Libya: Transition and U.S. Policy
Christopher M. Blanchard
Analyst in Middle Eastern Affairs
December 8, 2011
Congressional Research Service
7-5700
www.crs.gov
RL33142
CRS Report for Congress
Pr
epared for Members and Committees of Congress
Libya: Transition and U.S. Policy
Summary
After more than 40 years of authoritarian repression and eight months of armed conflict,
fundamental political change has come to Libya. The killing of Muammar al Qadhafi on October
20 and the declaration of Libya’s liberation by the interim Transitional National Council on
October 23 marked the end of the Libyan people’s armed revolt and the formal beginning of the
country’s transition to a new political order. Overcoming the legacy of Qadhafi’s rule and the
effects of the recent fighting is now the principal challenge for the Libyan people, the TNC, and
the international community. The transition period may prove to be as complex and challenging
for Libyans and their international counterparts as the recent conflict. Immediate tasks include
establishing and maintaining security, preventing criminality and reprisals, restarting Libya’s
economy, and taking the first steps in a planned transition to democratic governance. In the
coming weeks and months, Libyans will face key questions about basic terms for transitional
justice, a new constitutional order, political participation, and Libyan foreign policy. Security
challenges, significant investment needs, and vigorous political debates are now emerging.
Operation Unified Protector, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) military operation to
enforce the United Nations (U.N.) mandated no-fly zone and civilian protection mission, ended
on October 31, in line with Security Council Resolution 2016. The proliferation of military
weaponry from unsecured Libyan stockpiles—including small arms, explosives, and shoulder-
fired anti-aircraft missiles—remains a serious concern in Libya and in neighboring countries, and
the Security Council adopted Resolution 2017 to deal specifically with that threat. The Obama
Administration is implementing a program with the TNC to retrieve and disable certain types of
weapons, including shoulder-fired surface to air missiles. U.S. officials have stated that nuclear
materials and chemical weapons components (including newly discovered/previously undeclared
chemical weapons) remain secure. Libyan officials have reengaged with international monitors.
The U.S. Embassy in Tripoli has reopened with a limited staff. Congress may consider proposals
for assisting Libya’s transitional authorities.
The U.N. General Assembly has recognized the TNC as Libya’s U.N. representative, and the
Security Council has extended the mandate to March 2012 for the U.N. Support Mission in Libya
(UNSMIL) to assist Libyans with public security and transition arrangements. Resolutions 2009
and 2016 also set conditions for the sale of arms and training to the Libyan government and
partially lift the U.N. mandated asset freeze for certain purposes. The TNC continues to call for
the release of Libyan assets seized pursuant to Resolutions 1970 and 1973. Transfers of assets
have begun from multiple governments, including $1.5 billion in previously blocked assets that
the U.S. government has arranged to support Libyan humanitarian, fuel, and salary needs. U.S.
Treasury Department licenses now authorize the release of assets belonging to some Libyan
entities and allow new transactions with some Libyan state institutions, including oil companies.
A TNC stabilization team is leading Libyan efforts to deliver services; assess reconstruction
needs; and begin to reform ministries, public utilities, and security forces. The TNC has issued
orders concerning security and established a high security council to coordinate militia forces.
Initial reports from Libya suggest that local militias and some emergent political groups may
oppose certain TNC policies and seek to maintain their armed status during the transition period.
In spite of sporadic low-level conflict and serious government capacity gaps, TNC officials
remain confident in Libyan unity, and Interim Prime Minister Abderrahim al Kib swore in an
interim government on November 24. As Libyans work to shape their future, Congress and the
Administration have the first opportunity to fully redefine U.S.-Libyan relations since the 1960s.
