
in which Republicans were elected to the following: the governor’s office, at least one half of the
seats in the U.S. House of Representatives, a majority of the members of a chamber of the state
legislature (if the presiding officer is a Republican elected by the chamber), a majority of
members in all chambers of a state legislature (if the presiding officers are Republicans elected by
each chamber), or a U.S. Senate seat (in the six-year period preceding the presidential election
year). Republicans assign one alternate for each delegate.
Republicans assign at-large delegates to the District of Columbia, Guam, the Northern Mariana
Islands, Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands. The District of Columbia is also eligible for bonus
delegates if it cast its electoral vote (or a majority thereof) for the Republican nominee in the
preceding election.
Superdelegates
Another difference between the parties is the number of automatic delegate slots each party
reserves for party or elected officials. Although the Republican Party designates as delegates a
small number of party or elected officials, the term “superdelegate” has generally been used in
reference to a group of unpledged Democratic Party delegates. These delegates are designated
automatically and are not required to make known their Presidential candidate or uncommitted
preference, in contrast to all the other elected delegates. They include all Democratic Party
Members of Congress and Governors; members of the Democratic National Committee;
distinguished party members who include former Presidents and Vice Presidents, former
Democratic Leaders of the Senate, Speakers of the House, and Minority Leaders; and former
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Chairs of the Democratic National Committee. The superdelegates were added after the 1980
election when incumbent President James E. Carter lost to Governor Ronald Reagan in a 489-49
electoral vote landslide. The belief was that superdelegates, as party and elected leaders, could
serve as a counterweight to rank and file party voters in evaluating Presidential candidates.38 In
this way, the superdelegates represented an effort to somewhat reverse the effect of the 1970s
reforms in diminishing the influence of “party elders.” Democrats increased the number of such
delegates every four years since they were introduced in 1984 until the 2012 convention, for
which they have been slightly reduced.39
Figure 2. Democratic Party Delegates, 2012
Source: CRS figure based on Democratic Party of the United States, Call for the 2012 Democratic National
Convention, August 20, 2010, Appendix B.
Notes: Delegate totals are subject to change because of interim election results, resignations, and deaths.
For most of their existence, the superdelegates attracted little attention,40 but in 2008, it appeared
that they might decide the contest. By February, Senator Hillary Clinton and Senator Barack
Obama were so evenly matched in the fight to win delegates that the campaigns courted
individually many of the 796 superdelegates, who were nearly 20 percent of the convention
total.41 The contest was not resolved until the last events on the calendar, the June 3 primaries in
South Dakota and Montana. Obama claimed victory with 1,763 pledged and 438 superdelegates
(2,201), as compared to 1,640 pledged and 256 superdelegates for Clinton (1,896). A candidate
needed 2,118 to win the nomination.
38 William G. Mayer, In Pursuit of the White House: How We Choose Our Presidential Nominees, (Chatham, NJ:
Chatham House Publishers, Inc., 1996), pp. 123-124.
39 Democrats eliminated one category of superdelegates that are “add-on” slots for state and local party and elected
officials.
40 Vice President Walter Mondale needed 323 (out of 1,937) superdelegates to claim the nomination over Senator Gary
Hart in 1984. Mondale declared victory on the date of the last primaries, June 5, but would not have had a majority
without the superdelegates, a fact that was largely obscured because of the timing of his victory announcement. Elaine
C. Kamarck, Primary Politics: How Presidential Candidates Have Shaped the Modern Nominating System
(Washington: Brookings Institution Press, 2009), pp. 158-160.
41 Julie Bosman, “Wooing With Charm and PACS,” New York Times, February 15, 2008, p. 19.
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The Outlook for 2012
The delegate selection process in any given election year is usually shaped by events that
occurred in the previous cycle. That is especially true for the 2012 nominating season.
• Because of the front-loading that again characterized the calendar in 2008,
Democrats and Republicans for the first time agreed upon a plan to control the
calendar with a window for delegate selection events, that begins on March 6,
2012 for all but the exempt states of Iowa, New Hampshire, Nevada, and South
Carolina. The inter-party cooperation was unprecedented, as was the adoption of
a new Republican party rule, also intended to reduce front-loading, that requires
the use of proportional allocation to divide delegates in contests held before April
1 (except for the exempted states). Although the party did not specifically define
proportional allocation and instead left it to the discretion of the state parties, it
marks a change from awarding delegates largely on a winner-take-all basis at any
point in the calendar. The new rule has introduced an element of uncertainty into
the Republican nominating contest. Although the intention was to spread out the
contests, in an effort to reverse front-loading by delaying the use of winner-take-
all, the result may serve to prolong the nominating battle. According to Roll Call,
the earliest date that a candidate can secure a majority of delegates is April 24.42
In the meantime, without a contest on the Democratic side, the President is free
essentially to campaign for the general election.
• The 2012 calendar was finalized on November 2, when the New Hampshire
Secretary of State announced that the primary would be held on January 10.43
That announcement was preceded by several months of calendar maneuvering on
the part of certain states that began with an announcement that Florida would
hold its primary on January 31, 2011. The race will begin on the same date as in
2008—with the January 3 Iowa caucuses—but it will be less front-loaded than it
has been in some time. The New Hampshire, South Carolina and Nevada contests
are on virtually the same January dates as in 2008,44 as is Florida’s primary,
which is in violation of both parties’ rules this time. The schedule of contests in
February looks quite different than it did in 2008, however, as the first Tuesday
featured events in 22 states in that year, whereas only a handful of states (mostly
Republican events, except for the Missouri primary) will violate party rules to
hold February events in 2012. The first Tuesday in March is the officially
sanctioned opening date for non-exempt states to hold contests. The January start,
followed by a light schedule of events in February represents a dramatic shift in
the early characteristics of the calendar in comparison to 2008. Another trend is
that a number of states that had early primaries in 2008 have moved the contests
to later in the year, such as California and New Jersey (June 5), Ohio (June 12),
and Connecticut, Delaware and New York (April 24). The Democratic contest in
2008 extended into June under a much more front-loaded calendar (albeit with
42 Shira Toeplitz, Roll Call, “Prolonged 2012 Primary Risky for GOP,” December 20, available at
http://www.rollcall.com/issues/57_77/Prolonged-2012-Primary-Risky-for-GOP-211200-1.html?pos=htmbtxt.
43 Michael D. Shear, New York Times, “New Hampshire Claims Its Usual Spot on the Republican Primary Calendar,”
November 3, 2011, p. 22.
44 The dates of the Iowa, New Hampshire, South Carolina and Nevada events violate both the DNC and RNC rules for
2012, which provide for these contests to be held in February.
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different candidates and dynamics), while many more delegates will be at stake
in June, 2012.
• For many presidential election cycles since 1972, the “law of unintended
consequences” has been invoked to explain unwelcome results that sometimes
followed from Democratic rules changes. In 2012, with an open nominating
contest and unprecedented changes to the rules and calendar, it may be the
Republicans who could contend with unintended consequences.
Aside from the rules and calendar under which the presidential candidates will compete, the
amount of money to be spent in both the primary and general elections phases is also expected to
be unprecedented and unpredictable. New fundraising and spending trends in 2008, and
significant changes to campaign finance law since then, suggest that the terrain of the 2012
election is likely to be different than in any election that has preceded it.
Campaign Finance in Presidential Elections45
Campaigning for the presidency requires more money today than ever before.46 Raising funds
increasingly requires highly professional campaign staffs, typically supplemented with
fundraising consultants and assistance—where permissible—from national party committees.47
The money raised is spent on every facet of the campaign, particularly political advertising,
which is typically a national campaign’s largest budget item.48 Purchasing broadcast airtime to
run political ads is especially expensive in major media markets. Even without high airtime costs,
the advertising must be produced—usually through the services of professional media
consultants, polls must be commissioned to track the campaign’s popularity and messages, and all
sorts of everyday operational costs must be met.
Federal election law and regulation, discussed below, set the boundaries for how presidential
campaigns and other “political committees” (which include candidate committees, party
committees, and political action committees (PACs)) raise and spend money. Although public
financing dominated presidential campaigns between the 1970s and early 2000s, a combination of
legal and strategic developments have increased the emphasis on private money in recent election
cycles. In addition to the amounts raised and spent by candidate campaigns, other entities—
especially parties, PACs, and interest groups (e.g., tax-exempt 501(c) and 527 organizations)—are
major sources of political funds.
As Table 4 below shows, for the 2012 election cycle, an individual may contribute up to $5,000
to a presidential campaign. Of that amount, $2,500 may be contributed during the primary
election. Another $2,500 may be contributed during the general election. Also as the table shows,
45 R. Sam Garrett (x7-6443), Specialist in American National Government, authored this section.
46 For an overview of the changes in funding since the 1970s, see Candice J. Nelson, Grant Park: The Democratization
of Presidential Elections, 1968-2008 (Washington: Brookings Institution Press, 2011), pp. 9-24.
47 See, for example, R. Sam Garrett, Campaign Crises: Detours on the Road to Congress (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner
Publishers, 2010); and Dennis W. Johnson, No Place for Amateurs: How Political Consultants are Reshaping
American Democracy, 2nd ed. (New York: Routledge, 2007). Although some of the citations provided in this section
are from sources that emphasize congressional campaigns, the concepts also apply to presidential campaigns.
48 See, for example, John Sides et al., Campaigns and Elections: Rules, Reality, Strategy, Choice (New York: W.W.
Norton, 2011), p. 264.
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PACs and parties can also contribute to campaigns, just as a presidential campaign could choose
to contribute funds to one of those entities. Importantly, and as discussed below, publicly financed
candidates may not accept private contributions in the general election. The limits below also do
not necessarily apply to contributions to groups making only independent expenditures—
messages that explicitly call for election or defeat of a candidate but which are not coordinated
with the campaign.
Table 4. Federal Contribution Limits, 2011-2012
(additional limits appear in the table notes)
Recipient
Multicandidate
National Party
Principal
Committee (most
Committee
State, District,
campaign
PACs, including
(DSCC, NRCC,
Local Party
Contributor
committee
leadership PACs)
etc.)
Committee
Individual $2,500
per
$5,000 per year
$30,800 per year* $10,000 per year
election*
(combined limit)
Principal Campaign
$2,000 per
$5,000 per year
Unlimited
Unlimited
Committee
election
transfers to party
transfers to party
committees
committees
Multicandidate
$5,000 per
$5,000 per year
$15,000 per year
$5,000 per year
Committee (most
election
(combined limit)
PACs, including
leadership PACs)a
State, District, Local
$5,000 per
$5,000 per year
Unlimited
Unlimited
Party Committee
election
(combined limit)
transfers to party
transfers to party
(combined limit)
committees
committees
National Party
$5,000 per
$5,000 per year
Unlimited
Unlimited
Committee
election
transfers to party
transfers to party
committees
committees
Source: CRS adaptation from FEC, “Contribution Limits for 2011-2012,” http://www.fec.gov/info/
contriblimits1112.pdf.
Notes: A presidential campaign committee (e.g., Jones for President) is a “principal campaign committee.” The
same is true for a House or Senate campaign. The table assumes that leadership PACs would qualify for
multicandidate status. The original source, noted above, includes additional information and addresses non-
multicandidate PACs (which are relatively rare). Limits marked with an asterisk (*) are adjusted biennial y for
inflation. The table does not include the following notes regarding additional limitations: (1) For individuals, a
special biennial limit of $117,000 ($46,200 to al candidate committees and $70,800 to party and PAC
committees) also applies. These amounts are adjusted biennial y for inflation; (2) Contributions to independent-
expenditure-only PACs (super PACs) are unlimited, as are contributions to nonconnected PACs making
independent expenditures consistent with the Carey decision; (3) The national party committee and the national
party Senate committee (e.g., the DNC and DSCC or RNC and NRSC) share a combined per-campaign limit of
$43,100, which is adjusted biennial y for inflation.
a. “Multicandidate committees” are those that have been registered with the FEC (or, for Senate committees,
the Secretary of the Senate) for at least six months; have received federal contributions from more than 50
people; and (except for state parties) have made contributions to at least five federal candidates. See 11
C.F.R. §100.5(e)(3). In practice, most PACs attain this status automatical y over time.
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Campaign finance in presidential elections has been the subject of extensive research49 and is
subject to complex requirements specified in the Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA), the
Internal Revenue Code (IRC), and Federal Election Commission (FEC) regulations.50 In-depth
treatment of these subjects is beyond the scope of this report, which is designed to provide an
overview of major issues. The following pages discuss some of the most notable contemporary
issues affecting campaign finance in presidential elections. In particular, the discussion includes
recent changes in the legal and regulatory environment per the 2010 Supreme Court ruling in
Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission; the public financing program; and fundraising
and spending by campaigns and groups in 2008 and beyond. Among others, key points include
the following.
• Major legal changes resulted from the Supreme Court’s 2010 Citizens United
ruling. Although corporations and unions remain prohibited from using their
treasury funds to contribute to candidates, the 2012 election cycle will be the first
in which they can directly (but independently) spend treasury funds to advocate
election or defeat of a presidential candidate.
