Latin America: Terrorism Issues
Mark P. Sullivan
Specialist in Latin American Affairs
January 5, 2012
Congressional Research Service
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www.crs.gov
RS21049
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Latin America: Terrorism Issues

Summary
U.S. attention to terrorism in Latin America intensified in the aftermath of the September 2001
terrorist attacks on New York and Washington, with an increase in bilateral and regional
cooperation. In its 2010 Country Reports on Terrorism (issued in August 2011), the State
Department maintained that terrorism in the region was primarily perpetrated by terrorist
organizations in Colombia and by the remnants of radical leftist Andean groups. Overall,
however, the report maintained that the threat of a transnational terrorist attack remained low for
most countries in the hemisphere. With regard to concerns about drug trafficking-related violence
in Mexico, the State Department terrorism report asserted that “there was no evidence of ties
between Mexican criminal organizations and terrorist groups, nor that the criminal organizations
had aims of political or territorial control, aside from seeking to protect and expand the impunity
with which they conduct their criminal activity.” Cuba has remained on the State Department’s
list of state sponsors of terrorism since 1982 pursuant to Section 6(j) of the Export Administration
Act, which triggers a number of economic sanctions. Both Cuba and Venezuela are on the State
Department’s annual list of countries determined to be not cooperating fully with U.S.
antiterrorism efforts pursuant to Section 40A of the Arms Export Control Act. U.S. officials have
expressed concerns over the past several years about Venezuela’s lack of cooperation on
antiterrorism efforts, its relations with Iran, and potential support for Colombian terrorist groups.
Concerns about Iran’s increasing activities in Latin America center on Iran’s attempts to
circumvent U.N. and U.S. sanctions, as well as on its ties to the radical Lebanon-based Islamic
group Hezbollah. Allegations have linked Hezbollah to two bombings in Argentina: the 1992
bombing of the Israeli Embassy in Buenos Aires that killed 30 people and the 1994 bombing of
the Argentine-Israeli Mutual Association (AMIA) in Buenos Aires that killed 85 people. The State
Department terrorism report maintains that there are no known operational cells of either Al
Qaeda or Hezbollah-related groups in the hemisphere, but noted that “ideological sympathizers in
South America and the Caribbean continued to provide financial and moral support to these and
other terrorist groups in the Middle East and South Asia.”
In the 112th Congress, several legislative initiatives have been introduced related to terrorism
issues in the Western Hemisphere regarding Mexico, Venezuela, and the activities of Iran and
Hezbollah, and several oversight hearings have been held related to these topics. H.R. 3401
(Mack), marked up by the House Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere on December 15,
2011, would require the Secretary of State to submit a detailed counterinsurgency strategy “to
combat the terrorist insurgency in Mexico waged by transnational criminal organizations.”
Supporters of the bill argue that terrorist tactics are being employed by Mexican drug trafficking
organizations, and that the United States needs to use appropriate counterinsurgency tactics to
combat these groups. Opponents argue that Mexico is not facing a “terrorist insurgency” by
groups with political goals, and contend that pushing for a counterinsurgency strategy could
undermine the strong U.S. security relationship developed with Mexico. Among other introduced
initiatives, H.R. 1270 (McCaul) would direct the Secretary of State to designate as foreign
terrorist organizations six Mexican drug cartels; H.Res. 247 (Mack) would call for the
designation of Venezuela as a state sponsor of terrorism; and H.Res. 429 (Duncan) would call on
the Administration to develop “a comprehensive counterterrorism and counter-radicalization
strategy to defend United States geostrategic interests and defeat Iranian interests in the Western
Hemisphere.”

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Contents
Terrorism in Latin America: U.S. Concerns .................................................................................... 1
Colombia ................................................................................................................................... 2
Peru............................................................................................................................................ 4
Cuba........................................................................................................................................... 5
Venezuela................................................................................................................................... 7
Venezuela and FARC-Related Sanctions ............................................................................ 7
Growing Relations with Iran ............................................................................................... 8
Venezuela and Iran-Related Sanctions .............................................................................. 10
Venezuela and Hezbollah-Related Sanctions .................................................................... 12
Tri-Border Area of Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay ............................................................... 12
U.S. Policy..................................................................................................................................... 14
Increased Regional Cooperation Since 9/11............................................................................ 16
Legislative Initiatives and Oversight....................................................................................... 17
111th Congress ................................................................................................................... 17
112th Congress ................................................................................................................... 18
Conclusion ..................................................................................................................................... 20

Figures
Figure 1. Colombia and Neighboring Countries.............................................................................. 3
Figure 2. Tri-Border Area of Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay ...................................................... 13

Contacts
Author Contact Information........................................................................................................... 21

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Terrorism in Latin America: U.S. Concerns
Over the years, the United States has been concerned about threats to Latin American and
Caribbean nations from various terrorist or insurgent groups that have attempted to influence or
overthrow elected governments. Although Latin America has not been the focal point in the war
on terrorism, countries in the region have struggled with domestic terrorism for decades and
international terrorist groups have at times used the region as a battleground to advance their
causes.
The State Department’s annual Country Reports on Terrorism highlights U.S. concerns about
terrorist threats around the world, including in Latin America. The 2010 report (issued in August
2011) maintained that terrorist attacks in the region was primarily perpetrated by terrorist
organizations in Colombia and by the remnants of radical leftist Andean groups. Overall,
however, the report maintained that the threat of a transnational terrorist attack remained low for
most countries in the hemisphere. The report also asserted that there were no known operational
cells of either Al Qaeda or Hezbollah-related groups in the hemisphere, but noted that
“ideological sympathizers in South America and the Caribbean continued to provide financial and
moral support to these and other terrorist groups in the Middle East and South Asia.” With regard
to concerns about rising drug trafficking-related violence in Mexico, the State Department report
asserted that “there was no evidence of ties between Mexican criminal organizations and terrorist
groups, nor that the criminal organizations had aims of political or territorial control, aside from
seeking to protect and expand the impunity with which they conduct their criminal activity.”1
The report also stated that regional governments “took modest steps to improve their
counterterrorism capabilities and tighten border security” but that progress was limited by
“corruption, weak government institutions, insufficient interagency cooperation, weak or non-
existent legislation, and reluctance to allocate sufficient resources.” The report singled out
Argentina, Colombia, and Mexico for undertaking serious prevention and preparedness efforts,
and noted that “most countries began to look seriously at possible connections between
transnational criminal organizations and terrorist organizations.” It also noted that most
hemispheric nations had solid cooperation with the United States on terrorism issues, especially at
the operational level, with excellent intelligence, law enforcement, and legal assistance relations.
The report cited the Inter-American Committee Against Terrorism (CICTE) at the Organization of
American States as important for U.S. cooperation on terrorism with the region.
The State Department currently lists two Latin American countries—Cuba and Venezuela—on its
annual list of countries that are not “cooperating fully with United States antiterrorism efforts”
pursuant to Section 40A of the Arms Export Control Act. The most recent annual determination
was made in May 2011.2 In addition, Cuba has been on the State Department’s state sponsors of
terrorism list pursuant to Section 6(j) of the Export Administration Act (EAA) of 1979 since
1982. The state sponsors of terrorism list is not an annual list. Rather, countries remain on the list
until either the President or Congress take action to remove a country. The EAA sets forth
procedures for the President to remove a country from the list.

