Iran: U.S. Concerns and Policy Responses
Kenneth Katzman
Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs
December 15, 2011
Congressional Research Service
7-5700
www.crs.gov
RL32048
CRS Report for Congress
Pr
epared for Members and Committees of Congress
Iran: U.S. Concerns and Policy Responses
Summary
The Obama Administration identifies Iran as a major threat to U.S. national security interests.
This perception is generated by suspicions of Iran’s intentions for its nuclear program -
heightened by a November 8, 2011, International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) report - as well
as by Iran’s support for militant groups in the Middle East and in Iraq and Afghanistan. U.S.
officials also accuse Iran of helping Syria’s leadership try to defeat a growing popular opposition
movement, and of taking advantage of Shiite majority unrest against the Sunni-led, pro-U.S.
government of Bahrain. In October 2011, U.S. officials accused Iran of plotting to assassinate the
Saudi Ambassador to the United States.
The Obama Administration initially offered Iran’s leaders consistent and sustained engagement
with the potential for closer integration with and acceptance by the West in exchange for limits to
its nuclear program. After observing a crackdown on peaceful protests in Iran in 2009, and failing
to obtain Iran’s agreement to implement any nuclear compromise, the Administration has worked
since early 2010 on a “two-track strategy” to increase economic and diplomatic pressure on Iran
while maintaining offers of further engagement. Significant additional sanctions were imposed on
Iran by the U.N. Security Council (Resolution 1929), as well as related “national measures” by
the European Union, Japan, South Korea, and other countries. Further measures intended to
compel foreign firms to exit the Iranian market were contained in U.S. legislation passed in June
2010 (the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act, P.L. 111-195). In
concert, the Administration has stepped up arms sales to regional states that share the U.S.
suspicions of Iran’s intentions.
Perhaps hoping to avoid additional sanctions, Iran attended December 2010 and January 2011
talks with the six powers negotiating with Iran, but no substantive progress was reported at any of
these meetings. The prospects for new talks seemed to increase in August 2011 as a result of Iran-
Russia discussions of new formulas for compromise, supplemented by Iranian official statements
suggesting potential acceptance of some widely discussed international proposals. However, no
date for new talks was arranged and the November 2011 IAEA report reduced the prospect for
new talks and increased international support for additional sanctions. This tend has been
accelerated by a row between Iran and Britain that included the ransacking of Britain’s embassy
in Tehran on November 29 by youths tacitly backed by Iran’s security forces—an action that has
furthered Tehran’s isolation.
In 2011, in the context of the popular uprisings throughout the Middle East, and perhaps
addressing criticism that it did not sufficiently support the popular uprising in Iran in 2009, the
Administration has increased its public criticism of Iran’s human rights record. That effort has
been broadly supported in the international community. Some in the 112th Congress, aside from
supporting additional economic sanctions against Iran, believe the United States should provide
additional vocal and material support to the democracy movement in Iran, despite its outward
quiescence in most of 2011. The Administration argues that it has supported the opposition
through civil society and other programs, and by using recent authorities to sanction Iranian
officials who suppress human rights in Iran and help Syria repress human rights. For further
information, including pending Iran sanctions legislation, see CRS Report RS20871, Iran
Sanctions; and CRS Report RL34544, Iran’s Nuclear Program: Status.
Congressional Research Service
Iran: U.S. Concerns and Policy Responses
Contents
Political History............................................................................................................................... 1
Regime Structure, Stability, and Opposition.................................................................................... 2
Unelected Governing Institutions: The Supreme Leader, His Powers, and Other
Ruling Councils...................................................................................................................... 2
Council of Guardians and Expediency Council .................................................................. 3
Elected Institutions: The Presidency, the Majles (Parliament), the Assembly of
Experts, and Recent Elections ................................................................................................ 8
The Presidency .................................................................................................................... 8
The Majles........................................................................................................................... 8
The Assembly of Experts .................................................................................................... 9
Recent Presidential Elections: First Ahmadinejad Election in 2005................................... 9
Ahmadinejad (Disputed) Reelection on June 12, 2009: Protests Erupt ............................ 10
Ahmadinejad’s Second Term: Divisions Within the Regime Increase With
Popular Unrest and Arab Uprisings As Backdrop.......................................................... 11
The Opposition ........................................................................................................................ 14
The Green Movement........................................................................................................ 15
Green Movement Allies and Other U.S.-Based Activists.................................................. 16
The Opposition: Armed Factions............................................................................................. 17
People’s Mojahedin Organization of Iran (PMOI)/Camp Ashraf...................................... 17
Pro-Monarchy Radical Groups.......................................................................................... 20
Ethnic or Religiously Based Armed Groups ..................................................................... 20
Other Human Rights Practices....................................................................................................... 21
Criticism of Iran’s Record in U.N. Bodies .............................................................................. 22
Special U.N. Rapporteur Reestablished ............................................................................ 22
Iran’s Strategic Capabilities and Weapons of Mass Destruction Programs ................................... 24
Conventional Military/Revolutionary Guard/Qods Force ....................................................... 25
Nuclear Program and Related International Diplomacy.......................................................... 28
Iran’s Nuclear Intentions and the November 8, 2011, IAEA Report................................. 28
Iran’s Position and Counter-Arguments ............................................................................ 29
Status of Enrichment and Time Frame Estimates.............................................................. 29
The International Response and Policies........................................................................... 31
The International Response Under the Obama Administration......................................... 35
Chemical Weapons, Biological Weapons, and Missiles .......................................................... 39
Ballistic Missiles/Warheads .............................................................................................. 40
Foreign Policy and Support for Terrorist Groups .......................................................................... 41
Alleged Plot to Assassinate the Saudi Ambassador................................................................. 42
Foreign Policy: Relations with the Persian Gulf States........................................................... 44
Iranian Policy in Iraq ............................................................................................................... 46
Supporting Palestinian Militant Groups .................................................................................. 47
Iran and Hamas.................................................................................................................. 48
Lebanese Hezbollah and Syria ................................................................................................ 49
Syria .................................................................................................................................. 50
Central Asia and the Caspian................................................................................................... 51
South Asia: Afghanistan, Pakistan, and India.......................................................................... 52
Afghanistan ....................................................................................................................... 52
Pakistan ............................................................................................................................. 53
Congressional Research Service
Iran: U.S. Concerns and Policy Responses
India................................................................................................................................... 54
Al Qaeda.................................................................................................................................. 54
Latin America .......................................................................................................................... 55
Venezuela .......................................................................................................................... 55
Other Ties in the Region.................................................................................................... 56
Africa....................................................................................................................................... 56
U.S. Policy Approaches and Additional Options ........................................................................... 57
Relations Since the 1979 Revolution....................................................................................... 57
Clinton Administration Policy........................................................................................... 58
George W. Bush Administration Policy ............................................................................ 58
Overview of Obama Administration Policy: Engagement Superseded by Pressure
Strategies .............................................................................................................................. 59
2010 and 2011: Growing Skepticism on Engagement and Focus on Pressure.................. 60
U.S. and Other Military Action: “On The Table” But Apparently Not Likely, Despite
the November 2011 IAEA Report ........................................................................................ 61
An Israeli Strike?............................................................................................................... 62
Likely Iranian Reactions ................................................................................................... 63
Presidential Authorities and Legislation............................................................................ 63
Containment and the Gulf Security Dialogue.......................................................................... 64
Regime Change: Iran Crackdown and “Arab Spring” Add Support for This Option.............. 65
Pursuing a Middle Ground: Democracy Promotion and Internet Freedom Efforts .......... 66
Additional Sanctions ............................................................................................................... 72
Conclusion ..................................................................................................................................... 74
Figures
Figure 1. Structure of the Iranian Government .............................................................................. 76
Figure 2. Map of Iran..................................................................................................................... 77
Tables
Table 1. Major Factions, Personalities, and Interest Groups ........................................................... 4
Table 2. Factions in the Eighth Majles........................................................................................... 10
Table 3. Human Rights Practices: General Categories .................................................................. 22
Table 4. Iran’s Conventional Military Arsenal............................................................................... 26
Table 5. The Revolutionary Guard................................................................................................. 27
Table 6. Summary of Provisions of U.N. Resolutions on Iran Nuclear Program
(1737, 1747, 1803, and 1929)..................................................................................................... 39
Table 7. Iran’s Ballistic Missile Arsenal ........................................................................................ 41
Table 8. Iran Democracy Promotion Funding................................................................................ 71
Table 9. Digest of Existing U.S. Sanctions Against Iran ............................................................... 73
Table 10. Selected Economic Indicators........................................................................................ 75
Congressional Research Service
Iran: U.S. Concerns and Policy Responses
Contacts
Author Contact Information........................................................................................................... 77
Congressional Research Service
Iran: U.S. Concerns and Policy Responses
uch of the debate over U.S. policy toward Iran has centered on the nature of the current
regime. Some believe that Iran, a country of about 70 million people, is a threat to U.S.
M interests because hardliners in Iran’s regime dominate and set a policy direction
intended to challenge U.S. influence and allies in the region. President George W. Bush, in his
January 29, 2002, State of the Union message, labeled Iran part of an “axis of evil” along with
Iraq and North Korea.
Political History
The United States was an ally of the late Shah of Iran, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi (“the Shah”),
who ruled from 1941 until his ouster in February 1979. The Shah assumed the throne when
Britain and Russia forced his father, Reza Shah Pahlavi (Reza Shah), from power because of his
perceived alignment with Germany in World War II. Reza Shah had assumed power in 1921
when, as an officer in Iran’s only military force, the Cossack Brigade (reflecting Russian
influence in Iran in the early 20th century), he launched a coup against the government of the
Qajar Dynasty. Reza Shah was proclaimed Shah in 1925, founding the Pahlavi dynasty. The
Qajars had been in decline for many years before Reza Shah’s takeover. That dynasty’s perceived
manipulation by Britain and Russia had been one of the causes of the 1906 constitutionalist
movement, which forced the Qajars to form Iran’s first Majles (parliament) in August 1906 and
promulgate a constitution in December 1906. Prior to the Qajars, what is now Iran was the center
of several Persian empires and dynasties, but whose reach shrunk steadily over time. Since the
16th century, Iranian empires lost control of Bahrain (1521), Baghdad (1638), the Caucasus
(1828), western Afghanistan (1857), Baluchistan (1872), and what is now Turkmenistan (1894).
Iran adopted Shiite Islam under the Safavid Dynasty (1500-1722), which brought Iran out from a
series of Turkic and Mongol conquests.
The Shah was anti-Communist, and the United States viewed his government as a bulwark
against the expansion of Soviet influence in the Persian Gulf and a counterweight to pro-Soviet
Arab regimes and movements. Israel maintained a representative office in Iran during the Shah’s
time and the Shah supported a peaceful resolution of the Arab-Israeli dispute. In 1951, under
pressure from nationalists in the Majles (parliament) who gained strength in the 1949 Majles
elections, he appointed a popular nationalist parliamentarian, Dr. Mohammad Mossadeq, as prime
minister. Mossadeq was widely considered left-leaning, and the United States was wary of his
policies, which included his drive for nationalization of the oil industry. Mossadeq’s followers
began an uprising in August 1953 when the Shah tried to dismiss Mossadeq, and the Shah fled.
The Shah was restored in a successful CIA-supported uprising against Mossadeq.
The Shah tried to modernize Iran and orient it toward the West, but in so doing he also sought to
marginalize Iran’s Shiite clergy. He exiled Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini in 1964 because of
Khomeini’s active opposition, which was based on the Shah’s anti-clerical policies and what
Khomeini alleged was the Shah’s forfeiture of Iran’s sovereignty to the United States. Khomeini
fled to and taught in Najaf, Iraq, a major Shiite theological center that contains the Shrine of
Imam Ali, Shiism’s foremost figure. There, he was a peer of senior Iraqi Shiite clerics and, with
them, advocated direct clerical rule or velayat-e-faqih (rule by a supreme Islamic jurisprudent). In
1978, three years after the March 6, 1975, Algiers Accords between the Shah and Iraq’s Baathist
leaders, which settled territorial disputes and required each party to stop assisting each other’s
oppositionists, Iraq expelled Khomeini to France, from which he stoked the Islamic revolution.
Mass demonstrations and guerrilla activity by pro-Khomeini forces, allied with a broad array of
anti-Shah activists, caused the Shah’s government to collapse in February 1979. Khomeini
Congressional Research Service
1
Iran: U.S. Concerns and Policy Responses
returned from France and, on February 11, 1979, declared an Islamic Republic of Iran, which was
enshrined in the constitution that was adopted in a public referendum in December 1979 (and
amended in 1989). Khomeini, who established the position of Supreme Leader and served in that
role, was strongly anti-West and particularly anti-U.S., and relations between the United States
and the Islamic Republic turned openly hostile after the November 4, 1979, seizure of the U.S.
Embassy by pro-Khomeini radicals. Ayatollah Khomeini died on June 3, 1989, and was
succeeded by Ayatollah Ali Khamene’i.
Regime Structure, Stability, and Opposition
Iran’s Islamic regime, established in a constitution adopted in a popular referendum, is widely
considered authoritarian, but not as “one-man rule.” The system provides for a degree of popular
input and checks and balances provided by elected institutions. The Supreme Leaders is not
directly elected; the president and the Majles (parliament) are. There are also elections for
municipal councils, which in turn select mayors. Even within the unelected institutions, factional
disputes between those who insist on ideological purity and those considered more pragmatic
have been frequent and highly consequential.
The regime faced serious unrest in its first few years, including a June 1981 bombing at the
headquarters of the Islamic Republican Party (IRP) and the Prime Minister’s office that killed
several senior leaders, including close Khomeini confidant Mohammad Hossein Beheshti. These
events, along with the hostage crisis with the United States, provided cover for the regime to
purge many of the secular, liberal, and left-wing personalities and parties in the anti-Shah
coalition. Examples included the Tudeh Party (Communist), the People’s Mojahedin Organization
of Iran (PMOI, see below), the first elected President Abolhassan Bani Sadr, and the Iran
Freedom Movement of the regime’s first Prime Minister Mehdi Bazargan and, later, Ibrahim
Yazdi. The regime was under economic and military threat during the 1980-1988 Iran-Iraq War
which resulted, at times, in nearly halting Iran’s oil exports. Still, during these years, there was
diversity of opinion in ruling circles.
Despite these struggles, during 1982 until 2009, the regime had faced only episodic, relatively
low-level unrest from minorities, intellectuals, students, labor groups, and women. Since the June
2009 presidential election, the regime has struggled to contain popular dissatisfaction. In late
2009, several Iran experts believed this opposition movement—calling itself “The Green Path of
Hope” or “Green Movement” (Rah-e-Sabz)—posed a serious challenge to the current regime. The
success of the regime in preventing the Green Movement from holding a large counter-
demonstration on the 2010 anniversary of “Revolution Day” (February 11) and the movement’s
outward quiescence throughout 2010 and thus far in 2011 has led some to conclude the Green
Movement has been largely crushed. However, some believe it will reemerge as other
revolutionary movements succeed in ousting authoritarian regimes throughout the Middle East.
Unelected Governing Institutions: The Supreme Leader, His
Powers, and Other Ruling Councils
At the apex of the Islamic Republic’s power structure is a “Supreme Leader” who has vast powers
and no term limits, although an elected body (the Assembly of Experts) in theory “supervises” his
work and has the power to remove him. Upon Ayatollah Khomeini’s death, one of his disciples,
Ayatollah Ali Khamene’i, was selected Supreme Leader by the elected 86-seat “Assembly of
Congressional Research Service
2
Iran: U.S. Concerns and Policy Responses
Experts” (see further below).1 Although he has never had Khomeini’s undisputed authority,
Khamene’i has vast formal powers as Supreme Leader that help him maintain the regime’s grip
on power. Secretary of State Clinton said in February 2010 that the Supreme Leader’s authority is
being progressively usurped by regime security forces, most notably the Islamic Revolutionary
Guard Corps (IRGC). This view is disputed by some outside experts who continue to see the
clerics in firm control of regime decisionmaking.
Formally, the Supreme Leader is commander-in-chief of the armed forces, giving him the power
to appoint commanders and to be represented on the highest national security body, the Supreme
National Security Council (formerly called the Supreme Defense Council), composed of top
military and civilian security officials. The Supreme Leader also has the power, under the
constitution, to remove the elected president if either the judiciary or the elected Majles
(parliament) say the president should be removed, with cause.
Council of Guardians and Expediency Council
The Supreme Leader appoints half of the 12-member Council of Guardians;2 and the head of
Iran’s judiciary (currently Ayatollah Sadeq Larijani). Headed by Ayatollah Ahmad Jannati, the
conservative-controlled Council of Guardians reviews legislation to ensure it conforms to Islamic
law, and it screens election candidates and certifies election results. The Supreme Leader appoints
members of the 42-member Expediency Council, set up in 1988 to resolve legislative
disagreements between the Majles and the Council of Guardians. The Expedience Council’s
powers were expanded in 2006 to include oversight of the executive branch (cabinet)
performance. Its members serve five-year terms; its chairman, appointed most recently in
February 2007, is Ali Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani. He retains that post, although he was removed
in March 2011 as head of the Assembly of Experts (see below). The Expediency Council’s
executive officer is former Revolutionary Guard commander-in-chief Mohsen Reza’i.
1 At the time of his elevation to Supreme Leader, Khamene’i was generally referred to at the rank of Hojjat ol-Islam,
one rank below Ayatollah, suggesting his religious “elevation” was political rather than through traditional
mechanisms.
2 The Council of Guardians consists of six Islamic jurists and six secular lawyers. The six Islamic jurists are appointed
by the Supreme Leader. The six lawyers on the Council are selected by the judiciary but confirmed by the Majles.
Congressional Research Service
3
Iran: U.S. Concerns and Policy Responses
Table 1. Major Factions, Personalities, and Interest Groups
Conservatives
Supreme Leader Ali Khamene’i
Born in July 1939 to an Azeri (Turkic) family from Mashhad. Was jailed by
the Shah of Iran for supporting Ayatollah Khomeini’s revolution. After the
regime took power in 1979, helped organize Revolutionary Guard and
other security organs. Lost use of right arm in assassination attempt in
June 1981. Served as elected president during 1981-1989 and was selected
Khomeini’s successor in June 1989 upon his death. Upon that selection,
Khamene’i religious ranking was advanced in official organs to “Ayatollah”
from the lower ranking “Hojjat ol-Islam.” Although lacking Khomeini’s
undisputed authority, Khamene’i, like Khomeini, intervenes primarily on
major security matters, to resolve factional disputes, or to quiet popular
criticism. Took direct role to quiet opposition protests in wake of June
2009 election, in part by ordering Revolutionary Guard to crush dissent.
Considered moderate-conservative on domestic policy but hardline on
foreign policy and particularly toward Israel. Seeks to challenge U.S.
hegemony and wants Israel defeated but greatly fears direct military
confrontation with United States. Has general y supported the business
community (bazaaris), and opposed state control of the economy. Senior
aides in his office include second son, Mojtaba, who is said to be acquiring
increasing influence. Has made public reference to letters to him from
President Obama asking for renewed U.S.-Iran relations.
Expediency Council and Assembly of
Long a key strategist of the regime, and past advocate of “grand bargain”
Experts Chair Ali Akbar Hashemi-
to resolve all outstanding issues with United States. A mid-ranking cleric,
Rafsanjani
still heads the Expediency Council, but was seriously weakened in March
2011 by ouster as Assembly of Experts chairman, an outcome attributed
to his tacit support of Green challenge to Ahmadinejad reelection. Rift
with Ahmadinejad erupted when Ahmadinejad alleged Rafsanjani
corruption in 2009 campaign; led Rafsanjani to fund much of Musavi’s
election campaign. Daughter Faizah participated in several 2009 protests
and was detained briefly again in February 2011 as protests resumed. Five
Rafsanjani family members arrested in June 2009 (and another briefly
detained in March 2010), and there was a May 2010 threat to arrest his
son, Mehdi, if he returns from exile in Britain. Opposition activists say his
sister and brother-in-law have relocated to New York. In September
2010, criticized Ahmadinejad for minimizing the effects of growing
international sanctions against Iran. In October 2010, Khamene’i blocked
Rafsanjani’s efforts to convert endowment of Islamic Azad University,
which Rafsanjani helped found, to a religious trust. Was Majles speaker
during 1981-1989 and President 1989-1997. One of Iran’s richest men,
family owns large share of Iran’s total pistachio production.
President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad
Declared reelected on June 12, 2009, but results still not accepted by
most Green Movement adherents. Increasingly at odds with Supreme
Leader since April 2011—leading to increasing agitation by his
conservative opponents to try to have him removed, including by tagging
him with corruption. Split centers around Ahmadinejad effort to promote
non-clerical allies in key posts, including former chief of staff and relative
by marriage Esfandiar Rahim Mashai.
Majles Speaker Ali Larijani
Overwhelming winner for Majles seat from Qom on March 14, 2008, and
selected Majles Speaker (237 out of 290 votes). Former state broadcasting
head (1994-2004) and minister of culture and Islamic guidance (1993), was
head of Supreme National Security Council and chief nuclear negotiator
from August 2005 until October 2007 resignation. During that term, he
sought to avoid U.N. Security Council isolation. Is politically close to
Khamene’i and is considered a hardliner on many issues, but is a leading
antagonist of Ahmadinejad. Also a staunch backer of repression of Green
Congressional Research Service
4
Iran: U.S. Concerns and Policy Responses
Movement protests. Brother of judiciary head. Another brother,
Mohammad Javad, was deputy foreign minister (1980s.) May run again for
President in 2013.
Tehran Mayor Mohammad Baqer
Former Revolutionary Guard Air Force commander and police chief, but a
Qalibaf
moderate-conservative ally of Larijani and critic of Ahmadinejad.
Encourages comparisons of himself to Reza Shah, invoking an era of
stability and strong leadership. Lost in 2005 presidential elections, but
supporters won nine out of 15 seats on Tehran city council in December
2006 elections, propelling him to current post as mayor of Tehran. Has
won some popular support for Tehran’s cleanliness and relative order.
Recruited moderate-conservatives for March 2008 Majles election. May
run again in 2013.
Senior Shiite Clerics
The most senior clerics, most of whom are in Qom, including several
Grand Ayatollahs, are generally “quietist”—they believe that the senior
clergy should refrain from direct involvement in politics. These include
Grand Ayatollah Nasser Makarem Shirazi, Grand Ayatollah (former
judiciary chief) Abdol Karim Musavi-Ardabili, and Grand Ayatollah Yusuf
Sanei, all of whom have criticized regime crackdown against
oppositionists. Others believe in political involvement, including Ayatollah
Mohammad Taqi Mesbah Yazdi. He is founder of the hardline Haqqani
school, and spiritual mentor of Ahmadinejad. Yazdi, an assertive defender
of the powers of the Supreme Leader and a proponent of an “Islamic
state” rather than the current “Islamic republic,” fared poorly in
December 2006 elections for Assembly of Experts. Another hardline
senior cleric is Ayatollah Kazem Haeri, mentor of Iraqi cleric Moqtada Al
Sadr.
Judiciary Chief/Ayatollah Sadeq
Named judiciary head in late August 2009, replacing Ayatollah Mahmoud
Larijani
Shahrudi, who had headed the Judiciary since 1999. Brother of Ali Larijani;
both are close to the Supreme Leader but are moderate-conservative
opponents of Ahmadinejad. Both also support hard line against Green
Movement.
Militant Clerics Association
Longtime organization of hardline clerics headed by Ayatollah Mohammad
Mahdavi-Kani, who became chair of the Assembly of Experts on March 9,
2011. Did not back Ahmadinejad for reelection in 2009 vote.
Bazaar Merchants (“Bazaaris”)
The urban bazaar merchants fear jeopardizing the economy by
participating in political opposition activity; have conducted only a few
strikes or other organized action since the 1979 revolution. In July 2010,
many Tehran bazaaris—and bazaaris in several other major cities—closed
their shops for two weeks to protest a 70% tax increase, ultimately
compelling the government to reduce the increase to 15%. Some
interpreted the strikes as an indication that the bazaaris may be shifting
against the regime, which they see as causing the international community
to sanction Iran’s economy and bringing economic damage. The bazaaris
are also not a monolithic group; each city’s bazaars are organized by
industry (e.g., carpets, gold, jewelry, clothing) and bazaari positions tend
to be reached by consensus among elders representing each industry
represented at the bazaar.
Opposition/”Green Movement” (Rah-e-Sabz)
All of the blocs and personalities below can be considered, to varying degrees, as part of the Green Movement.
However, overall leadership of the movement and decision-making on protest activities is unclear, with several
components competing for preeminence. Some Green supporters have left for Europe, Asia, or the United States.
Titular Green Movement Leaders:
Khatemi—reformist president during 1997-2005 and declared he would
Mir Hossein Musavi/
run again for President in June 2009 elections, but withdrew when allied
Mohammad Khatemi/Mehdi Karrubi
reformist Mir Hossein Musavi entered the race in late March 2009.
Khatemi elected May 1997, with 69% of the vote; reelected June 2001
Congressional Research Service
5
Iran: U.S. Concerns and Policy Responses
with 77%. Rode wave of sentiment for easing social and political
restrictions among students, intel ectuals, youths, and women. These
groups later became disillusioned with Khatemi’s failure to stand up to
hardliners on reform issues. Now heads International Center for Dialogue
Among Civilizations. Visited U.S. in September 2006 to speak at Harvard
and the Washington National Cathedral on “dialogue of civilizations.” Has
hewed to staunch anti-Israel line of most Iranian officials, but perceived as
open to accepting a Palestinian-Israeli compromise. Perceived as open to a
political compromise that stops short of replacement of the regime.
Musavi is a non-cleric. About 68. An architect by training, and a disciple of
Ayatol ah Khomeini, he served as foreign minister (1980), then prime
minister (1981-1989), at which time he successfully managed the state
rationing program during the privations of the Iran-Iraq War but often
feuded with Khamene’i, who was then President. At that time, he was an
advocate of state control of the economy. His post was abolished in the
1989 revision of the constitution.
Musavi later adopted views similar to Khatemi on political and social
freedoms and on reducing Iran’s international isolation, but supports
strong state intervention in the economy to benefit workers, lower
classes. Appeared at some 2009 protests, sometimes intercepted or
constrained by regime security agents. However, not necessarily
respected by harder line opposition leaders who criticize his statements
indicating reconciliation with the regime is possible. He and wife
(prominent activist Zahra Rahnevard) repeatedly harassed by regime
during 2009 protests. He and Mehdi Karrubi, below, placed under strict
house arrest after Green demonstrations resumed in February 2011.
Musavi was prevented from attending father’s Tehran funeral on April 1,
2011.
A founder of the leftwing Association of Combatant Clerics (different
organization but with similar name from that above), Mehdi Karrubi was
Speaker of the Majles during, 1989-1992 and 2000-2004. Formed a
separate pro-reform “National Trust” faction after losing 2005 election.
Ran again in 2009, but received few votes and subsequently emerged,
along with Musavi, as a symbol of the opposition. Indicated in late January
2010 that Ahmadinejad is the chief executive of Iran by virtue of the
Supreme Leader’s backing, but later reiterated strong criticism of regime’s
use of force against protesters. Was been physically blocked by regime
from attending Green demonstrations during 2010 and, with Musavi, was
put under house arrest as of February 2011. Taken away to complete
isolation (except for regime agents) at a two room office on July 16, 2011.
Reportedly was al owed some access to his family in December 2011.
Other Prominent Dissidents/Shirin
Other leading dissidents, some in Iran, others in exile, have been
Abadi
challenging the regime since well before the Green Movement formed.
They are now, to varying degrees, part of the Green Movement. For
example, journalist Akbar Ganji conducted hunger strikes to protest
regime oppression; he was released on schedule on March 18, 2006, after
sentencing in 2001 to six years in prison for alleging high-level involvement
in 1999 murders of Iranian dissident intel ectuals. Another prominent
dissident is Abdol Karim Soroush, now exiled, who challenged the
doctrine of clerical rule. Former Revolutionary Guard organizer Mohsen
Sazegara is now based in the United States and is widely viewed in Iran via
Youtube. Other leading dissidents include former Culture Minister
Ataol ah Mohajerani, and Mohsen Kadivar. Some well known dissidents
who remained in Iran and were arrested in 2010 include filmmaker Jafar
Panahi and journalist Abdolreza Tajik. In November 2008, before the 2009
unrest, famed Iranian blogger Hossein Derakshan was jailed; he has
received a 20 year prison sentence. On the other hand, 80-year-old Iran
Freedom Movement leader Ibrahim Yazdi was released from prison in
Congressional Research Service
6
Iran: U.S. Concerns and Policy Responses
April 2011 after resigning as the Freedom Movement’s leader.
One major longtime dissident and human rights activist is Nobel Peace
Prize laureate (2003) and Iran human rights activist lawyer Shirin Abadi.
She has often represented clients persecuted or prosecuted by the
regime. She left Iran for Europe, fearing arrest in connection with the
postelection dispute. In December 2009, the regime confiscated her
Nobel Prize. In January 2011, a colleague, Nasrin Sotoudeh, was
sentenced to 11 years in prison.
Student Opposition
Groups composed of wel -educated, Westernized urban youth are the
Leaders/Confederation of Iranian
backbone of the Green Movement. Many are women. Student leaders
Students/Office of Consolidation of
currently attempting, with mixed success, to gain support of older
Unity (Daftar Tahkim-e-Vahdat)
generation, labor, clerics, vil age-dwellers, and other segments. Many in
the Office of Consolidation of Unity, the student group that led the 1999
riots but which has since become control ed by regime loyalists, believes
that major reform of the current regime might be acceptable. Along with
many other student/youth opposition groups, one offshoot of the Office,
the Confederation of Iranian Students (CIS), believes in outright
replacement of the regime; it is populated by staunchly pro-American,
pro-free market activists who support an embargo on Iranian oil
purchases. CIS has a growing Washington, DC, presence led by Amir
Abbas Fakhravar, who was jailed for five years for participating in July
1999 student riots, although it has chapters worldwide. Makes extensive
use of female activists, such as spokeswoman Saghar Kasraie. Overall
leader, Arzhang Davoodi, serving long prison sentence and several senior
activists arrested in April 2011. CIS has organized several broad
opposition conferences in Washington, DC.
Islamic Iran Participation Front (IIPF)
The most prominent and best organized pro-reform grouping, but has lost
political ground to more active and forceful core of the Green Movement
of which Musavi is the most visible symbol. Its leaders include Khatemi’s
brother, Mohammad Reza Khatemi (a deputy speaker in the 2000-2004
Majles) and Mohsen Mirdamadi. Backed Musavi in June 12 election; several
IIPF leaders, including Mirdamadi, detained and prosecuted in postelection
dispute. The party was outlawed by the regime in September 2010.