• In 2012, presidential campaigns (like all other federal candidate campaigns) can
raise no more than $5,000 from individual contributors ($2,500 for the primary
election; $2,500 for the general election).
• Presidential campaigns are on pace to raise record amounts in 2012, in addition
to substantial financial activity from parties, political action committees (PACs),
and outside groups.
• Although candidates from both parties widely participated in public financing
before 2000, the program’s popularity has declined in the past decade. In 2008
Barack Obama accepted no public funds. He was the first candidate elected
president solely with private funds since public financing was first offered in
1976.
• The decline of public financing is perhaps the greatest change in presidential
campaign finance in the past 20 years. It is possible that no major candidate will
participate in public financing in 2012.
• Democratic and Republican convention committees received base public
financing grants of approximately $17.7 million each (to be adjusted with an
additional inflation payment in 2012).
49 To cite just a few examples, see Herbert E. Alexander, Financing the 1960 Election (Princeton, N.J.: Citizens’
Research Foundation, 1962) (and subsequent volumes in the series); Raymond J. La Raja, Small Change: Money,
Political Parties, and Campaign Finance Reform (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2008); Costas
Panagoupolos and Daniel Bergen, “Contributions and Contributors in the 2004 Presidential Election Cycle,”
Presidential Studies Quarterly, vol. 36, no. 2 (June 2006), pp. 155-171; and Financing the 2008 Elections: Assessing
Reform, ed. David B. Magleby and Anthony Corrado (Brookings Institution Press, 2011). See also other sources cited
throughout this section.
50 FECA, as amended, is found at 2 U.S.C. § 431 et seq. Chapters 95 and 96 of the IRC, found in Title 26 of the U.S.
Code, are particularly relevant. FEC regulations are found in chapter 11 of the C.F.R.
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Recent Major Changes in Campaign Finance Law
Fundraising and spending in federal elections is governed by federal election law and FEC
regulations. Other CRS products discuss these topics in detail.51 In brief:
• Congress established modern campaign finance law in the 1970s by establishing
and amending FECA, which emphasized contribution limits, reporting
(disclosure) requirements, and establishing the FEC. Parts of FECA, particularly
campaign spending limits, were invalidated in the U.S. Supreme Court’s
landmark Buckley v. Valeo decision (1976).52
• FECA remained largely unchanged until 2002, when Congress amended the act
through the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act (BCRA), also known as “McCain-
Feingold.” Among other points, BCRA banned national parties, federal
candidates, and officeholders from raising soft money in federal elections;
increased most contribution limits; and placed additional restrictions on pre-
election issue advocacy. Specifically, the act’s electioneering communications
provision prohibited corporations and unions from using their treasury funds to
air broadcast ads referring to clearly identified federal candidates within 60 days
of a general election or 30 days of a primary election or caucus.
• Most notably for recent campaigns and the 2012 presidential election cycle, the
U.S. Supreme Court reached another landmark decision in January 2010.53 In
Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, the Court invalidated FECA’s
prohibitions on corporate and union treasury funding of independent
expenditures and electioneering communications. As a consequence of Citizens
United, corporations and unions are now free to use their treasury funds to air
political advertisements explicitly calling for election or defeat of federal or state
candidates (independent expenditures) or advertisements that refer to those
candidates during pre-election periods, but do not necessarily explicitly call for
their election or defeat (electioneering communications). Previously, such
advertising would generally have had to be financed through voluntary
contributions raised by PACs affiliated with unions or corporations.
• Subsequent litigation and FEC advisory opinions consistent with Citizens United
and the related case SpeechNow v. FEC gave rise to a new form of PAC, known
as “super PACs.” First active in 2010, super PACs may raise unlimited funds—
including from corporations or unions—to air independent expenditures (IEs) or
electioneering communications (ECs).
• In October 2011 the FEC announced that, in response to an agreement reached in
a case brought after SpeechNow (Carey v. FEC54), the agency would permit
51 See CRS Report R41542, The State of Campaign Finance Policy: Recent Developments and Issues for Congress, by
R. Sam Garrett; and CRS Report RL30669, The Constitutionality of Campaign Finance Regulation: Buckley v. Valeo
and Its Supreme Court Progeny, by L. Paige Whitaker.
52 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
53 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010). For a legal analysis of the case, see CRS Report R41045, The Constitutionality of Regulating
Corporate Expenditures: A Brief Analysis of the Supreme Court Ruling in Citizens United v. FEC, by L. Paige
Whitaker.
54 Civ. No. 11-259-RMC (D.D.C. 2011).
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entities known as “nonconnected” PACs—those that are unaffiliated with
corporations or unions—to accept unlimited contributions for use in IEs. These
entities are not super PACs, although their behavior might resemble that of super
PACs. As of this writing, fewer than a dozen nonconnected PACs have indicated
they plan to spend funds consistent with the Carey agreement.
Transitioning from Public Funds to Private Funds in Recent Election Cycles
Between 1976 and 2000, presidential campaigns were financed almost exclusively with public
funds. During this time—the heyday of the presidential public financing program to date—private
fundraising was generally perceived to be no match for the comparatively large matching funds
and grants taxpayer-funds provided presidential candidates through the public financing program.
This was true for both Democratic and Republican candidates.55 Although Republican candidates
are typically philosophically opposed to some campaign finance regulation and taxpayer funding
of elections, Republican presidential candidates—like their Democratic counterparts—have
actively participated in the public financing program. In fact, between 1976 (the first election
cycle in which public financing was offered) and 1996, every major-party nominee accepted
public funds in the primary- and general-election campaigns.
Beginning in the late-1990s and early 2000s, however, the public financing program began to
show signs of strain, as discussed below. Coupled with robust issue advertising—which does not
explicitly call for election or defeat of candidates but typically praises or criticizes them in ways
that could affect electoral outcomes—from interest groups, presidential candidates began looking
toward the additional funding and lack of spending limits that private funds could provide. The
emphasis on private funds continued into the 2000s, particularly after Barack Obama declined
participating in any aspect of the public financing in 2008, and after the Supreme Court held in
2010 that corporations and unions could make unlimited independent expenditures calling for
election or defeat of specific candidates. It remains to be seen whether public financing will play
an active role in the 2012 campaign, but even supporters of the program generally concede that it
is in need of significant reform to be attractive to contemporary candidates and to equip those
candidates with sufficient resources to compete in the modern campaign environment. The
following discussion explains the transition from public- to private financing since the 1970s.
The Public Financing Program56
Congress created the presidential public financing program in the 1971 Revenue Act, which
permitted individual taxpayers (except nonresident aliens) to designate $1 ($2 for married couples
filing jointly) to the Presidential Election Campaign Fund (PECF), the account that houses public
funds.57 (The checkoff amounts were raised to $3 and $6 respectively in 1993.58) As noted
55 Although third-party candidates may qualify for public funds, they rarely do.
56 For additional discussion of the public financing program, see CRS Report RL34534, Public Financing of
Presidential Campaigns: Overview and Analysis, by R. Sam Garrett; CRS Report RL34630, Federal Funding of
Presidential Nominating Conventions: Overview and Policy Options, by R. Sam Garrett and Shawn Reese; and CRS
Report R41604, Proposals to Eliminate Public Financing of Presidential Campaigns, by R. Sam Garrett.
57 On the presidential public financing portion of the Revenue Act, see 85 Stat. 573. The checkoff essentially routes the
designated portion of one’s taxes paid to the PECF rather than to the general treasury. It does not affect one’s tax
refund or liability.
58 26 U.S.C. § 6096(a). On the increase, see P.L. 103-66; 107 Stat. 567-568.
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previously, candidates first received public funds during the 1976 election cycle. Amounts in the
PECF are diverted from the Treasury’s general fund for use by qualified presidential candidates
and party nominating conventions. Checkoff designations are the only revenue source for the
public financing program, even if the Treasury Secretary projects that the fund will become
insolvent.59 Under current law, Congress makes no appropriation to the PECF.
The presidential public financing program provides funds for three phases of the campaign: (1)
grants to nominating conventions; (2) matching funds for qualified primary candidates; and (3)
grants for general-election nominees. Convention funding goes to the Democratic and Republican
parties’ (or qualifying third parties’) convention committees; funding for the primary and general
elections goes directly to qualifying candidates’ campaigns.60 Under federal law, convention
funding receives priority, followed by general election grants and primary matching funds.61 In
other words, primary matching funds are distributed only if sufficient amounts remain after first
providing convention grants and general-election grants. Prorated amounts may be distributed in
the event of shortfalls (insufficient balances in the fund); shortfalls have been of increasing
concern in recent years.62
How the Program Works
Public financing benefits are set by statute and vary by type of candidate and phase of the
campaign.63
• For their nominating conventions, each of the two major parties may qualify for
grants of $4 million as adjusted for inflation (approximately $16.8 million each
in 2008).64 For the 2012 election cycle, the Democratic and Republican
59 See, for example, 26 U.S.C. §9006(c).
60 For additional discussion of convention funding, see CRS Report RL34630, Federal Funding of Presidential
Nominating Conventions: Overview and Policy Options, by R. Sam Garrett and Shawn Reese.
61 On prioritization of convention funding, see 26 U.S.C. §9008(a).
62 Prorated funds are distributed under the so-called “shortfall rule,” which requires the Treasury Secretary to “seek to
achieve an equitable distribution” among competing members of the same political party. See 26 U.S.C. §9037(b).
Therefore, in the event of a shortfall, those competing for matching funds receive approximately the same amounts.
IRS regulations permit payments as soon as funds become available (rather than on the monthly basis specified in Title
26 of the U.S. Code) in the event of a shortfall. See Department of the Treasury, Internal Revenue Service, “Payments
From the Presidential Primary Matching Payment Account,” 73 Federal Register 8608, February 14, 2008; and
Department of the Treasury, Internal Revenue Service, “Payments From the Presidential Primary Matching Payment
Account,” 73 Federal Register 67103, November 13, 2008.
63 Congress established the public financing program via the 1971 Revenue Act (for the relevant portion, see 85 Stat.
73). Amounts available to candidates appear in Title 26 of the U.S. Code (the Internal Revenue Code), as cited below.
Separately, the following text does not cover lesser amounts available to third parties. As noted previously, third parties
and their candidates rarely receive public funds. For additional discussion, see CRS Report RL34534, Public Financing
of Presidential Campaigns: Overview and Analysis, by R. Sam Garrett.
64 Ibid., 26 U.S.C. §9008(b); 26 U.S.C. §9008(b)(2). On application procedures, see 11 C.F.R. 9008.3. The 2008 figures
were aggregated by the author from $16,356,000 in Federal Election Commission, “FEC Approves Matching Funds for
2008 Candidates,” press release, at http://www.fec.gov/press/press2007/20071207cert.shtml and $464,760 in an
inflation-adjustment figure provided by Wanda Thomas, deputy assistant staff director for public financing, FEC (e-
mail correspondence with author, April 9, 2008). Conventions also receive additional federal funding for security. On
that topic, see CRS Report RL34630, Federal Funding of Presidential Nominating Conventions: Overview and Policy
Options, by R. Sam Garrett and Shawn Reese. Although the FEC certified the 2008 Republican National Convention
for the full $16.8 million allocation, the committee ultimately received $13.0 million. The convention ended early due
to Hurricane Gustav.
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convention committees each received grants of approximately $17.7 million.
They are expected to receive an additional payment of approximately $600,000
each to adjust for inflation in 2012.
• For the general election, the Democratic and Republican presidential nominees
are eligible for $20 million grants, as adjusted for inflation (approximately $84.1
million each in 2008).65 Third parties may qualify for lesser amounts. As of this
writing, it is unclear whether any candidate will receive public funds for the 2012
general election.
• Publicly financed primary candidates could spend up to $42 million in 2008 (plus
approximately $14 million in fundraising, legal, and accounting costs, which are
exempt from the base spending limit), but the amount of funds participants
receive depends on their ability to secure government matching payments based
on private fundraising. Participating candidates’ individual contributions of up to
$250 may be matched at a rate of 100% each. For example, a privately raised
contribution of $200 would be matched for $200, bringing the candidate’s total
receipt of funds to $400. On the other hand, contributions of more than $250 are
matched only for the first $250.66 For example, a contribution of $1,000 would
only be eligible for $250 in matching funds.67 The primary matching fund
program, which was designed to magnify small donations, applies only to
individual contributions. PAC or party contributions are ineligible for matching
payments. As of this writing, it is unclear whether any candidate will receive
public funds for the 2012 primary election cycle.
Conditions on Participation
Publicly funded primary candidates must adhere to overall and state-specific spending limits.
• All publicly financed campaigns must: agree to various record-keeping
requirements, submit to FEC audits, and limit spending from the candidate’s
personal funds to no more than $50,000.68
• The aggregate limit was approximately $42 million in 2008 (plus approximately
$14 million in fundraising, legal, and accounting costs, which are exempt from
the base spending limit). State-specific limits in 2008 ranged from $841,000 in
sparsely populated states and territories, to approximately $18.3 million in
California. These amounts were (and are) determined by a formula established in
FECA (the greater of 16¢ multiplied by the voting-age population (VAP) of the
state, or $200,000, as adjusted for inflation).69
65 2 U.S.C. §§441a(b)(1); 441a(c). The 2008 amount appears in Federal Election Commission, “FEC Approves
Matching Funds for 2008 Candidates.”