1 U.S. Department of State, “Country Reports on Terrorism 2010,” August 18, 2011, available at
http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/crt/2010/index.htm
2 Department of State, “Determination and Certification Under Section 40A of the Arms Export Control Act,” 76
Federal Register 31390, May 31, 2011.
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Colombia
Colombia has three terrorist groups that have been designated by the Secretary of State as Foreign
Terrorist Organizations (FTOs): the leftist National Liberation Army (ELN), remaining elements
of the demobilized rightist paramilitary United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC), and the
leftist Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC).
The ELN reportedly has a dwindling membership of about 1,250 fighters with diminished
resources and reduced offensive capability, but has continued to inflict casualties through the use
of land mines and ambushes and continues to fund its operations through drug trafficking,
kidnapping, and extortion, according to the State Department’s 2010 terrorism report. Past peace
talks between the ELN and the Colombian government ended in 2008.
With more than 32,000 members demobilized, the AUC remained inactive as a formal
organization, but some former AUC paramilitaries continued to engage in criminal activities,
mostly drug trafficking, in newly emerging criminal organizations (known as BACRIM, Bandas
Criminales Emergentes). Estimates of the membership of these BACRIM range from over 3,500
to 6,000 or more. According to the terrorism report, the Colombian government continued to
process and investigate demobilized paramilitaries under the Justice and Peace Law, which offers
judicial benefits and reduced prison sentences for participants who confess fully to their crimes
and return all illicit profits. Many former AUC members also were receiving some reintegration
benefits.
Over the past several years, the FARC has been weakened significantly by the government’s
military campaign against it, including the killings of several FARC commanders in 2007 and the
group’s second in command, Raúl Reyes, during a Colombian government raid on a FARC camp
in Ecuador on March 1, 2008. In May 2008, the FARC admitted that its long-time leader, Manuel
Marulanda, had died of a heart attack in March. In July 2008, a Colombian military operation in
the southeastern province of Guaviare rescued 15 long-held hostages, including three U.S.
defense contractors held since February 2003—Thomas Howes, Keith Stansell, and Marc
Gonsalves; Colombian Senator and presidential candidate Ingrid Betancourt; and other
Colombians. The Colombian military dealt a significant blow to the terrorist group in September
2010 when it killed a top military commander, Victor Julio Suárez (aka “Mono Joyoy”) in a
bombing raid on his camp in a mountainous region of Meta department in central Colombia. Even
more significantly, in early November 2011, the Colombian military killed FARC leader Alfonso
Cano in a bombing raid in the department of Cauca in southwestern Colombia. In the aftermath of
Cano’s death, Rodrigo Londoño, also know as Timoleón Jiménez or Timonchenko, a long-time
member of the FARC Secretariat, was chosen as the FARC’s new leader in mid-November 2011.
The FARC is still estimated to have a strength of around 8,000, with the group responsible for
terrorist attacks, extortion, and kidnappings. In late November 2011, the FARC executed four
hostages who had been held for more than a decade when the Colombian military approached a
guerrilla camp in the southern department of Caqueta.
Colombian terrorist groups continue to utilize territory of several of Colombia’s neighbors—
Ecuador, Panama, Peru, and Venezuela—according to the State Department’s terrorism report
(see Figure 1). The FARC has training and logistical supply camps along Ecuador’s northern
border with Colombia. While Ecuador’s relations with Colombia became tense in the aftermath of
Colombia’s March 2008 military raid on a FARC camp in Ecuador’s Sucumbios province,
Ecuador’s military subsequently increased the number of operations against the FARC in its
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northern border region. Nevertheless, according to the 2010 terrorism report, resource constraints
and limited capabilities affected Ecuador’s actions. Under new Colombian President Juan Manuel
Santos, the two countries made progress in improving bilateral relations, and restored diplomatic
relations in December 2010.
Figure 1. Colombia and Neighboring Countries

Source: CRS.
Notes: The map shows Colombia’s departments and the bordering departments, provinces, and states of
neighboring Ecuador, Peru, Brazil, Venezuela, and Panama.
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In Panama, a small number of FARC members from the group’s 57th Front were reported to
operate in the country’s Darien province bordering Colombia, using the area as a safe haven. In
January 2010, three FARC members were killed and two were captured in a clash with
Panamanian forces in Darien, while late in 2010, Panama and Colombia agreed to establish police
stations near each side of the border.
In Peru, the FARC was reported to use remote areas along the Colombian-Peruvian border to rest,
regroup, and make arms purchases. According to the State Department terrorism report, experts
contend that the FARC continued to fund coca cultivation and cocaine production among the
Peruvian population in border areas.
As described in the 2010 terrorism report, the Colombian government of President Alvaro Uribe
publicly accused the Venezuelan government several times during the year of harboring members
of the FARC and ELN in its territory. In July 2010, the Uribe government presented evidence at
the OAS of FARC training camps in Venezuela. In response, Venezuela suspended diplomatic
relations on July 22, 2010, yet less than three weeks later new Colombian President Santos met
with Venezuelan President Chávez and the two leaders agreed to reestablish diplomatic relations
and to improve military patrols along their border. In congressional testimony on February 15,
2011, Assistant Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere Affairs Arturo Valenzuela maintained
that there was reduced Venezuelan support for the FARC since President Santos has reached out
to Venezuela.3 Since then, Venezuela has captured and returned to Colombia several members of
the FARC. In October 2011 congressional testimony, a U.S. official maintained that there
continues to be evidence that the FARC are sheltering in Venezuela, but not as close to the border
as before.4 (Also see section on “Venezuela” below.)
For additional information, see CRS Report RL32250, Colombia: Issues for Congress, by June S.
Beittel.
Peru
The brutal Shining Path (Sendero Luminoso or SL) insurgency, which the Department of State
has designated as an FTO, was significantly weakened in the 1990s with the capture of its leader
Abimael Guzman, who, after a new trial in 2006, was sentenced to life in prison. According to the
2010 State Department terrorism report, there are two remaining SL factions in Peru, one
operating in the Upper Huallaga River Valley led by Florindo Eleuterio Flores Hala (also known
as Comrade Artemio), and the other operating in the Apurimac and Ene River Valley led by Victor
Quispe Palomino. Both groups engage in drug trafficking, and in 2010 carried out 136 terrorist
acts, with killings of police, civilians, and military members. In 2010, the State Department added
the leaders of both SL factions to its Narcotics Reward Program offering up to $5 million for
information leading to the arrest and/or conviction of each leader. In early December 2011, the SL
faction led by Flores Hala called for a truce with the government and talks, although observers

3 “House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere Holds Hearing on U.S.-Latin America Relations,” CQ
Congressional Transcripts, February 15, 2011.
4 See testimony of Kevin Whitaker, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere Affairs in “The
Senate Caucus on International Narcotics Control Holds a Hearing on ‘U.S.-Andean Security Cooperation,’ – News
Event,” Political Transcripts by CQ Transcriptions, October 19, 2011.
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maintain that prospects are slim for either.5 (Also see discussion above on the FARC’s activities
in border areas with Colombia.)
Cuba
The Department of State, pursuant to Section 6(j) of the Export Administration Act (EAA) of
1979, has included Cuba among its list of states sponsoring terrorism since 1982 (the other states
currently on the list are Iran, Sudan, and Syria). Communist Cuba had a history of supporting
revolutionary movements and governments in Latin America and Africa, but in 1992, then Cuban
leader Fidel Castro said that his country’s support for insurgents abroad was a thing of the past.
Most analysts accept that Cuba’s policy generally did change, largely because the breakup of the
Soviet Union resulted in the loss of billions in subsidies.
The State Department’s 2010 terrorism report (issued in August 2011) stated that the Cuban
government “maintained a public stance against terrorism and terrorist financing, but there was
no evidence that it had severed ties with elements from the Revolutionary Armed Forces of
Colombia (FARC) and recent media reports indicate some current and former members of the
Basque Fatherland and Liberty (ETA) continue to reside in Cuba.” The report further stated that
“available information suggested that the Cuban government maintained limited contact with
FARC members, but there was no evidence of direct financial or ongoing material support.” It
maintained that Cuba allowed Spanish police to travel to Cuba to confirm the presence of
suspected ETA members. As in previous years, the report maintained that Cuba continued to
denounce U.S. counterterrorism efforts worldwide.
The 2010 terrorism report also maintained that Cuba has been used as a transit point by third-
country nationals to enter the United States illegally, and that Cuba was aware of the concerns
posed by such threats and took action to investigate third country migrant smuggling and related
criminal activities. The report noted that the Cuban government allowed representatives of the
U.S. Transportation Security Administration to conduct a series of airport security visits
throughout the country in November 2010.
Cuba’s retention on the terrorism list has been questioned by some observers. In general, those
who support keeping Cuba on the list point to the government’s history of supporting terrorist
acts and armed insurgencies in Latin America and Africa. They point to the government’s
continued hosting of members of foreign terrorist organizations and U.S. fugitives from justice.
Critics of retaining Cuba on the terrorism list maintain that it is a holdover of the Cold War. They
argue that domestic political considerations keep Cuba on the terrorism list, while North Korea
and Libya (before the overthrow of the Qadhafi regime) were removed, and maintain that Cuba’s
presence on the list diverts U.S. attention from struggles against serious terrorist threats.
Both the President and Congress have powers to take a country off the state sponsors of terrorism
list. As set forth in Section 6(j) of the Export Administration Act, a country’s retention on the list
may be rescinded in two ways. The first option is for the President to submit a report to Congress
certifying that there has been a fundamental change in the leadership and policies of the
government and that the government is not supporting acts of international terrorism and is
providing assurances that it will not support such acts in the future. The second option is for the