Congressional Research Service
Libya: Transition and U.S. Policy
Contents
Background...................................................................................................................................... 5
Assessment ...................................................................................................................................... 7
Issues before Congress..................................................................................................................... 8
Legislation in the 112th Congress .............................................................................................. 9
Possible Questions................................................................................................................... 11
Key Developments......................................................................................................................... 12
Libya’s Transition Plans, Interim Government, and Next Steps.............................................. 12
Transition Plans................................................................................................................. 12
Interim Cabinet.................................................................................................................. 12
Rival Militias and Unsecured Weapons Pose Security Challenges ......................................... 14
Regional Weapons Smuggling .......................................................................................... 16
Undeclared Chemical Weapons Raise Questions .................................................................... 16
Libyan Political Dynamics and Islamists ................................................................................ 18
Political Dynamics ............................................................................................................ 18
Libyans, Islam, and Islamists ............................................................................................ 19
United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) ............................................................ 22
Libyan Assets, TNC Funding, and Oil Exports ....................................................................... 23
U.S. Policy on Assets and Sanctions ................................................................................. 24
Libya’s Oil Production, Exports, and Revenue ................................................................. 25
International Criminal Court and United Nations Human Rights
Council Investigations.......................................................................................................... 25
Figures
Figure 1. Libya At a Glance............................................................................................................. 6
Contacts
Author Contact Information........................................................................................................... 27
Congressional Research Service
Libya: Transition and U.S. Policy
Background
Political change in neighboring Tunisia and Egypt helped bring long-simmering Libyan reform
debates to the boiling point in January and early February 2011. In recent years, leading Libyans
had staked out a broad range of positions about the necessary scope and pace of reform, while
competing for influence and opportunity under the watchful eye of hard-liners aligned with the
enigmatic leader of Libya’s September 1969 revolution, Muammar al Qadhafi. Qadhafi had long
insisted that he held no formal government position, but by all accounts he maintained his 40-
plus-year hold on ultimate authority, until his death in October 2011, as the “reference point” for
Libya’s byzantine political system. Ironically, that system cited “popular authority” as its
foundational principle and organizing concept, but it denied Libyans the most basic political
rights. Tribal relations and regional dynamics, particularly long-held resentments of Qadhafi
among residents in the east, continue to influence Libyan politics. Rivalries are emerging among
locally organized revolutionary groups with differing experiences during Qadhafi’s rule and the
recent conflict. Political groups with differing priorities will also shape Libya’s transition.
Qadhafi’s claimed policy reversals on weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and terrorism led to
the lifting of most international sanctions in 2003 and 2004, followed by economic liberalization,
oil sales, and foreign investment that brought new wealth to some in Libya. U.S. business
gradually reengaged amid continuing U.S.-Libyan tension over terrorism concerns that were
finally resolved in 2008. During this period of international reengagement, political change in
Libya remained elusive and illusory. Some observers argued that Qadhafi supporters’ suppression
of opposition had softened, as Libya’s international rehabilitation coincided with steps by some
pragmatists to maneuver within so-called “red lines.” The shifting course of those red lines had
been increasingly entangling reformers in the run-up to the outbreak of unrest in February 2011.
Government rehabilitation of imprisoned Islamist militants and the return of some exiled
opposition figures were welcomed by some observers. Ultimately, inaction on the part of the
government in response to calls for guarantees of basic political rights and for the drafting of a
constitution suggested a lack of consensus, if not outright opposition to meaningful reform.
The 2011 revolution was triggered in mid-February by a chain of events in Benghazi and other
eastern cities that quickly spiraled out of Qadhafi’s control. The government’s loss of control
these cities became apparent, and broader unrest emerged in other regions. A number of military
officers, their units, and civilian officials abandoned Qadhafi for the cause of the then-
disorganized and amorphous opposition. Qadhafi and his supporters denounced their opponents
as drug-fueled traitors, foreign agents, and Al Qaeda supporters. Until August, Qadhafi and allied
forces maintained control over the capital, Tripoli, and other cities. The cumulative effects of
attrition by NATO airstrikes against military targets and a coordinated offensive by rebels in
Tripoli and from across western Libya then turned the tide, sending Qadhafi and his supporters
into retreat and exile. September and early October were marked by sporadic and often intense
fighting with Qadhafi supporters in and around Qadhafi’s birthplace, Sirte, and the town of Bani
Walid and neighboring military districts. NATO air operations continued as rebel fighters engaged
in battles of attrition with Qadhafi supporters.
