Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance,
Security, and U.S. Policy

Kenneth Katzman
Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs
December 21, 2011
Congressional Research Service
7-5700
www.crs.gov
RL30588
CRS Report for Congress
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epared for Members and Committees of Congress

Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy

Summary
Stated U.S. policy is to ensure that Afghanistan will not again become a base for terrorist attacks
against the United States. Following policy reviews in 2009, the Obama Administration asserted
that it was pursuing a well-resourced and integrated military-civilian strategy intended to pave the
way for a gradual transition to Afghan leadership from July 2011 until the end of 2014. To carry
out U.S. policy, a total of 51,000 additional U.S. forces were authorized by the two 2009 reviews,
which brought U.S. troop numbers to a high of about 99,000, with partner forces adding about
42,000. On June 22, 2011, President Obama announced that the policy had accomplished most
major U.S. goals and that a drawdown of 33,000 U.S. troops would take place by September
2012. The first 10,000 of these are to be withdrawn by the end of 2011 and the remainder of that
number by September 2012. The transition to Afghan leadership began, as planned, in July 2011
in the first set of areas, four cities and three full provinces; a second and larger tranche of areas to
be transitioned was announced on November 27, 2011.
The U.S. official view is that security gains achieved by the surge could be at risk from weak
Afghan governance and insurgent safe haven in Pakistan, and that Afghanistan will still need
direct security assistance after 2014. Afghan governance is perceived as particularly weak and
corrupt, despite the holding of regular elections since 2004 and the establishment of several
overlapping anti-corruption institutions. In order to frame the long-term security relationship,
U.S. and Afghan officials are negotiating a “strategic partnership,” although differences over U.S.
latitude to conduct operations have held up completion of that pact to date.
As the transition proceeds, there is increasing emphasis on the need for a negotiated settlement to
the Afghanistan conflict. The September 20, 2011, assassination of former President Burhanuddin
Rabbani, a key figure in the reconciliation effort, set back such efforts, but perhaps only
temporarily. There are major concerns among Afghanistan’s minorities and among its women that
reconciliation might produce compromises that erode the freedoms enjoyed since 2001. Regional
support is considered key to reconciliation, and U.S. officials maintain that all of Afghanistan’s
neighbors, including Pakistan and Iran, should cease using Afghanistan to promote their own
interests and instead help Afghanistan reemerge as a major regional trade route as part of a “New
Silk Road (NSR)” economic integration strategy. Obtaining such regional commitments was a
focus of a November 2, 2011, meeting in Istanbul, although it was not a focus of the December 5,
2011, Bonn Conference because of Pakistan’s boycott of the meeting.
U.S. officials also hope to draw on Afghanistan’s vast mineral and agricultural resources to
promote long-term growth and prevent a severe economic downturn as international donors scale
back their involvement in Afghanistan. Several major mining, agricultural, and even energy
development programs, mostly funded by private investment, have begun in the past few years,
with more in various stages of consideration. To date, much of the development has been
accomplished with foreign, particularly U.S., help, which Afghanistan says will be needed at least
until 2025. Through the end of FY2011, the United States has provided over $67 billion in
assistance to Afghanistan since the fall of the Taliban, of which about $30 billion has been to
equip and train Afghan forces. During FY2001-FY2011, the Afghan intervention has cost about
$443 billion, including all costs. For FY2012, about $16 billion in aid (including train and equip)
is to be provided, in addition to about $90 billion for U.S. military operations there. (See CRS
Report RS21922, Afghanistan: Politics, Elections, and Government Performance, by Kenneth
Katzman.)

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Contents
Background...................................................................................................................................... 1
From Early History to the 19th Century ..................................................................................... 1
Early 20th Century and Cold War Era ........................................................................................ 1
Soviet Invasion and Occupation Period..................................................................................... 2
Geneva Accords (1988) and Soviet Withdrawal........................................................................ 3
The Mujahedin Government and Rise of the Taliban................................................................ 4
Taliban Rule (September 1996-November 2001)...................................................................... 5
U.S. Efforts Against Al Qaeda During Taliban Rule........................................................... 5
The “Northern Alliance” Congeals...................................................................................... 6
Policy Pre-September 11, 2001 ................................................................................................. 6
September 11 Attacks and Operation Enduring Freedom ................................................... 7
Post-Taliban Governance-Building Efforts ............................................................................... 8
Major Governance Issues .................................................................................................. 10
U.S. and International Civilian Policy Structure............................................................... 10
Security Policy, 2011-2014 “Transition, and Beyond” .................................................................. 13
Who Is “The Enemy”? Taliban, Haqqani, Al Qaeda, and Others............................................ 13
Groups: The Taliban (“Quetta Shura Taliban”) ................................................................. 13
Al Qaeda/Bin Laden.......................................................................................................... 14
Hikmatyar Faction............................................................................................................. 15
Haqqani Faction ................................................................................................................ 15
Pakistani Groups ............................................................................................................... 17
Insurgent Tactics................................................................................................................ 17
Insurgent Financing: Narcotics Trafficking and Other Methods....................................... 18
The U.S.-Led Military Effort: 2001-2008 ............................................................................... 19
Perception of “Victory,” Followed by Setback and Deterioration..................................... 19
Obama Administration Surge .................................................................................................. 21
Late 2009 Review: “Surge” Coupled With Transition ...................................................... 21
July 2011 “Deadline” Yields to “Transition” By the End of 2014 .................................... 22
Surge Implementation and Results.................................................................................... 23
Transition and U.S. Drawdown Under Way ............................................................................ 25
Unwinding of the Surge Announced ................................................................................. 26
Beyond 2014: Long-Term Commitment/Strategic Partnership Agreement............................. 27
No “SOFA” in Place Currently ......................................................................................... 28
Threats to Long-Term U.S. Presence: Civilian Casualties and 2011 Protests................... 29
Building Afghan Forces and Establishing Rule of Law .......................................................... 30
Current Size and Target Size ............................................................................................. 30
Training Overview ............................................................................................................ 31
The Afghan National Army (ANA)................................................................................... 31
Afghan Air Force............................................................................................................... 33
Afghan National Police (ANP) ......................................................................................... 33
Rule of Law/Criminal Justice Sector................................................................................. 34
Afghan Public Protection Force ........................................................................................ 34
U.S. Security Forces Funding/”CERP”............................................................................. 34
Policy Component: Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) ................................................ 35
Karzai Criticism of PRTs................................................................................................... 36
Cooperation With Allies/Preventing Allied “Rush for the Exits”............................................ 36
Major Contingent Developments During the U.S. “Surge” .............................................. 38
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Security/Political Initiatives To Facilitate the Transition ........................................................ 39
“Reintegration” and “Reconciliation” With Insurgents..................................................... 39
Local Security Experiments: Afghan Local Police (ALP) and Others.............................. 43
Policy Alternatives for the Post-Transition Period .................................................................. 46
Counter-Terrorism/Counter-Terrorism “Plus” Proposals .................................................. 46
Expand Afghan Forces/Rapid Transition to Afghan Lead................................................. 46
Make Concessions to the Taliban/De-Facto Partition ....................................................... 46
Legislatively Mandated Drawdown .................................................................................. 47
Regional Dimension ...................................................................................................................... 47
Pakistan/Pakistan-Afghanistan Border .................................................................................... 50
Pakistan-Afghanistan Relations ........................................................................................ 51
Iran........................................................................................................................................... 52
Iran’s Development Aid for Afghanistan........................................................................... 53
Iranian Assistance to Afghan Militants and to Pro-Iranian Groups and Regions.............. 53
Bilateral Government-to-Government Relations .............................................................. 54
India......................................................................................................................................... 55
India-Afghanistan Strategic Pact....................................................................................... 55
India’s Development Activities in Afghanistan................................................................. 56
Russia, Central Asian States, and China.................................................................................. 56
Russia/Northern Distribution Network ............................................................................. 56
Central Asian States .......................................................................................................... 57
China ................................................................................................................................. 59
Persian Gulf States: Saudi Arabia and UAE............................................................................ 59
UAE Involvement ............................................................................................................. 60
Keys to Afghanistan’s Post-War Future: U.S. and International Aid and
Economic Development.............................................................................................................. 61
U.S. Assistance to Afghanistan................................................................................................ 61
Aid Oversight .................................................................................................................... 62
Aid Authorization: Afghanistan Freedom Support Act ..................................................... 62
Direct Support to the Afghan Government........................................................................ 63
Sustaining Afghanistan Beyond the Transition: International Aid and Loans................... 65
Development in Key Sectors ................................................................................................... 66
Education........................................................................................................................... 66
Health ................................................................................................................................ 67
Roads................................................................................................................................. 67
Bridges .............................................................................................................................. 67
Railways............................................................................................................................ 67
Electricity .......................................................................................................................... 68
Agriculture ........................................................................................................................ 69
Telecommunications.......................................................................................................... 70
Airlines.............................................................................................................................. 70
Mining and Gems .............................................................................................................. 70
Oil, Gas, and Related Pipelines......................................................................................... 71
Trade Promotion/Reconstruction Opportunity Zones.............................................................. 72
Residual Issues from Past Conflicts............................................................................................... 91
Stinger Retrieval...................................................................................................................... 91
Mine Eradication ..................................................................................................................... 91

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Figures
Figure A-1. Map of Afghanistan.................................................................................................... 94
Figure A-2. Map of Afghan Ethnicities ......................................................................................... 95

Tables
Table 1. Afghanistan Political Transition Process............................................................................ 9
Table 2. U.N. Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) ....................................................... 12
Table 3.Summary of Current U.S. Strategy and Implementation .................................................. 23
Table 4. Operation Enduring Freedom Partner Forces .................................................................. 30
Table 5. Background on NATO/ISAF Formation and U.N. Mandate............................................ 38
Table 6. Major Security-Related Indicators ................................................................................... 45
Table 7. Afghan and Regional Facilities Used for
Operations in and Supply Lines to Afghanistan ......................................................................... 49
Table 8. Major Reporting Requirements........................................................................................ 65
Table 9. Comparative Social and Economic Statistics................................................................... 73
Table 10. Major Non-U.S. Donors to Afghanistan 2002-2011 ...................................................... 74
Table 11. U.S. Assistance to Afghanistan, FY1978-FY1998......................................................... 75
Table 12. U.S. Assistance to Afghanistan, FY1999-FY2002......................................................... 76
Table 13. U.S. Assistance to Afghanistan, FY2003 ....................................................................... 77
Table 14. U.S. Assistance to Afghanistan, FY2004 ....................................................................... 78
Table 15. U.S. Assistance to Afghanistan, FY2005 ....................................................................... 79
Table 16. U.S. Assistance to Afghanistan, FY2006 ....................................................................... 80
Table 17. U.S. Assistance to Afghanistan, FY2007 ....................................................................... 81
Table 18. U.S. Assistance to Afghanistan, FY2008 ....................................................................... 82
Table 19. U.S. Assistance to Afghanistan, FY2009 ....................................................................... 83
Table 20. FY2010 Assistance (Includes Supplemental)................................................................. 84
Table 21. FY2011........................................................................................................................... 85
Table 22. FY2012 .......................................................................................................................... 86
Table 23. Total Obligations for Major Programs: FY2001-FY2010.............................................. 87
Table 24. NATO/ISAF Contributing Nations ................................................................................ 88
Table 25. Provincial Reconstruction Teams................................................................................... 89
Table 26. Major Factions/Leaders in Afghanistan ......................................................................... 90

Appendixes
Appendix. U.S. and International Sanctions Lifted ....................................................................... 92
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Contacts
Author Contact Information........................................................................................................... 95

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Background
Afghanistan has a history of a high degree of decentralization, and resistance to foreign invasion
and occupation. Some have termed it the “graveyard of empires.”
From Early History to the 19th Century
Alexander the Great conquered what is now Afghanistan in three years (330 B.C.E. to 327
B.C.E), although at significant cost and with significant difficulty, and requiring, among other
steps, marriage to a resident of the conquered territory. From the third to the eighth century, A.D.,
Buddhism was the dominant religion in Afghanistan. At the end of the seventh century, Islam
spread in Afghanistan when Arab invaders from the Umayyad Dynasty defeated the Persian
empire of the Sassanians. In the 10th century, Muslim rulers called Samanids, from Bukhara (in
what is now Uzbekistan), extended their influence into Afghanistan, and the complete conversion
of Afghanistan to Islam occurred during the rule of the Gaznavids in the 11th century. They ruled
over the first vast Islamic empire based in what is now Ghazni province of Afghanistan.
In 1504, Babur, a descendent of the conquerors Tamarlane and Genghis Khan, took control of
Kabul and then moved on to India, establishing the Mughal Empire. (Babur is buried in the Babur
Gardens complex in Kabul, which has been refurbished with the help of the Agha Khan
Foundation.) Throughout the 16th and 17th centuries, Afghanistan was fought over by the Mughal
Empire and the Safavid Dynasty of Persia (now Iran), with the Safavids mostly controlling Herat
and western Afghanistan, and the Mughals controlling Kabul and the east. A monarchy ruled by
ethnic Pashtuns was founded in 1747 by Ahmad Shah Durrani, who was a senior officer in the
army of Nadir Shah, ruler of Persia, when Nadir Shah was assassinated and Persian control over
Afghanistan weakened.
A strong ruler, Dost Muhammad Khan, emerged in Kabul in 1826 and created concerns among
Britain that the Afghans were threatening Britain’s control of India; that fear led to a British
decision in 1838 to intervene in Afghanistan, setting off the first Anglo-Afghan War (1838-1842).
Nearly all of the 4,500-person British force was killed in that war, which ended with a final
British stand at Gandamack. The second Anglo-Afghan War took place during 1878-1880.
Early 20th Century and Cold War Era
King Amanullah Khan (1919-1929) launched attacks on British forces in Afghanistan (Third
Anglo-Afghan War) shortly after taking power and won complete independence from Britain as
recognized in the Treaty of Rawalpindi (August 8, 1919). He was considered a secular
modernizer presiding over a government in which all ethnic minorities participated. He was
succeeded by King Mohammad Nadir Shah (1929-1933), and then by King Mohammad Zahir
Shah. Zahir Shah’s reign (1933-1973) is remembered fondly by many older Afghans for
promulgating a constitution in 1964 that established a national legislature and promoting
freedoms for women, including dropping a requirement that they cover their face and hair. In part,
the countryside was secured during the King’s time by local tribal militias called arbokai.
However, possibly believing that he could limit Soviet support for Communist factions in
Afghanistan, Zahir Shah also built ties to the Soviet government by entering into a significant
political and arms purchase relationship with the Soviet Union. The Soviets began to build large
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infrastructure projects in Afghanistan during Zahir Shah’s time, such as the north-south Salang
Pass/Tunnel and Bagram airfield.
This period was the height of the Cold War, and the United States sought to prevent Afghanistan
from falling into the Soviet orbit. As Vice President, Richard Nixon visited Afghanistan in 1953,
and President Eisenhower visited in 1959. President Kennedy hosted King Zahir Shah in 1963.
The United States tried to use aid to counter Soviet influence, providing agricultural and other
development assistance. Among the major U.S.-funded projects were large USAID-led irrigation
and hydroelectric dam efforts in Helmand Province, including Kajaki Dam (see below).
Afghanistan’s slide into instability began in the 1970s, during the Nixon Administration, when the
diametrically opposed Communist Party and Islamic movements grew in strength. While
receiving medical treatment in Italy, Zahir Shah was overthrown by his cousin, Mohammad
Daoud, a military leader who established a dictatorship with strong state involvement in the
economy. Daoud was overthrown and killed1 in April 1978, during the Carter Administration, by
People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA, Communist party) military officers under the
direction of two PDPA (Khalq faction) leaders, Hafizullah Amin and Nur Mohammad Taraki, in
what is called the Saur (April) Revolution. Taraki became president, but he was displaced in
September 1979 by Amin. Both leaders drew their strength from rural ethnic Pashtuns and tried to
impose radical socialist change on a traditional society, in part by redistributing land and bringing
more women into government. The attempt at rapid modernization sparked rebellion by Islamic
parties opposed to such moves.
Soviet Invasion and Occupation Period
The Soviet Union sent troops into Afghanistan on December 27, 1979, to prevent further gains by
the Islamic militias, known as the mujahedin (Islamic fighters). Upon their invasion, the Soviets
replaced Amin with another PDPA leader perceived as pliable, Babrak Karmal (Parcham faction
of the PDPA), who was part of the 1978 PDPA takeover but was exiled by Taraki and Amin.
Soviet occupation forces numbered about 120,000. They were assisted by Democratic Republic
of Afghanistan (DRA) military forces of about 25,000–40,000, supplemented by about 20,000
paramilitary and tribal militia forces, including the PDPA-dominated organization called the
Sarandoy. The combined Soviet and Afghan forces were never able to pacify the outlying areas of
the country. DRA forces were consistently plagued by desertions and its effectiveness on behalf
of the Soviets was limited. The mujahedin benefited from U.S. weapons and assistance, provided
through the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in cooperation with Pakistan’s Inter-Service
Intelligence directorate (ISI). The mujahedin were also relatively well organized and coordinated
by seven major parties that in early 1989 formed a Peshawar-based “Afghan Interim
Government” (AIG). The seven party leaders were Mohammad Nabi Mohammadi; Sibghatullah
Mojaddedi; Gulbuddin Hikmatyar; Burhanuddin Rabbani; Yunus Khalis; Abd-i-Rab Rasul
Sayyaf; and Pir Gaylani. Mohammadi and Khalis have died in recent years of natural causes, and
Rabbani was killed in a September 20, 2011, assassination. The others are still active in Afghan
politics and governance or, in the case of Hikmatyar, fighting the Afghan government.

1 Daoud’s grave was discovered outside Kabul in early 2008. He was reburied in an official ceremony in Kabul in
March 2009.
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The mujahedin weaponry included U.S.-supplied portable shoulder-fired anti-aircraft systems
called “Stingers,” which proved highly effective against Soviet aircraft. The United States
decided in 1985 to provide these weapons to the mujahedin after substantial debate within the
Reagan Administration and some in Congress over whether they could be used effectively and
whether doing so would harm broader U.S.-Soviet relations. The mujahedin also hid and stored
weaponry in a large network of natural and manmade tunnels and caves throughout Afghanistan.
Partly because of the effectiveness of the Stinger in shooting down Soviet helicopters and fixed
wing aircraft, the Soviet Union’s losses mounted—about 13,400 Soviet soldiers were killed in the
war, according to Soviet figures—turning Soviet domestic opinion against the war. In 1986, after
the reformist Mikhail Gorbachev became leader, the Soviets replaced Karmal with the director of
Afghan intelligence, Najibullah Ahmedzai (known by his first name). Najibullah was a Ghilzai
Pashtun, and was from the Parcham faction of the PDPA. Some Afghans say that some aspects of
his governing style were admirable, particularly his appointment of a prime minister (Sultan Ali
Keshtmand and others) to handle administrative duties and distribute power.
Geneva Accords (1988) and Soviet Withdrawal
On April 14, 1988, Gorbachev agreed to a U.N.-brokered accord (the Geneva Accords) requiring
it to withdraw. The withdrawal was completed by February 15, 1989, leaving in place the weak
Najibullah government. A warming of relations moved the United States and Soviet Union to try
for a political settlement to the Afghan conflict, a trend accelerated by the 1991 collapse of the
Soviet Union, which reduced Moscow’s capacity for supporting communist regimes in the Third
World. On September 13, 1991, Moscow and Washington agreed to a joint cutoff of military aid
to the Afghan combatants.
The State Department has said that a total of about $3 billion in economic and covert military
assistance was provided by the U.S. to the Afghan mujahedin from 1980 until the end of the
Soviet occupation in 1989. Press reports say the covert aid program grew from about $20 million
per year in FY1980 to about $300 million per year during FY1986-FY1990.2 The Soviet pullout
decreased the perceived strategic value of Afghanistan, causing a reduction in subsequent covert
funding. As indicated in Table 11, U.S. assistance to Afghanistan remained at relatively low
levels from the time of the Soviet withdrawal, validating the views of many that the United States
largely considered its role in Afghanistan “completed” when Soviets troops left, and there was
little support for a major U.S. effort to rebuild the country. The United States closed its embassy
in Kabul in January 1989, as the Soviet Union was completing its pullout, and it remained so until
the fall of the Taliban in 2001.
With Soviet backing withdrawn, Najibullah rallied Afghan forces and successfully beat back the
first post-Soviet withdrawal mujahedin offensives. Although Najibullah defied expectations that
his government would immediately collapse after a Soviet withdrawal, military defections
continued and his position weakened in subsequent years. On March 18, 1992, Najibullah
publicly agreed to step down once an interim government was formed. That announcement set off
a wave of rebellions primarily by Uzbek and Tajik militia commanders in northern Afghanistan—
particularly Abdul Rashid Dostam, who joined prominent mujahedin commander Ahmad Shah
Masud of the Islamic Society, a largely Tajik party headed by Burhannudin Rabbani. Masud had

2 For FY1991, Congress reportedly cut covert aid appropriations to the mujahedin from $300 million the previous year
to $250 million, with half the aid withheld until the second half of the fiscal year. See “Country Fact Sheet:
Afghanistan,” in U.S. Department of State Dispatch, vol. 5, no. 23 (June 6, 1994), p. 377.
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earned a reputation as a brilliant strategist by preventing the Soviets from occupying his power
base in the Panjshir Valley of northeastern Afghanistan. Najibullah fell, and the mujahedin regime
began April 18, 1992.3 Each year, a public parade is held to mark that day.
The Mujahedin Government and Rise of the Taliban
The fall of Najibullah exposed the differences among the mujahedin parties. The leader of one of
the smaller parties (Afghan National Liberation Front), Islamic scholar Sibghatullah Mojadeddi,
was president during April-May 1992. Under an agreement among the major parties, Rabbani
became president in June 1992 with agreement that he would serve until December 1994. He
refused to step down at that time, saying that political authority would disintegrate without a clear
successor. Kabul was subsequently shelled by other mujahedin factions, particularly that of
nominal “Prime Minister” Gulbuddin Hikmatyar, a Pashtun, who accused Rabbani of
monopolizing power. Hikmatyar, who never formally assumed a working prime ministerial role
in Kabul because of suspicions of Rabbani, was purportedly backed by Pakistan. Hikmatyar’s
radical faction of the Islamist Hizb-e-Islami (Islamic Party) had received a large proportion of the
U.S. aid during the anti-Soviet war.
Yunus Khalis, an Islamic cleric, led a more moderate Hizb-e-Islami mujahedin party during that
war, although Khalis turned anti-U.S. in the mid-1990s. Taliban leader Mullah Umar was a fighter
in Khalis’s party during the anti-Soviet war. Khalis died in 2006.
In 1993-1994, Afghan Islamic clerics and students, mostly of rural, Pashtun origin, formed the
Taliban movement. Many were former mujahedin who had become disillusioned with conflict
among mujahedin parties and had moved into Pakistan to study in Islamic seminaries
(“madrassas”) mainly of the “Deobandi” school of Islam.4 Some say this interpretation of Islam is
similar to the “Wahhabism” that is practiced in Saudi Arabia. Taliban practices were also
consonant with conservative Pashtun tribal traditions.
The Taliban viewed the Rabbani government as corrupt and anti-Pashtun, and the four years of
civil war (1992-1996) created popular support for the Taliban as able to deliver stability. With the
help of defections, the Taliban peacefully took control of the southern city of Qandahar in
November 1994. By February 1995, it was approaching Kabul, after which an 18-month
stalemate ensued. In September 1995, the Taliban captured Herat province, bordering Iran, and
imprisoned its governor, Ismail Khan, ally of Rabbani and Masud, who later escaped and took
refuge in Iran. In September 1996, new Taliban victories near Kabul led to the withdrawal of
Rabbani and Masud to the Panjshir Valley north of Kabul with most of their heavy weapons; the
Taliban took control of Kabul on September 27, 1996. Taliban gunmen subsequently entered a
U.N. facility in Kabul to seize Najibullah, his brother, and aides, and then hanged them.

3 After failing to flee, Najibullah, his brother, and aides remained at a U.N. facility in Kabul until the Taliban
movement seized control in 1996 and hanged them.
4 The Deobandi school began in 1867 in a seminary in Uttar Pradesh, in British-controlled India, that was set up to train
Islamic clerics and to counter the British educational model.
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Taliban Rule (September 1996-November 2001)
The Taliban regime was led by Mullah Muhammad Umar, who lost an eye in the anti-Soviet war
while fighting as part of the Hizb-e-Islami mujahedin party of Yunis Khalis. Umar held the title of
Head of State and “Commander of the Faithful,” remaining in the Taliban power base in
Qandahar and almost never appearing in public, although he did occasionally receive high-level
foreign officials. Umar forged a political and personal bond with Bin Laden and refused U.S.
demands to extradite him. Like Umar, most of the senior figures in the Taliban regime were
Ghilzai Pashtuns, which predominate in eastern Afghanistan. They are rivals of the Durrani
Pashtuns, who are predominant in the south.
The Taliban lost international and domestic support as it imposed strict adherence to Islamic
customs in areas it controlled and employed harsh punishments, including executions. The
Taliban authorized its “Ministry for the Promotion of Virtue and the Suppression of Vice,” headed
by Maulvi Qalamuddin, to use physical punishments to enforce strict Islamic practices, including
bans on television, Western music, and dancing. It prohibited women from attending school or
working outside the home, except in health care, and it publicly executed some women for
adultery. In what many consider its most extreme action, and which some say was urged by Bin
Laden, in March 2001 the Taliban blew up two large Buddha statues carved into hills above
Bamiyan city, considering them idols.
The Clinton Administration held talks with the Taliban before and after it took power, but was
unable to moderate its policies. The United States withheld recognition of Taliban as the
legitimate government of Afghanistan, formally recognizing no faction as the government. The
United Nations continued to seat representatives of the Rabbani government, not the Taliban. The
State Department ordered the Afghan embassy in Washington, DC, closed in August 1997. U.N.
Security Council Resolution 1193 (August 28, 1998) and 1214 (December 8, 1998) urged the
Taliban to end discrimination against women. Women’s rights groups urged the Clinton
Administration not to recognize the Taliban government. In May 1999, the Senate-passed S.Res.
68 called on the President not to recognize an Afghan government that oppresses women.
U.S. Efforts Against Al Qaeda During Taliban Rule
The Taliban’s hosting of Al Qaeda’s leadership gradually became the Clinton Administration’s
overriding agenda item with Afghanistan. In April 1998, then U.S. Ambassador to the United
Nations Bill Richardson (along with Assistant Secretary of State Karl Inderfurth and NSC senior
official Bruce Riedel) visited Afghanistan, but the Taliban refused to hand over Bin Laden. They
did not meet Mullah Umar. After the August 7, 1998, Al Qaeda bombings of U.S. embassies in
Kenya and Tanzania, the Clinton Administration progressively pressured the Taliban, imposing
U.S. sanctions and achieving adoption of some U.N. sanctions as well. On August 20, 1998, the
United States fired cruise missiles at alleged Al Qaeda training camps in eastern Afghanistan, but
Bin Laden was not hit.5 Some observers assert that the Administration missed several other
opportunities to strike him, including a purported sighting of him by an unarmed Predator drone

5 A pharmaceutical plant in Sudan (Al Shifa) believe to be producing chemical weapons for Al Qaeda also was struck
that day, although U.S. reviews later corroborated Sudan’s assertions that the plant was strictly civilian in nature.
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at the Tarnak Farm camp in Afghanistan in the fall of 2000.6 Clinton Administration officials said
that domestic and international support for ousting the Taliban militarily was lacking.
The “Northern Alliance” Congeals
The Taliban’s policies caused different Afghan factions to ally with the Tajik core of the anti-
Taliban opposition—the ousted President Rabbani, Ahmad Shah Masud, and their ally in the
Herat area, Ismail Khan. Joining the Tajik factions in the broader “Northern Alliance” were
Uzbek, Hazara Shiite, and even some Pashtun Islamist factions discussed below. Virtually all the
figures mentioned remain key players in politics in Afghanistan, sometimes allied with and at
other times adversaries of President Hamid Karzai. (For more information on many of these
figures, see CRS Report RS21922, Afghanistan: Politics, Elections, and Government
Performance
, by Kenneth Katzman.)
Uzbeks/General Dostam. One major faction was the Uzbek militia (the
Junbush-Melli, or National Islamic Movement of Afghanistan) of General Abdul
Rashid Dostam. Frequently referred to by some Afghans as one of the “warlords”
who gained power during the anti-Soviet war, Dostam first joined those seeking
to oust Rabbani during his 1992-1996 presidency, but later joined him and the
other Northern Alliance factions opposed to the Taliban.
Hazara Shiites. Members of Hazara tribes, mostly Shiite Muslims, are
prominent in Bamiyan, Dai Kundi, and Ghazni provinces (central Afghanistan)
and are always fearful of, and subject to some extent to, repression by Pashtuns
and other larger ethnic factions. The Hazaras have tended to serve in working
class and domestic household jobs, although more recently they have been
prominent in technology jobs in Kabul, raising their economic status. They are
also increasingly cohesive politically, leading to gains in the September 2010
parliamentary elections. During the various Afghan wars, the main Hazara Shiite
militia was Hizb-e-Wahdat (Unity Party, composed of eight different groups).
Hizb-e-Wahdat suffered a major setback in 1995 when the Taliban captured and
killed its leader Abdul Ali Mazari. One of Karzai’s vice president’s Karim
Khalili, is a Hazara. Another prominent Hazara faction leader, Mohammad
Mohaqeq, is a Karzi critic.
Pashtun Islamists/Sayyaf. Abd-i-Rab Rasul Sayyaf, now a leading Islamic
conservative in parliament, headed a Pashtun-dominated hardline Islamist
mujahedin faction called the Islamic Union for the Liberation of Afghanistan
(Ittihad Islami) during the anti-Soviet war. Even though he is an Islamist
conservative, Sayyaf viewed the Taliban as selling out Afghanistan to Al Qaeda
and he joined the Northern Alliance.
Policy Pre-September 11, 2001
Throughout 2001, but prior to the September 11 attacks, Bush Administration policy differed little
from Clinton Administration policy—applying economic and political pressure while retaining
dialogue with the Taliban, and refraining from militarily assisting the Northern Alliance. The

6 http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/4540958.
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September 11 Commission report said that, in the months prior to the September 11 attacks,
Administration officials leaned toward such a step. The report added that some officials wanted,
in addition, to assist ethnic Pashtuns who were opposed to the Taliban. Other covert options were
reportedly under consideration as well.7
In a departure from Clinton Administration policy, the Bush Administration stepped up
engagement with Pakistan to try to reduce its support for the Taliban. At that time, there were
allegations that Pakistani advisers were helping the Taliban in their fight against the Northern
Alliance. In accordance with U.N. Security Council Resolution 1333, in February 2001 the State
Department ordered the Taliban representative office in New York closed, although Taliban
representative Abdul Hakim Mujahid continued to operate informally.8 In March 2001,
Administration officials received a Taliban envoy to discuss bilateral issues.
Even though the Northern Alliance was supplied with Iranian, Russian, and Indian financial and
military support—all of whom had different motives for that support—the Northern Alliance
nonetheless continued to lose ground to the Taliban after it lost Kabul in 1996. By the time of the
September 11 attacks, the Taliban controlled at least 75% of the country, including almost all
provincial capitals. The Alliance suffered a major setback on September 9, 2001 (two days before,
and possibly an integral part of, the September 11 attacks), when Ahmad Shah Masud was
assassinated by Al Qaeda operatives posing as journalists. He was succeeded by his intelligence
chief, Muhammad Fahim,9 a veteran figure but one who lacked Masud’s undisputed authority.
September 11 Attacks and Operation Enduring Freedom
After the September 11 attacks, the Bush Administration decided to militarily overthrow the
Taliban when it refused a final U.S. offer to extradite Bin Laden in order to avoid military action.
President Bush articulated a policy that equated those who harbor terrorists to terrorists
themselves, and judged that a friendly regime in Kabul was needed to enable U.S. forces to
search for Al Qaeda personnel there. The Administration sought and obtained U.N. backing: U.N.
Security Council Resolution 1368 of September 12, 2001, said that the Council “expresses its
readiness to take all necessary steps to respond (implying force) to the September 11 attacks.”
This was widely interpreted as a U.N. authorization for military action in response to the attacks,
but it did not explicitly authorize Operation Enduring Freedom to oust the Taliban. Nor did the
Resolution specifically reference Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter, which allows for responses to
threats to international peace and security.
In Congress, S.J.Res. 23 (passed 98-0 in the Senate and with no objections in the House, P.L.
107-40, signed September 18, 2011), was somewhat more explicit than the U.N. Resolution,
authorizing10 “all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or persons
he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on
September 11, 2001 or harbored such organizations or persons.”