5 Geoffrey Ramsey, “Shining Path Rebel Leader Calls for Truce with Peru’s Govt,” Insight, Organized Crime in the
Americas, December 8, 2011; “Peru Cautious About Sendero Overture,” Latin News Daily Report, December 8, 2011.
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President to submit a report to Congress, at least 45 days in advance justifying the rescission and
certifying that the government has not provided any support for international terrorism during the
preceding six-months, and has provided assurances that it will not support such acts in the future.
If Congress disagrees with the President’s decision to remove a country from the list, it could
seek to block the rescission through legislation.
Congress also has the power on its own to remove a country from the terrorism list. For example,
legislation introduced on Cuba in the 111th Congress, H.R. 2272 (Rush), included a provision that
would have rescinded the Secretary of State’s determination that Cuba “has repeatedly provided
support for acts of international terrorism.”
Cuba has been the target of various terrorist incidents over the years. In 1976, a Cuban plane was
bombed, killing 73 people. In 1997, there were almost a dozen bombings in the tourist sector in
Havana in which an Italian businessman was killed and several others were injured. Two
Salvadorans were convicted and sentenced to death for the 1997 bombings in March 1999
(although the sentences were commuted in 2010 to 30 years in prison), and three Guatemalans
were sentenced to prison terms ranging from 10 to 15 years in January 2002 for plans to conduct
bombings in 1998. In December 2010, another Salvadoran, Francisco Chávez Abarca, was
convicted for involvement in the 1997 bombings in Havana and sentenced to 30 years in prison.
In November 2000, four anti-Castro activists were arrested in Panama for a plot to kill Fidel
Castro. One of the accused, Luis Posada Carriles, is also alleged to be involved in the 1976 Cuban
airline bombing and the series of bombings in Havana in 1997 noted above.6 The four stood trial
in March 2004 and were sentenced on weapons charges to prison terms ranging from seven to
eight years. In late August 2004, Panamanian President Mireya Moscoso pardoned the four men
before the end of her presidential term.
Posada entered the United States illegally in 2005. In subsequent removal proceedings, an
immigration judge found that Posada could not be removed to Cuba or Venezuela because of
concerns that he would face torture, and he was thereafter permitted to remain in the United
States pending such time as he could be transferred to a different country. Posada subsequently
applied for naturalization to become a U.S. citizen. This application was denied, and criminal
charges were brought against him for allegedly false statements made in his naturalization
application and interview. Although a federal district court dismissed the indictment in 2007, its
ruling was reversed by an appellate court in 2008. In April 2009, the United States filed a
superseding indictment, which included additional criminal charges based on allegedly false
statements made by Posada in immigration removal proceedings concerning his involvement in
the 1997 Havana bombings. His trial originally was set to begin in August 2009, but was
rescheduled three times until it finally began in January 2011.7 Ultimately, Posada was acquitted
of the perjury charges in April 2011, an action that was strongly criticized by Cuban officials.
For additional information on Cuba, see CRS Report R41617, Cuba: Issues for the 112th
Congress. For background, see CRS Report RL32251, Cuba and the State Sponsors of Terrorism
List.

6 Frances Robles, “An Old Foe of Castro Looks Back on His Fight,” Miami Herald, September 4, 2003.
7 For additional information, see “Background on Luis Posada Carriles,” CRS Congressional Distribution
Memorandum, December 8, 2010, prepared by Mark P. Sullivan, Specialist in Latin American Affairs, and Michael
John Garcia, Legislative Attorney. Available from the authors.
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Venezuela8
U.S. officials have expressed concerns over the past several years about Venezuela’s lack of
cooperation on antiterrorism efforts, President Hugo Chávez’s sympathetic statements for
Colombian terrorist groups, and Venezuela’s relations with Iran. Since May 2006, the Secretary of
State has made an annual determination that Venezuela has not been “cooperating fully with
United States antiterrorism efforts” pursuant to Section 40A of the Arms Export Control Act
(AECA). The most recent determination was made in May 2011. As a result, the United States
imposed an arms embargo on Venezuela in 2006, which ended all U.S. commercial arms sales
and retransfers to Venezuela. (Other countries currently on the Section 40A list include Cuba,
Eritrea, Iran, North Korea, and Syria, not to be confused with the “state sponsors of terrorism” list
under Section 6(j) of the Export Administration Act of 1979.) In June 2011 congressional
testimony, State Department officials again expressed concern about “Venezuela’s relations with
Iran, its support for the FARC, [and] its lackluster cooperation on counterterrorism.”9
In its 2010 terrorism report (issued in August 2011), the State Department maintained that the
Venezuelan government took no action against Venezuelan government and military officials
linked to the FARC and ELN, Colombia’s two guerrilla insurgent groups. While it described
Colombia’s accusations against the Venezuela government for harboring the FARC and ELN, the
report also noted an improved bilateral Colombian-Venezuelan relationship on security issues
under the new government of Colombian President Juan Manuel Santos, including Venezuela’s
extradition to Colombia of several suspected members of the terrorists groups.
According to June 2011, State Department congressional testimony, “Colombian-Venezuelan
cooperation on terrorism and security matters is clearly increasing and being systematized,
yielding notable results.” The State Department noted Venezuela’s deportation of several FARC
and ELN members to Colombia, including key operatives and high-profile political actors. It said
that President Chávez has “called on the FARC to join a political reconciliation process and has
claimed that any discussion between Venezuelan government officials and the FARC about
establishing bases in Venezuela took place without his authorization.”10 As discussed above, a
U.S. official testified in October 2011 there continues to be evidence that the FARC are sheltering
in Venezuela, but not as close to the border as before. (See “Colombia” above.)
Venezuela and FARC-Related Sanctions
To date, the United States has imposed financial sanctions against seven current or former
Venezuelan government and military officials for providing support to the FARC. In September
2008, the Treasury Department froze the assets of two senior intelligence officials—General

8 For additional background on Venezuela, see CRS Report R40938, Venezuela: Issues for Congress, by Mark P.
Sullivan.
9 Joint Hearing on “Venezuela’s Sanctionable Activities,” House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on the
Western Hemisphere and Subcommittee on the Middle East and South Asia, and House Committee on Oversight and
Government Reform, Subcommittee on National Security, Homeland Defense and Foreign Operations. State
Department testimony of Ambassador Daniel Benjamin, Coordinator for Counterterrorism; Kevin Whitaker, Acting
Deputy Assistant Secretary for Western Hemisphere Affairs; and Thomas Delare, Director of the Terrorist Finance and
Economic Sanctions Policy, Bureau of Economic, Energy, and Business Affairs, June 24, 2011, available at
http://foreignaffairs.house.gov/112/ben062411.pdf
10 Ibid.
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Hugo Carvajal and General Henry Rangel—and the former interior minister, Ramón Rodríguez
Chacín, for allegedly helping the FARC with weapons and drug trafficking.11 In September 2011,
the Treasury Department imposed financial sanctions on four more Venezuelan officials for acting
for or on behalf of the FARC, often in direct support of its narcotics and arms trafficking
activities: Amilcar Jesus Figueroa Salazar, a member of Venezuela’s delegation to the Latin
American Parliament; Major General Cliver Antonio Alcala Cordones of the Venezuelan Army;
Freddy Alirio Bernal Rosales, a national legislator for the United Socialist Party of Venezuela
(PSUV); and Ramon Isidro Madriz Moreno, an officer of Venezuela’s intelligence service.12
Growing Relations with Iran
There has been increasing concern in recent years about Iran’s growing interest in Latin America,
particularly its relations with Venezuela under President Chávez. Venezuela’s relations with Iran
have been long-standing because they were both founding members of OPEC in 1960, but not
until President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s rule began in 2005, however, did Iran aggressively work
to increase its diplomatic and economic linkages with Latin American countries. A major
rationale for this increased focus on Latin America appears to be Iran’s efforts to overcome its
international isolation. The personal relationship between Ahmadinejad and Chávez has driven
the strengthening of bilateral ties. The two nations have signed a variety of agreements in
agriculture, petrochemicals, oil exploration in the Orinoco region of Venezuela, and the
manufacturing of automobiles, bicycles, and tractors. During an April 2009 trip to Tehran, Chávez
and Ahmadinejad inaugurated a new development bank for economic projects in both countries,
with each country reportedly providing $100 million in initial capital. Weekly flights between the
two countries began in 2007, but were curtailed in September 2010.13 In past years, the State
Department had expressed concern about these flights in the annual terrorism report, maintaining
that the flights were only subject to cursory immigration and customs controls.
An April 2010 unclassified Department of Defense report to Congress on Iran’s military power
(required by Section 1245 of the National Defense Authorization Act for FY2010, P.L. 111-84)
maintained that Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps—Qods Force (IRGC-QF), which
maintains operational capabilities around the world, has increased its presence in Latin America
in recent years, particularly in Venezuela.14 Despite the report, the commander of the U.S.
Southern Command, General Douglas Fraser, maintains that the focus of Iran in the region has
been diplomatic and commercial, and that he has not seen an increase in Iran’s military presence
in the region.15