Qadhafi’s death at the hands of rebel fighters in Sirte on October 20 brought the revolt to an
abrupt close, with some observers expressing concern that a dark chapter in Libyan history ended
violently, with an uncertain path ahead. An interim government is now in place, and the first steps
toward disarmament and creating unified security forces are being taken. Principal challenges
include disarming rebel forces and building national political consensus and capable institutions.
Congressional Research Service
5
Libya: Transition and U.S. Policy
Figure 1. Libya At a Glance
Source: Prepared by Amber Hope Wilhelm, CRS Graphics Specialist.
Congressional Research Service
6
Libya: Transition and U.S. Policy
Assessment
Events in Libya remain fluid and fast-moving. After the swell of confidence and international
recognition following the capture of Tripoli, Libya’s revolutionaries and the TNC are embarking
on an uncharted path of political transition and economic recovery. The post-Qadhafi Libyan
political order is complicated by the consequences of the violent revolution, the legacies of
decades of Qadhafi’s patronage- and fear-based rule, and the chronic economic and political
challenges that have fueled popular discontent in recent years.
Security is the immediate priority, and questions remain about the ability of the Transitional
National Council (TNC) to ensure order. A large number of armed groups remain active and their
continued unity of purpose and endorsement of proposed TNC transition plans cannot be taken
for granted. According to the United Nations Secretary General, “revolutionary groups have
assumed the main responsibility for law and order throughout the country, without appropriate
training and outside a proper legal framework.”1 As of late November, approximately 7,000
detainees suspected of having supported Qadhafi awaited some form of adjudication, and most
were under the control of militias.2
The apparent proliferation of small arms, man-portable air defense missile systems (MANPADS),
and some heavy weaponry among fighters on both sides of the recent conflict has led some
counterterrorism and arms trafficking experts, as well as officials in neighboring countries, to
express concern about the conflict’s longer-term implications for regional security. Most security
experts expect that unexploded ordnance, explosive remnants, and looted weaponry will present a
domestic and regional challenge for many years. Libya’s borders and hundreds of suspected
weapons sites remained largely unsecured, although limited efforts to secure them have begun.
Various rebel groups have stated their recognition of the TNC’s authority as a means of securing
the country. However, press reports and interviews suggest that these groups remain wary of each
other, and in some cases their members are intermittently hostile. In early December, Prime
Minister Al Kib called on non-local militia units in Tripoli to leave the city or face popular
pressure to do so. Both before and in the wake of the October 23 liberation announcement and the
November interim cabinet formation, some rebel groups have called for changes to the leadership
of the TNC. U.S. officials have not yet indicated they regard the ongoing debates, delays, and
insecurity as grave threats to the transition.3
Prior to the capture of Tripoli, reports from eastern Libya suggested that limited financial
resources and latent political rivalries were creating parallel challenges for the TNC as it sought
to solidify its base of support among the disparate groups that rose up against Qadhafi. Those
challenges are now reflected on a national scale. Meeting the post-conflict medical and financial
needs of Libyans affected by the fighting also remains a high priority for the TNC. TNC leaders
1 United Nations (U.N.) Security Council Document S/2011/727, Report of the Secretary-General on the United
Nations Support Mission in Libya, November 22, 2011.
2 Ibid.
3 Remarks by TNC Minister for Reconstruction Ahmed Jehani and U.S. Ambassador to Libya Gene Cretz.
Congressional Research Service
7
Libya: Transition and U.S. Policy
estimate that over 20,000 Libyans have been killed in the recent conflict, with a further 50,000
injured.4 These statistics have not been independently verified by any international third party.
U.N. officials and TNC leaders continue to warn of financial constraints in public statements and
urge governments to fully release frozen Libyan assets. Some reports suggest that while a lively
political atmosphere has emerged, political support for the TNC among the population may be
contingent on the council’s ability to provide basic services and financial support via salaries and
subsidies.5 Organized armed groups or ad hoc citizen coalitions may choose to challenge the TNC
if public hardships increase or if TNC political decisions prove controversial.