7 Drogin, Bob. “U.S. Had Plan for Covert Afghan Options Before 9/11.” Los Angeles Times, May 18, 2002.
8 Mujahid has reconciled with the current Afghan government, and serves as one of the deputy leaders of the 70
member High Council on political reconciliation.
9 Some Afghan sources refer to him by the name “Fahim Khan,” or “Marshal Fahim.”
10 Another law (P.L. 107-148) established a “Radio Free Afghanistan” under RFE/RL, providing $17 million in funding
for it for FY2002.
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Major combat in Afghanistan (Operation Enduring Freedom, OEF) began on October 7, 2001. It
consisted primarily of U.S. air-strikes on Taliban and Al Qaeda forces, facilitated by the
cooperation between reported small numbers (about 1,000) of U.S. special operations forces and
Central Intelligence Agency operatives. The purpose of these operations was to help the Northern
Alliance and Pashtun anti-Taliban forces by providing information to direct U.S. air strikes
against Taliban positions. In part, the U.S. forces and operatives worked with such Northern
Alliance contacts as Fahim and Amrollah Saleh, who during November 2001-June 2010 served as
Afghanistan’s intelligence director, to weaken Taliban defenses on the Shomali plain north of
Kabul (and just south of Bagram Airfield, which marked the forward position of the Northern
Alliance during Taliban rule). Some U.S. combat units (about 1,300 Marines) moved into
Afghanistan to pressure the Taliban around Qandahar at the height of the fighting (October-
December 2001), but there were few pitched battles between U.S. and Taliban soldiers.
The Taliban regime unraveled rapidly after it lost Mazar-e-Sharif on November 9, 2001, to forces
led by Dostam.11 Northern Alliance (mainly the Tajik faction) forces—the commanders of which
had initially promised then-Secretary of State Colin Powell that they would not enter Kabul—
entered the capital on November 12, 2001, to popular jubilation. The Taliban subsequently lost
the south and east to U.S.-supported Pashtun leaders, including Hamid Karzai. The end of the
Taliban regime is generally dated as December 9, 2001, when the Taliban surrendered Qandahar
and Mullah Umar fled the city, leaving it under tribal law administered by Pashtun leaders such as
the Noorzai clan.
Subsequently, U.S. and Afghan forces conducted “Operation Anaconda” in the Shah-i-Kot Valley
south of Gardez (Paktia Province) during March 2-19, 2002, against 800 Al Qaeda and Taliban
fighters. In March 2003, about 1,000 U.S. troops raided suspected Taliban or Al Qaeda fighters in
villages around Qandahar (Operation Valiant Strike). On May 1, 2003, then-Secretary of Defense
Rumsfeld announced an end to “major combat.”
Post-Taliban Governance-Building Efforts12
Taking the view that leaving the region after the 1989 Soviet pullout allowed Afghanistan to
degenerate into chaos, the Bush Administration decided to try to build a relatively strong Afghan
central government and economy, both of which were devastated by more than 20 years of war
prior to the September 11 attacks. The effort, which many outside experts described as “nation-
building,” was supported by the United Nations, international institutions, and U.S. partners in
several post-Taliban international meetings. Table 1 depicts, in brief, the process and events that
led to the formation of the post-Taliban government of Afghanistan. For detail, see CRS Report
RS21922, Afghanistan: Politics, Elections, and Government Performance.

11 In the process, Dostam captured Taliban fighters and imprisoned them in freight containers, causing many to
suffocate. They were buried in a mass grave at Dasht-e-Laili.
12 See also CRS Report RS21922, Afghanistan: Politics, Elections, and Government Performance, by Kenneth
Katzman, which covers the issues in this section in substantially greater depth.
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Table 1. Afghanistan Political Transition Process
Interim
Formed by Bonn Agreement. Headed by Hamid Karzai, an ethnic Pashtun, but key security
Administration
positions dominated by mostly minority “Northern Alliance.” Karzai reaffirmed as leader
by June 2002 “emergency loya jirga.” (A jirga is a traditional Afghan assembly).
Constitution
Approved by January 2004 “Constitutional Loya Jirga” (CLJ). Set up strong presidency, a
rebuke to Northern Alliance that wanted prime ministership to balance presidential
power, but gave parliament significant powers to compensate. Gives men and women
equal rights under the law, allows for political parties as long as they are not “un-Islamic;”
al ows for court rulings according to Hanafi (Sunni) Islam (Chapter 7, Article 15). Set out
electoral roadmap for simultaneous (if possible) presidential, provincial, and district
elections by June 2004. Named ex-King Zahir Shah to non-hereditary position of “Father
of the Nation;” he died July 23, 2007.
Presidential Election
Elections for president and two vice presidents, for five-year term, held October 9, 2004.
Turnout was 80% of 10.5 million registered. Karzai and running mates (Ahmad Zia Masud,
a Tajik and brother of legendary mujahedin commander Ahmad Shah Masud, who was
assassinated by Al Qaeda two days before the Sept. 11 attacks, and Karim Khalili, a
Hazara) elected with 55% against 16 opponents. Second highest vote getter, Northern
Alliance figure (and Education Minister) Yunus Qanooni (16%). One female ran. Funded
with $90 million from donors, including $40 million from U.S. (FY2004, P.L. 108-106).
First Parliamentary
Elections held September 18, 2005, on “Single Non-Transferable Vote” System; candidates
Elections
stood as individuals, not in party list. Parliament consists of a 249 elected lower house
(Wolesi Jirga, House of the People) and a selected 102 seat upper house (Meshrano Jirga,
House of Elders). 2,815 candidates for Wolesi Jirga, including 347 women. Turnout was
57% (6.8 million voters) of 12.5 million registered. Upper house is appointed by Karzai (34
seats, half of which are to be women), and by the provincial councils (68 seats). When
district councils are elected, they will appoint 34 of the seats. Funded by $160 million in
international aid, including $45 mil ion from U.S. (FY2005 supplemental, P.L. 109-13).
First Provincial
Provincial elections held September 18, 2005, simultaneous with parliamentary elections.
Elections/
Exact powers vague, but now taking lead in deciding local reconstruction Provincial
District Elections
council sizes range from 9 to the 29 seats on the Kabul provincial council. Total seats are
420, of which 121 held by women. l3,185 candidates, including 279 women. District
elections not held due to complexity and potential tensions of drawing district boundaries.
Second
Presidential and provincial elections were held August 20, 2009, but required a runoff
Presidential/Provincial because no candidate received over 50% in certified results issued October 20. Second
Elections
round not held because Dr. Abdullah, pulled out of runoff. Election costs: $300 million.
Parliamentary
Original y set for May 22, 2010; held September 18, 2010. Results disputed, but agreement
Elections
reached for Karzai inaugurate new lower house on January 26, 2011, six days after original
date. 70 women elected, two more than quota. Speaker selected on February 27, Abdul
Raouf Ibrahimi, an ethnic Uzbek. Special tribunal set up to investigate results and on June
23 ruled that 62 results be altered, prompting a backlash from those who might be
deprived of seats and threats of impeaching Karzai. Crisis eased on August 11, 2011, when
Karzai disbanded special tribunal and announced that only the election bodies have
standing to overturn results. Independent Election Commission announced August 21 that
nine lower house winners would be unseated for fraud. They were sworn in September 4;
but a broad lower house boycott renderied it non-functional until October 9, when
boycott ended. For the upper house, 68 seats council are appointed to four-year terms by
the elected provincial councils in each of Afghanistan’s 34 provinces, and remain in office.
Karzai made his 34 appointments on February 19, 2011. The speaker of that body is
Muslim Yaar (a Pashtun).
Third Presidential
To be held in 2014. In August 2011, Karzai told members of the National Assembly he will
Election
not seek to alter the constitution to allow him to run again (the constitution permits only
two consecutive terms). Press reports in December 2011, quoting German intelligence
estimates, questioned that commitment, saying Karzai might try to restructure the
government to allow him to retain power. Karzai publicly reiterated his vow to leave
office on Meet the Press on December 19, 2011.
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Major Governance Issues
The Obama Administration’s strategy review in late 2009 narrowed official U.S. goals to
preventing terrorism safe haven in Afghanistan and Pakistan. However, the elements of Obama
Administration strategy during 2009-2011 continued, or in some cases, expanded the nation-
building programs put in place by the Bush Administration.13 That task has proved slower and
more difficult than anticipated because of the devastation that years of war wrought on governing
institutions, on the education system, and on the already limited infrastructure. Some observers
believe the international community had unrealistic expectations of what could be achieved in a
relatively short time frame.
No matter how expansively the U.S. mission has been defined, building the capacity of and
reforming Afghan governance—particularly reducing governmental corruption—have been
consistently and widely judged to be key to the success of U.S. policy. This has been stated
explicitly in each Obama Administration policy review, strategy statement, and report on progress
in Afghanistan, as well as all major international conferences on Afghanistan, including the major
conference in Bonn on December 5, 2011. That was held at the 10th anniversary of the Bonn
Agreement that began the post-Taliban political transition. All of the major Afghan governance
issues are covered extensively in CRS Report RS21922, Afghanistan: Politics, Elections, and
Government Performance
, by Kenneth Katzman.
U.S. and International Civilian Policy Structure
Building the capacity of the Afghan government, and helping it develop economically, is
primarily, although not exclusively, the purview of U.S. and international civilian officials and
institutions. In line with the prioritization of Afghanistan policy, in February 2009, the
Administration set up the position of appointed “Special Representative for Afghanistan and
Pakistan” (SRAP), occupied first by Ambassador Richard Holbrooke, reporting to Secretary of
State Clinton. Holbrooke died on December 13, 2010, but his team at the State Department, led as
of February 2011 by Ambassador Marc Grossman, remains largely intact, consisting mainly of
members detailed from several different agencies.
At the U.S. Embassy in Kabul, Ambassador Ryan Crocker replaced Karl Eikenberry on July 25,
2011. Ambassador Crocker is working to improve the embassy’s relations with President Karzai,
which suffered partly because of Ambassador Eikenberry’s blunt criticisms of the Karzai
government’s shortcomings. There is a “deputy Ambassador” (currently State Department official
David Pearce) and separate Ambassador rank officials to manage U.S. economic assistance issues
and to oversee Embassy operations. Another official of Ambassador rank coordinates U.S. rule of
law programs. Ambassador Timothy Carney oversaw U.S. policy for the 2009 elections.
The U.S. Embassy has progressively expanded its personnel and facilities to accommodate the
additional civilian hires and Foreign Service officers who have been posted to Afghanistan since
2009 as mentors and advisers to the Afghan government. U.S. officials say there are more than
1,130 U.S. civilian officials in Afghanistan, as of late 2011, up from only about 400 in early 2009.
Of these at least 400 serve outside Kabul as part of initiatives such as the 32 “District Support
Teams” and the “District Working Groups.” That is up from 67 outside Kabul in 2009.

13 Text of the released summary is at http://documents.nytimes.com/the-obama-administrations-overview-on-
afghanistan-and-pakistan.
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On February 7, 2010, in an effort to improve civilian coordination between the United States, its
foreign partners, and the Afghan government, a NATO “Senior Civilian Representative” in
Afghanistan, UK Ambassador Mark Sedwill, took office. This official works not only with U.S.
military officials but with representatives of the embassies of partner countries and with a special
U.N. Assistance Mission–Afghanistan (UNAMA, see Table 2). In April 2011 Sedwill was
replaced by the former British Ambassador to Iran, Sir Simon Gass. The contribution of the
United Nations to enhancing governance and coordinating donors is discussed below.
Afghan Ambassador to the United States, Sayed Tayib Jawad, served as Ambassador from 2004
until his recall in August 2010. Then deputy Foreign Minister Eklil Hakimi replaced him on
February 23, 2011.
Consulates in Mazar-e-Sharif and Herat
The tables at the end of this report include U.S. funding for State Department and USAID
operations, including Embassy construction and running the “Embassy air wing,” a fleet of twin-
engine turboprops that ferry U.S. officials and contractors around Afghanistan. In a significant
development attempting to signal normalization of certain areas of Afghanistan, in early 2010 the
United States formally inaugurated U.S. consulates in Herat and Mazar-e-Sharif. In November
2010 contracts were announced for expansion of the U.S. Embassy ($511 million) and to
construct the two consulates ($20 million for each facility). As discussed below, both cities were
in the first tranche of areas to be transitioned to Afghan control.
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Table 2. U.N. Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA)
The United Nations is extensively involved in Afghan governance and national building, primarily in factional conflict
resolution and coordination of development assistance. The coordinator of U.N. efforts is the U.N. Assistance
Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA). It was headed during March 2010-December 2011 by Swedish diplomat Staffan de-
Mistura, replacing Norwegian diplomat Kai Eide. Mistura formerly played a similar role in Iraq. Slovakian diplomat Jan
Kubis has been named to replace him in January 2012, two months before a re-evaluation of the UNAMA mandate.
U.N. Security Council Resolution 1806 of March 20, 2008, expanded UNAMA’s authority to strengthen cooperation
between the international peacekeeping force (ISAF, see below) and the Afghan government. In concert with the
Obama Administration’s emphasis on Afghan policy, UNAMA is to open offices in as many of Afghanistan’s 34
provinces as financial y and logistical y permissible. The mandate of UNAMA, was renewed for another year on March
22, 2011, by Resolution 1974. As did Resolution 1917 the previous year, Resolution 1974 largely restated UNAMA’s
coordinating role with other high-level representatives in Afghanistan and election support role, while referring to
UNAMA’s role in facilitating the coming transition to Afghan leadership. As part of the expansion of its mandate,
UNAMA is playing a role in reintegration of surrendering insurgent fighters that is receiving increased emphasis. It is
doing so through a “Salaam (Peace) Support Group,” working with Afghanistan’s High Peace Council that is
promoting reconciliation and reintegration. UNAMA has always been involved in local dispute resolution and
disarmament of local militias, but its donor coordination has never materialized because of the large numbers and size
of donor-run projects in Afghanistan. Under a March 2010 compromise with Karzai, it nominates two international
members of the five person Electoral Complaints Commission (ECC), one fewer than the three it selected under the
prior election law.
UNAMA is also playing a growing role in engaging regional actors in Afghan stability. It was a co-convener of the
January 28, 2010, and July 20, 2010, London and Kabul Conferences, respectively. Along with Turkey, UNAMA chairs
a “Regional Working Group” to enlist regional support for Afghan integration.
On donor coordination, UNAMA is co-chair of the joint Afghan-international community coordination body cal ed
the Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board (JCMB), and is helping implement the five-year development strategy
outlined in a “London Compact,” (now called the Afghanistan Compact) adopted at the January 31-February 1, 2006,
London conference on Afghanistan. The priorities developed in that document comport with Afghanistan’s own
“National Strategy for Development,” presented on June 12, 2008, in Paris.
The difficulties in coordinating U.N. with U.S. and NATO efforts were evident in a 2007 proposal to create a new
position of “super envoy” that would represent the United Nations, the European Union, and NATO in Afghanistan.
The concept advanced and in January 2008, with U.S. support, U.N. Secretary General Ban Ki Moon tentatively
appointed British diplomat Paddy Ashdown as the “super envoy.” However, Karzai rejected the appointment
reportedly over concerns about the scope of authority of such an envoy. Ashdown withdrew his name on January 28,
2008 and further discussion has withered. The NATO senior civilian representative. post, discussed above, appears to
represent a step in the direction of improved donor coordination in Afghanistan and streamlining of the foreign
representative structure there.
For more information on UNAMA, see CRS Report R40747, United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan:
Background and Policy Issues
, by Rhoda Margesson.

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Security Policy, 2011-2014 “Transition,
and Beyond”14

The formal Obama Administration policy goal is to prevent Afghanistan from again becoming a
safe haven for global terrorism, but the U.S. criteria for judging achievement of that goal have
been broader, including the degree to which the Afghan government and security force can defend
itself, govern effectively, and develop economically. The President’s June 22, 2011, speech on
Afghanistan announcing a U.S. troop drawdown outlined that the Afghan government is to
progressively assume the lead on security as the United States reduces its level of military effort
over the next several years. Some U.S. military plans reported in late 2011 envision an
accelerated transition to Afghan security lead, with the U.S. and partner forces adopting a
mentoring “overwatch” role. Until the transition is complete, the basic pillars of U.S. and NATO
security strategy that have been in place since 2001 and discussed below will largely continue.
Who Is “The Enemy”? Taliban, Haqqani, Al Qaeda, and Others
Security in Afghanistan is being challenged by a confluence of related and, to varying degrees,
cooperating armed groups whose tactics continue to evolve based on experiences from previous
fighting.15 There has not been agreement about the relative strength of insurgents in all of the
areas where they operate. The top commander in Afghanistan, General John Allen, told journalists
in October 2011 that the numbers of insurgents may be far fewer than the 25,000 previously
assessed.
Groups: The Taliban (“Quetta Shura Taliban”)
The core of the insurgency remains the Taliban movement loyal, to varying degrees, to Mullah
Umar, who led the Taliban regime during 1996-2001. He and many of his top advisers reportedly
have relative safe haven in Pakistan, probably the city of Quetta, thus accounting for the term
usually applied to Umar and his aides: “Quetta Shura Taliban” (QST). Some, such as Mullah
Dadullah, his son Mansoor, and Mullah Usmani have been killed or captured. Others, such as
Mullah Hassan Rahmani, former Taliban governor of Qandahar, are said to have come under
some Pakistani pressure to refrain from militant activities.
For now still committed to insurgent action, Umar has been making appointments to replenish the
QST leadership ranks. When his top deputy, Mullah Bradar, was arrested in Pakistan in February
2011, Umar replaced him with younger and reputedly hardline, anti-compromise leaders Mullah
Abdul Qayyum Zakir, a U.S. detainee in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba until 2007; and Akhtar
Mohammad Mansoor, a logistics expert.16 The Taliban has several official spokespersons still at
large, including Qari Yusuf Ahmadi and Zabiullah Mujahid, and it operates a clandestine radio
station, “Voice of Shariat” and publishes videos.

14 Some of the information in this section is taken from U.S. Department of Defense (DOD), “Report on Progress
Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan,” April 2011.
15 http://www.defense.gov/news/1230_1231Report.pdf.
16 Ibid.; Moreau, Ron. “New Leaders for the Taliban.” Newsweek, January 24, 2011.
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Some believe that Umar and his inner circle blame their past association with Al Qaeda for their
loss of power and want to distance themselves from Al Qaeda. Other experts see continuing close
association that is likely to continue were the Taliban movement to return to power. This internal
debate apparently has not been resolved as a consequence of the death of Al Qaeda founder
Osama Bin Laden on May 1, 2011. However, U.S. officials argue that the successes produced by
the U.S. “surge” in Afghanistan are causing some Taliban leaders to at least consider the concept
of a political settlement, and Mullah Umar released a statement on the 10th anniversary of the
September 11 attacks on the United States acknowledging there have been some talks, although
only over prisoner exchanges, according to his statement. A subsequent statement by Umar
marking a Muslim holiday on November 10, 2011, viewed as reflecting increased willingness to
reconcile, admonished Taliban commanders to avoid causing civilian casualties. Reconciliation
talks are discussed in the section on that issue later in this report.
Al Qaeda/Bin Laden
U.S. officials have long considered Al Qaeda to have been largely expelled from Afghanistan
itself. This view was enhanced by the May 1, 2011, death of Bin Laden. U.S. commanders have,
for several years, characterized any Al Qaeda militants in Afghanistan as facilitators of militant
incursions into Afghanistan rather than active fighters in the Afghan insurgency. Then-Director of
Central Intelligence (now Secretary of Defense) Leon Panetta said on June 27, 2010, that Al
Qaeda fighters in Afghanistan itself might number 50-100.17 Contradicting those comments to
some extent, NATO/ISAF officials said in October 2010, that Al Qaeda cells may be moving back
into remote areas of Kunar and Nuristan provinces,18 particularly in areas vacated by U.S.-led
forces. Some of the Al Qaeda fighters are believed to belong to Al Qaeda affiliates such as the
Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU).
Until the May 1, 2011, death of Bin Laden, there had been frustration within the U.S. government
that Al Qaeda’s top leadership had eluded U.S. efforts to capture them. In December 2001, in the
course of the post-September 11 major combat effort, U.S. Special Operations Forces and CIA
operatives reportedly narrowed Osama Bin Laden’s location to the Tora Bora mountains in
Nangarhar Province (30 miles west of the Khyber Pass), but the Afghan militia fighters who were
the bulk of the fighting force did not prevent his escape. Some U.S. military and intelligence
officers (such as Gary Berntsen and Dalton Fury, who have written books on the battle) have
questioned the U.S. decision to rely mainly on Afghan forces in this engagement.
U.S. efforts to find Al Qaeda leaders are expected to now focus on his close ally Ayman al-
Zawahiri, who is also presumed to be on the Pakistani side of the border and who was named new
leader of Al Qaeda in June 2011. CNN reported October 18, 2010, that assessments from the
U.S.-led coalition said Zawahiri (and Bin Laden) was likely in a settled area near the border with
Afghanistan, and not living in a very remote uninhabited area. A U.S. strike reportedly missed
Zawahiri by a few hours in the village of Damadola, Pakistan, in January 2006, suggesting that
there was intelligence on his movements.19 Many observers say that Zawahiri is not well liked
within Al Qaeda and may have trouble holding the leading figures of the group together.

17 Text of the Panetta interview with ABC News is at http://abcnews.go.com/print?id=11025299.
18 Dreazen, Yochi. “Al Qaida Returning to Afghanistan for New Attacks.” Nationaljournal.com. October 18, 2010.
19 Gall, Carlotta and Ismail Khan. “U.S. Drone Attack Missed Zawahiri by Hours.” New York Times, November 10,
2006.
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Other senior Al Qaeda leaders are either in or are allowed to transit or reside in Iran. Among them
are Al Qaeda’s former spokesman, Kuwait-born Sulayman Abu Ghaith, as well as Sayf al Adl.
The United States has no diplomatic relations with Iran and has called on Iran to arrest and
submit any Al Qaeda operatives to international authorities for trial.
U.S. efforts in the region have killed numerous senior operatives other than Bin Laden. A January
2008 strike near Damadola killed Abu Laith al-Libi, who purportedly masterminded, among other
operations, the bombing at Bagram Air Base in February 2007 when Vice President Cheney was
visiting. In August 2008, an airstrike was confirmed to have killed Al Qaeda chemical weapons
expert Abu Khabab al-Masri, and two senior operatives allegedly involved in the 1998 embassy
bombings in Africa reportedly were killed by an unmanned aerial vehicle (Predator) strike in
January 2009. Following the killing of Bin Laden, another top Al Qaeda leader, Ilyas Kashmiri,
was reportedly killed by an armed drone strike in June 2011. Such aerial-based strikes have
become more frequent under President Obama, indicating that the Administration sees the tactic
as effective in preventing attacks.
Hikmatyar Faction
Another “high value target” identified by U.S. commanders is the faction of former mujahedin
party leader Gulbuddin Hikmatyar (Hizb-e-Islami Gulbuddin, HIG). He has been allied with Al
Qaeda and Taliban insurgents although his faction has sometimes competed with and clashed with
Taliban elements. As noted above, Hikmatyar was one of the main U.S.-backed mujahedin
leaders during the Soviet occupation era but he turned against his mujahedin colleagues after the
Communist government fell in 1992. He was displaced by the Taliban as the main opposition to
the 1992-1996 mujahedin government. Hikmatyar’s faction received extensive U.S. support
against the Soviet Union, but is now active against U.S. and Afghan forces in Kunar, Nuristan,
Kapisa, and Nangarhar provinces, north and east of Kabul. On February 19, 2003, the U.S.
government formally designated Hikmatyar as a “specially designated global terrorist,” under the
authority of Executive Order 13224, subjecting it to financial and other U.S. sanctions. It is not
designated as a “foreign terrorist organization” (FTO).
Hikmatyar has expressed a willingness to discuss a cease-fire with the Karzai government since
2007, and several of Karzai’s key allies in the National Assembly are members of a moderate
wing of Hikmatyar’s party. While U.S. forces continue to battle Hikmatyar’s militia, on March
22, 2010, both the Afghan government and Hikmatyar representatives confirmed talks in Kabul,
including meetings with Karzai. In January 2010, Hikmatyar outlined specific conditions for a
possible reconciliation with Karzai, including elections under a neutral caretaker government
following a U.S. withdrawal. Some close to Hikmatyar apparently attended the consultative peace
loya jirga on June 2-4, 2010, which discussed the reconciliation issue, as analyzed further below.
Haqqani Faction20
Another militant faction, cited by U.S. officials as perhaps the most potent threat to Afghan
security, is the “Haqqani Network” led overall by Jalaludin Haqqani but operationally by his sons
Siraj (or Sirajjudin) and Badruddin. As a mujahedin commander during the U.S.-backed war

20 A profile of the faction and its activities is provided in: Joshua Partlow. “In Afghan War, Haqqani Group Is
‘Resilient’ Foe.” Washington Post, May 30, 2011.
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against the Soviet Union, he was a U.S. ally. He subsequently joined the Taliban regime (1996-
2011) and served as Minister of Tribal Affairs in that government. Since the ousting of the Taliban
regime in 2001, he has been a staunch opponent of the Karzai government and his faction is
believed closer to Al Qaeda than to the ousted Taliban leadership in part because one of the elder
Haqqani’s wives is purportedly Arab. Press reports indicate that the few Al Qaeda fighters that are
in Afghanistan are mostly embedded with Haqqani fighters. On the other hand, the faction is
believed primarily interested in earning illicit monies and in controlling parts of Khost Province
than in imposing an extreme Islamic ideology throughout Afghanistan. As discussed below, is
increasingly targeting key locations in Kabul and elsewhere.
Suggesting it may act as a tool of Pakistani interests, the Haqqani network has primarily targeted
Indian interests. It claimed responsibility for two attacks on India’s embassy in Kabul (July 2008
and October 2009), and reportedly was involved, possibly with other groups, on the December
2009 attack on a CIA base in Khost that killed seven CIA officers. U.S. officials attribute the June
28, 2011, attack on the Intercontinental Hotel in Kabul and a September 10, 2011, truck bombing
in Wardak Province (which injured 77 U.S. soldiers) to the group. U.S. officials say the attacks on
the U.S. Embassy and ISAF headquarters in Kabul on September 13, 2011, were the work of the
faction as well.
That the faction is tolerated or protected in the North Waziristan area of Pakistan and also its
purported ties to Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate (ISI) were causes of sharp U.S.
criticism of Pakistan. The most widely cited criticism was by then Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman
Mullen, following the September 2011 attacks on the U.S. Embassy. Admiral Mullen testified
before the Senate Armed Services Committee on September 22, 2011, that the Haqqani network
acts “as a veritable arm” of the ISI. Other senior officials reiterated the thrust of that criticism,
although with perhaps more caveats and qualifications, suggesting some difference of opinion
within the Administration over Pakistan’s support for the group. The ISI is believed to see the
Haqqanis as a potential ally in any Afghan political structure that might be produced by a political
settlement in Afghanistan.
In addition to pressing Pakistan to deny the group safe haven, U.S. officials say they are
increasingly pressuring the Haqqani network with military action in Afghanistan and air strikes
on the Pakistani side of the border, as well as with direct ground action, such as a raid in late July
2011 that reportedly killed over 80 Haqqani network militants. One other Haqqani brother,
Mohammad, was reportedly killed by a U.S. unmanned vehicle strike in late February 2010,
although Mohammad was not thought to be a key militant commander. However, the faction,
which may have about 3,000 active fighters and operatives, is viewed as resilient and able to tap a
seemingly infinite pool of recruits.
The faction has generally been considered least amenable to a political settlement with the
Afghan government, but it is possible that the May 1, 2011, raid that killed Osama Bin Laden will
reinforce those within the faction who might want to reassess that stance. Siraj Haqqani said after
the September 13, 2011, attacks on the U.S. Embassy that the faction might, at some point,
participate in settlement talks, although many doubt that intent in light of the recent high profile
attacks by the group. It has also been reported that U.S. officials met with Haqqani
representatives over the summer of 2011, in meetings in UAE facilitated by the ISI. 21

21 Matthew Rosenberg. “U.S. Secretly Met Afghan Militants.” Wall Street Journal, October 5, 2011.
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The faction’s calculations could be affected by how the United States characterizes the group. In
July 2010, then-top U.S. commander in Afghanistan General David Petraeus advocated that the
Haqqani network be named as an FTO under the Immigration and Naturalization Act. Such a
move would be intended to signal to Pakistan that it should not continue to support the Haqqani
network.22 Secretary of State Clinton stated shortly after the September 13 attack on the U.S.
Embassy that such a designation is being prepared by the Administration. No designation has
come forth, to date, but a number of Haqqani leaders have been sanctioned as Specially
Designated Global Terrorists (SDGT) under Executive Order 13224, most recently in November
2011. An FTO designation could make it difficult to conduct further contacts with the faction. S.
1959, which passed the Senate on December 17, 2011, requires an Administration report on
whether the group meets the criteria for FTO designation and, if not, explanation of why not.
Pakistani Groups
The Taliban of Afghanistan are increasingly linked politically and operationally to Pakistani
Taliban militants. The Pakistani groups might see a Taliban recapture of Afghanistan’s
government as helpful to the prospects for these groups inside Pakistan or in their Kashmir
struggle. A major Pakistani group, the Pakistani Taliban (Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan, TTP), is
primarily seeking to challenge the government of Pakistan, but they facilitate the transiting into
Afghanistan of Afghan Taliban and support the Afghan Taliban goals of recapturing Afghanistan.
The TTP may also be seeking to target the United States, an assessment based on a failed
bombing in New York City in May 2010. The State Department designated the TTP as an FTO
under the Immigration and Naturalization Act on September 2, 2010, allegedly for having close
connections to Al Qaeda. Its current leader, Hakimullah Mehsud, was named as terrorism
supporting entities that day. (He succeeded Baitullah Mehsud, who was killed in a U.S. drone
strike in August 2009.)
Another Pakistani group said to be increasingly active inside Afghanistan is Laskhar-e-Tayyiba
(LET, or Army of the Righteous). LET is an Islamist militant group that has previously been
focused on operations against Indian control of Kashmir.
Insurgent Tactics
As far as tactics, U.S. commanders have, prior to mid-2011, worried most about insurgent use of
improvised explosive devices (IEDs), including roadside bombs. IEDs are the leading cause of
U.S. combat deaths, although the Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization, a part
of the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD), reported in February 2011 substantial progress finding
IEDs before they explode. In January 2010, President Karzai issued a decree banning importation
of fertilizer chemicals (ammonium nitrate) commonly used for the roadside bombs, but there
reportedly is informal circumvention of the ban for certain civilian uses, and the material
reportedly still comes into Afghanistan from at least two major production plants in Pakistan.
U.S. commanders have said they have verified some use of surface-to-air missiles,23 although it
does not appear that sophisticated missiles were involved in the apparent shootdown of a U.S.
Chinook helicopter in which about 30 U.S. soldiers (mostly special forces) were killed on August

22 Jane Perlez, Eric Schmitt, and Carlotta Gall, “Pakistan Is Said to Pursue Foothold in Afghanistan,” New York Times,
June 24, 2010.
23 Major General John Campbell, commander of RC-E, July 28, 2010, press briefing.
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6, 2011. During 2011, insurgents made increasing use of infiltrators within the Afghan security
forces, persons impersonating Afghan security personnel, or recruits to their ranks from among
aides trusted by Afghan leaders. Afghan officials have tried to increase monitoring over the sale
of military-style clothing that might be used for such attacks. Other insurgents appear to be
making increasing use of bombs hidden in turbans, which have, until October 2011, generally not
been searched out of respect for Afghan religious traditions. Such a bomb killed former President
Rabbani on September 20, 2011, as noted above.
Insurgent Financing: Narcotics Trafficking and Other Methods
All of the insurgent groups in Afghanistan benefit, at least in part, from narcotics trafficking.
However, the adverse effects are not limited to funding insurgents; the trafficking also
undermines rule of law within government ranks. At the same time, narcotics trafficking is an
area on which there has been progress in recent years, although some question whether progress
is sustainable. The trafficking is said to generate an estimated $70 million-$100 million per year
for the Taliban. A UNODC report of September 2011 reversed, to some extent, the relatively
positive trend in reporting on this issue, noting that 17 provinces out of 34 provinces in
Afghanistan) fall into the “poppy free” category; that is down from 20 provinces in the previous
year’s UNODC report. The value of the opium is set to double in 2011 to $1.4 billion. The report
attributed these trends to a sharp rise in the price of opium crops. One bright spot is that the area
under poppy cultivation in Helmand province, the main opium producing center of Afghanistan,
fell by about 3% from the prior year. 24
The Obama Administration approach focuses on promoting legitimate agricultural alternatives to
poppy growing in line with Afghan government preferences. In July 2009, the United States
ended its prior focus on eradication of poppy fields on the grounds that this practice was driving
Afghans into the arms of the Taliban as protectors of their ability to earn a living. The de-
emphasis on eradication also put aside the long-standing differences with Karzai over whether to
conduct aerial spraying of fields. Congress apparently has sided with Karzai’s view; the
successive annual appropriations laws since FY2008 have prohibited U.S. counter-narcotics
funding from being used for aerial spraying on Afghanistan poppy fields without Afghan
concurrence. Other policies, such as “good governance” U.S.-funded bonuses, give an incentive
to provinces to actively work against cultivation.
The U.S. military, in support of the effort after initial reluctance, is flying Afghan and U.S.
counter-narcotics agents (Drug Enforcement Agency, DEA) on missions and identifying targets; it
also evacuates casualties from counter-drug operations and assists an Afghan helicopter squadron
to move Afghan counter-narcotics forces around the country. To help break up narcotics
trafficking networks, the DEA presence in Afghanistan is has expanded from 13 agents in 2008 to
over 80 by the start of 2011.
The Obama Administration has placed additional focus on the other sources of Taliban funding,
including continued donations from wealthy residents of the Persian Gulf. It established a
multinational task force to combat Taliban financing generally, not limited to narcotics, and U.S.
officials are emphasizing with Persian Gulf counterparts the need for cooperation.