11 Phil Gunson, op. cit., September 13, 2008; Federal Register, September 19, 2008, pp. 54453-54454.
12 U.S. Department of the Treasury, “Treasury Designates Four Venezuelan Officials for Providing Arms and Security
to the FARC,” Press Center, September 8, 2011.
13 “House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Middle East and South Asia and Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere
and House Oversight and Government Reform Subcommittee on National Security, Homeland Defense and Foreign
Operations Hold Joint Hearing on Venezuela’s Sanctionable Activity,” CQ Congressional Transcripts, June 24, 2011;
and “House Foreign Affairs Committee Holds Hearing on Threats and Security in the Western Hemisphere,” CQ
Congressional Transcripts, October 13, 2011.
14 Department of Defense, “Unclassified Report on Military Power of Iran,” April 2010. For the full text of the report,
see http://www.politico.com/static/PPM145_link_042010.html. For background on the Qods Force, see CRS Report
RL32048, Iran: U.S. Concerns and Policy Responses, by Kenneth Katzman.
15 Anne Flaherty, “Pentagon Says Iran’s Reach in Latin America Doesn’t Pose Military Threat,” AP Newswire, April
27, 2010. General Fraser reiterated that Iran’s focus in Latin America has been “primarily diplomatic and commercial:
in March 30, 2011, testimony before the House Armed Services Committee. See: “Hearing of the House Armed
(continued...)
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Venezuela also has played a key role in the development of Iran’s expanding relations with other
countries in the region. In recent years, Iran’s relations have grown with Bolivia under President
Evo Morales, with Ecuador under President Rafael Correa, and with Nicaragua under President
Daniel Ortega. While Iran has promised significant assistance and investment to these countries,
observers maintain that there is little evidence to show that such promises have been fulfilled.16 In
Nicaragua for example, Iran has not followed through on its promise to finance the construction
of a deep-water port. An Iranian project that has gone forward in Nicaragua is the construction of
a hospital in 2009.17 Likewise in Bolivia and Ecuador, there has been little evidence showing that
Iran has followed up on its promises of investment. Nevertheless, in late August 2010, Iran
announced that it would provide a $250 million loan to Bolivia for the construction of dairy,
textile cement, and other plants, and geological prospecting for minerals such as uranium and
lithium.18 According to February 2011 testimony by Director of National Intelligence James
Clapper, “we expect Tehran to continue offering economic and other incentives to try to expand
its outreach.”19
On the diplomatic front, Iran has opened embassies over the past several years in Bolivia,
Ecuador, and Nicaragua, as well as in Colombia, Chile, and Uruguay. This is in addition to
existing embassies in Cuba, Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, and Venezuela.20 Reports that Iran was
building a large embassy in Managua, Nicaragua (which even Secretary of State Hillary Clinton
noted in public remarks) turned out to be erroneous.21 As noted above, President Ahmadinejad has
visited Venezuela several times, and has also visited Bolivia, Brazil, Nicaragua, and Cuba. In
early May 2009, a scheduled first trip by Ahmadinejad to Brazil was unexpectedly postponed
until after Iran’s election in June. There had been some protests in Brazil against Ahmadinejad’s
visit, but the trip ultimately took place in November 2009. Brazilian President Lula da Silva
maintains that the West should not isolate Iran. On the same trip, the Iranian president once again
visited Bolivia and Venezuela.22
Iranian President Ahmadinejad is once again scheduled to visit the region beginning on January 8,
2012, first with a stop in Venezuela to visit President Chávez followed by attendance at the
presidential inauguration of Daniel Ortega in Nicaragua on January 10. The Iranian president will

(...continued)
Services Committee; Subject FY2012 National Defense Authorization Budget Requests for the U.S. Southern
Command, U.S. Northern Command, and U.S. European Command,” Federal News Service, March 30, 2011.
16 For example, see Kavon “Hak” Hakimzadeh, “Iran & Venezuela: The Axis of Annoyance,” Military Review, May 1,
2009; and Anne-Marie O’Connor and Mary Beth Sheridan, “Iran’s Invisible Nicaragua Embassy; Feared Stronghold
Never Materialized,” Washington Post, July 13, 2009. Also see “House Foreign Affairs Committee Holds Hearing on
Democracy in Nicaragua,” CQ Congressional Transcripts, December 1, 2011.
17 Steve Stecklow and Farnaz Fassihi, “Iran’s Global Foray Has Mixed Results,” Wall Street Journal, September 28,
2009.
18 “Iran Announces 250m Dollar-Loan to Bolivia to Assist Uranium Prospecting,” BBC Monitoring Americas,
September 1, 2010.
19 James R. Clapper, Director of National Intelligence, “Statement for the Record on the Worldwide Threat Assessment
of the U.S. Intelligence Community,” House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, February 10, 2011, available
at http://intelligence.house.gov/sites/intelligence.house.gov/files/documents/DNISFR021011.pdf
20 Anne-Marie O’Connor and Mary Beth Sheridan, “Iran’s Invisible Nicaragua Embassy; Feared Stronghold Never
Materialized,” Washington Post, July 13, 2009.
21 Ibid; and Sylvie Lanteaume, “Iran’s Hand in Latin America Not as U.S. Feared,” Agence France Presse, July 14,
2009.
22 Juan Forero, “Ahmadinejad Boosts Latin American Ties,” Washington Post, November 28, 2009.
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then reportedly visit Cuba and Ecuador. The probable purpose of the trip is to shore up relations
with these countries as a means of overcoming Iran’s international isolation. As in the past, the
trip is likely to increase concerns among those concerned about Iran’s growing relations with the
region.
Venezuela and Iran-Related Sanctions
To date, the United States has imposed sanctions on two companies in Venezuela because of
connections to Iran’s proliferation activities. In August 2008, the State Department imposed
sanctions on the Venezuelan Military Industries Company (CAVIM) pursuant to the Iran, North
Korea, and Syria Nonproliferation Act (P.L. 109-353) for allegedly violating a ban on technology
that could assist Iran in the development of weapons systems.23 The sanctions prohibited any U.S.
government procurement or assistance to the company. While these sanctions expired in 2010,
they were imposed once again on May 23, 2011, for a two-year period.24 In October 2008, the
U.S. Treasury Department imposed sanctions on an Iranian-owned bank based in Caracas, the
Banco Internacional de Desarollo, C.A., under Executive Order 13382 that allows the President to
block the assets of proliferators of weapons of mass destruction and their supporters. The bank is
linked to the Export Development Bank of Iran (EDBI), which the Treasury Department asserts
has provided or attempted to provide services to Iran’s Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces
Logistics.25
In September 2009, during President Chávez’s visit to Tehran, Venezuela and Iran signed several
energy sector memorandums of understanding. As reported in the press, one of these agreements
would provide for Venezuela’s state-owned oil company, Petroleos de Venezuela S.A. (PdVSA),
to acquire a 10% stake in Iran’s South Pars gas project valued at some $760 million. Such
investment, if it occurs, would appear to subject PdVSA to sanctions under the Iran Sanctions Act
(P.L. 104-172). Under another accord, Venezuela agreed to help Iran circumvent any potential
U.S. or U.N. sanctions against Iranian gasoline imports by supplying Iran with gasoline
(reportedly some 20,000 barrels per day) with the money earned from the gasoline sales to be
deposited to a fund that would be set up by Iran to finance Venezuelan purchases of Iranian
machinery and technology.26
Under Iran sanctions legislation signed into law July 1, 2010 (P.L. 111-195, Comprehensive Iran
Sanctions, Accountability, and Disinvestment Act of 2010), gasoline sales to Iran valued at more
than $1 million (or $5 million over a 12-month period) would subject PdVSA to U.S. sanctions.27
Assistant Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere Affairs Arturo Valenzuela maintained in
congressional testimony on February 15, 2011, that the United States was examining the issue of
whether Venezuela was in violation of the Iran sanctions legislation.28 Secretary of State Clinton
indicated in congressional testimony on March 1, 2011, that the Administration would act if there