Mojahedin of the Islamic Revolution
Composed mainly of left-leaning Iranian figures who support state control
Organization (MIR)
of the economy, but want greater political pluralism and relaxation of
rules on social behavior. A major constituency of the reformist camp. Its
leader is former Heavy Industries Minister Behzad Nabavi, who supported
Musavi in 2009 election and has been incarcerated for most of the time
since June 2009. The organization was outlawed by the regime
simultaneously with the outlawing of the IIPF, above.
Labor Unions
Organized labor has suffered from official repression for many years.
Organized labor is not a core constituency of the Green Movement, but
laborers viewed as increasingly sympathetic to political change. Some
labor protests took place in Tehran on “May Day” 2010, and selected
small strikes (truckers, some factories) during 2010 led some experts to
believe that labor might be gravitating toward Green Movement.
However, younger Green Movement activists are suspicious of labor as a
leftwing bastion. Others say union members fear income disruption if they
openly defy the regime. A bus drivers union leader, Mansur Osanloo, has
been in jail since July 2007.
Congressional Research Service
7
Iran: U.S. Concerns and Policy Responses
Elected Institutions: The Presidency, the Majles (Parliament),
the Assembly of Experts, and Recent Elections
Elections in Iran have become progressively less credible to international observers in recent
cycles as hardliners, who control key election administration bodies such as the Interior Ministry
and the Council of Guardians, have sought to limit the candidate choices. Even before the 2009
presidential election, votes in the Islamic republic had already been criticized as unfair because of
the “screening” function of the Council of Guardians; the Council can approve or deny candidates
based on its application of constitutional requirements about a candidate’s knowledge of Islam
and loyalty to the Islamic system of government.
Another criticism of the political process in Iran is the relative absence of political parties—
establishing a party requires the permission of the Interior Ministry under Article 10 of Iran’s
constitution. The standards to obtain approval are high: to date, numerous parties have filed for
permission since the regime was founded, but only those considered loyal to the regime have
been granted (or allowed to retain) license to operate. Some of those authorized include
Ahmadinejad’s “Alliance of Builders of Islamic Iran” party, and the “Executives of Construction”
party. Some have been licensed and then banned, such as the two reformist parties, Islamic Iran
Participation Front, and the Organization of Mojahedin of the Islamic Revolution. They were
formally outlawed in September 2010. All of these factors work against moderate factions.
The Presidency
The main elected institution is the presidency. The presidency is clearly subordinate to the
Supreme Leader, although most presidents during the Islamic republic have sought, generally
unsuccessfully, more authority relative to that of the Supreme Leader. Still, the presidency is a
coveted position which provides vast opportunities for the holder of the post to empower his
political base and to affect day-to-day policy, particularly on economic issues. The president
appoints and supervises the work of the cabinet, but the Supreme Leader is believed to have
significant input into security-related cabinet appointments, including ministers of defense,
interior, and intelligence (Ministry of Information and Security, MOIS). Prior to 1989, Iran had
both an elected president as well as a Prime Minister selected by the elected Majles (parliament).
However, the officials who held these posts during 1981-89 (Ali Khamene’i, who is now
Supreme Leader, and Mir Hossein Musavi, who is now the main opposition leader, respectively)
were in constant institutional conflict and the constitution was revised in 1989 to eliminate the
post of Prime Minister.
In a speech on October 16, 2011, Supreme Leader Khamene’i raised the possibility of his
directing another alteration to eliminate the post of President and restore the post of Prime
Minister. The comments were viewed in the context of a rift between him and President
Ahmadinejad, discussed below. Khamene’i indicated the change would not be difficult to
orchestrate, suggesting this change could conceivably be accomplished before the next scheduled
presidential election in 2013.
The Majles
Iran’s Majles, or parliament, consists of 290 seats, all elected. However, there are reserved seats
(one each) for members of Iran’s religious minorities, including Jews and Christians. There is no
“quota” for the number of women to be elected, but women regularly run and win election,
Congressional Research Service
8
Iran: U.S. Concerns and Policy Responses
although not in proportion to their percentage of the population. Majles elections occur one year
prior to the presidential elections; the next Majles elections are to be held on March 2, 2012.
Cabinet appointments are subject to confirmation by the Majles (parliament), which also drafts
and acts on legislation. The unicameral Majles in Iran is highly factionalized but, as an institution,
it is far from the “rubber stamp” that characterizes many elected national assemblies in the region,
but it generally has lost institutional disputes to the President. Among its main duties is to
consider and enact a proposed national budget; that review typically takes place each February
and March in advance of the Persian New Year (Nowruz) on March 21.
The Assembly of Experts
Another elected institution, mentioned above, is the Assembly of Experts; it is empowered to
oversee the work of the Supreme Leader and replace him if necessary, as well as to amend the
constitution. The elected Assembly serves an eight-year term. It generally meets two times a year,
for a few days each. The fourth election for the Assembly was held on December 15, 2006; after
that election, Rafsanjani, still a major figure having served two terms as president (1989-1997),
was named deputy leader of the Assembly. After the death of the leader of the Assembly
(Ayatollah Meshkini), Rafsanjani was selected its head in September 2007. However, as part of
the broader power struggles within the regime that have raged since the post-2009 election
uprising, Rafsanjani was not reelected as Assembly of Experts chair in March 2011. He was
replaced by aging and infirm compromise candidate Ayatollah Mohammad Reza Mahdavi-Kani.
See Figure 1 for a chart of the Iranian regime.
Recent Presidential Elections: First Ahmadinejad Election in 2005
After suffering several presidential election defeats at the hands of President Mohammad
Khatemi and the reformists in the 1997 and 2001 presidential elections, hardliners successfully
moved to regain the sway they held when Khomeini was alive. Conservatives won a majority
(155 out of the 290 Majles seats) in the February 20, 2004, Majles elections (which are always
held one year prior to each presidential election), in large part because of the Council of
Guardians’ disqualification of 3,600 reformist candidates, including 87 Majles incumbents. The
George W. Bush Administration and the Senate (S.Res. 304, adopted by unanimous consent on
February 12, 2004) criticized the elections as unfair because of the disqualifications.
As the reformist faction suffered setbacks, the Council of Guardians narrowed the field of
candidates for the June 2005 presidential elections to 8 out of the 1,014 persons who filed.
Rafsanjani3 was considered the favorite against several opponents more hardline than he is—three
had ties to the Revolutionary Guard: Ali Larijani; Mohammad Baqer Qalibaf; and Tehran mayor
Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. In the June 17, 2005, first round, turnout was about 63% (29.4 million
votes out of 46.7 million eligible voters). With 21% and 19.5%, respectively, Rafsanjani and
Ahmadinejad, who did unexpectedly well because of tacit backing from Khamene’i and the Basij
militia arm of the Revolutionary Guard, moved to a runoff. Reformist candidates (Mehdi Karrubi
and Mostafa Moin) fared worse than expected. Ahmadinejad won in the June 24 runoff, receiving
61.8% to Rafsanjani’s 35.7%. He first took office on August 6, 2005.
3 Rafsanjani was constitutionally permitted to run because a third term would not have been consecutive with his
previous two terms. In the 2001 presidential election, the Council permitted 10 out of the 814 registered candidates.
Congressional Research Service
9
Iran: U.S. Concerns and Policy Responses
During his first term, splits widened between Ahmadinejad and other conservative members of
his “Principalist” (usulgaran) faction. That rift was evident in the March 2008 Majles elections in
which his base of support fractured and some conservatives ran as an anti-Ahmadinejad bloc, as
shown in Table 2.
Table 2. Factions in the Eighth Majles
(Elected March 14-April 25, 2008)
Pro-Ahmadinejad Conservatives (United Front of Principalists)
117
Anti-Ahmadinejad Conservatives (Coalition of Principalists)
53
Reformists (39 seats in seventh Majles)
46
Independents
71
Seats annulled or voided
3
Total 290
Ahmadinejad (Disputed) Reelection on June 12, 2009: Protests Erupt
With splits in Ahmadinejad’s base, prospects for reformists to unseat Ahmadinejad through the
established election process seemed to brighten. In February 2009, when Khatemi indicated a
willingness to run, but he ultimately yielded to and endorsed a fellow reformist, Mir Hossein
Musavi. Musavi was viewed as somewhat less divisive (and therefore more acceptable to the
Supreme Leader) than Khatemi because of Musavi’s service as prime minister during the 1980-
1988 Iran-Iraq War.
A total of about 500 candidates for the June 12, 2009, presidential elections registered their names
during May 5-10, 2009. The Council of Guardians decided on four final candidates on May 20:
Ahmadinejad, Musavi, Mehdi Karrubi, and former Commander-in-Chief of the Revolutionary
Guard Mohsen Reza’i. The Interior Ministry, which runs the election, also instituted an
unprecedented series of one-on-one debates, which including Ahmadinejad’s acrimonious
accusations of corruption against Rafsanjani and against Musavi’s wife. If no candidate received
more than 50% of the vote on June 12, there would have been a runoff one week later.
The challengers and their backgrounds and platforms were as follows.
• Mir Hosein Musavi. The main reformist candidate. See box above.
• Mehdi Karrubi. See box above.
• Mohsen Reza’i. As noted, commander in chief of the Revolutionary Guard
through the Iran-Iraq War. About 58 years old, he was considered an anti-
Ahmadinejad conservative. Reza’i dropped out just prior to the 2005 presidential
election. He alleged fraud in the 2009 election but later dropped his challenge.
The outcome of the election was always difficult to foresee; polling was inconsistent. Musavi
supporters using social media such as Facebook and Twitter organized large rallies in Tehran, but
pro-Ahmadinejad rallies were large as well. During the campaign, Khamene’i professed
neutrality, but he and Musavi were often at odds during the Iran-Iraq War, when Khamene’i was
president and Musavi was prime minister. Turnout was high at about 85%; 39.1 million valid (and
invalid) votes were cast. The Interior Ministry announced two hours after the polls closed that
Congressional Research Service
10
Iran: U.S. Concerns and Policy Responses
Ahmadinejad had won, although in the past results have been announced the day after. The totals
were announced on Saturday, June 13, 2009, as follows:
• Ahmadinejad: 24.5 million votes—62.6%
• Musavi: 13.2 million votes—33.75%
• Reza’i: 678,000 votes—1.73%
• Invalid: 409,000 votes—1%
• Karrubi: 333,600 votes—0.85%
Almost immediately after the results of the election were announced on June 13, 2009, Musavi
supporters began protesting the results as he, Karrubi, and Reza’i asserted outright fraud and
called for a new election. They cited the infeasibility of counting 40 million votes so quickly; the
barring of candidate observers at many polling stations; regime shut down of Internet and text
services; and repression of postelection protests. Khamene’i declared the results a “divine
assessment,” appearing to certify the results even though formal procedures require a three day
complaint period. Some outside analysts said the results tracked pre-election polls, which showed
strong support for Ahmadinejad in rural areas and among the urban poor.4
“Green Movement” Forms
Continuing to use Facebook and Twitter, and fueled by outrage over regime use of force as
depicted on Youtube, the demonstrations built throughout June 13-19, large in Tehran but also
held in other cities. Security forces used varying amounts of force to control them, causing 27
protester deaths (official tally) during that period, with figures from opposition groups running
over 100. The protesters’ hopes of having Khamene’i annul the election were dashed by his major
Friday prayer sermon on June 19 in which he refuted allegations of vast fraud and threatened a
crackdown on further protests. Protesters defied Khamene’i the following day but faced a
crackdown that killed at least 10 protesters. On June 29, 2009, the Council of Guardians tried to
address the complaints by performing a televised recount of 10% of the votes of Tehran’s districts
and some provincial ballots and, finding no irregularities, certified the results. As 2009
progressed, the opposition congealed into the “Green Movement of Hope and Change,” which
later moved well beyond the election issue into a challenge to the regime, as discussed below.
Ahmadinejad’s Second Term: Divisions Within the Regime Increase With
Popular Unrest and Arab Uprisings As Backdrop
As the Green Movement gathered strength in 2009, splits within the regime widened, although
most of the core regime leaders tried to remain outwardly unified. Some regime leaders, including
Supreme Leader Khamene’i, backed Ahmadinejad during the period of unrest, while some leaders
argued that Iran needed to heed international criticism about the use of force against protesters.
In 2010, as unrest faded from the streets, Ahmadinejad sought to move beyond the election-
related unrest and to promote the interests of his loyalists. In September 2010, Ahmadinejad
4 A paper published by Chatham House and the University of St. Andrews strongly questions how Ahmadinejad’s vote
could have been as large as reported by official results, in light of past voting patterns throughout Iran. “Preliminary
Analysis of the Voting Figures in Iran’s 2009 Presidential Election.” http://www.chathamhouse.org.uk.
Congressional Research Service
11
Iran: U.S. Concerns and Policy Responses
sought to appoint “special envoys” to several world regions to circumvent longtime diplomats in
the Foreign Ministry. The appointments reportedly led the Foreign Minister, Manuchehr Mottaki,
to threaten to resign, withdrawing that threat only after the office of the Supreme Leader
downgraded the appointments to that of “advisers.” Ahmadinejad later gained Khamene’i’s
acquiescence to dismiss Mottaki on December 13, 2010, while Mottaki was abroad. Ahmadinejad
replaced him with a trusted associate, civilian nuclear chief Ali Akbar Salehi. Many interpreted
Ahmadinejad’s personnel shifts as narrowing his inner circle to only the most trusted confidants.
The disputes broadened to a contest over the relative powers of the executive and legislative
branches. The proximate cause was Ahmadinejad’s attempt to assert the primacy of the executive
branch by refusing to carry out certain expenditures appropriated by the Majles and approved by
the Expediency Council (headed by Ahmadinejad rival, Rafsanjani). That disagreement became
potentially more ominous when, in October 2010, the politically powerful Revolutionary Guard,
in one of its publications, sided with the Majles. A further split was exposed in mid-November
when the Majles voted to remove the President from the post of chairman of the governing board
of Iran’s Central Bank.
However, the Supreme Leader helped Ahmadinejad against their mutual rival in October 2010.
He sided with Ahmadinejad to block Rafsanjani from placing the endowment assets of Islamic
Azad University, which has branches countrywide, into a religious trust. That move would have
permanently prevented Ahmadinejad from a government takeover of that university system. As
noted above, the Supreme Leader and Ahmadinejad’s attempts to sideline Rafsanjani gained
further strength in March 2011 when they persuaded a majority of the Assembly of Experts to
replace Rafsanjani as chair of the body, in favor of Mahdavi-Kani (mentioned above).
Rift with the Supreme Leader Widens in mid-2011
In early 2011, the Supreme Leader began to firmly side with those who want to halt
Ahmadinejad’s efforts to promote his inner circle and to advance a nationalist version of Islam
that would limit the authority of Iran’s clerics. Ahmadinejad is undoubtedly aware that many in
the regime want to see antagonists of his, such as Ali Larijani or Mohammad Baqr Qalibaf (who
are viewed as more moderate), as the next president in 2013. Ahmadinejad is perceived as
promoting the political fortunes of his former chief-of-staff, Esfandiar Rahim Mashai, to whom
he is related through their children’s marriage. As part of that effort, and to try to bolster his
support in the March 2, 2012 Majles elections, Ahmadinejad has supported the application of
seven groups, all said to be supportive of Mashai, to become formal political parties (which
requires Interior Ministry approval).
The rift between Ahmadinejad and Khamene’i erupted into the open April 2011 when
Ahmadinejad dismissed the intelligence minister Heydar Moslehi and attempted to replace him
with a Mashai loyalist. The Supreme Leader reinstated Moslehi, and Ahmadinejad protested by
refusing to attend cabinet meetings from April 24 to May 4. The political establishment, including
the Revolutionary Guard and Majles, rallied around the Supreme Leader, forcing Ahmadinejad to
accept Moslehi’s reinstatement and later leading to the charging of 25 Mashai loyalists with
witchcraft or sorcery. The Majles voted on May 25, 2011, to investigate Ahmadinejad for bribery
in the 2009 election. On June 1, the Majles voted 165-1 to declare illegal Ahmadinejad’s mid-
May 2011 sacking of the Oil Minister and two other ministers. In late June, the Majles rejected
Ahmadinejad’s nominee to head a new Sports and Youth Affairs Ministry and said it would
summon Ahmadinejad for formal questioning.
Congressional Research Service
12
Iran: U.S. Concerns and Policy Responses
Perhaps seeking to prevent the Revolutionary Guard from acting more forcefully against him,
Ahmadinejad appointed Guard official Rostam Ghasemi (commander of its engineering arm,
Khatem ol-Anbiya) as Oil Minister on July 27, 2011. He was confirmed on August 3 and
simultaneously took over leadership of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries
(OPEC) because Iran holds the rotating leadership seat. Ghasemi is under U.S. financial sanctions
and EU financial and travel sanctions, although an agreement between OPEC and Austria will
allow him to attend the group’s meetings in Vienna.
The institutional moves to criticize and investigate Ahmadinejad and his allies caused many
outside experts to conclude that the Supreme Leader had shifted decisively against Ahmadinejad
to the point where he was seeking his removal. Others assess that the Supreme Leader seeks to
weaken Ahmadinejad but not force his replacement outright, because ousting him would expose
divisiveness within the regime that could benefit the Green Movement. In September 2011, the
split continued with allegations that a $2.6 billion embezzlement scheme involving fraudulent
letters of credit were facilitated by Mashai—an implied link of the scam to Ahmadinejad himself.
The allegations prompted the Majles to begin impeachment proceedings against the Finance
Minister, Shams ed-Din Hoseini, an Ahmadinejad ally. In early November 2011, an ally of
Mashai reportedly was arrested and Ahmadinejad, in November 3 speech to supporters, harshly
criticized Khamene’i loyalists who he believes are responsible for the political attacks on his
presidency and his allies. On November 22, 2011, security forces loyal to the (pro-Khamene’i)
judiciary briefly detained the head of official state news agency, the Islamic Republic News
Agency (IRNA), Ali Akbar Javanfekr, who is considered an Ahmadinejad ally. The arrest was
ostensibly for a newspaper he runs publication of an article questioning enforcement of the dress
restrictions on women.
As the split has unfolded, a debate has arisen over the possibility of abolishing the presidency
entirely and putting governance directly in the hands of the Supreme Leader and a Prime Minister
selected by the Majles. The Supreme Leader expressed support for that idea, an implicit threat to
prevent Ahmadinejad from helping Mashai succeed him as President, on October 16, 2011.
However, in December 2011, Mohammad Javad Larijani, another Larijani brother who is close to
Khamene’i (and heads a human rights oversight body in Iran, the High Council of Human Rights)
said such an alteration of the power structure was not likely for at least the next several four-year
election cycles.
Economy and Sanctions-Driven Schisms
There are no indications that the political disputes among senior level figures are specifically a
response to economic issues or international sanctions. Well before international sanctions were
expanded in 2010, many middle class Iranians accused Ahmadinejad for favoring the lower
classes economically by raising some wages and lowering interest rates for poorer borrowers,
cancelling some debts of farmers, and increasing some social welfare payments. Poorer Iranians
saw Ahmadinejad as attentive to their economic plight.
These class divisions increased somewhat after Ahmadinejad, in October 2010, won Majles
approval to reduce state subsidies on staple goods—which cost Iran at least $30 billion per year
according to outside estimates (the government puts the cost at close to $100 billion per year)—
over the subsequent five years. After several delays to plan for anticipated unrest, the subsidy
elimination program began on December 19, 2010.
Congressional Research Service
13
Iran: U.S. Concerns and Policy Responses
Some believe that key regime constituencies may even benefit from economic sanctions. Major
economic sectors and markets are controlled by the quasi-statal “foundations” (bonyads), run by
powerful former officials, and there are special trading privileges for them and the bazaar
merchants, a key constituency for some conservatives. The same privileges—and more—
reportedly apply to businesses run by the Revolutionary Guard, as discussed below, leading to
criticism that the Guard is using its political influence to win business contracts. Additional
analysis of the subsidy phaseout issue, and the economic and policy effects of sanctions, are
discussed in substantial depth in CRS Report RS20871, Iran Sanctions, by Kenneth Katzman.
Mahmoud Ahmadinejad
First non-cleric to be president of the Islamic republic since the assassination of then-president Mohammad Ali Rajai
in August 1981. About 58, he asserts he is a “man of the people,” the son of a blacksmith who lives in modest
circumstances, who would promote the interests of the poor and return government to the original principles of the
Islamic revolution. Has burnished that image as president through regular visits to poor areas and through subsidies
directed at the lower classes. His official biography says he served with the “special forces” of the Revolutionary
Guard, and he served subsequently (late 1980s) as a deputy provincial governor. Although he is a member of the
Builders of Islamic Iran party, he more closely identifies with a Principalist faction composed of former Guard and
Basij (volunteer popular forces) leaders and other hardliners. U.S. intelligence reportedly determined he was not one
of the holders of the 52 American hostages during November 1979-January 1981. Other accounts say Ahmadinejad
believes his mission is to prepare for the return of the 12th Imam—Imam Mahdi—whose return from occultation
would, according to Twelver Shi te doctrine, be accompanied by the establishment of Islam as the global religion.
Earned clerical criticism in May 2008 for again invoking intervention by Imam Mahdi in present day state affairs.
Following limited recount, declared winner of June 12, 2009, election. Well earlier, had been a controversial figure for
inflammatory statements. He attracted significant world criticism for an October 26, 2005, Tehran conference
entitled “A World Without Zionism” by stating that “Israel should be wiped off the map.” In an October 2006
address, Ahmadinejad said, “I have a connection with God.” He insisted on holding a December 2006 conference in
Tehran questioning the Holocaust, a theme he has returned to several times since, including at a September 2007
speech at Columbia University. A U.N. Security Council statement and Senate and House resolutions (H.Res. 523 and
S.Res. 292), passed by their respective chambers, condemned the statement. On June 21, 2007, the House passed
H.Con.Res. 21, calling on the U.N. Security Council to charge Ahmadinejad with violating the 1948 Convention on
the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide; the Convention includes “direct and public incitement” of
genocide as a punishable offense. On March 6, 2010, Ahmadinejad cal ed the September 11, 2001, attacks on the
United States a “big lie” used to justify intervention in Afghanistan. Was apparent target of an unsuccessful grenade
attack on his motorcade in the city of Hamedan on August 4, 2010. As noted, has been embroiled in power struggle
with the Supreme Leader since early 2011 as rival factions maneuver for advantage in 2012 Majles elections and then
the 2013 presidential elections.
The Opposition
The popular uprising of 2009 constituted the most significant unrest faced by the regime since its
inception in 1979. Many experts on Iran believe that the still seething opposition remains a key
concern of the regime, particularly in the context of successful uprisings in the Arab world in
2011. Still, the regime’s willingness to use force and mass arrests, and the lack of clear leadership
of the protest movement, clouds the opposition’s prospects to return to the streets in large
numbers. Not all the opposition operates under the Green Movement banner; some opposition
groups in exile or in Iran operate separately, and may be acting to further ethnic or other interests
rather than establish democracy in Iran.
Congressional Research Service
14
Iran: U.S. Concerns and Policy Responses
The Green Movement
The Green Movement, the genesis of which was the post-presidential election protests as
discussed above, constitutes a significant popular opposition. It includes many different social
groups, although it is centered around educated, urban youth. To its detriment, it has not to date
incorporated many traditionally conservative groups such as older Iranians and Iranians who live
in rural areas. Many believe that bringing such groups into the movement is imperative if the
Green Movement is to expand to the point where it can achieve its objectives. It furthermore is
divided between those who believe the regime can be reformed and moderated, and those who
believe it must be replaced outright by a more secular, or at least less Islamic, system of
government.
The year 2009 was clearly “the high water mark” of the Green Movement to date. After the initial
post-election daily protests, Green Movement members organized protests around major holidays
and called openly for the downfall of the regime, rather than its reform. Some of the protests in
late 2009 nearly overwhelmed regime security forces. Large protests were held on the July 9
anniversary of the suppression of the 1999 student riots; the August 5, 2009, official inauguration
of Ahmadinejad; September 18, 2009 (“Jerusalem Day”); November 4, 2009, 30th anniversary of
the takeover of the U.S. embassy in Tehran; and the Ashura Shiite holy day (December 27, 2009).
The latter protest, conducted the seventh day after the death of major regime critic Ayatollah
Montazeri, was marked by the seizure and burning of several police vehicles, and the refusal by
some anti-riot police to beat protesters; it spread to smaller cities and was joined by some clerics.
Quiescence in 2010 and Brief Reemergence At Outset of Arab Uprisings in 2011
The momentum of the Green Movement in late 2009 led some experts to predict the downfall of
the regime, but the movement’s outward activity declined after its demonstration planned for the
February 11, 2010, anniversary of the founding of the Islamic Republic (in 1979) was suppressed.
With weeks to prepare, the regime limited opposition communication and made several hundred
preemptive arrests, as well as executing some oppositionists in January 2010. Minor protests were
held on March 16, 2010, a Zoroastrian holiday (Fire Festival) celebrated by many Iranians,
defying a Khamene’i edict against celebrations. Scattered protests, including by some labor
groups, were held in major cities on May 1, 2010 (May Day). Musavi and Karrubi called for a
huge demonstration on the June 12, 2010, anniversary of the election, leading to some movement
by parliament hardliners to have them arrested. Sensing regime preparations for repression, the
two publicly “called off” the protest in order to avoid harm to protesters.
A major question was whether the opposition uprisings in Tunisia and Egypt, which toppled
leaders there in January and February 2011, would reinvigorate the Green Movement, which has
used similar social media techniques and has similar grievances. The regime, seeking to parry
such parallels, praised the Tunisian and Egyptian events as inspired by Iran’s 1979 revolution,
while Green Movement leaders compared those uprisings to their uprising in 2009. The question
was answered when Musavi and Karrubi called for protests on February 14, 2011, and there were
numerous clashes with tear-gas-wielding riot police in Tehran and other cities. In advance of that
demonstration, Karrubi and Musavi were placed under house arrest, an action that appeared to
energize some of the February 11 protests. Suggesting growing regime concerns, a sizeable bloc
of Majles members demonstrated in the chamber chanting for their execution. Further protests,
which reportedly drew large numbers of protesters but were ultimately suppressed by the Basij
were held on February 20 and weekly from March 1 until Nowruz (March 21, 2011). No major
demonstrations materialized at the 2011 anniversary of the June 12, 2009, disputed election.
Congressional Research Service
15
Iran: U.S. Concerns and Policy Responses
Expectations were similarly incorrect that protests would result from the death of activist Haleh
Shahabi at the June 1, 2011, funeral of her father, prominent Freedom Movement dissident
Ezatollah Sahabi. Her death was attributed to a heart attack caused by regime security forces’
confrontation of her during the funeral procession.
Despite these setbacks, observers in Iran say the Green Movement remains highly active
underground and is likely to reemerge. A likely time for its reemergence, if that happens, would
be in the run-up to the March 2, 2012 Majles elections when increased open political activity is
typically allowed. Many believe that the Green Movement would be energized if the regime,
through the Council of Guardians, attempts to limit candidate choice to only those most loyal to
the Supreme Leader, Ahmadinejad, or other regime leaders.
Green Movement Allies and Other U.S.-Based Activists
Some movements that are outside Iran are increasingly allied with the Green Movement inside
Iran. Numerous Iranians Americans of differing ideologies in the United States want to see a
change of regime in Tehran. Many of them are based in California, where there is a large Iranian
American community, and there are about 25 small-scale radio or television stations that
broadcast into Iran. A growing number of U.S.-based Iranian activists appear to be supporting or
affiliated with the Green Movement. Many of them protest Ahmadinejad’s visits to the United
Nations General Assembly every September, and many others sport green bracelets showing
support for the Green Movement. One U.S.-based group, the International Campaign for Human
Rights in Iran, appears supportive of the Green Movement. Believed close to Karrubi and
Musavi, it is headed by Hadi Ghaemi. Former CNN anchor Rudi Bahktiar, a relative of the Shah’s
last prime minister, Shahpour Bakhtiar, has been part of the group. During 2011, she briefly was
an adviser at the Voice of America’s Persian News Network (PNN).
Supporters of the Son of the Late Shah of Iran
Some Iranians want to replace the regime with a constitutional monarchy led by Reza Pahlavi, the
U.S.-based son of the late former Shah and a U.S.-trained combat pilot. The Shah’s son, who is
about 53 years old, has delivered statements condemning the regime for the post-2009 election
crackdown and he has called for international governments to withdraw their representation from
Tehran. He has some support particularly in the older generation in Iran, but he may be trying to
broaden his following by capitalizing on the opposition’s growing popularity with Iranian youth.
As of March 2011, he has been increasingly cooperating with—and possibly attempting to co-
opt—younger Green Movement figures. His office formally supported a CIS (see above)
conference in Washington, DC, in June 2011. In a meeting with the author in June 2011, Pahlavi
indicated that an internationally provided “strike fund” would help Iranian labor rise up against
the regime by protecting their incomes from regime retaliation. He also advocates establishing a
large scale opposition radio station, funded presumably by wealthy Persian Gulf states. He is
supported by Iranian exile-run stations in California.5 A younger brother, Ali Reza Pahlavi,
committed suicide in January 2011.
5 Kampeas, Ron. “Iran’s Crown Prince Plots Nonviolent Insurrection from Suburban Washington.” Associated Press,
August 26, 2002.
Congressional Research Service
16
Iran: U.S. Concerns and Policy Responses
National Iranian-American Council and Public Affairs Alliance of
Iranian-Americans
Some organizations, such as The National Iranian American Council (NIAC) and the Public
Affairs Alliance of Iranian-Americans (PAAIA), are not necessarily seeking change within Iran.
The stated mission of NIAC, composed largely of Iranian Americans, is to promote discussion of
U.S. policy. The group advocates engagement with Iran, supports easing some U.S. sanctions
against Iran, opposes removing the People’s Mojahedin (see below) from the U.S. list of terrorist
organizations, and has warned that some U.S. experts are seeking to convince the Administration
to take military action against Iran. These positions have led some experts and commentators to
criticize NIAC as sympathetic to or even supportive of Iran’s regime. On the other hand, NIAC
has criticized the regime’s human rights abuses.
PAAIA’s mission is to discuss issues affecting Iranian Americans, such as discrimination caused
by public perceptions of association with terrorism or radical Islam. Some observers believe it is
less active in 2011 than in the two previous years, perhaps because of desertions by some who
wanted PAAIA to take a strong stand against the regime in Tehran.
The Opposition: Armed Factions
Some groups have been committed to the replacement of the regime virtually since its inception,
and have used, or are still using, violence to achieve their objectives. Their linkages to the Green
Movement are tenuous, if present at all, and some indications suggest these movements want to
dominate any coalition that might topple the regime.