66 The $250 cap applies to any single contribution or to small contributions from the same individual that aggregate
more than $250. For example, a series of six $50 contributions (aggregating $300) would only be matched at $250.
67 The base amount, without the inflation adjustment, is $10 million. On primary spending limits, see 2 U.S.C.
§§441a(b)(1); 441a(c).
68 26 U.S.C. §§9003(a); 9033(a). On the $50,000 limit, see 26 U.S.C. §9006(d).
69 The base limit (before the inflation adjustment) is $10 million. See 2 U.S.C. §441a(b)1(A). For the 2008 limits, see
Federal Election Commission, “Presidential Spending Limits for 2008,” at http://www.fec.gov/pages/brochures/
pubfund_limits_2008.shtml.
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Publicly financed candidates in the general election must agree not to raise private funds for their
campaigns. In exchange for the taxpayer-funded grant, their spending was limited to
approximately $84.1 million in 2008.70
Declining Participation Over Time
Perhaps the most significant change in the campaign finance environment for recent presidential
campaigns is the decline of the public financing program. This is true both for taxpayer
designations through the checkoff and for candidate participation in the program. As Figure 3
below shows, checkoff participation reached a high point in 1980, when 28.7% of filers
designated funds for the PECF. With minor exceptions, participation has fallen steadily since that
time. Fewer than 15% of taxpayers have made public financing designations every calendar year
since 1993. Taxpayer participation reached a low of 7.3% in 2009.71 Despite a slight increase in
2010, for rounding purposes, the figure remained at 7.3%.72
Figure 3. Taxpayer Participation in Public Financing Since 1976
Source: CRS graph based on IRS data cited in Federal Election Commission, “Presidential Matching Fund Income
Tax Check-Off Status,” brochure, June 2008. FY2008-FY2010 data were provided separately to CRS by the FEC.
Although taxpayers have never heavily participated in public financing, every major presidential
candidate since 1976 participated in at least the general-election phase of the program until 2008.
Indeed, only a few wealthy, self-financed candidates declined to participate in public financing.73
Beginning during the 2000 election cycle, however, some major candidates began to opt out of
primary matching funds, apparently believing that bypassing required spending limits would be
strategically advantageous. That year, George W. Bush participated in public financing during the
general election but not during the primary. Then-candidate Bush was the first person elected
70 The base limit (before the inflation adjustment) is $20 million. See 2 U.S.C. §441a(b)1(B).
71 Checkoff percentage data since 2007 appear to be reported by fiscal year, whereas the pre-2007 data appear to be
reported by calendar year.
72 Financial Management Service data obtained via the FEC indicate that the 2009 rate was 7.27%, compared with
7.28% for 2010.
73 Examples include Ross Perot (1992) and Steve Forbes (1996).
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president without having accepted both primary and general election public financing. In 2004,
President Bush and Democratic nominee Senator John Kerry both declined public financing
during the primary campaign.74 Both accepted public funds for the general-election campaign.
Disparate Resources: Public versus Private Funds in 2008 and Beyond
The crowded field of competitive candidates and front-loaded primary calendar in 2008
contributed to fundraising pressures early in the cycle.75 As shown in Table 5 below, eight
candidates received primary matching funds in 2008. The Democratic and Republican parties also
both received funding for their nominating conventions.76 In the general election in 2008,
Republican nominee John McCain accepted the $84.1 million public financing grant. Democratic
nominee Barack Obama became the first person elected president without having participated in
any aspect of the public financing program. Accepting public funding in the general election
relieved the McCain campaign of private fundraising obligations (although publicly funded
candidates nonetheless may continue to raise private funds for limited legal and accounting
expenses and joint fundraising ventures with party committees). It also meant that the campaign
could spend no more in the general election than the $84.1 million it received in public funds.
Table 5. Public Financing to 2008 Presidential Candidates
Candidate Campaign Amount
Joseph Biden
Primary
$2.0 million
Christopher Dodd
Primary
$2.0 million
John Edwards
Primary
$12.9 million
Mike Gravel
Primary
$0.2 million
Duncan Hunter
Primary
$0.5 million
Dennis Kucinich
Primary
$1.1 million
John McCain
General
$84.1 million
Ralph Nader
Primary
$0.9 million
Thomas Tancredo
Primary
$2.3 million
Total
Primary and General
$106.0 million
Source: CRS analysis of FEC certifications and Treasury Department, Financial Management Service, payment
data.
Notes: Amounts for individual candidates are rounded to the nearest hundred-thousand dol ars. The total is
rounded to the nearest million dollars. The table does not include funds initially certified for Senator McCain’s
campaign, which applied for primary matching funds but later withdrew from public financing during the primary
campaign.
74 Federal Election Commission, “FEC Approves Matching Funds for 2004 Presidential Candidates,” final
certifications, press release, April 1, 2005, at http://www.fec.gov/press/press2005/20050401cert.html. See also Anthony
Corrado, “Public Funding of Presidential Campaigns,” p. 184.
75 Anthony Corrado, “Fund-raising Strategies in the 2008 Presidential Campaign,” in Campaigns and Elections
American Style, ed. James A. Thurber and Candice J. Nelson, 3rd ed. (Boulder, CO: Westview, 2010), pp. 105-136.
76 See Federal Election Commission, “FEC Approves Matching Funds for 2008 Candidates,” press release, December
20, 2007, at http://www.fec.gov/press/press2007/20071207cert.shtml for a base certification of $16,356,000. The FEC
also certified an additional payment, to cover inflation, of $464,760. Information on the inflation adjustment comes
from e-mail correspondence between the author and Wanda Thomas, deputy assistant staff director for public
financing, FEC, April 9, 2008. The convention refunded the remaining amount of the 2008 allocation.
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The Obama campaign, meanwhile, could raise and spend unlimited amounts because it opted out
of public financing.77 The $747.8 million the Obama campaign raised—partially by tapping a vast
network of contributors who gave less than $200 and through successful online fundraising—far
exceeded previous records.78 Indeed, even with accepting unlimited private funds in the primary
election, the McCain campaign raised less than half ($351.5 million) as much as the Obama
campaign, as shown in Figure 4 below. The Obama campaign’s fundraising prowess also far
outpaced the privately financed Hillary Clinton campaign ($223.9 million) in the long
Democratic primary. As noted previously, as of this writing, candidate participation for the 2012
cycle remains to be determined.
Figure 4. Total Fundraising by Selected 2008 Presidential Campaigns
Source: CRS analysis of FEC data, http://www.fec.gov/disclosurep/pnational.do.
These developments, combined with declining PECF balances due to low levels of taxpayer
participation (discussed above), have placed the public financing program’s future viability in
doubt. Even those who support the program have proposed significant reforms to make public
financing more attractive to candidates. Legislation to that effect has been regularly introduced in
recent congresses, as have bills to eliminate the program.79
77 Of course, contributions must be solicited and raised within the limits established in FECA. Overall, however, there
is no aggregate fundraising or spending limit for privately financed candidates.
78 The $747.8 million figure comes from CRS analysis of FEC data cited throughout this section. On Obama campaign
small donor activity, see, for example, Anthony Corrado, “Fund-raising Strategies in the 2008 Presidential Campaign,”
in Campaigns and Elections American Style, ed. James A. Thurber and Candice J. Nelson, 3rd ed. (Boulder, CO:
Westview, 2010), pp. 114-120; Campaign Finance Institute, “All CFI Funding Statistics Revised And Updated For The
2008 Presidential Primary And General Election Candidates,” press release, January 8, 2010, http://www.cfinst.org/
Press/PReleases/10-01-08/Revised_and_Updated_2008_Presidential_Statistics.aspx.; and Michael Malbin, “Small
Donors, Large Donors, and the Internet: Rethinking Public Financing After Obama,” in Public Financing in American
Elections, ed. Costas Panagopoulos (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2011), pp. 36-61.
79 See CRS Report RL34534, Public Financing of Presidential Campaigns: Overview and Analysis, by R. Sam Garrett;
CRS Report RL34630, Federal Funding of Presidential Nominating Conventions: Overview and Policy Options, by R.
Sam Garrett and Shawn Reese; and CRS Report R41604, Proposals to Eliminate Public Financing of Presidential
Campaigns, by R. Sam Garrett.
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As Table 6 and Table 7 below show, when third-quarter 2011 reports were filed with the FEC in
October of that year (covering activity through September 30), President Obama’s reelection
campaign had raised more than $86 million, an amount just below the approximately $90 million
raised by his Republican opponents’ campaigns. As the tables and Figure 5 show, fundraising
among Republican candidates was highly skewed. Specifically, and as is typical in presidential
campaigns, three Republicans reported raising more than $10 million (Ron Paul, Rick Perry, and
Mitt Romney), while the remainder reported raising less than that amount—in a few cases, less
than $1 million.
Table 6. 2012 Presidential Campaign Receipts by Party
Data are current through September 30, 2011, FEC filings, the latest available as of this writing.
Candidate Contributions
All Democrats
$86.2 million
All Republicans
$90.3 million
Total $176.5
million
Source: CRS analysis of Federal Election Commission data, http://www.fec.gov/disclosurep/pnational.do.
Notes: The table excludes candidates who are not general y recognized as national political figures. Third-party
and independent candidates are also excluded.
Table 7. 2012 Presidential Campaign Receipts by Candidate and Party
Data are current through September 30, 2011, FEC filings, the latest available as of this writing.
Party Candidate
Contributions
Republican
Michelle Bachmann
$8.4 million
Republican
Herman Cain
$5.3 million
Republican
Jon Huntsman
$4.5 million
Republican
Newt Gingrich
$2.9 million
Republican
Gary Johnson
$0.4 million
Republican
Thaddeus McCotter
$0.5 million
Democrat
Barack Obama
$86.2 million
Republican
Tim Pawlenty
$4.7 million
Republican
Ron Paul
$12.6 million
Republican
Rick Perry
$17.2 million
Republican
Buddy Roemer
$0.2 million
Republican
Mitt Romney
$32.2 million
Republican
Rick Santorum
$1.3 million
Source: CRS analysis of Federal Election Commission data, http://www.fec.gov/disclosurep/pnational.do.
Notes: The table excludes candidates who are not general y recognized as national political figures. Third-party
and independent candidates are also excluded. Party affiliations are the same as those listed in the FEC source
data.
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Figure 5. 2012 Presidential Campaign Receipts by Candidate and Party
Data are current through September 30, 2011, FEC filings, the latest available as of this writing.
Source: CRS analysis of Federal Election Commission data, http://www.fec.gov/disclosurep/pnational.do.
Notes: The figure excludes candidates who are not generally recognized as national political figures. Third-party
and independent candidates are also excluded. Party affiliations are the same as those listed in the FEC source
data.
The data also show that Obama campaign fundraising remains roughly consistent with its record-
breaking amounts raised in 2008. Specifically, in its October 2007 third-quarter report, the Obama
campaign reported raising approximately $78.9 million—when adjusted for inflation,
approximately $82.9 million in 2011.80 As of this writing, therefore, the Obama campaign is
slightly ahead of its 2007 performance, having raised $86.2 million by third-quarter 2011.
Furthermore, as Figure 5 shows, the Obama campaign alone raised almost as much (95.5%) as its
Republican opponents combined.
Outside Money: Spending by Parties, PACs, and Other Groups
In addition to amounts raised and spent by the campaigns themselves, non-candidate
organizations can also play a key role in presidential campaigns. These funds, often characterized
as “outside” money for its separation from candidate campaigns, have been especially prominent
in recent election cycles. The types of funds, groups, and which laws and regulations apply to the
groups can vary substantially with individual circumstances. In the broadest sense, non-candidate
activity can be divided into fundraising and spending by entities known as “political committees”
and “non-political committees.”
Political committees (which also include candidate committees) are party committees and PACs.
Political committees are primarily regulated by FECA and the FEC. Non-political committees
most prominently include entities known as “political organizations,” as regulated under the
80 CRS calculated the inflation-adjusted amounts in the text and obtained the 2007 filing information from the Obama
for America’s amended report filed with the FEC. These and other FEC reports are available at
http://query.nictusa.com/cgi-bin/fecimg.
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Internal Revenue Code (IRC) administered by the Internal Revenue Service (IRS). In particular,
they include groups regulated as Section 501(c)(4) social welfare organizations, 501(c)(5) labor
unions, and 501(c)(6) trade associations. They also include Section 527 organizations—groups
whose activities might influence elections but which are not considered political committees.81
The degree to which an entity can coordinate its activities with a political campaign is limited—
and in some cases, prohibited.82 Although the details of coordination are beyond the scope of this
report, the important point for the general discussion here is that outside organizations are limited
in the ways in which they can support candidate campaigns, as briefly summarized below.83
• Political parties and PACs (but not super PACs, discussed below) can contribute
directly to presidential campaigns, up to the amounts specified in FECA and
shown in Table 4, above.84
• Party committees may make coordinated expenditures, subject to limits,
supporting their presidential candidates. In 2008, the Democratic and Republican
parties were limited to $19.2 million in coordinated expenditures supporting their
presidential candidates. That figure will be adjusted during inflation for the 2012
cycle.