24 UNDOC, http://www.unodc.org/documents/crop-monitoring/Afghanistan/Executive_Summary_2011_web.pdf
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The Bush and Obama Administrations have exercised waiver provisions to required certifications
of full Afghan cooperation needed to provide more than congressionally stipulated amounts of
U.S. economic assistance to Afghanistan. A certification requirement (to provide amounts over
$300 million) was contained in the FY2008 appropriation (P.L. 110-161); in the FY2009 regular
appropriation, P.L. 111-8 ($200 million ceiling); and the FY2010 appropriation, P.L. 111-117,
($200 million ceiling). The FY2009 supplemental (P.L. 111-32) withheld 10% of State
Department narcotics funding (International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement, INCLE)
pending a report that Afghanistan is removing officials involved in narcotics trafficking or gross
human rights violations. No specific counter-narcotics requirement was in the FY2011
appropriation (P.L. 112-10) although there are more general certification requirements that
Afghanistan is taking steps to eliminate official corruption. No funds for Afghanistan have been
held up on these grounds. Narcotics trafficking control was perhaps the one issue on which the
Taliban regime satisfied much of the international community. However, cultivation flourished in
provinces under Northern Alliance control, such as Badakhshan.
The U.S.-Led Military Effort: 2001-2008
To combat the insurgency, in partnership with 49 other countries and the Afghan government and
security forces (see Table 24), there were about 99,000 U.S. troops in Afghanistan as of the
beginning of July 2011—the height of the U.S. troop presence. That has fallen to about 89,000 as
of the end of 2011, in line with the mandated drawdown discussed below. The vast majority
operate under NATO/ISAF command, but about 9,000 are part of the post-September 11 anti-
terrorism mission Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF). On April 28, 2011, President Obama
nominated then top U.S. and NATO commander in Afghanistan, General David Petraeus, to
become CIA Director, and Lieutenant General John Allen took over the command in Afghanistan
on July 18, 2011. Serving under the top U.S. and NATO/ISAF commander is an “Intermediate
Joint Command” focused primarily on day-to-day operations; it is headed since July 2011 by
Lieutenant General Curtis Scaparrotti, who succeeded Major General David Rodriguez.
Prior to the U.S. surge in 2009, most U.S. forces were in eastern Afghanistan, leading Regional
Command East (RC-E) of the NATO/ISAF operation. The most restive provinces in RC-E are
Paktia, Paktika, Khost, Kunar, and Nuristan. Helmand, Qandahar, Uruzgan, Zabol, Nimruz, and
Dai Kundi provinces constituted a “Regional Command South (RC-S),” a command formally
transferred to NATO/ISAF responsibility on July 31, 2006. The growing U.S. troop strength in
RC-S in 2009 and 2010—a product of the fact that most of the 2009-2010 U.S. “surge” was
focused on the south—prompted a May 2010 NATO decision to bifurcate RC-S, with the United
States leading at first leading a “southwest” subdivision for Helmand and Nimruz. U.S.
commanders now lead both RC-S and RC-SW. About 4,000 U.S. forces are under German
command in RC-North, headquartered in Konduz. Turkey commands ISAF forces in the capital,
Kabul, and on October 7, 2011, Turkey agreed to continue in that role for another year. Afghan
forces are in overall lead in the capital, however.
Perception of “Victory,” Followed by Setback and Deterioration
During 2001 to mid-2006, U.S. forces and Afghan troops fought relatively low levels of insurgent
violence with focused combat operations against Taliban concentrations in the south and east. For
example, the United States and partner forces conducted “Operation Mountain Viper” (August
2003); “Operation Avalanche” (December 2003); “Operation Mountain Storm” (March-July
2004); “Operation Lightning Freedom” (December 2004-February 2005); and “Operation Pil”
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(Elephant, October 2005). By late 2005, U.S. and partner commanders appeared to believe that
the combat, coupled with overall political and economic reconstruction, had virtually ended any
insurgency. Anticipating further stabilization, NATO/ISAF assumed lead responsibility for
security in all of Afghanistan during 2005-2006.
Contrary to U.S. expectations, violence increased significantly in mid-2006, particularly in the
east and the south, where ethnic Pashtuns predominate. Reasons for the deterioration include
Afghan government corruption; the absence of governance or security forces in many rural areas;
the safe haven enjoyed by militants in Pakistan; the reticence of some NATO contributors to
actively combat insurgents; a popular backlash against civilian casualties caused by NATO and
U.S. military operations; and the slow pace of economic development. Many Afghans are said to
have turned to the Taliban as a source of impartial and rapid justice, in contrast to the slow and
corrupt processes instituted by the central government.
Since 2006, and particularly during 2010, the key theater of implementation of U.S. strategy has
been eastern and southern Afghanistan, especially Helmand and Qandahar provinces. NATO
counter-offensives during 2006-2008—such as Operation Mountain Lion, Operation Mountain
Thrust, and Operation Medusa (August-September 2006, in Panjwai district of Qandahar
Province)—cleared key districts but did not prevent subsequent reinfiltration because Afghan
governance was not established in cleared areas.
As a further response, NATO and OEF forces tried preemptive combat and increased
development work. Major combat operations in 2007 included U.S. and NATO attempted
preemption of an anticipated Taliban “spring offensive” (“Operation Achilles,” March 2007) in
the Sangin district of Helmand Province, around the Kajaki dam, and Operation Silicon (May
2007), also in Helmand. (In September 2010, Britain turned over security leadership in Sangin to
U.S. forces. That district produced half of Britain’s casualties in Afghanistan to date.)
Despite the additional resources put into Afghanistan, throughout 2008, growing concern took
hold within the Bush Administration. Pessimism was reflected in such statements as a September
2008 comment by Joint Chiefs of Staff chairman Admiral Mike Mullen that “I’m not sure we’re
winning” in Afghanistan. Several major incidents supported that assessment, including (1)
expanding Taliban operations in provinces where it had not previously been active, particularly
Lowgar, Wardak, and Kapisa, close to Kabul; (2) high-profile attacks in Kabul, such as the
January 14, 2008, attack on the Serena Hotel in Kabul and the July 7, 2008, suicide bombing at
the Indian Embassy in Kabul, killing more than 50; (3) the April 27, 2008, assassination attempt
on Karzai during a military parade celebrating the ouster of the Soviet Union; and (4) a June 12,
2008, Sarposa prison break in Qandahar, in which several hundred Taliban captives were freed.
Start of the Buildup
To try to arrest deterioration, the United States and its partners decided to increase force levels by
partly fulfilling a mid-2008 request by General David McKiernan for 30,000 additional U.S.
troops. The decision whether to fulfill the entire request was deferred to the next Administration.
U.S. troop levels started 2006 at 30,000; climbed slightly to 32,000 by December 2008; and
reached 39,000 by April 2009 (shortly after President Obama took office). Partner forces were
increased significantly as well, by about 6,000 during this time, to a total of 39,000 at the end of
2009 (rough parity between U.S. and non-U.S. forces). Many of the U.S. forces deployed in 2008
and 2009 were Marines that deployed to Helmand, large parts of which had fallen out of
coalition/Afghan control.
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In September 2008, the U.S. military and NATO each began strategy reviews. The primary U.S.
review was headed by Lieutenant General Douglas Lute, the Bush Administration’s senior adviser
on Iraq and Afghanistan (who is in the Obama NSC with responsibility for Afghanistan). These
reviews were briefed to the incoming Obama Administration.
Obama Administration Surge
The Obama Administration maintained that Afghanistan needed to be given a higher priority than
it was during the Bush Administration, but also that the U.S. mission in Afghanistan not be
indefinite. The new Administration integrated the reviews under way at the end of the Bush
Administration’s into an overarching 60-day inter-agency “strategy review.” It was chaired by
South Asia expert Bruce Riedel and co-chaired by Ambassador Holbrooke and Under Secretary
of Defense for Policy Michele Flournoy.
Following its initial review, President Obama announced a “comprehensive” strategy on March
27, 2009.25 In conjunction, he announced the deployment of an additional 21,000 U.S. forces, of
which about 4,000 would be trainers. Despite approving most of General McKiernan’s request for
30,000 additional forces, the Administration decided that U.S. military leadership in Afghanistan
was insufficiently innovative. On May 11, 2009, then-Secretary of Defense Gates announced that
General McKiernan would be replaced by General Stanley McChrystal, considered an innovative
commander as head of U.S. Special Operations forces from 2003 to 2008. He assumed command
in Afghanistan on June 15, 2009.
General McChrystal, after assuming command, assessed the security situation and suggested a
strategy in a report of August 30, 2009, and presented to NATO on August 31, 2009,26 as follows.
• That the goal of the U.S. military should be to protect the population—and to
help the Afghan government take steps to earn the trust of the population—rather
than to focus on searching out and combating Taliban concentrations. Indicators
of success such as ease of road travel, participation in local shuras, and normal
life for families are more significant than counts of enemy fighters killed.
• That there is potential for “mission failure” unless a fully resourced,
comprehensive counter-insurgency strategy is pursued and reverses Taliban
momentum within 12-18 months. About 44,000 additional U.S. combat troops
(beyond those approved by the Obama Administration strategy review in March
2009) would be needed to have the greatest chance for his strategy’s success.
Late 2009 Review: “Surge” Coupled With Transition
The McChrystal assessment set off debate within the Administration and another policy review,
taking into account the McChrystal recommendations and the marred August 20, 2009, Afghan
presidential election. Some senior U.S. officials, such as then-Secretary of Defense Gates, were
concerned that adding many more U.S. forces could create among the Afghan people a sense of

25 “White Paper,” http://www.whitehouse.gov/assets/documents/Afghanistan-Pakistan_White_Paper.pdf.
26 Commander NATO International Security Assistance Force, Afghanistan, and U.S. Forces, Afghanistan.
“Commander’s Initial Assessment.” August 30, 2009, available at http://media.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/politics/
documents/Assessment_Redacted_092109.pdf?.
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“occupation” that could prove counter-productive. The high-level review included at least nine
high-level meetings, chaired by President Obama, and reportedly concluded on November 19,
2009. The President announced the following decisions in a speech at West Point military
academy on December 1, 2009:27
• That 30,000 additional U.S. forces (a “surge”) would be sent (bringing U.S.
levels close to 100,000) to “reverse the Taliban’s momentum” and strengthen the
capacity of Afghanistan’s security forces and government.
• That there would be a transition, beginning in July 2011, to Afghan leadership of
the stabilization effort and a corresponding beginning of a drawdown of U.S.
force levels. The July 2011 “deadline” caused significant controversy, as
discussed below.
McChrystal Replaced by Petraeus
On June 23, 2010, President Obama accepted the resignation of General McChrystal after
summoning him to Washington, DC, to discuss the comments by him and his staff to a reporter
for Rolling Stone magazine that disparaged several civilian figures involved in Afghanistan
policy. He named General Petraeus as General McChrystal’s successor. In a June 23, 2010,
statement, President Obama attributed the change purely to the Rolling Stone comments, and
stated that Afghanistan policy would not change. General Petraeus was confirmed by the Senate
on June 30, 2010, and assumed command on July 4, 2010.
July 2011 “Deadline” Yields to “Transition” By the End of 2014
The Obama Administration emphasis on transition to Afghan security leadership beginning in
July 2011 was perhaps the most widely debated aspect of policy. The Administration explained
the time frame as a means of demonstrating to a war-weary public that U.S. military involvement
in Afghanistan is not open-ended, and to compel the Afghan government to assume greater
ownership and responsibility for the mission. However, the 2011 deadline was interpreted by
some Administration critics—and by some Afghan and regional leaders—as laying the
groundwork for a rapid winding down of U.S. involvement.28 Perhaps to address perceived
criticism of such a deadline in the upper ranks of the U.S. military, in an August 31, 2010,
statement, the President asserted that the pace and scope of any drawdown would be subject to
conditions on the ground.
The debate over the July 2011 drawdown abated substantially with an agreement between the
United States and NATO partner forces to focus on allowing a longer time frame for transition to
Afghan leadership. At the November 19-20, 2010, NATO summit in Lisbon, it was agreed that
the transition to Afghan leadership would begin in 2011 and would be completed by the end of
2014.

27 President Obama speech, op. cit. Testimony of Secretary Gates, Secretary Clinton, and Admiral Mullen before the
Senate Armed Services Committee and the House Foreign Affairs Committee. December 2, 2009.
28 Commander NATO International Security Assistance Force, Afghanistan, and U.S. Forces, Afghanistan.
“Commander’s Initial Assessment.” August 30, 2009, available at http://media.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/politics/
documents/Assessment_Redacted_092109.pdf. White House. Remarks by the President In Address to the Nation on the
Way Forward in Afghanistan and Pakistan. December 1, 2009; Chandrasekaran, Rajiv. “Differing Views of New
Afghanistan Strategy.” Washington Post, December 26, 2009.
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Table 3.Summary of Current U.S. Strategy and Implementation
The major outlines of Obama Administration strategy have taken shape as outlined below.
Goals: (1) to disrupt terrorist networks in Afghanistan and Pakistan to degrade their ability to launch international
terrorist attacks; (2) promote a more capable, accountable, and effective government in Afghanistan; (3) develop self-
reliant Afghan security forces; and (4) involve the international community to achieve these objectives.
Strategy Definition: to employ the U.S. and NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) to build Afghan
institutions and prepare them for a transition to full responsibility for securing and developing Afghanistan by the end
of 2014. A U.S. drawdown began in July 2011 in concert with the start of a transition to Afghan security leadership in
specified areas. The United States and Afghanistan are negotiating a long-term security partnership agreement that
will outline the continuing U.S. commitment to Afghan stability subsequent to 2014.
Surge and then Drawdown: to surge forces during 2009- 2011 to align resource “inputs” with mission requirements.
U.S. force levels reached a high of 99,000. A U.S. drawdown of 33,000 is to be completed by September 2012, with
the remaining drawdown plan until 2014 to be determined at a NATO meeting in Chicago in May 2012.
Afghan Governance: to develop Afghan institutions, particularly at the provincial and local levels.
Reintegration and Reconciliation: to support Afghan efforts to reach a settlement with insurgent leaders and provide
financial and social incentives to persuade insurgents to lay down their arms.
Pakistan: to engage Pakistan and enlisting its increased cooperation against militant groups, such as the Haqqani
network, that have a measure of safe haven in Pakistan.
International Dimension: to integrate Afghanistan into existing and new international diplomatic and economic
structures, and to better coordinate all “stakeholders” in the Afghanistan issue (NATO, Afghanistan’s neighbors,
other countries in Afghanistan’s region, the United Nations, and other donors). A major conference was held in Bonn
on December 5, 2011, the 10th anniversary of the original Bonn Conference on Afghanistan.
Partner Participation: to encourage partner forces to remain in Afghanistan until the completion of the transition.
Metrics: to measure progress along clear metrics. P.L. 111-32 (FY2009 supplemental appropriation) requires that the
President submit to Congress, 90 days after enactment (by September 23, 2009), metrics by which to assess progress,
and a report on that progress every 180 days thereafter. The Administration’s approximately 50 metrics29 and
reports are submitted regularly, the latest of which was issued in April 2011. In its September 22, 2009, report on the
situation in Afghanistan (A/64/364-S/2009/475), the United Nations developed its own “benchmarks” for progress.
Surge Implementation and Results
The pace and scope of the transition to Afghan security leadership was intended to depend on
assessments of how well U.S. policy is working. Prior to the surge, the Karzai government was
estimated by to control about 30% of the country, while insurgents controlled 4% (13 out of 364
districts). Insurgents “influenced” or “operated in” another 30% (Afghan Interior Ministry
estimates in August 2009). Tribes and local groups with varying degrees of loyalty to the central
government control the remainder. Some outside groups report higher percentages of insurgent
control or influence.30 The Taliban had named “shadow governors” in 33 out of 34 of
Afghanistan’s provinces, although many provinces in northern Afghanistan were assessed as
having minimal Taliban presence.
By the end of 2010, the Obama Administration claimed that “the momentum achieved by the
Taliban in recent years has been arrested in much of the country and reversed in some key areas,
although these gains remain fragile and reversible.”31 That assessment was repeated in a White
House progress report submitted to Congress on April 5, 2011, cited above. In his June 22, 2011,

29 http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2009/09/16/evaluating_progress_in_afghanistan_pakistan.
30 http://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/12/world/asia/12afghan.html?_r=1.
31 National Security Staff, “Overview of the Afghanistan and Pakistan Annual Review,” December 15, 2010.
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speech, President Obama stated that the United States had achieved its core objectives, articulated
in the December 2009 speech, of pressuring Al Qaeda, reversing Taliban momentum, and
building capable Afghan security forces.
On September 22, 2011, Secretary of Defense Panetta testified before the Senate Armed Services
Committee that “The insurgency has been turned back in much of the country, including its
heartland in the south, and Afghan national security forces are increasingly strong and capable.”
The October 2011 DOD report on Afghanistan stability reiterated that theme, saying strategy had
achieved “important security gains, reversing violence trends in much of the country (except
along the border with Pakistan).” That assessment was based on October 2011, ISAF statistics
that showed a reduction of insurgent attacks compared to previous years. During a visit to
Afghanistan in mid-December 2011, Secretary Panetta, at one stop during the trip, told U.S.
forces: “We’re winning this very tough conflict here in Afghanistan.” Panetta did not repeat that
phraseology in the rest of the trip, and other officials have refrained from language that
optimistic, although the tone of all U.S. comments is that the Taliban has been severely
weakened. After the turnover of the next phase of areas under transition (see below), the Afghan
forces will be in the lead in areas covering more than 50% of the Afghan population.
Still, many commanders attributed the signs of progress not only to the increase in numbers of
U.S. forces, but to a near tripling of Special Operations Force operations in Afghanistan since
2009 (nearly 2,000 such missions during January-August 2011), and to increased UAV
(unmanned aerial vehicle) strikes on insurgent concentrations.
Less optimistic assessments of the surge are based on observations that the insurgents continue to
be able to operate in normally quiet provinces, including cities in the first group to be
transitioned, such as Herat. U.N. statistics released in early October 2011, although counting all
violent incidents, including attacks by ISAF on insurgents, showed violence increasing rather
than slowing. Security fears in the south were raised by the July 2011 assassinations in Qandahar
discussed below.
Moreover, observers note an apparent increase in major attacks in Kabul, which is generally
considered secure: on June 28, insurgents stormed the historic Intercontinental Hotel in Kabul,
prompting a several hour gun battle with Afghan authorities backed by NATO-led forces. On
August 19, 2011, insurgents attacked the compound of the British Council in Kabul, on the
anniversary of Afghanistan’s formal independence from Britain in 1919. The September 13, 2011,
rocket and gunfire attack on the U.S. Embassy in Kabul and ISAF headquarters prompted even
more significant questions about U.S. and Afghan successes, although some U.S. officials used
the attack as an indication that insurgent groups are altering their tactics in response to being
largely defeated in their strongholds in eastern and southern Afghanistan (discussed below). U.S.
casualties also increased during the surge. U.S. deaths in 2010 reached a new high for the Afghan
conflict of just over 500; about 210 soldiers from partner countries were killed during 2010.
The October 2011 DOD report notes that Afghan governance is lagging to the point where the
Afghans may not be able to hold U.S./NATO gains on their own. The report also notes threats to
the U.S.-led gains from the continuing safe haven that insurgents enjoy in Pakistan.
Significant Progress Reported in Helmand and Qandahar
As noted by the October 2011 DOD report, the surge achieved gains in the restive provinces of
Helmand and Qandahar, as was hoped. The reports of progress in Helmand, particularly the
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settled areas along the Helmand River, include gains from “Operation Moshtarek” (Operation
Together) in Marjah.
There are perceptions of major progress in Qandahar Province. Many of the restive districts
around the city, such as Arghandab, Zhari, and Panjwai, are said to be considerably more stable
and vibrant than was the case prior to the surge. Some of the gains could be caused by DOD and
USAID work to expand electricity availability in and around Qandahar by refurbishing
substations, a large effort that prompted a request for the “Afghanistan Infrastructure Fund”
mechanism discussed later.
On the other hand, the Qandahar stabilization effort suffered a significant setback on July 12,
2011, when a trusted aide killed President Karzai’s half-brother, Ahmad Wali Karzai, chair of the
provincial council.32 The death shook confidence in the U.S.-led effort and could still provoke a
power struggle with rivals to Karzai’s Popolzai tribe. Karzai has named another brother, Shah
Wali Karzai, as head of the Popolzai subsequently, although Shah Wali is said to lack the
dynamism and effect of Ahmad Wali. Unconfirmed reports suggest Karzai might appoint a
replacement to Governor Tooryalai Wesa, a low key technocrat who has tried to balance the flow
of U.S. and international funds to the various tribes and clans in the province but who lacked
Ahmad Wali Karzai’s influence in the province. On the other hand, some say that Shah Wali and
other alternative leadership in the province could help alleviate some of the grudges and
jealousies of Ahmad Wali’s often arbitrary exercise of influence and result in a net increase in
stability. Karzai’s influence in Qandahar was further weakened on July 27, 2011, when the mayor
of Qandahar city, Ghulam Haider Hamidi, was killed.
Transition and U.S. Drawdown Under Way
Despite doubts about the durability of progress to date, the transition to Afghan leadership began,
as planned, in July 2011, and is continuing. The transition began in the areas that Karzai
announced on March 22, 2011, as the first set of areas to be transitioned. They are:
• Three provinces: Kabul (except Sarobi district, which is still restive), Panjshir,
and Bamiyan. The latter two are considered highly stable. In Kabul, Afghan
forces have already been in the lead for at least one year. The formal transition
process began with Bamiyan on July 17.
• Four cities: Herat, Mazar-e-Sharif, Lashkar Gah, and Mehtarlam. The former two
cities are widely considered stable. The latter two are in restive areas, Helmand
and Laghman provinces, respectively, and the announcement of transition in
these cities surprised many observers.
In each area of transition, the process of completing the transition to Afghan responsibility is to
take about 12-18 months, according to U.S. commanders. As the transition process proceeds, U.S.
forces are being withdrawn or thinned out; some forces may be “reinvested” (redeployed) to areas
where extra combat force is required.

32 Partlow, Joshua. “U.S. Seeks to Bolster Kandahar Governor, Upend Power Balance.” Washington Post, April 29,
2010.
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Unwinding of the Surge Announced
Then top commander General Petraeus’s recommendations about the size of the initial drawdown
were submitted in mid-June 2011. According to his testimony during his confirmation hearings to
be CIA Director, and that of Admiral Mullen on June 23, 2011, the U.S. military recommended a
gradual drawdown in which the overwhelming majority of the surge forces would be in combat
through the end of 2012. They also had wanted to redeploy some troops to RC-E, where there had
not been as intensive an effort since 2010 as in RC-S or RC-SW. President Obama, asserting that
key goals of the surge had been accomplished, announced his decision on June 22, 2011, as
• the drawdown of 10,000 U.S. forces by the end of 2011. That drawdown has been
accomplished, and U.S. force levels in Afghanistan are about 90,000.
• the removal of another 23,000 forces (the remainder of the surge forces) by
September 2012. The United States will have about 66,000-68,000 after this
drawdown is completed.
• a decision on a drawdown plan for the remaining forces, from 2012 until the
2014 transition completion, to be decided at a NATO meeting in Chicago in May
2012. However, the top U.S. commander, General John Allen, made clear in
interviews in late December 2011 that U.S. forces—no numbers specified—
would likely remain even after the 2014 transition, and possibly for several years
thereafter. Experts assess the likely numbers at about 20,000 troops, for
overwatch and training the ANSF.
Press reports say the President’s drawdown decision was colored by the perception that the killing
of Osama Bin Laden represented a key accomplishment of the core U.S. mission, and because of
the financial needs to reduce the size of the U.S. budget deficit.
Slight Mission Changes as Drawdown Proceeds
In announcing the drawdown, the President did not announce a significant scaling back of the
U.S. mission. General Petraeus and Admiral Mullen, in their testimonies the following day,
acknowledged that the President’s decision represented an “aggressive” drawdown but both said
that they could still carry out U.S. policy with it. In a press interview, then Secretary Gates
indicated that U.S. strategy would progressively evolve to more of “overwatch” and counter-
terrorism but that, for the near term, the current counter-insurgency approach could still be
pursued in some areas of Afghanistan, particularly the still restive east.
As the drawdown has begun, however, some U.S. commanders, including top commander
General Allen, have begun to reveal a slight mission change. According to their comments, some
U.S. mentoring and advisory forces will be sent to Afghanistan in 2012 in an effort to transfer
more combat burden to the Afghan forces, and thereby allow more U.S. regular combat forces to
withdraw than was previously forecast. However, commanders have given all indications that the
planned drawdown to a net total U.S. force of 68,000 would still be achieved.33

33 Shanker, Thom. “U.S. Shift May Push Afghans Into Lead Role.” New York Times, December 14, 2011.
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Transition Continues: Second Phase Announced
Subsequent to the drawdown announcement, ISAF and the Afghan government began planning
the next phase of the transition to Afghan security lead. The areas to be transitioned in the second
phase (with transition to occur from the end of 2011 until the spring of 2012) were announced on
November 27, 2011, as follows:
• Complete provinces: Balkh, Dai Kundi, Takhar, Samangan, Nimruz, and those
areas of Kabul province not transitioned already (Sarobi district). Most of these
provinces are considered relatively stable.
• Large/significant cities: Jalalabad (capital of Nangarhar), Gachcharan (capital of
Ghowr), Shebergan (capital of Jowzjan), Faizabad (capital of Badakshan), Midan
Shahr (capital of Wardak), and Qali Now (capital of Badghis). Most of these
cities are in relatively secure provinces, except for Wardak and Nangarhar.
• Districts of several other provinces in this and the preceding transition phase,
including Nawa, Nad Ali, and Marjah of restive Helmand province; six districts
of Badakhshan; Abkamari district of Badghis; all districts of Herat except for
Shindand; three districts of Laghman; three districts of Nangarhar (outside
Jalalabad city); all districts of Parwan except Shiwari and Siahgherd; all districts
of Sar-i-Pol except Sayyad and the part of Behsud city that is in that province;
and Jalrez and the center of Behsud city in Wardak province.
Beyond 2014: Long-Term Commitment/Strategic
Partnership Agreement

As noted, President Obama and other senior U.S. officials say that 2014 is not a date certain for a
complete U.S. pullout, but rather for a transition to Afghan leadership. As noted above, General
Allen has been clear that the United States will likely keep some troops in Afghanistan after that
time.34 Such troops would remain under the auspices of a strategic partnership agreement under
negotiation. The negotiations are pursuant to President Obama’s statement, at a May 12, 2010,
press conference with visiting President Karzai, in which President Obama stated that the United
States and Afghanistan would renew and expand an existing, five-year-old strategic partnership. A
new strategic partnership agreement is likely to be modeled along that of a “Security Agreement”
agreed with Iraq in 2008, although likely without an end date for U.S. military involvement in
Afghanistan. Unlike Iraq, few major Afghan figures are calling for an outright end to U.S.
military involvement in Afghanistan after 2014.
Negotiations began with the February 24-28, 2011, visit to Washington, DC, of Afghan Defense
Minister Wardak and Interior Minister Khan; the talks continued with the March 2011 visit to
Afghanistan of a U.S. negotiating team, as stated by then Secretary Gates on March 7, 2011. The
Administration intent was to finalize the new strategic partnership to coincide with the beginning
of the U.S. drawdown in July 2011, although that goal was not met. Press reports indicate that
negotiations, led on the Afghan side by key Karzai aide Ashraf Ghani, bogged down over Afghan
insistence on firm deadlines for Afghan institutions to assume control over detention centers and
decisions on nighttime and other U.S.-led raids on insurgents. The pact reportedly will not

34 General Allen interview with Scott Pelley, CBS 60 Minutes. Broadcast October 15, 2011.
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provide for “permanent” U.S. bases or for the use of Afghan facilities for use against neighboring
countries, but would apparently allow long-term U.S. use of the facilities. On September 10,
2011, Karzai’s National Security Adviser Rangin Spanta said the gaps were narrowing and the
pact would likely be agreed soon.
President Karzai had long indicated he would put the accord to a special loya jirga for
ratification. In advance of the pact’s completion, Karzai called a loya jirga to endorse the concept
of the pact but also conditions he seeks for any final agreement. Those conditions include more
Afghan control over detentions and approval authority for U.S.-led night raids. A November 16-
19, 2011, traditional loya jirga (the jirga was conducted not in accordance with the constitution
and its views are therefore non-binding), consisting of about 2,030 delegates, gave Karzai the
approvals he sought, both for the pact itself and his suggested conditions to it, for example, on
more Afghan control of night raids and other raids on Afghan homes.
The pact would also likely provide for continuing provision of arms to the Afghan security forces.
One issue in the long-term relationship that might cause debate on the U.S. side is that the
Afghans are said to have overly ambitious plans to buy major U.S. combat systems, such as F-
16s, that the Afghans cannot likely sustain without significant long-term assistance.
The strategic partnership was first established on May 23, 2005, when Karzai and President Bush
issued a “joint declaration”35 providing for U.S. forces to have access to Afghan military
facilities, in order to prosecute “the war against international terror and the struggle against
violent extremism.” The joint statement did not give Karzai enhanced control over facilities used
by U.S. forces, over U.S. operations, or over prisoners taken during operations. Some of the
bases, both in and near Afghanistan, that support combat in Afghanistan, include those in Table 7.
Karzai’s signing of the partnership had been blessed by 1,000 Afghan representatives on May 8,
2005, at a consultative jirga in Kabul. That jirga supported an indefinite presence of international
forces to maintain security but urged Karzai to delay a firm decision to request such a presence.
Karzai stated on March 22, 2011, that he would likely call another loya jirga to evaluate the
renewed and expanded partnership, if it is agreed with the United States. A FY2009 supplemental
appropriation (P.L. 111-32) and the FY2010, FY2011, and FY2012 National Defense
Authorization Acts (P.L. 111-84, P.L. 111-383, and H.R. 1540, respectively) prohibit the U.S.
establishment of permanent bases in Afghanistan.
No “SOFA” in Place Currently
U.S. forces currently operate in Afghanistan under “diplomatic notes” between the United States
and the interim government of Afghanistan—primarily one that was exchanged in November
2002. That agreed note gives the United States legal jurisdiction over U.S. personnel serving in
Afghanistan and states the Afghan government’s acknowledgment that U.S.-led military
operations were “ongoing.” A draft SOFA—or technical agreement clarifying U.S./coalition
authorities in Afghanistan—reportedly has been under discussion between the United States and
Afghanistan since 2007, but is now likely to be incorporated into the strategic agreement above.