Some expert observers of Libya’s domestic politics have emphasized the general weakness and
fractured condition of Libya’s political landscape after 40 years of idiosyncratic abuse by Qadhafi
and his supporters. Qadhafi purposely undermined state institutions, including the military, and
manipulated tribal, regional, and political groups to maintain power. As a result, transitional
authorities are inheriting very weak national institutions, and competition among those groups
may intensify during the transition. Differences could emerge in the short term over security
arrangements or over the goals and shape of the new political system. The political ascendance of
nonviolent Islamist opposition forces or the potential intransigence of any of the armed organized
factions now active, including armed Islamists, also may create new challenges. The United
States and Europe have expressed concern about violent Islamist groups in Libya and are
expected to seek to maintain counterterrorism cooperation with the post-Qadhafi government.
Taken together, these factors suggest that securing U.S. interests in Libya may require sustained
attention and resources during the transition period. Since the uprising began, U.S. officials have
argued that U.S. policy must remain flexible in order to effectively shape and respond to changing
developments. Given these circumstances, Administration officials and Members of Congress
may choose to reexamine U.S. interests in Libya; discuss the range of possible outcomes and their
potential implications; and define the authorities for and costs of potential U.S. responses.
Issues before Congress
Many Members of Congress welcomed the announcement of Libya’s liberation and the formation
of the interim government, while expressing concern about security in the country, the
proliferation of weapons, and the prospects for a smooth political transition. Congress continues
to exercise oversight over U.S. diplomatic, security, and assistance efforts in Libya and is
considering appropriation and authorization requests and notifications related to Libya programs.
Securing stockpiles of Libyan conventional and chemical weapons has emerged as an issue of
broad congressional concern, as has ensuring that transitional authorities act in accordance with
international human rights standards in pursuing justice and handling detainees.
U.S. programs to mitigate threats posed by weapons proliferation continue. On May 9, the
Administration notified Congress that it had waived normal congressional notification
requirements to immediately obligate $1.5 million in Nonproliferation, Antiterrorism, Demining
and Related Programs (NADR) account funding for “urgently needed assistance to collect,
4 OSC Report GMP20111023001007, “Libya: TNC Chairman Mustafa Abd-al-Jalil on Aftermath of Al-Qadhafi’s
Death,” October 23, 2011.
5 CRS interviews and review of unpublished NGO and unclassified State Department reporting, 2011.
Congressional Research Service
8
Libya: Transition and U.S. Policy
destroy, and reestablish control of Libyan munitions and small arms and light weapons” in
response to “a substantial risk to human health or welfare.”6 These efforts are now being
expanded. The Obama Administration has notified Congress of its intention to use $40 million in
previously appropriated funding to support disarmament and weapons depot security efforts that
are now ongoing, with U.S. civilian advisers working with the TNC to locate, secure, and disable
shoulder-fired anti-aircraft missiles and other weaponry.7
During the conflict, the Administration also notified Congress of its intent to offer up to $25
million in nonlethal material support to groups in Libya, including the TNC. U.S. officials argued
that the rebels’ most pressing needs were command and control, communications, training,
organization, and logistics support. These needs are now reflected in discussions about
reconstituting a national military for Libya, incorporating opposition fighters and former regime
personnel into security forces, and demobilizing civilian volunteers. U.S. officials have not
publicly discussed specific proposals to assist Libya’s interim government in this regard.
U.S. civil society support for Libya’s transition is being provided under the auspices of the
Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI) and the $5 million Libya Transition Initiative (LTI),
managed by the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) Office of Transition
Initiatives (OTI). Through the LTI, USAID contract partners are implementing programs to
provide civil society training and resources to Libyan citizens and organizations.8 The U.S.
government also continues to provide medical and humanitarian assistance to Libyans injured or
displaced during the revolution.9
Some Members of Congress have suggested that some Libyan assets seized by the United States
in March 2011 pursuant to Executive Order 13566 should be directed, in consultation with Libyan
authorities, toward reimbursement of the United States and other NATO countries for their U.N.-
approved military operations. Others are seeking to link the availability of assets frozen by the
United States to Libyan cooperation with investigations into Qadhafi-era terrorist attacks. (See
“Libyan Assets, TNC Funding, and Oil Exports” below.)