• In the aftermath of Citizens United, as discussed previously, corporations and
unions (including incorporated entities such as 501(c)(4) social welfare
organizations) may make IEs explicitly calling for election or defeat of a federal
candidate. Parties and PACs may also make IEs, as they could before Citizens
United. Super PACs also provide an option for IEs supporting or opposing
presidential candidates.
• Non-political committees may make electioneering communications (ECs) that
refer to clearly identified federal candidates during pre-election periods but do
not explicitly call for their election or defeat. These communications are also
sometimes known as “issue advertisements,” signifying their focus on policy
issues rather than electoral issues.85 Congress originally established the EC
81 As the term is commonly used, “527” refers to groups registered with the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) as section
527 political organizations that seemingly intend to influence federal elections in ways that place them outside the
FECA definition of a political committee. By contrast, political committees (which include candidate committees, party
committees, and political action committees) are regulated by the FEC and federal election law. There is a debate
regarding which 527s are required to register with the FEC as political committees. FEC contributor disclosure for
these organizations applies only to those who designate their contributions for use in independent expenditures or
electioneering communications. For additional discussion, see CRS Report RS22895, 527 Groups and Campaign
Activity: Analysis Under Campaign Finance and Tax Laws, by L. Paige Whitaker and Erika K. Lunder.
82 Coordination is a complex topic that is beyond the scope of this report. In brief, limits on coordination between
campaigns and other political committees or outside organizations are intended to prevent circumvention of
contribution limits. On coordination and the three-part regulatory test for coordination, see, respectively 2 U.S.C. §
441a(a)(7)(B) and 11 C.F.R. § 109.21. For additional discussion, see CRS Report RS22644, Coordinated Party
Expenditures in Federal Elections: An Overview, by R. Sam Garrett and L. Paige Whitaker.
83 Although not discussed here, in previous election cycles, party committees have also pursued hybrid advertising and
joint fundraising committees, which benefit multiple candidates. For additional discussion, see CRS Report R40091,
Campaign Finance: Potential Legislative and Policy Issues for the 111th Congress, by R. Sam Garrett.
84 In the case of a contribution to a publicly financed presidential candidate in the primary, contributions from parties or
PACs would not be eligible for PECF matching funds. In the general election, publicly financed candidates are
prohibited from accepting private contributions.
85 The terms “issue advertisements” or “issue advertising” are not exclusive to ECs, which, by definition, must meet
(continued...)
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concept in BCRA to target “sham” issue ads that urged voters to form opinions
about candidates in ways that many observers believed influenced electoral
outcomes. In the wake of Citizens United, it is unclear how prominent ECs will
continue to be, as corporations and unions may now engage in IEs that directly
advocate for or against candidates.
Of these categories of “outside” spending, IEs and ECs are perhaps the most notable because,
unlike contributions and coordinated party expenditures, IEs and ECs cannot be constitutionally
limited.86 In addition, unlike generic issue advertising that does not refer to federal candidates,
IEs and ECs clearly refer to particular presidential candidates. As Figure 6 below shows,
particularly since 2004, both types of spending have been prominent in presidential elections.
Specifically, IEs and ECs have accounted for $445.9 million since 1996. Of that amount, virtually
all ($429.8 million) was spent in 2004 and 2008. As the figure shows, like much political
advertising, IEs more typically oppose candidates than support candidates.87
Figure 6. Selected Outside Spending in Presidential Campaigns, 1996-2008
Source: CRS analysis of FEC “Overview of Presidential Financial Activity 1996 – 2008” file, http://www.fec.gov/
press/press2009/20090608PresStat.shtml.
(...continued)
certain timing requirements and other criteria. For additional discussion, see, for example, CRS Report R41542, The
State of Campaign Finance Policy: Recent Developments and Issues for Congress, by R. Sam Garrett; and CRS Report
RL30669, The Constitutionality of Campaign Finance Regulation: Buckley v. Valeo and Its Supreme Court Progeny,
by L. Paige Whitaker. See also 2 U.S.C. § 434(f)(3).
86 Unlimited campaign spending, except as a condition of participation in public financing, was established in Buckley.
For additional discussion, see CRS Report RL30669, The Constitutionality of Campaign Finance Regulation: Buckley
v. Valeo and Its Supreme Court Progeny, by L. Paige Whitaker.
87 Whether or not political advertising that opposes candidates is “negative” is subject to substantial debate. See, for
example, Michael M. Franz et al., Campaign Advertising and American Democracy (Philadelphia: Temple University
Press, 2008); John G. Geer, In Defense of Negativity: Attack Ads in Presidential Campaigns (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 2006); and Crowded Airwaves: Campaign Advertising in Elections, ed. James A. Thurber, Candice J.
Nelson, and David A. Dulio (Washington: Brookings Institution Press, 2000). EC reports do not include support or
opposition information, as these expenditures do not include express advocacy messages.
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Notes: Electioneering communication reports were first filed during the 2004 election cycle. The increase
between 2000 and 2004 is likely due to increased IE reporting by 527 organizations, shifting party strategies away
from soft money post-BCRA, and the particularly competitive nature of the election.
The Outlook for 2012
Because Citizens United, SpeechNow, and related developments were not in effect during the
2008 election cycle, the scope of outside spending in 2012 may be even greater than discussed
above. Just a few selected examples of fundraising and spending developments in 2012
demonstrate that candidates and their allies and opponents are preparing to raise and spend
tremendous sums to capture the presidency.88
• By September 30, 2011, major presidential candidates had reported raising more
than $175 million.
• By September 30, 2011, the Obama for America committee—President Obama’s
principal campaign committee and reelection campaign organization—reported
raising $86.2 million for the 2012 cycle. That amount is $2 million more than the
entire public financing allocation for a general-election nominee in 2008 ($84.1
million).
• In the aftermath of Citizens United, SpeechNow, and FEC activity, super PACs
have pledged to raise millions of dollars to influence the 2012 elections. These
groups provide another outlet for individual contributors, as well as the potential
for corporate and union spending. Nonconnected PACs that choose to do so may
also raise and spend unlimited amounts for independent expenditures per the
Carey scenario discussed above. CRS discusses both topics elsewhere.89
Although super PACs are prohibited from coordinating their activities with
candidate campaigns, some of the most prominent super PACs operating in 2012
appear to have close ties with, or employ directly, staff members who have close
personal or professional ties with presidential candidates. Whether these
relationships circumvent the spirit of limits on campaign coordination is a
contentious point of debate.90
• Transparency among IE donors has been a concern in recent years, but may
particularly be so in 2012 given post-Citizens United avenues for political
donations (especially super PACs). Despite disclosure requirements, the original
source of some contributions that ultimately support IEs are not reported to the
FEC if the source did not specify that the donation was intended to further IEs.91
88 Unless otherwise noted, information in this section comes from CRS analysis of various FEC data.
89 See CRS Report R42042, “Super PACs” in Federal Elections: Overview and Issues for Congress, by R. Sam
Garrett; and CRS Report R41542, The State of Campaign Finance Policy: Recent Developments and Issues for
Congress, by R. Sam Garrett.
90 For additional discussion of these and related points regarding 2012 presidential activity, see, for example, Kenneth
P. Doyle, “New PAC Ads Feature Gov. Perry as FEC Considers Ruling on Coordination Issues,” Daily Report for
Executives, November 9, 2011, p. A-10, DER 217; and “The Campaign Jungle,” New York Times, November 13, 2011,
p. SR-10, New York edition.
91 For example, if a corporation made an unrestricted contribution to a trade association, which in turn contributed those
funds to a super PAC that used them for an IE, the trade association—not the corporation—would be reported as the IE
donor. For additional discussion of disclosure requirements, see CRS Report R42042, “Super PACs” in Federal
Elections: Overview and Issues for Congress, by R. Sam Garrett and CRS Report R41542, The State of Campaign
(continued...)
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• During the 2010 congressional elections—when super PACs were only permitted
to operate for, at most, the final 10 months of the election cycle—80 super PACs
spent more than $60 million on IEs supporting and opposing congressional
candidates. As of this writing, the details of 2012 presidential super PAC activity
remain unclear, but more than 250 super PACs are now registered with the FEC.
Many of these groups will not file detailed financial reports until after the first
presidential primaries. By the fall of 2011, those that had reported made $3.5
million in IEs supporting or opposing 2012 presidential candidates.92
Thus far, this report has discussed the major contemporary issues surrounding how candidates
secure their party’s nomination for the presidency and how campaign finance law and practice
facilitate and constrain key elements of the campaign. Candidates, voters, political parties and
various interest groups are central players in the campaign for the primary nomination and in the
general election. The electoral college phase of the election is separate from the campaign season
and the popular vote, but its role in choosing a president and vice president is rooted in the
Constitution and political tradition. The report now turns to this essential final step in presidential
selection.
The Electoral College System: Contemporary
Trends93
One of the many compromises incorporated into the U.S. Constitution, the electoral college
represented an effort by the Philadelphia Convention of 1787 to provide for a presidential election
that would:
• be free of undue influence by Congress, thus insuring greater independence in the
executive;
• provide a fundamental role for the states by establishing the election as a federal,
rather than national, process;
• allocate electors by a formula that provided some advantage to less populous states;
• give the states wide-ranging authority over the means by which they would choose
their electors ― democratically, by popular vote, by the legislature itself, or by
another body altogether; and, ultimately;
• temper popular enthusiasms and partisan and sectional attachments by giving the
actual vote to the electors, who, it was hoped, would be prominent citizens of their
states and communities, well-informed and educated persons who would make a
balanced and measured selection.
Whatever the founders’ intentions, from the very beginning, the electoral college began to change
almost immediately, through constitutional amendment, state laws, and political party practices.
(...continued)
Finance Policy: Recent Developments and Issues for Congress, by R. Sam Garrett.
92 The $3.5 million figure comes from CRS analysis of super PAC IE reports filed as of December 2011.
93 Thomas H. Neale (x7-7883), Specialist in American National Government, authored this section.
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The growth of political parties and the spread of voting rights and democratic principles overtook
the founders’ vision within two decades, and the electoral college system evolved into the
compound system that continues to govern U.S presidential elections two centuries later.
The Electoral College System Today
The United States is almost unique among contemporary democratic republics in that its
President and Vice President are elected indirectly, on a federal basis, rather than directly by
popular vote on a nationwide basis. The fundamentals of the electoral college system were
established by Article II, Section 1 of the U.S. Constitution, and subsequently revised by the 12th
Amendment. The Constitution’s minimal provisions have been complemented over the past two
centuries by a range of federal and state laws, political party procedures, and enduring political
traditions, leading to the system as it exists today. The salient features of the contemporary
system, a mixture of these elements, are detailed below.
Components of the Electoral College
The electors are collectively known as the electoral college; although this phrase does not appear
in the Constitution, it gained currency in the early days of the republic, and was recognized in
federal law in 1845.94 The electoral college has no continuing existence; its sole purpose is to
elect the President and Vice President. Each state is allocated a number of electors equal to the
combined total of its U.S. Senate and House of Representatives delegations.95 The District of
Columbia is also allocated three electors.96 At present, the total is 538, reflecting the combined
size of the Senate (100 Members), the House (435 Members) and the District of Columbia
electors. Any person may serve as an elector, except Senators and Representatives, or any other
person holding an office of “trust or profit” under the United States.97 The legislatures of the
several states select the method by which electors are chosen.98 In practice, all states currently
provide for popular election of their electoral college delegations.99 Candidates for the office of
elector are nominated by political parties and other groups eligible to be on the ballot in each
state. In most cases, the elector candidates are nominated by the state party committee or the
party’s statewide convention.100 The winning candidates must gain a majority of electoral votes,
currently 270 of 538, in order to be elected. If no ticket of candidates attains a majority, then the
House of Representatives elects the President, and the Senate the Vice President, in a procedure
known as contingent election.101
94 3 U.S.C. §4.
95 U.S. Constitution, Article II, Section 1.
96 Ibid., 23rd Amendment.
97 Ibid., Article II, Section 1.
98 Ibid.
99 Neal Peirce and Lawrence Longley, The People’s President, The Electoral College in American History and the
Direct Vote Alternative, rev. ed. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1981), pp. 44-47.
100 See U.S. Congress, Senate, Nomination and Election of the President and Vice President of the United States, 2008,
“Part IV. State Laws Relating to the Nomination and Election of Presidential Electors.” S. Doc. 111-15 (Washington:
GPO, 2010), pp. 346-444.
101 For more detailed information on the contingent election process, please consult CRS Report R40504, Contingent
Election of the President and Vice President by Congress: Perspectives and Contemporary Analysis, by Thomas H.
Neale.