35 See http://merln.ndu.edu/archivepdf/afghanistan/WH/20050523-2.pdf.
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Threats to Long-Term U.S. Presence: Civilian Casualties and 2011 Protests
As noted above, Afghan officials seek in any long-term pact to limit the U.S. ability to cause
civilian casualties and to conduct certain operations that cause political backlash against the
United States and the Afghan government. U.S. commanders agree, to a large extent, with the
Afghan concerns, but seek to balance civilian casualties against the need to accomplish
operational objectives. The Afghan position is a result of several major incidents. One major such
incident occurred near Herat on August 22, 2008, in which a NATO bomb killed up to 90
civilians, as well as the incident in September 2009 in Konduz in which Germany’s contingent
called in an airstrike on Taliban fighters who captured two fuel trucks; killing several civilians as
well as Taliban fighters. However, ISAF-caused civilian casualties continue and usually lead to
recriminations from President Karzai, including a veiled threat from Karzai in May 2011 that
continued civilian casualties would cause Afghans to view international forces as occupiers, and
Karzai instructions to Afghan military leaders to play in approving NATO operations. He made
similar comments in June 2011, causing outgoing Ambassador Eikenberry to rebuke him
indirectly but publicly.
If there is a decision to retain international forces in Afghanistan beyond 2014, the attitudes of the
Afghan population might become a factor. The insurgent forces had always used the presence of
foreign forces on Afghan soil as a rallying and recruiting point, but the vast bulk of Afghans have,
in surveys, generally appreciated the need for foreign forces to secure Afghanistan. There were
signs in April 2011 that the public welcome of foreign forces might be eroding. On April 1, 2011,
crowds of Afghans in the northern city of Mazar-e-Sharif demonstrated against the March 2011
burning of a Quran by a Florida pastor. The demonstration turned violent, with protesters
storming the U.N. compound in the city and killing 12, including 7 U.N. staff. Demonstrations in
other Afghan cities followed, including anti-U.S. slogans and posters echoing the Taliban’s anti-
U.S., anti-Western rhetoric. The demonstrations raised questions as to whether the Afghan public
has begun to see international forces as occupiers, and appeared to illustrate that a long-term
presence of large numbers of international forces might be opposed broadly within Afghanistan.
Additionally, a riot erupted on May 19, 2011, in normally quiet Takhar Province to protest a
NATO night raid there that allegedly killed four civilians.
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Table 4. Operation Enduring Freedom Partner Forces
Operation Enduring Freedom continues as a separate combat track, led by the United States but joined by at least
twelve partners. The caveat issue is less of a factor with OEF, since OEF is known as a combat-intensive mission
conducted in large part by special forces contingents of contributing nations. The overwhelming majority of non-U.S.
forces are under the NATO/ISAF mission. Prior to NATO assumption of command in October 2006, 19 coalition
countries—primarily Britain, France, Canada, and Italy contributing approximately 4,000 combat troops to OEF-
Afghanistan. Most were subsequently rebadged to ISAF. However, several foreign contingents, composed mainly of
special operations forces, including forces from the UAE, are still part of OEF-Afghanistan. This includes about 500
British special forces, some German special forces, and other special forces units. In early 2010, U.S. Special Forces
operating in Afghanistan were brought under direct command of the top U.S. command in Afghanistan.
Under OEF, Japan provided naval refueling capabilities in the Arabian sea, but the mission was suspended in October
2007 fol owing a parliamentary change of majority there in July 2007. The mission was revived in January 2008 when
the new government forced through parliament a bill to allow the mission to resume. It was renewed again, over
substantial parliamentary opposition, in December 2008, but the opposition party won September 2009 elections in
Japan and reportedly has decided on an alternative to continuing the refueling mission—by increasing its financial
contributions to economic development in Afghanistan. That led to an October 2009 pledge by Japan—already the
third largest individual country donor to Afghanistan, providing about $1.9 billion in civilian reconstruction aid since
the fall of the Taliban—to provide another $5 billion over five years. It has been requested to be a major financial
donor of an Afghan army expansion, and, in March 2009, it pledged to pay the costs of the Afghan National Police for
six months.
As part of OEF outside Afghanistan, the United States leads a multi-national naval anti-terrorist, anti-smuggling, anti-
proliferation interdiction mission in the Persian Gulf/Arabian Sea, headquartered in Bahrain. That mission was
expanded after the fall of Saddam Hussein to include protecting Iraqi oil platforms in the Gulf.
Building Afghan Forces and Establishing Rule of Law
Since the Taliban were ousted from power, a key tenet of U.S. and NATO policy—and the key to
their “exit strategy” from Afghanistan—has been to build capable Afghan National Security
Forces (ANSF), consisting primarily of the Afghan National Army (ANA) and Afghan National
Police (ANP). This policy is being emphasized to an even greater degree as the transition to
Afghan lead proceeds.
Although the ANSF has expanded considerably since 2002, it has been considered a struggle to
bring these forces to a level of capability that would allow them to assume responsibility for
securing Afghanistan. Obama Administration strategy emphasizes expanding the ANSF and
improving it through partnering and more intense mentoring and training—about 90% of ANSF
units are now partnered with international forces. This trend is likely to be accelerated further as
part of the U.S. military transition plan discussed above. The October 2011 DOD report on
Afghan stability, cited earlier, provides a detailed assessment of what it says is “substantial
progress” of the ANSF, as well as continued deficiencies.
Much of the deficiency throughout the ANSF is due to illiteracy, which is estimated at about 90%.
That has prompted NTM-A to increasingly focus on providing literacy training, which is also
seen as a large driver of recruits who want the literacy education. The October 2011 DOD report
says there were 89,000 Afghan soldiers and police undergoing literacy training as of September
2011.
Current Size and Target Size
On January 21, 2010, the joint U.N.-Afghan “Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board” (JCMB)
agreed that, by October 2011, the ANA would expand to 171,600 and the ANP to about 134,000,
for a total ANSF of 305,600. Both forces reached that level by late September 2011 and continue
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to grow. They now total about 312,000. Earlier, both forces reached a lower interim size of
134,000 and 109,000 respectively in August 2010, two months earlier than planned.
Based on U.S. commander recommendations, in August 2011 a new, larger target level for the
ANSF was set: 352,000 by November 2012. That is allocated as: 195,000 ANA and 157,000 ANP.
This new target level is slightly smaller than a General Petraeus recommendation of 378,000,
which was not adopted because of the concerns about the Afghan ability to sustain so large a
force. A final target size for the post-2014 period has not been set, according to DOD. About 1%
of the ANSF is female.
Training Overview
U.S. forces, along with partner countries and contractors, train the ANSF. In February 2010, the
U.S.-run “Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan” (CSTC-A) that ran the training
was subordinated to the broader NATO Training Mission—Afghanistan (NTM-A). NTM-A is
commanded by U.S. Major General William Caldwell. CSTC-A’s mission was reoriented to
building the capacity of the Afghan Defense and Interior Ministries, and to provide resources to
the ANSF. The total number of required trainers (U.S. and partner) for these institutions is 4,750.
The unfilled gap of trainers totaling about 750 is discussed in the section on Alliances below, and
particular attention has been called to the need for 290 police trainers to staff five new police
training centers scheduled that opened in 2011.36
A core element of NATO’s training efforts are its mentoring teams—known as Operational
Mentoring Liaison Teams (OMLTs) and Police Operational Mentoring and Liaison Teams
(POMLTs). The OMLTs and POMLTs are responsible for training and mentoring deployed ANSF
units. OMLTs, which operate with the Afghan National Army (ANA), consist of 11-28 personnel
from one or several countries. POMLTs, which teach and mentor the Afghan National Police
(ANP), are composed of 15-20 personnel each. It is not known whether this structure will be
preserved after the 2014 completion of the transition.
Working with NTM-A is a separate France-led 300-person European Gendarmerie Force (EGF)
has been established to train Afghan forces in the provinces. The European Union is providing a
190-member “EUPOL” training effort, and 60 other experts to help train the ANP.
The Afghan National Army (ANA)
The Afghan National Army has been built “from scratch” since 2002—it is not a direct
continuation of the national army that existed from the 1880s until the Taliban era. That national
army all but disintegrated during the 1992-1996 mujahedin civil war and the 1996-2001 Taliban
period. However, some Afghan officers who served prior to the Taliban have joined the ANA.
U.S. and allied officers say that the ANA is becoming a major force in stabilizing the country and
a national symbol. It now has at least some presence in most of Afghanistan’s 34 provinces,
working with the PRTs, and it deployed outside Afghanistan to assist relief efforts for victims of
the October 2005 Pakistan earthquake. ANA battalions, or “Kandaks,” are the main unit of the
Afghan force.

36 Deb Riechmann, “NATO:740 Trainers still needed for Afghan forces,” Associated Press, February 13, 2010.
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The ANA is able to lead a growing percentage of all combat operations, but there is substantial
skepticism within the U.S. defense establishment that it can assume full security responsibility by
2014, which is the target time frame announced by Karzai. U.S. military assessments say the
force remains poorly led. It still suffers from at least a 20% desertion rate. Some accounts say that
a typical ANA unit is only at about 50% of its authorized strength at any given time, and there are
significant shortages in about 40% of equipment items. The high desertion rate complicates U.S.-
led efforts to steadily grow the force. Some recruits take long trips to their home towns to remit
funds to their families, and often then return to the ANA after a long absence. Others, according
to U.S. observers, often refuse to serve far from their home towns. The FY2005 foreign aid
appropriation (P.L. 108-447) required that ANA recruits be vetted for terrorism, human rights
violations, and drug trafficking.
On the other hand, the ANA is assuming more responsibility without faltering outright. In August
2008, the ANA took over security of Kabul city from Italy, and it took formal control of Kabul
Province in early 2009. The commando forces of the ANA, trained by U.S. Special Operations
Forces, and numbering about 5,300, are considered well-trained and are taking the lead in some
operations against high-value targets.
To assist its performance, the United States is attempting to better equip the ANA. Approximately
$2.7 billion worth of vehicles, weapons, equipment, and aircraft are being provided during
August 2011-March 2012. General Caldwell stated in June 2011 that the United States is also
helping the ANSF build up an indigenous weapons production capability.
The United States has built five ANA bases: Herat (Corps 207), Gardez (Corps 203), Qandahar
(Corps 205), Mazar-e-Sharif (Corps 209), and Kabul (Division HQ, Corps 201, Air Corps).
Coalition officers conduct heavy weapons training for a heavy brigade as part of the “Kabul
Corps,” based in Pol-e-Charki, east of Kabul.
ANA Ethnic and Factional Considerations
At the time the United States first began establishing the ANA, Northern Alliance figures who
were then in key security positions weighted recruitment for the national army toward its Tajik
ethnic base. Many Pashtuns, in reaction, refused recruitment or left the ANA program. The
naming of a Pashtun, Abdul Rahim Wardak, as Defense Minister in December 2004 reduced
desertions among Pashtuns (he remains in that position). U.S. officials in Afghanistan say this
problem was further alleviated with better pay and more close involvement by U.S. forces, and
that the force is ethnically integrated in each unit and representative. With about 41% Pashtuns,
34% Tajiks, 12% Hazaras, and 8% Uzbeks, the force is roughly in line with the broad
demographics of the country, according to the April 2010 DOD report. However, U.S.
commanders say that those Pashtuns who are in the force are disproportionately eastern Pashtuns
(from the Ghilzai tribal confederations) rather than southern Pashtuns (mostly Durrani tribal
confederations). Defense Minister Wardak said in February 2011 that a greater proportion of
southern Pashtuns are being recruited to redress that imbalance somewhat, and the October 2011
DOD reports says a re-evaluation in 2011 shows that there are more southern Pashtuns in the
force than previously thought. The chief of staff was General Bismillah Khan, a Tajik who was a
Northern Alliance commander, although as of June 2010 he is Interior Minister.
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Afghan Air Force
Equipment, maintenance, and logistical difficulties continue to plague the Afghan Air Force, and
it remains mostly a support force for ground operations rather than a combat-oriented force.
However, the Afghan Air Force has been able to make ANA units nearly self-sufficient in airlift.
The force is a carryover from the Afghan Air Force that existed prior to the Soviet invasion, and
is expanding gradually after its equipment was virtually eliminated in the 2001-2002 U.S. combat
against the Taliban regime. It now has about over 3,000 personnel, including 400 pilots, as well as
a total of about 46 aircraft (of a planned fleet of 146 aircraft). Afghan pilots are based at Bagram
air base. There are some female Afghan Air Force personnel; four arrived in the United States in
July 2011 for training as military helicopter pilots.
Afghanistan is seeking the return of 26 aircraft, including some MiG-2s that were flown to safety
in Pakistan and Uzbekistan during the past conflicts in Afghanistan. U.S. plans do not include
supply of fixed-wing combat aircraft such as F-16s, which Afghanistan wants, according to U.S.
military officials. There is a concern that Afghanistan will not soon have the capability to sustain
operations of an aircraft as sophisticated as the F-16. In 2010, Russia and Germany supplied MI-8
helicopters to the Afghan Air Force.
Afghan National Police (ANP)
U.S. and Afghan officials believe that building up a credible and capable national police force is
at least as important to combating the insurgency as building the ANA. The DOD reports on
Afghanistan, cited earlier, contains substantial detail on U.S.-led efforts to continue what it says
are “significant strides [that] have been made in professionalizing the ANP.” Outside assessments
are widely disparaging, asserting that there is rampant corruption to the point where citizens
mistrust and fear the ANP. Among other criticisms are a desertion rate far higher than that of the
ANA; substantial illiteracy; involvement in local factional or ethnic disputes because the ANP
works in the communities its personnel come from; and widespread use of drugs. It is this view
that has led to consideration of stepped up efforts to promote local security solutions such as
those discussed above.
Bismillah Khan, the Interior Minister, was highly respected as ANA chief of staff and has taken
steps to try to improve the ANP, including through unannounced visits to stations around the
country. He has also instituted salary increases and objective standards for promotions and
assignments. Still, some Pashtuns might resent his Tajik ethnicity, and some criticized him for
direct involvement in combating the September 13, 2011, attack on the U.S. Embassy in Kabul
and confusing the lines of authority and reducing the effect of the Afghan counterattack. His
reform efforts build on those taken in March 2010, by then-Interior Minister Atmar when he
signed a “strategic guidance” document for the ANP, which prioritizes eliminating corruption
within the ANP and winning public confidence. About 1,000 ANP are women, demonstrating
some commitment to gender integration of the force.
Other U.S. commanders credit a November 2009 raise in police salaries (nearly doubled to about
$240 per month for service in high combat areas)—and the streamlining and improvement of the
payments system for the ANP—with reducing the solicitation of bribes by the ANP. The raise also
stimulated an eightfold increase in the number of Afghans seeking to be recruited. Others note the
success, thus far, of efforts to pay police directly (and avoid skimming by commanders) through
cell phone-based banking relationships (E-Paisa, run by Roshan cell network).
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The United States has worked to correct longstanding equipment deficiencies. According to
General Caldwell in June 2011, the ANP is increasingly being provided with heavy weapons and
now have about 5,000 armored vehicles countrywide. Still, most police units lack adequate
ammunition and vehicles. In some cases, equipment requisitioned by their commanders is being
sold and the funds pocketed by the police officers. These activities contributed to the failure of a
2006 “auxiliary police” effort that attempted to rapidly field large numbers of new ANP officers.
The U.S. police training effort was first led by State Department/INL, but DOD took over the lead
in police training in April 2005. Some U.S. officials believe that the United States and its partners
still have not centered on a clearly effective police training strategy. A training reorganization was
implemented during 2007-2011, called “focused district development.” In that program, a district
police force was taken out and retrained, its duties temporarily performed by more highly trained
police (Afghan National Civil Order Police, or ANCOP, which number about 9,400 nationwide),
and then reinserted after the training is complete. However, the ANCOP officers are currently
being used mostly to staff new checkpoints that are better securing the most restive districts.
Police training includes instruction in human rights principles and democratic policing concepts,
and the State Department human rights report on Afghanistan, referenced above, says the
government and outside observers are increasingly monitoring the police force to prevent abuses.
Rule of Law/Criminal Justice Sector
Many experts believe that an effective justice sector is vital to Afghan governance. Some of the
criticisms and allegations of corruption at all levels of the Afghan bureaucracy have been
discussed throughout this report. U.S. justice sector programs generally focus on promoting rule
of law and building capacity of the judicial system, including police training and court
construction. The rule of law issue is covered in detail in CRS Report R41484, Afghanistan: U.S.
Rule of Law and Justice Sector Assistance
, by Liana Sun Wyler and Kenneth Katzman.
Afghan Public Protection Force
A new force is being developed by the Ministry of Interior, in partnership with ISAF and U.S.
Embassy Kabul. The Afghan Public Protection Force is intended to be a guard force of about
14,000 personnel which will help guard diplomatic and development sites. The force was
developed to implement Karzai’s demands in 2010 that private security contractor forces be
disbanded and their functions performed by official Afghan government forces.
U.S. Security Forces Funding/”CERP”
Because the Afghan government has so few resources, the Afghan security sector is funded
almost entirely through international donations. In 2011, NTM-A has a budget of $10 billion,
almost all of which is U.S. funded, including $3 billion for infrastructure; $3 billion for
equipment; $1 billion for training; and $3 billion for “sustainment” (food and salaries for the
Afghan forces, and related costs).
Most estimates say that, beyond the 2014 transition completion, the ANSF will require $6 billion
to $8 billion per year. The United States, as noted below, expects to spend $12.8 billion on the
ANSF in FY2012, but press reports in September 2011 say the Administration plan is to reduce
U.S. contributions to about $6 billion in FY2014. It is possible that the United States will seek
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matching partner contributions to provide for the ANSF after 2014, in order to allow the U.S.
contribution to be reduced to about $4 billion per year after 2014, according to press reports in
September 2011.
The time frame for Afghan financial self-sufficiency for its security is far in the future. As noted
elsewhere, the Afghan government will take in less than $2 billion in total revenue in 2011. In
December 2009, Karzai asserted that the Afghan government could not likely fund its own
security forces until 2024, and no Afghan or other official has shortened that time frame since.
Recent appropriations for the ANA and ANP are contained in the tables at the end of this report,
which also contain breakdowns for Commanders Emergency Response Program funds, or CERP,
which is used for projects that build goodwill and presumably reduce the threat to use forces.
CERP has also been used for what could be considered development projects, a point of
contention among some observers. As noted in the tables, as of FY2005, the security forces
funding has been DOD funds, not State Department funds (Foreign Military Financing, FMF).
NATO Trust Fund for the ANA
In 2007 ISAF set up a trust fund for donor contributions to fund the transportation of equipment
donated to and the training of the ANA; the mandate was expanded in 2009 to include
sustainment costs. In November 2010 a further expansion was agreed on to support literacy
training for the ANA. The total of all NATO ANA trust fund balances started 2011 at about $22
million. (U.S. funding for the ANA is provided separately, not through this fund.) Donations
totaling $163 million were received during 2011, almost all of which was used, leaving a balance
as of October 2011 of about $53 million.
Law and Order Trust Fund for the ANP
There is also a separate “Law and Order Trust Fund” (LOTF) for Afghanistan, run by the U.N.
Development Program, which is used to pay the salaries of the ANP and other police-related
functions. From 2002-2010, donors contributed $1.74 billion to the Fund, of which the United
States contributed about $620 million, according to the April 2011 DOD report (p. 41). Japan’s
2009 pledge to pay the expenses of the Afghan police for at least six months (about $125 million
for each six month period) is implemented through the LOTF.
Other Bilateral Donations
The October 2011 DOD report discusses other bilateral donations to the ANSF, both in funds and
in arms and equipment donations. Since 2002, about $2.9 billion in assistance to the ANSF has
come from these sources. As an example, in October 2011, Croatia and Slovenia donated a total
of over 20,000 AK-47 assault rifles to the ANP. Australia contributed $40 mliion to relocate the
ANA’s 205th Corps, and South Korea contributed $30 million for medical and communications
equipment.
Policy Component: Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs)
U.S. and partner officials have generally praised the effectiveness of “Provincial Reconstruction
Teams” (PRTs)—enclaves of U.S. or partner forces and civilian officials that provide safe havens
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for international aid workers to help with reconstruction and to extend the writ of the Kabul
government—in accelerating reconstruction and assisting stabilization efforts. The PRTs, the
concept for which was announced in December 2002, perform activities ranging from resolving
local disputes to coordinating local reconstruction projects, although most U.S.-run PRTs and
most PRTs in combat-heavy areas focus on counter-insurgency. Many of the additional U.S.
civilian officials deployed to Afghanistan during 2009 and 2010 are based at PRTs, which have
facilities, vehicles, and security. Some aid agencies say they have felt more secure since the PRT
program began,37 but several relief groups do not want to associate with military forces because
doing so might taint their perceived neutrality. Others, such as Oxfam International, argue that the
PRTs are delaying the time when the Afghan government has the skills and resources to secure
and develop Afghanistan on its own. It is likely that the PRTs in Afghanistan will either be phased
out or transitioned to purely civilian leadership and roles as the transition unfolds.
The list of PRTs in operation, including lead country, is shown in Table 25. Virtually all the PRTs
are now under the ISAF mission. Each PRT operated by the United States has U.S. forces; DOD
civil affairs officers; representatives of USAID, State Department, and other agencies; and
Afghan government (Interior Ministry) personnel. Most PRTs, including those run by partner
forces, have personnel to train Afghan security forces. USAID officers assigned to the PRTs
administer PRT reconstruction projects.
Karzai Criticism of PRTs
As far as use of PRTs to jump-start development, USAID observers say there is little Afghan
input, either into development project decision making or as contractors for facility and other
construction. That lack of input has fed criticism by Karzai, most recently at his February 6, 2011,
speech at a security conference in Munich, that the PRTs should be abolished and all aid funds
channeled through the Afghan government. USAID spending on PRT projects is in the table on
USAID spending in Afghanistan at the end of this report.
To address the criticism, some donor countries have enhanced the civilian component of the PRTs
and change their image from military institutions. There has been long been consideration to turn
over the lead in the U.S.-run PRTs to civilians rather than military personnel, presumably State
Department or USAID officials. That was first attempted in 2006 with the establishment of a
civilian-led U.S.-run PRT in the Panjshir Valley. As noted, in March 2009, the Netherlands
converted its PRT to civilian lead, although that alteration ceased after the assumption of U.S. and
Australian PRT command in July 2010. As of November 2009, the “civilianization” of the PRT
concept has evolved further with the decision to refer to PRTs as Interagency Provincial Affairs
(IPA) offices or branches. In this new concept—a local parallel to the Senior Civilian
Representatives now assigned to each regional command—State Department officers enjoy
enhanced decision-making status at each PRT.
Cooperation With Allies/Preventing Allied “Rush for the Exits”
Since the fall of the Taliban, the U.S.-led mission in Afghanistan has been in cooperation with
partners. Since 2006, the vast bulk of all U.S. troops in Afghanistan have served under the
umbrella of the NATO-led “International Security Assistance Force” (ISAF). ISAF consists of all

37 Kraul, Chris. “U.S. Aid Effort Wins Over Skeptics in Afghanistan.” Los Angeles Times, April 11, 2003.
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26 NATO members states plus partner countries—a total of 50 countries including the United
States. President Obama’s December 1, 2009, policy speech on Afghanistan was explicit in
seeking new partner troop commitments, and pledges met or exceeded what some U.S. officials
expected. However, as the transition to Afghan leadership began in July 2011, U.S. officials are
attempting to prevent a “rush to the exits” in which partner forces pull out before their areas of
responsibility are ready for transition. Rather, U.S. officials want partner drawdowns to occur at
roughly the same rate and proportion as the U.S. drawdown occurs—thus far achieved.
Virtually all the European governments have long been under pressure from their publics and
parliaments to end or reduce their military involvement in Afghanistan. Several key contingents
had (1) already ended their combat missions (the Netherlands), (2) announced firm ends to those
missions (Canada ended its combat mission in late July 2011, but will furnish 950 trainers for the
ANSF), or (3) set notional times to depart before the 2014 completion of the transition. Partner
forces that continue to bear the brunt of combat in Afghanistan include Britain, Canada, Poland,
France, Denmark, Romania, and Australia.
The drawdown schedule from 2012–2014 is to be decided at the May 2012 NATO summit
meeting in Chicago, as stated above. There are no firm indications, to date, of which countries
would maintain forces in Afghanistan beyond the 2014 transition. However, some experts believe
that close U.S. allies will keep some forces in Afghanistan in order to show support for U.S.
policy after 2014.
Other partner countries are planning their own near-term drawdowns, leading to the completion
of their missions by the end of 2014, as follows:
• France will cut about 1,000 forces by the end of 2012.
• Britain announced it would withdraw about 900 of its force by the end of 2012,
and the remainder of the contingent would out by the end of 2014.
• Italy, Poland, and Germany have also indicated an intent to try to wind down
their involvement in Afghanistan before the end of 2014.
• Germany’s parliament in January 2011 renewed the German participation for one
year, although that might be reviewed in late 2011.
• Denmark will withdraw 120 troops by the end of 2012, but will increase
development aid and ANSF training contributions.
• Belgium will remove 300 personnel from Kabul International Airport by the end
of 2012.
• Turkey will redeploy 200-300 personnel from the Kabul sector by the end of
2013.
• Australia may end its mission in Afghanistan before the 2014 completion of the
transition, according to Prime Minister Julia Gillard in November 2011. That
comment may have been triggered by Afghan military comments that the ANA is
capable of assuming responsibility for the mission in Uruzgan Province.
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Table 5. Background on NATO/ISAF Formation and U.N. Mandate
The International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) was created by the Bonn Agreement and U.N. Security Council
Resolution 1386 (December 20, 2001, a Chapter 7 resolution),38 initially limited to Kabul. In October 2003, after
Germany agreed to contribute 450 military personnel to expand ISAF into the city of Konduz, ISAF contributors
endorsed expanding its presence to several other cities, contingent on formal U.N. approval—which came on
October 14, 2003, in U.N. Security Council Resolution 1510. In August 2003, NATO took over command of ISAF—
previously the ISAF command rotated among donor forces including Turkey and Britain.
NATO/ISAF’s responsibilities broadened significantly in 2004 with NATO/ISAF’s assumption of security responsibility
for northern and western Afghanistan (Stage 1, Regional Command North, in 2004 and Stage 2, Regional Command
West, in 2005, respectively). The transition process continued on July 31, 2006, with the formal handover of the
security mission in southern Afghanistan to NATO/ISAF control. As part of this “Stage 3,” a British/Canadian/Dutch-
led “Regional Command South” (RC-S) was formed. Britain is the lead force in Helmand; Canada is lead in Qandahar,
and the Netherlands was lead in Uruzgan until its departure in July 2010; the three rotated the command of RC-S.
“Stage 4,” the assumption of NATO/ISAF command of peacekeeping in 14 provinces of eastern Afghanistan (and thus
all of Afghanistan), was completed on October 5, 2006. As part of the completion of the NATO/ISAF takeover, the
United States put about half the U.S. troops then operating in Afghanistan under NATO/ISAF in “Regional Command
East” (RC-E).
The ISAF mission was renewed (until October 13, 2012) by U.N. Security Council Resolution 2011 (October 12,
2011), which reiterated previous resolutions’ support for the Operation Enduring Freedom mission. Tables at the end
of this report list contributing forces, areas of operations, and their Provincial Reconstruction Teams.
Major Contingent Developments During the U.S. “Surge”
U.S. partners note that they have repeatedly answered the U.S. call to support the mission. In
concert with the beginning of the U.S. surge in early 2009, additional pledges came through at the
April 3-4, 2009, NATO summit, and other force pledges were announced in conjunction with the
January 28, 2010, conference on Afghanistan in London. Among major pledges (troops and major
aid funds) that supported the U.S. surge:
• November 10, 2009: Ahead of President Obama’s visit to Asia, Japan announced
a pledge of $5 billion over the next five years for Afghanistan civilian
development, although it suspended its naval refueling mission. Japan has been
covering about half of the $250 million yearly salary costs of the ANP.
• July 2009: South Korea announced it would increase its aid contribution to
Afghanistan by about $20 million, in part to expand the hospital capabilities at
Bagram Air Base. In July 2010, it returned about 150 engineers to Afghanistan
for development missions, protected by 300 South Korean forces, to Parwan
Province.39
• December 2009-January 2010 (London conference): A total of about 9,000 forces
were pledged (including retaining 2,000 sent for the August 2009 election who
were due to rotate out). Several countries pledged police trainers.

38 Its mandate was extended until October 13, 2006, by U.N. Security Council Resolution 1623 (September 13, 2005);
and until October 13, 2007, by Resolution 1707 (September 12, 2006).
39 Until December 2007, 200 South Korean forces at Bagram Air Base, mainly combat engineers, were part of
Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF); they left in December 2007 in fulfillment of a decision by the South Korean
government the previous year. However, many observers believe South Korea did not further extend its mission beyond
that, possibly as part of an agreement in August 2007 under which Taliban militants released 21 kidnapped South
Korean church group visitors. Two were killed during their captivity. The Taliban kidnappers did not get the demanded
release of 23 Taliban prisoners held by the Afghan government.
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• July 2010: Malaysia became a new contributor to the Afghanistan effort,
furnishing 40 military medics.
• March 2011: Germany said it would add 300 forces to operate surveillance
systems, although this decision was related to its refusal to participate in military
action against Libya rather than to an Afghanistan-specific requirement.
• May 2011: Kazakhstan became the first Central Asian state to announce a troop
contribution, pledging four non-combat troops to the mission.
National “Caveats” on Combat Operations
One of the most thorny issues has been the U.S. effort to persuade other NATO countries to adopt
flexible rules of engagement that allow all contributing forces to perform combat missions.
NATO and other partner forces have not, as they pledged at the NATO summit in April 2008,
removed the so-called “national caveats” on their troops’ operations that Lieutenant General
McChrystal says limits operational flexibility. For example, some nations refuse to conduct night-
time combat. Others have refused to carry Afghan personnel on their helicopters. Others do not
fight after snowfall. These caveats were troubling to NATO members with forces in heavy combat
zones; such countries feel they are bearing the brunt of the fighting.
Security/Political Initiatives To Facilitate the Transition
Despite the assessments of progress, the U.S. view is that ending the conflict on favorable terms
requires convincing insurgent leaders that a negotiated settlement should be pursued. Some of the
more recent strategy and policy innovations designed to pave the way for a successful U.S.
military “exit” from Afghanistan are discussed below.
“Reintegration” and “Reconciliation” With Insurgents
Even before his term as top commander in Afghanistan, General Petraeus had said that the way
conflicts like the one in Afghanistan end is through a political settlement. The issue of
reintegrating insurgent fighters into society, and reconciling with insurgent leaders, is receiving
increasing high-level attention, to the point where SRAP Grossman is said to focus primarily on
this issue. Both are Afghan-led processes but they have concerned some in the international
community and Afghanistan because of the potential for compromises with insurgents that may
produce backsliding on human rights. Most insurgents are highly conservative Islamists who
agreed with the limitations in women’s rights that characterized Taliban rule. Many leaders of
ethnic minorities are also skeptical of the effort because they fear that it might further Pashtun
political strength within Afghanistan, and enhance the influence of Pakistan in Afghan politics.
The United States and the Karzai government agree that any settlement requires that fighters and
insurgent leaders agree, as an outcome,40 to (1) cease fighting, (2) accept the Afghan constitution,
and (3) sever any ties to Al Qaeda or other terrorist groups.

40 The concept that this stipulations could be an “outcome” of negotiations was advanced by Secretary of State Clinton
at the first annual Richard C. Holbrooke Memorial Address. February 18, 2011.
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Reintegration/”Peace Jirga”
Before the more recent emphasis on reconciliation, the concept of providing incentives to
persuade insurgents to surrender and reenter their communities received most of the U.S.
attention. The elements included in a reintegration plan drafted by the Afghan government and
adopted by a “peace loya jirga” during June 2-4, 201041 included providing surrendering fighters
with jobs, amnesty, protection, and an opportunity to be part of the security architecture for their
communities. In its final declaration, the peace jirga backed the plan, but also called for the
release of some detained insurgents where allegations against them are weak. Later in June 2010,
President Karzai issued a decree to implement the plan, which involves outreach by Afghan local
leaders to tribes and others who can convince insurgents to lay down their arms. The Afghan plan
received formal international backing at the July 20, 2010, Kabul Conference. Britain, Japan, and
several other countries, including the United States, have announced a total of about $235 million
in donations to a new fund to support the reintegration process, of which $134 million has been
received.42 The U.S. contribution is to be about $100 million (CERP funds), of which $50 million
was formally pledged in April 2011.43
Despite the international funding for the effort, the Afghan-led reintegration process has moved
forward slowly. As of December 2011, over 2,400 fighters had reintegrated, but they are mostly
from the north and west and not the more violent south and east. Another 1,000-2,000, including a
higher percentage of those from the south, are awaiting participation in the process. Some
accounts attribute the slow progress to delays by Afghan officials who say they are not ready to
provide the promised protection and job training services to reintegrating fighters. In addition,
short of formal reintegration, U.S. military meetings with tribal elders have, in some cases,
persuaded Taliban and other insurgents in their areas to stop fighting. On the other hand, some
observers say there have been cases in which reintegrated fighters have committed Taliban-style
human rights abuses against women and others, suggesting that the reintegration process might
have unintended consequences.
Previous efforts similarly met mixed success. A “Program for Strengthening Peace and
Reconciliation” (referred to in Afghanistan by its Pashto acronym “PTS”) operated during 2003-
2008, headed by then Meshrano Jirga speaker Sibghatullah Mojadeddi and Vice President Karim
Khalili, and overseen by Karzai’s National Security Council. The program persuaded 9,000
Taliban figures and commanders to renounce violence and join the political process.
Reconciliation With Taliban Figures/Rabbani Assassination Setback
The separate but related Afghan-led initiative is to conduct negotiations with senior insurgent
leaders. Many in the international community, including within the Obama Administration,
initially withheld endorsement of reconciliation, fearing it might result in the incorporation into
the Afghan political system of insurgent leaders who retain ties to Al Qaeda and commit severe
human rights abuses. According to Afghan and U.S. officials, any settlement would require the
Taliban to drop at least some of its demands that (1) foreign troops leave Afghanistan; (2) a new