23 Although the sanction became effective in August 2008, it was not published in the Federal Register until October
2008. See Federal Register, pp. 63226-63227, October 23, 2008.
24 U.S. Department of State, “Iran, North Korea and Syria Nonproliferation Act (INKSNA),” Fact Sheet, May 24, 2011.
25 U.S. Department of the Treasury, Press Release, “Export Development Bank of Iran Designated as a Proliferator,”
October 22, 2008.
26 “Venezuela Pledges to Help Iran with Investment, Gasoline Supplies,” The Oil Daily, September 10, 2009.
27 For further information, see CRS Report RS20871, Iran Sanctions, by Kenneth Katzman.
28 “House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere Holds Hearing on U.S.-Latin America Relations,”
CQ Congressional Transcripts, February 15, 2011.
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were evidence that Venezuela was in violation of U.S. sanctions on Iran.29 Subsequently, on May
24, 2011, the State Department imposed sanctions on PdVSA for providing cargoes of reformate,
an additive used in gasoline, to Iran between December 2010 and March 2011 valued at around
$50 million. Specifically, the State Department imposed three sanctions on PdVSA to prohibit it
from competing for U.S. government procurement contracts, securing financing from the Export-
Import Bank, and obtaining U.S. export licenses. The sanctions specifically exclude PdVSA
subsidiaries (Citgo) and do not prohibit the export of oil to the United States.30
Venezuelan comments about support for Iran’s nuclear program and about potential Iranian
support for the development of nuclear energy in Venezuela have raised concerns among U.S.
officials and other observers. President Chávez repeatedly has expressed support for Iran’s
development of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, including most during a September 2009
visit to Iran.31 President Chávez also announced during the visit that Venezuela is working on a
preliminary plan for the construction of a “nuclear village” in Venezuela with Iranian assistance
so that “the Venezuelan people can count in the future on this marvelous resource for peaceful
purposes.”32 The transfer of Iranian nuclear technology from Iran would be a violation of U.N.
Security Council Resolutions—1737 (2006), 1747 ( 2007), and 1803 (2008)—that imposed
restrictions on Iran’s nuclear technology transfers. In September 2010, President Chávez
maintained that his government was carrying out initial studies into starting a nuclear energy
program. In October 2010, Russia agreed to help Venezuela build its first nuclear power plant, but
in March 2011, in the aftermath of Japan’s nuclear plant disaster, President Chávez said that he
was freezing plans for a nuclear power program.33
In late September 2009, comments by Venezuelan officials offered conflicting information about
Iran’s support for Venezuela’s search for uranium deposits. Venezuelan Minister of Basic Industry
and Mining Rodolfo Sanz said that Iran was assisting Venezuela in detecting uranium reserves in
the west and southwest of Venezuela.34 Subsequently, however, Venezuela’s Minister of Science,
Technology, and Intermediary Industry Jesse Chacon denied that Iran was helping Venezuela seek
uranium, while Venezuela’s Minister of Energy Rafael Ramirez maintained that Venezuela has yet
to develop a plan to explore or exploit its uranium deposits.35 U.N. Security Council Resolution
1929 (June 9, 2010) bars Iranian investment in uranium mining projects abroad.
In November 2010 and again in May 2011, an online German publication, Die Welt, alleged that
Venezuela and Iran had signed an agreement in October 2010 for a jointly operated missile base

29 “House Foreign Affairs Committee Holds Hearing on U.S. Foreign Policy Priorities,” CQ Congressional
Transcripts, March 1, 2011.
30 U.S. Department of State, “Seven Companies Sanctioned Under the Amended Iran Sanctions Act,” Fact Sheet, May
24, 2011.
31 “Visiting Chávez Backs Iran Nuclear Programme,” Tehran Press TV Online, September 5, 2009.
32 “Iran Will Not Back Down on Nuclear Energy: Hugo Chávez” Agence France Presse, September 4, 2009.
33 “Hugo Chávez Says Venezuela Is Studying Idea of Starting Peaceful Nuclear Energy Program,” AP Newswire,
September 28, 2010; “Russia to Build Nuclear Power Plant in Venezuela,” Reuters News, October 15, 2010; Diego
Ore, “Venezuela Halts Nuclear Program After Japan Disaster,” Reuters News, March 15, 2011.
34 See the following press reports: “Iran Helps Venezuela Find Uranium Deposits,” BBC Monitoring Caucasus,
September 26, 2009; and “Iran Helps Venezuela Find Uranium Deposits,” Tehran Press TV Online, September 26,
2009.
35 “Venezuela Denies Iran is Helping It,” New York Times, September 27, 2009; and Fabian Cambero, “Interview:
Venezuela Says No Plans Yet on Exploring Uranium,” Reuters, September 27, 2009.
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in Venezuela.36 The Department of State, however, maintains that there is no evidence to support
such claims, and that that there is no reason to believe that the assertions are credible.37
Venezuela’s foreign minister also called the reports by the German newspaper “an extravagant
lie.”38
Venezuela and Hezbollah-Related Sanctions
Another reason for U.S. concerns about Iran’s deepening relations with Venezuela is Iran’s ties to
the radical Lebanon-based Islamic group Hezbollah, a State Department-designated Foreign
Terrorist Organization supported by Iran, which is reported to have been linked to two bombings
against Jewish targets in Argentina in the early 1990s (see “Tri-Border Area of Argentina, Brazil,
and Paraguay” below). On June 18, 2008, the U.S. Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign
Assets Control (OFAC) announced that it was freezing the U.S. assets of two Venezuelans—
Ghazi Nasr al Din (a Venezuelan diplomat serving in Lebanon) and Fawzi Kan’an—for providing
financial and other support to Hezbollah. U.S. citizens are also prohibited from engaging in any
transactions with the two Venezuelans, including any business with two travel agencies in
Caracas owned by Kan’an. The State Department’s 2010 terrorism report continues to express
concern about Hezbollah’s fundraising activities in Venezuela.
Tri-Border Area of Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay39
In recent years, U.S. concerns have increased over activities of Hezbollah and the Sunni Muslim
Palestinian group Hamas (Islamic Resistance Movement) in the tri-border area (TBA) of
Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay, which has a large Muslim population. The TBA has long been
used for arms and drug trafficking, contraband smuggling, document and currency fraud, money
laundering, and the manufacture and movement of pirated goods. A 2009 RAND study examined
how Hezbollah has benefitted from film piracy proceeds in the tri-border.40
As reflected in several versions of the State Department annual report on terrorism, U.S. concerns
have focused on fundraising activities by Hezbollah and Hamas sympathizers in the TBA, but
consistently asserted that “that there was no corroborated information … that these or other
Islamic extremist groups had an operational presence in the region.”41 As noted above, the State
Department’s 2010 terrorism report asserted more broadly that there were no known operational
cells of either Al Qaeda or Hezbollah-related groups in the hemisphere, but noted that
“ideological sympathizers in South America and the Caribbean continued to provide financial and
moral support to these and other terrorist groups in the Middle East and South Asia.”42 In March