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How The Electoral College Functions
Presidential Election Day is set by law for Tuesday after the first Monday in November every
fourth year succeeding the election of President and Vice President.102 Presidential Election Day
falls on November 6 in 2012. On Presidential Election Day, voters across the country cast one
vote for the team of candidates for President and Vice President they support. When they do so,
however, they are actually voting for the political party “ticket” of electors supporting, and
pledged to vote for, that team of presidential and vice presidential candidates.103 Popular votes are
cast, electors are chosen, and electoral votes are cast on a state-by-state basis. While the
nationwide vote count is given considerable publicity, it is the vote in the states that decides the
election.
The goal of presidential campaigns is to win by carrying states that collectively cast a majority of
electoral votes. In particular, political parties and individual presidential campaigns give attention
to states that are closely contested, or that have large delegations of electoral votes, or both.
Winning a majority of the more populous “battleground” states is considered crucial to obtaining
the necessary electoral vote majority.
In 48 states and the District of Columbia, the presidential/vice presidential ticket winning the
most popular votes (a plurality or more) in that state is awarded all of its electoral votes. That is to
say, the winning party’s entire ticket of electors is elected. This is referred to as the “winner-take-
all” or “general ticket” system. Maine and Nebraska use a different method of allocating electoral
votes, the “district” system. Under this method, popular votes are counted twice, first, on a
statewide basis, and second, on a congressional district basis. The presidential/vice presidential
ticket receiving the most votes statewide receives two electors/electoral votes for this total. The
ticket winning the most votes in each congressional district receives a single elector/electoral vote
for that district. In this way, a state’s electoral vote may be divided to reflect geographical
differences in support within the state for different candidates.104
Presidential electors assemble on the first Monday after the second Wednesday in December
following the general election.105 In 2012, the electors will assemble on December 17. They meet
in their respective states, not collectively, and cast separate votes by ballot for the President and
Vice President.106
As noted earlier, candidates for the office of elector are selected by their respective political party.
They are expected to vote for the presidential and vice presidential candidates to whom they are
pledged.107 Some states seek to require them to so vote by law or other means, but most
constitutional scholars hold that the electors remain free agents under the Constitution, and that
102 3 U.S.C. §1.
103 For individual state provisions, see Nomination and Election of the President and Vice President, pp. 310-345.
104 For individual state requirements, see Ibid.
105 3 U.S.C. § 7.
106 U.S. Constitution, Article II, Section 1; 12th Amendment. The words “by ballot” are interpreted to mean by paper
ballot. With respect to the location of meetings of the electors, the founders reasoned that if they met in their respective
states, there would be less opportunity for political intrigue and chicanery than if they assembled in a single location.
The difficulties inherent in long-distance travel at the time may also have influenced the Constitutional Convention’s
decision.
107 For individual state requirements, see Nomination and Election of the President and Vice President, pp. 310-345.
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they may vote for any person they choose.108 On rare occasions, an elector will vote for a
different candidate, or abstain from casting his or her vote for any candidate/s. They are known as
“faithless electors.”109
After the electoral college votes, the results are sent by state authorities to Congress and various
other federal authorities. On January 6 of the year following a presidential election, Congress
meets in a joint session to count the electoral votes and make a formal declaration of which
candidates have been elected President and Vice President.110
Criticism and Defense of the Electoral College
The electoral college and the presidential election system that was built around it have been the
subject of criticism since the earliest days of the Republic.
The primary contemporary criticism of the founders’ creation is philosophical. Proponents of
change maintain that the electoral college system is fundamentally undemocratic ― it provides
for “indirect” election of the President and Vice President. This, they assert, is an 18th century
anachronism, dating from a time when communications were poor, the literacy rate was much
lower, and the nation had yet to develop the durable, sophisticated, and inclusive democratic
political system it now enjoys. They maintain that only direct popular election of the President
and Vice President is consistent with modern democratic values and practice. Survey research
consistently shows broad popular support for direct election. In its most recent question on the
issue, the Gallup Poll reported that 62% of respondents favored an amendment providing for
direct popular election, while 35% favored retention of the electoral college. This finding mirrors
those recorded by Gallup as early as 1967.111
Beyond their fundamental challenge to the electoral college system, critics cite what they identify
as a wide range of technical flaws. Perhaps the most prominent of these is that the electoral
college system can lead to the election of Presidents who win the electoral vote, but gain fewer
popular votes than their major opponent. This condition, often termed a “misfire” occurs
primarily because of the nearly universal reliance on the “winner-take-all” or general ticket
system in the states. Under these circumstances, a presidential ticket can gain an electoral college
majority, but actually win fewer votes than its opponents. This happened in 1876, 1888, and, most
recently, in 2000, when Democratic candidates Al Gore, Jr. and Joseph Lieberman gained
50,992,335 popular votes to 50,455,156 for Republican candidates George W. Bush and Richard
Cheney.112 The Republican nominees were elected, however, having won 30 states with 271
108 See U.S.Constitution, Analysis and Interpretation, “The Constitution Annotated,” Article II Analysis, Article II,
Section 1, clauses 2-4, Election: Electors as Free Agents, available online to Members of Congress and staff at
http://crs.gov/conan/default.aspx?mode=topic&doc=Article02.xml&t=1|4&s=1&c=2.
109 For further information, see Project Fairvote, “Faithless Electors,” available online at http://archive.fairvote.org/
e_college/faithless.htm.
110 3 U.S.C. §15-18. The same sections of the U.S. Code provide for challenges to electoral votes, as occurred in 2001
and 2005.
111 Lydia Saad, “Americans Would Swap Electoral College for Popular Vote,” The Gallup Poll, October 24, 2011,
available at http://www.gallup.com/poll/150245/americans-swap-electoral-college-popular-vote.aspx .
112 Congressional Quarterly’s Guide to U.S. Elections, 4th ed. (Washington: CQ Press, 2001), vol. 1, p. 688.
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electoral votes, while their Democratic opponents took 20 states and the District of Columbia
with 266 electoral votes.113
Other points of contention include the general ticket system itself, which is said to unfairly
allocate electoral votes on a winner-take-all basis, rather than proportionally to reflect the vote in
each state; the faithless elector phenomenon; the Constitution’s provisions for contingent election
by Congress in the event no candidate wins an electoral college majority;114 the system’s alleged
“biases” in favor of populous states, less populous states and ethnic minorities; and the fact that
electoral vote allocations do not reflect population change between reapportionments, the so-
called decennial census bias.115
Defenders of the electoral college system reject the suggestion that it is undemocratic ― electors
are chosen by the voters in free elections. They note that the system prescribes a federal election
of the President with votes tallied in each state. The United States is a federal republic, in which
the states have a role in many areas of governance, including presidential elections. The Founders
intended that choosing the President would be an action American voters take both as citizens of
the United States, and as members of their state communities.
Further, defenders reject the suggestion that less populous states have an unfair advantage when
compared to more populous states. Any modest mathematical advantage conveyed by the
assignment of two electors to all states, regardless of size, is outmatched by the “voting power”
advantage conferred on states such as California, whose 55 electoral votes constitute more than
20% of the number needed to win the presidency.116 They also find the “faithless elector”
argument to be specious.117 Only nine such electoral votes have been cast against instructions
since 1820, and none has ever influenced the outcome of an election. Nearly all electoral college
reform plans would remove even this slim possibility for mischief by eliminating the office of
elector.
Finally, they assert that the electoral college system promotes political stability. Parties and
candidates must conduct ideologically broad-based campaigns throughout the nation in hopes of
assembling a majority of electoral votes. The consequent need to forge national coalitions having
113 One District of Columbia elector cast a blank ballot in protest against the outcome.
114 For further information, see above at footnote 8.
115 For further information on these alleged technical biases, see Gordon J. Hylton, “How Much Difference Does the
Small State Advantage in the Electoral College Really Make?” Marquette University Faculty Law School Blog, March
8, 2010, available online at http://law.marquette.edu/facultyblog/2010/03/08/how-much-difference-does-the-small-
state-advantage-in-the-electoral-college-really-make/; Lawrence D. Longley and James D. Dana, Jr., “The Biases of the
Electoral College in the 1990s,” Polity, vol. 25, no. 1, autumn, 1992, pp. 123-45 (the author of this section has been
unable to identify any studies updating Professor Longley’s work since his death in 2002); and U.S. Federal Election
Commission, National Clearinghouse on Election Administration, The Electoral College, by William C. Kimberling,
Washington, 1992, p. 12. Representatives of the American Jewish Congress and the National Urban League also cited
this advantage in Senate Subcommittee on the Constitution hearings in 1979. See U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on
the Judiciary, Subcommittee on the Constitution, Direct Election of the President and Vice President of the United
States, hearings on S.J.Res. 28, 96th Congress, 1st session, March 27, 30, April 3, 9, 1979 (Washington: GPO, 1979),
pp. 163-219.
116 For additional information on the voting power theory, please consult CRS Report RL30804, The Electoral College:
An Overview and Analysis of Reform Proposals, by L. Paige Whitaker and Thomas H. Neale.
117 Faithless electors are those who cast their votes for candidates other than those to whom they are pledged.
Notwithstanding political party rules and state laws, most constitutional scholars believe that electors remain free
agents, guided, but not bound, to vote for the candidates they were elected to support. For further information, see ibid.
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a wide appeal has been a contributing factor in the moderation and stability of the nation and the
two-party system.
Congressional Efforts to Reform the Electoral College by
Constitutional Amendment, 1948-1979
From the late 1940s through 1979, a series of lively debates took place in Congress on the subject
of electoral college reform. Throughout this period, hundreds of electoral college reform
proposals were introduced in both chambers. They generally centered on one of two courses:
“end it” by eliminating the entire electoral college system and establishing direct popular election,
or “mend it” by reforming its more controversial provisions.118 The question of electoral college
reform or replacement was given active consideration by Congress throughout this period.
Proposed amendments were the subject of hearings in the Senate and House Judiciary
Committees on 17 different occasions between 1948 and 1979, and, most notably, electoral
college reform proposals were debated in the full Senate on five occasions, and twice in the
House during this period. Proposals were approved by the necessary two-thirds majority twice in
the Senate and once in the House, but never in the same Congress.119
Following the 1979 defeat of a direct popular election amendment on the Senate floor, and the
1980 departure of Senator Birch Bayh, a prominent advocate for direct popular election, the
question of electoral college reform largely disappeared from public attention and Congress’s
legislative agenda. Although Senators and Representatives continued to introduce reform
proposals, few received any more action than routine committee referral, and in time, the number
of measures introduced dropped almost to zero.120 Even after the presidential election of 2000,
which featured a so-called “misfire,” there was little evidence of support in Congress for electoral
college reform.121 Moreover, the system worked almost perfectly in the presidential election of
2008, at least according to contemporary expectations. Democratic candidates Barack Obama and
Joseph Biden were able to translate a 7% popular vote margin of 52.9% (69,457,000) to 45.7%
(59,935,00) for Republican contenders John McCain and Sarah Palin, into an overwhelming
electoral vote of 365 votes (67.9%) to 173 (32.1%).122
118 The three principal reform proposals would all eliminate the office of elector, and distribute electoral votes on the
basis of different criteria. They were, and remain: (1) the automatic system, which would award electoral votes
“automatically” in each state on a winner-take-all basis; (2) the district system, which would incorporate the system
currently in place in Maine and Nebraska (see earlier in this report under “How the Electoral College Functions);” and
(3) the proportional system, which would award votes in each state in direct proportion to the percentage of popular
votes won by competing tickets in that state. For example, assume that a state is allocated 10 electoral votes, and that
Ticket A received 60% of the state popular vote for President and Vice President, while Ticket B received 40%. Ticket
A would be awarded six electoral votes, and Ticket B four.
119 For a detailed examination and analysis of these efforts, see Peirce and Longley, The People’s President: The
Electoral College in American History and the Direct Vote Alternative, rev. ed. pp. 131-206.
120 Only one relevant amendment, H.J.Res. 36, which is discussed below, has been proposed to date in the 112th
Congress (H.J.Res. 36, Rep. Jesse L. Jackson, Jr.). By comparison, 41 amendments related to direct election or
electoral college reform were introduced in the 95th Congress (1977-1978).
121 Congress responded with the Help America Vote Act, enacted in 2002. For additional information, please consult
CRS Report RS20898, The Help America Vote Act and Elections Reform: Overview and Issues, by Kevin J. Coleman
and Eric A. Fischer.
122 U.S. Federal Election Commission, 2008 Official Presidential General Election Results, available at
http://www.fec.gov/pubrec/fe2008/2008presgeresults.pdf.
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Proposals to replace the electoral college system with direct popular election continue to be
introduced in every Congress, albeit far fewer than in earlier years. For instance, H.J.Res. 36,
introduced in the 112th Congress by Representative Jesse L. Jackson, Jr., and 27 co-sponsors,
provides that “the President and Vice President shall be elected jointly by the direct vote of the
citizens of the United States, without regard to whether the citizens are residents of a State.” In
common with similar proposals in earlier Congresses, this measure has been referred to the House
Judiciary Committee’s Subcommittee on the Constitution, but no further action has been
scheduled. Given the prevalence of this pattern, it is arguable that there may be little
congressional interest in devoting the high levels of time and energy demanded to consideration
of an electoral college-related constitutional amendment in the foreseeable future.