41 Afghanistan National Security Council. “Afghanistan Peace and Reintegration Program.” April 2010.
42 United Nations. Report of the Secretary General: “The Situation in Afghanistan and Its Implications for International
Peace and Security.” March 9, 2011.
43 The National Defense Authorization Act for FY2010 (P.L. 111-84) authorized the use of CERP funds to win local
support, to “reintegrate” Taliban fighters.
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“Islamic” constitution be adopted; and (3) Islamic law is imposed. However, those are viewed as
opening positions; the Afghan government, for its part, may have softened its position on changes
to the Afghan constitution as part of a settlement. Secretary Clinton said in India on July 20,
2011, that any settlement must not result in and undoing of “the progress that has been made [by
women and ethnic minorities] in the past decade.”
Following the 2010 U.S. shift on the issue, the July 20, 2010, Kabul Conference endorsed
establishment of an Afghan High Peace Council to build Afghan consensus on the issue. That
Council was established on September 5, 2010, and its 70 members met for the first time under
the leadership of Tajik leader Burhanuddin Rabbani on October 10, 2010. Rabbani was appointed
because of Karzai’s perception that he could bring along skeptical Northern Alliance/Tajik/other
minority figures to support reconciliation. He earned substantial respect among all factions for his
diligent work in this role; for example he led High Peace Council visits to Pakistan and other
regional countries, and established provincial representative offices of the Council in at least 27
provinces. On the other hand, some of the nine women on the Council say their views have been
routinely dismissed. In the wake of Rabbani’s September 20, 2011, assassination, no permanent
replacement has been identified.
Rabbani’s assassination at his home by a turban-bomb-wielding insurgent set back the
reconciliation process. Rabbani reportedly was lured to take the meeting when the assassin
pretended to be delivering a key new message from Taliban leaders based in Pakistan. The
Northern Alliance reacted to the assassination by asserting that this action affirms its assertions
that the Taliban does not want reconciliation and that counting on its prospects is naïve. The
unrest among the members of this faction contributed to Karzai’s decision to criticize Pakistan
and its Afghan militant contacts as untrustworthy opponents unwilling to reconcile. He
subsequently stated that any reconciliation effort needs to start with Pakistan because of its
purported control over Afghan militants. However, subsequent U.S. and Karzai statements
indicated that the Afghan and U.S. governments would continue to pursue reconciliation,
although perhaps with more input from Pakistan. An opportunity for Afghanistan, Pakistan, and
others to pursue the issue was lost when Pakistan boycotted the December 5, 2011, Bonn
Conference, which was supposed to discuss this issue, over a November 26, 2011, security
incident involving the United States (discussed below).
Prior to the Rabbani killing, senior U.S. officials had grown more optimistic about reconciliation
as contacts between Taliban representatives and the Karzai government have continued and
proliferated. On April 7, 2011, the Afghan head of the reintegration process, Mohammad
Stanekzai (who is also the secretary of the High Peace Council and who was seriously wounded
in the Rabbani attack) said that the Afghan government was in talks with Taliban representatives.
The issue garnered further attention in May 2011 amid reports that U.S. officials had met at least
three times in 2011 with Tayeb Agha, a figure believed close to Mullah Umar. In late June 2011,
those meetings were confirmed both by Karzai and then-Secretary of Defense Gates, who said the
talks have been led by the State Department (deputy SRAP Frank Ruggiero, but not current SRAP
Marc Grossman), and have been facilitated by Germany and Qatar. In early September 2011 press
reports stated that U.S. officials had accepted, in principle, the opening of a Taliban political
office in Qatar to facilitate talks. However, that effort may have been disrupted by Afghan
opposition to Qatar’s role; Afghanistan called its Ambassador to Qatar back for consultations in
December 2011 when Afghanistan learned that Qatar was about to allow a Taliban office to open.
Yet, that action—which suggests Karzai and his aides want a high degree of control over any
settlement talks—came amid reports that U.S. officials had been meeting Taliban figures, in Qatar
and Germany, more frequently than was previously believed, and that the United States was
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considering transferring some Taliban captives from the Guantanamo detention facility to Afghan
custody.44 Other reports of U.S. contacts with the Haqqani faction, long considered least
amenable to reconciliation, were discussed above in the section on that group.
The contacts discussed above came after a “false start,” in which one purported senior Taliban
interlocutor was revealed as an imposter. Earlier, Mullah Bradar, who is close to Mullah Umar,
was said by the Afghan side to have been engaged in talks with the Afghan government prior to
his arrest by Pakistan in February 2010. Karzai reportedly believes that Pakistan arrested Bradar
in order to be able to influence the course of any Afghan government-Taliban settlement. The
Taliban as a movement was not invited to the June 2-4, 2010, consultative peace jirga, but some
Taliban sympathizers reportedly were there.
Other talks have taken place previously, primarily in Saudi Arabia and UAE. Press reports said
that Afghan officials (led by Karzai’s brother Qayyum) and Taliban members had met each other
in Ramadan-related gatherings in Saudi Arabia in September 2008, with further talks held in
January 2009 in Saudi Arabia. Some of these talks apparently involved Arsala Rahmani, a former
Taliban official now in parliament, and the former Taliban Ambassador to Pakistan, Abdul Salam
Zaeef, who purportedly is in touch with Umar’s inner circle. These same Taliban representatives
may be involved in the ongoing talks referred to above. Separately, as discussed above, in
advance of the peace jirga, the Karzai government and representatives of Hikmatyar confirmed
peace talks on March 21, 2010, in which Karzai and several Northern Alliance figures met with
the Hikmatyar representatives.
Removing Taliban Figures From U.N. Sanctions Lists. The consultative peace jirga, in its final
declaration, supported Karzai’s call for the removal of the names of some Taliban figures from
U.N. lists of terrorists, lists established pursuant to Resolution 1267 and Resolution 1333
(October 15, 1999, and December 19, 2000, both pre-September 11 sanctions against the Taliban
and Al Qaeda) and Resolution 1390 (January 16, 2002). Press reports before the July 20, 2010,
Kabul Conference said the Afghan government has submitted a list of 50 Taliban figures it wants
taken off this list (which includes about 140 Taliban-related persons or entities) as a confidence-
building measure. The Conference called on Afghanistan to engage with the U.N. Security
Council to provide evidence to justify such de-listings, and U.N., U.S., and other international
officials said they would support considering de-listings on a case-by-case basis. On January 26,
2010, Russia, previously a hold-out against such a process, dropped opposition to removing five
Taliban-era figures from these sanctions lists, including Taliban-era foreign minister Wakil
Mutawwakil, who ran in 2005 parliamentary elections. Also removed was Abdul Hakim Monib,
who has served Karzai as governor of Uruzgan, Abdul Hakim Mujahid, who was Taliban
representative in the United States, and three others. Mujahid now is one of three deputy chairs of
the High Peace Council. “Mullah Rocketi,” not on the sanctions list, is a former Taliban
commander who ran for president in the August 2009 elections.
On June 17, 2011, in concert with U.S. confirmations of talks with Taliban figures, the U.N.
Security Council adopted Resolution 1988 and 1989. The resolutions drew a separation between
the Taliban and Al Qaeda with regard to the sanctions. However, a decision on whether to remove
the 50 Taliban figures from the list, as suggested by Afghanistan, was deferred. On July 21, 2011,

44 Missy Ryan, Warren Strobel, and Mark Hosenball. “Secret U.S., Taliban Talks Reach Turning Point.” Reuters,
December 19, 2011.
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14 Taliban figures were removed from the “1267” sanctions list; among them were four members
of the High Peace Council (including Arsala Rahmani, mentioned above).
Local Security Experiments: Afghan Local Police (ALP) and Others
Until mid-2008, U.S. military commanders opposed assisting local militias anywhere in
Afghanistan for fear of creating rivals to the central government and of re-creating militias that
commit abuses and administer arbitrary justice. However, the urgent security needs in
Afghanistan caused reconsideration and, during his command, General Petraeus expanded local
security experiments, based on successful experiences in Iraq and after designing mechanisms to
reassure Karzai that any local security organs would be firmly under Afghan government control.
Among these initiatives are:
Afghan Local Police. This is a program in which local security organs are formed
from local recruits who want to defend their communities. The local units are
under the control of district police chiefs and each fighter is vetted by a local
shura as well as Afghan intelligence (Petraeus testimony, March 15 and 16,
2011). As of November 2011, the initiative has recruited a total of about 8,000
ALP from 48 different districts in several different provinces. There are three
ALP centers in Helmand province. A total of 100 districts have been approved for
the program, each with about 300 fighters, which would bring the target size of
the program to about 30,000. DOD notified Congress in September 2010 that it
will reprogram about $35 million in Afghan security forces funding to support
the initiative. However, the ALP program, and associated and preceding such
programs discussed below, were heavily criticized in a September 12, 2011,
Human Rights Watch report citing wide-scale human rights abuses (killings,
rapes, arbitrary detentions, and land grabs) committed by the recruits. The report
triggered a U.S. military investigation which substantiated many of the report’s
findings, although not the most serious of the allegations.45
Local Defense Initiative/Village Stability Operations. A separate program, the
Local Defense Initiative, began in February 2010 in Arghandab district of
Qandahar Province. U.S. Special Forces organized about 25 villagers into a
neighborhood watch group, which is armed. The program has been credited by
U.S. commanders as bringing normal life back to the district. A different militia
was allowed to operate in Konduz to help secure the northern approaches to that
city. Problems arose when the militia began arbitrarily administering justice,
fueling the concerns discussed above these local security approaches. This
program apparently has evolved into a joint Afghan-U.S. Special Operations
program called “Village Stability Operations,” in which 12 person teams from
these forces live in communities to help improve governance, security and
development. The program is discussed in the October 2011 DOD “1230 report.”
Afghan Provincial Protection Program. The ALP initiative also built on another
program begun in 2008, termed the “Afghan Provincial Protection Program”
(APPP, commonly called “AP3”), funded with DOD (CERP) funds. The APPP
got under way in Wardak Province (Jalrez district) in early 2009 and 100 local

45 Ernesto Londono. “U.S. Cites Local Afghan Police Abuses.” Washington Post, December 16, 2011. The Human
Rights Watch report is entitled “Just Don’t Call It a Militia.” http://www.hrw.org, September 12, 2011.
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security personnel “graduated” in May 2009. It was subsequently expanded to
1,200 personnel. U.S. commanders said no U.S. weapons were supplied to the
militias, but the Afghan government provided weapons (Kalashnikov rifles) to
the recruits, possibly using U.S. funds. Participants in the program are given
$200 per month. General Petraeus showcased Wardak in August 2010 as an
example of the success of the APPP and similar efforts. The National Defense
Authorization Act (P.L. 111-84) called for a report on the program within 120
days of the October 28, 2009, enactment.
The local security experiments to date resemble but technically are not arbokai, which are private
tribal militias. Some believe that the arbokai concept should be revived as a means of securing
Afghanistan, as the arbokai did during the reign of Zahir Shah and in prior pre-Communist eras.
Reports persist that some tribal groupings have formed arbokai without specific authorization.
Reversal of Previous Efforts: DDR and DIAG Programs
As noted, the local security programs appear to reverse the 2002-2007 efforts to disarm local
sources of armed force.
DDR. The main program, run by UNAMA, was called the “DDR” program—Disarmament,
Demobilization, and Reintegration—and it formally concluded on June 30, 2006. The program
got off to a slow start because the Afghan Defense Ministry did not reduce the percentage of
Tajiks in senior positions by a July 1, 2003, target date, dampening Pashtun recruitment. In
September 2003, Karzai replaced 22 senior Tajiks in the Defense Ministry officials with Pashtuns,
Uzbeks, and Hazaras, enabling DDR to proceed. The major donor for the program was Japan,
which contributed about $140 million. Figures for collected weapons are in and U.S. spending on
the programs are in the U.S. aid tables later in the report.
The DDR program was initially expected to demobilize 100,000 fighters, although that figure was
later reduced. (Figures for accomplishment of the DDR and DIAG programs are contained in
Table 6.) Of those demobilized, 55,800 former fighters have exercised reintegration options
provided by the program: starting small businesses, farming, and other options. U.N. officials say
at least 25% of these found long-term, sustainable jobs. Some studies criticized the DDR program
for failing to prevent a certain amount of rearmament of militiamen or stockpiling of weapons
and for the rehiring of some militiamen.46 Part of the DDR program was the collection and
cantonment of militia weapons, but generally only poor-quality weapons were collected. As one
example, Fahim, still the main military leader of the Northern Alliance faction, continues to turn
heavy weapons over to U.N. and Afghan forces (including four Scud missiles), although the U.N.
Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) says that large quantities of weapons remain in the
Panjshir Valley.
Despite the earlier demobilization, which affected many of the northern minorities, there are
indications that some faction leaders may be seeking to revive disbanded militias. The minorities
may fear increased Taliban influence as a result of the Karzai reconciliation efforts, and the
minorities want to be sure they could combat any Taliban abuses that might result if the Taliban
achieves a share of power.

46 For an analysis of the DDR program, see Christian Dennys. Disarmament, Demobilization and Rearmament?, June
6, 2005, http://www.jca.apc.org/~jann/Documents/Disarmament%20demobilization%20rearmament.pdf.
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DIAG. Since June 11, 2005, the disarmament effort has emphasized another program called
“DIAG”—Disbandment of Illegal Armed Groups. It is run by the Afghan Disarmament and
Reintegration Commission, headed by Vice President Khalili. Under the DIAG, no payments are
available to fighters, and the program depends on persuasion rather than use of force against the
illegal groups. DIAG has not been as well funded as was DDR: it has received $11 million in
operating funds. As an incentive for compliance, Japan and other donors have made available
$35 million for development projects where illegal groups have disbanded. These incentives were
intended to accomplish the disarmament of a pool of as many as 150,000 members of 1,800
different “illegal armed groups”: militiamen that were not part of recognized local forces (Afghan
Military Forces, AMF) and were never on the rolls of the Defense Ministry. These goals were not
met by the December 2007 target date in part because armed groups in the south say they need to
remain armed against the Taliban, but UNAMA reports that 100 out of 140 districts planned for
DIAG are now considered “DIAG compliant.” (U.N. Secretary General Report, March 9, 2011).
Table 6. Major Security-Related Indicators
Force Current
Level
Total Foreign Forces in
About 131.000: About 90,000 U.S. (in line with mandated drawdown of 10,000 by the
Afghanistan
end of 2011) and 40,500 non-U.S. partner forces. (U.S. total was: 25,000 in 2005;
16,000 in 2003; 5,000 in 2002. ISAF totals were: 12,000 in 2005; and 6,000 in 2003.)
US. forces deployed at 88 bases in Afghanistan, and include 1 air wing (40 aircraft) and
1 combat aviation brigade (100 aircraft).
U.S. Casualties in
1,740 killed, of which 1,460 by hostile action. Additional 103 U.S. deaths in other OEF
Afghanistan
theaters. 150 U.S. killed from October 2001-January 2003. 315 killed in 2009, and
about 500 killed in 2010. 300+ UK forces killed to date.
NATO Sectors (Regional
RC-S: 35,000 (U.K. lead). RC-Southwest: 27,000 (U.S. lead); RC-E: 32,000 (U.S. lead);
Commands-South, east,
north, west, and
RC-N: 11,000 (German lead); RC-W: 6,000 (Italy lead) RC-Kabul: 5,000 (Turkey,
Afghan lead).
central/Kabul)
Afghan National Army
Above October 2011 goal of 171,600, with 195,000 planned by November 2012.
(ANA)
About 2,000 trained per month. 5,300 are commando forces, trained by U.S. Special
Forces. ANA private paid about $200 per month; generals about $750 per month.
Afghan National Police
Above October 2011 goal of 134,000, with planned size of 157,000 by November
(ANP)
2012. 21,000 are Border Police; 3,800+ counter-narcotics police; 14,400 Civil Order
Police (ANCOP). 1,000+ are female.
ANSF Salaries
About $800 million per year, paid by donor countries bilaterally or via trust funds
U.S. and Partner Trainers
About 4,000, with target of 4,750. Pledges to fill the 750 person gap still required
Number of Al Qaeda
“Less than 100 or so,” according to General Petraeus in April 2011. Also, small
numbers of Lashkar-e-Tayyiba, Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, Pakistan Taliban.
Number of Taliban fighters Up to 25,000 (U.S. military and Afghan estimates in mid-2011), although General Allen
appears to believe numbers are much lower. Plus about 3,000 Haqqani faction and
1,000 Hikmatyar (HIG).
Insurgents Reintegrated
Over 2,400 since 2010 with at about another 2,000 awaiting processing
Attacks per day (average)
1,500+ per month in 2010; compared to 800 per month in 2007; 400 in 2005.
Afghan casualties
See CRS Report R41084, Afghanistan Casualties: Military Forces and Civilians, by Susan G.
Chesser.
Sources: CRS; testimony and public statements by DOD officials.
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Policy Alternatives for the Post-Transition Period
As the end of the planned transition approaches in 2014, there is growing discussion of alternative
strategies and policies that will stabilize Afghanistan after that time.
Counter-Terrorism/Counter-Terrorism “Plus” Proposals
During the late 2009 strategy review, some, purportedly including Vice President Joseph Biden,
favored a more limited mission for Afghanistan designed solely to disrupt Al Qaeda in
Afghanistan and Pakistan. Some believed that the President might shift to this strategy when he
made his June 22, 2011, drawdown announcement, but he appears to have leaned toward a
modified version of this strategy called “counter-terrorism plus,” in which combat is conducted
by Special Operations forces against high value targets but regular U.S. forces remain to protect
some key population centers. U.S. commanders say that some of the most effective current U.S.
operations consist of Special Operations forces tracking and killing selected key mid-level
insurgent commanders, even though such operations were not intended to be the centerpiece of
current U.S. strategy. Some of these operations reportedly involve Afghan commandos trained by
U.S. Special Forces.
As discussed above, the United States is likely to revisit these options as a long-term policy
beyond 2014, and experts believe the strategy would require about 20,000 U.S. troops. Many
experts believe that this modest amount of U.S. forces would prevent a collapse of Afghan forces
or the Afghan government after 2014, even if the Taliban remains as active as it is today. Others
believe this strategy would likely lead to Taliban gains in the south and east, although likely not
gains that would cause U.S. policy to be considered a failure. Critics of this approach express the
view that the Afghan government might collapse and Al Qaeda would have safe haven again in
Afghanistan if there are insufficient numbers of U.S. forces there.47 Others say that it would be
difficult to identify targets to strike with aircraft or aerial vehicles unless there were sufficient
forces on the ground to identify targets.
Expand Afghan Forces/Rapid Transition to Afghan Lead
Some have long advocated a rapid build-up of Afghan security forces as an alternative to large
numbers of U.S. troops. During the Administration debate over strategy in late 2009, some
Members of Congress, including Senate Armed Services Committee Chairman Carl Levin, took
this position. Still, the focus on building up Afghan forces as a central feature of the transition and
the post-transition period indicates that this option has been adopted to a large extent.
Make Concessions to the Taliban/De-Facto Partition
Some experts, such as former U.S. Ambassador to India Robert Blackwill and members of a
working group sponsored by the Century Foundation (including former negotiator Lakhdar
Brahimi and former high-ranking State Department official Thomas Pickering), believe that
ultimately the United States and its partners will have to work with Pakistan and other
neighboring states to reach a political settlement that might be favorable to the Taliban. These

47 Ibid.
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experts believe that the Afghan government will not be able to secure itself by 2014 and that the
Taliban would make steady gains if U.S. troop levels fall to low levels.
Some proposals by these experts involve allowing the Taliban to control large parts of the south
and east, where the insurgency is most active, and to work with the Northern Alliance to keep
other parts of Afghanistan relatively peaceful. These plans are referred to by experts as partition
or de-facto partition plans, although those terms are usually used by experts who believe these
plans amount to a managed U.S. defeat.
Legislatively Mandated Drawdown
In Congress, some have expressed support for efforts or plans to wind down the U.S. involvement
in Afghanistan far more rapidly than those outlined by the Administration. That effort appears to
have gained momentum in the aftermath of the death of Osama Bin Laden on May 1, 2011. In the
111th Congress, H.Con.Res. 248, a resolution introduced by Representative Kucinich to require
removal of U.S. forces from Afghanistan not later than December 31, 2010, was defeated in the
House by a vote of 65 to 356 on March 10, 2010. Other legislation, requiring the Administration
to develop (by January 1, 2011) plans to wind down the U.S. military presence in Afghanistan
failed 18-80, May 27, 2010) in a Senate vote during consideration of a FY2010 supplemental
appropriation (H.R. 4899). On July 1, 2010, the House voted 162-260 to reject a plan in that bill
to require the Administration to submit, by April 4, 2011, a plan and timetable to redeploy from
Afghanistan. Earlier, in House consideration of a FY2010 National Defense Authorization Act
(H.R. 2647), a similar provision failed on June 25, 2009, by a vote of 138-278.
However, in the 112th Congress, on May 26, 2011, an amendment to the defense authorization bill
(H.R. 1540) that would have required a plan to accelerate the transition to Afghan-lead security
failed narrowly by a vote of 204-215. The bill, without the amendment, was passed by both
chambers in December 2011. The amendment contained the main elements of the “Afghanistan
Exit and Accountability Act” (H.R. 1735), which was introduced after the death of Bin Laden. A
day earlier (May 25), an amendment that would require U.S. troops to withdraw and leave in
place only U.S. counter-terrorism operations failed 123-294. Among other bills, H.R. 651 requires
an agreement with Afghanistan under which U.S. forces redeploy from Afghanistan within one
year of entry into that agreement, and H.Con.Res. 28, H.R. 780, and H.Con.Res. 248 require a
withdrawal. The latter bill failed by a vote of 356 to 65 on March 10, 2011.
Regional Dimension
Most of Afghanistan’s neighbors believed that the fall of the Taliban in Afghanistan would
stabilize the region, but Taliban and other Islamist militants have continued to challenge the
Afghan government, have battled the government of Pakistan, and have conducted acts of
terrorism against India. The transition to Afghan security leadership has led some regional powers
to plan to secure their interests in Afghanistan in a post-ISAF Afghanistan.
As part of the transition plan, the Obama Administration is increasingly promoting Afghanistan’s
integration into regional security and economic organizations and patterns. The Administration is
emphasizing development of a Central Asia-South Asia trading hub—part of a “New Silk Road”
(NSR)—in an effort to keep Afghanistan stable and economically vibrant as donors wind down
their involvement. As part of this effort, the Administration obtained pledges from Afghanistan’s
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neighbors to these goals at a region-led international meeting in Istanbul on November 2, 2011,
resulting in the “Istanbul Declaration.” Similar commitments to Afghan sovereignty, stability, and
cooperation were sought—and for the most part obtained—at the December 5, 2011, Bonn
Conference on Afghanistan (the 10th anniversary of the Bonn Conference that formed the post-
Taliban political and security architecture for Afghanistan). That meeting was attended by high-
level representatives from 85 countries and 15 international organizations. Although the final
declaration of the conference affirmed that vision, Pakistan decided not to send high-level
representation to the conference because of a November 26, 2011, security incident with the
United States, clouding the conference’s results.
Prior to the recent efforts, Afghanistan has been slowly integrated into regional security and
economic organizations. In November 2005, Afghanistan joined the South Asian Association for
Regional Cooperation (SAARC), and Afghanistan has observer status in the Shanghai
Cooperation Organization, a security coordination body that includes Russia, China, and several
Central Asian states. U.S. officials have sought to enlist both regional and greater international
support for Afghanistan through the still-expanding 50-nation “International Contact Group,”
which held its latest meeting in Jeddah on March 3, 2011.
Several regional summit meeting series have been established involving Afghanistan, including
• Summit meetings between Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Turkey; and between Iran,
Afghanistan, and Pakistan. The latest Iran-Afghanistan-Pakistan meeting took
place in Tehran on June 25, 2011. The fifth of the Turkey-led meetings occurred
on December 24, 2010, and resulted in a decision for joint military exercises in
March 2011 between Turkey, Afghanistan, and Pakistan.
• Turkey and UNAMA co-chair a “Regional Working Group” initiative, which
organized the major meeting on Afghanistan in Istanbul on November 2, 2011.
• UNAMA also leads a “Kabul Silk Road” initiative, to promote regional
cooperation on Afghanistan.
• Russia has put together two “quadrilateral summits,” the latest of which was on
August 18, 2010, among Pakistan, Russia, Afghanistan, and Tajikistan, and
focused on counter-narcotics and anti-smuggling.
• Another regional collaborative effort is the Regional Economic Cooperation
Conference on Afghanistan, which was launched in 2005. It will hold its fifth
meeting in Tajikistan on March 26-27, 2012.
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Table 7. Afghan and Regional Facilities Used for
Operations in and Supply Lines to Afghanistan
Facility
Use
Bagram Air
50 miles north of Kabul, the operational hub of U.S. forces in Afghanistan, and base for CJTF-
Base
82. At least 2000 U.S. military personnel are based there. Handles many of the 150+ U.S.
aircraft (including helicopters) in country. Hospital constructed, one of the first permanent
structures there. FY2005 supplemental (P.L. 109-13) provided about $52 million for various
projects to upgrade facilities at Bagram, including a control tower and an operations center, and
the FY2006 supplemental appropriation (P.L. 109-234) provided $20 million for military
construction there. NATO also using the base and sharing operational costs. Bagram can be
accessed directly by U.S. military flights following April 2010 agreement by Kazakhstan to allow
overflights of U.S. lethal equipment.
Qandahar Air
Just outside Qandahar, the hub of military operations in the south. Turned over from U.S. to
Field
NATO/ISAF control in late 2006 in conjunction with NATO assumption of peacekeeping
responsibilities. Enhanced (along with other facilities in the south) at cost of $1.3 billion to
accommodate influx of U.S. combat forces in the south.
Shindand Air
In Farah province, about 20 miles from Iran border. Used by U.S. forces and combat aircraft
Base
since October 2004, after the dismissal of Herat governor Ismail Khan, who controlled it.
Peter Ganci
Used by 1,200 U.S. military personnel as wel as refueling and cargo aircraft for shipments into
Base: Manas,
Afghanistan. Leadership of Kyrgyzstan changed in April 2005 in an uprising against President
Kyrgyzstan
Askar Akayev and again in April 2010 against Kurmanbek Bakiyev. Previous Kyrgyz governments
demanded the U.S. vacate the base but in both cases, (July 2006 and July 2009) agreement to
use the base was extended in exchange for large increase in U.S. payments for its use (to $60
million per year in the latter case). Interim government formed in April 2010 first threatened
then retracted eviction of U.S. from the base, but the issue remains subject to decision making
by a new government elected in Kyrgyzstan on October 11, 2010. Some questions have arisen
in Congress over alleged corruption involving fuel suppliers of U.S. aircraft at the base.
Incirlik Air
About 2,100 U.S. military personnel there; U.S. aircraft supply U.S. forces in Iraq and
Base, Turkey
Afghanistan. U.S. use repeatedly extended for one year intervals by Turkey.
Al Dhafra, UAE Air base used by about 1,800 U.S. military personnel, to supply U.S. forces and related
transport into Iraq and Afghanistan. Could see increasing use if Manas closes.
Al Udeid Air
Largest air facility used by U.S. in region. About 5,000 U.S. personnel in Qatar. Houses central
Base, Qatar
air operations coordination center for U.S. missions in Iraq and Afghanistan; also houses
CENTCOM forward headquarters. Could see increased use if Manas closes.
Naval Support
U.S. naval command headquarters for OEF anti-smuggling, anti-terrorism, and anti-proliferation
Facility, Bahrain
naval search missions, and Iraq-related naval operations (oil platform protection) in the Persian
Gulf and Arabian Sea. About 5,100 U.S. military personnel there.
Karsi-Khanabad Not used by U.S. since September 2005 fol owing U.S.-Uzbek dispute over May 2005 Uzbek
Air Base,
crackdown on unrest in Andijon. Once housed about 1,750 U.S. military personnel (900 Air
Uzbekistan
Force, 400 Army, and 450 civilian) supplying Afghanistan. U.S. relations with Uzbekistan have
improved since 2009, but there is still no U.S. use of the air base. Uzbekistan allowed German
use of the base temporarily in March 2008. Some U.S. shipments began in February 2009
through Navoi airfield in central Uzbekistan, and U.S. signed agreement with Uzbekistan on
April 4, 2009, al owing nonlethal supplies for the Afghanistan war. Goods are shipped to Latvia
and Georgia, some transits Russia by rail, then to Uzbekistan.
Tajikistan
Some use of air bases and other facilities by coalition partners, including France, and emergency
use by U.S. India also uses bases under separate agreement. New supply lines to Afghanistan
established in February 2009 (“northern route”) make some use of Tajikistan.
Pakistan
As discussed below, most U.S. supplies flow through Pakistan. Heavy equipment docks in
Karachi and is escorted by security contractors to the Khyber Pass crossing.
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Pakistan/Pakistan-Afghanistan Border48
The Afghanistan neighbor that is considered most crucial to Afghanistan’s future is Pakistan, and
Pakistan’s actions on the Afghanistan issue are of increasing concern to U.S. policymakers, as
U.S.-Pakistan relations have deteriorated throughout 2011. Pakistan is determined to retain
influence over Afghanistan—a position heavily colored by fears of historic rival India. Pakistan
appears insistent that Afghanistan, at the very least, not align with rival India, and, at best,
provide Pakistan strategic depth against India. Pakistan says India is using its Embassy and four
consulates in Afghanistan (Pakistan says India has nine such consulates) to train and recruit anti-
Pakistan insurgents, and is using its reconstruction funds to build influence there.
Virtually all Obama Administration policy statements on Afghanistan emphasize the linkage
between militant safe haven in Pakistan and the difficulty stabilizing Afghanistan. Questions
about Pakistan’s commitment to the overall effort against militants increased substantially after
the May 1, 2011, U.S. raid on Bin Laden’s compound in Abbotabad, a compound which he
apparently inhabited for more than five years without being discovered by Pakistani intelligence.
That event led to some public recriminations by Pakistan about U.S. interference.
U.S. concerns heightened significantly in the wake of the September 13, 2011, attack on U.S.
Embassy Kabul, allegedly by the Haqqani network, which Pakistan sees as an ally in a post-
settlement Afghanistan. U.S. officials, particularly then Joint Chiefs Chairman Mullen in
September 22, 2011, testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee, called the network
the “veritable arm” of Pakistan’s Inter Services Intelligence Directorate (ISI). Other
Administration officials attempted to couch or downplay the Mullen comments, suggesting
concerns about the potential for an outright U.S. rupture with Pakistan, still the main supply line
for U.S. forces. Still, following a September 29, 2011, White House meeting that reportedly
decided on a harder U.S. line toward Pakistan, Secretary Clinton led a senior U.S. delegation in
October 20-21, 2011, meetings in Pakistan in which they warned Pakistani leaders that stronger
action must be taken against Afghan militants in Pakistan, lest the United States take direct action
itself. Relations worsened significantly following a November 26, 2011, incident in which a U.S.
airstrike killed 24 Pakistani soldiers in an incident still under investigation by the U.S. military.
Pakistan responded by closing border crossings, suspending participation in the border
coordination centers (see below), and boycotting the December 5 Bonn Conference; reports in
late December 2011 suggest Pakistan has resumed the border coordination center work.
Suspicions were further inflamed on December 6, 2011, when a Pakistan-based group, Lashkar-i-
Janghvi, claimed responsibility for two suicide bombings against Afghan Hazara Shiites
celebrating a Shiite holiday, killing 80.
The 2011 U.S.-Pakistan recriminations contrast with the first several years after the September
11, 2001, attacks, Pakistani cooperation against Al Qaeda had been considered by U.S. officials to
be relatively consistent and effective. During 2001-2006, the Bush Administration praised then
President Pervez Musharraf for Pakistani accomplishments against Al Qaeda, including the arrest
of over 700 Al Qaeda figures since the September 11 attacks.49 After the attacks, Pakistan

48 For extensive analysis of U.S. policy toward Pakistan, and U.S. assistance to Pakistan in conjunction with its
activities against Al Qaeda and the Taliban, see CRS Report RL33498, Pakistan-U.S. Relations, by K. Alan Kronstadt.
49 Among those captured by Pakistan are top bin Laden aide Abu Zubaydah (captured April 2002); alleged September
11 plotter Ramzi bin Al Shibh (September 11, 2002); top Al Qaeda planner Khalid Shaikh Mohammed (March 2003);
and a top planner, Abu Faraj al-Libbi (May 2005).
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provided the United States with access to Pakistani airspace, some ports, and some airfields for
OEF. Others say Musharraf acted against Al Qaeda only when it threatened him directly; for
example, after the December 2003 assassination attempts against him.
In April 2008, in an extension of the work of the Tripartite Commission (Afghanistan, Pakistan,
and ISAF, in which military leaders of these entities meet on both sides of the border), the three
countries agreed to set up five “border coordination centers” (BCCs) which include networks of
radar nodes to give liaison officers a common view of the border area. These centers build on an
agreement in May 2007 to share intelligence on extremists’ movements. Four have been
established to date, including one near the Torkham Gate at the Khyber Pass, but all four are on
the Afghan side of the border. The White House report released April 5, 2011, said that Pakistan
had not fulfilled its pledge (May 2009) to establish one on the Pakistani side of the border.
Pakistan-Afghanistan Relations
The U.S. mission in Afghanistan also depends on healthy, consistent, and operationally significant
cooperation between Pakistan and Afghanistan. However, Afghanistan-Pakistan relations have
tended to fluctuate. Many Afghans fondly remember Pakistan’s role as the hub for U.S. backing
of the mujahedin that forced the Soviet withdrawal in 1988-1989, but, later, most Afghan leaders
came to resent Pakistan as the most public defender of the Taliban movement when it was in
power. (Pakistan was one of only three countries to formally recognize it as the legitimate
government; Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates are the others.)
After the end of the rule of military leader and President Pervez Musharraf in 2008, there was
improvement in Afghanistan-Pakistan relations. Karzai attended the September 9, 2008,
inauguration of civilian President Asif Zardari. Zardari visited Kabul on January 9, 2009, where
he and Karzai signed a joint declaration against terrorism that affects both countries. (A
September 2010 meeting between them reaffirmed this declaration.) Afghan and Pakistani
ministers jointly visited Washington, DC, during February 23-27, 2009, to participate in the first
Obama Administration strategic review, and Karzai and Zardari conducted a joint visit to
Washington, DC, in May 2009.
In the aftermath of Afghan recriminations against Pakistan for the presence of Bin Laden, Karzai
had what were widely described as productive meetings in Islamabad during June 10-11, 2011,
including the announcement of implementation of the new transit trade agreement discussed
below. The summit paved the way for a U.S.-Pakistan-Afghanistan meeting on June 28, 2011,
attended by SRAP Grossman, to discuss possible pathways to reconciliation in the Afghan
conflict. However, the tripartite meeting was clouded somewhat by Afghan allegations that
several hundred rockets had been fired into Afghanistan from Pakistan in prior days—allegations
that have continued since. The September 2011 attacks on the U.S. Embassy and the killing of
former President Rabbani worsened relations significantly (as discussed above in the section on
reconciliation with the Taliban.) Pakistan’s worst fears about Indian influence in Afghanistan
were inflamed when Karzai, on October 5, 2011, and perhaps as a reaction to the Haqqani attacks
in Kabul, flew to India to sign a significant trade and security pact (see below).
Regarding the long-term relationship, Pakistan wants the government of Afghanistan to pledge to
abide by the “Durand Line,” a border agreement reached between Britain (signed by Sir Henry
Mortimer Durand) and then Afghan leader Amir Abdul Rahman Khan in 1893, separating
Afghanistan from what was then British-controlled India (later Pakistan after the 1947 partition).
The border is recognized by the United Nations, but Afghanistan continues to indicate that the
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border was drawn unfairly to separate Pashtun tribes and should be renegotiated. As of October
2002, about 1.75 million Afghan refugees have returned from Pakistan since the Taliban fell, but
as many as 3 million might still remain in Pakistan, and Pakistan says it plans to expel them back
into Afghanistan in the near future.
Afghanistan-Pakistan Transit Trade Agreement (APTTA)
Pakistan has also sought to control Afghanistan’s trade, particularly with India, leading to U.S.
efforts to persuade Pakistan to forge a “transit trade” agreement with Afghanistan. That effort
bore success with the signature of a trade agreement between the two on July 18, 2010, allowing
for an easier flow of Afghan products, which are mostly agricultural products that depend on
rapid transit. On June 12, 2011, in the context of a Karzai visit to Islamabad, both countries began
full implementation of the agreement. It is expected to greatly expand the $2 billion in trade per
year the two countries were doing prior to the agreement. The agreement represented a success
for the Canada-sponsored “Dubai Process” of talks between Afghanistan and Pakistan on
modernizing border crossings, new roads, and a comprehensive border management strategy to
meet IMF benchmarks. A drawback to the agreement is that Afghan trucks, under the agreement,
are not permitted to take back cargo from India after dropping off goods there.
The Afghanistan-Pakistan trade agreement came after earlier signs of growing cooperation,
including Afghan agreement to send more Afghan graduate students to study in Pakistan, and a
June 2010 Afghan agreement to send small numbers of ANA officers to undergo training in
Pakistan.50 In early January 2011, Secretary of Homeland Security Janet Napolitano visited
Afghanistan and announced a future tripling (from 25 to 77) of the number of U.S. customs
agents that will train Afghan border and customs officers.
Iran
Iran perceives its key national interests in Afghanistan as denying the United States a base from
which to pressure or attack Iran. Secondarily, Iran seeks to exert its traditional influence over
western Afghanistan, which Iran borders and was once part of the Persian empire, to protect
Afghanistan’s Shiite and other Persian-speaking minorities. There are mixed views on how
influential Iran is in Afghanistan; most experts appear to see Iran as relatively marginal player,
particularly compared to Pakistan.
The Obama Administration initially saw Iran as potentially helpful to its strategy for Afghanistan;
the late SRAP Holbrooke was an advocate of cooperation with Iran on Afghanistan issues. Early
in the Administration, Secretary of State Clinton made a point of announcing that Iran would be
invited to the U.N.-led meeting on Afghanistan at the Hague on March 31, 2009. At the meeting,
the late SRAP Holbrooke briefly met the Iranian leader of his delegation to the meeting, and
handed him a letter on several outstanding human rights cases involving Iranian-Americans. At
the meeting, Iran pledged cooperation on combating Afghan narcotics and in helping economic
development in Afghanistan—both policies Iran is pursuing to a large degree.
Still, suggesting that the concept of cooperation with Iran on Afghanistan still resonates with
some U.S. officials and outside experts, Iran’s attendance of the October 18, 2010, International