36 “Iran Planning to Build Missile Base in Venezuela,” November 25, 2010, and “Venezuela, Iran Press Ahead with
Missile Base,” May 13, 2011, website of Die Welt online (as translated by Open Source Center).
37 CRS correspondence with Department of State, January 5, 2011, and May 23, 2011; “Chávez Mocks Missile Base
Reports,” CNN Wire, June 1, 2011.
38 “Chávez Mocks Missile Base Reports,” CNN Wire, June 1, 2011.
39 For additional background, see Threat Convergence in South America’s Tri-Border Area (TBA), The Fund for Peace,
Center for the Study of Threat Convergence, Factsheet Series, January 11, 2010; and Rensselaer Lee, “Dispatches: The
Tri-Border-Terrorism Nexus,” Global Crime, Vol. 9, No 4, November 2008.
40 Gregory F. Treverton et al, Film Piracy, Organized Crime, and Terrorism, RAND, 2009.
41 U.S. Department of State, “Country Reports on Terrorism 2009,” August 5, 2010.
42 U.S. Department of State, “Country Reports on Terrorism 2010,” August 18, 2011, available at
http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/crt/2010/index.htm
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2011 congressional testimony, General Douglas Fraser, commander of the U.S. Southern
Command, maintained that he has not seen Hezbollah or Hamas growing in any capacity in the
region, and reiterated that “primarily any support that they are giving is financial support,
principally back to parent organizations in the Middle East.”43
Allegations have linked Hezbollah to two bombings in Argentina: the 1992 bombing of the Israeli
Embassy in Buenos Aires that killed 30 people and the 1994 bombing of the Argentine-Israeli
Mutual Association (AMIA) in Buenos Aires that killed 85 people. In November 2006, an
Argentine judge issued arrest warrants in the AMIA case for nine individuals: an internationally
wanted Hezbollah militant from Lebanon, Imad Mughniyah, and eight Iranian government
officials, including former Iranian President Hashemi Rafsanjani. Interpol subsequently posted a
Red Notice for Mughniyah, and in November 2007, its General Assembly voted to approve
notices for five of the Iranians wanted by Argentina (not including Rafsanjani). The action had
been held up since March 2007, when Iran appealed the decision by Interpol’s Executive
Committee to issue the notices. In February 2008, Imad Mughniyah was killed by a car bomb in
Damascus, Syria. In December 2008, an Argentine judge in a civil suit against the Iranian
suspects ordered the attachment of six commercial properties in Argentina owned by a former
Iranian cultural attaché who is one of the suspects in the AMIA bombing.
Figure 2. Tri-Border Area of Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay

Source: CRS.

43 House Armed Services Committee Holds Hearing on the Defense Authorization Proposed Budget Requests for
Fiscal 2012 and Future Years on the U.S. Southern Command, U.S. Northern Command, and U.S. European
Command,” CQ Congressional Transcripts, March 30, 2011.
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Beyond concerns about Hezbollah in the TBA, the Treasury Department, as noted above,
sanctioned two Venezuelans in September 2008 for providing financial and other support to
Hezbollah (see “Venezuela and Iran-Related Sanctions” above). On February 10, 2011, the
Treasury Department identified the Lebanon-based Lebanese Canadian Bank as a financial
institution of “primary money laundering concern” under the PATRIOT Act (Section 311) for its
role in facilitating the money laundering activities of an international narcotics trafficking and
money laundering network with ties to Hezbollah. The Treasury Department maintained that the
network is involved in moving illegal drugs from South America to Europe and the Middle East
via West Africa.44
U.S. Policy
As in other parts of the world, the United States has assisted Latin American and Caribbean
nations over the years in their struggle against terrorist or insurgent groups indigenous to the
region. For example, in the 1980s, the United States supported the government of El Salvador
with significant economic and military assistance in its struggle against a leftist guerrilla
insurgency. In recent years, the United States has employed various policy tools to combat
terrorism in the Latin America and Caribbean region, including sanctions, anti-terrorism
assistance and training, law enforcement cooperation, and multilateral cooperation through the
OAS. Moreover, given the nexus between terrorism and drug trafficking, one can argue that
assistance aimed at combating drug trafficking organizations in the Andean region has also been a
means of combating terrorism by cutting off a source of revenue for terrorist organizations. The
same argument can be made regarding efforts to combat money laundering in the region.
Although terrorism was not the main focus of U.S. policy toward the region in recent years,
attention increased in the aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist attacks on New York and Washington.
Anti-terrorism assistance has increased along with bilateral and regional cooperation against
terrorism. Congress approved the Bush Administration’s request in 2002 to expand the scope of
U.S. assistance to Colombia beyond a counternarcotics focus to also include counterterrorism
assistance to the government in its military efforts against drug-financed leftist guerrillas and
rightist paramilitaries. Border security with Mexico also became a prominent issue in bilateral
relations, with attention focused on the potential transit of terrorists through Mexico to the United
States.
The United States has imposed sanctions on three groups in Colombia (ELN, FARC, and AUC)
and one group in Peru (SL) designated by the Department of State as FTOs. Official designation
of such groups as FTOs triggers a number of sanctions, including visa restrictions and the
blocking of any funds of these groups in U.S. financial institutions. The designation also has the
effect of increasing public awareness about these terrorist organizations and the concerns that the
United States has about them. As noted above, the United States has included Cuba on its list of
state sponsors of terrorism since 1982, pursuant to Section 6(j) of the EAA, and both Cuba and
Venezuela are currently on the annual Section 40A AECA list of countries that are not
cooperating fully with U.S. antiterrorism efforts, lists that trigger a number of sanctions.