Trends in Congressional Electoral College Reform Proposals
As noted previously, congressional interest in constitutional amendments to reform or eliminate
the electoral college has declined in recent decades. From proposals offered in recent years, two
trends emerge. First, nearly all relevant amendments would eliminate the electoral college and
substitute direct popular election. No proposal to reform the electoral college has been introduced
since the 107th Congress. Second, the scope of proposed direct popular election amendments is
arguably evolving in complexity and detail.
It is unclear whether the first development reflects a decline in electoral college support, lack of
interest in reform proposals, or simply the absence of a sense of urgency. It is possible that
supporters of the current system in some form would coalesce to defend the electoral college, if
its existence or integrity were endangered. Recent action by the Heritage Foundation and the
State Government Leadership Foundation, reported later in this report, arguably confirm this
thesis.
Another trend is that recent proposals go beyond substituting direct election for the electoral
college. Presidential election reform amendments in recent Congresses have frequently included
provisions to enhance and extend federal authority in such areas as residence standards, definition
of citizenship, national voter registration, inclusion of U.S. dependencies in the presidential
election process, establishment of an election day holiday, ballot access standards for parties and
candidates, etc. If approved and ratified, they would afford Congress authority to establish broad
national election standards which would supersede current state and political party practices and
requirements.
Congressional authority over federal elections stems from Article I Section 4, clause 1 of the
Constitution for Congress, and Article II, Section 1, clause 4 for presidential electors. For further
information and a detailed analysis of this authority, consult CRS Report RL30747,
Congressional Authority to Standardize National Election Procedures, by Kenneth R. Thomas.
The prospect of increased federal involvement in the administration of presidential elections
raises two potential issues. The first is whether such federal involvement in traditionally state and
local practices might be considered an unfunded mandate, as it could impose additional costs on
sub-federal governments. Indeed, bills that had the effect of imposing uncompensated costs on
state and local election authorities might be subject to points of order on the floor of both the
House and Senate.123 One response by the affected governments might be to call for federal
123 For additional information, please consult CRS Report for Congress CRS Report RS20058, Unfunded Mandates
(continued...)
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funding to meet the increased expenses imposed by federal requirements. Precedent for this exists
in the grant program incorporated in the Help American Vote Act (HAVA).124 A second issue
centers on perceptions that such an amendment might be regarded as federal intrusion in state and
local responsibilities. For instance, a far-reaching scenario might include the gradual assumption
of the election administration structure by the federal government. In this hypothetical case,
questions could be raised as to: (1) the costs involved; (2) whether a national election
administration system could efficiently manage all the varying nuances of state and local
conditions; and (3) what would be the long term implications for federalism? Conversely, it could
be asserted that (1) a national or federal election administration structure is appropriate for
national elections; (2) that state or local concerns are counterbalanced by the urgent requirement
that every citizen be enabled and encouraged to vote; and (3) that every vote should be accurately
counted.
Current Developments in Reform Initiatives ― Activity in the
States
Given the unlikely prospect of congressional action on electoral college reform, a variety of
alternative plans has emerged over the past decade. While only a constitutional amendment can
alter the fundamental arrangements of the electoral college, some elements of the system could be
changed by the states. In this instance, the states would act, or have acted in the case of Maine
and Nebraska in their adoption of the district plan, in their classic role as “laboratories of
democracy.” The Constitution, in Article II, Section 1, clause 2 requires that “Each State shall
appoint, in such Manner as the Legislature thereof may direct, a Number of Electors, equal to the
whole Number of Senators and Representatives to which the State may be entitled in
Congress....”125 In other words, the states are free to experiment with systems of elector selection
and electoral vote allocation, up to a point. Over the past decade both proportional and
congressional district plan proposals have been advanced in the states. A technical caveat to the
reader: it should be recalled that, notwithstanding widespread usage, including in this report,
electoral votes are not awarded to particular candidates; rather, electors pledged to support
particular candidates are elected.
Proportional Plan ― Colorado Amendment 36, 2004
On November 2, 2004, Colorado voters rejected a state constitutional amendment that would
have provided for proportional allocation of electoral votes.126 Had the amendment passed and
survived legal challenges, it would have provided proportional allocation of Colorado’s
presidential electors for 2004 and future presidential elections. After a spirited campaign that
stirred some national interest, Amendment 36 was ultimately defeated by a vote of 697,000 in
(...continued)
Reform Act Summarized, by Keith Bea and Richard S. Beth.
124 Help America Vote Act ( HAVA): P.L. 107-252; 116 Stat. 1666.
125 This power is not, however, absolute. Federal court decisions have struck down state laws concerning appointment
of electors that were found to be in violation of the 14th Amendment’s guarantee of equal protection. For additional
discussion, see United States Constitution: Analysis and Interpretation Constitution Annotated), Article II, Section 1,
Clauses 2-4. Available at http://www.crs.gov/products/conan/Article02/topic_S1_C2_1_2.html.
126 Amendment 36, available at http://www.lawanddemocracy.org/pdffiles/COamend36.pdf.
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favor to1,307,000 opposed.127 For the record, if the amendment had been in effect for the 2008
election, the Democratic candidates Barack Obama and Joe Biden would have received five
electoral votes, while the Republicans John McCain and Sarah Palin would have received four.
Under the winner-take-all system, the Democratic ticket received all nine Colorado electoral
votes.128
District Plan ― California, 2008
Supporters of the district plan assert that it is an fairer alternative to the general ticket/winner-
take-all system because in tallying popular votes by congressional district, it more accurately
reflects voter preferences in different parts of a state, and by also counting them statewide, it
recognizes the overall winners on the state level by awarding them the two “senatorial” electors.
Results of the 2008 presidential election in Nebraska provide a real-world example of the district
plan in action.129 Republican candidates McCain and Palin won a majority of votes both in
Nebraska’s 1st and 3rd congressional districts, and statewide, while Democrats Obama and Biden
won a majority in the 2nd congressional district. Under Nebraska’s district plan, the Republican
ticket took four electoral votes, one for each district, and two for the statewide total, while the
Democrats took a single electoral vote, representing the 2nd congressional district.130
Earlier in the decade, district plan advocates in the Golden State proposed the California
Presidential Reform Act (California Counts), a version similar to those used in Maine and
Nebraska. They sought to have their proposal submitted to the voters under California’s provision
for enactment of legislation by popular initiative. Supporters noted that in 2004, Democratic
nominees John Kerry and John Edwards received 54.3% of the popular vote, and all 55 electoral
votes, while Republicans George Bush and Dick Cheney received 44.4% of the popular vote, but
no electoral votes.131 If the district system had been in place in California in 2004, Kerry-Edwards
would have received 33 electoral votes (31 congressional districts, and 2 statewide electors, and
Bush-Cheney, 22 (22 congressional districts).132 California Counts was the subject of heated
political debate between Democrats and Republicans, and was also criticized on state
constitutional grounds.133 A greater obstacle was the need to gather supportive petitions from
voters equal in number to 5% of votes cast in the most recent gubernatorial election, a total of
127 Colorado, Secretary of State, Official Publication of the Abstract of Votes Cast for the 2003 Coordinated[,] 2005
Primary[,] 2004 General [Elections] (n.p., n.d.), pp. 138-139.
128 U.S. Congress, House, Clerk of the House of Representatives, Statistics of the Presidential and Congressional
Elections, November 4, 2008, available at http://clerk.house.gov/member_info/electionInfo/2008/
2008Stat.htm#stateCO.
129 As noted earlier in this report, Maine and Nebraska both use a district system to award electoral votes.
130 Nebraska, Secretary of State, Official Results of Nebraska General Election, November 4, 2008, p. 10; available at
http://www.sos.ne.gov/elec/pdf/2008%20General%20Canvass%20Book.pdf, p. 10.
131 America at the Polls 26, p. 28.
132 Electoral College Vote by Congressional District, 1996-2004, CRS Congressional Distribution Memorandum by
Kevin J. Coleman, Royce Crocker, Dana Ely and Terrence Lisbeth, September 10, 2007, p. 3. For the record, in 2008
the district plan would have awarded 44 electoral votes (42 districts and 2 statewide electoral votes) to Obama and
Biden, and 11 (11 congressional districts) to McCain and Palin. See “Election 08 Results by District,” CQ Politics,
available at http://innovation.cq.com/atlas/district_08.
133 Vikram David Amar, “The So-Called Presidential Reform Act: A Clear Abuse of California’s Initiative Process,”
FindLaw Legal News and Commentary, August 17, 2007, available at http://writ.news.findlaw.com/amar/
20070817.html.
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433,971 valid signatures of registered voters at that time.134 The California Counts organization
ultimately failed to obtain the necessary signatures, and the proposed act never appeared on the
ballot in 2008.135
District Plans, 2011-2012 ― Nebraska Out? Pennsylvania and Wisconsin In?
The district plan has generated a renewed level of interest in a number of states since early 2011.
Legislators in Nebraska introduced legislation to return that state to winner-take-all disposition of
electoral votes, while a bill to move Pennsylvania into the district system was introduced in that
state, and another was discussed in Wisconsin.
Nebraska
On January 6, 2011, LB21, a bill to return Nebraska to the general ticket or winner-take-all
system was introduced in the unicameral legislature. Proponents asserted that the district plan had
weakened the state’s influence in national politics, while those opposed claimed that it actually
promoted grassroots involvement in elections and public affairs, and that the split electoral vote
in 2008 proved the validity of the district plan.136 Some commentators, however, suggested that
the proposed change reflected Republican concerns that the district system had energized
Democratic voters in the 2008 election, leading to closer results than anticipated in the statewide
presidential vote and other election contests that year.137 Although the bill was the subject of
committee discussion, it was “shelved” for the balance of 2011 the session. LB21 remains “live,”
and could be the subject of action in the legislature’s 2012 session, but at the time of this writing,
the Nebraska Unicameral’s website shows no action planned on the bill.138
Pennsylvania
News of a district plan proposal in the Pennsylvania legislature later in the year generated
considerably greater publicity and political controversy. On September 6, 2011, Senator Dominic
Pileggi, Majority Leader of the Pennsylvania Senate, announced his intention to introduce
legislation to substitute the district plan for the general ticket system used in the Keystone State
since the first presidential elections.
Senator Pileggi’s proposal, Senate Bill 1282, was introduced on September 30, 2011; its
provisions mark it as a classic “district plan” proposal. Each joint ticket of presidential and vice
presidential candidates eligible for placement would be represented by a single elector-candidate
in each congressional district, and two at-large elector-candidates, reflecting the senatorial factor
in electoral vote allocation. On election day, voters would cast a single vote for the electors
134 Computed from California, Secretary of State, Elections Division, Statement of Vote, 2006 General Election, p. x,
available at http://www.sos.ca.gov/elections/sov/2006_general/complete_sov.pdf.
135 See, for example: Shane Goldmacher, “Electoral College Measure Falls Short,” Sacramento Bee Capitol Alert,
February 5, 2008, available at http://blogs.sacbee.com/capitolalertlatest/2008/02/electoral-colle.html.
136 “Electoral College Changes Proposed,” Unicameral Update, the Nebraska Legislature’s Official News Source,
February 24, 2011, available at http://update.legislature.ne.gov/?p=3539.
137 Don Walton, “Electoral Vote Change Stuck in Committee,” JournalStar.com, Lincoln Journal-Star, March 10,
2011, available at http://journalstar.com/news/unicameral/article_6b78c3da-95fc-54c0-8f12-486e5e8a9fff.html.
138 http://nebraskalegislature.gov/bills/view_bill.php?DocumentID=11810.
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pledged to their candidates, and these popular election results would be counted statewide. The
ticket of candidates winning the most votes in the state would be awarded the two at-large
electors, reflecting the senatorial factor in electoral vote assignments. The ticket winning the most
popular vote in each congressional district would be awarded the single elector representing that
district.139 Senator Pileggi’s statement asserted that, “[t]his proposal will more fairly align
Pennsylvania’s electoral college votes with the results of the popular vote. It will also make
individual votes across the state more important, giving voters a more significant say in
presidential elections.’’ 140 Some observers suggested the proposal was designed to break a 20-
year Democratic hold on Pennsylvania’s electoral college delegation.141 In awarding electoral
votes by congressional district, it was argued, Republicans might gain as many as 12 or 13
electoral votes from Republican-leaning districts under the district plan.142
Opponents claimed the proposal was “a blatant power grab meant to rig presidential elections and
diminish the voice of voters in Democratic strongholds.”143 Some Republicans also criticized the
bill, on the grounds that the state Democratic Party organization might “move campaigns out of
safe Democratic districts in urban population centers and into the more moderate suburbs.”144 SB
1282 was referred to the Committee on State Government on September 30, but no further action
had been taken by the time of this writing.145 By the end of November, interest in the proposal
had waned, and both Senator Pileggi and Pennsylvania Governor Tom Corbett indicated that SB
1282 was on hold, perhaps indefinitely.146
Wisconsin
Shortly after Pennsylvania’s SB 182 was introduced, the Milwaukee Journal Sentinel reported
that Wisconsin State Representative Daniel Le Mahieu was proposing district plan legislation for
that state. Arguments in favor of and opposition to the proposal were similar to those raised in
139 Senate Bill No. 1282, Amending the Act of June 3, 1937, Session of 2011, Pennsylvania General Assembly,
available at http://www.legis.state.pa.us/cfdocs/billinfo/billinfo.cfm?syear=2011&sind=0&body=S&type=B&BN=
1282.