People’s Mojahedin Organization of Iran (PMOI)/Camp Ashraf
One of the best-known exiled opposition groups is the People’s Mojahedin Organization of Iran
(PMOI).6 Secular and left-leaning, it was formed in the 1960s to try to overthrow the Shah of Iran
and has been characterized by U.S. reports as attempting to blend several ideologies, including
Marxism, feminism, and Islamism, although the organization denies that it ever advocated
Marxism. It allied with pro-Khomeini forces during the Islamic revolution and, according to past
State Department reports, supported the November 1979 takeover of the U.S. Embassy in Tehran,
although the group claims that it is the regime that alleged this support in order to discredit the
group with the West. The group was driven into exile when it rose up against the Khomeini
regime in September 1981. Even though it is an opponent of Tehran, since the late 1980s the State
Department has refused contact with the PMOI and its umbrella organization, the National
Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI). The State Department designated the PMOI as a foreign
terrorist organization (FTO) in October 19977 and the NCR was named as an alias of the PMOI in
the October 1999 redesignation. In August 14, 2003, the State Department designated the NCR
offices in the United States an alias of the PMOI, and NCR and the Justice Department closed
down those offices.
6 Other names by which this group is known is the Mojahedin-e-Khalq Organization (MEK or MKO) and the National
Council of Resistance (NCR).
7 The designation was made under the authority of the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (P.L.
104-132).
Congressional Research Service
17
Iran: U.S. Concerns and Policy Responses
The FTO designation is a widely debated issue. The State Department’s annual reports on
international terrorism, including the report for 2010 issued August 18, 2011, asserts that the
organization—and not just a radical element of the organization as the group asserts—was
responsible for the alleged killing of seven American military personnel and contract advisers to
the former Shah in 1975-1976. The report also repeats allegations of the previous year’s report
that the group is responsible for bombings at U.S. government facilities in Tehran in 1972 as a
protest of the visit to Iran of then-President Richard Nixon. The State Department report also list
as terrorist acts numerous attacks by the group against regime officials, facilities in Iran and
abroad, and security officers, all prior to 2001. However, the report does not list any attacks by
the group that purposely targets civilians—a key distinction that leads several experts to argue
that the group should not be considered “terrorist.” The State Department report does not state
that the group has, as of mid-2001, fulfilled pledges to end all use of violence inside Iran and that
there are no reports that it has resumed those activities. The group’s alliance with Saddam
Hussein’s regime in the 1980s and 1990s has contributed to the U.S. criticism of the organization.
In challenging its FTO decision, the PMOI also asserts that, by retaining the group on the FTO
list, the United States is unfairly preventing the PMOI from participating in the opposition
movement. The regime accuses the group of involvement in the post-June 2009 presidential
election violence, and some of those tried for mohareb since February 2010 are members of the
organization, according to statements by human rights groups such as Amnesty International.
It also points to recent legal successes in Europe as evidence that it should no longer be
considered an FTO. On January 27, 2009, the European Union (EU) removed the group from its
terrorist group list; the group had been so designated by the EU in 2002. In May 2008, a British
appeals court determined that the group should no longer be considered a terrorist organization on
the grounds that the British government did not provide “any reliable evidence” that the PMOI
would “resort to terrorist activities in the future.” Currently, the governments that still list the
group as a “terrorist organization,” include the United States, Canada, and Australia. In June
2003, France arrested about 170 opposition activists, including Maryam Rajavi (wife of PMOI
founder Masoud Rajavi, whose whereabouts are unknown), the “President-elect” of the NCRI.
She was released and remains based in France, and is frequently received by European
parliamentarians and other politicians in Europe. On May 12, 2011, France dropped charges
against Mrs. Rajavi and 23 other PMOI activists who remained under investigation, saying there
was no evidence the PMOI conducted or backed violence against civilians, but only against
regime personnel. Such action, in the view of the judges, constituted resistance, not terrorism.
Nine of the 24 remained under investigation for embezzlement.
In related action, in July 2008, the PMOI petitioned to the State Department that its designation
be revoked, on the grounds that it renounced any use of terrorism in 2001. However, the State
Department reaffirmed the listing in January 2009 and after a January 2010 review. In her March
1, 2011, testimony, Secretary Clinton said the department would “carefully review” a July 16,
2010, Court of Appeals decision to ask the State Department to review the decision to retain the
group’s FTO listing; the decision was based on a ruling that the group had not been given proper
opportunity to rebut allegations against it. At a May 5, 2011, House Foreign Affairs Committee
hearing, State Department Coordinator for Counterterrorism Daniel Benjamin said a decision
would be made by the end of 2011.8 Apparently in an effort to obtain a favorable decision, during
8House Foreign Affairs Committee, Subcommittee on Europe and Eurasia. Overview of Security Issues in Europe and
Eurasia. May 5, 2011.
Congressional Research Service
18
Iran: U.S. Concerns and Policy Responses
2010 and 2011 supporters of the organization have reportedly paid several former U.S. officials
for panel appearances in which they supported de-listing the group. H.Res. 60, introduced
January 26, 2011, “urges” the Secretary of State to remove the PMOI from the FTO list. It has
nearly 100 co-sponsors. Some advocate that the United States not only remove the group from the
FTO list but also enter an alliance with the group.
Camp Ashraf Issue
The issue of group members in Iraq is increasingly pressing. U.S. forces attacked PMOI military
installations in Iraq during Operation Iraqi Freedom and negotiated a ceasefire with PMOI
military elements in Iraq, requiring the approximately 3,400 PMOI fighters to remain confined to
their Ashraf camp near the border with Iran. Its weaponry is in storage, guarded first by U.S. and
now by Iraqi personnel. Another 200 Ashraf residents have taken advantage of an arrangement
between Iran and the ICRC for them to return to Iran if they disavow further PMOI activities;
none is known to have been persecuted since returning.
In July 2004, the United States granted the Ashraf detainees “protected persons” status under the
4th Geneva Convention. However, that designation ended in June 2004 when Iraq formally
reassumed full sovereignty from a U.S.-led occupation authority. The U.S.-led, U.N. supported
security mandate in Iraq was replaced on January 1, 2009, by a bilateral U.S.-Iraq agreement that
limits U.S. flexibility in Iraq, and Iraq assumed full authority over Ashraf.
The group has long feared that Iraqi control of the camp would lead to the expulsion of the group
to Iran. The Iraqi government tried to calm those fears in January 2009 by saying that it would
adhere to all international obligations not to do so, but that trust was reduced on July 28, 2009,
when Iraq used force to overcome resident resistance to setting up a police post in the camp.
Eleven residents of the camp were killed.
The PMOI’s fears for Ashraf residents heightened as of July 1, 2010, when the Iraqi Security
Forces assumed full physical control over Ashraf. That transfer occurred and the U.S. military
post near the camp closed, although U.S. forces in Iraq continued to periodically visit the camp to
monitor conditions and mentor Iraqi forces there. On April 2, 2011, with a U.S. military unit
overseeing the rotation, the Iraqi government changed the Iraq Security Forces (ISF) brigade that
guards Ashraf, triggering PMOI warnings that the troops might move against Ashraf residents.
According to a timeline prepared by PMOI supporters in Washington, DC, the U.S. unit departed
on April 7. Clashes between the Iraqi force and camp residents took place on April 8; U.N. High
Commissioner for Human Rights Navanethem Pillay largely confirmed PMOI claims that 35
Ashraf residents were killed and that Iraqi forces were at fault. The State Department issued a
statement attributing the deaths to the actions of Iraq and its military, although noting that the
U.S. government may not have had complete facts about what transpired.9 After the clash, Iraqi
officials reiterated its commitment to close Ashraf at the end of 2011 (following a full U.S.
withdrawal from Iraq), but said such closing would be done in co-operation with the United
Nations and other international organizations. On May 16, 2011, the United States offered to help
relocate camp residents before Iraq closes it and, in early July 2011, U.S. Ambassador to Iraq Jim
Jeffrey called on the Ashraf residents to disband and seek refugee status elsewhere in Iraq as part
of a solution. The U.N. High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) has declared the residents
“asylum seekers” and is seeking to assess each resident in an effort to resettle them elsewhere, but
9 http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2011/04/160404.htm
Congressional Research Service
19
Iran: U.S. Concerns and Policy Responses
the group says the Iraqi government is demanding the residents leave the Camp and has called on
the international community to press Iraq to postpone its deadline to close it. Echoing that call is
the top U.N. envoy in Iraq, Martin Kobler, who has offered to mediate between the Ashraf
residents and the Iraqi government to find a solution to the issue. On September 26, 2011, the EU
named Belgian diplomat Jean De Ruyt as an adviser to EU foreign policy chief Catherine Ashton
on the Camp Ashraf issue.
From the U.S. standpoint, the issue clouds its withdrawal from Iraq at the end of 2011. In
November 2011, the Administration appointed Ambassador Daniel Fried as a coordinator to try to
resolve the Ashraf issue. He testified on December 7, 2011, before the Subcommittee on
Oversight and Investigations of the House Foreign Affairs Committee that the United States is
pressing the Iraqi government for a humane, peaceful resolution of the Ashraf issue, while also
blaming the Ashraf leadership for refusing any relocation plan other than en masse relocation
outside Iraq as refugees. U.S. officials say that adequate food, fuel, and medical supplies are
reaching camp residents. However, supporters of the group continue to challenge that assertion.10
In the aftermath of the April 8 clashes, H.Res. 231 was introduced, calling on the President to
undertake “all necessary and appropriate steps” to ensure the safety and protection of the Ashraf
residents. It has 18 co-sponsors as of June 28, 2011. Another bill, H.Res. 332, introduced June 24,
2011, calls for a congressional investigation of the incident; it has 9 co-sponsors thus far.
Pro-Monarchy Radical Groups
One issue that has arisen in 2010 is that a pro-monarchist armed group in Iran, called Tondar
(Thunder)/Kingdom Assembly of Iran is accused of conducting attacks inside Iran. One attack, a
bombing of a mosque in Shiraz that took place in April 2008, killed 14 Iranian worshippers,
including some children. There are some allegations that Iranians living in California are
directing the group’s activities in Iran.
Ethnic or Religiously Based Armed Groups
Some armed groups are operating in Iran’s border areas, and are generally composed of ethnic or
religious minorities. These groups are not known to be cooperating with the mostly Persian
members of the Green Movement. One such group is Jundullah, composed of Sunni Muslims
primarily from the Baluchistan region bordering Pakistan. On the grounds that the group has
attacked civilians in the course of violent attacks in Iran, Jundallah was formally placed on the
U.S. of Foreign Terrorist Organizations on November 4, 2010. Some saw the designation as an
overture toward the Iranian government, while others saw it as a sign that the United States does
not support ethnic or sectarian opposition groups that use violence, but only groups that are
committed to peaceful protest.
As noted in the State Department terrorism report for 2010, released August 18, 2011, since mid-
2006, it has conducted several successful attacks on Iranian security and civilian officials. One of
its most widely noted terrorist attacks was a May 2009 bombing of a mosque in Zahedan, which it
claimed constituted revenge for the poor treatment of Sunnis in Iran. On October 18, 2009, it
claimed responsibility for killing five Revolutionary Guard commanders during a meeting they
10 Author conversations with supporters of the PMOI in Washington, DC, February-April, 2011.
Congressional Research Service
20
Iran: U.S. Concerns and Policy Responses
were holding with local groups in Sistan va Baluchistan Province. The regime claimed a major
victory against the group in late February 2010 by announcing the capture of Jundullah’s top
leader, Abdolmalek Rigi. The regime executed him in June 2010, and the group retaliated in July
2010 with another major bombing in Zahedan, which killed 28 persons, including some
Revolutionary Guards. Secretary of State Clinton publicly condemned this bombing. The group is
believed responsible for a December 15, 2010, bombing at a mosque in Chahbahar, also in the
Baluchistan region, that killed 38 persons.
An armed Kurdish group operating out of Iraq is the Free Life Party, known by its acronym
PJAK. Its leader is believed to be Abdul Rahman Hajji Ahmadi, born in 1941, who is a citizen of
Germany and lives in that country. Many PJAK members are said to be women, who support the
organization’s dedication to women’s rights. PJAK was designated by the Treasury Department in
early February 2009 as a terrorism supporting entity under Executive Order 13224, although the
designation statement indicated the decision was based mainly on PJAK’s association with the
Turkish Kurdish opposition group Kongra Gel, also known as the PKK. The five Kurds executed
by Iran’s regime in May 2010 were alleged members of PJAK.
In June 2010, Iran conducted some shelling of reputed PJAK bases inside Iraq, reportedly killing
some Kurdish civilians. It repeated that activity in July 2011. On September 26, 2011, Turkey’s
Prime Minister Erdogan said that Iran and Turkey are planning joint operations against the Iraq-
based hideouts of these Kurdish opposition groups.
Another militant group, the Ahwazi Arabs, operates in the largely Arab inhabited areas of
southwest Iran, bordering Iraq. Its activity level appears to have been scant over the past few
years.
Other Human Rights Practices
International criticism of Iran’s human rights practices predates and transcends the crackdown
against the Green Movement. Table 3, which discusses the regime’s record on a number of
human rights issues, is based largely on the latest State Department human rights report (for
2010: April 8, 2011)11 and State Department International Religious Freedom report (for July-
December 2010: September 13, 2011). These reports cite Iran for a wide range of serious abuses,
including unjust executions (312 for 2010, according to the State Department human rights
report), politically motivated abductions by security forces, torture, arbitrary arrest and detention,
and arrests of women’s rights activists. The State Department human rights report for 2010
contains detail on a substantial number of specific cases of dissident arrests, torture, or execution,
many of them student activists; some of them are discussed in Table 1. On February 17, 2011, the
Senate adopted S.Res. 73 (unanimous consent) “express[ing] strong support for the people of Iran
in their peaceful calls for a representative and responsive democratic government that respects
[human] rights.”
11 Text is at http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2010/nea/154461.htm.
Congressional Research Service
21
Iran: U.S. Concerns and Policy Responses
Criticism of Iran’s Record in U.N. Bodies
The post-election crackdown on the Green Movement was a focus of the U.N. four-year review of
Iran’s human rights record that took place in mid-February 2010 in Geneva. Despite the criticism,
on April 29, 2010, Iran acceded to the U.N. Commission on the Status of Women, after earlier
dropping its attempt to win a seat on the higher-profile U.N. General Assembly Human Rights
Council. Still, on June 10, 2010, Iran was formally questioned by the U.N. Human Rights Council
about its record. On November 19, 2010, by a vote of 74-48, with 59 countries abstaining, the
General Assembly’s “Third Committee” expressed “deep concern” about Iran’s forms of
punishments and other abuses.
Special U.N. Rapporteur Reestablished
On February 28, 2011, in remarks at the U.N. Human Rights Council in Geneva, Secretary
Clinton said the United States is working with Sweden and other countries to reconstitute a
Special Rapporteur to report on Iranian human rights abuses. Such a mission existed during the
from 1988-2002, but Iran tended to offer little, if any, cooperation with the various Rapporteurs
who investigated the issue during that time. On March 24, 2011, the U.N. Human Rights Council
voted, 22 to 7, to reestablish a Special Rapporteur for Iran’s human rights situation. On June 17,
2011, former Maldives Foreign Minister Ahmad Shaheed was appointed to this role, but Iran has
not, to date, indicated whether it would provide requested cooperation such as permitting him to
conduct fact-finding visits to Iran. The Rapporteur issued his first report on September 23, 2011
(U.N. Document Number A/66/374: “The Situation of Human Rights in the Islamic Republic of
Iran”), citing many of the same abuses as do the State Department reports mentioned above. On
November 21, 2011, the U.N. General Assembly’s Third Committee, by a vote of 86-32, with 59
abstentions, approved a resolution asserting that Iran must cooperate with the efforts of the
Special Rapporteur to assess the human rights situation in Iran. The full Assembly is expected to
vote on the resolution later in December 2011.
Table 3. Human Rights Practices: General Categories
Group/Issue
Regime Practice/Recent Developments
Ethnic and
Persians are about 51% of the population, and Azeris (a Turkic people) are about 24%. Kurds
Religious
are about 7% of the population, and about 3% are Arab. Of religions, Shiite Muslims are about
Breakdown
90% of the Muslim population and Sunnis are about 10%. About 2% of the population is non-
Muslim, including Christians, Zoroastrians (an ancient religion in what is now Iran), Jewish,
and Baha’i.
Media Freedoms
Even before the 2009 unrest, Iran’s Ministry of Culture and Islamic Guidance had an active
program of blocking pro-reform websites and blogs, and had closed hundreds of reformist
newspapers, although many have tended to reopen under new names. The State Department
human rights report discusses numerous journalists, bloggers, and editors that have been
arrested, along with the news organizations they worked for. The report discusses censorship
and monitoring of the Internet.
Labor
Independent unions are technical y legal but not al owed in practice. The sole authorized
Restrictions
national labor organization is a state-controlled “Workers’ House” umbrella.
Women
Women can vote and run in parliamentary and municipal elections. Iranian women can drive,
and many work outside the home, including owning their own businesses. Nine women are in
the Majles. Regime enforces requirement that women be covered in public, generally with a
garment called a chador. Women do not have inheritance rights equal to that of men, and
their court testimony carries half the weight of a male. In March 2007, the regime arrested 31
women activists who were protesting the arrest in 2006 of several other women’s rights
Congressional Research Service
22
Iran: U.S. Concerns and Policy Responses
Group/Issue
Regime Practice/Recent Developments
activists; all but 3 of the 31 were released by March 9. In May 2006, the Majles passed a bill
calling for increased public awareness of Islamic dress; the bill did not contain a requirement
that members of Iran’s minority groups wear badges or distinctive clothing.
Religious
Each year since 1999, the State Department religious freedom report has named Iran as a
Freedom
“Country of Particular Concern” under the International Religious Freedom Act (IRFA). No
sanctions have been added under IRFA, on the grounds that Iran is already subject to
extensive U.S. sanctions. Continued deterioration in religious freedom noted in the
International Religious Freedom report for the second half of 2010, which stated that
“Government rhetoric and actions created a threatening atmosphere for nearly all non-Shia
religious groups, most notably for Bahais, as well as Sufi Muslims, evangelical Christians, Jews,
and Shia groups that do not share the government's official religious views.”
In late September 2011, a Protestant pastor who was born a Muslim, Youcef Nadarkhani, was
sentenced to death for refusing to recant his Christian faith. White House, State Department,
and many human rights groups have cal ed for an overturning of the sentence.
Baha’is
Iran repeatedly cited for repression of the Baha’i community, which Iran’s Shiite Muslim clergy
views as a heretical sect. It numbers about 300,000-350,000. At least 30 Baha’is remain
imprisoned. Several were sentenced to death in February 2010. Seven Baha’i leaders were
sentenced to 20 years in August 2010; their sentences were reduced in September 2010 to
10 years but the full sentence was restored on appeal. In the 1990s, several Baha’is were
executed for apostasy (Bahman Samandari in 1992; Musa Talibi in 1996; and Ruhol ah Ruhani
in 1998). Another, Dhabihullah Mahrami, was in custody since 1995 and died of unknown
causes in prison in December 2005. Virtually every year, congressional resolutions have
condemned Iran’s treatment of the Baha’is.
Jews
Along with Christians, a “recognized minority,” with one seat in the Majles, the 30,000-
member Jewish community (the largest in the Middle East aside from Israel) enjoys somewhat
more freedoms than Jewish communities in several other Muslim states. However, in practice
the freedom of Iranian Jews to practice their religion is limited, and Iranian Jews remain
reluctant to speak out for fear of reprisals. During 1993-1998, Iran executed five Jews
allegedly spying for Israel. In June 1999, Iran arrested 13 Jews (mostly teachers, shopkeepers,
and butchers) from the Shiraz area that it said were part of an “espionage ring” for Israel.
After an April-June 2000 trial, 10 of the Jews and 2 Muslim accomplices were convicted (July
1, 2000), receiving sentences ranging from 4 to 13 years. An appeals panel reduced the
sentences, and al were released by April 2003. On November 17, 2008, Iran hanged
businessman Ali Ashtari (a Muslim), who was arrested in 2006, for allegedly providing
information on Iran’s nuclear program to Israel.
Kurds/Other
The cited reports note other discrimination against Sufis and Sunni Muslims, although abuses
Sunni Muslims
against Sunnis could reflect that minority ethnicities, including Kurds, are mostly Sunnis. No
reserved seats for Sunnis in the Majles but several are usual y elected in their own right. Five
Kurdish oppositionists executed in May 2010 and more in January 2011.
Human
The June 27, 2011 (latest), State Department “Trafficking in Persons” report continued to
Trafficking
place Iran in Tier 3 (worst level) for failing to take significant action to prevent trafficking in
persons. Among many different examples of activity in the report, Iranian women and girls are
trafficked for sexual exploitation to other countries, sometimes with the active involvement
of Iranian religious leaders and immigration officials.
Executions Policy Human rights groups say executions have increased sharply since the dispute over the June
2009 election. The State Department human rights report says there were 312 executions in
2010, and 135 during January 1-May 11, 2011. Iran executed six persons under the age of 18
in 2008, the only country to do so. As a party to the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights and the Convention on the Rights of the Child, Iran is obligated to cease them.
In a trend that sparked alarm from U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights Navi Pillay,
during January 2011, Iran reportedly executed 66 persons, including some for al eged
participation in anti-regime activities.
Stonings
In 2002, the head of Iran’s judiciary issued a ban on stoning. However, Iranian officials later
called that directive “advisory” and could be ignored by individual judges. On December 2,
Congressional Research Service
23
Iran: U.S. Concerns and Policy Responses
Group/Issue
Regime Practice/Recent Developments
2008, Iran confirmed the stoning deaths of two men in Mashhad who were convicted of
adultery. A sentence of stoning against a 45-year-old woman (Sakineh Ashtiani) convicted of
adultery and assisting in the murder of her husband was set aside for further review in July
2010. An Iranian parliamentarian said on January 17, 2011, the stoning sentence was dropped
but she would serve 10 years in prison.
Azeris
Azeris are one-quarter of the population, but they complain of ethnic and linguistic
discrimination. In 2008, there were several arrests of Azeri students and cultural activists who
were pressing for their right to celebrate their culture and history.
Arrests of Dual
An Iranian American journalist, Roxanna Saberi, was arrested in January 2009 allegedly
Nationals and
because her press credentials had expired; was charged on April 9, 2009, with espionage for
Foreign
possessing an Iranian military document. Sentenced to eight years in jail, she was released on
Nationals/Robert
appeal on May 12, 2009, and left Iran. Another dual national, Esha Momeni, arrested in
Levinson/ the
October 2008, is unable to leave Iran.
American Hikers
U.S. national, former FBI agent Robert Levinson, remains missing after a visit in 2005 to Kish
Island, although the State Department announced on March 3, 2011, that it had received
evidence he is alive and being held somewhere in “Southwest Asia.” In December 2011, his
family released a one-year old taped statement by him and appealed for help in obtaining his
release, although Iran said it does not know where he is.
Hikers. Three American hikers were arrested in August 2009 after crossing into Iran, possibly
mistakenly, from a hike in northern Iraq. The mothers visited the hikers during May 20-21,
2010, but left Iran with their children still incarcerated. On September 15, 2010, after Sara
Shourd reported possible health issues, she was released on $500,000 bail, and her departure
was brokered by Oman. Her fiancé, Shane Bauer, and Josh Fattal, remained incarcerated and
were to go on trial beginning November 5, 2010, but postponed until February 6, 2011, and
then again until a final hearing on August 3. On August 7, 2011, they were sentenced to eight
years incarceration. On September 21, 2011, on the eve of Ahmadinejad’s address to the
U.N. General Assembly, the two were released on $500,000 bail each, a sum reportedly paid
by Oman, which played a key role in brokering their exit.
An ailing 72-year-old Iranian American, Reza Taghavi, was incarcerated since May 2008, but
was released in October 2010 when the regime judged him not a threat to Iranian security.
While on a visit to Iran, he delivered a small amount of funds from an Iranian American to this
person’s relative in Iran who, unbeknownst to Taghavi, was part of the Tondar group.
Sources: Most recent State Department reports on human rights (April 8, 2011), trafficking in persons (June 27,
2011), and on religious freedom (September 13, 2011). http://www.state.gov.; U.N. Special Rapporteur report
dated September 23, 2011 (U.N. document no. A/66/374).
Iran’s Strategic Capabilities and Weapons of Mass
Destruction Programs
The Obama Administration views Iran as one of the key national security challenges facing the
United States.12 This assessment, made clear repeatedly by senior U.S. officials, is based largely
on Iran’s weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programs and its ability to exert influence in the
region counter to U.S. objectives.13 Many experts agree that Iran’s core national security goals are
to protect itself from foreign, primarily U.S., interference or attack, and to exert regional
12 A March 16, 2006, “National Security Strategy” document stated that the United States “may face no greater
challenge from a single country than from Iran.”
13 See http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss/2006/.
Congressional Research Service
24
Iran: U.S. Concerns and Policy Responses
influence that Iran believes is commensurate with its size and concept of nationhood. A nuclear
armed Iran, in the view of many experts, would be more assertive than it now is in supporting
countries and movements that oppose U.S. interests and allies because Iran would likely conclude
that the United States would hesitate to take military action against a nuclear power.
Conventional Military/Revolutionary Guard/Qods Force
Iran’s armed forces are extensive but they are widely considered relatively combat ineffective in a
head-on confrontation against a well-trained, sophisticated military such as that of the United
States or even a major regional power such as Turkey. Iran is believed to largely lack the
logistical ability to project power much beyond its borders. On September 28, 2011, a high
ranking Iranian naval official, Rear Admiral Habibollah Sayyari, said it would send naval ships
off the U.S. Atlantic coast, although Iran’s ability to implement that deployment effectively
enough to cause any U.S. concern was immediately questioned by most experts as well as White
House spokesperson Jay Carney.
Whether or not Iran’s claims about fielding naval forces close to the continental United States
prove accurate, Iranian forces are widely assessed as able to cause damage to U.S. forces and
allies in the Gulf region, although not necessarily to cripple them. The Iranian armed forces also
are sufficiently effective to deter or fend off conventional threats from Iran’s weaker neighbors
such as post-war Iraq, Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan, and Afghanistan. Iran’s armed forces have few
formal relationships with foreign militaries, but Iran and India have a “strategic dialogue” and
some Iranian naval officers reportedly have undergone some training in India. As noted above,
Iran and Turkey are implementing an agreement in April 2008 to jointly fight terrorism (Kurdish
opposition groups) along their border.
Most of Iran’s other military-to-military relationships, such as with Russia, Ukraine, Belarus,
North Korea, and a few others, generally center on Iranian arms purchases or upgrades (although
such activity is now banned by U.N. Resolution 1929 of June 2010). This assessment was
presented in the Defense Department’s mandated Unclassified Report on Military Power of Iran
released in April 2010.14
Iran’s armed forces are divided organizationally. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC,
known in Persian as the Pasdaran)15 controls the Basij (Mobilization of the Oppressed) volunteer
militia that enforces adherence to Islamic customs and has been the main instrument to repress
the postelection protests in Iran. The IRGC and the regular military report to a joint headquarters,
headed by Dr. Hassan Firuzabadi.
14 For text, see http://media.washingtontimes.com/media/docs/2010/Apr/20/Iran_Military_Report.pdf. The report is
required by Section 1245 of the National Defense Authorization Act for FY2010 (P.L. 111-84).
15 For a more extensive discussion of the IRGC, see Katzman, Kenneth. “The Warriors of Islam: Iran’s Revolutionary
Guard,” Westview Press, 1993.
Congressional Research Service
25
Iran: U.S. Concerns and Policy Responses
Table 4. Iran’s Conventional Military Arsenal
Surface-
Military
Air
Combat
Defense
Personnel Tanks
Missiles
Aircraft Ships
Budget
460,000+. Regular ground force is
1,800+
150+
330+
100+ (IRGC and
About
about 220,000, Revolutionary Guard (incl.
I-Hawk
(incl. 25 MiG-29
regular Navy)
2.8% of
Corps (IRGC) ground force is about 480 T-
plus some
and 30 Su-24).
(incl. 4 Corvette; 18
GDP
130,000. Remainder are regular and
72)
Stinger
Still dependent
IRGC-controlled
IRGC navy (18,000 and 20,000
on U.S. F-4’s, F-
Chinese-made
personnel respectively) and Air
5’s and F-14
Hudong, 40
Forces (52,000 regular Air Force
bought during
Boghammer) Also
personnel and 5,000 Guard Air
Shah’s era.
has 3 Kilo subs (reg.
Force personnel. ) About 12,000 air
Navy control ed)
defense.
Security Forces About 40,000-60,000 law enforcement forces on duty, with another 600,000 Basij
security/paramilitary forces available for combat or internal security missions.
Ship-launched cruise missiles. Iran is able to arm its patrol boats with Chinese-made C-802 cruise missiles. Iran
also has Chinese-supplied HY-2 Seerseekers emplaced along Iran’s coast.
Midget Subs. Iran has been long said to possess several small subs, possibly purchased assembled or in kit form from
North Korea. Iran claimed on November 29, 2007, to have produced a new smal sub equipped with sonar-evading
technology, and it claimed to deploy four Iranian-made “Ghadir class” subs to the Red Sea in June 2011.
Anti-aircraft missile systems. Russia delivered to Iran (January 2007) 30 anti-aircraft missile systems (Tor M1),
worth over $1 billion. In September 2006, Ukraine agreed to sell Iran the Kolchuga radar system that can improve
Iran’s detection of combat aircraft. In December 2007, Russia agreed to sell the highly capable S-300 (also known as
SA-20 “Gargoyle”) air defense system, which would greatly enhance Iran’s air defense capability. The value of the deal
is estimated at $800 million. The system is a ground-to-air missile whose sale to Iran would, according to most
experts, not technical y violate the provisions of U.N. Resolution 1929, because the system is not covered in the
“U.N. Registry on Conventional Arms. However, on September 22, 2010, Russian President Medvedev signed a
decree banning the supply of the system to Iran, asserting that its provision to Iran is banned by Resolution 1929. In
November, Iran claimed to have deployed its own version (Mersad) of the Russian S-200 air defense system. In
August 2011, Iran sued Russia at the International Counrt of Justice for non-delivery of the system.
Source: IISS Military Balance: 2010—Section on Middle East and North Africa, and various press reports; April
2010 DOD report on “Military Power of Iran,” cited earlier.
Congressional Research Service
26
Iran: U.S. Concerns and Policy Responses
Table 5. The Revolutionary Guard
The IRGC is generally loyal to Iran’s hardliners politically and is clearly more politically influential than is Iran’s regular
military, which is numerically larger, but was held over from the Shah’s era. IRGC influence has grown sharply as the
regime has relied on it to suppress dissent to the point where Secretary of State Clinton sees it as wielding
preponderant influence. As described in a 2009 Rand Corporation study,“ Founded by a decree from Ayatol ah
Khomeini shortly after the victory of the 1978-1979 Islamic Revolution, Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps
(IRGC) has evolved well beyond its original foundations as an ideological guard for the nascent revolutionary regime.
Today the IRGC functions as an expansive socio-political-economic conglomerate whose influence extends into
virtual y every corner of Iranian political life and society. Bound together by the shared experience of war and the
socialization of military service, the Pasdaran have articulated a populist, authoritarian, and assertive vision for the
Islamic Republic of Iran that they maintain is a more faithful reflection of the revolution’s early ideals. The IRGC’s
presence is particularly powerful in Iran’s highly factionalized political system, in which [many senior figures] hail from
the ranks of the IRGC. Outside the political realm, the IRGC oversees a robust apparatus of media resources,
training activities, education programs designed to bolster loyalty to the regime, prepare the citizenry for homeland
defense, and burnish its own institutional credibility vis-à-vis other factional actors.”