Legislation in the 112th Congress
Debate between Congress and the Obama Administration about congressional authorization and
the cost of U.S. military operations in Libya diminished during 2011 as the prospect of a
6 The notification requirements were waived pursuant to Section 634a of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 and
Sections 7015(f) and 7015 (e) of the Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations
Act (SFOAA), 2010 (Div. F, P.L. 111-117), as amended and carried forward by the Full-Year Continuing
Appropriations Act, 2011 (Div. B, P.L. 112-10). The funding was provided to nongovernmental organizations
specializing in international demining and ordnance disposal. Those organizations and others are working with the
United Nations as part of a Joint Mine Action Coordination Team that issues regular reports on the status of efforts to
remove ordnance threats across Libya and related funding needs. For more information see the United Nations Mine
Action Service website at http://www.mineaction.org/overview.asp?o=3994.
7 This includes $34.3 million in Nonproliferation Disarmament Fund monies appropriated in FY2003, FY2004,
FY2009 and FY2010. An additional $5.75 million in FY2011 Nonproliferation, Antiterrorism, Demining and Related
Programs (NADR) funding will also be used. Details available from CRS.
8 More information is available online from USAID at http://www.usaid.gov/locations/middle_east/libya/ and,
http://www.usaid.gov/our_work/cross-cutting_programs/transition_initiatives/country/libya/index.html.
9 For an overview of U.S. efforts through late September 2011, see U.S. Government Humanitarian Fact Sheet #44,
Libya – Complex Emergency, Fiscal Year 2011, September 29, 2011.
Congressional Research Service
9
Libya: Transition and U.S. Policy
sustained military campaign requiring extended U.S. investment and force deployments became
less likely. Earlier in the year, some Members of Congress sought a clearer definition of U.S.
objectives, costs, and operations, and, in June and July, some Members of Congress became
increasingly assertive in their efforts to force President Barack Obama to seek congressional
authorization for continued U.S. military involvement. A number of proposed resolutions and
amendments to appropriations and authorization bills sought to require reporting on U.S. strategy
and operations or to proscribe limits on the authorization or funding for continued U.S. military
operations in Libya. Others sought to authorize the continued use of U.S. Armed Forces in
support of NATO operations, short of the use of ground troops.
On June 3, the House adopted H.Res. 292 (Roll no. 411), which directed the Administration to
provide documents on consultation with Congress and a report “describing in detail United States
security interests and objectives, and the activities of United States Armed Forces, in Libya since
March 19, 2011.” The Administration submitted the report on June 15, 2011.10 The House of
Representatives rejected a series of other resolutions seeking to authorize or de-authorize
continuing U.S. participation in Operation Unified Protector. U.S. military operations as part of
the NATO mission ended in late October.
Debate concerning the future of U.S. policy toward Libya will be shaped by the events of the
transition period, and may increasingly reflect issues that were prominent prior to the uprising,
including U.S. counterterrorism priorities and Libyan economic and political aspirations. Pending
legislation introduced in the 112th Congress related to Libya includes:
• The Senate version of the FY2012 State Department and Foreign Operations
appropriations bill (S. 1601), which would provide $20 million in bilateral
Economic Support Fund (ESF) account assistance “to promote democracy,
transparent and accountable governance, human rights, transitional justice, and
the rule of law in Libya, and for exchange programs between Libyan and
American students.” The bill prohibits non-loan-based funding for rehabilitation
or reconstruction of infrastructure in Libya. The committee report on the bill
directs the use of Nonproliferation, Antiterrorism, Demining, and Related
Programs (NADR) account funding for disarmament and securing Libyan
weapons stockpiles.