140 “Senator Pileggi Unveils Proposal to More Fairly Allocate Electoral College Votes,” statement, September 13,
2011, available at http://www.senatorpileggi.com/press/2011/0911/091311.htm.
141 Pennsylvania voted for Democratic presidential candidates for every election since 1992.
142 Aaron Blake, “Could Pennsylvania Republicans End the Electoral College as We Know It?” Washington Post,
September 14, 2011, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-fix/post/could-pennsylvania-republicans-
end-the-electoral-college-as-we-know-it/2011/09/14/gIQAQUzUSK_blog.html .
143 Dan Hirschhorn, “House GOP Fret Over Pa. Electorals [sic],” Politico, September 14, 2011, available at
http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0911/63522.html. Here again, Professor Lawrence Longley’s “voting power”
theory comes into play. Substantial concentrations of Democratic voters, particularly minority voters, in the
Philadelphia and Pittsburgh metropolitan areas have long been regarded as a key element in gaining a Democratic
plurality or majority in the popular vote in Pennsylvania. A district plan system for awarding electoral votes would
arguably lessen the voting power of minority votes in the state by awarding as many as 12 to 13 electoral votes to
congressional district electors from Republican-leaning districts in the state.
144 “Pete Sessions: Pa. Electoral College Change Would Put House Races at Risk,” Wall Street Journal, Washington
Wire, September 15, 2011, available at http://blogs.wsj.com/washwire/2011/09/15/pete-sessions-pa-electoral-college-
change-would-put-house-races-at-risk/.
145 SB 1282, Regular Session, 2011-2012, Pennsylvania General Assembly, available at http://www.legis.state.pa.us/
cfdocs/billinfo/billinfo.cfm?syear=2011&sind=0&body=S&type=B&BN=1282 .
146 “Pennsylvania Electoral College Bill On Hold,” CBS Philly, November 27, 2011, available at
http://philadelphia.cbslocal.com/2011/11/27/pennsylvania-electoral-college-bill-on-hold/.
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Pennsylvania.147 Opponents, however, also claimed that the district plan would eliminate
Wisconsin from the roster of “battleground” states. This, they asserted, would lead presidential
campaign organizations and political parties to shift their resources to states where the winner-
take-all system promised bigger electoral vote rewards for their campaign spending. Under this
scenario, the district system would ultimately cost the state economy millions of dollars in
broadcast TV revenue, and even more from lost radio, cable, travel, staff, and other
campaign-related spending.148 At the time of this writing, however, no such bill had been
introduced in the legislature.149
The National Popular Vote Campaign: Direct Popular Election
Through an Interstate Compact
The National Popular Vote (NPV) campaign movement seeks to establish direct popular election
of the President and Vice President through an interstate compact, rather than by constitutional
amendment. Under the compact’s provisions, legislatures of the 50 states and the District of
Columbia would appoint presidential electors committed to the presidential/vice presidential
ticket that gained the most votes nationwide. This would deliver a unanimous electoral college
decision for the candidates winning a plurality of the popular vote.
Northwestern University law professor Robert W. Bennett and constitutional scholars Akhil and
Vikram Amar are generally credited as originators of the NPV concept.150 Their proposal provides
the basis of the National Popular Vote Plan. NPV relies on the Constitution’s broad grant of
power to each state to “appoint, in such Manner as the Legislature thereof may direct [emphasis
added], a Number of Electors, equal to the whole Number of Senators and Representatives to
which the State may be entitled in the Congress....”151
Specifically, the plan calls for an interstate agreement or compact in which the legislature in each
of the participating states agrees to appoint electors pledged to the candidates who won the
nationwide popular vote. State election authorities would count and certify the popular vote in
each state, which would be aggregated and certified nationwide as the “nationwide popular vote.”
The participating state legislatures would then choose the slate of electors pledged to the
“nationwide popular vote winner,” notwithstanding the results within their particular state.152
147 Craig Gilbert, “Changing the Way the Electoral College Works in Wisconsin: A Recipe for Irrelevance?”
Milwaukee Journal Sentinel, Journal Interactive, October 23, 2011. Available at http://www.jsonline.com/blogs/news/
132415248.html .
148 Ibid.
149 Wisconsin Legislative Documents website, available at https://docs.legis.wisconsin.gov/2011/related/author_index/
assembly/A_LeMahieu_Daniel?view=section .
150 Robert W. Bennett, “Popular Election of the President Without a Constitutional Amendment,” The Green Bag, An
Entertaining Journal of Law, 4 Green Bag 2d 241, available from the Social Science Research Network by
subscription, see http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=261057; Akhil Reed Amar and Vikram David
Amar, “How to Achieve Direct National Election of the President Without Amending the Constitution,” Findlaw’s
Writ, December 28, 2001, available at http://writ.news.findlaw.com/amar/20011228.html .
151 U.S. Constitution, Article II, Section 1, clause 2.
152 Under NPV, assume that presidential ticket “A” won 55% of the popular vote in State “X,” and ticket “B” won 45%.
Under the current general ticket system, the state legislature would typically choose electors pledged to ticket A. Under
NPV, assume the same in-state results, but assume that ticket “B” won the national popular vote. The state legislature,
in compliance with the National Popular Vote compact, would vote to chose electors committed to ticket “B,” because
that ticket won the national popular vote, notwithstanding the in-state returns.
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Barring unforeseen circumstances, the NPV would ultimately result in a unanimous electoral
college vote of 538 electors for the winning candidates. As a safety measure, the process would
come into effect only after states whose total electoral votes equal or exceed a majority of 270
approve the plan. If the national popular vote were tied, the states would be released from their
commitment under the compact, and choose electors who represented the presidential ticket that
gained the most votes in each particular state. One novel NPV provision would enable the
presidential candidate who won the national popular vote to fill any vacancies in the electoral
college with electors of his or her own choice.
States would retain the right to withdraw from the compact, but if a state chose to withdraw
within six months of the end of a presidential term, the withdrawal would not be effective until
after the succeeding President and Vice President had been elected.
National Popular Vote, Inc.
The NPV advocacy effort is managed by National Popular Vote, Inc., a “501(c)(4)”153 non profit
corporation, established in California in 2006 by Barry Fadem, an attorney specializing in
initiative and referendum law, and Stanford University professor John R. Koza.154 As a 501(c)(4)
entity, it is permitted to engage in political activity in furtherance of its goal, so long as this is not
its primary activity. NPV’s board members include former Senators and Representatives of both
major political parties, suggesting bipartisan support on the national level. As of October 27,
2011, NPV claimed the support of 2,110 state legislators, over one sixth of the 7,382 total, and
endorsements by the New York Times, Los Angeles Times, Chicago Sun-Times, Minneapolis Star
Tribune, Boston Globe, Miami Herald and other newspapers.155
NPV Momentum?
According to NPV, the compact has been introduced in the legislatures of all 50 states, and the
Council of the District of Columbia. By late 2011, eight states and the District of Columbia,
possessing a total of 132 electoral votes had adopted it. In chronological order with year of
adoption, they are:
• Hawaii (four electoral votes), 2008;
• Illinois (20 electoral votes), 2008;
• Maryland (10 electoral votes), 2008;
• New Jersey (14 electoral votes), 2008;
• Washington (12 electoral votes), 2009;
• Massachusetts (11 electoral votes), 2010;
• District of Columbia (three electoral votes), 2010;
153 26 U.S.C. 501 (c)(4). Organizations recognized by the Internal Revenue Service under this provision of the IRS
Code may lobby for legislation and participate in political campaigns and elections.
154 Rick Lyman, “Innovator Devises Way Around Electoral College,” New York Times, September 22, 2006,
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/09/22/us/politics/22electoral.html.
155 National Popular Vote website, available at http://www.nationalpopularvote.com/.
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• Vermont (three electoral votes), 2011; and
• California (55 electoral votes), 2011.
After a slow start, the NPV compact may have gained a degree of momentum. California’s
accession to the compact, finalized by Governor Edmund G. “Jerry” Brown on August 11, 2011,
added 55 electoral votes to the total in states that have approved NPV, and brought it to 49% of its
270-vote operational threshold. In addition, the compact was under active consideration in 2011
in the legislatures of 11 additional states which collectively cast an additional 124 electoral votes.
In another recent development, on February 23, 2011, businessman, philanthropist, and former
three-time New York gubernatorial candidate, Tom Golisano, announced that he would become a
spokesman for the National Popular Vote campaign, and, according to press accounts, would
“bankroll” NPV efforts.156 Perhaps in response to perceived NPV momentum, defenders of the
existing arrangements have begun measures to protect the electoral college system. On December
7, 2011, the Heritage Foundation, a conservative public policy institute, hosted a forum at which
guest speakers, including five state secretaries of state, expressed their concern over the National
Popular Vote campaign.157 On December 8, Roll Call reported that the State Government
Leadership Foundation, a project of the Republican State Leadership Committee, would begin a
campaign to defend the electoral college and counter recent NPV gains.158
National Popular Vote: Pro and Con
Arguments in support of and opposed to the National Popular Vote proposal resemble those for
and against direct popular election; the central issue turns on the question of the simplicity, logic,
and democratic attractiveness of the direct election idea as compared to a more complex array of
factors cited by supporters of the electoral college system.
Arguments Favoring the NPV Compact
The National Popular Vote movement advocates the NPV compact on the grounds of fairness and
respect for the voters’ choice. According to NPV, the central argument in favor is that the compact
“would guarantee the Presidency to the candidate who receives the most popular votes [or at least
a plurality] in all 50 states (and the District of Columbia).”159 It also eliminates: 1) the possibility
of Presidents who won fewer votes than their opponent; 2) faithless electors; 3)
“disfranchisement” under the winner-take-all system; 4) the various “voting power” advantages
noted earlier in this report; and 5) the potential for contingent election under the 12th
Amendment.160
156 Joseph Spector, “Tom Golisano to Lead National Popular Vote Effort,” WGRZ.com (Buffalo, New York), February
23, 2011, available at http://www.wgrz.com/news/article/110466/1/Tom-Golisano-to-Lead-National-Popular-Vote-
Effort . Hendrik Hertzberg, “N.P.V. Gets a Boost,” The New Yorker (Blogs), March 14, 2011, available at
http://www.newyorker.com/online/blogs/hendrikhertzberg/2011/03/npv-gets-a-boost.html .
157 Heritage Foundation, “The Electoral College and the National Popular Vote Plan,” available at
http://www.heritage.org/events/2011/12/electoral-college .
158 Eliza Newlin Carney, “GOP Nonprofit Backs Electoral College,” Roll Call.com, December 8, 2011, available at
http://www.rollcall.com/issues/57_71/GOP-Nonprofit-Backs-Electoral-College-210872-1.html .
159 National Popular Vote website, available at http://www.nationalpopularvote.com/pages/explanation.php.
160 Contingent election takes place under the existing system if no candidates receive a majority of electoral votes. For
(continued...)
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In addition to the argument to fairness and democratic principle, NPV also asserts it
would provide a practical benefit to non-“battleground states,” encouraging presidential
nominees and their organizations to spread their presence and resources more evenly as
they campaigned for every vote nationwide, rather than concentrate on winning key
“battleground” states:
... candidates have no reason to poll, visit, organize, campaign, or worry about the concerns
of voters of states that they cannot possibly win or lose. This means that voters in two thirds
of the states are effectively disenfranchised in presidential elections because candidates
concentrate their attention on a small handful of “battleground” states. In 2004, candidates
concentrated over two-thirds of their money and campaign visits in just five states; over 80%
in nine states, and over 99% of their money in just 16 states.161
For instance, they note that California voters seldom see the presidential or vice presidential
nominees or benefit from campaign spending because the Golden State is considered to be
reliably Democratic, so Democratic candidates are said to take its 55 electoral votes for granted,
and Republican candidates make few appearances in support of an apparently hopeless cause.
Similar arguments on the Republican side apply to Texas, a state that has voted for Republican
presidential nominees since 1980. Opponents might argue that spreading campaign spending
resources in non-battlegrounds states is a questionable goal with which to justify such a profound
change in the presidential election process. Campaign appearances and spending, they might
assert, should not be considered to be a local economic stimulus package, nor are the amounts in
question sufficient to make much of a difference in the economic condition of most states.
Moreover, they might continue, it is equally dubious to assert that nominees will slight the
concerns of citizens of the states from which they draw their greatest support, or that concentrated
campaigning in the “battleground” states somehow “disenfranchises” voters in others. In the
modern era, only a tiny percentage of voters ever actually see a presidential or vice presidential
candidate from either party. Television, the Internet, and newspapers, not rallies and torchlight
parades, and word of mouth, are the dominant sources of voters’ information on the campaign
today.