Through its Qods (Jerusalem) Force, the IRGC has a foreign policy role in exerting influence throughout the region
by supporting pro-Iranian movements, as discussed further below. The Qods Force numbers approximately 10,000-
15,000 personnel who provide advice, support, and arrange weapons deliveries to pro-Iranian factions in Lebanon,
Iraq, Persian Gulf states, Gaza/West Bank, Afghanistan, and Central Asia. It also operates a worldwide intelligence
network to give Iran possible terrorist option and to assist in procurement of WMD-related technology. The Qods
Force commander, Brigadier General Qassem Soleimani, is said to have his own independent channel to Supreme
Leader Khamene’i, bypassing the IRGC and Joint Staff command structure. The Qods Force commander during 1988-
1995 was Brigadier General Ahmad Vahidi, confirmed as defense minister on September 3, 2009. He led the Qods
Force when it allegedly assisted two bombings of Israeli and Jewish targets in Buenos Aires (he is wanted by Interpol
for a role in the 1994 bombing there); recruited Saudi Hezbol ah activists later accused of the June 1996 Khobar
Towers bombing; and assassinated Iranian dissident leaders in Europe in the early 1990s.
IRGC leadership developments are significant because of the political influence of the IRGC. On September 2, 2007,
Khamene’i named Mohammad Ali Jafari as commander in chief of the Guard; Jafari is considered a hardliner against
political dissent and increasingly at odds with Ahmadinejad in the context of the Ahmadinejad-Khamene’ power
struggle. The Basij reports to the IRGC commander in chief; its leadership was changed in October 2009, to Brigadier
General Mohammad Reza Naqdi (replacing Hossein Taeb). It operates from thousands of positions in Iran’s
institutions. Command reshuffles in July 2008 integrated the Basij more closely with provincially based IRGC units;
furthered the view that the Basij is playing a more active role in internal security. In November 2009, the regime gave
the IRGC’s intelligence units greater authority, perhaps surpassing those of the Ministry of Intelligence, in monitoring
dissent. The IRGC Navy has responsibility to patrol the entire Persian Gulf, and the regular Navy is patrolling the
Strait of Hormuz.
As noted, the IRGC is also increasingly involved in Iran’s economy, acting through a network of contracting
businesses it has set up, most notably Ghorb (also cal ed Khatem ol-Anbiya, Persian for “Seal of the Prophet”). Active
duty IRGC senior commanders reportedly serve on Ghorb’s board of directors and its commander, Rostam
Ghasemi, became Oil Minister in August 2011. In September 2009, the Guard bought a 50% stake in Iran
Telecommunication Company at a cost of $7.8 billion. In the past five years, Guard affiliated firms have won 750 oil
and gas and construction contracts, and the Guard has its own civilian port facilities. However, questions arose about
the IRGC firms’ capabilities in July 2010 when Ghorb pulled out of a contract to develop part of the large South Pars
gas field, citing the impact of expanded U.S. and international sanctions (which might have caused foreign partner
firms to refuse to cooperate with Ghorb).
On October 21, 2007, the Treasury Department designated several IRGC companies as proliferation entities under
Executive Order 13382. Also that day, the IRGC as a whole, the Ministry of Defense, several IRGC commanders, and
several Iranian banks were sanctioned under that same executive order. Simultaneously, the Qods Force was named
as a terrorism supporting entity under Executive Order 13224. These orders freeze the U.S.-based assets and
prevent U.S. transactions with the named entities, but these entities are believed to have virtual y no U.S.-based
assets. On June 9, 2011, the IRGC and Basij were named as human rights abusers under Executive Order 13553.
Sources: Frederic Wehrey et al. “The Rise of the Pasdaran.” Rand Corporation. 2009. Katzman, Kenneth. “The
Warriors of Islam: Iran’s Revolutionary Guard.” Westview Press, 1993; Dept. of the Treasury.
Congressional Research Service
27
Iran: U.S. Concerns and Policy Responses
Nuclear Program and Related International Diplomacy
International attention to Iran’s nuclear program intensified in late 2002, when Iran confirmed
PMOI allegations that Iran was building two facilities that could potentially be used to produce
fissile material useful for a nuclear weapon: a uranium enrichment facility at Natanz and a heavy
water production plant at Arak,16considered ideal for the production of plutonium.
The United States and its partners state that they accept Iran’s right to pursue peaceful uses of
nuclear energy, but that Iran must verifiably demonstrate that its nuclear program is for only those
purposes.Iran is enriching uranium, but doing so could reflect many intentions, depending on the
level of enrichment. To construct an actual nuclear weapon, Iran would also have to develop a
capability to trigger a nuclear detonation of highly enriched (90%+) uranium.
Iran’s Nuclear Intentions and the November 8, 2011, IAEA Report17
As to Iran’s intentions, International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) reports indicate that Iran has
not satisfactorily addressed IAEA information that Iran might have a nuclear weapons program.18
Several past IAEA reports describe Iranian documents that show a possible involvement of Iran’s
military in the program. The IAEA report released September 2, 2011, said the IAEA is
“increasingly concerned” about the possible existence in Iran of past or undisclosed nuclear
related activities, including “activities related to the development of a nuclear payload for a
missile, about which the Agency continues to receive new information.” In a February 21, 2011,
interview with Lally Weymouth of the Washington Post, IAEA Director Yukia Amano stated, in
response to the assertion that Iranian leaders seem very determined to build a nuclear weapon, “I
have the same impression.”
The IAEA appeared to heighten U.S. and other concerns about Iran’s intentions in its report
released November 8, 2011. The report contained an extensive annex laying out the IAEA’s
information on Iran’s apparent efforts to acquire the knowledge required to weaponize highly
enriched uranium, and on some possible facilities Iran had constructed that could be used for such
an effort. The annex discussed the IAEA’s sources, purported foreign scientific assistance to the
experimentation, and Iran’s management structure for a weapons program. The Obama
Administration considered the report conclusive enough to suggest that additional sanctions be
imposed on Iran, but some observers said the report did not present substantially new or
conclusive information and should not be used to justify military or other action against Iran that
might cause Iran to end its cooperation with the IAEA entirely. On November 18, 2011, the IAEA
Board of Governors adopted a resolution expressing “deep and increasing concern” about Iran’s
nuclear program. The vote was 32 – 2 against (Cuba, Ecuador) and 1 abstention (Indonesia).
16 In November 2006, the IAEA, at U.S. urging, declined to provide technical assistance to the Arak facility on the
grounds that it was likely for proliferation purposes.
17 Text of the report is at http://isis-online.org/uploads/isis-reports/documents/IAEA_Iran_8Nov2011.pdf.
18 http://www.isis-online.org/uploads/isis-reports/documents/Iran_report-nov23.pdf.;
http://lewis.armscontrolwonk.com/files/2011/02/gov2011-7.pdf.
Congressional Research Service
28
Iran: U.S. Concerns and Policy Responses
Iran’s Position and Counter-Arguments
Even after the release of the November 8, 2011, IAEA report, Iranian leaders continued to deny
they are trying to achieve a nuclear weapons capability. They accuse the IAEA of basing its
findings on forged or erroneous information, and asserted that the report demonstrated little more
than that some of its scientists may have experimented with nuclear weapons calculations on their
computers. They assert that Iran’s nuclear program is for electricity generation, given finite oil
and gas resources, and that enrichment is its “right” as a party to the 1968 Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty.19 An analysis was published by the National Academy of Sciences
challenging the U.S. view that Iran is petroleum rich and therefore has no need for a nuclear
power program. According to the analysis, the relative lack of investment could cause Iran to
have negligible exports of oil by 2015.20 U.S. officials have said that Iran’s gas resources make
nuclear energy unnecessary. Iran professes that WMD is inconsistent with its ideology and says
that its leaders, including the late Ayatollah Khomeini, have issued formal pronouncements
(fatwas) that nuclear weapons are un-Islamic.
Iran’s assertions of a purely peaceful program have been met with widespread skepticism, not
only because of the activities discussed above but also because Iran’s governing factions appear
to perceive a nuclear weapons capability as a means of ending Iran’s perceived historic
vulnerability to invasion and domination by great powers, and as a symbol of Iran as a major
nation. Others believe a nuclear weapon represents the instrument with which Iran intends to
intimidate its neighbors and dominate the Persian Gulf region. Still others believe regime leaders
see a nuclear weapon as insurance that domestic or international opponents will end perceived
attempts to displace the Islamic regime. There are also fears Iran might transfer WMD to
extremist groups or countries as a means of extending its influence and ideology and positioning
itself to retaliate against any adversary.
Some Iranian strategists appear to agree with U.S. assertions that a nuclear weapon will not
deliver Iran absolute security, but will instead make Iran less secure. According to this view,
moving toward a nuclear weapons capability will bring Iran further sanctions, military
containment, U.S. attempted interference in Iran, and efforts by neighbors to develop
countervailing capabilities. Some Green Movement leaders, such as Musavi, have positions on
the nuclear issue similar to those of regime leaders, but several Green Movement factions see the
nuclear program as an impediment to eventual reintegration with the West and might be willing to
significantly limit the program.
Status of Enrichment and Time Frame Estimates
Sparking further concerns among several governments is the steady progress of Iran’s enrichment
program. The November 8, 2011, IAEA reports reiterated previous IAEA findings that Iran has
enriched enough uranium for at least two nuclear weapons (if enriched to 90%) as enrichment
continues. Most of Iran’s enrichment thus far has been primarily to less than 3.5% - 5%, which is
a level that would permit only civilian uses, but it has enriched a portion to the 20% level, which
is necessary for medical use but also shows Iran’s capability to enrich to ever higher levels. Of
19 For Iran’s arguments about its program, see Iranian paid advertisement “An Unnecessary Crisis—Setting the Record
Straight About Iran’s Nuclear Program,” in the New York Times, November 18, 2005. P. A11.
20 Stern, Roger. “The Iranian Petroleum Crisis and United States National Security,” Proceedings of the National
Academy of Sciences of the United States of America. December 26, 2006.
Congressional Research Service
29
Iran: U.S. Concerns and Policy Responses
concern to some experts, it announced on June 8, 2011, that it would triple production of the 20%
enriched uranium after it activates the heavily fortified Fordow site that Iran admitted in
September 2009 (after discovery by Western intelligence) that it had developed. In July 2011, Iran
notified the IAEA it intended to install its newer generation centrifuges (IR-2M and IR-4) at the
Fordow and the main Natanz enrichment site. Press reports in December 2011 say the Fordow
site may begin operating by early January 2012.
In late August 2011, the head of Iran’s atomic energy agency said Iran would produce more 20%
enriched uranium than it needs for the medical reactor, causing further concern among experts
about Iran’s intentions. As of the November 8 IAEA report, Iran had produced about 160 pounds
of 20% enriched uranium. The IAEA reports, including the one released on November 8, 2011,
continue to maintain that there is no evidence that Iran has diverted any nuclear material (for a
nuclear weapons program). The February 25, 2011, IAEA report has annexes listing Iran’s
declared nuclear sites as well as a summary of all the NPT obligations Iran is not meeting.21
Estimates differ as to when Iran might achieve a nuclear weapons capability if there were a
decision to pursue that course: a decision that, according to public statements from the
intelligence community, has not necessarily been made. DNI testimony on February 10, 2011
(annual worldwide threat briefing), stated that “Iran has the scientific, technical, and industrial
capacity to … produce[] enough highly enriched uranium for a weapon in the next few years, if it
chooses to.” These statements took into account technical difficulties, possibly caused by Western
activities and international sanctions, as well as reported covert action (discussed further below),
that might have delayed a nuclear-armed Iran. National Security Adviser Donilon stated in his
Brookings Institution speech on November 22, 2011, that sanctions and other difficulties “have
succeeded in slowing [Iran’s] nuclear program.” Among these “difficulties” is the effect of a
deliberate computer virus (Stuxnet) in September-October 2010 that appeared to target Iranian
nuclear facility computers by altering their spin rate, causing Iran to take about 1,000 centrifuges
out of service,22 although the May 24, 2011, IAEA report indicates Iran had largely overcome the
effects of Stuxnet. Because most of the information presented in the November 8, 2011, IAEA
report was apparently known to the United States and its partners, the report does not necessarily
alter U.S. or other conclusions of the possible time frame for a nuclear-armed Iran, if that is Iran’s
intent.
Bushehr Reactor
U.S. officials have generally been less concerned with Russia’s work, under a January 1995
contract, on an $800 million nuclear power plant at Bushehr. Russia insisted that Iran sign an
agreement under which Russia would reprocess the plant’s spent nuclear material; that agreement
was signed on February 28, 2005. The plant was expected to become operational in 2007, but
Russia had insisted that Iran first comply with the U.N. resolutions discussed below. Some tests
of the plant began in February 2009, but Russia appeared to delay opening it to pressure Iran on
the broader nuclear issue. The plant was inaugurated on August 21, 2010, and fueling was
completed by October 25, 2010. It was scheduled to be operational as of late January 2011, but
the February 25, 2011, IAEA report said Iran has to unload the fuel from the reactor core due to a
reported problem with a cooling pump. It began limited operations on May 8, 2011, and was
21 IAEA report of February 25, 2011. http://lewis.armscontrolwonk.com/files/2011/02/gov2011-7.pdf
22 For information on Stuxnet and its origins and effects, see Broad William, John Markoff and David Sanger. “Israeli
Test on Worm Called Crucial in Iran Nuclear Delay.” New York Times, January 15, 2011.
Congressional Research Service
30
Iran: U.S. Concerns and Policy Responses
linked to Iran’s power grid in September 2011. As part of this work, Russia trained 1,500 Iranian
nuclear engineers.
The International Response and Policies
The international response to Iran’s nuclear program has evolved into a growing global consensus
to apply substantial pressure on Iran—coupled with incentives and diplomacy—to limit its
program. The U.S. and international position is that an Iranian nuclear weapon would reinforce
Iran’s efforts to work against U.S. policy and could stimulate a nuclear weapons race in a volatile
region.
Diplomatic Efforts in 2003 and 2004/Paris Agreement
In 2003, France, Britain, and Germany (the “EU-3”) opened a separate diplomatic track to curb
Iran’s program. On October 21, 2003, Iran pledged, in return for peaceful nuclear technology, to
(1) fully disclose its past nuclear activities, (2) sign and ratify the “Additional Protocol” to the
NPT (allowing for enhanced inspections), and (3) suspend uranium enrichment activities. Iran
signed the Additional Protocol on December 18, 2003, although the Majles has not ratified it. Iran
discontinued abiding by the Protocol after the IAEA reports of November 10, 2003, and February
24, 2004, stated that Iran had violated its NPT reporting obligations over an 18-year period.
In the face of the U.S. threat to push for Security Council action, the EU-3 and Iran reached a
more specific November 14, 2004, “Paris Agreement,” committing Iran to suspend uranium
enrichment (which it did as of November 22, 2004) in exchange for renewed trade talks and other
aid.23 The Bush Administration did not openly support the track until March 11, 2005, when it
announced it would drop U.S. objections to Iran applying to join the World Trade Organization (it
applied in May 2005) and to selling civilian aircraft parts to Iran. The Bush Administration did
not participate directly in the talks.
Reference to the Security Council
The Paris Agreement broke down just after Ahmadinejad’s election; Iran rejected as insufficient
an EU-3 offer to assist Iran with peaceful uses of nuclear energy and provide limited security
guarantees in exchange for Iran’s (1) permanently ending uranium enrichment; (2) dismantling
the Arak heavy-water reactor;24 (3) no-notice nuclear inspections; and (4) a pledge not to leave
the NPT (it has a legal exit clause). On August 8, 2005, Iran broke the IAEA seals and began
uranium “conversion” (one step before enrichment) at its Esfahan facility. On September 24,
2005, the IAEA Board declared Iran in non-compliance with the NPT and decided to refer the
issue to the Security Council,25 but no time frame was set for the referral. After Iran resumed
23 For text of the agreement, see http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/Focus/IaeaIran/eu_iran14112004.shtml. EU-3-Iran
negotiations on a permanent nuclear pact began on December 13, 2004, and related talks on a trade and cooperation
accord (TCA) began in January 2005.
24 In November 2006, the IAEA, at U.S. urging, declined to provide technical assistance to the Arak facility.
25 Voting in favor: United States, Australia, Britain, France, Germany, Canada, Argentina, Belgium, Ghana, Ecuador,
Hungary, Italy, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Sweden, Slovakia, Japan, Peru, Singapore, South Korea, India. Against:
Venezuela. Abstaining: Pakistan, Algeria, Yemen, Brazil, China, Mexico, Nigeria, Russia, South Africa, Sri Lanka,
Tunisia, and Vietnam.
Congressional Research Service
31
Iran: U.S. Concerns and Policy Responses
enrichment activities, on February 4, 2006, the IAEA board voted 27-326 to refer the case to the
Security Council. On March 29, 2006, the Council agreed on a presidency “statement” setting a
30-day time limit (April 28, 2006) for ceasing enrichment.27
Establishment of “P5+1” Contact Group/June 2006 Incentive Package
Taking a multilateral approach, the George W. Bush Administration offered on May 31, 2006, to
join the nuclear talks with Iran if Iran first suspends its uranium enrichment. Such talks would
center on a package of incentives and possible sanctions—formally agreed on June 1, 2006—by a
newly formed group of nations, the so-called “Permanent Five Plus 1” (P5+1: United States,
Russia, China, France, Britain, and Germany). EU representative Javier Solana formally
presented the P5+1 offer to Iran on June 6, 2006. (The package is Annex I to Resolution 1747.)
Incentives:
• Negotiations on an EU-Iran trade agreements and acceptance of Iran into the
World Trade Organization.
• Easing of U.S. sanctions to permit sales to Iran of commercial aircraft/parts.
• Sale to Iran of a light-water nuclear reactor and guarantees of nuclear fuel
(including a five-year buffer stock of fuel), and possible sales of light-water
research reactors for medicine and agriculture applications.
• An “energy partnership” between Iran and the EU, including help for Iran to
modernize its oil and gas sector and to build export pipelines.
• Support for a regional security forum for the Persian Gulf, and support for the
objective of a WMD free zone for the Middle East.
• The possibility of eventually allowing Iran to resume uranium enrichment if it
complies with all outstanding IAEA requirements.
Sanctions:28
• Denial of visas for Iranians involved in Iran’s nuclear program and for high-
ranking Iranian officials.
• A freeze of assets of Iranian officials and institutions; a freeze of Iran’s assets
abroad; and a ban on some financial transactions.
• A ban on sales of advanced technology and of arms to Iran; and a ban on sales to
Iran of gasoline and other refined oil products.
• An end to support for Iran’s application to the WTO.
26 Voting no: Cuba, Syria, Venezuela. Abstaining: Algeria, Belarus, Indonesia, Libya, South Africa.
27 See http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N06/290/88/PDF/N0629088.pdf?OpenElement.
28 One source purports to have obtained the contents of the package from ABC News: http://www.basicint.org/pubs/
Notes/BN060609.htm.
Congressional Research Service
32
Iran: U.S. Concerns and Policy Responses
First Set of U.N. Security Council Resolutions Adopted
Iran did not immediately respond to the offer. In response, the U.N. Security Council began its
efforts, still ongoing, to impose sanctions on Iran in an effort to shift Iran’s calculations toward
compromise.
• Resolution 1696. On July 31, 2006, the Security Council voted 14-1 (Qatar
voting no) for U.N. Security Council Resolution 1696, giving Iran until August
31, 2006, to fulfill the long-standing IAEA nuclear demands (enrichment
suspension, etc.). Purportedly in deference to Russia and China, it was passed
under Article 40 of the U.N. Charter, which makes compliance mandatory, but
not under Article 41, which refers to economic sanctions, or Article 42, which
would authorize military action. It called on U.N. member states not to sell Iran
WMD-useful technology. On August 22, 2006, Iran responded, but Iran did not
offer enrichment suspension, instead offering vague proposals of engagement
with the West.
• Resolution 1737. With the backing of the P5+1, chief EU negotiator Javier
Solana negotiated with Iran to try arrange a temporary enrichment suspension,
but talks ended on September 28, 2006, without agreement. The Security Council
adopted U.N. Security Council Resolution 1737 unanimously on December 23,
2006, under Chapter 7, Article 41 of the U.N. Charter. It prohibits sale to Iran—
or financing of such sale—of technology that could contribute to Iran’s uranium
enrichment or heavy-water reprocessing activities. It also required U.N. member
states to freeze the financial assets of 10 named Iranian nuclear and missile firms
and 12 persons related to those programs. It called on—but did not mandate—
member states not to permit travel by these persons. In deference to Russia, the
Resolution did not apply to the Bushehr reactor.
• Resolution 1747. Resolution 1737 demanded enrichment suspension by February
21, 2007. With no Iranian compliance, on March 24, 2007, after only three weeks
of P5+1 negotiations, Resolution 1747 was adopted unanimously, which
demanded Iran suspend enrichment by May 24, 2007, and:
• added 10 military/WMD-related entities, 3 Revolutionary Guard entities, 7
Revolutionary Guard commanders, 8 other persons, and Bank Sepah.
• banned arms transfers by Iran, a provision targeted at Iran’s alleged arms
supplies to Lebanese Hezbollah and to Shiite militias in Iraq.
• required all countries to report to the United Nations when sanctioned Iranian
persons travel to their territories.
• called for (but did not require) countries to avoid selling arms or dual use
items to Iran and for countries and international financial institutions to avoid
any new lending or grants to Iran. The Resolution specifically exempted
loans for humanitarian purposes, thereby not applying to World Bank loans.
• Iran did not comply with Resolution 1747, but, in August 2007, it agreed to
sign with the IAEA an agreement to clear up outstanding questions on past
nuclear activities by the end of 2007. On September 28, 2007, the P5+1
grouping—along with the EU itself—agreed to a joint statement pledging to
negotiate another sanctions resolution if there is no progress reported by the
Congressional Research Service
33
Iran: U.S. Concerns and Policy Responses
IAEA in implementing the August 2007 agreement or in negotiations with
EU representative Javier Solana. The IAEA and Solana indicated that Iran’s
responses fell short; Solana described a November 30, 2007, meeting with
Iranian negotiator Sayid Jallili as “disappointing.”
• Resolution 1803 and Additional Incentives for Iran. After several months of
negotiations, Resolution 1803 was adopted by a vote of 14-0 (Indonesia
abstaining) on March 3, 2008. It:
• banned virtually all sales of dual use items to Iran, citing equipment listed as
dual use in various proliferation conventions and documents;
• authorized, but did not require, inspections of shipments by Iran Air Cargo
and Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Line, if such shipments are suspected
of containing banned WMD-related goods;
• imposed a firm travel ban on five Iranians named in Annex II to the
Resolution and requires reports on travel by 13 other named individuals;
• called for, but did not impose, a prohibition on financial transactions with
Iran’s Bank Melli and Bank Saderat;
• added 12 entities to those sanctioned under Resolution 1737;
• stated the willingness of the P5+1 to consider additional incentives to resolve
the Iranian nuclear issue through negotiation “beyond those of June 2006.
• The Bush Administration agreed to expand the June 2006 incentive package at a
meeting in London on May 2, 2008, offering to add political cooperation and
enhanced energy cooperation for Iran. EU envoy Solana presented the package
(which included a signature by Secretary of State Rice) on June 14, 2008, but
Iran was non-committal. (The text of the enhanced incentive offer to Iran is
contained in an Annex to Resolution 1929.)
• Iran did not accept the enhanced package of incentives as a basis of further
discussion but, in July 2008, Iran indicated it might be ready to first accept a six
week “freeze for freeze:” the P5+1 would freeze further sanctions efforts and Iran
would freeze any expansion of uranium enrichment (though not suspend
outright). To try to take advantage of this opening, the Bush Administration sent
Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs William Burns to join Solana and
the other P5+1 representatives at a meeting in Geneva on July 19, 2008. Iran did
not accept the “freeze for freeze” by an extended deadline of August 2, 2008.
• Resolution 1835. As a result of the lack of progress, the P5+1 began discussing
another sanctions resolution. However, the August 2008 crisis between Russia
and Georgia contributed to Russia’s opposing new U.N. sanctions on Iran. In an
effort to demonstrate to Iran continued unity, the Council adopted Resolution
1835 (September 27, 2008), calling on Iran to comply with previous resolutions,
but restating a willingness to negotiate and imposing no new sanctions.
• The P5+1 met again in October and in November of 2008, but U.S. partner
officials were uncertain about what U.S. policy toward Iran might be under a new
U.S. Administration. No consensus on additional sanctions was reached.
Congressional Research Service
34
Iran: U.S. Concerns and Policy Responses
The International Response Under the Obama Administration
After President Obama was inaugurated, the P5+1 met in Germany (February 4, 2009), reportedly
focusing on the new Administration’s approach on Iran. The other members of the P5+1 sought to
incorporate the Administration’s commitment to direct U.S. engagement with Iran into the U.N.
sanctions and negotiating framework. The meeting recommitted to the “two track” strategy of
incentives and sanctions.29 At another P5+1 meeting in London on April 8, 2009, Under Secretary
Burns told the other members of the group that, henceforth, a U.S. diplomat would attend all of
the group’s meetings with Iran. Iran put off new meetings until after its Iranian June 12, 2009,
election.30 The P5+1 did not materially alter its approach because of the unrest in Iran that erupted
after that election, and a July 9, 2009, G-8 summit statement, which included Russian
concurrence, mentioned late September 2009 (G-20 summit on September 24) as a time by which
the P5+1 would expect Iran to attend new talks and offer constructive proposals, lest the P5+1
consider imposing “crippling sanctions” on Iran.
Sensing pressure, on September 1, 2009, Iran’s senior negotiator, Sayid Jallili, said Iran would
come to new talks. On September 9, 2009, Iran distributed its long-anticipated proposals to settle
the nuclear issue to P5+1 representatives in Iran (the Swiss ambassador represented the United
States).31 The Iranian proposals were criticized as vague, but the P5+1 considered it a sufficient
basis to meet with Iran in Geneva on October 1, 2009.
October 1, 2009, Agreement on Reprocessing Iran’s Enriched Uranium
In light of September 25, 2009, revelations about the previously unreported Iranian nuclear site,
little progress was expected at the meeting. However, the seven-hour session, in which U.S.
Under Secretary of State William Burns, representing the United States, also met privately with
Iranian negotiator Sayed Jallili, resulted in tentative agreements to (1) meet again later in
October; (2) allow the IAEA to inspect the newly revealed Iranian facility near Qom; and (3)
allow Russia and France, subject to technical talks to begin by mid-October, to reprocess 2,600
pounds (about 75% of Iran’s low-enriched uranium) for medical use. (The Qom facility was
inspected during October 25-29, 2009, as agreed.)
The technical talks were held October 19-21, 2009, at IAEA headquarters in Vienna, Austria, and
chaired on the U.S. side by Deputy Energy Secretary Daniel Poneman. A draft agreement was
approved by the P5+1 countries and the IAEA. Despite Ahmadinejad’s comments in early
February 2010 that he “did not have a problem” with the arrangement, political opposition from
hardliners inside Iran led Iran to refuse to finalize the concept. Instead, Iran floated counter-
proposals to ship its enriched uranium to France and Russia in increments, to ship the uranium to
Turkey, or to reprocess the uranium in Iran itself.
29 Dempsey, Judy. “U.S. Urged to Talk With Iran.” International Herald Tribune, February 5, 2009.
30 CRS conversations with European diplomats in July 2009.
31 “Cooperation for Peace, Justice, and Progress.” Text of Iranian proposals: http://enduringamerica.com/2009/09/11/
irans-nukes-full-text-of-irans-proposal-to-51-powers/.
Congressional Research Service
35
Iran: U.S. Concerns and Policy Responses
Iran-Brazil-Turkey Uranium Exchange Deal (“Tehran Declaration”)
All of Iran’s counter-proposals were deemed insufficiently specific or responsive to meet P5+1
demands. Iran also rebuffed a specific U.S. proposal in January 2010 to allow it to buy on the
open market isotopes for its medical reactor. However, as international discussions of new
sanctions accelerated in April 2010, Brazil and Turkey negotiated with Iran to revive the October
1, 2009, arrangement. On May 17, 2010, with the president of Brazil and prime minister of
Turkey in Tehran, the three signed an arrangement for Iran to send 2,600 pounds of uranium to
Turkey, which would be exchanged for medically useful reprocessed uranium along the lines
discussed in October 2009.32 As required by the agreement, Iran forwarded to the IAEA a formal
letter accepting the agreement terms. Even though some assert that the Obama Administration
quietly supported the Brazil-Turkey initiative, the Obama Administration did not accept the
Tehran Declaration, asserting that the amount of enriched uranium to be reprocessed does not
therefore preclude enrichment of enough uranium for a nuclear weapon and did not address Iran’s
enrichment to the 20% level.
Resolution 1929 and EU Follow-Up
On May 18, 2010, one day after the signing of the Tehran Declaration, Secretary of State Clinton
announced that the P5+1 had reached agreement on a new sanctions resolution. The resolution
reflects a compromise designed to attract support from Russia and China, which believe sanctions
might threaten their own interests in Iran, while also giving U.S. allies authority to take
substantial new measures against Iran. It largely met the insistence of Russia and China that new
sanctions not target Iran’s civilian economy or its population, although it does provide authority
for those countries that want to limit banking or other corporate relationships with Iran. During
the negotiations, China received U.S. briefings on the likely adverse implications for the oil
market if Iran’s nuclear program proceeds apace. China was also reportedly reassured that the
UAE and Saudi Arabia would compensate for Iran’s oil exports to China if Iran cut off supplies to
retaliate for China’s support for new sanctions.33 Simultaneously with Russian agreement on the
draft, several Russian entities, including the main state arms export agency Rosoboronexport,
were removed from U.S. lists of sanctioned entities. (See CRS Report RS20871, Iran Sanctions
for a table of entities under sanction.)
The main points of the draft, which was adopted on June 9, 2010 (Resolution 1929), by a vote of
12-2 (Turkey and Brazil) with one abstention (Lebanon) are the following.34
• It added 15 Iranian firms affiliated with the Revolutionary Guard firms to the list
of U.N.-sanctioned entities, although some of these firms are alternate names for
the Khatem ol-Anbiya (Seal of the Prophet) engineering firm under Guard
control. Twenty-two other Iranian entities, including the “First East Export
Bank,” and one individual, AEIO head Javad Rahiqi, were also added to the list.
32 Text of the pact is at http://www.cfr.org/publication/22140/.
33 Mackenzie, Kate. “Oil At the Heart of Latest Iranian Sanctions Efforts.” Financial Times, March 8, 2010.
34 Text of the resolution is at http://www.isis-online.org/uploads/isis-reports/documents/
Draft_resolution_on_Iran_annexes.pdf.