44 U.S. Department of the Treasury, “Treasury Identifies Lebanese Canadian Bank Sal as a Primary Money Laundering
Concern,” Press Release, February 10, 2011.
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The United States provides assistance to improve Latin American countries’ counterterrorism
capabilities through several types of programs administered by the Department of State,
including: an Anti-Terrorism Assistance (ATA) program, an Export Control and Related Border
Security (EXBS) program, a Counterterrorism Financing (CTF) program, and a Terrorist
Interdiction Program (TIP). All the programs are funded through the Nonproliferation, Anti-
terrorism, Demining, and Related Programs (NADR) foreign aid funding account.
The largest of these is the ATA program, which over the years has provided training and
equipment to Latin American countries to help improve their capabilities in such areas as airport
security management, hostage negotiations, bomb detection and deactivation, and countering
terrorism financing. Such training was expanded to Argentina in the aftermath of the two
bombings in 1992 and 1994. Assistance was also stepped up in 1997 to Argentina, Brazil, and
Paraguay in light of increased U.S. concern over illicit activities in the tri-border area of those
countries. In recent years, ATA for Western Hemisphere countries amounted to $9.1 million in
FY2008, $9.3 million in FY2009, an estimated $9.3 million in FY2010, and an estimated $12.75
million in FY2011. For FY2012, the Administration requested $12.28 million, with $2.25 million
for Colombia, $4.18 million for Mexico and $5.85 million for other Latin American countries
through a regional program.
The EXBS program helps countries develop export and border control systems in order to prevent
states and terrorist organizations from acquiring weapons of mass destruction, their delivery
systems, and destabilizing conventional weapons. Latin American countries received $7.1 million
in EXBS assistance in FY2008, $2.1 million in FY2009, an estimated $2.925 million in FY2010,
and an estimated $7.950 million in FY2011. The FY2012 request was for $3.25 million, with
assistance slated for Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Mexico, Panama, and a regional program.
CTF assistance provides support in detecting, isolating, and dismantling terrorist financial
networks. No CTF assistance was provided for Latin America in FY2008, while $225,000 was
provided in FY2009, largely to Mexico, and an estimated $460,000 is being provided in FY2010
for countries under a regional program. No assistance was requested for the region for FY2011 or
FY2012.
TIP assistance helps foreign immigration authorities with a computer database system that
enables identification of suspected terrorists attempting to transit air, land, or sea ports of entry.
No assistance was provided to the region in FY2008 or FY2009, but an estimated $1.3 million
was provided for a Western Hemisphere regional program in FY2010 and an estimated $1 million
in FY2011. The FY2012 request was for $1 million for a regional funding program.
A number of Latin American countries participate in U.S.-government port security programs
administered by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the Department of Energy. The
Container Security Initiative (CSI) operated by the U.S. Customs and Border Protection of DHS
uses a security regime to ensure that all containers that pose a potential risk for terrorism are
identified and inspected at foreign ports before they are placed on vessels destined for the United
States. Ten Latin American ports in Argentina, the Bahamas, Brazil, Colombia, the Dominican
Republic, Honduras, Jamaica, and Panama participate in the CSI program. The Department of
Energy’s National Nuclear Security Administration administers the Megaports Initiative, a
program which involves deploying radiation detection equipment in order to deter, detect, and
interdict illicit trafficking in nuclear and radioactive materials. To date, the Megaports Initiative is
operational in ports in the Bahamas, Colombia, the Dominican Republic, Honduras, Mexico, and
Panama.
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The Department of Homeland Security’s Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) has
partnered with several Latin American countries to establish Trade Transparency Units that
facilitate exchanges of information in order to combat trade-based money laundering. TTUs have
been established in Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Paraguay, and Mexico.
The United States also has worked closely with the governments of the tri-border area—
Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay—through the “3+1 regional cooperation mechanism,”
established in 2002 to serve as a forum for counterterrorism cooperation and prevention among
all four countries.
Increased Regional Cooperation Since 9/11
Latin American nations strongly condemned the September 2001 terrorist attacks on the United
States and took action through the OAS and the Rio Treaty to strengthen hemispheric cooperation
against terrorism. The OAS, which happened to be meeting in Peru at the time, swiftly
condemned the attacks, reiterated the need to strengthen hemispheric cooperation to combat
terrorism, and expressed full solidarity with the United States. At a special session on September
19, 2001, OAS members invoked the 1947 Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, also
known as the Rio Treaty, which obligates signatories to the treaty to come to one another’s
defense in case of outside attack. Another resolution approved on September 21, 2001, called on
Rio Treaty signatories to “use all legally available measures to pursue, capture, extradite, and
punish those individuals” involved in the attacks and to “render additional assistance and support
to the United States, as appropriate, to address the September 11 attacks, and also to prevent
future terrorist acts.”
In the aftermath of 9/11, OAS members reinvigorated efforts of the of the Inter-American
Committee on Terrorism (CICTE) to combat terrorism in the hemisphere. The CICTE has
cooperated on border security mechanisms, controls to prevent terrorist funding, and law
enforcement and counterterrorism intelligence and information.45 It was worked on a wide range
of capacity building and training programs including border controls (covering maritime and
aviation security, customs, and immigration), critical infrastructure protection (covering
cybersecurity, major events security, and tourism security), counter-terrorism legislative
assistance and combating terrorism financing, and strengthening strategies on emerging terrorist
threats. At the CICTE’s 11th regular session held in March 2011, member states issued a
declaration of renewed hemispheric commitment to enhance cooperation to prevent, combat, and
eliminate terrorism.46
OAS members signed the Inter-American Convention Against Terrorism in June 2002. The
Convention, among other measures, improves regional cooperation against terrorism, commits
parties to sign and ratify U.N. anti-terrorism instruments and take actions against the financing of
terrorism, and denies safe haven to suspected terrorists. President Bush submitted the Convention
to the Senate on November 12, 2002, for its advice and consent, and the treaty was referred to the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee (Treaty Doc. 107-18). In the 109th Congress, the committee
formally reported the treaty on July 28, 2005 (Senate Exec. Rept. 109-3), and on October 7, 2005,

45 See the website of the CICTE available at http://www.cicte.oas.org/Rev/en/
46 See the documents of the eleventh regular session of the CICTE, including the declaration, available at
http://www.cicte.oas.org/Rev/EN/Meetings/Sessions/11/Default.asp
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the Senate agreed to the resolution of advice and consent. The United States deposited its
instruments of ratification for the Convention on November 15, 2005.
Legislative Initiatives and Oversight
111th Congress
In the 111th Congress, President Obama signed into law the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions,
Accountability, and Disinvestment Act of 2010 (P.L. 111-195) on July 1, 2010, which included a
provision making gasoline sales to Iran subject to U.S. sanctions. (Subsequently, the State
Department imposed sanctions on Venezuela’s state oil company, PdVSA, in May 2011 for
providing cargoes of reformate, an additive used in gasoline, to Iran between December 2010 and
March 2011 valued at around $50 million. See “Venezuela and Iran-Related Sanctions” above.)
Several other measures with Venezuela provisions were considered or introduced in the 111th
Congress, but action was not completed on these initiatives. In June 2010, the Senate Committee
on Armed Services reported S. 3454, the National Defense Authorization Act for FY2011, with a
provision that would have required a report on Venezuela related to terrorism issues. In June
2009, the House approved H.R. 2410, the Foreign Relations Authorization Act for FY2010 and
FY2011, with a provision in Section 1011 that would have required a report within 90 days on
Iran’s and Hezbollah’s actions in the Western Hemisphere. On July 23, 2009, the Senate had
approved its version of the National Defense Authorization Act for FY2010, S. 1390 (Levin),
with a provision that would have required the Director of National Intelligence to provide a report
on Venezuela’s military purchases, its potential support for the FARC and Hezbollah, and other
Venezuelan activities, but the final enacted measure dropped the provision.
Other resolutions and bills related to Venezuela that were introduced in the 111th Congress include
H.R. 375 (Ros-Lehtinen), introduced January 9, 2009, would have, among its provisions, placed
restrictions on nuclear cooperation with countries assisting the nuclear programs of Venezuela.
H.R. 2475 (Ros-Lehtinen), introduced May 19, 2009, included a provision identical to that in
H.R. 375 described above that would have placed restrictions on nuclear cooperation with
countries assisting the nuclear programs of Venezuela. H.Res. 872 (Mack), introduced October
27, 2009, would have called on Venezuela to be designated a state sponsor of terrorism because of
its alleged support of Iran, Hezbollah, and the FARC.
Over the years, the U.S. Congress has continued to express concern about progress in Argentina’s
investigation of the 1994 AMIA bombing, with the House often passing resolutions on the issue
around the time of the anniversary of the bombing on July 18. In the 111th Congress, H.Con.Res.
156 (Ros-Lehtinen), approved July 17, 2009, again condemned the AMIA bombing and urged
Western Hemisphere governments to take actions to curb the activities that support Hezbollah and
other such extremist groups.
On October 27, 2009, the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittees on the Western
Hemisphere, the Middle East and South Asia, and Terrorism, Nonproliferation and Trade held a
joint hearing on “Iran in the Western Hemisphere” featuring private witnesses.47

47 A transcript and webcast of the hearing is available at http://foreignaffairs.house.gov/hearing_notice.asp?id=1127
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112th Congress
In the 112th Congress, several legislative initiatives have been introduced related to terrorism
issues in the Western Hemisphere associated with Mexico, Venezuela, and the activities of Iran
and Hezbollah in the Western Hemisphere, and several hearings have been held related to these
topics.
Mexico
H.R. 3401 (Mack), the Enhanced Border Security Act, introduced November 10, 2011, and
ordered reported by the House Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere, Committee on Foreign
Affairs, on December 15, 2011, would require the Secretary of State within 90 days to submit a
detailed counterinsurgency strategy “to combat the terrorist insurgency in Mexico waged by
transnational criminal organizations.” The strategy is to include a plan to combat the operations,
financial networks, and money laundering techniques of transnational criminal organizations in
the United States; a plan in coordination with Mexico and the Department of Homeland Security
to address resources, technology, and infrastructure required to create a secure border; and a
multi-agency action plan in coordination with Mexico to develop strong rule-of-law institutions
and diminish support for, and neutralize, transnational criminal organizations within Mexico.
Supporters of the measure argue that terrorist and insurgent tactics are being employed by drug
traffickers and criminal organizations in Mexico and constitute a threat to democracy. They argue
that the Mérida Initiative is failing to address the problem, and that the United States needs to use
appropriate counterinsurgency tactics to combat these criminal organizations. Opponents of the
measure argue that Mexico is not facing a “terrorist insurgency” by groups with political goals,
but is combating narco-criminal organizations that employ brutal tactics to sustain their money-
making goals. They contend that the bill’s call for a counterinsurgency strategy would undermine
the strong security relationship with Mexico developed under the Mérida Initiative.48
Another legislative initiative, H.R. 1270 (McCaul), introduced March 30, 2011, would direct the
Secretary of State to designate as foreign terrorist organizations six Mexican drug cartels.
The State Department’s 2010 terrorism report, issued in August 2011, stated that “no known
international terrorist organization had an operational presence in Mexico and no terrorist group
targeted U.S. interests and personnel in or from Mexican territory.” As noted above, the report
also stated that “there was no evidence of ties between Mexican criminal organizations and
terrorist groups, nor that the criminal organizations had aims of political or territorial control,
aside from seeking to protect and expand the impunity with which they conduct their criminal
activity.”
Several hearings to date in the 112th Congress have focused on the drug trafficking situation in
Mexico and allegations that the drug trafficking organizations constitute a criminal insurgency or
have links to terrorism. The House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on the Western
Hemisphere, held a September 13, 2011, hearing entitled “Has Mérida Evolved? Part One: The
Evolution of Drug Cartels and the Threat to Mexico’s Governance” featuring private witnesses.49
The Western Hemisphere Subcommittee followed up on October 4, 2011, with a joint hearing