Arguments Opposing the NPV Compact
Opponents may assert that NPV would undermine the Constitution and overturn the Founders’
original intent. As noted earlier in this report, they could argue that presidential elections are not
only national, but federal, contests, in which the states have an important role. The electoral
college is an integral and important component of federalism, against which national popular
election would be a serious blow. From a practical standpoint, they might argue that NPV would
lead to an increase in contested election results and legal challenges in the states, as the political
parties maneuver to claim every possible vote.
Another point in opposition could be that NPV is an admitted “end run” around the
Constitution,162 that seeks fundamental change in the nation’s election structure by circumventing
(...continued)
further information, please consult CRS Report RL32695, Election of the President and Vice President by Congress:
Contingent Election, by Thomas H. Neale.
161 National Popular Vote website, available at http://www.nationalpopularvote/com/pages/explanation.php.
162 This is the term applied by NPV founder, John Koza, in a 2006 interview: “When people complain that it’s an end
run,” Dr. Koza said, “I just tell them, ‘Hey, an end run is a legal play in football.’” Rick Lyman, “Innovator Devises
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the amendment process established by the Founders in Article V of the Constitution. Proponents
may argue that Article V presents too high a hurdle for what they consider a necessary reform of
the system, but opponents would likely assert that the Founders intended to make it difficult to
alter provisions of the nation’s fundamental charter. NPV, they could assert, seeks to circumvent
these safeguards, and in this sense, it is anti-constitutional, if not unconstitutional.
Critics may also note that the National Popular Vote plan contains no “statute of limitations,”
unlike constitutional amendments which must be approved by three fourths of the states, typically
within a seven-year period.163 Where, critics may ask, is a similar time limit that would “sunset”
the National Popular Vote compact, after which it NPV would expire, or return to “square one?”
According to its website, NPV was launched on February 23, 2006;164 if it were a constitutional
amendment, it would expire after February 23, 2013, if not adopted by three fourths of the states.
By what reasoning, they might argue, should the NPV be exempt from the standards Congress
sets for constitutional amendments?
Ultimately, opponents could argue, NPV uses anti-democratic means to secure a democratic goal.
Once the NPV compact is operational, the will of the citizens of any state, as expressed in their
vote, will be immaterial when compared with the nationwide popular vote total—legislatures
would be compelled by the compact to appoint electors pledged to the nationwide winners,
notwithstanding the preference expressed by the voters of their state. Barring unforeseen
circumstances, the electoral vote under NPV would always be 538 for the ticket winning the most
popular votes nationwide to 0 for the runners-up, no matter how many states they carried.
Opponents might note that results like these would be more characteristic of a totalitarian
“people’s democracy” than a democratic federal republic like the United States, and might lead to
the very sort of constitutional crisis NPV was intended to avoid.
National Popular Vote: Legal and Constitutional Issues
Some observers have questioned the constitutionality of the National Popular Vote plan. Derek T.
Muller, writing in Election Law Journal, asserts that NPV is an interstate compact within the
meaning of the Constitution, and that it must be approved by Congress before taking effect.165
Certain types of interstate agreements or compacts, he notes, do not require the explicit consent of
Congress “because they do not affect national sovereignty or concern the core meaning of the
Compact Clause.”166 He maintains, however, that the National Popular Vote agreement would
require explicit congressional approval because it binds the states to a particular course of action,
places time limits on their ability to withdraw from NPV, and meets or exceeds conditions
(...continued)
Way Around Electoral College.” New York Times, September 22, 2006, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2006/09/
22/us/politics/22electoral.html .
163 Congress has set the seven-year period as a reasonable time limit for the ratification process for the 18th, 20th, and all
succeeding amendments.
164 See National Popular Vote website, available at http://www.nationalpopularvote.com/pages/summary.php .
165 “No State shall, without the consent of Congress, ... enter into any Agreement or Compact with another State, or
with a foreign Power.... ” Article I, Section 10, clause 3.
166 Derek T. Muller, “The Compact Clause and the National Popular Vote Interstate Compact,” Election Law Journal,
vol. 8, no. 4 (n.d.), 2007, p. 382. Examples include the multi-state “EZ-Pass” auto toll agreement, and the northeastern
states Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative.
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historically found to define “interstate compacts” by the Supreme and other U.S. Courts.167
Muller further maintains that the NPV concept is inherently unconstitutional unless specifically
approved by Congress because it would enhance the political power of participating states, at the
expense of those that did not join the compact:
States have an interest in appointing their electors as they see fit, and the Presidential
Electors Clause of the Constitution grants this exclusive authority to the states. Technically,
the non-compacting sister states can still appoint electors, but the Interstate Compact makes
such an appointment meaningless. The outcome of the Electoral College would be
determined by an arranged collective agreement among compacting states, regardless of
what non-compacting states do about it.... This evisceration of political effectiveness is a
sufficient interest to invoke the constitutional safeguard of congressional consent.168
The National Popular Vote movement agrees that NPV is an interstate compact, but it maintains
that the Constitution implicitly permits valid interstate agreements without the need for
congressional approval on any subject that falls within the states’ constitutional authority.169 NPV
further notes that since the compact concerns the states’ undisputed discretion as to the method by
which they appoint electors, it would therefore be an appropriate subject for an interstate
compact.170 Finally, they assert that the Supreme Court twice rejected arguments that an interstate
compact was unconstitutional because “it impaired the sovereign rights of non-member states or
enhanced the political power of the member states at the expense of other states,” as has been
asserted by NPV opponents.171
Other critics claim the National Popular Vote compact might violate Sections 2 and 5 of the
Voting Rights Act (VRA). Writing in Columbia Law Review, David Gringer invokes the voting
power theory.172 He argues that the plan conflicts with Section 2 of VRA because moving from “a
state-based [vote] to a national popular vote dilutes the voting strength of a given state’s minority
population by reducing its ability [voting power] to influence the outcome of presidential
elections.”173 Gringer also asserts that the NPV compact may violate Section 5 of the act, which
restrains “covered”174 jurisdictions from implementing changes to “any voting qualification or
prerequisite to voting, or standard, practice, or procedure (emphasis added) with respect to
voting,”175 until the proposed change has been reviewed for potential discriminatory intent, a
process known as preclearance. He argues that the NPV compact would qualify as a covered
167 Ibid., pp. 388-389.
168 Ibid., p. 391.
169 John R. Koza, Barry Fadem, et al. Every Vote Equal: A State-Based Plan for Electing the President by National
Popular Vote (Los Altos, CA: National Popular Vote Press, 2006), pp. 284-285.
170 Koza, Fadem, et al., Every Vote Equal, pp. 284-285.
171 Ibid., citing U.S. Steel Corp. v. Multistate Tax Commission, 434 U.S. 452, 494 n. 23 (1978) (White dissenting), and
Northeast Bancorp, Inc. v. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 472 U.S. 159, 176 (1985).
172 As noted earlier, the voting power theory holds that a state’s influence depends on the size of its electoral college
delegation, and its consequent ability to influence the outcome of an election. For a fuller explanation of voting power,
see Lawrence D. Longley and Neal R. Peirce, The Electoral College Primer 2000 (Yale University Press, New Haven:
1999), pp. 149-161.
173 David Gringer, “Why the National Popular Vote Plan is the Wrong Way to Abolish the Electoral College, Columbia
Law Review, vol. 108, 2008, p. 208.
174 Covered jurisdictions were defined in the act as effectively those in which there was evidence of discrimination
against minority voting rights in the years prior to passage of the original Voting Rights Act in 1965. They include
eight states and local jurisdictions in another eight, located largely, though not exclusively, in the south.
175 42 U.S.C. 1973c.
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practice under Section 5, and that the legislatures of all the “covered” states would need to obtain
preclearance before implementing the compact.176
Responding to this point, NPV noted that
The National Popular Vote bill manifestly would make every person’s vote for President
equal throughout the United States in an election to fill a single office (the Presidency). It is
entirely consistent with the goal of the Voting Rights Act. There have been court cases under
the Voting Rights Act concerning contemplated changes in voting methods for various
representative legislative bodies.... However, these cases do not bear on elections to fill a
single office (i.e., the Presidency).”177
Finally, it may be noted that the states’ authority to appoint electors by any method their
legislatures choose is not absolute. Federal court decisions have struck down state laws
concerning appointment of electors that were found to be in violation of the 14th Amendment’s
guarantee of equal protection:
Although Clause 2 (of Article II, Section 1 of the Constitution) seemingly vests complete
discretion in the states, certain older cases had recognized a federal interest in protecting the
integrity of the process. Thus, the Court upheld the power of Congress to protect the right of
all citizens who are entitled to vote to lend aid and support in any legal manner to the
election of any legally qualified person as a presidential elector.... [I]n Oregon v. Mitchell
(42 U.S. 112 (1970)), the Court upheld the power of Congress to reduce the voting age in
presidential elections and to set a thirty-day durational residency period as a qualification for
voting in presidential elections. Although the Justices were divided on the reasons, the
rationale emerging from this case, considered with Williams v. Rhodes, (393 U.S. 20 1968))
is that the Fourteenth Amendment limits state discretion in prescribing the manner of
selecting electors and that Congress in enforcing the Fourteenth Amendment may override
state practices that violate that Amendment and may substitute standards of its own.178
It is beyond the scope of this report to speculate on the outcome of these asserted legal and
constitutional issues concerning the National Popular Vote compact, but the fact that they have
been identified and noted suggests the possibility of court challenges to the compact in the event
that NPV were to approach or meet its 270 electoral vote threshold.
Outlook for 2012
There is little likelihood of major changes to the electoral college system during the coming year
occurring by any of the three processes cited in this report—constitutional amendment, state
legislation changing electoral vote formulae, or through the interstate compact proposed by the
National Popular Vote campaign.
• From the standpoint of a constitutional amendment, there is little indication of
congressional interest in the question; as noted earlier, one relevant proposal has
been introduced in the 112th Congress, and no committee action is scheduled at
176 Gringer, “Why the National Popular Vote Plan is the Wrong Way to Abolish the Electoral College,” p.188.
177 National Popular Vote, Myths About the National Popular Vote, “18.1 Myths About the Voting Rights Act,”
http://www.nationalpopularvote.com/pages/answers/m18.php.
178 For additional discussion, see United States Constitution: Analysis and Interpretation Constitution Annotated),
Article II, Section 1, Clauses 2-4. Available at http://www.crs.gov/products/conan/Article02/topic_S1_C2_1_2.html.
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this time. The length of time involved in the amendment process, from
introduction in Congress, to its approval by the House and Senate and proposal
for ratification by the states, makes an amendment unlikely.
• Legislative action might result in changes in the formula for allocation of
electoral votes in individual states—relevant bills are pending, but inactive, in
Nebraska (to replace a district system arrangement with winner-take-all),
Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin (to replace winner-take-all systems with a district
arrangement). Changes in their methods of assigning electoral votes by any of
these states might result in little more than publicity. If, however, a district
system were enacted and operational in Pennsylvania and Wisconsin in 2012, and
if the election were closely contested in the electoral college, the state
legislatures’ actions might be subject to serious criticism, and could result in legal
challenges on various grounds, including dilution of minority voter influence.
Under such circumstances, the prospect for a post-election controversy similar in
scale to that which took place in Florida following the election of 2000 is remote
but not impossible.
• Finally, the National Popular Vote campaign, despite its recent successes, has no
chance of affecting the 2012 presidential election. Even if further accessions
pushed the total number of electoral votes in states that joined the compact above
the 270-vote trigger that would cause its implementation, the compact would not
take effect until 2016.
Conclusion
The issues discussed in this report are not the only ones affecting contemporary presidential
elections. As the report and the sources cited herein suggest, presidential elections are the subject
of substantial scholarly study, media and public interest, and governmental activity. The three
major topics discussed here—the nominating process, campaign finance, and the electoral
college—are, however, among the most enduring issues in presidential elections. All three remain
highly relevant for 2012. In each case, major changes to presidential selection have occurred
since 2008 or are under consideration. Many of the developments discussed above will require
additional time to fully understand, perhaps even beyond completion of the 2012 election cycle
(especially for proposed changes to the electoral college). Nonetheless, history suggests that each
of these areas will continue to be pillars of the presidential election process.
With these potentially major developments in mind, this report provides Congress with
background about how and why contemporary presidential elections occur as they do. The
process for selecting presidents has remained more or less unchanged since the 19th century.
Generally speaking, that trend is likely to continue. The topics discussed here could nonetheless
set the boundaries for how today’s citizens, candidates, political parties, and outside groups
participate in presidential elections. Members of Congress can and do participate in the politics
and elections surrounding presidential selection. Congress also has unique responsibilities for
overseeing federal roles in that process, which requires an understanding of how presidential
elections evolved. This report provides a resource for doing so.
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Author Contact Information
Kevin J. Coleman
Thomas H. Neale
Analyst in Elections
Specialist American National Government
kcoleman@crs.loc.gov, 7-7878
tneale@crs.loc.gov, 7-7883
R. Sam Garrett
Specialist in American National Government
rgarrett@crs.loc.gov, 7-6443
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