• The Senate version of the FY2012 National Defense Authorization Act (S. 1867)
was amended (S.Amdt. 1180) to include, in Section 1243, a requirement that the
Director of National Intelligence submit to Congress an assessment “that
accounts for the disposition of, and the threat to United States citizens and
citizens of allies of the United States posed by man-portable air-defense systems
that were in Libya as of March 19, 2011.” The bill would also require the
Administration to develop a strategy for mitigating potential related threats and
submit a detailed report to Congress, in unclassified and classified form.
• S.Res. 317 would affirm “the national interest of the United States in a successful
and irreversible transition to democracy in Libya,” and urge transitional
authorities to prepare for elections, restore security, ensure human rights,
eliminate chemical weapons stockpiles and secure nuclear materials.
10 Overview of United States Activities in Libya, June 15, 2011. Available from CRS.
Congressional Research Service
10
Libya: Transition and U.S. Policy
• H.Con.Res. 75, which would state the sense of Congress that
“the funds of the regime of Muammar Qaddafi that have been frozen by the United States
should be returned to the people of Libya for their benefit, including humanitarian and
reconstruction assistance, and the President should explore the possibility with the
Transitional National Council of using some of such funds to reimburse NATO countries for
expenses incurred in Operation Odyssey Dawn and Operation Unified Protector.”
• S. 1520, which would restrict the transfer of blocked Libyan assets to Libyan
authorities for other than humanitarian purposes until the President certifies to
Congress “that the Transitional National Council or successor government is
fully cooperating with requests for information and ongoing investigations
related to the bombing of Pan Am flight 103 and any other terrorist attacks
attributable to the government of Muammar Qaddafi against United States
citizens.” The bill would provide national security waiver authority to the
President and require reporting on U.S. efforts to obtain information regarding
terrorist attacks along with Libyan cooperation.
• S. 1822, would call on the Secretary of Defense to “take whatever actions may be
necessary” to repatriate, identify, and properly reinter the remains of U.S. service
members buried in Tripoli who were killed in early 19th century naval combat.
Possible Questions
Possible questions that Members of Congress may wish to consider when assessing the recent
developments in Libya and proposals regarding U.S. economic and security assistance or political
engagement include the following:
• In the wake of Qadhafi’s downfall, what are the goals of U.S. policy in Libya?
What U.S. national interests are at stake? What options exist for securing them?
What civilian or military advisory support and assistance, if any, should be
provided to interim authorities and civil society?
• In addition to the United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL), which
international actors are providing assistance and advice to Libyans on security,
stabilization, and reconstruction? Under what authority and on what terms? What
role, if any, does the United States seek to play? What appropriations or
authorizations might be required to support such a role?
• Who are the individuals and groups emerging as key political, economic, and
security actors in Libya? What are their relative goals and agendas? What should
be the key components of a future U.S.-Libyan bilateral relationship? What limits
to engagement, if any, should the United States impose on its dealings with
different Libyan groups? What type of security relationship, if any, should the
United States pursue with a new Libyan government?
• What further steps, if any, should the United States take to assist Libyan
authorities in securing chemical weapons stockpiles and nuclear materials? What
else should be done to limit the proliferation of conventional weaponry within
and beyond Libya?
Congressional Research Service
11
Libya: Transition and U.S. Policy
• When should the United States transfer Libyan assets to a new Libyan governing
authority and for what purposes? Should the United States seek reimbursement
from Libya for the cost of military operations or humanitarian assistance?
• How are events in Libya likely to shape developments in the broader Middle East
and North Africa? What unintended consequences may result from the revolution
in Libya? What opportunities does change present? What precedents have U.S. or
multilateral military intervention in the Libyan conflict set and how might those
precedents be affecting the context in which U.S. decision makers respond to
other regional crises and events?
Key Developments
Libya’s Transition Plans, Interim Government, and Next Steps
Transition Plans
On October 23, interim Transitional National Council (TNC) chairman Mustafa Abdeljalil
announced the liberation of Libya and stated that an interim government would be named within
one month. Accordingly, NATO-led military operations to enforce U.N. Security Council
Resolution 1970 and 1973 drew to a close, and ended on October 31. Members of the TNC
elected Interim Prime Minister Abderrahim al Kib (pronounced al keeb) to head the interim
cabinet, which he subsequently swore in on November 24. The interim cabinet is tasked to
oversee an initial 8-month transition period, at the end of which elections are to be held for a
national assembly.