Congressional Research Service
36
Iran: U.S. Concerns and Policy Responses
• It made mandatory a ban on travel for Iranian persons named in it and in previous
resolutions—including those Iranians for whom there was a non-binding travel
ban in previous resolutions.
• It gave countries the authorization to inspect any shipments—and to dispose of
their cargo—if the shipments are suspected to carry contraband items. However,
inspections on the high seas are subject to concurrence by the country that owns
that ship. This provision is modeled after a similar provision imposed on North
Korea, which did cause that country to reverse some of its shipments.
• It prohibited countries from allowing Iran to invest in uranium mining and related
nuclear technologies, or nuclear-capable ballistic missile technology.
• It banned sales to Iran of most categories of heavy arms and requests restraint in
sales of light arms, but did not bar sales of missiles not on the “U.N. Registry of
Conventional Arms” (meaning that the delivery of the S-300 system, discussed
above, would not be banned).
• It required countries to insist that their companies refrain from doing business
with Iran if there is reason to believe that such business could further Iran’s
WMD programs.
• It requested, but does not mandate, that countries prohibit Iranian banks to open
in their countries, or for their banks to open in Iran, if doing so could contribute
to Iran’s WMD activities.
• The resolution set up a “panel of experts,” which the Obama Administration
announced on June 10, 2010, would be chaired by senior State Department
official Robert Einhorn. The panel, which has been named, has assessed the
effect of the U.N. resolutions and suggested ways of more effective
implementation.
Reported Covert Action
As international concern about Iran’s nuclear program has grown, there is increasing discussion
about a reported covert component to U.S. policy, and the policy of others, such as Israel, that are
striving to prevent a nuclear armed Iran. Examples include the Stuxnet virus, discussed above.
The killings of some Iranian scientists over the past few years remain unexplained and could have
been the result of foreign covert action. On December 5, 2011, a U.S. drone, the RQ-170 Sentinel,
went down in Iran; it reportedly was based in Afghanistan and may have been sent over Iran to
monitor Iran’s nuclear sites. Iran has refused a U.S. request to return the drone.
Most Recent Diplomatic Developments
President Obama and other senior officials noted that the intent of Resolution 1929 was to bring
Iran back to negotiations, and an annex to the resolution reinforced that point by presenting a
modified offer of incentives for Iran to rejoin the international community. After the passage of
the Resolution, EU foreign policy chief Ashton issued a letter to Iran inviting it to attend new
talks. Iran’s chief nuclear negotiator Seyed Jallili responded on July 6, 2010, by letter, saying that
Iran might welcome new talks in September 2010, although his letter indicated Iran might want to
raise issues beyond just the nuclear question. Iran subsequently took the position that any new
talks should take place with the “Vienna Group” (Russia, France, and the United States) that were
Congressional Research Service
37
Iran: U.S. Concerns and Policy Responses
the pivotal countries that would have implemented the October 1, 2009, agreement discussed
above. Iran also wanted Brazil and Turkey, the two countries that orchestrated the “Tehran
Declaration,” to attend any new meetings. EU foreign affairs chief Ashton (on October 14, 2010)
sent a new invitation to Iran for talks with the P5+1 (not the “Vienna Group”), and implying that
Iran could raise issues beyond the nuclear issue.
Iran accepted talks, and they were held during December 6-7, 2010, with the P5+1, in Geneva. By
all accounts, the meeting made little progress on core issues. The United States and Iran did not,
as they did in the October 2009 talks, hold direct bilateral talks during the two days of meetings.
Iran reportedly focused on a purported “double standard” that allow Israel to go unpunished for
its reputed nuclear weapons arsenal. Still, there was agreement to hold additional Iran-P5+1 talks
in Istanbul (January 21-22, 2011), which some thought might lead Iran to show more flexibility
because of Turkey’s stated willingness to take Iran’s viewpoints into account.
The Istanbul talks, by all accounts, made virtually no progress and reportedly nearly broke down
after the first full day as Iran demanded lifting of international sanctions as a precondition to
substantive discussions. No date for new talks was announced. (In advance of the talks, Iran
invited major powers, but not the United States, to tour some of its nuclear facilities in January
2011, but most turned down the offer on the grounds that any assessments need be done by
qualified IAEA inspectors, not diplomats. A few countries accepted, including those friendly or
neutral toward Iran such as Egypt, Cuba, Syria, Algeria, Venezuela, Oman, and the Arab League.)
Suggesting that the Administration seeks to keep diplomacy as an active option, Secretary Clinton
testified before the House Foreign Affairs Committee on March 1, 2011, that the United States
might agree to a settlement that allowed Iran to continue enriching uranium in Iran, if Iran
resolved all outstanding questions about its program and if the enrichment were under
supervision. A P5+1 statement of March 9, 2011, affirmed the lack of progress at Istanbul, but
also said “the door remains open.”35 Iranian chief negotiator Jalilli sent a letter to Ms. Ashton on
May 8, 2011, but she stated publicly on May 11, 2011, that that the letter “does not contain
anything new and does not appear to justify another meeting.”
Reflecting the U.S. view, National Security Adviser Tom Donilon said on July 3, 2011, that the
United States remains open to further talks but remains focused on continued pressure on Iran.
Some indications that talks may revive followed Iran-Russia talks during August 15-16, 2011,
when Iran praised as a “basis to start negotiations” Russia’s proposals for a stepwise exchange of
the lifting of international sanctions for Iran’s giving up some nuclear activities. A State
Department spokeswoman, Victoria Nuland, confirmed that U.S. diplomats had worked with
Russian counterparts to develop the proposal. Further movement was apparent in connection with
the U.N. General Assembly meetings in New York in mid-late September; in interviews with
journalists before and during his stay in New York, Ahmadinejad indicated that Iran might give
up enrichment to the 20% level in return for guaranteed outside supplies of that fuel. In an
interview with CNN broadcast on October 23, 2011, Ahmadinejad indicated Iran’s willingness in
principle to engage in new talks. Although those statements can be viewed as conciliatory and a
potential basis for further discussion, no new P5+1-Iran talks were announced.
The diplomatic climate changed again after the release of the November 8, 2011, IAEA report.
That report which, as noted, casts doubt on Iran’s assertions of its purely peaceful nuclear
35 http://vienna.usmission.gov/110309p51.html.
Congressional Research Service
38
Iran: U.S. Concerns and Policy Responses
program, stimulated a U.S. call for additional pressure in the form of sanctions. National Security
Adviser Donilon made clear in a speech on November 22, 2011, at the Brookings Institution that
the United States remains focused on pressuring Iran, although it keeps the door to diplomacy
open. The diplomatic option faded on November 21 2011 when the United States, Britain, and
Canada took additional steps to shut Iran out of the international banking system. Iran’s isolation
increased on November 29, 2011, with the ransacking of the British Embassy in Tehran with the
apparent support of the Basij militia, an action which led to the closure of the Iranian and British
embassies in Tehran and London, respectively.
Table 6. Summary of Provisions of U.N. Resolutions on Iran Nuclear Program
(1737, 1747, 1803, and 1929)
Requires Iran to suspend uranium enrichment.
Prohibits transfer to Iran of nuclear, missile, and dual use items, except for use in light-water reactors.
Prohibits Iran from exporting arms or WMD-useful technology.
Prohibits Iran from investing abroad in uranium mining, related nuclear technologies or nuclear capable ballistic missile
technology.
Freezes the assets of over 80 named Iranian persons and entities, including Bank Sepah, and several corporate
affiliates of the Revolutionary Guard.
Requires that countries ban the travel of over 40 named Iranians.
Mandates that countries not export major combat systems to Iran.
Calls for “vigilance” (a non-binding call to cut off business) with respect to all Iranian banks, particularly Bank Melli and
Bank Saderat.
Calls for vigilance (voluntary restraint) with respect to providing international lending to Iran and providing trade
credits and other financing and financial interactions.
Cal s on countries to inspect cargoes carried by Iran Air Cargo and Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines—or by any
ships in national or international waters—if there are indications they carry cargo banned for carriage to Iran.
Searches in international waters would require concurrence of the country where the ship is registered.
A Sanctions Committee, composed of the fifteen members of the Security Council, monitors implementation of all
Iran sanctions and collects and disseminates information on Iranian violations and other entities involved in banned
activities. A “panel of experts” is empowered to make recommendations for improved enforcement.
Chemical Weapons, Biological Weapons, and Missiles
Official U.S. reports and testimony state that Iran maintains the capability to produce chemical
warfare (CW) agents and “probably” has the capability to produce some biological warfare agents
for offensive purposes, if it made the decision to do so.36 This raises questions about Iran’s
compliance with its obligations under the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), which Iran
signed on January 13, 1993, and ratified on June 8, 1997.
36 Deputy Director of National Intelligence for Analysis. “Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of
Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions, Covering 1 January to
31 December 2010. March 2011.
Congressional Research Service
39
Iran: U.S. Concerns and Policy Responses
Ballistic Missiles/Warheads
The Administration view is that Iran’s growing inventory of ballistic missiles and its acquisition
of indigenous production of anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCMs) provide capabilities to enhance its
power projection. Tehran views its conventionally armed missiles as an integral part of its
strategy to deter—and if necessary retaliate against—forces in the region, including U.S. forces.
However, Iran’s technical capabilities are a matter of some debate among experts, and Iran
appears to have focused on missiles capable of hitting regional targets rather than those of
intercontinental range. Still, there are concerns that Iran might seek to develop warheads that
could carry a nuclear payload, and the November 8, 2011, IAEA report discusses a “Project 111”
conducted during 2002-2003 that could have had that intent. Table 7 contains some details on
Iran’s missile programs.37 A U.N. experts panel reported in May 2011 that might be getting
ballistic missile technology from North Korea, in violation of U.S. sanctions against Iran
(discussed above).
On November 12, 2011, an unexplained explosion at a ballistic missile base 25 miles from Tehran
killed 17 IRGC missile force officers, including commander Hassan Tehrani Moghaddam. He
reportedly has been instrumental in developing Iran’s missile force and his death might represent
a setback to the program. Iran said the explosion was accidental, caused during a movement of
munitions at the base. However, the death of Moqhaddam in the blast raised suspicions among
many in and outside Iran that the blast was caused by sabotage, possibly by an outside power or
possibly by a domestic opposition group. The base was almost completely destroyed, according
to commercial satellite photos posted on various websites.
In August 2008, the George W. Bush Administration reached agreements with Poland and the
Czech Republic to establish a missile defense system to counter Iranian ballistic missiles. These
agreements were reached over Russia’s opposition, which was based on the belief that the missile
defense system would be used to neutralize Russian capabilities. However, reportedly based on
assessments of Iran’s focus on missiles of regional range, on September 17, 2009, the Obama
Administration reoriented this missile defense program to focus, at least initially, on ship-based
systems, possibly later returning to the idea of Poland- and Czech-based systems. Some saw this
as an effort to win Russia’s support for additional sanctions on Iran, although President
Medvedev expressed continued Russian disagreement with the plan during an Asia Pacific
summit meeting in Hawaii in mid-November 2011.
As far as implementation, in February 2010, Romania’s top defense policy body approved a U.S.
plan to base missile interceptors there. At the November 19-20, 2010, NATO meeting in Lisbon,
NATO adopted the concept of a missile defense system, and to work with Russia to conceive a
system that Russia could support, but the summit did not specifically name Iran as a threat the
system is intended to address.
37 Annual Threat Assessment of the Intelligence for the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Dennis C. Blair,
Director of National Intelligence, February 2, 2010.
Congressional Research Service
40
Iran: U.S. Concerns and Policy Responses
Table 7. Iran’s Ballistic Missile Arsenal
Shahab-3
800-mile range. The Defense Department report of April 2010, cited earlier, has the missile as
(“Meteor”)
“deployed.” Stil , several of its tests (July 1998, July 2000, and September 2000) reportedly were
unsuccessful or partially successful, and U.S. experts say the missile is not completely reliable. Iran
tested several of the missiles on September 28, 2009, in advance of the October 1 meeting with
the P5+1.
Shahab-3
1,200-1,500-mile range. The April 2010 Defense Department report has the liquid fueled Shahab-3
“Variant” /Sijjil
“variant” as “possibly deployed” The solid fuel version, called the Sijil, is considered “not”
deployed by the Defense Department. The Sijil is alternately called the “Ashoura.” These missiles
potential y put large portions of the Near East and Southeastern Europe in range, including U.S.
bases in Turkey. A U.N. experts panel reported in May 2011 that Iran tested the missile in
October 2010 although the launch was “reported by a [U.N.] Member state,” and not announced
publicly. In concert with the beginning of 10-day “Great Prophet Six “military exercises, on June
28, 2011, Iran unveiled undeground missile silos and undertook some missile tests.
BM-25
1,500-mile range. On April 27, 2006, Israel’s military intelligence chief said that Iran had received a
shipment of North Korean-supplied BM-25 missiles. Missile said to be capable of carrying nuclear
warheads. The Washington Times appeared to corroborate this reporting in a July 6, 2006, story,
which asserted that the North Korean-supplied missile is based on a Soviet-era “SS-N-6” missile.
Press accounts in December 2010 indicate that Iran may have received components but not the
entire BM-25 missile from North Korea.
ICBM
U.S. officials believe Iran might be capable of developing an intercontinental ballistic missile (3,000
mile range) by 2015, a time frame reiterated by the April 2010 DOD report.
Other
On September 6, 2002, Iran said it successfully tested a 200 mile range “Fateh 110” missile (solid
Missiles
propel ant), and Iran said in late September 2002 that it had begun production. Iran also possesses
a few hundred short-range ballistic missiles, including the Shahab-1 (Scud-b), the Shahab-2 (Scud-
C), and the Tondar-69 (CSS-8). In January 2009, Iran claimed to have tested a new air-to-air missile.
On March 7, 2010, Iran claimed it was now producing short-range cruise missiles that it claimed
are highly accurate and can destroy heavy targets. This could be the same as a short range ballistic
missile named the Qiam, tested in August 2010.
Space
In February 2008 Iran claimed to have launched a probe into space, suggesting its missile
Vehicle
technology might be improving to the point where an Iranian ICBM is realistic. Following an
August 2008 failure, in early February 2009, Iran successfully launched a small, low-earth satellite
on a Safir-2 rocket (range about 155 miles). The Pentagon said the launch was “clearly a concern
of ours” because “there are dual-use capabilities here which could be applied toward the
development of long-range missiles.” A larger space vehicle, Simorgh, was displayed in February
2010. Iran claimed to have launched a satellite into orbit on June 16, 2011.
Warheads
Wall Street Journal report of September 14, 2005, said that U.S. intelligence believes Iran is working
to adapt the Shahab-3 to deliver a nuclear warhead. Subsequent press reports say that U.S.
intelligence captured an Iranian computer in mid-2004 showing plans to construct a nuclear
warhead for the Shahab.38 The IAEA is seeking additional information from Iran.
Foreign Policy and Support for Terrorist Groups
Iran’s foreign policy is a product of the ideology of Iran’s Islamic revolution, blended with long-
standing national interests and what some describe as a near obsession about U.S. strategic power.
38 Broad, William and David Sanger. “Relying On Computer, U.S. Seeks to Prove Iran’s Nuclear Aims.” New York
Times, November 13, 2005.
Congressional Research Service
41
Iran: U.S. Concerns and Policy Responses
Some of Iran’s leaders, including Ahmadinejad, increasingly assert that Iran is a major regional
power whose interests must be taken into account. Others interpret Iran’s objectives as well
beyond defensive—as a vision of overturning of the power structure in the Middle East, which
Iran believes favors the United States, Israel, and their “collaborators”: Sunni Muslim regimes
such as Egypt, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia.
Because of Iran’s objectives, some experts saw Iran as a potential strategic beneficiary of the
uprisings that have toppled the leaders of Egypt, Tunisia, and Libya, and which have threatened
the grip on power of the Sunni Muslim rulers of Bahrain. Some evidence of Iran as beneficiary
could be provided by reports of a willingness of the new leaders of Egypt to end decades of
diplomatic estrangement with Iran, and their decision to allow two Iranian ships to transit the
Suez Canal shortly after the fall of President Mubarak.
In addition, according to some, Iran remains ascendant in the region because of the installation of
pro-Iranian regimes in Iraq and Afghanistan, and the continuing political strength of Hezbollah in
Lebanon and Hamas in Gaza. Iran might, according to this view, seek to press its advantage to
strengthen regional Shiite movements and possibly drive the United States out of the Gulf. Others
say Iran’s attendance at various regional summits on Afghanistan and on regional relations
demonstrates that Iran is far from isolated.
On the other hand, Iran itself has become threatened by the unrest in its key Middle Eastern ally,
Syria, on which Iran depends for its ability to intervene in the Arab-Israeli dispute. As a sign of
that nervousness, on August 31, 2011, Supreme Leader Khamene’i warned that the United States
and Israel might take advantage of or benefit from the various uprisings. Some accounts say that
the Administration decided to militarily support the uprising in Libya in part to signal support for
pro-democracy protesters in Iran, and to demonstrate potential consequences to Iran if it uses
force against protesters.
Although Iran’s foreign policy is broad and complex, some focus on its support of movements
that are considered terrorist by the United States. The State Department report on international
terrorism for 2010 released August 18, 2011, again stated (as it has for more than a decade) that
Iran “remained the most active state sponsor of terrorism” in 2010, and it again attributed the
terrorist activity primarily to the Qods Force of the Revolutionary Guard. On October 27, 2008,
the deputy commander of the Basij became the first top Guard leader to publicly acknowledge
that Iran supplies weapons to “liberation armies” in the region, a reference to pro-Iranian
movements discussed below. The appointment of Brigadier General Ahmad Vahidi, the former
Qods Forces commander, as defense minister in September 2009 caused concern in some
neighboring states. A congressionally mandated April 2010 Defense Department report on Iran,
cited earlier, contained substantial discussion of the role of the Qods Force in supporting the
movements and factions discussed below.
In the 1990s, Iran allegedly was involved in the assassination of several Iranian dissidents based
in Europe. In May 2010, France allowed the return to Iran of Vakili Rad, who had been convicted
in the 1991 stabbing of the Shah’s last prime minister, Shahpour Bakhtiar. Iran has not been
accused of dissident assassinations abroad in over a decade.
Alleged Plot to Assassinate the Saudi Ambassador
On October 11, 2011, in an alleged plot that the Administration called a “dangerous escalation”
by Iran, the U.S. Justice Department indicted an Iranian American, Mansour Arbabsiar, for
Congressional Research Service
42
Iran: U.S. Concerns and Policy Responses
allegedly trying to hire, at the behest of named Qods Force officers (Gholam Shakuri and his
superior and a purported Arbabsiar relative, Abdul Reza Shahlai), what he thought was a member
of the Los Zetas organization of Mexican drug dealers, to assassinate the Saudi Ambassador to
the United States (Adel al-Jubeir). The Justice Department complaint cited evidence of financial
transfers originating with the Qods Force, and Administration officials said that senior Qods and
Iranian civilian leaders appeared to have at least some knowledge of the plot, although there is
not firm evidence of that. Amid comments by some experts that, among other factors, Iran has not
typically used non-Muslim proxies such as Los Zetas in its terrorist plots, the Administration
informed the U.N. Secretary General of the alleged plot and subsequently briefed its evidence to
allied governments to support an argument for additional sanctions against Iran. Others noted that
Iran typically would not use figures like Arbabsiar, who was not himself a Qods Force officer and
was a 30-year resident of the United States, in a high level terrorist plot. Arbabsiar and four
named Qods Force officials were sanctioned under Executive Order 13224, and an Iranian airline,
Mahan Air, was sanctioned as well for allegedly helping the Qods Force move weapons and
materiel around the Middle East.
Table 8: Major Past Acts of Iran or Iran-Related Terrorism
Date
Incident/Event Likely/Claimed
Perpetrator
April 18, 1983
Truck bombing of U.S. Embassy in
Factions that eventually formed
Beirut, Lebanon. 63 dead, including 17
Lebanese Hezbol ah claimed
U.S. citizens.
responsibility.
October 23, 1983
Truck bombing of U.S. Marine barracks
Same as above
in Beirut. 241 Marines killed.
December 12, 1983
Bombings of U.S. and French embassies
Da’wa Party of Iraq - Iran-
in Kuwait City. 5 fatalities.
supported Iraqi Shiite militant
group. 17 Da’wa activists charged
and imprisoned in Kuwait
September 20, 1984
Truck bombing of U.S. embassy annex in Factions that eventually formed
Beirut. 23 killed.
Lebanese Hezbol ah
May 25, 1985
Bombing of Amir of Kuwait’s motorcade Da’wa Party of Iraq
June 14, 1985
Hijacking of TWA Flight 847. One
Lebanese Hezbol ah
fatality, Navy diver Robert Stetham
April 5, 1988
Hijacking of Kuwait Air passenger plane.
Lebanese Hezbol ah, seeking
Two kil ed.
release of 17 Da’wa prisoners in
Kuwait.
March 17, 1992
Bombing of Israeli Embassy in Buenos
Lebanese Hezbol ah, assisted by
Aires. 29 killed.
Iranian intelligence/diplomats.
July 18, 1994
Bombing of Argentine-Jewish Mutual
Same as above
Association (AMIA) building in Buenos
Aires.
June 25, 1996
Bombing of Khobar Towers housing
Saudi Hezbol ah, supported by
complex near Dhahran, Saudi Arabia. 19 Iran. Some assessments point to
U.S. Air Force personnel killed.
possible involvement of Al Qaeda
as well.
Source: CRS. Prepared with the assistance of Hussein Hassan, Knowledge Services Group
Congressional Research Service
43
Iran: U.S. Concerns and Policy Responses
Foreign Policy: Relations with the Persian Gulf States
The Persian Gulf monarchy states (Gulf Cooperation Council, GCC: Saudi Arabia, Kuwait,
Bahrain, Qatar, Oman, and the United Arab Emirates) are concerned about Iranian strategic
influence. They have not openly supported U.S. conflict with Iran that might cause Iran to
retaliate against Gulf state targets, although observers who meet with Gulf leaders say these
leaders believe the United States should move decisively to end Iran’s nuclear potential.
Reflecting that concern, the Gulf states are, for the most part, cooperating with U.S. containment
strategies discussed in the sections, below. That is evident from the large quantities of potential
arms sales to the Gulf states - possibly totaling more than $120 billion over the next several years
- that are in varying stages of implementation.
Still, outwardly, both diplomatic and commercial relations between the Gulf states and Iran are
relatively normal. Some Gulf state refiners, particularly in UAE and Bahrain, may still be selling
gasoline to Iran.
• Saudi Arabia. Iran and Saudi Arabia appear to represent opposite poles of
influence and interests in the region. Saudi Arabia sees itself as leader of the
Sunni Muslim world and views Shiite Muslims, including those in eastern Saudi
Arabia, as heretical and disloyal. Saudi alarm over Iranian influence infuses the
Saudi lack of support for the Iraqi government of Nuri al-Maliki, and is a major
factor in the military intervention by Saudi Arabia (joined by UAE) on behalf of
the Bahraini government in March 2011. The Saudis repeatedly raise past issues,
including blame of Iran for disruptive and sometimes violent demonstrations at
annual Hajj pilgrimages in Mecca in the 1980s and 1990s, and for supporting a
pro-Iranian movement in the Kingdom, Saudi Hezbollah, that the Saudis hold
responsible for the June 25, 1996, Khobar Towers bombing listed in the table
above.39 Still, after restoring relations in December 1991 (after a four-year
break), Saudi-Iran ties progressed to high-level contacts during Khatemi’s
presidency, including Khatemi visits in 1999 and 2002. Ahmadinejad has visited
on several occasions.
• United Arab Emirates (UAE) concerns about Iran never fully recovered from the
April 1992 Iranian expulsion of UAE security forces from the Persian Gulf island
of Abu Musa, which it and the UAE shared under a 1971 bilateral agreement. (In
1971, Iran, then ruled by the U.S.-backed Shah, seized two other islands, Greater
and Lesser Tunb, from the emirate of Ras al-Khaymah, as well as part of Abu
Musa from the emirate of Sharjah.) In general, the UAE (particularly the
federation capital, Abu Dhabi), backs U.S. efforts to dissuade Iran from
developing its nuclear capability through international sanctions. The UAE
reportedly has increased scrutiny of exports to Iran and Iranian banking activities
in the UAE since the passage of Resolution 1929 in June 2010, and it has frozen
the assets of Iranians subject to asset freezes under the U.N. resolutions. These
moves have slightly reduced the estimated $12 billion in Iran-UAE trade.
39 Walsh, Elsa. “Annals of Politics: Louis Freeh’s Last Case.” The New Yorker, May 14, 2001. The June 21, 2001,
federal grand jury indictments of 14 suspects (13 Saudis and a Lebanese citizen) in the Khobar bombing indicate that
Iranian agents may have been involved, but no indictments of any Iranians were announced. In June 2002, Saudi
Arabia reportedly sentenced some of the eleven Saudi suspects held there. The 9/11 Commission final report asserts
that Al Qaeda might have had some as yet undetermined involvement in the Khobar Towers attacks.
Congressional Research Service
44
Iran: U.S. Concerns and Policy Responses
Within the UAE, Abu Dhabi generally takes a harder line against Iran than does
the emirate of Dubai, which has an Iranian-origin resident community as large as
300,000 and business ties to Iran. This view could explain comments by the UAE
Ambassador to the United States on July 6, 2010, when, on a panel at the Aspen
Institute, Ambassador Yusuf Otaiba said, when asked about UAE support for
military action to try to halt Iran’s nuclear program, “We cannot live with a
nuclear Iran…. I am willing to absorb what takes place at the expense of the
security of the UAE.” On the islands dispute, the UAE seeks to refer the dispute
to the International Court of Justice (ICJ), but Iran insists on resolving the issue
bilaterally. (ICJ referral requires concurrence from both parties to a dispute.) The
UAE formally protested Iran’s setting up of a maritime and ship registration
office on Abu Musa in July 2008. The United States supports UAE proposals but
takes no formal position on sovereignty. Still seeking to avoid antagonizing Iran,
in May 2007 the UAE received Ahmadinejad (the highest-level Iranian visit since
the 1979 revolution) and allowed him to lead an anti-U.S. rally of several
hundred Iranian-origin residents of Dubai at a stadium there.
• Qatar, like most of the other Gulf states, does not seek confrontation and seeks to
accommodate some of its interests, yet Qatar remains wary that Iran might
eventually seek to encroach on its large North Field (natural gas). It shares that
field with Iran (called South Pars on Iran’s side) and Qatar earns large revenues
from natural gas exports from it. Qatar’s fears have been heightened by
occasional Iranian statements, such as one in April 2004, when Iran’s deputy oil
minister said that Qatar is probably producing more gas than “her right share”
from the field and that Iran “will not allow” its wealth to be used by others.
Possibly to try to ease such implied threats, Qatar invited Ahmadinejad to the
December 2007 GCC summit there.
• Bahrain is about 60% Shiite-inhabited, many of whom are of Persian origin, but
its government is dominated by the Sunni Muslim Al Khalifa family. In 1981 and
again in 1996, Bahrain publicly accused Iran of supporting Bahraini Shiite
dissidents in efforts to overthrow the ruling Al Khalifa family. These concerns
underlie the government response to the 2011 uprising against the Al Khalifa
regime by mostly Shiite demonstrators. In November 2011, an investigatory
commission concluded there is no evidence to indicate Iran instigated the
protests, although U.S. officials say there is evidence Iran is “trying to exploit the
situation in Bahrain,” by working with Shiite hardline groups that seek the
downfall of the regime. Earlier, tensions flared several times since July 2007,
when Iranian editorialists asserted that Bahrain is part of Iran—that question was
the subject of the 1970 U.N.-run referendum in which Bahrainis opted for
independence. The issued flared again after a February 20, 2009, statement by Ali
Akbar Nateq Nuri, an adviser to Khamene’i, that Bahrain was at one time an
Iranian province.
Still, Bahrain has sought not to antagonize Iran and has apparently allowed Iran’s
banks to establish a presence in Bahrain’s vibrant banking sector. On March 12,
2008, the Treasury Department sanctioned the Bahrain-based Future Bank under
Executive Order 13382 that sanctions proliferation entities. Future Bank
purportedly is controlled by Bank Melli, but it remains in operation.
• Oman. Of the GCC states, the Sultanate of Oman is closest politically to Iran and
has refused to ostracize Iran or directly criticize Iranian policies. During the
Congressional Research Service
45
Iran: U.S. Concerns and Policy Responses
Shah’s rule, Iran sent troops to help the Sultan suppress rebellion in the Dhofar
region. Sultan Qaboos made a state visit to Iran in August 2009, coinciding with
the inauguration of Ahmadinejad, and despite the substantial unrest inside Iran
over his reelection. As noted, Oman supplied the aircraft to fly U.S. hiker Sara
Shourd out of Iran in September 2010, and her companions who were releaed on
September 21, 2011, one year later, suggesting it played a brokering role in these
releases. Some press reports say local Omani officials routinely turn a blind eye
to or even cooperate in the smuggling of western goods to Iran.
• Kuwait has enjoyed generally good relations with Iran because it saw Iran as the
counterweight to Saddam Hussein, who invaded Kuwait in August 1990. Since
Saddam’s overthrow in 2003, Kuwait has become somewhat more distant from
Iran and, in May 2010, Kuwait confirmed that it had arrested some Kuwaiti civil
servants and stateless residents for allegedly working on behalf of the Qods
(Jerusalem) Force of the Revolutionary Guard Corps of Iran in a plot to blow up
Kuwaiti energy facilities.40 In March 2011, a Kuwait court sentenced two
Iranians and a Kuwaiti were sentenced to death in the alleged plot. In a related
development that month, Kuwait expelled three Iranian diplomats, and Iran
expelled three Kuwaiti diplomats in response. Iranian official visits to Kuwait in
May 2011 defused the issue, to some extent, but the suspicions flared again in
November 2011 when Iran arrested two persons its says are Kuwaiti spies. About
25% of Kuwaitis are Shiite Muslims, and Iran supported Shiite radical groups in
Kuwait in the 1980s as a means to try to pressure Kuwait not to support the Iraqi
war effort in the Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988). Some of the acts of Iran-supported
terrorism are listed in the table above. Kuwaiti refineries have ceased sales of
gasoline to Iran as of mid-2010, according to the State Department.
Iranian Policy in Iraq41
The U.S. military ousting of Saddam Hussein in 2003 appeared to benefit Iran strategically by
removing a long time nemesis of Iran and bringing to power a government led by Shiite Islamists
who have longstanding ties to Iran. These Iraqi leaders are sympathetic to some of Iran’s regional
goals, such as keeping in power Iran’s ally President Bashar al-Assad of Syria, and of eliminating
Iranian opposition groups, particularly the PMOI, from Iran’s borders. The Iraqi government first
formed in May 2006 has been led by Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki, the head of a Shiite Islamist
party called the Da’wa (Islamic Call) Party; he has made several visits to Iran during his tenure.