50 Partlow, Joshua. “Afghans Build Up Ties With Pakistan.” Washington Post, July 21, 2010.
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Contact Group” meeting in Rome, including a briefing by then top commander in Afghanistan
General Petraeus. Earlier, the United States and Iran took similar positions at a U.N. meeting in
Geneva in February 2010 that discussed drug trafficking across the Afghan border. Iran did not
attend the January 28, 2010, international meeting in London, but it did attend the July 28, 2010,
international meeting in Kabul (both discussed above). As a member of the OIC, an Iranian
representative attended the March 3, 2011, Contact Group meeting at OIC headquarters in
Jeddah. Iran attended the region-led international meeting in Istanbul on November 2, 2011, and
the December 5, 2011, Bonn Conference.
Iran’s Development Aid for Afghanistan
Iran’s economic aid to Afghanistan supports international efforts to develop Afghanistan. Iran has
pledged at least $400 million in aid to Afghanistan, according to the Afghan government, much of
which has been used to build roads and bridges in western Afghanistan. In cooperation with India,
Iran has been building roads that would connect western Afghanistan to Iran’s port of Chahbahar,
and provide Afghan and other goods an easier outlet to the Persian Gulf. Iran also has provided
credits to the Afghan private sector and helped develop power transmission lines in the provinces
bordering Iran.
Iranian Assistance to Afghan Militants and to Pro-Iranian Groups and Regions
Even though Iran aids Afghanistan’s development, it also is allegedly arming militants there. Iran
may be arming groups in Afghanistan to try to pressure U.S. forces that use Afghanistan’s
Shindand air base,51 which Iran fears the United States might use to attack or conduct surveillance
against Iran. Or, Iran’s policy might be to gain broader leverage against the United States by
demonstrating that Iran is in position to cause U.S. combat deaths in Afghanistan.
The State Department report on international terrorism for 2010, released August 18, 2011, said
the Qods Force of the Revolutionary Guard of Iran continues to provide training to the Taliban on
small unit tactics, small arms, explosives, and indirect weapons fire, and that it ships arms to
militants in Qandahar. This phrasing implies that Iran is arming Pashtun Taliban militants in the
core of the combat zone in Afghanistan. Weapons provided, according to the State Department
report, include mortars, 107mm rockets, rocket-propelled grenades, and plastic explosives. On
March 9, 2011, NATO said it had seized 48 Iranian-made rockets in Nimruz Province, bound for
Afghan militants; the 122mm rockets, have a range (13 miles) greater than those previously
provided by Iran. On August 3, 2010, the Treasury Department, acting under Executive Order
13224, named two Qods Force officers as terrorism supporting entities (freezing assets in the
United States, if any). They are Hossein Musavi, Commander of the Qods Force Ansar Corps,
which is the key Qods unit involved in Afghanistan; and Hasan Mortezavi, who is a Qods officer
responsible for providing funds and materiel to the Taliban, according to the Treasury
Department.52

51 Rashid, Ahmed. “Afghan Neighbors Show Signs of Aiding in Nation’s Stability.” Wall Street Journal, October 18,
2004.
52 Treasury Department. Fact Sheet: U.S. Treasury Department Targets Iran’s Support for Terrorism. August 3, 2010.
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Assistance to Ethnic and Religious Factions in Afghanistan
Others are puzzled by Iran’s support of Taliban fighters who are Pashtun, because Iran has
traditionally supported Persian-speaking non-Pashtun factions in Afghanistan, many of whom
have been oppressed by the Pashtuns. Some of Iran’s funding has been intended to support pro-
Iranian groups in the west as well as Hazara Shiites in Kabul and in the Hazara heartland of
Bamiyan, Ghazni, and Dai Kundi, in part by providing scholarships and funding for technical
institutes. Iran has used some of its funds to construct mosques in Herat, pro-Iranian theological
seminaries in Shiite districts of Kabul, and Shiite institutions in Hazara-dominated areas. Iran also
offers scholarships to Afghans to study in Iranian universities, and there are consistent allegations
that Iran has funded Afghan provincial council and parliamentary candidates who are perceived
as pro-Tehran.53 These efforts have helped Iran retain close ties with Afghanistan’s leading Shiite
cleric, Ayatollah Mohammad Mohseni.
Bilateral Government-to-Government Relations
Iran’s interest in a broad relationship with Karzai has not, to date, been affected by Iran’s
continued support for Taliban and other militants in Afghanistan. Karzai has, at times, called Iran
a “friend” of Afghanistan; in March 2010 he met with Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad
on two occasions, possibly to signal to the United States that he might realign with regional actors
if the United States continues to criticize his leadership. One of the meetings was just after the
departure of visiting Defense Secretary Gates. Previously, Karzai received Ahmadinejad in Kabul
in August 2007, and he visited Tehran at the end of May 2009 as part of the tripartite diplomatic
process between Iran, Pakistan, and Afghanistan. During a visit to the United States in May 2009,
Karzai said he had told both the United States and Iran that Afghanistan must not become an
arena for the broader competition and disputes between the United States and Iran.54 The latest
Afghanistan-Pakistan-Iran summit meeting was held in Tehran during June 24-25, 2011. It came a
few days after a visit to Afghanistan by Iran’s Defense Minister, Ahmad Vahidi, to sign a bilateral
border security agreement.
A controversy arose in late October 2010 when Karzai acknowledged accepting about $2 million
per year in cash payments from Iran, via his Chief of Staff Mohammad Daudzai. On the other
hand, in December 2010, Iran suddenly ceased shipping fuel into Afghanistan, causing some spot
dislocations in Afghanistan, including in Kabul. The move could have been related to reported
shortages of gasoline inside Iran, which are a result of U.S. sanctions imposed on sales of
gasoline to Iran in July 2010.
Many Afghans look fondly on Iran for helping them try to oust the Taliban regime when it was in
power. Iran saw the Taliban regime, which ruled during 1996-2001, as a threat to its interests in
Afghanistan, especially after Taliban forces captured Herat in September 1995. Iran subsequently
drew even closer to the ethnic minority-dominated Northern Alliance than previously, providing
its groups with fuel, funds, and ammunition.55 In September 1998, Iranian and Taliban forces
nearly came into direct conflict when Iran discovered that nine of its diplomats were killed in the
course of the Taliban’s offensive in northern Afghanistan. Iran massed forces at the border and

53 King, Laura. “In Western Afghan City, Iran Makes Itself Felt.” Los Angeles Times, November 14, 2010.
54 Comments by President Karzai at the Brookings Institution. May 5, 2009.
55 Steele, Jonathon. “America Includes Iran in Talks on Ending War in Afghanistan.” Washington Times, December 15,
1997.
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threatened military action, but the crisis cooled without a major clash, possibly out of fear that
Pakistan would intervene on behalf of the Taliban. Iran offered search and rescue assistance in
Afghanistan during the U.S.-led war to topple the Taliban, and it also allowed U.S. humanitarian
aid to the Afghan people to transit Iran. Iran helped construct Afghanistan’s first post-Taliban
government, in cooperation with the United States—at the December 2001 “Bonn Conference.”
In February 2002, Iran expelled Karzai-opponent Gulbuddin Hikmatyar, but it did not arrest him.
At other times, Afghanistan and Iran have had disputes over Iran’s efforts to expel Afghan
refugees. About 1.2 million remain, mostly integrated into Iranian society, and a crisis erupted in
May 2007 when Iran expelled about 50,000 into Afghanistan. About 300,000 Afghan refugees
have returned from Iran since the Taliban fell.
India
The interests and activities of India in Afghanistan are almost the exact reverse of those of
Pakistan. India’s goals are to deny Pakistan “strategic depth” in Afghanistan, to deny Pakistan the
ability to block India from trade and other connections to Central Asia and beyond; and to prevent
militants in Afghanistan from attacking Indian targets in Afghanistan. India saw the Afghan
Taliban’s hosting of Al Qaeda during 1996-2001 as a major threat to India itself because of Al
Qaeda’s association with radical Islamic organizations in Pakistan, such as LET (Laskhar-e-
Tayyiba, or Army of the Righteous), one of the groups that was formed in Pakistan to challenge
India’s control of part of the disputed territories of Jammu and Kashmir. Some of these groups
have committed major acts of terrorism in India, including the terrorist attacks in Mumbai in
November 2008 and in July 2011. Pakistan accuses India of using nine consulates in Afghanistan
to spread Indian influence in Afghanistan. According to Afghan officials, India has four
consulates (in the major cities of Qandahar, Jalalabad, Mazar-e-Sharif, and Herat) and no security
presence in Afghanistan, to date.
India-Afghanistan Strategic Pact
Some believe India has been concerned that any negotiated settlement of the Afghanistan conflict
will give Pakistan preponderant influence in Afghanistan, and India, which supported the
Northern Alliance against the Taliban in the mid-1990s, has stepping up its contacts with those
factions to discuss possible contingencies in the event of an Afghan settlement deal. Still, possibly
at U.S. urging, in May 2011, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, during a visit to Afghanistan,
publicly expressed India’s support for the reconciliation process. He also announced during that
visit a new India–Afghanistan “Strategic Partnership,” which demonstrated India’s support for
U.S. efforts to better integrate Afghanistan into regional political, economic, and security
structures. On October 5, 2011, shortly after the Rabbani assassination and Afghan recriminations
against Pakistan, Karzai visited Delhi to sign the pact. The pact affirmed Pakistan’s worst fears
because it gives India, for the first time, a formal role as one of the guarantors of Afghan stability.
In addition, the pact provides for expanded political and cultural ties. Indian experts noted that no
Indian troops or security forces would necessarily deploy to Afghanistan as a consequence of the
pact, although the pact would mean increased cooperation on counter-terrorism operations and
possibly Indian training of the ANSF. The United States views India’s role in Afghanistan as
constructive, although U.S. officials have often cautioned against an Indian role in Afghan
security so as not to inflame Pakistan’s sentiments. The signature of the Afghan-Indian pact might
represent a softening of that U.S. position in light of the U.S.-Pakistan rift discussed above.
Tajikistan, which also supported the mostly Tajik Northern Alliance against the Taliban when it
was in power, allows India to use one of its air bases.
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Even had the strategic pact not been signed, it is unlikely Afghanistan will ever distance itself
from India. Many of the families of Afghan leaders have lived in India at one time or another and,
as noted above, Karzai studied there.
India’s Development Activities in Afghanistan
India is the fifth-largest single country donor to Afghan reconstruction, funding projects worth
over $1.5 billion, with an additional $500 million announced during the Singh visit to Kabul in
May 2011. Indian officials assert that all their projects are focused on civilian, not military,
development and are in line with the development priorities set by the Afghan government. India,
along with the Asian Development Bank, financed a $300 million project, mentioned above, to
bring electricity from Central Asia to Afghanistan. It has also renovated the well-known Habibia
High School in Kabul and committed to a $67 million renovation of Darulaman Palace as the
permanent house for Afghanistan’s parliament. At a cost of about $85 million, India financed the
construction of a road to the Iranian border in remote Nimruz province, linking landlocked
Afghanistan to Iran’s Chahbahar port on the Arabian Sea. India currently constructing the 42
megawatt hydroelectric Selwa Dam in Herat Province at a cost of about $77 million. This will
increase electricity availability in the province.
India is also helping the IDLG with its efforts to build local governance organizations, and it
provides 1,000 scholarships per year for Afghans to undergo higher education in India. Some
Afghans want to enlist even more Indian assistance in training Afghan bureaucrats in accounting,
forensic accounting, oversight, and other disciplines that will promote transparency in Afghan
governance.
Russia, Central Asian States, and China
Some neighboring and nearby states take an active interest not only in Afghan stability, but in the
U.S. military posture that supports U.S. operations in Afghanistan. The region to the north of
Afghanistan is a growing factor in U.S. efforts to rely less on supply routes through Pakistan,
particularly as U.S. relations with Pakistan have deteriorated.
Russia/Northern Distribution Network
Russia wants to reemerge as a great power and to contain U.S. power in Central Asia, including
Afghanistan. At the same time, by supporting the “Northern Distribution Network” supply route
for NATO forces in Afghanistan, Russia supports U.S. and NATO efforts to combat militants in
the region who have sometimes posed a threat to Russia itself. Its hosting of the “quadrilateral
summits” mentioned above, could represent stepped up efforts by Russia to exert influence on the
Afghanistan issue. President Medvedev is expected to visit Afghanistan later in 2011, a high
profile visit given the sensitivities Afghans have about Russia’s past involvement in Afghanistan.
Previously, Russia had kept a low profile in the country because it still feels humiliated by its
withdrawal in 1989 and senses some Afghan resentment of the Soviet occupation. Since 2002,
Russia has only been providing small amounts of humanitarian aid to Afghanistan.
In line with Russian official comments in June 2010 that more economic and social assistance is
needed for Afghanistan, Russia is considering investing $1 billion in Afghanistan to develop its
electricity capacity and build out other infrastructure. Included in those investments are
implementation of an agreement, reached during a Karzai visit to Moscow on January 22, 2011,
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for Russia to resume long dormant Soviet occupation-era projects such as expanding the Salang
Tunnel connecting the Panjshir Valley to Kabul, hydroelectric facilities in Kabul and Baghlan
provinces, a customs terminal, and a university in Kabul.
During the 1990s, after its 1989 withdrawal and the breakup of the Soviet Union, Russia
supported the Northern Alliance against the Taliban with some military equipment and technical
assistance in order to blunt Islamic militancy emanating from Afghanistan.56 Although Russia
supported the U.S. effort against the Taliban and Al Qaeda in Afghanistan out of fear of Islamic
(mainly Chechen) radicals, Russia continues to seek to reduce the U.S. military presence in
Central Asia. Russian fears of Islamic activism emanating from Afghanistan may have ebbed
since 2002 when Russia killed a Chechen of Arab origin known as “Hattab” (full name is Ibn al-
Khattab), who led a militant pro-Al Qaeda Chechen faction. The Taliban government was the
only one in the world to recognize Chechnya’s independence, and some Chechen fighters fighting
alongside Taliban/Al Qaeda forces have been captured or killed.
Northern Distribution Network and Other Aid to Afghan Security
Russian cooperation is crucial to the U.S. effort in Afghanistan. In February 2009, Russia paved
the way for the expansion of the Northern Distribution Network by allowing the resumption of
shipment of non-lethal equipment into Afghanistan through Russia (following a suspension in
2008 caused by differences over the Russia-Georgia conflict). There are discussions with Russia
over possibly allowing some lethal equipment to transit as well. About half of all ground cargo
for U.S. forces in Afghanistan now flow through the Northern Distribution Network, and the
United States is emphasizing developing this network further as relations with Pakistan have
deteriorated in 2011.
Russia has also responded to NATO requests to provide helicopters and spare parts to the Afghan
forces (which still make heavy use of Russian-made Hind helicopters) as well as fuel. In April
2011, there was agreement to establish a “Helicopter Maintenance Trust Fund.” Russia has also
delivered 24 helicopters to Afghan forces, financed by the United States. Russia reportedly has
pledged to train Afghan security forces.
In November 2010, in its most significant intervention in Afghanistan since its occupation,
Russian officers reportedly joined U.S. and Afghan forces attempting to interdict narcotics
trafficking in Afghanistan. However, the move prompted a complaint by President Karzai because
he was not consulted about the inclusion of the Russians.
Central Asian States
These states are crucial to the U.S. transition in Afghanistan, as discussed in a Senate Foreign
Relations Committee staff report released December 19, 2011, entitled “Central Asia and the
Transition in Afghanistan.” As shown in Table 7, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, and
Kazakhstan are pivotal actors in U.S. efforts to expand the Northern Distribution Network supply
route as an alternative to reliance on routes through Pakistan. These states are also becoming
crucial to the New Silk Road (NSR) strategy that seeks to help Afghanistan become a trade
crossroads between South and Central Asia—a strategy that could net Kabul substantial customs

56 Risen, James. “Russians Are Back in Afghanistan, Aiding Rebels.” New York Times, July 27, 1998.
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duties and other economic benefits. The possible revival of a long-standing plan to establish
Afghanistan as a transit hub for Central Asian natural gas (TAPI pipeline) is discussed later in this
report under “Development in Key Sectors.” Turkmenistan is key to this natural gas project but,
perhaps to avoid offending Pakistan or other actors, it takes a position of “positive neutrality” on
Afghanistan and does not allow its territory to be part of the Northern Distribution Network. No
U.S. forces have been based in Turkmenistan.
On security cooperation, Tajikistan allows access primarily to French combat aircraft, and
Kazakhstan has allowed use of facilities in case of emergency. In May 2011, Kazakhstan became
the first Central Asian state to pledge forces to Afghanistan (four non-combat troops). Earlier, in
April 2010, Kazakhstan agreed to allow U.S. over flights of lethal military equipment to
Afghanistan, allowing the United States to use polar routes to fly materiel directly from the
United States to Bagram Airfield.
In 1996, several of the Central Asian states banded together with Russia and China into a regional
grouping called the Shanghai Cooperation Organization to discuss the Taliban threat. It includes
China, Russia, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan. Reflecting Russian and
Chinese efforts to limit U.S. influence in the region, the group has issued statements, most
recently in August 2007, that security should be handled by the countries in the Central Asia
region. A meeting of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization to discuss Afghanistan was held in
Moscow on March 25, 2009, and was observed by a U.S. official, as well as by Iran.
Uzbekistan, a sponsor of Afghan faction leader Abdul Rashid Dostam, an ethnic Uzbek, allowed
use of Karshi-Khanabad air base by OEF forces from October 2001 until a rift emerged in May
2005 over Uzbekistan’s crackdown against riots in Andijon. Uzbekistan’s March 2008 agreement
with Germany for it to use Karshi-Khanabad air base temporarily, for the first time since the rift
with the United States, suggested potential for U.S.-Uzbek cooperation on Afghanistan and other
issues to be rebuilt. Renewed U.S. discussions with Uzbekistan apparently bore some fruit with
the Uzbek decision in February 2009 to allow the use of Navoi airfield for shipment of
U.S./NATO goods into Afghanistan. As a rift with Pakistan widened in September 2011, the
United States launched new overtures to Uzbekistan, including a call from President Obama to
Uzbek President Islam Karimov congratulating him on 20 years of independence from
Russia/Soviet Union. Subsequently, the Administration opened formal negotiations with
Uzbekistan to enlist its cooperation with further expansion of the Northern Distribution Network.
An increasing amount of trade is flowing from Afghanistan to and through the Central Asian
states. As noted below, railway lines are being built to Uzbekistan. The Panj bridge, built largely
with U.S. funds, has become a major thoroughfare for goods to move between Afghanistan and
Tajikistan. Kazakhstan is funding a $50 million program to develop Afghan professionals.
Central Asian Activities During Taliban Rule
During Taliban rule, Russian and Central Asian leaders grew increasingly alarmed that radical
Islamic movements were receiving safe haven in Afghanistan. Uzbekistan, in particular, has long
asserted that the group Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), allegedly responsible for four
simultaneous February 1999 bombings in Tashkent that nearly killed President Islam Karimov, is
linked to Al Qaeda.57 One of its leaders, Juma Namangani, reportedly was killed while

57 The IMU was named a foreign terrorist organization by the State Department in September 2000.
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commanding Taliban/Al Qaeda forces in Konduz in November 2001. Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan
do not directly border Afghanistan, but IMU guerrillas transited Kyrgyzstan during incursions
into Uzbekistan in the late 1990s.
Of the Central Asian states that border Afghanistan, only Turkmenistan chose to seek close
relations with the Taliban leadership when it was in power, possibly viewing engagement as a
more effective means of preventing spillover of radical Islamic activity from Afghanistan. It saw
Taliban control as facilitating construction of the natural gas pipeline, discussed above, that was
under consideration during Taliban rule. The September 11 events stoked Turkmenistan’s fears of
the Taliban and its Al Qaeda guests and the country publicly supported the U.S.-led war.
China58
China’s involvement in Afghanistan policy appears to be growing, primarily to secure access to
Afghan minerals and resources but perhaps also to help its ally, Pakistan, avoid encirclement by
India. Like Pakistan, China has been a rival of India. China also is concerned about the potential
for Islamic militancy in Afghanistan to inflame Islamist sentiment among China’s Uighur
community in China. A major organizer of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, China has a
small border with a sparsely inhabited sliver of Afghanistan known as the “Wakhan Corridor,”
and it is building border access routes and supply depots to facilitate China’s access to
Afghanistan through the corridor. Chinese delegations continue to assess the potential for new
investments in such sectors as mining and energy,59 and the cornerstone is the development of the
Aynak copper mine south of Kabul. For more information, see the sections below on the Afghan
economy: mining sector. In late 2009, China allocated an additional $75 million in economic aid
to Afghanistan, adding to the $130 million its has provided during 2002-2009. On March 20,
2010, ahead of a visit to China by Karzai, China called for more international support for
Afghanistan. During the visit, China stressed that its investments in Afghanistan would continue.
China has not taken any direct role in securing Afghanistan. Having established significant
strategic and economic interests in post-Taliban Afghanistan, there were indications in 2009 that
China was considering contributing some People’s Liberation Army (PLA) forces, possibly in a
non-combat role, to help secure Afghanistan. A communiqué from the Obama visit to China in
November 2009 implied a possible larger role for China to help stabilize Afghanistan. However,
no such Chinese mission has been announced.
In December 2000, sensing China’s increasing concern about Taliban policies, a Chinese official
delegation met with Mullah Umar. However, China did not enthusiastically support U.S. military
action against the Taliban, possibly because China was wary of a U.S. military buildup nearby.
Persian Gulf States: Saudi Arabia and UAE
The Gulf states are considered a key part of the effort to stabilize Afghanistan. As noted, the late
Ambassador Holbrooke focused substantial U.S. attention—and formed a multilateral task
force—to try to curb continuing Gulf resident donations to the Taliban in Afghanistan. He

58 For more information, see CRS Report RL33001, U.S.-China Counterterrorism Cooperation: Issues for U.S. Policy,
by Shirley A. Kan.
59 CRS conversations with Chinese officials in Beijing. August 2007.
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maintained that these donations are a larger source of Taliban funding than is the narcotics trade.
The Gulf states have also been a source of development funds and for influence with some
Afghan clerics and factions.
Saudi Arabia has a role to play in Afghanistan in part because, during the Soviet occupation,
Saudi Arabia channeled hundreds of millions of dollars to the Afghan resistance, primarily
Hikmatyar and Sayyaf. Drawing on its reputed intelligence ties to Afghanistan during that era,
Saudi Arabia worked with Taliban leaders to persuade them to suppress anti-Saudi activities by Al
Qaeda. Some press reports indicate that, in late 1998, Saudi and Taliban leaders discussed, but did
not agree on, a plan for a panel of Saudi and Afghan Islamic scholars to decide Bin Laden’s fate.
A majority of Saudi citizens practice the strict Wahhabi brand of Islam similar to that of the
Taliban, and Saudi Arabia was one of three countries to formally recognize the Taliban
government. The Taliban initially served Saudi Arabia as a potential counter to Iran, but Iranian-
Saudi relations improved after 1997 and balancing Iranian power ebbed as a factor in Saudi
policy toward Afghanistan.
Saudi Arabia has played a role as a go-between for negotiations between the Karzai government
and “moderate” Taliban figures. This role was recognized at the London conference on January
28, 2010, in which President Karzai stated in his opening speech that he sees a role for Saudi
Arabia in helping stabilize Afghanistan. As noted, some reports say that a political settlement
might involve Mullah Umar going into exile in Saudi Arabia.
According to U.S. officials, Saudi Arabia cooperated extensively, if not publicly, with OEF. It
broke diplomatic relations with the Taliban in late September 2001 and quietly permitted the
United States to use a Saudi base for command of U.S. air operations over Afghanistan, but it did
not permit U.S. airstrikes from it.
UAE Involvement
The United Arab Emirates, the third country that recognized the Taliban regime, is emerging as
another major donor to Afghanistan. It contributes about 300 troops to OEF and ISAF security
missions in southern Afghanistan, including Helmand province. Some are military medical
personnel who run small clinics and health programs for Afghans in the provinces where they
operate.
The UAE has donated at least $135 million to Afghanistan since 2002, according to the Afghan
Finance Ministry. Projects funded include housing in Qandahar, roads in Kabul, a hospital in
Zabol province, and a university in Khost. At the same time, the UAE property market has been
an outlet for investment by Afghan leaders who may have acquired their funds through soft loans
from the scandal-plagued Kabul Bank or through corruption connected to donor contracts or other
businesses.
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Keys to Afghanistan’s Post-War Future:
U.S. and International Aid and
Economic Development

Experts have long believed that accelerating economic development would do more to improve
the security situation than other policy components, and that economic development is widely
considered pivotal to Afghanistan’s ability to shape its future after the bulk of international forces
depart and donors presumably wind down their financial as well as military involvement. The
crucial role of economic factors in the success of the transition and in post-2014 Afghanistan are
discussed in an Administration report released in December 2011, called the “U.S. Economic
Strategy for Afghanistan.”60
The United States and partner countries provide large amounts of assistance, but many economic
sectors are have been developed with private investment, including by wealthy or well-connected
Afghans who have founded companies. The multiple overlapping funding streams complicate
efforts to determine the effects on Afghanistan’s economy of aid, as compared to the effects of
investment, trade, and other variables. As noted above, as part of the U.S. strategy, in July 2011
Secretary of State Clinton and other U.S. officials began to articulate a post-transition vision of
greater Afghan economic integration in the region and its role in a “New Silk Road” trading
system which would presumably accelerate Afghan private sector growth and customs revenue
receipts.
Hindering Afghanistan is that its economy and society are still fragile after decades of warfare
that left about 2 million dead, 700,000 widows and orphans, and about 1 million Afghan children
who were born and raised in refugee camps outside Afghanistan. More than 3.5 million Afghan
refugees have since returned, although a comparable number remain outside Afghanistan. The
U.N. High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) supervises Afghan repatriation and Afghan
refugee camps in Pakistan. As discussed, the literacy rate is very low and Afghanistan has a small,
although growing, pool of skilled labor, middle managers, accountants, and information
professionals.
There are debates over virtually all aspects of international aid to Afghanistan, including amounts,
mechanisms for providing it, the lack of coordination among donors, and how aid is distributed
within Afghanistan. For example, some of the more stable provinces, such as Bamiyan and Balkh,
complain that U.S. and international aid is flowing mostly to the restive provinces in an effort to
quiet them, and ignoring the needs of poor Afghans in peaceful areas. Later in this report are
tables showing U.S. appropriations of assistance to Afghanistan, and Table 23 lists U.S. spending
on all sectors for FY2001-FY2010.
U.S. Assistance to Afghanistan
During the 1990s, the United States became the largest single provider of assistance to the Afghan
people. During Taliban rule, no U.S. aid went directly to that government; monies were provided

60 The report, produced by the National Security Staff, was released December 2, 2011. It was mandated by the
National Defense Authorization Act for FY2011 (Section 1535 of P.L. 111-383).
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through relief organizations. Between 1985 and 1994, the United States had a cross-border aid
program for Afghanistan, implemented by USAID personnel based in Pakistan. Citing the
difficulty of administering this program, there was no USAID mission for Afghanistan from the
end of FY1994 until the reopening of the U.S. Embassy in Afghanistan in late 2001.
For all of FY2002-FY2011, the United States has provided about $67.4 billion in assistance,
including military “train and equip” for the ANA and ANP (which is about $39.5 billion of these
funds). The figures in the tables do not include costs for U.S. combat operations. Including those
costs, the United States spent about $105 billion for FY2010 and expects to spend about $120
billion for FY2011. A total of $118 billion in DOD funds is requested for FY2012 for both
Afghanistan and Iraq. For further information on combat costs, see CRS Report RL33110, The
Cost of Iraq, Afghanistan, and Other Global War on Terror Operations Since 9/11
, by Amy
Belasco.
Aid Oversight
Still heavily dependent on donors, Karzai has sought to reassure the international donor
community by establishing a transparent budget and planning process. Some in Congress want to
increase independent oversight of U.S. aid to Afghanistan; the conference report on the FY2008
defense authorization bill (P.L. 110-181) established a “special inspector general” for Afghanistan
reconstruction, (SIGAR) modeled on a similar outside auditor for Iraq (“Special Inspector
General for Iraq Reconstruction,” SIGIR). Funds provided for the SIGAR are in the tables below.
On May 30, 2008, Major General Arnold Fields (Marine, ret.) was named to the position. His
office has filed several reports on Afghan reconstruction, which include discussions of SIGAR
staffing levels and activities, as well as several specific project audits. However, he acknowledged
that criticisms in a July 2010 “peer review” of SIGAR operations by the Inspectors General of
several U.S. agencies were valid, attributing many of the shortcomings to slow pace of fully
funding his office.61 One recent SIGAR report noted deficiencies in the ability of the Afghan
government’s Central Audits Office to monitor how funds are used. Another (January 2011)
assesses the degree of coordination in U.S. programs to help women and girls. Some Members of
Congress criticized the SIGAR for ineffective oversight and called for his replacement; General
Fields (ret) announced his resignation in January 2011. His deputy, Herb Richardson, replaced
him on an acting basis as of February 2011, but in August 2011, Richardson announced his
departure, leaving the permanent top position at SIGAR again in transition. The acting deputy,
Steve Trent, is acting SIGAR as of September 2011.
Aid Authorization: Afghanistan Freedom Support Act
A key post-Taliban aid authorization bill, S. 2712, the Afghanistan Freedom Support Act (AFSA)
of 2002 (P.L. 107-327, December 4, 2002), as amended, authorized about $3.7 billion in U.S.
civilian aid for FY2003-FY2006. The law, whose authority has now expired, was intended to
create a central source for allocating funds; that aid strategy was not implemented. However,
some of the humanitarian, counter-narcotics, and governance assistance targets authorized by the
act were met or exceeded by appropriations. No Enterprise Funds authorized by the act have been
appropriated. The act authorized the following:

61 http://www.sigar.mil/pdf/peer_review/Section5.pdf.
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• $60 million in total counter-narcotics assistance ($15 million per year for
FY2003-FY2006);
• $30 million in assistance for political development, including national, regional,
and local elections ($10 million per year for FY2003-FY2005);
• $80 million total to benefit women and for Afghan human rights oversight ($15
million per year for FY2003-FY2006 for the Afghan Ministry of Women’s
Affairs, and $5 million per year for FY2003-FY2006 to the Human Rights
Commission of Afghanistan);
• $1.7 billion in humanitarian and development aid ($425 million per year for
FY2003-FY2006);
• $300 million for an Enterprise Fund;
• $550 million in drawdowns of defense articles and services for Afghanistan and
regional militaries. (The original law provided for $300 million in drawdowns.
That was increased by subsequent appropriations laws.)
A subsequent law (P.L. 108-458, December 17, 2004), implementing the recommendations of the
9/11 Commission, contained “The Afghanistan Freedom Support Act Amendments of 2004.” The
subtitle mandated the appointment of a U.S. coordinator of policy on Afghanistan and requires
additional Administration reports to Congress.
Afghan Freedom Support Act Reauthorization
In the 110th Congress, H.R. 2446, passed by the House on June 6, 2007 (406-10), would have
reauthorized AFSA through FY2010. A version (S. 3531), with fewer provisions than the House
bill. It was not taken up by the full Senate, possibly over concerns that it might limit
Administration flexibility in allocating aid. H.R. 2446 would have authorized about $1.7 billion
in U.S. economic aid and $320 in military aid (including drawdowns of equipment) per fiscal
year. It also would have authorized a pilot program of crop substitution to encourage legitimate
alternatives to poppy cultivation; and a cut off of U.S. aid to any Afghan province in which the
Administration reports that the leadership of the province is complicit in narcotics trafficking.
AFSA reauthorization was not reintroduced in the 111th Congress.
Direct Support to the Afghan Government
Although the Afghan government has been increasing its revenue (about $1.7 billion expected for
all of 2011), its revenues cover only about one-third of its overall budget of about $4.5 billion
(including donated development funds). USAID and other donors provide funding to help the
Afghan government meet gaps in its operating budget. As shown in the tables below, some U.S.
funds are provided both directly and through a U.N.-run multi-donor Afghan Reconstruction Trust
Fund (ARTF) account, run by the World Bank. As of early 2011, 31 donors had contributed $4.1
billion to the ARTF, with $2.1 billion for Afghan salaries and over $1.2 billion for priority
investments. (DOD “1230 report,” April 2011, p. 86.) Donors, including the United States,
resumed contributing to the ARTF in November 2011, when the IMF restored its credit program
for Afghanistan, which had been suspended for more than a year because of the Kabul Bank
scandal.
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Currently, the United States disburses more than 40% of its donated aid funds through the Afghan
government. The Kabul Conference (July 20, 2010) communiqué endorsed a goal of increasing
that to about 50% and for 80% of all funds to align with Afghan government priorities. Karzai has
long complained about the high percentage of donor aid not channeled through the Afghan
government and this criticism of what he calls a “parallel government” was emphasized in his
February 6, 2011, speech at a Munich security conference.62
National Solidarity Program
Through the ARTF, the United States supports an Afghan government program that promotes
local decision making on development—the “National Solidarity Program” (NSP). The program
provides block grants of about $60,000 per project to local councils to implement their priority
projects, most of which are water projects. The Afghan implementer is the Ministry of Rural
Rehabilitation and Development. As discussed in a SIGAR report of March 2011, it is widely
hailed as a highly successful, Afghan-run program, although the report says its contributions to
improving local governance are unclear. Still, it is being implemented in almost every district of
Afghanistan, and it employs over 800 Afghans. Donors have provided the program with $600
million through March 2011, of which U.S. funding (through October 2010) has been $528
million (DOD “1230 report,” April 2011. p. 86).
U.S. funds for the program are drawn from a broad category of ESF for “good governance.” P.L.
111-32, the FY2009 supplemental discussed above, earmarks $70 million to defray a large part of
a shortfall in that program. The FY2010 consolidated appropriation (P.L. 111-117) earmarked
another $175 million in ESF for the program. A total of almost $800 million in good governance
funds are requested for FY2012, meaning that the NSP funding provided by the U.S. will likely
meet prior years’ levels, if the funds are appropriated. The FY2010 National Defense
Authorization Act (P.L. 111-84) authorizes the use of some CERP funds, controlled by the U.S.
military, to supplement the funding for the NSP. However, this authorization, if implemented,
incurred opposition from some international NGOs who are opposed to combining military action
with development work.