Within 90 days of October 23, electoral legislation must be adopted and a regulatory entity must
be identified for the elections. Key related issues include the identification of an electoral system,
delineation of districts, voter registration and education, and determination of candidate eligibility
criteria. At the end of the initial transition period, an elected assembly is expected to name a new
cabinet and choose a committee to draft a new constitution. Within two months of a proposed
constitution being presented to the elected assembly, a national referendum is to be held on the
proposal. After that, national elections are to be held within 9 months. This overall transition plan
marks waypoints on a nearly 20-month course through Libya’s uncertain future.
Figure 2 below illustrates the transition timeline laid out by the TNC, including key milestones
and pending decision points.
Interim Cabinet
The makeup of the country’s interim executive leadership has been a matter of quiet but persistent
contention since the fall of Tripoli in August 2011, with locally organized groups and militia
leaders making statements about the qualifications of potential interim cabinet nominees and their
perceived right to serve in leadership positions on the basis of their personal backgrounds and
roles in ousting the Qadhafi government. Prime Minister Al Kib articulated clear standards for
selecting the members of the interim cabinet and consulted closely with representatives of various
Congressional Research Service
12
Libya: Transition and U.S. Policy
interest groups, militias, and municipalities in an attempt to ensure the cabinet would be seen as
reflecting the diversity of interests and identities among Libyans.11 In the wake of the cabinet’s
inauguration, some local groups and some representatives of Libya’s Berber (or Amazigh)
minority have criticized the cabinet as failing to include members of their constituencies.
Figure 2. Libya’s Proposed Transition Timeline
Source: Prepared by Amber Hope Wilhelm, CRS Graphics Specialist. Information derived from Transitional
National Council draft charter, August 2011; and, United Nations Secretary General Report on the U.N. Support
Mission in Libya, S/2011/727, November 22, 2011.
Notes: Subject to revision.
Libyan and international media reporting suggests that the cabinet selection process may have
been influenced by some groups’ lingering suspicion of figures from the former government and
the emergence of strong local identities during the conflict. Dynamics among expatriate Libyan
opposition figures and Libya-based activists reflect the subtle legacies of Libya’s former
monarchy period, changes to monarchy-era power structures under Qadhafi, and the events of the
2011 revolution.12 Differences of opinion about the TNC’s transition plans and proposed
11 OSC Report GMP20111102825005, “Libya: Interim Prime Minister Abd-al-Rahim al-Kib on Government,
Program,” Al Sharq Al Awsat (London), November 2, 2011.
12 According to one analyst, the TNC leadership consists of members from several general groups: “defectors from the
former regime elite”; “scions of the aristocratic and bourgeois families who had dominated Libya during the monarchy
(1951-69)”; exiled “members of the non-aristocratic Libyan intelligentsia and business community”; and, Libya-based
“representatives of the educated elite, such as lawyers and university professors.” These individuals have struggled to
make common cause at times with Islamists, elites in western Libya, protestors, and armed volunteer fighters. See
Wolfram Lacher, “Families, Tribes and Cities in the Libyan Revolution,” Middle East Policy Council, November 2011.
Congressional Research Service
13
Libya: Transition and U.S. Policy
transition schedule also may have influenced the cabinet selection and may continue to shape
relations within the cabinet and between the TNC and the Libyan public.
Transition plans include a series of restrictions on the ability of TNC and executive authority
members from holding dual office, benefitting from transactions involving state property, and
standing for some future elected positions.
Figure 3 below provides the names of ministers named to the interim cabinet that will oversee the
initial transition period and make important decisions about defense matters, disarmament of
militias, electoral arrangements, the reconstitution of government capacity, and sector-by-sector
assessments of reconstruction and investment needs.
Rival Militias and Unsecured Weapons Pose Security Challenges
As the interim government begins its work, security is its top priority. TNC figures and militia
leaders have issued repeated calls for armed groups and citizens to avoid destruction of public
property, looting, and reprisals, in a conscious effort to avoid some of the immediate security
problems that plagued Iraq in the wake of the collapse of Saddam Hussein’s government.