However, Maliki is also close to the United States, and, in late 2010, both the United States and
Iran supported an agreement among Iraqi factions for Maliki to continue as Prime Minister.
At the same time, the State Department terrorism report for 2010 says that Iran (particularly the
Qods Force) continues to support materially (funds, weapons, training, and guidance) Shiite
militia groups that act outside the formal political structure. These Shiite militias, such as Asa’ib
al-Haq (League of the Righteous), Promised Day Brigade, and Kata’ib Hezbollah (Hezbollah
Brigades) are, to varying degrees, loyal to or supportive of Iran’s key protégé in Iraq: Shiite cleric
and faction leader Moqtada Al Sadr. (Kata’ib Hezbollah, although with a strength of only 400
40 “Iran Spy Cell Dismantled in Kuwait.” Associated Press, May 6, 2010; “Iran Cell Planned Attacks in Kuwait,
Minister Says. Reuters, April 21, 2011.
41 This issue is covered in greater depth in CRS Report RS22323, Iran-Iraq Relations, by Kenneth Katzman.
Congressional Research Service
46
Iran: U.S. Concerns and Policy Responses
persons, according to the State Department 2010 report on terrorism, was designated an FTO in
July 2009.) Since returning to Iraq in January 2011, Al Sadr strongly opposed any U.S. military
presence in Iraq after the mandated withdrawal date of December 31, 2011, and has threatened to
allow militias loyal to him to rearm and to attack U.S. forces if U.S. forces remain in Iraq beyond
2011. That opposition apparently contributed to an Iraqi refusal to meet U.S. requirements that
any U.S. forces remaining in Iraq after 2011 continue to enjoy existing legal immunities, and
President Obama announced on October 21, 2011, that all U.S. forces would leave Iraq as
scheduled by the end of 2011. Addressing expert concerns that Iran would increase its influence
over an Iraq that is devoid of U.S. forces, Secretary of State Clinton and Secretary of Defense
Panetta indicated that the United States retains a large presence in the region and can continue to
engage Iraq extensively with diplomatic and military training and other programs that do not
require U.S. troops to be in Iraq. Still, in an October 23, 2011, interview with CNN, Ahmadinejad
said Iran might begin training Iraqi Security Forces after U.S. forces depart. Another possible sign
of Iranian intent to influence Iraq came in November 2011 with the relocation to the holy Iraqi
city of Najaf of an Iraqi senior cleric, longtime resident in Iran, Ayatollah Mahmoud Shahrudi.
However, other senior Iraqi clerics, such as Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, reportedly are
shunning him, suggesting they do not want additional Iranian religious influence in Najaf.
U.S. officials have gone to substantial lengths to back up their assertions about Iranian arming of
Iraqi Shiite militias. Since 2005, U.S. commanders in Iraq have asserted that the Qods
(Jerusalem) Force was providing highly lethal “explosively forced projectiles,” training,
guidance, and financing) to Shiite militias in Iraq. In late June and early July 2011, a spate of
reports quoting senior U.S. officials (including Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Mike Mullen and
Ambassador to Iraq Jeffrey) said there was recent, forensically confirmed evidence of Iranian
weapons deliveries to Shiite militias: weapons that in June 2011 caused more U.S. troop deaths in
Iraq (14 during the month) that at any time in the past two years. The shipments included more
advanced versions of rocket-propelled munitions and bombs and were fielded by Shiite militias
mostly in southern Iraq.
Defense Secretary Leon Panetta, on his first trip to Iraq in that capacity on July 11, 2011, vowed
that the United States would press the Iraqi government to combat the militias that are responsible
for the violence. Joint Iraqi-U.S. interdiction action reportedly was taken and U.S. commanders
say Shiite attacks on U.S. forces in southern Iraq have been reduced. There were no U.S. troop
deaths in Iraq at all in August 2011. However, suggesting that the threat is ongoing, on September
22, 2011, outgoing Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Mullen testified before the Senate Armed
Services Committee that Iran is supplying increasingly large rocket-propelled munitions
(Improvised Rocket Assisted Munitions, or IRAM’s) to Iraqi militias and that the United States
would not “sit idly by and watch” if Iranian supplied militias attack U.S. forces. This aspect of
Iranian policy might be of less concern as of January 1, 2012 because all U.S. forces will be out
of Iraq by then, although there are fears these groups could try a major attack on the U.S.
consulate in Basra, where several hundred U.S. personnel serve. The consulate reportedly has
been shelled a few times a week in recent months.
Supporting Palestinian Militant Groups
Iran’s support for Palestinian militant groups has long concerned U.S. administrations, as part of
an apparent effort by Tehran to obstruct an Israeli-Palestinian peace, which Iran believes would
strengthen the United States and Israel. Ahmadinejad’s various statements on Israel were
discussed above, and Supreme Leader Khamene’i has repeatedly called Israel a “cancerous
Congressional Research Service
47
Iran: U.S. Concerns and Policy Responses
tumor.” He used a similar term (“disease”) in an August 18, 2010, speech. In December 2001,
Rafsanjani, now considered a moderate, said that it would take only one Iranian nuclear bomb to
destroy Israel, whereas a similar strike against Iran by Israel would have far less impact because
Iran’s population is large. Iran has hosted numerous conferences to which anti-peace process
terrorist organizations were invited (for example: April 24, 2001, and June 2-3, 2002). The formal
position of the Iranian Foreign Ministry, considered a bastion of moderates, is that Iran would not
seek to block an Israeli-Palestinian settlement but that the process is too weighted toward Israel to
yield a fair result. Iran supports Palestinian efforts to obtain U.N. recognition of statehood.
Iran and Hamas
The State Department report on terrorism for 2010 (mentioned above) says that Hamas “receives
the majority of its funding, weapons, and training from Iran.” The report repeats previous year’s
reports assertions that Iran also provides funding, weapons, and training to Palestinian Islamic
Jihad (PIJ), the Al Aqsa Martyr’s Brigades, and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-
General Command (PFLP-GC). All are named as foreign terrorist organizations (FTO) by the
State Department for their use of violence to undermine the Arab-Israeli peace process. Some saw
Iran’s regional policy further strengthened by Hamas’s victory in the January 25, 2006,
Palestinian legislative elections, and even more so by Hamas’s June 2007 armed takeover of the
Gaza Strip. Hamas activists downplay Iranian influence asserting that Iran is mostly Shiite, while
Hamas members are Sunni Muslims.42
It was evident from the December 27, 2008-January 17, 2009, Israel-Hamas war in Gaza, that
Iran provides material support to Hamas. Then Joint Chiefs Chairman Admiral Mike Mullen said
on January 27, 2009, that the United States boarded but did not seize a ship carrying light arms to
Hamas from Iran; the ship (the Monchegorsk) later went to Cyprus. On March 11, 2009, a U.N.
committee monitoring Iran’s compliance with Resolution 1747, which bans Iranian arms exports,
said Iran might have violated that resolution with the alleged shipment. Hamas appeared to
corroborate allegations of Iranian weapons supplies when its exiled leader, Khaled Meshal, on
February 1, 2009, publicly praised Iran for helping Hamas achieve “victory” over Israel in the
conflict.43 Iran joined in regional criticism of Israel for its May 31, 2010, armed inspection of a
Turkish ship, carrying humanitarian goods, that attempted to evade Israel’s naval blockade of
Gaza. In March 2011, Israel intercepted a ship, the Victoria, off its coast, and seized a “large
quantity” of mortars and C-704 cruise missiles that Israel said were bound for Hamas in Gaza.
On the other hand, the 2011 Arab uprisings may be affecting Iran’s relationship with Hamas.
Hamas has been halting in its public support for a miltary-led crackdown against unrest by Syrian
President Bashar Al Assad, possibly because Hamas is a Sunni Muslim organization and most of
the Syria protesters are Sunni. Iran has supported Assad and, perhaps to prod Hamas to follow
suit, Iran reportedly suspended payments to Hamas as of July 2011. It is also possible that
international sanctions are reducing the funds Iran has available to support such groups.
42 CNN “Late Edition” interview with Hamas co-founder Mahmoud Zahar, January 29, 2006.
43 Hamas Leader Praises Iran’s Help in Gaza ‘Victory.’ CNN.com, February 1, 2009.
Congressional Research Service
48
Iran: U.S. Concerns and Policy Responses
Lebanese Hezbollah and Syria44
Iran has maintained a close relationship with Hezbollah since the group was formed in 1982, and
then officially unveiled in 1985, by Lebanese Shiite clerics of the pro-Iranian Lebanese Da’wa
Party. That aid has helped Hezbollah become a major force in Lebanon’s politics. Ahmadinejad
advertised Iran’s strong commitment to Hezbollah during his October 14-15, 2010, visit to
Lebanon, the first by a president of the Islamic Republic, which included his visiting villages near
the border with Israel. Ahmadinejad did not commit any direct acts of provocation, which some
feared, such as throwing stones across the Israeli border. Demonstrating Iran’s influence in
Lebanon, Lebanon’s then Prime Minister Saad Hariri visited Iran on November 27, 2010, for a
three-day visit. Hariri represents factions in Lebanon generally opposed to Hezbollah, and his
visit suggested a need to try to assuage Iran. Iran was perceived as a political beneficiary of
Hezbollah’s decision in January 2011 to withdraw from the Lebanese cabinet, which led to the
fall of the Hariri government and the formation of a government by Hezbollah-selectee Najib
Makati, a Sunni Muslim. (Under a long-standing agreed political formula in Lebanon, the prime
minister is a Sunni Muslim.)
Iran has long seen Hezbollah as an instrument to exert regional influence. Acts of terrorism by the
group and its antecedents are listed in the table above. Hezbollah’s attacks on Israeli forces in
southern Lebanon contributed to an Israeli withdrawal in May 2000, but Hezbollah maintained
military forces along the border. Hezbollah continued to remain armed and outside Lebanese
government control, despite U.N. Security Council Resolution 1559 (September 2, 2004) that
required its dismantlement. In refusing to disarm, Hezbollah says it was resisting Israeli
occupation of some Lebanese territory (Shib’a Farms).
Although Iran likely did not instigate Lebanese Hezbollah to provoke the July-August 2006 war,
Iran has long been its major arms supplier. Hezbollah fired Iranian-supplied rockets on Israel’s
northern towns during the fighting. Reported Iranian shipments to Hezbollah prior to the conflict
included the “Fajr” (dawn) and Khaybar series of rockets that were fired at the Israeli city of
Haifa (30 miles from the border), and over 10,000 Katyusha rockets that were fired at cities
within 20 miles of the Lebanese border.45 Iran also supplied Hezbollah with an unmanned aerial
vehicle (UAV), the Mirsad, which Hezbollah briefly flew over the Israel-Lebanon border on
November 7, 2004, and April 11, 2005; at least three were shot down by Israel during the conflict.
On July 14, 2006, Hezbollah apparently hit an Israeli warship with a C-802 sea-skimming missile
probably provided by Iran. Iran also purportedly provided advice during the conflict; about 50
Revolutionary Guards Qods Force personnel were in Lebanon (down from about 2,000 when
Hezbollah was formed, according to a Washington Post report of April 13, 2005) when the
conflict began; that number might have increased during the conflict to help Hezbollah operate
the Iran-supplied weaponry. Even though Hezbollah reduced its overt military presence in
southern Lebanon in accordance with the conflict-related U.N. Security Council Resolution 1701
(July 31, 2006), Hezbollah was perceived as a victor in the war for holding out against Israel.
44 For detail on Hezbollah, see CRS Report R41446, Hezbollah: Background and Issues for Congress, by Casey L.
Addis and Christopher M. Blanchard
45 “Israel’s Peres Says Iran Arming Hizbollah.” Reuters, February 4, 2002.
Congressional Research Service
49
Iran: U.S. Concerns and Policy Responses
Recent Arming and Funding
Since the 2006 conflict, Iran has resupplied Hezbollah with at least 25,000 new rockets and46
press reports in early 2010 said Hezbollah maintains a wide network of arms and missile caches
around Lebanon. Among the post-war deliveries were 500 Iranian-made “Zelzal” (Earthquake)
missiles with a range of 186 miles, enough to reach Tel Aviv from south Lebanon. In November
2009, Israel intercepted a ship that it asserted was carrying 500 tons of arms purportedly for
Hezbollah. Iran also made at least $150 million available for Hezbollah to distribute to Lebanese
citizens (mostly Shiite supporters of Hezbollah) whose homes were damaged in the Israeli
military campaign.47
As far as funding, the State Department terrorism report for 2008, released on April 30, 2009,
specified Iranian aid to Hezbollah as exceeding $200 million in 2008, and said that Iran trained
over 3,000 Hezbollah fighters in Iran during that year. The report for 2009 used similar figures for
Iranian aid and training for Hezbollah but over an unspecified time frame. The State Department
report for 2010, released August 18, 2011, said Iran “has provided hundreds of millions of dollars
in support of Hezbollah and has trained thousands of Hezbollah fighters at camps in Iran.” Some
experts believe Iranian support to Hezbollah has declined in 2011 as international sanctions have
taken a toll on Iran’s economy and supply of available hard currency.
Syria
Iran is one of Syria’s few strategic allies, and Iran fears that this alliance is likely to dissolve
outright if the pro-democracy movement in Syria (which is at its core Sunni Muslim) succeeds in
changing Syria’s regime. To try to prevent this outcome, Iran, which has trumpeted protests
elsewhere in the region as evidence of the success of its own revolution, has materially supported
the Syrian regime. On April 14, 2011, U.S. officials, commenting on background, reportedly said
that Iran is providing Syria with equipment to suppress crowds and to monitor and block protester
use of the Internet.48 U.S. officials told journalists in May 2011 that Iran was sending Qods Force
advisers to help Syria crush the unrest; on May 4, 2011, the Treasury Department designated the
Qods Force as an entity subject to a U.S. assets freeze for human rights abuses in Syria (under
Executive Order 13572). On May 18, 2011, the Treasury Department designated Mohsen Chizari,
a Qods Force officer, and Qods Force overall commander Qasem Soleimani under that order.
Other Iranians were sanctioned in late June under that order. In late August 2011, the European
Union sanctioned the Qods Force for assisting the Syrian crackdown. Prior to the unrest in Syria,
there was a widespread belief that the Iran-Syria alliance would not be severed unless and until
Syria and Israel reach a peace agreement that results in the return of the Golan Heights to Syria.
Iran’s relationship with Syria is key to Iran’s efforts to support Hezbollah. Syria is the transit
point for the Iranian weapons shipments to Hezbollah, and both countries see Hezbollah as
leverage against Israel to achieve their regional and territorial aims. In March 2011, Turkey
intercepted and removed weapons from an Iranian cargo plane bound for Syria. Turkey
impounded another such shipment consisting of several truckloads in late April. It is not known
whether Syria was the final destination for either of these cargoes. Referring to these shipments, a
46 Rotella, Sebastian. “In Lebanon, Hezbollah Arms Stockpile Bigger, Deadlier.” Los Angeles Times, May 4, 2008.
47 Shadid, Anthony. “Armed With Iran’s Millions, Fighters Turn to Rebuilding.” Washington Post, August 16, 2006.
48 Adam Entous and Matthew Rosenberg. “U.S. Says Iran Helps Crackdown in Syria.” Wall Street Journal, April 14,
2011.
Congressional Research Service
50
Iran: U.S. Concerns and Policy Responses
May 2011 report of the U.N. experts panel chartered under Security Council Resolution 1929
reportedly says that most documented cases of Iran’s exports of arms, in violation of Resolution
1747, involve weapons shipments to Syria.
At the same time, perhaps trying to preserve its influence should President Bashar Al Assad fall,
Iran has tried to encourage President Assad to take steps to calm the unrest through reforms.
Foreign Minister Salehi said on August 28, 2011, that Syria should recognize its people’s
“legitimate demands.” In September 2011, Ahmadinejad called on Assad to cease using force
against demonstrators and open dialogue on reforms.
In order to foster its links to Syria, Iran purportedly has acted as an intermediary with North
Korea to supply Syria with various forms of WMD and missile technology. In April 2010, the
Obama Administration called in Syria’s ambassador to ask about reports that Syria had
transferred Scud missiles to Hezbollah, although an Iranian connection to the purported transfer
remains unclear. However, in late June 2010, it was reported that Iran had sent Syria a
sophisticated air defense radar system that Syria could potentially use to thwart Israeli air
strikes.49 On December 13, 2009, the Syrian and Iranian defense ministers signed a defense
agreement to “face common enemies and challenges.” In March 2011, Iranian officials
commented that they might contribute to improving some Syrian port facilities or other
installations.
Central Asia and the Caspian
Iran’s policy in Central Asia has thus far emphasized Iran’s rights to Caspian Sea resources,
particularly against Azerbaijan. That country’s population, like Iran’s, is mostly Shiite Muslim,
but its leadership is secular. In addition, Azerbaijan is ethnically Turkic, and Iran fears that
Azerbaijan nationalists might stoke separatism among Iran’s large Azeri Turkic population, which
demonstrated some unrest in 2006. These factors could explain why Iran has generally tilted
toward Armenia, which is Christian, even though it has been at odds with Azerbaijan over
territory and control of ethnic Armenians. In July 2001, Iranian warships and combat aircraft
threatened a British Petroleum (BP) ship on contract to Azerbaijan out of an area of the Caspian
that Iran considers its own. The United States called that action provocative, and it is engaged in
border security and defense cooperation with Azerbaijan directed against Iran (and Russia). The
United States successfully backed construction of the Baku-Tblisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline, intended
in part to provide alternatives to Iranian oil.
Along with India and Pakistan, Iran has been given observer status at the Central Asian security
grouping called the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO—Russia, China, Kazakhstan,
Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan). In April 2008, Iran applied for full membership in the
organization, which opposes a long-term U.S. presence in Central Asia. However, illustrating the
degree to which the United States has been able to isolate Iran, in June 2010 the SCO denied
Iran’s bid by barring admission to countries under U.N. Security Council sanctions.
49 Levinson, Charles. “Iran Arms Syria With Radar.” Wall Street Journal, June 30, 2010.
Congressional Research Service
51
Iran: U.S. Concerns and Policy Responses
South Asia: Afghanistan, Pakistan, and India50
Iran looks to its eastern neighbors in South Asia as allies and potential allies to help parry U.S.
and European pressure on Iran’s economy and its leaders.
Afghanistan
In Afghanistan, as in Iraq, Iran is viewed by U.S. officials as pursuing a multi-track strategy—
attempting to help develop Afghanistan and enhance its influence there, while also building
leverage against the United States by arming anti-U.S. militant groups. Iran’s main goal appears
to be to restore some of its traditional sway in eastern, central, and northern Afghanistan, where
Persian-speaking Afghans predominate. Many Afghans, even those of Pashtun ethnicity, speak
Dari, a dialect of Persian language.
Iran has sought additional influence through supporting the government of President Hamid
Karzai, who is a Sunni Muslim and a Pashtun. Karzai has said publicly, most recently in
December 2011 (during a visit by Defense Secretary Panetta) that he does not want proxy
competition between the United States and Iran in Afghanistan. Partly as a signal of respect for
these Afghans, Karzai visited Iran for the celebration of Nowruz (Persian new year). He returned
to Kabul to receive President Obama on March 28, 2010. Karzai and Ahmadinejad have met
several times since, including at the summit of Persian-speaking nations in Tehran on August 5,
2010, and during a June 2011 tripartite meeting of leaders of Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iran.
Karzai admitted on October 26, 2010, that press reports were true that Iran has given Afghanistan
direct cash payments (about $2 million per year) to support its budget and to possibly drive a
wedge between Afghanistan and the United States. In addition, the two countries are said to be
cooperating effectively against narcotics trafficking from Afghanistan into Iran; Iranian border
forces take consistent heavy losses in operations to try to prevent this trafficking.
Because Iran has some influence in Afghanistan, some U.S. officials reportedly are arguing that
the United States should develop a bilateral dialogue on Afghanistan, to be conducted by their
respective ambassadors in Kabul. Iran may have signaled a willingness for such engagement
when it attended the October 18, 2010, meeting in Rome of the 44-nation “International Contact
Group” on Afghanistan. The United States did not object to the Iranian attendance at the meeting,
which included a briefing by General David Petraeus (then top U.S./NATO commander in
Afghanistan). Iran was represented by its Foreign Ministry director of Asian Affairs Mohammad
Ali Qanezadeh. Iran also attended the a Contact Group meeting on March 3, 2011, in Jeddah,
Saudi Arabia (at the headquarters of the Organization of Islamic Conference). Iran did not attend
the January 28, 2010, international meeting in Britain on Afghanistan, but it did attend a follow-
up meeting in Kabul on July 20, 2010. Iran attended the regional meeting on Afghanistan in
Istanbul on November 2, 2011, at which all regional countries pledged to support Afghan stability
and sovereignty. It also attended the major international Bonn Conference on Afghanistan on
December 5, 2011.
At the same time, Iran wants to be in position to threaten U.S. forces, and in particular the U.S.
use of the air base at Shindand, in Herat Province, which Iran believes could be used for
surveillance of or strikes on Iran. (The Administration is using FY2011 military construction
50 Substantially more detail on Iran’s activities in Afghanistan is contained in: CRS Report RL30588, Afghanistan:
Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy, by Kenneth Katzman.
Congressional Research Service
52
Iran: U.S. Concerns and Policy Responses
funds to improve that airbase.) The drone that went down in Iran in December 2011 was believed
to be based in Shindand. U.S. reports, including the State Department terrorism report for 2010,
continue to accuse the Qods Force of supplying various munitions, including 107 mm rockets, to
Taliban and other militants in Afghanistan, and of training Taliban fighters in small unit tactics,
small arms use, explosives, and indirect weapons fire. In February 2011, British forces captured a
shipment of 48 Iranian-made rockets in Afghanistan’s western province of Nimruz, allegedly
bound for Talibgan militants. Observers said the 122 mm rockets were the most powerful Iranian
weapons seized in Afghanistan to date. The State Department report for 2010 asserts Iran is
arming factions in Qandahar, which is a Pashtun-inhabited province in southern Afghanistan and
demonstrates that Iran is not only assisting militants near its borders. On the other hand, U.S.
commanders have consistently maintained that the Iranian assistance to Afghan militants is not
decisive on the battlefield.
Iran’s materiel support for Taliban elements may also give it leverage in any Taliban-government
political settlement in Afghanistan; Iran reportedly invited some Taliban members to an “Islamic
Awakening” conference in Tehran in mid-September 2011. The invitation was reportedly part of
an attempt to broker a meeting between the Taliban representatives and Afghan government
representatives attending the conference—the chief Afghan representative was the then head of
the Afghanistan High Peace Council overseeing the reconciliation process, former President
Burhanuddin Rabbani who was assassinated in Kabul after returning from the conference.
In August 2010, the Treasury Department sanctioned two Iranian Qods Force officers allegedly
involved in supplying funds and materiel to Afghan militants. They were sanctioned under
Executive Order 13224 for supporting international terrorism.
Iran may also seek to use economic weapons against the Afghan government to complicate the
U.S. mission. In January 2011, Iran halted about 2,500 trucks carrying gasoline to Afghanistan,
claiming the fuel was going to supply U.S. and NATO forces there. Afghanistan is dependent on
Iranian gasoline supplies and the halt caused fuel shortages in the west of Afghanistan and in
Kabul. Some interpreted the move as an Iranian attempt to identify additional fuel supplies should
protests erupt in Iran as a result of the reduction of gasoline subsidies there. After several months,
the shipments into Afghanistan returned to or near previous levels.
Pakistan
Iran’s relations with Pakistan have been partly a function of events in Afghanistan, although
relations have worsened somewhat in late 2009 as Iran has accused Pakistan of supporting Sunni
Muslim rebels in Iran’s Baluchistan region. These Sunni guerrillas have conducted a number of
attacks on Iranian regime targets in 2009, as discussed above (Jundullah).
Iran had a burgeoning military cooperation with Pakistan in the early 1990s, and it was revealed
in 2003 that the founder of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program, A. Q. Khan, sold Iran nuclear
technology and designs.51 However, Iran-Pakistan relations became strained in the 1990s when
Pakistan was supporting the Taliban in Afghanistan, which committed alleged atrocities against
Shiite Afghans (Hazara tribe), and which seized control of Persian-speaking areas of Afghanistan.
Currently, Iran remains suspicious that Pakistan might want to again implant Taliban and related
51 Lancaster, John and Kamran Khan.“Pakistanis Say Nuclear Scientists Aided Iran.” Washington Post, January 24,
2004. http://isis-online.org/uploads/isis-reports/documents/IAEA_Iran_8Nov2011.pdf
Congressional Research Service
53
Iran: U.S. Concerns and Policy Responses
militants in power in Afghanistan, but Iran and Pakistan now have a broad bilateral agenda that
includes a potential major gas pipeline project.
India
India and Iran have sought to accommodate each others’ interests and avoid mutual conflict; India
has tended to shy away from joining U.S.-led efforts to isolate Iran but, since 2010, it has sided
more clearly with the United States by limiting its relations with Iran and enforcing aspects of
international and U.S.-led multilateral sanctions against Iran. A major Indian gasoline refiner,
Reliance Industries Ltd, reportedly has ended gasoline sales to Iran in an effort to avoid any U.S.
sanction. In December 2010, India ceased using the Tehran-based Asian Clearing Union to
process payments to Iran for oil shipments, leading to payments disputes and the placement of
Indian funds for Iranian oil in escrow. This is discussed more extensively in CRS Report
RS20871, Iran Sanctions.
Another aspect of the energy relationship involves the potential building of a natural gas pipeline
from Iran, through Pakistan, to India. While India’s participation in a trans-Pakistan pipeline
remains uncertain over pricing and security issues, India and Iran reportedly are discussing a
direct, undersea pipeline that would bypass Pakistan. India reportedly wants to expedite the
development of Iran’s Chabahar port, which would give India direct access to Afghanistan and
Central Asia without relying on transit routes through Pakistan.
Of particular concern to some U.S. officials, particularly in the late 1990s, were India-Iran
military-to-military relationships and projects. The relationship included visits to India by some
Iranian naval personnel, although India said these exchanges involve junior personnel and focus
mainly on promoting interpersonal relations and not on India’s provision to Iran of military
expertise. The military relationship between the countries has withered over at least the past five
years. India and Iran, along with the United States, backed anti-Taliban factions in Afghanistan
during 1996-2001.
Al Qaeda
Iran is not a natural ally of Al Qaeda, largely because Al Qaeda is an orthodox Sunni Muslim
organization. However, some experts believe that hardliners in Iran still might want to use Al
Qaeda activists as leverage against the United States and its allies, despite the May 1, 2011, death
of Al Qaeda founder Osama bin Laden in a U.S. raid in Pakistan. The 9/11 Commission report
said several of the September 11 hijackers and other plotters, possibly with official help, might
have transited Iran, but the report did not assert that the Iranian government cooperated with or
knew about the plot. A court filing in May 2011 in New York named Iranian officials and
ministries as complicit in the September 11 attacks and alleges Iran helped Al Qaeda plan the
attacks. On November 28, 2011, a U.S. district court issued a ruling linking Iran (and Sudan) to
the August 1998 Al Qaeda bombings of the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania.
Even though bin Laden has been killed, Iran might see possibilities for tactical alliance with Al
Qaeda. Three major Al Qaeda figures believed to still be based mostly in Iran include spokesman
Sulayman Abu Ghaith, top operative Sayf Al Adl, and a bin Laden’s son, Saad.52 All three have
52 Gertz, Bill. “Al Qaeda Terrorists Being Held by Iran.” Washington Times, July 24, 2003.
Congressional Research Service
54
Iran: U.S. Concerns and Policy Responses
been reported, at least on occasion, to have been allowed outside Iran to travel to Pakistan. (U.S.
officials blamed Saad bin Laden, Adl, and Abu Ghaith for the May 12, 2003, bombings in
Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, against four expatriate housing complexes, saying they have been able to
contact associates outside Iran.53) The Department of Treasury, on January 16, 2009, designated
four Al Qaeda operatives in Iran, including Saad bin Laden (and three lesser known figures) as
terrorist entities under Executive Order 13224. On July 28, 2011, under that same order, the
Treasury Department sanctioned six Al Qaeda members for allegedly moving funds to Al Qaeda
in Pakistan and Afghanistan via their bases in Iran, and under a specific agreement between Al
Qaeda and Iran. Another bin Laden ally, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, killed by U.S. forces in Iraq on
June 7, 2006, reportedly transited Iran after the September 11 attacks and took root in Iraq,
becoming an insurgent leader there.
Iran has, to some extent, confirmed the presence of Al Qaeda militants in Iran. It asserted on July
23, 2003, that it had “in custody” senior Al Qaeda figures. On July 16, 2005, Iran’s intelligence
minister said that 200 Al Qaeda members are in Iranian jails.54 U.S. officials have said since
January 2002 that Iran has not prosecuted or extradited any senior Al Qaeda operatives. In
December 2009, Iran’s foreign minister confirmed that a teenage daughter of Osama bin Laden
had sought refuge in the Saudi embassy in Tehran—the first official confirmation that members of
bin Laden’s family have been in Iran. She left Iran in March 2010, and one of her brothers may
have left for Syria around this time. As many as 20 other family members are said to still be
living in a compound in Iran since the September 11, 2001, attacks, and accusing Iran of refusing
to allow them to leave for Saudi Arabia or other places. Some family members have said the
young bin Ladens have never been affiliated with Al Qaeda.
Latin America
A growing concern has been Iran’s developing relations with countries and leaders in Latin
America considered adversaries of the United States, particularly Cuba and Venezuela. Venezuela
has become Iran’s closest ally in that region, as discussed below. Recent State Department
terrorism reports have said that Cuba, a named state sponsor of terrorism by the United States,
maintains “close relationships with other state sponsors of terrorism such as Iran.” Suggesting
expanded Iranian interest in the Western Hemisphere, during 2006-2011, Iran opened six
embassies in countries in the region.
Venezuela
The relationship between Venezuela and Iran has attracted substantial attention. On October 30,
2007, then-Secretary of Homeland Security Michael Chertoff said that Iran’s relationship with
Venezuela is an emerging threat because it represents a “marriage” of Iran’s extremist ideology
with “those who have anti-American views.” On January 27, 2009, then Secretary of Defense
Gates said Iran was expanding front companies and opening offices in countries there. The April
2010 Defense Department report on Iran was the first U.S. government publication to say that
Qods Force personnel are in Venezuela, where their presence has “increased” in recent years.
Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez has visited Iran on several occasions, offering to engage in
joint oil and gas projects, and Ahmadinejad has visited Venezuela officially. It was reported in
53 Gertz, Bill. “CIA Points to Continuing Iran Tie to Al Qaeda.” Washington Times, July 23, 2004.
54 “Tehran Pledges to Crack Down on Militants.” Associated Press, July 18, 2005.