48 “House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere Holds Markup on H.R. 3401 and H.R. 2542,” CQ
Congressional Transcripts, December 15, 2011.
49 A transcript and webcast of the hearing is available at http://foreignaffairs.house.gov/hearing_notice.asp?id=1348
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with the House Committee on Homeland Security, Subcommittee on Oversight, Investigations,
and Management, entitled “Mérida Part Two: Insurgency and Terrorism in Mexico,” with
testimony from the State Department, the Drug Enforcement Administration, and the Department
of Homeland Security.50
Looking more broadly at drug trafficking, the House Committee on Foreign Affairs,
Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, held an October 12, 2011, hearing entitled ‘The
International Exploitation of Drug Wars and What We Can Do About It” featuring private
witnesses.51 The House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on Terrorism,
Nonproliferation and Trade also held two hearings on “Narcoterrorism and the Long Reach of
U.S. Law Enforcement,” on October 12 and November 17, 2011, that examined the links between
drug trafficking and terrorism worldwide and featured private witnesses and an official from the
Drug Enforcement Administration.52
For further background on Mexico, see CRS Report R41576, Mexico’s Drug Trafficking
Organizations: Source and Scope of the Rising Violence, by June S. Beittel; CRS Report R41349,
U.S.-Mexican Security Cooperation: The Mérida Initiative and Beyond , by Clare Ribando Seelke
and Kristin M. Finklea; and CRS Report RL32724, Mexico: Issues for Congress, by Clare
Ribando Seelke.
Venezuela
H.Res. 247 (Mack), introduced May 4, 2011, would condemn Venezuela “for its state-sponsored
support of international terrorist groups” and call “on the Secretary of State to designate
Venezuela as a state sponsor of terrorism” for “its support of Iran, Hezbollah, and the
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC).”
On June 24, 2011, a joint hearing on “Venezuela’s Sanctionable Activities” by subcommittees of
the House Committee on Foreign Affairs and the House Committee on Oversight and
Government Reform featured testimony by State Department and Treasury Department officials.
State Department officials expressed concern about “Venezuela’s relations with Iran, its support
for the FARC, [and] its lackluster cooperation on counterterrorism.”53 Administration officials
testified that Hezbollah’s activity in Venezuela was confined to fundraising.
For further background on Venezuela, see CRS Report R40938, Venezuela: Issues for Congress,
by Mark P. Sullivan.

50 Testimony and a webcast of the joint hearing is available at http://homeland.house.gov/hearing/joint-subcommittee-
hearing-m%C3%A9rida-part-two-insurgency-and-terrorism-mexico
51 A transcript and webcast of the hearing is available at http://foreignaffairs.house.gov/hearing_notice.asp?id=1365
52 A transcript and webcast of the October 12, 2001, hearing is available at
http://foreignaffairs.house.gov/hearing_notice.asp?id=1362; a webcast of the November 17, 2011, hearing is available
at http://foreignaffairs.house.gov/hearing_notice.asp?id=1379
53 Joint Hearing on “Venezuela’s Sanctionable Activities,” House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on the
Western Hemisphere and Subcommittee on the Middle East and South Asia, and House Committee on Oversight and
Government Reform, Subcommittee on National Security, Homeland Defense and Foreign Operations. June 24, 2011.
Testimony and webcast of the joint hearing is available at
http://oversight.house.gov/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=1349%3A6-24-11-qvenezuelas-
sanctionable-activityq&catid=17&Itemid=25
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Iran and Hezbollah in the Western Hemisphere
Broader than the focus on Iran and Venezuela, H.Res. 429 (Duncan), introduced October 11,
2011, would express the sense of the House that “there exists significant cause for concern and
further investigation of potential counterterrorism threats from Iran’s growing presence and
influence in the Western Hemisphere.” The resolution calls for the Administration to include the
Western Hemisphere in its 2012 National Strategy for Counterterrorism’s Area of Focus, with
specific attention on the “counterterrorism threat to the homeland emanating from Iran’s growing
presence and activity in the Western Hemisphere.” It also calls on the Administration to utilize an
existing counterterrorism taskforce led by the Department of Homeland Security to examine the
presence and activities of Iran, the Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), the
IRGC’s Qods Force, and Hezbollah within the Western Hemisphere, including the relationship of
these groups with governments in the Western Hemisphere and drug trafficking organizations as
well as the fundraising efforts of these groups. The resolution also calls for the Administration to
submit to Congress within 120 days a report containing “a comprehensive counterterrorism and
counter-radicalization strategy to defend United States geostrategic interests and defeat Iranian
interests in the Western Hemisphere.”
On July 7, 2011, the House Committee on Homeland Security, Subcommittee on
Counterterrorism and Intelligence held a hearing on “Hezbollah in Latin America – Implications
for U.S. Policy,” featuring private witnesses.54 The joint hearing on “Venezuela’s Sanctionable
Activities” cited above also touched on concerns about Iran and Hezbollah in the Western
Hemisphere.
The House Foreign Affairs Committee held a broader hearing on October 13, 2011, entitled
“Emerging Threats and Security in the Western Hemisphere: Next Steps for U.S. Policy,” with
witnesses from the Departments of State, Treasury, and Defense that touched on concerns about
Iran and Hezbollah in the Western Hemisphere.55
Conclusion
For most countries in Latin America and the Caribbean, threats emanating from terrorism are low.
Terrorism in the region is largely perpetrated by groups in Colombia and by the remnants of
radical leftist Andean groups. According to the Department of State, most governments in the
region have good records of cooperation with the United States on anti-terrorism issues, although
progress in the region on improving counterterrorism capabilities is limited by several factors,
including corruption, weak governmental institutions, weak or non-existent legislation, and
reluctance to allocate sufficient resources. Both Cuba and Venezuela are on the State
Department’s list of countries determined to be not cooperating fully with U.S. antiterrorism
efforts, and Cuba has remained on the State Department’s list of state sponsors of terrorism since
1982. U.S. officials and some Members of Congress have expressed concern over the past several
years about Venezuela’s relations with Iran, with concerns centered on efforts by Iran to

54 U.S. Congress, House Committee on Homeland Security, Subcommittee on Counterterrorism and Intelligence,
“Hezbollah in Latin America – Implications for U.S. Homeland Security,” July 7, 2011. Testimony and webcast
available at http://homeland.house.gov/hearing/subcommittee-hearing-hezbollah-latin-america-implications-us-
homeland-security
55 A transcript and webcast of the hearing is available at http://foreignaffairs.house.gov/hearing_notice.asp?id=1361
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circumvent U.N. and U.S. sanctions and on Iran’s ties to Hezbollah, alleged to be linked to two
bombings in Argentina in the 1990s. The State Department maintains that there are no known
operation cells of either Al Qaeda or Hezbollah-related groups in the hemisphere, although it
notes that ideological sympathizers continue to provide financial and moral support to these and
other terrorist groups in the Middle East and South Asia.

Author Contact Information

Mark P. Sullivan

Specialist in Latin American Affairs
msullivan@crs.loc.gov, 7-7689


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