62 http://www.afghanistan-un.org/2011/02/statement-by-his-excellency-hamid-karzai-president-of-the-islamic-republic-
of-afghanistan-at-the-47th-munich-security-conference-msc/.
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Table 8. Major Reporting Requirements
Several provisions require Administration reports on numerous aspects of U.S. strategy, assistance, and related issues.

P.L. 108-458, The Afghanistan Freedom Support Act Amendments required, through the end of FY2010, an
overarching annual report on U.S. strategy in Afghanistan. Other reporting requirements expired, including
required reports (1) on long-term U.S. strategy and progress of reconstruction; (2) on how U.S. assistance is
being used; (3) on U.S. efforts to persuade other countries to participate in Afghan peacekeeping; and (4) a joint
State and DOD report on U.S. counter-narcotics efforts in Afghanistan.

P.L. 110-181 (Section 1230), FY2008 Defense Authorization Act requires a quarterly DOD report on the
security situation in Afghanistan; the first was submitted in June 2008. It was required by that law through
FY2011. Section 1231 requires a report on the Afghan National Security Forces through the end of FY2010.
Both reports were extended by the FY2011 National Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 111-383), and then by the
FY2012 National Defense Authorization Act (H.R. 1540). The FY2011 act also required a report, within six
months of enactment, on U.S. economic strategy for Afghanistan and a plan, to be submitted concurrent with
the FY2012 budget submission, to transition the duties of the Task Force for Business and Stability Operations in
Afghanistan to the Department of State; and a report by State, DOD, and USAID on the use of contractors in
Afghanistan.

Section 1229 of the same law requires the quarterly report of the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan
Reconstruction (SIGAR).

P.L. 111-8 (Omnibus Appropriation, explanatory statement) required a State Department report on the use of
funds to address the needs of Afghan women and girls (submitted by September 30, 2009).

P.L. 111-32, FY2009 Supplemental Appropriation (Section 1116), required a White House report, by the time of
the FY2011 budget submission, on whether Afghanistan and Pakistan are cooperating with U.S. policy sufficiently
to warrant a continuation of Administration policy toward both countries, as wel as efforts by these
governments to curb corruption, their efforts to develop a counter-insurgency strategy, the level of political
consensus in the two countries to confront security chal enges, and U.S. government efforts to achieve these
objectives. The report was released with a date of September 30, 2010.

The same law (Section 1117) required a report, by September 23, 2009, on metrics to be used to assess
progress on Afghanistan and Pakistan strategy. A progress report measured against those metrics is to be
submitted by March 30, 2010, and every six months thereafter, until the end of FY2011.

Section 1228 of the FY2010 National Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 111-84) required a report, within 120
days, on the Afghan Provincial Protection Program and other local security initiatives. Section 1235 authorized a
DOD-funded study of U.S. force levels needed for eastern and southern Afghanistan, and Section 1226 required
a Comptrol er General report on the U.S. “campaign plan” for the Afghanistan (and Iraq) effort.
Sustaining Afghanistan Beyond the Transition: International Aid and Loans
U.S. and Afghan policymakers are concerned that international assistance will wane after the end
of the transition in 2014. As shown in Table 10, non-U.S. donors, including such institutions as
the EU and the Asian Development Bank, have provided over $29 billion in assistance to
Afghanistan since the fall of the Taliban. When combined with U.S. aid, this by far exceeds the
$27.5 billion for reconstruction identified by the IMF as required for 2002-2010. Major pledges
have been made primarily at donor conferences such as Tokyo (2002), Berlin (April 2004), Kabul
(April 2005), London (February 2006), Paris (June 2008), and London (January 2010).
The December 5, 2011, Bonn Conference was not, according to U.S. officials, intended as a
“pledging conference,” although in advance of that conference the World Bank released a report
warning that an abrupt aid cutoff could lead to fiscal implosion, loss of control over the security
sector, the collapse of political authority, and the possibility of civil war. At the Bonn Conference,
Afghan officials stated that Afghanistan would be dependent on about $10 billion per year of
international economic aid until 2025. Identifying sources of long-term assistance to Afghanistan
will be the focus of an international conference on Afghanistan in Tokyo in July 2012.
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Among multilateral lending institutions, in May 2002, the World Bank reopened its office in
Afghanistan after 20 years. Its projects have been concentrated in the telecommunications and
road and sewage sectors. The Asian Development Bank (ADB) has also been playing a major role
in Afghanistan, including in financing railway construction. Another of its projects in Afghanistan
was funding the paving of a road from Qandahar to the border with Pakistan, and as noted above,
it is contributing to a project to bring electricity from Central Asia to Afghanistan. On the eve of
the London conference on January 28, 2010, the IMF and World Bank announced $1.6 billion in
Afghanistan debt relief.
Development in Key Sectors
Efforts to build the legitimate economy are showing some results, by accounts of senior U.S.
officials. Some sectors, discussed below, are being developed primarily (although not
exclusively) with private investment funding. There has been substantial new construction,
particularly in Kabul, including luxury hotels; a $25 million Coca Cola bottling factory (opened
in September 2006); apartment and office buildings; and marriage halls and other structures. The
bottling factory is located near the Bagrami office park (another private initiative), which includes
several other factories. The Serena luxury hotel was built by the Agha Khan foundation, a major
investor in Afghanistan.
An arm of DOD, called the Task Force for Business and Stability Operations, formerly headed by
Deputy Under Secretary Paul Brinkley, facilitated some of the investment. The Task Force has
seen many of its personnel depart because of a provision of the FY2011 Defense Authorization
Act (P.L. 111-383) that required the Task Force be folded into State/USAID-led assistance
structures by the end of FY2011; that transition has occurred. Others say that private investment
could be healthier if not for the influence exercised over it by various faction leaders and Karzai
relatives.
The following are some key sectors and what has been accomplished with U.S. and international
donor funds, as well as with private investment.
Education
Despite the success in enrolling Afghan children in school since the Taliban era (see statistics
above), setbacks have occurred because of Taliban attacks on schools, causing some to close. In
addition, Afghanistan’s university system is said to be woefully underfunded, in part because
Afghans are entitled to free higher education (to the B.A. level) by the Constitution which means
that demand for the higher education far outstrips Afghan resources. The shortfall is impeding the
development of a large enough pool of skilled workers for the Afghan government. Afghanistan
requires about $35 million to operate its universities and institutes for one year; USAID has
requested $20 million to help fund those activities for FY2012.63

63 Boak, Josh. “Afghan Universities Struggling for Funding.” Washington Post, February 13, 2011.
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Health
The health care sector, as noted by Afghan observers, has made considerable gains in reducing
infant mortality and giving about 65% of the population at least some access to health
professionals. In addition to U.S. assistance to develop the health sector’s capacity, Egypt
operates a 65-person field hospital at Bagram Air Base that instructs Afghan physicians. Jordan
operates a similar facility in Mazar-e-Sharif.
Roads
Road building is considered a U.S. priority and has been USAID’s largest project category there,
taking up about 25% of USAID spending since the fall of the Taliban. Roads are considered key
to enabling Afghan farmers to bring legitimate produce to market in a timely fashion, and former
commander of U.S. forces in Afghanistan General Eikenberry (later Ambassador) said “where the
roads end, the Taliban begin.” The major road, the Ring Road, is nearly all repaved, and the 150
miles in the northwest remaining to be repaved is being funded by a $350 million Asian
Development Bank donation. Among other major projects completed are a road from Qandahar to
Tarin Kowt, (Uruzgan province) built by U.S. military personnel, inaugurated in 2005; and a road
linking the Panjshir Valley to Kabul. In several of the most restive provinces, U.S. funds
(sometimes CERP funds) are being used to build roads that link up farming communities to the
market for their products. Other key priorities are completing a Khost-Gardez road, under way
currently, but slowed by security concerns, and a Salang Bypass Road through Bamiyan province.
The Afghan government has committed to developing an East-West road across Afghanistan,
from Herat to Kabul. However, funding for that project has not been identified to date.
Bridges
Afghan officials are said to be optimistic about increased trade with Central Asia now that a new
bridge has opened (October 2007) over the Panj River, connecting Afghanistan and Tajikistan.
The bridge was built with $33 million in (FY2005) U.S. assistance. The bridge is helping what
press reports say is robust reconstruction and economic development in the relatively peaceful
and ethnically homogenous province of Panjshir, the political base of the Northern Alliance.
Railways
Afghanistan does not currently have any functioning railway. However, three railway projects are
under way. One, from Mazar-i-Sharif to Hairaton, on the border with Uzbekistan, was completed
in March 2011 with $165 million from the Asian Development Bank. It is to become operational
in summer 2011. With funding from Japan and China, other rail lines will extend from Iran to
Herat Province, and from the Tajikistan border down to Konduz. The various segments are
eventually to link up and parallel the Ring Road that circles Afghanistan. The railway will
integrate Afghanistan to the former Soviet railway system in Central Asia, increasing
Afghanistan’s economic integration in the region.
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Electricity
At least 10% of USAID funds for Afghanistan have been spent on power projects, although that
percentage is rising in 2010 and 2011. The Afghanistan Compact states that the goal is for
electricity to reach 65% of households in urban areas and 25% in rural areas by 2010, a goal that
has not been met. However, severe power shortages in Kabul, caused in part by the swelling of
Kabul’s population to about 3 million, up from half a million when the Taliban was in power, are
fewer now than two years ago. Power to the capital has grown due to the Afghan government’s
agreements with several Central Asian neighbors to import electricity, as well as construction of
new substations. Many shops in Kabul are now lit up at night, as observed by numerous visitors
over the past few years, including CRS. On the other hand, there has been some criticism of a 105
Megawatt power generating plants built by USAID at Tarakhil, in north Kabul at a cost of about
$300 million because of the high costs of fuel, the questionable need for the plant given
alternative plants built recently, and the possible inability of the Afghan authorities to maintain
them. As noted above, in January 2011, Russia pledged to resume work on some long dormant
hydroelectric projects in Afghanistan that were suspended when Soviet troops withdrew in 1989.
Kajaki Dam and Qandahar Power Initiative
A major USAID and DOD focus is on power projects in southern Afghanistan. The key long-term
project is to expand the capacity of the Kajaki Dam, located in Helmand Province. USAID has
allocated about $500 million to restore and expand the capacity of the dam. Currently, two
turbines are operating—one was always working, and the second was repaired by USAID
contractors. This has doubled electricity production in the south and caused small factories and
other businesses to come to flourish. USAID plans to further expand capacity of the dam by
installing a third turbine (which there is a berth for but which never had a turbine installed.) In an
operation involving 4,000 NATO troops (Operation Ogap Tsuka), components of the third turbine
were successfully delivered to the dam in September 2008. It was expected to be operational in
mid-late 2009 but technical and security problems, such as inability to secure and build roads
leading to the dam, have delayed the project. A $266 million USAID contract was let to Black
and Veatch in December 2010 to complete the installation, and it tried to eliminate the security
bottleneck in mid-2011 by hiring a private security firm to protect the dam, but there still is no
public estimate as to when the third turbine will be completed.
In the interim, and to the consternation of some who want long-term, sustainable solutions for
Afghanistan rather than short-term palliatives, the U.S. military and USAID began in February
2011 to implement a plan (“Qandahar Power Initiative”) to focus on smaller substations and
generator projects that can bring more electricity to Qandahar and other places in the south
quickly. The initiative has been pursued in order to facilitate the U.S.-military led counter-
insurgency strategy in Qandahar, even though the initiative may not produce sustainable gains
over the longer term. Some of the power provided by additional diesel generators is being used to
supply the Qandahar Industrial Park. For this and other power projects, the Administration
requested legislative authority for an “Infrastructure Fund” to be funded by DOD. That authority
was provided in the FY2011 DOD authorization bill (P.L. 111-383). Actual funding is depicted in
the FY2011 and FY2012 aid tables below. President Karzai said in a CNN interview on June 26,
2011, that the Afghan government favored emphasizing the longer-term Kajaki Dam project
rather than the interim generator project.
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Solar Power
There is also an apparent increasing emphasis on providing electricity to individual homes and
villages through small solar power installations. A contractor to USAID, IRG, is providing small
solar powered-electricity generators to homes in several districts of Afghanistan, alleviating the
need to connect such homes to the national power grid. However, there are technical drawbacks,
including weather-related inconsistency of power supply and the difficulty of powering
appliances that require substantial power. The U.S. broadcasting service to Afghanistan, Radio
Azadi, run by Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, has given out 20,000 solar-powered radios
throughout Afghanistan, according to RFE/RL in December 2010.
Agriculture
With about 80% of Afghans living in rural areas, the agriculture sector has always been key to
Afghanistan’s economy and stability. The late Ambassador Holbrooke, including in his January
2010 strategy document, outlined U.S. policy to boost Afghanistan’s agriculture sector not only to
reduce drug production but also as an engine of economic growth. Prior to the turmoil that
engulfed Afghanistan in the late 1970s, Afghanistan was a major exporter of agricultural
products.
USAID has spent about 15% of its Afghanistan funds on agriculture (and “alternative
livelihoods” to poppy cultivation), and this has helped Afghanistan double its legitimate
agricultural output over the past five years. One emerging “success story” is growing Afghan
exports of high-quality pomegranate juice called Anar. Other countries are promoting not only
pomegranates but also saffron rice and other crops that draw buyers outside Afghanistan. Another
emerging success story is Afghanistan’s November 2010 start of exports of raisins to Britain.64
Wheat production was robust in 2009 because of healthy prices for that crop, and Afghanistan is
again self-sufficient in wheat production. According to April 2011 DOD report, the U.S.
Department of Agriculture has about 110 personnel in Afghanistan on long-term and priority
projects; there are also at least 25 agriculture experts from USAID in Afghanistan. Their efforts
include providing new funds to buy seeds and agricultural equipment, and to encourage agri-
business. In addition, the National Guard from several states is deploying nine (as of March 2011)
“Agribusiness Development Teams” in several provinces to help Afghan farmers with water
management, soil enhancement, crop cultivation, and improving the development and marketing
of their goods.
U.S. strategy has addressed not only crop choice but also trying to construct the entirety of the
infrastructure needed for a healthy legitimate agriculture sector, including road building, security
of the routes to agriculture markets, refrigeration, storage, transit through Pakistan and other
transportation of produce, building legitimate sources of financing, and other aspects of the
industry. U.S. officials in Kabul say that Pakistan’s restrictions on trade between Afghanistan and
India had prevented a rapid expansion of Afghan pomegranate exports to that market, but the
transit trade agreement between Afghanistan and Pakistan, discussed above, is expected to
alleviate some of these bottlenecks. Dubai is another customer for Afghan pomegranate exports.

64 Lemmon, Gayle Tzemach. “New Hope for Afghan Raisin Farmers.” New York Times, October 9, 2010.
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There is a vibrant timber industry in the northeast provinces. However, the exports are illegal. De-
forestation has been outlawed because of the potential for soil erosion and other economic and
environmental effects.
In terms of specific programming, USAID has a $150 million program for the relatively safe
areas of Afghanistan to continue to develop licit crops. The Incentives Driving Economic
Alternatives for the North, East, and West (IDEA-NEW) program is planned to run through
FY2014. In southern and eastern areas of the country where counterinsurgency operations are
ongoing, USAID’s $474 million Afghanistan Vouchers for Increased Production in Agriculture
(AVIPA-Plus) program is scheduled to run through FY2011 and includes initiatives coordinated
with U.S. counterinsurgency operations in Helmand and Qandahar provinces. The program
provides vouchers for wheat seed, fertilizer, and tools, in addition to supporting cash for work
programs and small grants to local cooperatives.
Telecommunications
Several Afghan telecommunications firms have been formed. With startup funds from the Agha
Khan Foundation (the Agha Khan is leader of the Isma’ili community, which is prevalent in
northern Afghanistan), the highly successful Roshan cellphone company was founded. Another
Afghan cellphone firm is Afghan Wireless. The most significant post-Taliban media network is
Tolo Television, owned by Moby Media. U.S. funds are being used to supplement the private
investment; a $4 million U.S. grant, in partnership with the Asia Consultancy Group, is being
used to construct communication towers in Bamiyan and Ghor provinces. The Afghan
government says it plans to link all major cities by fiber optic cable by the end of 2011.
Airlines
The 52-year-old national airline, Ariana, is said to be in significant financial trouble due to
corruption that has affected its safety ratings and left it unable to service a heavy debt load.
However, there are new privately run airlines, such as Safi Air (run by the Safi Group, which has
built a modern mall in Kabul), and Kam Air. Another, Pamir, was ordered closed in 2010 due to
safety concerns.
Mining and Gems
Afghanistan’s mining sector has been largely dormant since the Soviet invasion. Some Afghan
leaders complain that not enough has been done to revive such potentially lucrative industries as
minerals mining, such as of copper and lapis lazuli (a stone used in jewelry). The issue became
more urgent in June 2010 when a DOD development team announced, based on surveys, that
Afghanistan may have untapped minerals worth over $1 trillion.65 Then top commander in
Afghanistan General Petraeus, in an interview with NBC News on August 15, 2010, said the
amount could be in the “trillions.” Although copper and iron are the largest categories by value,
there are believed to also be significant reserves of such minerals as lithium in western
Afghanistan—lithium is crucial to the new batteries being used to power electric automobiles.

65 Risen, James. “U.S. Identifies Mineral Riches in Afghanistan.” New York Times, June 14, 2010.
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There is substantial activity in this sector, which the Afghan government estimates will generate
$1.4 billion in annual government revenue by 2016, and $2.2 billion per year by 2020. A major
project, signed in November 2007, is with China Metallurgical Group for the company to invest
$3.0 billion to develop Afghanistan’s Aynak copper field in Lowgar Province. The agreement,
viewed as generous to the point where it might not be commercially profitable for China
Metallurgical Group, includes construction of two coal-fired electric power plant (one of which
will supply more electricity to Kabul city); a segment of railway (discussed above); and a road
from the project to Kabul. Work on the mine reportedly has been slowed by various factors,
including the need to clear mines in the area and to excavate ancient artifacts that the Afghan
government seeks to preserve. Actual digging at the mine is expected to begin in mid-2012. U.S.
forces do not directly protect the project, but U.S. forces have set up small bases on some of the
roads leading to the mine project to provide general stability there.
On December 14, 2010, with involvement of the DOD Task Force for Business and Stability
Operations, 10 outside investors announced $50 million in investment in a gold mine in Baghlan
Province. There is another gold mine operating in neighboring Takhar Province.
In September 2011 seven bids were submitted for another large mining project, the Hajigak iron
ore mine (which may contain 60 billion tons of iron ore) near Kabul. The bids—from Chinese,
Indian, and other firms—are under and a contract award is expected in early 2012. On December
7, 2011, the Ministry of Mines began accepting bids to develop copper and gold deposits in large
parts of the north, northeast, west, and central Afghanistan.
Oil, Gas, and Related Pipelines
Afghanistan has no hydrocarbons energy export industry and a small refining sector that provides
some of Afghanistan’s needs for gasoline or other fuels. Almost all of Afghanistan’s fuel comes
from neighboring states. As noted, Afghanistan has had virtually no operational hydrocarbon
energy sector. However, Afghanistan’s prospects in this sector appeared to brighten by the
announcement in March 2006 of an estimated 3.6 billion barrels of oil and 36.5 trillion cubic feet
of gas reserves. Experts believe these amounts, if proved, could make Afghanistan relatively self-
sufficient in energy and able to export energy to its neighbors. In a major development, on
December 15, 2010, the Afghan government let a six-month contract to a local firm, Ghazanfar
Neft Gas, to collect and market crude oil from the Angot field in northern Afghanistan (part of a
field that may contain 80 million barrels of oil), initially producing at the low rate of 800 barrels
per day. However, the sector is expected to expand to more fields in the Amu Darya basin
(northern Afghanistan), and a tender will be offered to develop a larger oil field in Balkh Province
(Kasha Kari bloc), estimated to hold 1.8 billion barrels of oil.
USAID has funded test projects to develop gas resources in northern Afghanistan. Building on
that aid, there is increasing optimism that private investors will fund at least 25% of a $300
million needed investment for a 200 megawatt gas-fired thermal plant in northern Afghanistan.
The plant would be part of a plan to link Afghanistan’s natural gas field in Shehbergan to the
population center in Mazar-e-Sharif.
TAPI (Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India) Gas Pipeline Project. Another major energy
project remains under consideration. During 1996-1998, the Clinton Administration supported
proposed natural gas and oil pipelines through western Afghanistan as an incentive for the
warring factions to cooperate. A consortium led by Los Angeles-based Unocal Corporation
proposed a $7.5 billion Central Asia Gas Pipeline that would originate in southern Turkmenistan
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and pass through Afghanistan to Pakistan, with possible extensions into India.66 The deterioration
in U.S.-Taliban relations after 1998 suspended hopes for the pipeline projects, but prospects for
the project improved in the post-Taliban period. In a summit meeting in late May 2002 between
the leaders of Turkmenistan, Afghanistan, and Pakistan, the three countries agreed to revive the
project. Sponsors held an inaugural meeting on July 9, 2002, in Turkmenistan, signing a series of
preliminary agreements. On December 12, 2010, in the Turkmenistan capital Ashkabad, the
relevant leaders reaffirmed their intent to complete the project Disagreements remain over the
proportion of gas supplied to the line by individual countries, and over pricing, but Afghan
officials say the Asian Development Bank has agreed to finance the project, removing what had
been a major hurdle. U.S. officials view this project as a superior alternative to a proposed gas
pipeline from Iran to India, transiting Pakistan.
Trade Promotion/Reconstruction Opportunity Zones
The key to U.S. economic strategy, as exemplified by the New Silk Road strategy, is to encourage
Afghanistan’s trade relationships. The United States is doing so by promoting regional economic
integration, discussed above, as well as through bilateral economic agreements with Afghanistan.
A key to the strategy was accomplished in 2011 when Afghanistan and Pakistan finalized
provisions to implement their 2010 transit trade agreement. To facilitate Afghanistan’s ability to
increase trade, USAID is funding a five year project ($63 million total during 2010-2014) to
simplify the customs clearance process. This includes new import procedures that have reduced
the time needed for imports to clear customs by 45%. On December 13, 2004, the 148 countries
of the World Trade Organization voted to start membership talks with Afghanistan.
Earlier, in September 2004, the United States and Afghanistan signed a bilateral trade and
investment framework agreement (TIFA), and most of Afghanistan’s exports are eligible for duty
free treatment under the enhanced Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) program. The
Administration economic strategy report of December 2011 says the Administration is reaching
out to Afghan exporters and U.S. importers of Afghan products to make increased use of the GSP
program. The TIFA is seen as a prelude to a broader and more complex bilateral free trade
agreement, but negotiations on an FTA have not yet begun.
Another initiative supported by the United States is the establishment of joint Afghan-Pakistani
“Reconstruction Opportunity Zones” (ROZs) which would be modeled after “Qualified Industrial
Zones” run by Israel and Jordan in which goods produced in the zones receive duty free treatment
for import into the United States. For FY2008, $5 million in supplemental funding was requested
to support the zones, but P.L. 110-252 did not specifically mention the zones.
Bills in the 110th Congress, S. 2776 and H.R. 6387, would have authorized the President to
proclaim duty-free treatment for imports from ROZs to be designated by the President. In the
111th Congress, a version of these bills was introduced (S. 496 and H.R. 1318). President Obama
specifically endorsed passage of these bills in his March 2009 strategy announcement. H.R. 1318
was incorporated into H.R. 1886, a Pakistan aid appropriation that is a component of the new
U.S. strategy for the region, and the bill was passed by the House on June 11, 2009, and then

66 Other participants in the Unocal consortium include Delta of Saudi Arabia, Hyundai of South Korea, Crescent Steel
of Pakistan, Itochu Corporation and INPEX of Japan, and the government of Turkmenistan. Some accounts say
Russia’s Gazprom would probably receive a stake in the project. Nezavisimaya Gazeta (Moscow), October 30, 1997,
p. 3.
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appended to H.R. 2410. However, another version of the Pakistan aid bill, S. 1707, did not
authorize ROZs; it was passed and became law (P.L. 111-73).
Table 9. Comparative Social and Economic Statistics
Population
28 million +. Kabul population is 3 million, up from 500,000 in Taliban era.
Ethnicities/Religions
Pashtun 42%; Tajik 27%; Uzbek 9%; Hazara 9%; Aimak 4%; Turkmen 3%; Baluch 2%.
Size of Religious
Religions: Sunni (Hanafi school) 80%; Shi te (Hazaras, Qizilbash, and Isma’ilis) 19%; other 1% Christians-
Minorities
estimated 500-8,000 persons; Sikh and Hindu-3,000 persons; Bahai’s-400 (declared blasphemous in May
2007); Jews-1 person; Buddhist- smal numbers, mostly foreigners. No Christian or Jewish schools. One
church.
Literacy Rate
28% of population over 15 years of age. 43% of males; 12.6% of females.
GDP, and GDP Growth
$29.8 billion purchasing power parity (PPP). 109th in the world. Per capita: $1,000 purchasing power parity.
and Unemployment
212th in the world. Growth: about 9% for 2010 and 8% expected for 2011. GDP was about $10 billion (PPP)
Rates
during last year of Taliban rule. Unemployment rate is about 40%.
Children in
7.1 million, of which 40% are girls. Up from 900,000 boys in school during Taliban era. 4,000 schools built (all
School/Schools Built
donors) and 140,000 teachers hired since Taliban era. 17 universities, up from 2 in 2002. 75,000 Afghans in
since 2002
universities in Afghanistan (35% female); 5,000 when Taliban was in power.
Afghans With Access to
65% with basic health services access-compared to 8% during Taliban era. Infant mortality down 22% since
Health Coverage
Taliban to 135 per 1,000 live births. 680 clinics built .
Roads Built
About 2,500 miles paved post-Taliban, including repaving of “Ring Road” (78% complete) that circles the
country. Kabul-Qandahar drive reduced to 6 hours.
Judges/Courts
Over 1,000 judges (incl. 200 women) trained since fal of Taliban.
Banks Operating
17, including branches in some rural areas, but about 90% of the population still use hawalas (informal money
transfer services). No banks existed during Taliban era. Some limited credit card use. Some Afghan police
now paid by cel phone (E-Paisa).
Access to Electricity
15%-20% of the population. Much of its electricity imported from neighboring states.
Government Revenues
About $1.7 billion in 2010; more than double the $720 million 2007. Total Afghan budget is about $4.5 billion
(excl. donor funds)
(including development funds)—shortfal covered by foreign donors, including through Afghanistan
Reconstruction Trust Fund.
Financial Reserves/Debt
About $4.4 billion, up from $180 million in 2002. Includes amounts due Central Bank. $8 billion bilateral debt,
plus $500 million multilateral. U.S. forgave $108 million in debt in 2004, and $1.6 billion forgiven by other
creditors in March 2010.
Foreign/Private
About $500 million to $1 billion per year. Four Afghan airlines: Ariana (national) plus at least two privately
Investment
owned: Safi and Kam. Turkish Air and India Air fly to Kabul.
Mining/Minerals
Vast untapped minerals affirmed by U.S. experts (June 2010). Chinese firm mining copper in Lowgar Province,
and contracts to mine iron ore and produce oil in in various stages of consideration and implementation.
Legal Exports/
80% of the population is involved in agriculture. Self-sufficiency in wheat production as of May 2009 (first time
Agriculture
in 30 years). Exports: $400 million+ (2011): fruits, raisins, melons, pomegranate juice (Anar), nuts, carpets,
lapis lazuli gems, marble tile, timber products (Kunar, Nuristan provinces). July 2010 Afghanistan-Pakistan
trade agreement.
Imports
Imports: $3.4 billion (2009): food, energy, capital goods, textiles, autos. Top five trading partners (in
descending order): Pakistan, Russia, Iran, India, United States.
Oil Proven Reserves
3.6 billion barrels of oil, 36.5 trillion cubic feet of gas. Current oil production negligible, but USAID funding
project to revive oil and gas facilities in the north.
Cellphones/Tourism
About 6.5 million cellphone subscribers, up from neglibile amounts during Taliban era. Tourism: National
park opened in Bamiyan June 2009. Increasing tourist visits.
Sources: CIA, The World Factbook; various press and U.S. government official testimony.
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Table 10. Major Non-U.S. Donors to Afghanistan 2002-2011
(in $ millions)
Japan

3,150
European Union

2,880
Asian Development Bank

2,270
Britain
2,220
World Bank

2,140
Germany 2,130
India
1,515
Canada
1,255
Netherlands
775
Norway 745
Australia 645
Italy
645
Sweden 635
United Nations

445
Denmark 435
Iran
400
France 320
Spain
220
Turkey 210
Finland 160
Russia
150
Saudi Arabia

140
China
140
UAE
135
Switzerland
120
South Korea

115
Czech Republic

105
Total
$24,900

(includes donors of under
(of which $19,700
$100 million, not listed)
disbursed—about 80%)
Source: Afghanistan Ministry of Finance: Development Cooperation Report, 2010.
Note: Table includes donors of over $100 million only.
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Table 11. U.S. Assistance to Afghanistan, FY1978-FY1998
($ in millions)
Fiscal
Devel.
Econ. Supp.
P.L. 480 (Title I
Other (Incl. Regional
Year
Assist.
(ESF)
and II)
Military
Refugee Aid)
Total
1978 4.989 —
5.742 0.269
0.789 11.789
1979 3.074 —
7.195 —
0.347 10.616
1980

(Soviet invasion-December 1979)


1981 — —
— —


1982 — —
— —


1983 — —
— —


1984 — —
— —


1985 3.369 —



3.369
1986 — —
8.9 —

8.9
1987
17.8
12.1 2.6 —
— 32.5
1988 22.5 22.5 29.9 —

74.9
1989 22.5 22.5 32.6 —

77.6
1990 35.0 35.0 18.1 —

88.1
1991 30.0 30.0 20.1 —

80.1
1992 25.0 25.0 31.4 —

81.4
1993 10.0 10.0 18.0 —
30.2 68.2
1994 3.4 2.0
9.0 —
27.9 42.3
1995 1.8 —
12.4 —
31.6 45.8
1996 — — 16.1 —
26.4 42.5
1997 — — 18.0 —
31.9a 49.9
1998 — —
3.6 —
49.14b 52.74
Source: Department of State.
a. Includes $3 million for demining and $1.2 million for counternarcotics.
b. Includes $3.3 million in projects targeted for Afghan women and girls, $7 million in earthquake relief aid,
100,000 tons of 416B wheat worth about $15 million, $2 million for demining, and $1.54 for
counternarcotics.
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Table 12. U.S. Assistance to Afghanistan, FY1999-FY2002
($ in millions)