Congressional Research Service
55
Iran: U.S. Concerns and Policy Responses
May 2011 that the two may have signed an agreement in October 2010 to develop a joint missile
base in Venezuela, but Venezuela has denied these reports and the Obama Administration has said
there is no evidence to support the missile base assertion. Venezuela reportedly has purchased
some Iranian military equipment, such as rifles, as well as $23 million in military equipment
upgrades and an explosives factory.55 Contrary to the assertions of some experts, a State
Department official testified before the House Foreign Affairs Committee on June 24, 2011, that
Iran’s embassy in Caracas has only about 14 diplomats and is not particularly active in terms of
open diplomatic activity, casting doubt on reports that Iran has a large, active presence in
Venezuela.
Many accounts say that most of the agreements between Iran and Venezuela are agreements in
principle that have not been implemented in reality. Among the arrangements implemented are
the establishment of direct air links through an obscure air service dedicated to this route. A firm
deal for Petroleos de Venezuela to supply Iran with gasoline was signed in September 2009,
apparently in a joint effort to circumvent the reduction in worldwide sales of gasoline to Iran. In
part because of this trade, the firm was sanctioned under the Iran Sanctions Act in May 2011, as
discussed in CRS Report RS20871, Iran Sanctions. About 400 Iranian engineers have reportedly
been sent to Venezuela to work on infrastructure projects there.
Other Ties in the Region
Iran also has built closer ties to Ecuador, Bolivia, Nicaragua, and Brazil, although some press
accounts may exaggerate the extent and strategic significance of these relations. Iranian Defense
Minister Ahmad Vahidi visited Bolivia in May 2011 but President Evo Morales was then
compelled to apologize to Argentina for inviting him because of Vahidi’s alleged involvement in
the 1994 Buenos Aires bombing listed in the table above. Vahidi was, at the time, the head of the
Qods Force. Iran reportedly has $1 billion in joint ventures with Bolivia.
Iran’s embassy in Managua, Nicaragua, is said by close observers to be small, contrasting with
some reports on that issue, and Nicaragua has refused Iranian demands to repay $160 million in
debt it owes Iran. Because of its large economy, Brazil has emerged as Iran’s most significant
supporter, particularly because of Brazil’s engagement with Iran to forge the “Tehran
Declaration” on nuclear issues in June 2010. Iran has also apparently succeeded in persuading
Brazil to publicly oppose additional U.N. sanctions on Iran.
Africa
To reduce Iran’s isolation, Ahmadinejad has reached tried to enlist the support of some African
leaders. Iran has cultivated Senegal as an ally, for example. In April 2010, Ahmadinejad visited
Uganda and Zimbabwe, even though Zimbabwe’s leader, Robert Mugabe, has himself been
heavily criticized by the international community in recent years. Still, it is believed that African
support for Iran is unlikely to outweigh its growing estrangement from Europe and its partial
abandonment by Russia and China. Some observers believe that Iran’s outreach is focused on
those African countries that might be able to export natural uranium for Iran’s nuclear program to
compensate for Iran’s domestic deficiencies; such uranium producers include Zimbabwe,
Senagal, Nigeria, and the Democratic Republic of Congo.
55 Martin Arostegui. “Iran Tries to Gain Sway in Latin America.” Wall Street Journal, December 6, 2011.
Congressional Research Service
56
Iran: U.S. Concerns and Policy Responses
Some Members of Congress are concerned that Iran is supporting radical Islamist movements in
Africa. In the 111th Congress, H.Con.Res. 16 cited Hezbollah for engaging in raising funds in
Africa by trafficking in “conflict diamonds.” Iran also might have supplied Islamists in Somalia
with anti-aircraft and anti-tank weaponry, although the few press reports about such activity
suggests it is a minor component of Iranian policy, if at all. The possible transfer of weaponry to
Hamas via Sudan was discussed above. A U.N. panel of experts report on Iranian arms sales
embargo violations, discussed above, reportedly cites Iranian attempts to ship weapons to allies in
the Middle East via Nigeria.
U.S. Policy Approaches and Additional Options
The February 11, 1979, fall of the Shah of Iran, a key U.S. ally, opened a long and deep rift in
U.S.-Iranian relations. As noted in the section on Iran’s foreign policy and support of terrorism,
U.S.-Iran differences predated and transcend more recent concerns over Iran’s nuclear program.
The nuclear issue has, according to many, made a U.S. policy focus on Iran more urgent.
Relations Since the 1979 Revolution
The Carter Administration sought a degree of engagement with the Islamic regime during 1979,
but it agreed to allow in the ex-Shah for medical treatment, and Iranian officials of the new
regime who engaged the United States were singled out as insufficiently loyal or revolutionary.
As a result, the U.S.-Iran estrangement began in earnest on November 4, 1979, when radical pro-
Khomeini “students in the line of the Imam (Khomeini)” seized the U.S. Embassy in Tehran and
held its diplomats hostage until minutes after President Reagan’s inauguration on January 20,
1981. The United States broke relations with Iran on April 7, 1980 (two weeks prior to the failed
U.S. military attempt to rescue the hostages during April 24-25, 1980), and the two countries had
only limited official contact thereafter.56 The United States tilted toward Iraq in the 1980-1988
Iran-Iraq War, including U.S. diplomatic attempts to block conventional arms sales to Iran,
providing battlefield intelligence to Iraq57 and, during 1987-1988, direct skirmishes with Iranian
naval elements in the course of U.S. efforts to protect international oil shipments in the Gulf from
Iranian mines and other attacks. In one battle on April 18, 1988 (“Operation Praying Mantis”),
Iran lost about one-quarter of its larger naval ships in a one-day engagement with the U.S. Navy,
including one frigate sunk and another badly damaged. Iran strongly disputed the U.S. assertion
that the July 3, 1988, U.S. shoot down of Iran Air Flight 655 by the U.S.S. Vincennes over the
Persian Gulf (bound for Dubai, UAE) was an accident.
In his January 1989 inaugural speech, President George H. W. Bush laid the groundwork for a
rapprochement, saying that, in relations with Iran, “goodwill begets goodwill,” implying better
relations if Iran helped obtain the release of U.S. hostages held by Hezbollah in Lebanon. Iran
reportedly did assist in obtaining their releases, which was completed in December 1991, but no
56 An exception was the abortive 1985-1986 clandestine arms supply relationship with Iran in exchange for some
American hostages held by Hezbollah in Lebanon (the so-called “Iran-Contra Affair”). Iran has an interest section in
Washington, DC, under the auspices of the Embassy of Pakistan; it is staffed by Iranian Americans. The U.S. interest
section in Tehran has no American personnel; it is under the Embassy of Switzerland.
57 Sciolino, Elaine. The Outlaw State: Saddam Hussein’s Quest for Power and the Gulf Crisis. New York: John Wiley
and Sons, 1991. p. 168.
Congressional Research Service
57
Iran: U.S. Concerns and Policy Responses
thaw followed, possibly because Iran continued to back groups opposed to the U.S.-sponsored
Middle East peace process, a major U.S. priority.
Clinton Administration Policy
Upon taking office in 1993, the Clinton Administration moved to further isolate Iran as part of a
strategy of “dual containment” of Iran and Iraq. In 1995 and 1996, the Clinton Administration and
Congress added sanctions on Iran in response to growing concerns about Iran’s weapons of mass
destruction and its efforts to subvert the Arab-Israeli peace process by supporting militants
opposed to peace. The election of Khatemi in May 1997 precipitated a U.S. shift toward
engagement; the Clinton Administration offered Iran official dialogue, with no substantive
preconditions. In January 1998, Khatemi publicly agreed to “people-to-people” U.S.-Iran
exchanges, but ruled out direct talks. In a June 1998 speech, then-Secretary of State Albright
called for mutual confidence building measures that could lead to a “road map” for normalization.
Encouraged by the reformist victory in Iran’s March 2000 Majles elections, Secretary Albright, in
a March 17, 2000, speech, acknowledged past U.S. meddling in Iran, announcing an easing of the
U.S. trade ban with Iran, and promised to try to resolve outstanding claims disputes. In September
2000 U.N. “Millennium Summit” meetings, Albright and President Clinton sent a positive signal
to Iran by attending Khatemi’s speeches.
George W. Bush Administration Policy
The George W. Bush Administration undertook multi-faceted efforts to limit Iran’s strategic
capabilities through international diplomacy and sanctions—both international sanctions as well
as national measures outside Security Council mandate. The policy framework was supported by
maintenance of large U.S. conventional military capabilities in the Persian Gulf. On only one
occasion, July 19, 2008, did a U.S. official attend the P5+1 nuclear negotiations with Iran. An
amendment by then Senator Biden (adopted June 2006) to the FY2007 defense authorization bill
(P.L. 109-364) supported the Administration joining nuclear talks with Iran.
On the other hand, Bush Administration statements that it considered Iran a great nation and
respects its history could have reflected the views of those in the Bush Administration who
believed diplomacy was the optimal policy choice. Such themes were prominent in speeches by
President George W. Bush such as at the Merchant Marine Academy on June 19, 2006, and his
September 18, 2006, speech to the U.N. General Assembly. Bush Administration officials
engaged Iran on specific regional issues: for example, dialogue with Iran on Iraq and Afghanistan
from late 2001 until May 2003, when the United States broke off the talks following the May 12,
2003, terrorist bombing in Riyadh. At that time, the United States and Iran publicly
acknowledged that they were conducting direct talks in Geneva on those two issues,58 the first
confirmed direct dialogue between the two countries since the 1979 revolution. The United States
aided victims of the December 2003 earthquake in Bam, Iran, including a reported offer—
rebuffed by Iran—to send a high-level delegation to Iran, reportedly including Senator Elizabeth
Dole and President George W. Bush’s sister, Dorothy.
At times, the George W. Bush Administration considered or pursued more assertive options.
Some Administration officials, reportedly led by Vice President Cheney, believed that policy
58 Wright, Robin. “U.S. In ‘Useful’ Talks With Iran.” Los Angeles Times, May 13, 2003.
Congressional Research Service
58
Iran: U.S. Concerns and Policy Responses
should focus on the possibility of military action against Iran or on U.S. efforts to change Iran’s
regime.59 The George W. Bush Administration’s belief in this option became apparent after the
September 11, 2001, attacks, when President George W. Bush described Iran as part of an “axis of
evil” in his January 2002 State of the Union message. President George W. Bush’s second
inaugural address (January 20, 2005) and his State of the Union message of January 31, 2006,
stated that the United States would be a close ally of a free and democratic Iran.
“Grand Bargain Concept”
The George W. Bush Administration did not offer Iran an unconditional, direct U.S.-Iran bilateral
dialogue on all issues of U.S. concern. However, some say the Bush Administration “missed an
opportunity” for a “grand bargain” with Iran on its nuclear program and other issues of concern
by rebuffing a reported comprehensive overture from Iran just before the May 12, 2003, Riyadh
bombing. The Washington Post reported on February 14, 2007, (“2003 Memo Says Iranian
Leaders Backed Talks”) that the Swiss ambassador to Iran in 2003, Tim Guldimann, had informed
U.S. officials of a comprehensive Iranian proposal for talks with the United States.60 However,
State Department officials and some European diplomats based in Tehran at that time question
whether that proposal represented an authoritative Iranian communication. Others argue that the
offer was unrealistic because an agreement would have required Iran to abandon key tenets of its
Islamic revolution.
Overview of Obama Administration Policy: Engagement
Superseded by Pressure Strategies
President Obama’s Administration took office asserting that there was an opportunity to
diplomatically dissuade Iran from expanding its nuclear program, and possibly to build a new
framework for relations with Iran after the decades of estrangement and enmity. The
Administration offered to integrate Iran into the world economy in return for Iranian
compromises on its nuclear program. Early in the Administration, some officials, including
Secretary of State Clinton and Secretary of Defense Gates, expressed skepticism that engagement
would yield changes in Iran’s policies. Others, including Dennis Ross, first an adviser to
Secretary of State Clinton for “Southwest Asia” (a formulation understood to center on Iran) and
then assigned to a similar capacity in the White House from June 2009 – November 2011,
believed that the United States and its partners need to present Iran with clear incentives and
punishments for continuing nuclear enrichment.
The first major public manifestation of President Obama’s approach to Iran policy came in his
message to the Iranian people on the occasion of Nowruz (Persian New Year), March 21, 2009.
He stated that the United States “is now committed to diplomacy that addresses the full range of
issues before us, and to pursuing constructive ties among the United States, Iran, and the
international community.” He also referred to Iran as “The Islamic Republic of Iran,” a
formulation that suggested that the United States fully accepts the Islamic revolution in Iran and
did not seek “regime change.” (President Obama issued another Nowruz message on March 20,
59 Cooper, Helene and David Sanger. “Strategy on Iran Stirs New Debate at White House.” New York Times, June 16,
2007.
60 http://www.armscontrol.org/pdf/2003_Spring_Iran_Proposal.pdf.
Congressional Research Service
59
Iran: U.S. Concerns and Policy Responses
2010, but it was critical of Iran’s lack of acceptance of the diplomatic overtures of the past year.)
In concert with that approach, Obama Administration officials did not indicate support for
hardline options such as military action or regime change, although no option was explicitly
“taken off the table.” Prior to the June 12, 2009, election in Iran, other steps included
• President Obama’s reported two letters in 2009 to Iran’s Supreme Leader
expressing the Administration’s philosophy in favor of engagement with Iran.
• A major speech to the “Muslim World” in Cairo on June 4, 2009, in which
President Obama said the United States had played a role in the overthrow of
Mossadeq, and said that Iran had a right to peaceful nuclear power if it complies
with its responsibilities under the NPT.
• An announcement on April 8, 2009, that U.S. officials would attend all future
P5+1 meetings with Iran.
• Loosened restrictions on U.S. diplomats to meet their Iranian counterparts at
international meetings, and permission for U.S. embassies to invite Iranian
diplomats to the 2009 celebration of U.S. Independence Day. (The July 4, 2009,
invitations did not get issued because of the Iran unrest.)
2010 and 2011: Growing Skepticism on Engagement and Focus on Pressure
The crackdown on the 2009 election-related unrest by Iran and its refusal to agree to technical
terms of the October 1, 2009, nuclear agreement substantially reduced the Administration’s belief
in engagement. In a statement following the June 9, 2010, passage of Resolution 1929, President
Obama described Iran as refusing, thus far, to accept the path of engagement and choosing instead
to preserve all elements of its nuclear program. During 2010-2011, the Administration has
emphasized pressuring Iran through sanctions, while still offering dialogue and negotiations. The
sanctions imposed in 2010-2011 are discussed in detail in CRS Report RS20871, Iran Sanctions.
In concert with the democratic uprisings in the Middle East in early 2011, the Administration has
not only increased sanctions but it has expressed more direct criticism of Iran for its human rights
abuses. As noted above, President Obama’s March 20, 2011, Nowruz statement was significantly
more supportive of the pro-democracy movement in Iran than it was in prior years. These
pronouncements have been supported by imposition of sanctions on Iranian human rights abusers,
as discussed further below in the section on regime change.
On July 3, 2011, National Security Adviser Tom Donilon reiterated that the United States remains
open to diplomacy with Iran on its nuclear program but will continue to pressure Iran with
sanctions and other diplomatic actions. Still, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Wendy
Sherman testified before the House Foreign Affairs Committee on October 14, 2011, that the
United States and its partners had agreed in late September 2011 that there would be no further
dialogue with Iran unless it indicates its seriousness to engage substantively on the main nuclear
issues of concern. Adviser Donilon’s speech on November 22, 2011, at the Brookings Institution
reiterated that the door is open to diplomacy but focused almost exclusively on all the various
means of pressuring Iran that the United States and its partners are employing.
The opportunity for diplomacy with Iran seemed to shrink further when, as a reaction to a
November 21, 2011, U.S.-Canada-Britain tightening of sanctions (Britain announced a cutoff
from any financial dealings with Iran’s Central Bank), the Majles voted on November 28 to expel
the British Ambassador, and on November 29, a militant mob ransacked British diplomatic
Congressional Research Service
60
Iran: U.S. Concerns and Policy Responses
installations in Tehran as the Basij and other government forces stood idly by, suggesting
complicity. Britain ordered all Iranian diplomats out and the EU subsequently met to consider a
voluntary embargo on purchases of Iranian oil—consideration of that move was deferred until
another EU meeting in January 2012, at which time all EU countries might have line up
alternative oil suppliers. Still, U.S. engagement with Russia to help it formulate August 2011
proposals for Iran to revive talks further suggests the Administration does not want to foreclose
the diplomatic option.
Supreme Leader Khamene’i has ruled out bilateral talks with the United States unless the United
States ceases a strategy of pressuring Iran through sanctions. This differs somewhat from the
position of Ahmadinejad who continues to indicate willingness to talk directly to President
Obama.
U.S. and Other Military Action: “On The Table” But Apparently
Not Likely, Despite the November 2011 IAEA Report
Some who view a nuclear Iran as an unacceptable development believe that military action might
be the only means of preventing Iran from acquiring a working nuclear device. Others see such
action as an appropriate punishment for Iran’s support of terrorism. Even after the release of the
November 8, 2011, IAEA report, discussed above, the Obama Administration has not has not
indicated an inclination toward military options against Iran’s nuclear program. Senior U.S.
officials have repeatedly stressed the potential adverse consequences, such as Iranian retaliation, a
reduction of Iran’s regional isolation, and an escalation of world oil prices, as well as the
likelihood that military action would only delay Iran’s eventual acquisition of a nuclear weapons
capability by about one-two years. These points were enumerated by Secretary of Defense
Panetta in a speech to the Brookings Institution on December 2, 2011.61 Still, Administration
officials, including Panetta, stress that this option remains available. Perhaps in the belief that
there needs to be more advanced planning for military action, the FY2011 Defense Authorization
Act (P.L. 111-383, signed January 7, 2011) contained a provision (Section 1243) requiring the
Administration to develop a “National Military Strategy to Counter Iran.”
Proponents of U.S. air and missile strikes against suspected nuclear sites argue that military
action could set back Iran’s nuclear program because there are only a limited number of key
targets, and these targets are known to U.S. planners and vulnerable, even those that are hardened
or buried.62 Estimates of the target set range from 400 nuclear and other WMD-related targets, to
potentially a few thousand targets crucial to Iran’s economy and military. Those who take an
expansive view of the target set argue that the United States would need to reduce Iran’s potential
for retaliation by striking not only nuclear facilities but also Iran’s conventional military,
particularly its small ships and coastal missiles.
A U.S. ground invasion to remove Iran’s regime has not, at any time, appeared to be under serious
consideration in part because of the likely resistance an invasion would meet in Iran. This option
has also suffered from a widespread belief that U.S. action would undercut the prospects of the
61 http://2scottmontgomery.blogspot.com/2011/12/panetta-brookings-speech.html
62 For an extended discussion of U.S. air strike options on Iran, see Rogers, Paul. Iran: Consequences Of a War. Oxford
Research Group, February 2006.
Congressional Research Service
61
Iran: U.S. Concerns and Policy Responses
Green opposition movement within Iran by rallying the public around the regime. Most U.S.
allies in Europe, not to mention Russia and China, oppose military action.
Still others argue that there are military options that do not require actual combat. Some say that a
naval embargo or related embargo is possible and could pressure Iran into reconsidering its stand
on the nuclear issue. Others say that the imposition of a “no-fly zone” over Iran might also serve
that purpose. Still others say that the United Nations could set up a special inspection mission to
dismantle Iran’s WMD programs, although inserting such a mission is likely to be resisted by Iran
and could involve hostilities.
An Israeli Strike?
Some experts express greater concern over the potential for a strategic strike on Iran by Israel –
an issue that is not new but which took on increased discussion in Israel and among observers
after the release of the November 2011 IAEA report. In mid-June 2008, Israeli officials confirmed
reports that Israel had practiced a long-range strike such as that which would be required. In
March and April 2009 with statements by Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to The
Atlantic magazine stating that “You don’t want a messianic apocalyptic cult controlling atomic
bombs.” Debate increased further following the publication by the September 2010 issue of that
same magazine of an article by Jeffrey Goldberg entitled “Point of No Return.”63 As noted in the
piece, Israeli officials view a nuclear armed Iran as an existential threat and have repeatedly
refused to rule out the possibility that Israel might strike Iran’s nuclear infrastructure. Taking a
position similar to that of the George W. Bush Administration, in meetings with senior Israeli
officials, U.S. officials have expressed the view that the Obama Administration is committed to
strict sanctions on Iran—with the implication that Israeli military action should not be
undertaken. In the context of the November 2011 IAEA report, some observers openly warned
that Israel might no longer be swayed by that Administration argument, noting that Israel was
conducting civilian defense drills and that there were Israeli press reports that some senior Israeli
officials might be pushing for cabinet backing for such a strategic strike.64 Discussion of an
imminent Israeli action eased somewhat with the December 1, 2011, statement by Israel’s
Defense Minister Ehud Barak that: “We have no intention, at the moment, of taking action
[against Iran]…”
Although Israeli strategists say this might be a viable option, several experts doubt that Israel has
the capability to make such action sufficiently effective to justify the risks. Israel’s air force is
capable but far smaller than that of the United States, and could require overflight of several
countries not likely to support Israeli action, such as Iraq. U.S. military leaders are said by
observers to believe that an Israeli strike would inevitably draw the United States into a conflict
with Iran but without the degree of planning that would be needed for success.
63 See http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2010/09/the-point-of-no-return/8186/.
64 Isabel Kershner. “Israel Lobbies Discreetly for More Sanctions After U.N. Report on Iran.” New York Times,
November 14, 2011.
Congressional Research Service
62
Iran: U.S. Concerns and Policy Responses
Likely Iranian Reactions65
Were the United States or Israel to strike Iran, many experts anticipate that Iran would respond
with conventional or, of even more concern, unconventional retaliation. In the aftermath of the
November 2011 IAEA report release, the Supreme Leader of Iran explicitly warned of retaliation
if any military action were taken against Iran. Iran’s military leaders have, in mid-2010, stressed
its willingness and ability to retaliate in the Gulf and cause the West economic difficulty. Iran has
repeatedly stated it is capable of closing the Strait of Hormuz and would do so, if attacked. Such
conflict is likely to raise world oil prices significantly out of fear of an extended supply
disruption. Others say such action would cause Iran to withdraw from the NPT and refuse any
IAEA inspections.
Iran has developed a strategy for unconventional warfare that partly compensates for its
conventional weakness. If there were a conflict in the Gulf, some fear that Iran might try to use
large numbers of boats to attack U.S. ships or to lay mines in the Strait of Hormuz to try to close
that body. However, U.S. naval and other military officials have repeatedly expressed confidence
that U.S. forces could quickly reopen the waterway. Others argue Iran would not attempt this
tactic because Iran depends on the free flow of commerce through the Strait to export its oil.
Iran has tried repeatedly to demonstrate its naval retaliatory capacity. In February 2007, Iran
seized 15 British sailors that Iran said were patrolling in Iran’s waters, although Britain says they
were in Iraqi waters performing coalition-related searches. They were held until April 5, 2007. On
January 6, 2008, the U.S. Navy reported a confrontation in which five IRGC Navy small boats
approached three U.S. Navy ships to the point where they manned battle stations. The IRGC
boats veered off before any shots were fired. In October 2008, Iran announced it is building
several new naval bases along the southern coast, including at Jask, indicating enhanced
capability to threaten the entry and exit to the Strait of Hormuz. In late November 2009, Iran
seized and held for about one week a British civilian sailing vessel and crew that Iran said had
strayed into its waters.
Many experts view as potentially more significant the potential for Iran to fire missiles at Israel—
and Iran’s July 2008 missile tests could have been intended to demonstrate this retaliatory
capability—or to direct Lebanese Hezbollah or Hamas to fire rockets at Israel. Iran could also try
to direct anti-U.S. militias in Iraq and Afghanistan to attack U.S. troops, although that threat will
dissipate with respect to Iraq at the end of 2011 when all U.S. troops will have left. The Gulf
states fear that Iran will fire coastal-based cruise missiles at their oil loading or other installations
across the Gulf, as happened during the Iran-Iraq War.
Presidential Authorities and Legislation
A decision to take military action might raise the question of presidential authorities. In the 109th
Congress, H.Con.Res. 391, introduced on April 26, 2006, called on the President to not initiate
military action against Iran without first obtaining authorization from Congress. A similar bill,
H.Con.Res. 33, was introduced in the 110th Congress. An amendment to H.R. 1585, the National
Defense Authorization Act for FY2008, requiring authorization for force against Iran, was
defeated 136 to 288. A provision that sought to bar the Administration from taking military action
65 See also, Washington Institute for Near East Policy. “The Last Resort: Consequences of Preventive Military Action
Against Iran,” by Patrick Clawson and Michael Eisenstadt. June 2008.
Congressional Research Service
63
Iran: U.S. Concerns and Policy Responses
against Iran without congressional authorization was taken out of an early draft of an FY2007
supplemental appropriation (H.R. 1591) to fund additional costs for Iraq and Afghanistan combat
(vetoed on May 1, 2007). Other provisions, including requiring briefings to Congress about
military contingency planning related to Iran’s nuclear program, were in a House-passed FY2009
defense authorization bill (H.R. 5658).
Incidents at Sea Agreement?
In the 111th Congress, H.Con.Res. 94 called for the United States to negotiate an “Incidents at
Sea” agreement with Iran. Section 1240 of the National Defense Authorization Act for FY2011
(P.L. 111-383) calls for a DOD report, within one year of enactment, on the merits of such an
agreement with Iran and other Persian Gulf countries. A press report in September 2011 said that
some Defense Department officials are contemplating establishing formal communications
channels to Iranian naval officers to prevent misunderstandings and unintended conflict.66 The
idea grew out of a series of incidents with Iranian vessels, some of the incidents involving British
warships, that nearly prompted confrontation with Iran.
Containment and the Gulf Security Dialogue
Successive Administrations have taken steps to pursue containment of Iran, either to contribute to
dissuading Iran from pursuing a nuclear weapon or to constrain Iranian power if that capability is
achieved. A containment component of policy was emphasized during the Bush Administration;
in mid-2006 the State Department, primarily the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs (“Pol-Mil”),
established the “Gulf Security Dialogue” (GSD). This built on U.S.-Gulf state defense initiatives
begun during the Clinton Administration.
The Obama Administration has continued the GSD effort. During a visit to the Middle East in
March 2009, Secretary of State Clinton said, after meeting with several Arab and Israeli leaders in
the region, that “there is a great deal of concern about Iran from this whole region.” Iran was also
the focus of her trip to the Gulf region (Qatar and Saudi Arabia) in February 2010. On this trip,
she again raised the issue of a possible U.S. extension of a “security umbrella” or guarantee to
regional states against Iran, as a means of preventing Gulf accommodations to Iranian demands or
attempting themselves to acquire countervailing nuclear capabilities. The Middle East unrest that
spread to the Gulf states of Bahrain and Oman in February 2011 has caused the Administration to
announce a broad arms sales review of all Middle East arms sales. That at first appeared to place
the GSD concept in some doubt, although the continuing threat from Iran makes it unlikely that
the United States will fundamentally alter its close alliance with any of the GCC states.
The main component of the GSD is to boost Gulf state capabilities through new arms sales to the
GCC states. As noted above, the Gulf states might buy more than $120 billion worth of U.S.
military equipment and services over the next several years, the core of which is a sale of $60
billion worth of aircraft, helicopters, and services for Saudi Arabia67 that was notified to Congress
in mid-October 2010. A major intent of the sales has been to improve Gulf state missile defense
capabilities, as well as to improve border and maritime security equipment through sales of
combat littoral ships, radar systems, and communications gear. Several GSD-inspired sales
66 Jay Solomon and Julian Barnes. “U.S. Weighs A Direct Line to Tehran.” Wall Street Journal, September 19, 2011.
67 Khalaf, Roula and James Drummond. “Gulf in $123 Bn Arms Spree.” Financial Times, September 21, 2010.
Congressional Research Service
64
Iran: U.S. Concerns and Policy Responses
include PAC-3 sales to UAE and Kuwait, and Joint Direct Attack Munitions (JDAMs) to Saudi
Arabia and UAE (notified to Congress in December 2007 and January 2008). A sale to UAE of
the very advanced “THAAD” (Theater High Altitude Area Defense) has also been notified,
although some reports in August 2011 say the UAE might reduce the order from what was
expected. Reports in mid-November 2011 indicated the Administration might sell “bunker-
buster” bombs to the UAE, largely as a signal to Iran that U.S. allies could potentially take out
hardened Iranian targets.68
The containment policy may have been furthered somewhat in May 2009 when France
inaugurated a small military base in UAE, its first in the region. This signaled that France is
committed to helping contain Iran. In May 2011, the UAE discussed with NATO the hosting of a
NATO facility in UAE and it plans to appoint an Ambassador to NATO.
Regime Change: Iran Crackdown and “Arab Spring” Add Support
for This Option
Throughout its first year, the Obama Administration sought to allay Iran’s long-standing
suspicions that the main U.S. goal is to unseat the Islamic regime in Iran. Iran’s suspicions of U.S.
intentions are based on the widespread perception that the United States has hoped, and at times
sought, to promote regime change since the 1979 Islamic revolution. The United States provided
some funding to anti-regime groups, mainly pro-monarchists, during the 1980s,69 and the George
W. Bush Administration expressed attraction to this option on several occasions. The Obama
Administration’s stated policy remains to alter Iran’s behavior, not to change its regime.
The 2009 domestic unrest in Iran complicated Iran policy for the Obama Administration because
it demonstrated, for perhaps the first time since 1979, that the Islamic regime in Iran might be
vulnerable to overthrow. However, the Administration, initially assessing that outcome as
unlikely, sought to preserve the possibility of a nuclear agreement with Iran while expressing
support for human and political rights demanded by the Green Movement. As 2009 progressed,
the statements of President Obama and other U.S. officials became progressively more critical of
the regime. On December 28, 2009, President Obama expressed forthright support for the
opposition outright by saying, in regard to the unrest in Iran, “Along with all free nations, the
United States stands with those who seek their universal rights.”70 With the protests absent in Iran
for nearly a year, Secretary of State Clinton reiterated this position on September 19, 2010, but
said the United States needs take care not to be so overtly supportive as to make the Iranian
opposition appear as “stooges” of the United States.
In 2011, the Administration reevaluated its stance on the Green Movement in the context of the
broader Middle East uprisings. Statements by Secretary Clinton and the National Security
68 Adam Entous, Jay Solomon, and Julian Barnes. “U.S. Plans Bomb Sales in Gulf to Counter Iran.” Wall Street
Journal, November 11, 2011.
69 CRS conversations with U.S. officials responsible for Iran policy. 1980-1990. After a period of suspension of such
assistance, in 1995, the Clinton Administration accepted a House-Senate conference agreement to include $18-$20
million in funding authority for covert operations against Iran in the FY1996 Intelligence Authorization Act (H.R.
1655, P.L. 104-93), according to a Washington Post report of December 22, 1995. The Clinton Administration
reportedly focused the covert aid on changing the regime’s behavior, rather than its overthrow.
70 White House, Office of the Press Secretary. “Statement by the President on the Attempted Attack on Christmas Day
and Recent Violence in Iran.” December 28, 2009.
Congressional Research Service
65
Iran: U.S. Concerns and Policy Responses
Council accused Iran of hypocrisy for supporting demonstrations in Egypt while preventing
similar free expression inside Iran.71 Many observers noted that President Obama’s 2011 Nowruz
address (delivered March 20, the eve of Nowruz) was far more explicitly supportive of the Iranian
opposition than in past years, mentioning specific dissidents who have been jailed and saying to
the “young people of Iran … I want you to know that I am with you.”72 Since that statement, the
Administration has, as noted below, sanctioned Iranian officials for human rights abuses in Iran
and for assisting Syria with its crackdown against demonstrations. In his speech to the U.N.
General Assembly on September 21, 2011, President Obama said “In Iran, we’ve seen a
government that refuses to recognize the rights of its own people.” These statements and steps
stop short of constituting a policy of “regime change,” although Iran interprets any public support
for the Green Movement as evidence of U.S. intent to overthrow the clerical government.
Some Congress appear to advocate more direct, public, and broad U.S. support for the overthrow
of the regime as a focus of U.S. policy. In the 111th Congress, one bill said that it should be U.S.
policy to promote the overthrow of the regime (The Iran Democratic Transition Act, S. 3008).
Pursuing a Middle Ground: Democracy Promotion and Internet
Freedom Efforts
In the absence of all-out U.S. pursuit of regime change, successive Administrations and Congress
have agreed on more modest steps to promote political evolution in Iran through “democracy
promotion,” and, as of 2010, sanctioning Iranian human rights abusers.
Sanctioning Iranian Human Rights Abusers and Abuses
As part of its efforts to isolate the regime on human rights grounds, on September 29, 2010,
President Obama, acting in accordance with Section 105 of P.L. 111-195 (CISADA), issued
Executive Order 13553, imposing sanctions on Iranian officials determined to have committed
human rights abuses since Iran’s 2009 election. Sanctions include a ban on visas to the United
States and freeze on U.S.-based assets or trade with them. In an annex, eight Iranian officials
were named as violators and were subjected to the sanctions. Two more Iranian officials (Tehran
prosecutor Abbas Dowlatabadi and Basij commander Mohammad Reza Naqdi) were added to that
list on February 23, 2011, and, on June 9, 2011, the Administration added the IRGC (already
sanctioned as a proliferator), the Basij, the Law Enforcement Forces (LEF), and LEF Commander
Ismail Ahmadi Moghaddam to the list. On December 14, 2011, two more Iranians (head of the
Joint Staff Dr. Hassan Firuzabadi and deputy IRGC commander Abdullah Argahi) were named as
well. That brought the total to 13 Iranian persons and 3 entities designated to date. (The full list of
Iranian sanctioned under that and under other Executive Orders and U.N. Resolutions is provided
in Table 6 of CRS Report RS20871, Iran Sanctions.)
On July 8, 2011, the Administration, in concert with a similar move by Britain, imposed
restrictions on more than 50 Iranian officials deemed to have played a role in repression. The
action was taken under authority in the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA). The
71 http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/02/27/statement-national-security-council-spokesman-tommy-
vietor-iran.
72 White House. “Remarks of President Obama Marking Nowruz.” March 20, 2011.
Congressional Research Service
66
Iran: U.S. Concerns and Policy Responses
Administration did not name the Iranian officials covered by the ruling, on the grounds that the
INA requires that visa records are confidential.
In the 112th Congress, several bills have been introduced to increase sanctions on Iranian human
rights abusers. On May 4, 2011, the Iran Human Rights and Democracy Promotion Act of 2011
was introduced (S. 879 / H.R. 1714)—it would make mandatory investigations of Iranian human
rights abusers; sanction the sale to Iran of equipment that could be used to suppress
demonstrations; reauthorize the Iran Freedom Support Act (see below); and create a “Special
Representative” position at the Department of State to focus on highlighting Iran’s human rights
abuses and coordinate U.S. and international responses. This legislation is intended, in part, to
build on several human rights-related provisions of CISADA. Elements of these bills are also
contained in broader Iran sanctions bills, H.R. 1905 and S. 1048, the former of which was
reported out by the House Foreign Affairs Committee on November 2, 2011, and passed by the
full House on December 14, 2011, by a vote of 410-11.
Democracy Promotion Funding
Binding legislation to favor democracy promotion in Iran was enacted in the 109th Congress. The
Iran Freedom Support Act (P.L. 109-293), signed September 30, 2006, authorized funds (no
specific dollar amount) for Iran democracy promotion.73 Iran asserts that funding democracy
promotion represents a violation of the 1981 “Algiers Accords” that settled the Iran hostage crisis
and provide for non-interference in each others’ internal affairs.
The George W. Bush Administration asserted that open funding of Iranian pro-democracy
activists (see below) as a stated effort to change regime behavior, not to overthrow the regime,
although some saw the Bush Administration’s efforts as a cover to achieve a regime change
objective. A few accounts, such as “Preparing the Battlefield” by Seymour Hersh in the New
Yorker (July 7 and 14, 2008) say that President George W. Bush authorized U.S. covert operations
to destabilize the regime,74 involving assistance to some of the ethnic-based armed groups
discussed above. CRS has no way to confirm assertions in the Hersh article that up to $400
million was appropriated and/or used to aid the groups mentioned.
The State Department, the implementer of U.S. democracy promotion programs for Iran, has used
funds in appropriations (see Table 8) to support pro-democracy programs run by at organizations
based in the United States and in Europe; the department refuses to name grantees for security
reasons. The funds shown below have been obligated through DRL and the Bureau of Near
Eastern Affairs in partnership with USAID. At least $60 billion of the funds have been allocated
to date. Some of the funds have been appropriated for cultural exchanges, public diplomacy, and
broadcasting to Iran. A further indication of the sensitivity of specifying the use of the funds is
that the Obama Administration requested funds for Near East regional democracy programs in its
FY2010, FY2011, and FY2012 budget requests, but no specific requests for funds for Iran were
delineated.
73 This legislation was a modification of H.R. 282, which passed the House on April 26, 2006, by a vote of 397-21, and
S. 333, which was introduced in the Senate.
74 Ross, Brian and Richard Esposito. Bush Authorizes New Covert Action Against Iran, http://blogs.abcnews.com/
theblotter/2007/05/bush_authorizes.html.
Congressional Research Service
67
Iran: U.S. Concerns and Policy Responses
Many have consistently questioned the effectiveness of such funding. In the view of many
experts, U.S. funds would make the aid recipients less attractive to most Iranians. Even before the
post-2009 election crackdown, Iran was arresting civil society activists by alleging they are
accepting the U.S. democracy promotion funds, while others have refused to participate in U.S.-
funded programs, fearing arrest.75 In May 2007—Iranian American scholar Haleh Esfandiari, of
the Woodrow Wilson Center in Washington, DC, was imprisoned for several months, on the
grounds that the Wilson Center was part of this effort. The center has denied being part of the
democracy promotion effort in Iran.
Perhaps in response to some of these criticisms, the Obama Administration altered Iran
democracy promotion programs somewhat toward working directly with Iranians inside Iran who
are organized around such apolitical issues as health care, the environment, and science.76 During
2009, less emphasis was placed on funding journalists and human rights activists in Iran, or on
sponsoring visits by Iranians to the United States.77 One issue arose concerning the State
Department decision in late 2009 not to renew a contract to the Iran Human Rights
Documentation Center (IHRDC), based at Yale University, which was cataloguing human rights
abuses in Iran. Some outside experts believe that, particularly in the current context of a regime
crackdown against democracy activists, the contract should have been renewed. That criticism
went hand in hand with the view of some experts that the post-election unrest in Iran was
evidence that such democracy promotion programs were working and should be enhanced.
In line with legislation and new assessments of the best use of U.S. assistance, recent U.S. actions
have focused on preventing the Iranian government’s suppression of electronic communication.
Among legislation that was enacted is the “Voice (Victims of Iranian Censorship) Act” (Subtitle
D of the FY2010 Defense Authorization, P.L. 111-84), which contains provisions to potentially
penalize companies that are selling Iran technology equipment that it can use to suppress or
monitor the Internet usage of Iranians.78 In February 2010, the Administration eased licensing
requirements for Iranians to download free mass market U.S. software. And, the U.S. Office of
Foreign Assets Control has reportedly licensed a California firm (Censorship Research Center) to
export anti-filtering software to Iran.79 Under Secretary of State Sherman testified on October 14
that some of the democracy promotion funding has been to train Iranians in the use of
technologies that undermine regime Internet censorship efforts.
Broadcasting/Public Diplomacy Issues
Another part of the democracy promotion effort has been the development of new U.S.
broadcasting services to Iran. The broadcasting component of policy has been an extension of a
trend that began in the late 1990s. Radio Farda (“tomorrow,” in Farsi) began under Radio Free
75 Three other Iranian Americans were arrested and accused by the Intelligence Ministry of actions contrary to national
security in May 2007: U.S. funded broadcast (Radio Farda) journalist Parnaz Azima (who was not in jail but was not
allowed to leave Iran); Kian Tajbacksh of the Open Society Institute funded by George Soros; and businessman and
peace activist Ali Shakeri. Several congressional resolutions called on Iran to release Esfandiari (S.Res. 214 agreed to
by the Senate on May 24; H.Res. 430, passed by the House on June 5; and S.Res. 199). All were released by October
2007. Tajbacksh was rearrested in September 2009 and remains incarcerated.
76 CRS conversation with U.S. officials of the “Iran Office” of the U.S. Consulate in Dubai. October 2009.
77 Solomon, Jay. “U.S. Shifts Its Strategy Toward Iran’s Dissidents.” Wall Street Journal, June 11, 2010.
78 For more discussion of such legislation, see CRS Report RS20871, Iran Sanctions.
79 Ibid.
Congressional Research Service
68
Iran: U.S. Concerns and Policy Responses
Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL), in partnership with the Voice of America (VOA), in October
1998. The service was established with an initial $4 million from the FY1998
Commerce/State/Justice appropriation (P.L. 105-119). (It was to be called Radio Free Iran but
was never formally given that name by RFE/RL.) Radio Farda now broadcasts 24 hours/day.
Radio Farda has 59 full time employees, and 15 freelancers. No U.S. assistance has been
provided to Iranian exile-run stations.80
According to information provided to CRS by the BBG in February 2011, the costs of Radio
Farda are FY2010 (actual)—$9.9 million; FY2011 (estimate)—$11.84 million; FY2012
(request)—$11.77 million.
Persian News Network (PNN). The VOA established a Persian language service to Iran (VOA
Persian Service) in July 2003. In July 2007, it was renamed Persian News Network (PNN),
encompassing radio (1 hour a day or original programming); television (7 hours a day of original
or acquired programming, rebroadcast throughout a 24 hour period); and Internet.
Even though PNN has expanded its offerings significantly, it has come under criticism from
observers who say that PNN risks losing its audience among young, educated Iranians who form
the core of the anti-regime Green Movement and are looking for signs of U.S. official support.
The Inspector General report cited above, as well as many observers maintain that decisions on
who to put on PNN panel discussion shows have been made by a small group of Iranian exiles
who do not seek the replacement of the Iranian regime and who deliberately exclude certain
Green Movement persons with whom they disagree. Still others say that PNN frequently airs the
views of Iranian groups that are advocates of U.S. engagement of the regime or who downplay
regime transgressions. Some have criticized PNN for covering long-standing exiled opposition
groups, such as supporters of the son of the former Shah of Iran.81 Other critics say PNN offers
little coverage of the Green Movement, even though, in the view of these critics, one mission of
the network is, or should be, to highlight the purported unpopularity of the regime. Several
observers point to one particular PNN show as having particular ffect on audiences inside Iran.
That show is called “Parazit” (Persian for static); it is a weekly comedy show modeled on a U.S.
program on Comedy Central network called “The Daily Show.” On Parazit, the writers of the
show, Kambiz Hosseini and Saman Arbabi, mock President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and other
Iranian figures, using political satire.
To address the various criticisms, all of which were reflected in the Inspectors General report, the
Broadcasting Board of Governors formed a “PNN subcommittee,” headed by one of its members,
Enders Wimbush. In an e-mail to the author on February 25, 2011, Wimbush provided an update
on the progress of efforts to address the criticisms, saying “I wish I could say that PNN is ‘fixed,’
but we still have some way to go.” In February 2011, Ramin Asgard, a former State Department
officer, was hired as PNN director.82 tasked with redressing the PNN deficiencies.
PNN has 92 full-time slots available, of which nearly all are filled. According to information
provided to CRS by the BBG board of governors in February 2011, the costs for PNN are:
80 The conference report on the FY2006 regular foreign aid appropriations, P.L. 109-102, stated the sense of Congress
that such support should be considered.
81 CRS conversations with Iranian members of the Green Movement. December 2009-August 2010.
82 http://ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews=54504. Confirmed to CRS on February 25, 2011, by a member of the BBG.
Congressional Research Service
69
Iran: U.S. Concerns and Policy Responses
FY2010 (actual)—$23.78 million; FY2011 (estimate)—$22.5 million; FY2012 (request)—
$23.32 million.
In part to augment U.S. public diplomacy, the State Department announced in April 2011 that a
Persian-speaking U.S. diplomat, Alan Eyre, based at the U.S. Consulate in Dubai, would make
regular appearances on Iranian official media to explain U.S. positions.
Other Internet, Media, and Outreach Efforts. Separate from the Internet efforts of the BBG-
supervised services, the State Department is trying to expand outreach to the Iranian population.
In May 2003, the State Department added a Persian-language website to its list of foreign
language websites, under the authority of the Bureau of International Information Programs. The
website, according to a statement issued by then-Secretary of State Colin Powell, is intended to
be a source of information about the United States and its policy toward Iran. On February 14,
2011, the State Department announced that it had begun Persian-language Twitter feeds in an
effort to connect better with Internet users in Iran. On October 27, 2011, Secretary Clinton
announced the United States would set up a “virtual Embassy” to Iran on the Internet, which
would provide Iranians with information on visas to the United States and exchange programs.
Congressional Research Service
70
Iran: U.S. Concerns and Policy Responses
Table 8. Iran Democracy Promotion Funding
FY2004
Foreign operations appropriation (P.L. 108-199) earmarked $1.5 mil ion for “educational, humanitarian
and non-governmental organizations and individuals inside Iran to support the advancement of
democracy and human rights in Iran.” The State Department Bureau of Democracy and Labor (DRL)
gave $1 million to a unit of Yale University, and $500,000 to National Endowment for Democracy.
FY2005 $3
million from FY2005 foreign aid appropriation (P.L. 108-447) for democracy promotion. Priority
areas: political party development, media, labor rights, civil society promotion, and human rights.
FY2006
$11.15 for democracy promotion from regular FY2006 foreign aid appropriation (P.L. 109-102). $4.15
million administered by DRL and $7 million for the Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs.
FY2006
Total of $66.1 million (of $75 million requested) from FY2006 supplemental (P.L. 109-234): $20 million
supp.
for democracy promotion; $5 million for public diplomacy directed at the Iranian population; $5
million for cultural exchanges; and $36.1 million for Voice of America-TV and “Radio Farda”
broadcasting. Broadcasting funds are provided through the Broadcasting Board of Governors.
FY2007
FY2007 continuing resolution provided $6.55 million for Iran (and Syria) to be administered through
DRL. $3.04 million was used for Iran. No funds were requested.
FY2008 $60
million (of $75 million requested) is contained in Consolidated Appropriation (H.R. 2764, P.L. 110-
161), of which, according to the conference report $21.6 million is ESF for pro-democracy programs,
including non-violent efforts to oppose Iran’s meddling in other countries. $7.9 million is from a
“Democracy Fund” for use by DRL. The Appropriation also fully funded additional $33.6 million
requested for Iran broadcasting: $20 million for VOA Persian service; and $8.1 million for Radio Farda;
and $5.5 million for exchanges with Iran.
FY2009
Request was for $65 million in ESF “to support the aspirations of the Iranian people for a democratic
and open society by promoting civil society, civic participation, media freedom, and freedom of
information.” H.R. 1105 (P.L. 111-8) provides $25 million for democracy promotion programs in the
region, including in Iran.
FY2010 $40
million requested and used for Near East Regional Democracy programming. Programs to
promote human rights, civil society, and public diplomacy in Iran constitute a significant use of these
region-wide funds.
FY2011 $40
million requested and will be used for Near East Regional Democracy programs. Programming for
Iran with these funds to be similar to FY2010
FY2012 $35
million requested for Near East Regional Democracy, and Iran-related use is to be similar to
FY2010 and FY2011.
Source: Information provided by State Department and reviewed by Department’s Iran Office,
February 1, 2010; FY2012 Congressional Budget Justification; author conversation with Department of State Iran
Office, April 21, 2011.
Enhanced Iran-Focused Regional Diplomatic Presence
In 2006, the George W. Bush Administration also began increasing the presence of Persian-
speaking U.S. diplomats in U.S. diplomatic missions around Iran, in part to help identify and
facilitate Iranian participate in U.S. democracy-promotion programs. The Iran unit at the U.S.
consulate in Dubai has been enlarged significantly into a “regional presence” office, and “Iran-
watcher” positions have been added to U.S. diplomatic facilities in Baku, Azerbaijan; Istanbul,
Turkey; Frankfurt, Germany; London; and Ashkabad, Turkmenistan, all of which have large
expatriate Iranian populations and/or proximity to Iran.83 An enlarged (eight-person) “Office of
Iran Affairs” has been formed at the State Department, and it is reportedly engaged in contacts
with U.S.-based exile groups such as those discussed earlier.
83 Stockman, Farah. “‘Long Struggle’ With Iran Seen Ahead.” Boston Globe, March 9, 2006.
Congressional Research Service
71
Iran: U.S. Concerns and Policy Responses
Enhanced U.S. Interests Section
Some go further and say that the United States should staff the U.S. interests section in Tehran
with U.S. personnel, who would mostly process Iranian visas and help facilitate U.S.-Iran people-
to-people contacts (the interests section is currently under the auspices of the Swiss Embassy).
U.S. staffing was considered by the George W. Bush Administration in late 2008, but the decision
was left to the Obama Administration. The Obama Administration appeared inclined toward U.S.
staffing, but no decision was announced. Such a step was likely delayed or derailed outright by
the Iranian response to the post-election protests. However, some observers say that there are
State Department officials who see U.S. staffing as a way to broaden U.S. contacts with
representatives of the Green Movement and more accurately gauge its strength. Perhaps as a
temporary alternative, the State Department is attempting outreach to the Iranian people by
establishing, as of November 2011, an Internet-based “virtual embassy,” that explains the visa
application process and other items of interest to Iranians. However, press reports say Iran has
censored the site and rendered it at least partially inaccessible.
Additional Sanctions
As noted throughout this paper, there are numerous ideas and suggestions for additional economic
and diplomatic sanctions against Iran. Some are U.S. sanctions, some are U.S. sanctions against
foreign entities intended to compel them to exit the Iranian market, and others are multilateral or
international. These and other options, as well as existing sanctions, are discussed in significant
detail in CRS Report RS20871, Iran Sanctions, by Kenneth Katzman:
• Mandating Reductions in Diplomatic Exchanges with Iran or Prohibiting Travel
by Iranian Officials.
• Banning Passenger Flights to and from Iran.
• A Worldwide Ban on Exports to Iran of Refined Oil Products and Energy
Equipment and Services. An Executive Order issued November 21 (Executive
Order 13590, makes sanctionable foreign sales to Iran of energy sector
equipment, including petrochemical sector equipment.
• Worldwide Financial Sanctions, Such as Sanctions on the Central Bank. On
November 21, 2011, the Treasury Department declared the Iranian financial
sector as an entity of “money laundering concern” under Section 311 of the USA
Patriot Act. Several bills under active consideration in the 112th Congress would
go further, mandating sanctions against dealings with Iran’s Central Bank. The
conference report on a FY2012 defense authorization bill, H.R. 1540, contains a
provision that would prohibit the opening of U.S. accounts by any foreign bank
that does business with Iran’s Central Bank. A similar provision, along with many
other provisions, are contained in H.R. 1905, which was passed by the House on
December 14, 2011, and is discussed in detail in CRS Report RS20871, Iran
Sanctions, by Kenneth Katzman.
• Limiting Lending to Iran by International Financial Institutions. Resolution 1747
calls for restraint on but does not outright ban international lending to Iran.
• Banning Trade Financing or Official Insurance for Trade Financing. This was
not made mandatory by Resolution 1929, but several countries imposed this
sanction (as far as most trade financing) subsequently.
Congressional Research Service
72
Iran: U.S. Concerns and Policy Responses
• Banning Worldwide Investment in Iran’s Energy Sector. Such a step is authorized,
not mandated, by Resolution 1929, and a growing number of countries have used
that authority to impose these sanctions on Iran. Energy investment in Iran is
sanctionable under the Iran Sanctions Act (see CRS Report RS20871, Iran
Sanctions).
• Restricting Operations of and Insurance for Iranian Shipping. A call for restraint
is in Resolution 1929, but is not mandatory. The EU and other national measures
announced subsequently did include this sanction (IRISL) to operate.
• Imposing a Worldwide Ban on Sales of Arms to Iran. Resolution 1929 imposes a
ban on sales of major weapons systems to Iran, but another option is to extend
that ban to all lethal equipment.
• Imposing an International Ban on Purchases of Iranian Oil. This option appears
to be gaining increasing discussion in the wake of the November 29, 2011,
ransacking of the British embassy in Tehran. As noted, the EU may agree to stop
purchases of Iranian oil as early as January 2012. Some believe such an act might
enable countries that do not join such an embargo to drive down the price of
Iranian crude, thereby reducing Iran’s revenue without raising world oil prices.
Table 9. Digest of Existing U.S. Sanctions Against Iran
Ban on U.S. Trade With and Investment in Iran. Executive Order 12959 (May 6, 1995) bans almost all U.S. trade with and
investment in Iran. Modifications in 1999 and 2000 al owed for exportation of U.S. food and medical equipment, and
importation from Iran of luxury goods (carpets, caviar, dried fruits, nuts), but P.L. 111-195 (Comprehensive Iran
Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act, CISADA) restored the complete ban on imports. The trade ban does
not apply to foreign subsidiaries of U.S. firms.
U.S. Sanctions Against Foreign Firms that Invest in Iran’s Energy Sector . The Iran Sanctions Act (P.L. 104-172, August 5,
1996, as amended, most recently by P.L. 111-195) authorizes the President to select three out of a menu of nine
sanctions to impose against firms that the Administration has determined have invested more than $20 million to
develop Iran’s petroleum (oil and gas) sector, or which sell Iran more than $1 million worth of gasoline or equipment
to import gasoline or refine oil into gasoline. in the 112th Congress, Representative Sherman has introduced H.R.
1655 which would amend ISA to make sanctionable “long term agreements” to buy oil from Iran—agreements that
would involve large, up-front payments to Iran for purchases of oil over a long period of time.
Targeted Financial Measures by Treasury Department. U.S. Treasury Department officials say they have had substantial
success in efforts to persuade foreign banks to cease transactions with Iran. CISADA bans accounts with banks that
do business with the Revolutionary Guard and sanctioned entities.
Terrorism List Designation Sanctions. Iran’s designation by the Secretary of State as a “state sponsor of terrorism”
(January 19, 1984—commonly referred to as the “terrorism list”) triggers several sanctions, including the following:
(1) a ban on the provision of U.S. foreign assistance to Iran under Section 620A of the Foreign Assistance Act; (2) a
ban on arms exports to Iran under Section 40 of the Arms Export Control Act (P.L. 95-92, as amended); (3) under
Section 6(j) of the Export Administration Act (P.L. 96-72, as amended), a significant restriction—amended by other
laws to a “presumption of denial”—on U.S. exports to Iran of items that could have military applications; (4) under
Section 327 of the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (P.L. 104-132, April 24, 1996), a requirement that
U.S. representatives to international financial institutions vote against international loans to Iran (and other terrorism
list states, by those institutions.
Sanctions Against Foreign Firms that Aid Iran’s Weapons of Mass Destruction Programs. The Iran-Syria-North Korea
Nonproliferation Act (P.L. 106-178, March 14, 2000, as amended) authorizes the Administration to impose sanctions
on foreign persons or firms determined, under the act, to have provided assistance to Iran’s weapons of mass
destruction (WMD) programs. Sanctions to be imposed include restrictions on U.S. trade with the sanctioned entity.
Sanctions Against Foreign Firms that Sell Advanced Arms to Iran. The Iran-Iraq Arms Nonproliferation Act (P.L. 102-484,
October 23, 1992, as amended) provides for U.S. sanctions against foreign firms that sell Iran “destabilizing numbers
Congressional Research Service
73
Iran: U.S. Concerns and Policy Responses
and types of conventional weapons” or WMD technology.
Ban on Transactions With Foreign Entities Determined to Be Supporting International Terrorism. Executive Order 13324
(September 23, 2001) authorizes a ban on U.S. transactions with entities determined to be supporting international
terrorism. The Order was not specific to Iran, coming 12 days after the September 11, 2001, attacks, but several
Iranian entities have been designated.
Ban on Transactions With Foreign Entities that Support Proliferation. Executive Order 13382 (June 28, 2005) amended
previous executive orders to provide for a ban on U.S. transactions with entities determined to be supporting
international proliferation. As is the case for Executive Order 13324, mentioned above, Executive Order 13382 was
not specific to Iran. However, numerous Iranian entities, including the IRGC itself, have been designated.
Divestment. A Title in P.L. 111-195 authorizes and protects from lawsuits various investment managers who divest
from shares of firms that conduct sanctionable business with Iran.
Counter-Narcotics. In February 1987, Iran was first designated as a state that failed to cooperate with U.S. anti-drug
efforts or take adequate steps to control narcotics production or trafficking. U.S. and U.N. Drug Control Program
(UNDCP) assessments of drug production in Iran prompted the Clinton Administration, on December 7, 1998, to
remove Iran from the U.S. list of major drug producing countries. This exempts Iran from the annual certification
process that kept drug-related U.S. sanctions in place on Iran. According to the State Department’s International
Narcotics Strategy Report (INSCR), the most recent of which was issued March 3, 2011, several governments, over
the past few years Iran has augmented security on its border with Afghanistan in part to prevent the flow of narcotics
from that country into Iran.
U.S.-Iran Assets Disputes. Iranian leaders continue to assert that the United States is holding Iranian assets, and that this
is an impediment to improved relations. See CRS Report RS20871, Iran Sanctions, by Kenneth Katzman.
Travel-Related Guidance. Use of U.S. passports for travel to Iran is permitted. Iranians entering the United States are
required to be fingerprinted, and Iran has imposed reciprocal requirements.
Source: CRS. For analysis and extended discussion of U.S. and international sanctions against Iran, see CRS
Report RS20871, Iran Sanctions, by Kenneth Katzman.
Conclusion
Mistrust between the United States and Iran’s Islamic regime has run deep for more than three
decades. Some argue that, no matter who is in power in Tehran, the United States and Iran have a
common long-term interest in stability in the Persian Gulf and South Asia regions. According to
this view, major diplomatic overtures toward the regime might not only help resolve the nuclear
issue but yield fruit in producing a new, constructive U.S.-Iran relationship.
Others argue that U.S. concerns stem first and foremost from the character of Iran’s regime.
Those who take this view see in the Green Movement the potential to replace the regime and to
integrate Iran into a pro-U.S. strategic architecture in the region. Many argue that a wholesale
replacement of the current regime could produce major strategic benefits beyond potentially
reducing the threat from Iran’s nuclear program, including an end to Iran’s effort to obstruct a
broad Arab-Israeli peace.
Others argue that many Iranians are united on major national security issues and that a new
regime would not necessarily align with the United States. Some believe that many Iranians fear
that alignment with the United States would produce a degree of U.S. control and infuse Iran with
Western culture that many Iranians find un-Islamic and objectionable.
Congressional Research Service
74
Iran: U.S. Concerns and Policy Responses
Table 10. Selected Economic Indicators
Economic Growth
1 % (2010 est.); 1.5% (2009)
Per Capita Income
$10,600/yr purchasing power parity (2010)
GDP
$818 billion purchasing power parity (2010)
Proven Oil Reserves
135 billion barrels (highest after Russia and Canada)
Oil
About 3.9 million barrels per day (mbd)/ 2.4 mbd exports.
Production/Exports
Major Oil/Gas
China—300,00 barrels per day (bpd); about 4% of China’s oil imports; Japan—600,000
Customers
bpd, about 12% of oil imports; other Asia (mainly South Korea)—450,000 bpd; Italy—
300,000 bpd; France—210,000 bpd; Netherlands 40,000 bpd; other Europe—200,000
bpd; India—150,000 bpd (10% of its oil imports; Africa—200,000 bpd. Turkey—gas: 8.6
billion cubic meters/yr
Major Export Markets Japan ($9.9 billion); China ($9.2 billion); Turkey ($5.1 billion); Italy ($4.45 billion); South
Korea ($4 billion); Netherlands ($3.2 billion); France ($2.7 billion); South Africa ($2.7
billion); Spain ($2.3 billion); Greece ($2 billion)
Major Imports
Germany ($5.6 billion); China ($5 billion); UAE ($4 billion); S. Korea ($2.9 billion); France
($2.6 billion); Italy ($2.5 billion); Russia ($1.7 billion); India ($1.6 billion); Brazil ($1.3
billion); Japan ($1.3 billion).
Trade With U.S.
Total U.S. Exports to Iran: $208 mil ion; Total Imports to U.S. from Iran: $94 million
(2010)
Major Non-Oil
Renault (France) and Mercedes (Germany)—automobile production in Karaj, Iran—
Investments
valued at $370 million; Renault (France), Peugeot (France) and Volkswagen (Germany)—
auto parts production; Turkey—Tehran airport, hotels; China—shipbuilding on Qeshm
Island, aluminum factory in Shirvan, cement plant in Hamadan; UAE financing Esfahan
Steel Company; India—steel plant, petrochemical plant; S. Korea—steel plant in Kerman
Province; S. Korea and Germany—$1.7 billion to expand Esfahan refinery.
“Oil Stabilization
$12.1 billion (August 2008, IMF estimate).
Fund” Reserves
Public Debt
$16.2% of GDP (2010 est.)
Development
2003 (latest available): $136 million grant aid. Biggest donors: Germany ($38 million);
Assistance Received
Japan ($17 million); France ($9 million).
Inflation
10% + (May 2011), official estimate. Outside experts put the rate much higher.
Unemployment Rate
14.6%+
Sources: CIA, The World Factbook; various press; IMF; Iran Trade Planning Division; CRS conversations with
experts and foreign diplomats.
Congressional Research Service
75
Figure 1. Structure of the Iranian Government
Source: CRS.
CRS-76
Iran: U.S. Concerns and Policy Responses
Figure 2. Map of Iran
Source: Map Resources, adapted by CRS (April 2005).
Author Contact Information
Kenneth Katzman
Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs
kkatzman@crs.loc.gov, 7-7612
Congressional Research Service
77