FY1999 FY2000 FY2001
FY2002
(Final)
U.S. Department of
42.0 worth of
68.875 for 165,000
131.1 (300,000
198.12 (for food
Agriculture (DOA) and
wheat (100,000
metric tons.
metric tons under
commodities)
USAID Food For Peace
metric tons under
(60,000 tons for
P.L. 480, Title II,
(FFP), via World Food
“416(b)” program.)
May 2000 drought
and 416(b))
Program(WFP)
relief)
State/Bureau of
16.95 for Afghan
14.03 for the same
22.03 for similar
136.54 (to U.N.
Population, Refugees and
refugees in Pakistan
purposes
purposes
agencies)
Migration (PRM) via
and Iran, and to
UNHCR and ICRC
assist their
repatriation
State Department/
7.0 to various
6.68 for drought
18.934 for similar
113.36 (to various
Office of Foreign
NGOs to aid
relief and health,
programs
U.N. agencies and
Disaster Assistance
Afghans inside
water, and
NGOs)
(OFDA)
Afghanistan sanitation programs
State Department/HDP
2.615
3.0
2.8
7.0 to Halo
(Humanitarian Demining
Trust/other demining
Program)
Aid to Afghan Refugees
5.44 (2.789 for
6.169, of which
5.31 for similar

in Pakistan (through
health, training—
$3.82 went to
purposes
various NGOs)
Afghan females in
similar purposes
Pakistan)
Counter-Narcotics

1.50
63.0
USAID/Office of

0.45
(Afghan
24.35 for
Transition Initiatives
women in
broadcasting/media
Pakistan)
DOD



50.9 ( 2.4 million
rations)
Foreign Military



57.0 (for Afghan
Financing
national army)
Anti-Terrorism



36.4
Economic Support Funds


105.2
(E.S.F)
Peacekeeping


24.0
Totals
76.6
113.2
182.6
815.9
Source: CRS.
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Table 13. U.S. Assistance to Afghanistan, FY2003
($ in millions; same acronyms as Table 12)
FY2003 Foreign Aid Appropriations (P.L. 108-7)
Development/Health 90
P.L. 480 Title II (Food Aid)
47
Peacekeeping 10
Disaster Relief
94
ESF
50
Non-Proliferation, De-mining, Anti-Terrorism (NADR)
5
Refugee Relief
55
Afghan National Army (ANA) train and equip (FMF)
21
Total from this law
372
FY2003 Supplemental (P.L. 108-11)
Road Construction (ESF, Kabul-Qandahar road)
100
Provincial Reconstruction Teams (ESF)
10
Afghan government support (ESF)
57
ANA train and equip (FMF)
170
Anti-terrorism/de-mining
28
(NADR, some for Karzai protection)
Total from this law
365
Total for FY2003
737
Source: CRS.
Note: Earmarks for programs benefitting women and girls totaled $65 million. Of that amount, $60 million was
earmarked in the supplemental and $5 million in the regular appropriation.
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Table 14. U.S. Assistance to Afghanistan, FY2004
($ in millions, same acronyms as previous tables)
Afghan National Police (FMF)
160
Counter-Narcotics
125.52
Afghan National Army (FMF)
719.38
Presidential Protection (NADR)
52.14
DDR Program (disarming militias)
15.42
MANPAD destruction
1.5
Terrorist Interdiction Program
0.41
Border Control (WMD)
0.23
Good Governance Program
113.57
Political Competition, Consensus Building
24.41
(Elections)
Rule of Law and Human Rights
29.4
Roads
348.68
Education/Schools 104.11
Health/Clinics 76.85
Power
85.13
PRTs
57.4
CERP (DOD funds to build good will)
39.71
Private Sector Development/Economic Growth
63.46
Water Projects
28.9
Agriculture 50.5
Refugee/IDPs 82.6
Food Assistance
88.25
De-mining 12.61
State/USAID Program Support
203.02
Total Aid for FY2004
2,483.2
Laws Derived: FY2004 supplemental (P.L. 108-106); FY2004 regular appropriation (P.L. 108-
199). Regular appropriation earmarked $5 million for programs benefitting women and girls.
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Table 15. U.S. Assistance to Afghanistan, FY2005
($ in millions)
Afghan National Police (State Department funds, FMF, and DOD funds,
624.46
transition to DOD funds to Afghan security forces
Counter-Narcotics 775.31
Afghan National Army (State Department funds, FMF, and DOD funds)
1,633.24
Presidential (Karzai) Protection (NADR funds)
23.10
DDR
5.0
Detainee Operations
16.9
MANPAD Destruction
0.75
Smal Arms Control
3.0
Terrorist Interdiction Program
0.1
Border Control (WMD)
0.85
Good Governance
137.49
Political Competition/Consensus-Building/Election Support
15.75
Rule of Law and Human Rights
20.98
Roads
334.1
Afghan-Tajik (Nizhny Panj) Bridge
33.1
Education/Schools 89.63
Health/Clinics 107.4
Power
222.5
PRTs
97.0
CERP
136.0
Civil Aviation (Kabul International Airport)
25.0
Private Sector Development/Economic Growth
77.43
Water Projects
43.2
Agriculture 74.49
Refugee/IDP Assistance
54.6
Food Assistance (P.L. 480, Title II)
108.6
Demining
23.7
State/USAID Program Support
142.84
Total Aid for FY2005
4,826.52
Laws Derived: FY2005 Regular Appropriations (P.L. 108-447); Second FY2005 Supplemental
(P.L. 109-13). The regular appropriation earmarked $50 million to be used for programs to
benefit women and girls.
Source: CRS.
Note: In FY2005, funds to equip and train the Afghan national security forces was altered from State
Department funds (Foreign Military Financing, FMF) to DOD funds.
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Table 16. U.S. Assistance to Afghanistan, FY2006
($ in millions)
Afghan National Police (DOD funds)
1,217.5
Counter-narcotics
419.26
Afghan National Army (DOD funds)
735.98
Presidential (Karzai) protection (NADR funds)
18.17
Detainee Operations
14.13
Smal Arms Control
2.84
Terrorist Interdiction
.10
Counter-terrorism Finance
.28
Border Control (WMD)
.40
Bilateral Debt Relief
11.0
Budgetary Support to the Government of Afghanistan
1.69
Good Governance
10.55
Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund
47.5
Political Competition/Consensus Building/Elections
1.35
Civil Society
7.77
Rule of Law and Human Rights
29.95
Roads
235.95
Education/Schools 49.48
Health/Clinics 51.46
Power
61.14
PRTs
20.0
CERP Funds (DOD)
215.0
Private Sector Development/Economic Growth
45.51
Water Projects
.89
Agriculture 26.92
Food Assistance
109.6
De-mining 14.32
Refugee/IDP aid
36.0
State/USAID program support
142.42
Total 3,527.16
Laws Derived: FY2006 Regular Foreign Aid Appropriations (P.L. 109-102); FY06 supplemental
(P.L. 109-234). The regular appropriation earmarked $50 million for programs to benefit
women and girls.
Source: CRS.
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Table 17. U.S. Assistance to Afghanistan, FY2007
($ in millions)
Afghan National Police (DOD funds)
2,523.30
Afghan National Army (DOD funds)
4,871.59
Counter-Narcotics
737.15
Presidential (Karzai) Protection (NADR)
19.9
Detainee Operations
12.7
Smal Arms Control
1.75
Terrorist Interdiction Program
0.5
Counter-Terrorism Finance
0.4
Border Control (WMD)
0.5
Budget Support to Afghan Government
31.24
Good Governance
107.25
Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund (incl. National
63
Solidarity Program)
Political Competition/Election support (ESF)
29.9
Civil Society (ESF)
8.1
Rule of Law/Human Rights (ESF)
65.05
Roads (ESF)
303.1
Education/Schools (ESF)
62.75
Health/Clinics 112.77
Power (ESF)
194.8
PRTs (ESF)
126.1
CERP (DOD funds)
206
Private Sector Development/Economic Growth
70.56
Water Projects (ESF)
2.3
Agriculture (ESF)
67.03
Refugee/IDP Assistance
72.61
Food Assistance
150.9
Demining 27.82
State/USAID Program Support
88.7
Total 9,984.98
Laws Derived: Regular Appropriation P.L. 110-5; DOD Appropriation P.L. 109-289; and
FY2007 Supplemental Appropriation P.L. 110-28. The regular appropriation earmarked $50
million for programs to benefit women/ girls. Providing ESF in excess of $300 million subject
to certification of Afghan cooperation on counter-narcotics.
Sources: CRS; Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, October 2008 report.
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Table 18. U.S. Assistance to Afghanistan, FY2008
(appropriated; $ in millions)
Afghan National Army (DOD funds)
1,724.68
Afghan National Police (DOD funds)
1,017.38
Counter-Narcotics (INCLE and DOD funds)
619.47
NADR (Karzai protection)
6.29
Radio Free Afghanistan
3.98
Detainee operations
9.6
Smal Arms Control
3.0
Terrorist Interdiction Program
.99
Counter-Terrorism Finance
.60
Border Control (WMD)
.75
Commanders Emergency Response Program (CERP, DOD
269.4
funds)
Direct Support to Afghan Government
49.61
Good Governance
245.08
Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund (incl. National
45.0
Solidarity program)
Election Support
90.0
Civil Society Building
4.01
Rule of Law and Human Rights
125.28
Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction
2.0
(SIGAR)
Roads
324.18
Education/Schools 99.09
Health/Clinics 114.04
Power (incl. Kajaki Dam rehabilitation work)
236.81
PRT programs
75.06
Economic Growth/Private Sector Development
63.06
Water Projects
16.4q
Agriculture 34.44
Refugee/IDP Assistance
42.1
Food Aid
101.83
De-Mining 15.0
State/USAID Program Support
317.4
Total 5,656.53
Appropriations Laws Derived: Regular FY2008 (P.L. 110-161); FY2008 Supplemental (P.L.
110-252). The regular appropriation earmarked $75 million for programs to benefit woman
and girls. ESF over $300 million subject to narcotics cooperation certification.
Sources: Special Inspector General Afghanistan Reconstruction, October 2008 report; CRS.
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Table 19. U.S. Assistance to Afghanistan, FY2009
($ in millions)
Regular
Bridge
FY2009
Appropriation
Supplemental
Supplemental

(P.L. 111-8)
(P.L. 110-252)
(P.L. 111-32)
Total
ANSF
Funding
2,000 3,607
5,607
CERP (DOD funds)

683

683
Detainee ops (DOD)

4

4
Counternarcotics (C-N) (DOD)
24
150
57
232
C-N
(DEA)
19
19
C-N—Alternative. Livelihoods (INCLE)
100
70
87
257
C-N—Eradication, Interdiction (INCLE)
178
14
17
209
IMET
1.4
1.4
ARTF (Incl. National Solidarity Program)
45
20
85
150
Governance building
100
68
115
283
Civil Society promotion
8
4

12
Election
Support
93 56 25
174
Strategic Program Development


50
50
Rule of Law Programs (USAID)
8
15
20
43
Rule of Law (INCLE)
34
55
80
169
Roads (ESF)
74
65

139
Power (ESF)
73
61

134
Agriculture (ESF and DA)
25

85
110
PRTs/Local Governance (ESF)
74
55
159
288
Education 88
6

94
Health 61
27

88
Econ Growth/”Cash for Work”
49
37
220
306
Water, Environment, Victims Comp.
31
3

34
Karzai Protection (NADR)
32

12
44
Food Aid (P.L. 480, Food for Peace)
14
44

58
Migration, Refugee Aid

50
7
57
State Ops/Embassy Construction
308
131
450
889
USAID Programs and Ops
18
2
165
185
State/USAID IG/SIGAR
3
11
7
20
Cultural Exchanges, International Orgs
6
10

16
Totals
1,463 3,640 5,248
10,352
Notes: P.L. 111-32 (FY2009 supplemental): provides requested funds, earmarks $70 million for National
Solidarity Program; $150 million for women and girls (all of FY2009); ESF over $200 million subject to narcotics
certification; 10% of supplemental INCLE subject to certification of Afghan government moves to curb human
rights abuses, drug involvement.
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Table 20. FY2010 Assistance (Includes Supplemental)
($ in millions)
Afghan Security Forces Funding (DOD funds)
9,162 (6,563 appropriated plus 2,600
supplemental request)
CERP (DOD funds)
1,000
Counternarcotics (DOD)
361
INCLE: all functions: interdiction, rule of law,
620 (420 regular approp. plus 200
alternative livelihoods
supplemental request)
IMET
1.5
Global Health/Child Survival
92.3
Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund (Incl.
200
National Solidarity Program) (ESF)
Governance building (ESF)
191
Civil Society promotion (ESF)
10
Election Support (ESF)
90
Strategic Program Development (ESF)
100
USAID Rule of Law Programs (ESF)
50
Roads (ESF)
230
Power (ESF)
230
Agriculture (ESF)
230
PRT programs/Local governance (ESF)
251
Education (ESF)
95
Health (ESF)
102
Econ Growth/”Cash for Work” (ESF)
274
Water, Environment, Victim Comp. (ESF)
15
Karzai Protection (NADR)
58
Food Aid (P.L. 480, Food for Peace)
16
Refugees and Migration
11
State Ops/Embassy Construction
697 (486 regular plus 211 supplemental)
Cultural Exchanges
6
SIGAR
37 (23 regular plus 14 supp request)
FY2010 supplemental ESF request (for ESF
1,576
programs above)
Total Appropriated (Incl. Supplemental)
15,700
Laws derived: FY2010 foreign aid appropriation in Consolidated Appropriation (P.L. 111-117),
which earmarks: $175 million (ESF and INCLE) for programs for women and girls, and $175
mil ion (ESF) for the National Solidarity Program. The FY2010 Defense Appropriation (P.L.
111-118), which cut $900 million from the requested amount for the ANSF (regular defense
appropriation). FY2010 supplemental funds appropriated by H.R. 4899 (P.L. 111-212)
Source: CRS.
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Table 21. FY2011
($ in millions)
Program/Area Amount

Afghan National Security Forces (DOD funds)
11,620
(enacted, as requested)
CERP
400
Afghanistan Infrastructure Fund (DoD funds)
400
Business Stability Task Force (DoD funds)
150
DoD Counternarcotics
333
Economic Support Funds (ESF)
1,967
(of 3,316 requested)
Refugee Accounts
65
Food Aid
15
Global Health/ Child Survival
70
International Disaster Assistance
30
INCLE
400
Karzai Protection (NADR funds)
69.3
IMET
1.5
State Department Operations (not incl. security)
754
SIGAR
24
Total Request
16,303
Amounts are as enacted in budget agreement (H.R. 1473, P.L. 112-10). The Administration
requested to authorize an “Afghanistan Infrastructure Fund,” to contain mostly DOD funds,
beginning with $400 million in FY2011, was authorized in H.R. 6523, the National Defense
Authorization Act for FY2011, (P.L. 111-383). Funds were appropriated. The fund will be
used mostly for electricity projects, including an ongoing major electricity project for
Qandahar, but could be used for other infrastructure projects later on, such as roads.
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Table 22. FY2012
($ in millions)
Program/Area Amount
ANSF Funding
11,200
(12,800 was requested)
Economic Support Funds
2,804
(incl.: $227 m for health, $115 m for education, $790 m
(of which 1,216 is Overseas
for “good governance,”$185 m for agriculture, $66 m for
Contingency Operations
“private sector competitiveness”)
funding)
Health and Child Survival (State)
0.5
Health and Child Survival (USAID)
0.5
Food For Peace Title II
15.5
INCLE (counter-narcotics, rule of law)
324 (50 earmarked for rule of
law programs)
NADR funds (Karzai protection, explosives removal,
66.2
counter-terrorism)
IMET
2.4
Diplomatic and Consular (embassy construction,
758
personnel)
Diplomatic and Consular (security)
190
SIGAR
44
CERP (regular)
400
CERP (contribution to Afghan Infrastructure Fund)
400
(500 was requested)
CERP (Taskforce for Business)
150
Total
16,350
Amounts appropriated in the FY2012 Consolidated Appropriation, H.R. 2055. ESF and INCLE
are conditioned on certification of Afghan progress against corruption, and in protecting
women’s rights. Provision bans any funds to establish permanent U.S. military facilities in
Afghanistan.
Note: Figures do not include about $90 billion in U.S. military operations costs.
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Table 23. Total Obligations for Major Programs: FY2001-FY2010
($ in millions. Source: USAID and CRS calculations)
Security Related Programs (mostly DOD funds)
Afghan National Security Forces (incl. FMF, and DoD ANSFF)
40506
Commander Emergency Response Program (CERP)
3039
Karzai Protection (NADR funds)
440
Counter-Narcotics (INCLE, DOD, DEA)
5227
Other, incl de-mining operations (Halo Trust, other contractors)
146
International Military Education and Training Funds (IMET)
9.8
Other DoD: AFSA defense article drawdown (540), Infrastructure Fund (400),
1547
Business Task Force (150)
Humanitarian-Related Programs
Food Aid (USDA and USAID: P.L. 480 Title 1 and II; Food for Progress, 416(b),
994
Food for Education)
Migration and Refugee aid (including emergency)
690
Debt Relief for Afghan government
11
Disaster Relief (IDA)
406
USAID Development Funding: Economic Support Funds (ESF) and
Total: 15,900+
Development Assistance (DA)
Afghan government budget support
423
Democracy (Including election support)
1775
Afghan Reconstruction Trust Fund (for National Solidarity Program, etc)
1909
(about 500 for NSP)
Rule of Law and Human Rights (incl. some INCLE funds)
935
Roads
2280
Power/Electricity
1453
Education
782
Health Sector
932
Water
88
Agriculture
1192
PRT projects (development and local governance)
1692
Private Sector Development/Econ. Growth (incl cash-for-work)
1406
Alternative Development/Livelihoods
1186
Embassy Operations, Construction, Aid Oversight
3,721
Other Aid:

Child Survival and Health
556
Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC)
26
Treasury Technical Assistance
3.5
USAID (other)
31
Total (including minor amounts not included in table)
73,255
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Table 24. NATO/ISAF Contributing Nations
(as of October 18, 2011)
NATO Countries
Non-NATO Partners
Belgium 520
Albania 286
Bulgaria 597
Armenia 126
Canada 529*
Austria 3
Czech Republic
623
Australia
1550
Denmark 750
Azerbaijan 94
Estonia 159
Bosnia-Herzegovina
55
France 3932
Croatia 317
Germany 5000
Finland
156
Greece 153
Georgia 937
Hungary 415
Ireland
7
Iceland 4
Jordan 0
Italy 3952
Macedonia
163
Latvia 174
Malaysia 46
Lithuania 236
Mongolia 114
Luxemburg 11
Montenegro 39
Netherlands 183
New
Zealand 188
Norway 429
Singapore 39
Poland
2580
South Korea
350
Portugal 140
Sweden 500
Romania 1873
Ukraine
23
Slovakia
309
United Arab Emirates
35
Slovenia 77
Tonga 55
Spain 1526


Turkey 1840


United Kingdom
9500


United States
90000


Total Listed ISAF: 130,638
Source: http://www.isaf.nato.int/images/stories/File/Placemats/16%20August%202011%20Placemat.pdf
Note: As noted elsewhere in this report, U.S. force totals in Afghanistan (including those not under
NATO/ISAF) are approximately 98,000. In addition, the NATO/ISAF site states that troop numbers in this table
are based on broad contribution and do not necessarily reflect the exact numbers on the ground at any one
time. Kazakhstan announced in May 2011that it would send 4 non-combat officers to join ISAF. *ISAF figures
now reflect Canada combat troop pullout in July-August 2011; numbers listed are to train the ANSF. Numbers in
the table for the United States may not reflect the start of a U.S. drawdown in July 2011.
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Table 25. Provincial Reconstruction Teams
Location (City)
Province/Command
U.S.-Lead (all under ISAF banner)
1. Gardez
Paktia Province (RC-East, E)
2. Ghazni
Ghazni (RC-E). with Poland.
3. Jalalabad
Nangarhar (RC-E)
4. Khost
Khost (RC-E)
5. Qalat
Zabol (RC-South, S). with Romania.
6. Asadabad
Kunar (RC-E)
7. Sharana
Paktika (RC-E). with Poland.
8. Mehtarlam
Laghman (RC-E)
9. Jabal o-Saraj
Panjshir Province (RC-E), State Department lead
10. Qala Gush
Nuristan (RC-E)
11. Farah
Farah (RC-SW)
Partner Lead (most under ISAF banner)
PRT Location
Province
Lead Force/Other forces
12. Qandahar
Qandahar (RC-S)
Canada (seat of RC-S)
13. Lashkar Gah
Helmand (RC-S)
Britain. with Denmark and Estonia
14. Tarin Kowt
Uruzgan (RC-S)
Australia (and U.S.) (Replaced Netherlands in August 2010)
15. Herat
Herat (RC-W)
Italy (seat of RC-W)
16. Qalah-ye Now
Badghis (RC-W)
Spain
17. Mazar-e-Sharif
Balkh (RC-N)
Sweden
18. Konduz
Konduz (RC-N)
Germany (seat of RC-N)
29. Faizabad
Badakhshan (RC-N)
Germany. with Denmark, Czech Rep.
20. Meymaneh
Faryab (RC-N)
Norway. with Sweden.
21. Chaghcharan
Ghowr (RC-W)
Lithuania. with Denmark, U.S., Iceland
22. Pol-e-Khomri
Baghlan (RC-N)
Hungary
23. Bamiyan
Bamiyan (RC-E)
New Zealand (not NATO/ISAF).
24. Maidan Shahr
Wardak (RC-C)
Turkey
25. Pul-i-Alam
Lowgar (RC-E)
Czech Republic
26. Shebergan
Jowzjan (RC-N)
Turkey
27. Charikar
Parwan (RC-E)
South Korea (Bagram, in Parwan Province, is the base of RC-E)
Note: RC = Regional Command.
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Table 26. Major Factions/Leaders in Afghanistan
Party/
Ideology/

Leader Leader
Ethnicity Regional
Base
Taliban
Mullah (Islamic cleric) Muhammad Umar (still at large
Ultra-
Throughout
possibly in Afghanistan. Umar, born in Tarin Kowt, Uruzgan
orthodox
south and east.
province, is about 65 years old.
Islamic,
Smal numbers
Pashtun
elsewhere.
Haqqani
Jalaludin Haqqani. Allied with Taliban and Al Qaeda. Said to
Same
as
Paktia, Paktika,
Network
be supported, or at least tolerated, by Pakistani ISI.
above
Khost, Kabul
Islamic Society Yunus Qanooni (speaker of lower house)/Muhammad
Moderate Much of
(leader of
Fahim/Dr. Abdul ah Abdul ah (Foreign Minister 2001-2006).
Islamic,
northern and
“Northern
Ismail Khan, a so-called “warlord,” heads faction of the
mostly Tajik western
Alliance”)
grouping in Herat area.
Afghanistan,
including Kabul
National
Abdul Rashid Dostam. Was Karzai rival in October 2004
Secular,
left-
Jowzjan, Balkh,
Islamic
presidential election, then his top “security adviser.” As of
leaning,
Faryab, Sar-i-Pol,
Movement of
October 2011, reportedly has joined new opposition
Uzbek
and Samangan
Afghanistan
movement called “Truth and Justice Party.”
provinces.
Hizb-e-
Composed of Shiite Hazara tribes from central Afghanistan.
Shiite,
Bamiyan, Ghazni,
Wahdat
Former members Karim Khalili is vice president, but
Hazara
Dai Kundi
Mohammad Mohaqiq is Karzai rival. General y pro-Iranian.
tribes
province
Was part of Rabbani 1992-1996 government, and fought
unsuccessfully with Taliban over Bamiyan. Still revered by
Hazaras is the former leader of the group, Abdul Ali Mazari,
who was captured and killed by the Taliban in March 1995.
Pashtun
Various regional governors and local leaders in the east and
Moderate Dominant in the
tribal/regional
south; central government led by Hamid Karzai.
Islamic,
south and east
leaders
Pashtun
Hizb-e-Islam
Mujahedin party leader Gulbuddin Hikmatyar. Was part of
Orthodox Small groups in
Gulbuddin
Soviet-era U.S.-backed “Afghan Interim Government” based
Islamic,
Nangarhar,
(HIG)
in Peshawar, Pakistan. Was nominal “prime minister” in
Pashtun
Nuristan, and
1992-1996 mujahedin government but never actual y took
Kunar provinces
office. Lost power base around Jalalabad to the Taliban in
1994, and fled to Iran before being expelled in 2002. Still
active in operations east of Kabul, but open to ending
militant activity. Leader of a rival Hizb-e-Islam faction, Yunus
Khalis, the mentor of Mullah Umar, died July 2006.
Islamic Union
Abd-I-Rab Rasul Sayyaf. Islamic conservative, leads a pro-
orthodox Paghman
Karzai faction in parliament. Lived many years in and
Islamic,
(west of Kabul)
politically close to Saudi Arabia, which shares his “Wahhabi”
Pashtun
ideology. During anti-Soviet war, Sayyaf’s faction, with
Hikmatyar, was a principal recipient of U.S. weaponry.
Criticized the U.S.-led war against Saddam Hussein after
Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait.
Source: CRS.
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Residual Issues from Past Conflicts
A few issues remain unresolved from Afghanistan’s many years of conflict, such as Stinger
retrieval and mine eradication.
Stinger Retrieval
Beginning in late 1985 following internal debate, the Reagan Administration provided about
2,000 man-portable “Stinger” anti-aircraft missiles to the mujahedin for use against Soviet
aircraft. Prior to the ouster of the Taliban, common estimates suggested that 200-300 Stingers
remained at large, although more recent estimates put the number below 100.67 The Stinger issue
resurfaced in conjunction with 2001 U.S. war effort, when U.S. pilots reported that the Taliban
fired some Stingers at U.S. aircraft. No hits were reported. The danger of these weapons has
become apparent on several past occasions. Iran bought 16 of the missiles in 1987 and fired one
against U.S. helicopters in the Persian Gulf. India claimed that it was a Stinger supplied to
Islamic rebels in Kashmir by sympathizers in Afghanistan, that shot down an Indian helicopter
over Kashmir in May 1999.68 Soviet-made SA-7 “Strella” man-portable launchers, which
allegedly have been used in the past by Al Qaeda, including against an Israeli passenger jet in
Kenya on November 30, 2002, were discovered in Afghanistan by U.S. forces in December 2002.
In 1992, after the fall of the Russian-backed government of Najibullah, the United States
reportedly spent about $10 million to buy the Stingers back, at a premium, from individual
mujahedin commanders. The New York Times reported on July 24, 1993, that the buy back effort
failed because the United States was competing with other buyers, including Iran and North
Korea, and that the CIA would spend about $55 million in FY1994 in a renewed effort. On March
7, 1994, the Washington Post reported that the CIA had recovered only about 50 or 100 at-large
Stingers. In February 2002, the Afghan government found and turned over to the United States
“dozens” of Stingers.69 In January 2005, Afghan intelligence began buying Stingers back, at a
reported cost of $150,000 each.70 Any Stingers that remain in Afghanistan likely pose little threat,
in part because of deteriorating components. No recent uses are reported.
Mine Eradication
Land mines laid during the Soviet occupation constitute one of the principal dangers to the
Afghan people. The United Nations estimates that 5 million to 7 million mines remain scattered
throughout the country, although some estimates are lower. U.N. teams have destroyed one
million mines and are now focusing on de-mining priority-use, residential and commercial
property, including lands around Kabul. Amounts contributed by the United States to the de-
mining effort are shown in the tables above. Most of the funds have gone to HALO Trust, a
British organization, and the U.N. Mine Action Program for Afghanistan. The Afghanistan
Compact adopted in London in February 2006 states that by 2010, the goal should be to reduce
the land area of Afghanistan contaminated by mines by 70%.

67 Saleem, Farrukh. “Where Are the Missing Stinger Missiles? Pakistan,” Friday Times. August 17-23, 2001.
68 “U.S.-Made Stinger Missiles—Mobile and Lethal.” Reuters, May 28, 1999.
69 Fullerton, John. “Afghan Authorities Hand in Stinger Missiles to U.S.” Reuters, February 4, 2002.
70 “Afghanistan Report,” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty. February 4, 2005.
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Appendix. U.S. and International Sanctions Lifted
Virtually all U.S. and international sanctions on Afghanistan, some imposed during the Soviet
occupation era and others on the Taliban regime, have now been lifted.
• P.L. 108-458 (December 17, 2004, referencing the 9/11 Commission
recommendations) repealed bans on aid to Afghanistan outright. On October 7,
1992, President George H. W. Bush had issued Presidential Determination 93-3
that Afghanistan is no longer a Marxist-Leninist country, but the determination
was not implemented before he left office. Had it been implemented, the
prohibition on Afghanistan’s receiving Export-Import Bank guarantees,
insurance, or credits for purchases under Section 8 of the 1986 Export-Import
Bank Act, would have been lifted. In addition, Afghanistan would have been able
to receive U.S. assistance because the requirement would have been waived that
Afghanistan apologize for the 1979 killing in Kabul of U.S. Ambassador to
Afghanistan Adolph “Spike” Dubs. (Dubs was kidnapped in Kabul in 1979 and
killed when Afghan police stormed the hideout where he was held.)
• U.N. sanctions on the Taliban imposed by Resolution 1267 (October 15, 1999),
Resolution 1333 (December 19, 2000), and Resolution 1363 (July 30, 2001) have
now been narrowed to penalize only Al Qaeda (by Resolution 1390, January 17,
2002). Resolution 1267 banned flights outside Afghanistan by Ariana, and
directed U.N. member states to freeze Taliban assets. Resolution 1333 prohibited
the provision of arms or military advice to the Taliban (directed against
Pakistan); ordered a reduction of Taliban diplomatic representation abroad; and
banned foreign travel by senior Taliban officials. Resolution 1363 provided for
monitors in Pakistan to ensure that no weapons or military advice was provided
to the Taliban.
• On January 10, 2003, President Bush signed a proclamation making Afghanistan
a beneficiary of the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP), eliminating U.S.
tariffs on 5,700 Afghan products. Afghanistan had been denied GSP on May 2,
1980, under Executive Order 12204 (45 F.R. 20740).
• On April 24, 1981, controls on U.S. exports to Afghanistan of agricultural
products and phosphates were terminated. Such controls were imposed on June 3,
1980, as part of the sanctions against the Soviet Union for the invasion of
Afghanistan, under the authority of Sections 5 and 6 of the Export Administration
Act of 1979 [P.L. 96-72; 50 U.S.C. app. 2404, app. 2405].
• In mid-1992, the George H. W. Bush Administration determined that Afghanistan
no longer had a “Soviet-controlled government.” This opened Afghanistan to the
use of U.S. funds made available for the U.S. share of U.N. organizations that
provide assistance to Afghanistan.
• On March 31, 1993, after the fall of Najibullah in 1992, President Clinton, on
national interest grounds, waived restrictions provided for in Section 481 (h) of
the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 mandating sanctions on Afghanistan,
including bilateral aid cuts and suspensions, including denial of Ex-Im Bank
credits; the casting of negative U.S. votes for multilateral development bank
loans; and a non-allocation of a U.S. sugar quota. Discretionary sanctions
included denial of GSP; additional duties on exports to the United States; and
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curtailment of air transportation with the United States. Waivers were also
granted in 1994 and, after the fall of the Taliban, by President Bush.
• On May 3, 2002, President Bush restored normal trade treatment to the products
of Afghanistan, reversing the February 18, 1986, proclamation by President
Reagan (Presidential Proclamation 5437) that suspended most-favored nation
(MFN) tariff status for Afghanistan (51 F.R. 4287). The Foreign Assistance
Appropriations for FY1986 [Section 552, P.L. 99-190] had authorized the denial
of U.S. credits or most-favored-nation (MFN) status for Afghanistan.
• On July 2, 2002, the State Department amended U.S. regulations (22 C.F.R. Part
126) to allow arms sales to the new Afghan government, reversing the June 14,
1996, addition of Afghanistan to the list of countries prohibited from importing
U.S. defense articles and services. Arms sales to Afghanistan had also been
prohibited during 1997-2002 because Afghanistan had been designated under the
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (P.L. 104-132) as a state
that is not cooperating with U.S. anti-terrorism efforts.
• On July 2, 2002, President Bush formally revoked the July 4, 1999, declaration
by President Clinton of a national emergency with respect to Taliban because of
its hosting of Bin Laden. The Clinton determination and related Executive Order
13129 had blocked Taliban assets and property in the United States, banned U.S.
trade with Taliban-controlled areas of Afghanistan, and applied these sanctions to
Ariana Afghan Airlines, triggering a blocking of Ariana assets (about $500,000)
in the United States and a ban on U.S. citizens’ flying on the airline. (The ban on
trade with Taliban-controlled territory had essentially ended on January 29, 2002,
when the State Department determination that the Taliban controls no territory
within Afghanistan.)

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Figure A-1. Map of Afghanistan

Source: Map Resources. Adapted by CRS.

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Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy

Figure A-2. Map of Afghan Ethnicities

Source: 2003 National Geographic Society. http://www.afghan-network.net/maps/Afghanistan-Map.pdf. Adapted
by Amber Wilhelm, CRS Graphics.
Notes: This map is intended to be illustrative of the approximate demographic distribution by region of
Afghanistan. CRS has no way to confirm exact population distributions.

Author Contact Information

Kenneth Katzman

Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs
kkatzman@crs.loc.gov, 7-7612


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