According to the United Nations Department of Safety and Security, the security situation in the
country varies regionally from moderate to extreme risk, and the Secretary-General has reported
that “the threat posed by the proliferation of arms and related material” is a major security
challenge.13
The TNC has asserted nominal control over developments in Tripoli and has begun the task of
coordinating the diverse collection of armed groups that made the rebel capture of the city
possible, but which did not previously necessarily coordinate their actions with the TNC or each
other. Prior to the introduction of the interim cabinet, a “supreme security council” served as the
coordinating mechanism for disparate volunteer groups and regime defectors, including armed
factions from communities like Zintan and Misuratah and those led by Islamist figures, such as
former Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG) commander Abdelhakim Belhajj.14
A series of clashes among different revolutionary militia in Tripoli in late November and early
December has produced increasing citizen demands for the TNC to act more decisively to control
armed groups. The TNC has demanded that non-Tripoli based militias leave the capital, and Most
observers expect that the Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Interior will become more involved
13 U.N. Security Council Document S/2011/727, Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Support
Mission in Libya, November 22, 2011. OSC Report GMP20111202693003, “Libyan Defense Minister Interviewed on
Security Situation, Other Issues,” Al Arabiyah Television (Dubai), December 2, 2011.
14 Revolutionary militia members from Zintan under the command of the Madani clan claimed to have 5,000 armed
men in Tripoli as of early September. Other reports state that the umbrella Council of Revolutionaries in Tripoli places
its numbers at 7,000 personnel. Fighters from Misuratah reportedly shifted toward the pursuit of pro-Qadhafi forces in
Sirte and Bani Walid during September and October, and their numbers in Tripoli had declined. Belhajj claimed to
have taken a leading role in the Tripoli operations. He was released from prison by the Qadhafi government in 2010 as
part of a reconciliation agreement with LIFG fighters in exchange for their renunciation of violence. See Adrien
Jaulmes, “The Fragile Patchwork of the Libyan Rebels,” Le Figaro (Paris), September 8, 2011; U.S. Open Source
Center (OSC) Report GMP20110824715001, “Rebel Commander Balhaj Urges Al-Qadhafi Brigades To ‘Abandon’
Regime,” August 20, 2011; and OSC Report GMP20100323950045, “Three Leaders of Libyan Fighting Group Freed –
Paper,” March 23, 2010.
Congressional Research Service
14
Libya: Transition and U.S. Policy
in the process of managing relations among militias, removing heavy weaponry from civilian
hands, and finding recruitment or demobilization pathways for armed volunteers. The Defense
Figure 3. Libya’s Interim Government
On November 24, Interim Prime Minster Abderrahim al Kib administered inaugural oaths to new members of Libya’s
interim government, which will manage the country’s executive decision making in consultation with the Transitional
National Council and the Libyan public until national elections are held and an elected national assembly selects a new
cabinet. The members of the current interim cabinet are as fol ows:
•
Dr. Mustafa Abu Shaqur Ghayth - Deputy Prime Minister
•
Dr. Umar Abdallah Abdel Karim - Deputy Prime Minister
•
Mr. Ali Ahmad Salah - Deputy Prime Minister
•
Mr. Osama Juwayli – Minster of Defense
•
Mr. Fawzi Abdel Al – Minister of Interior
•
Mr. Ashur Bin Khayyal - Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation
•
Mr. Hassan Zaqlam – Minister of Finance
•
Dr. Issa al Tuwajar – Minister of Planning
•
Mr. Tahar Sharkas – Minister of Economy
•
Mr. Abderrahman Bin Yazzah – Minister of Oil and Gas
•
Dr. Hamzah Abu Faris – Minister of Islamic Endowments (awqaf) and Religious Affairs
•
Mr. Abdel Nasser Jibril Hamid - Minister for the Care of the Families of Martyrs and Missing Persons
•
Mrs. Mabrukah Sharif Jibril – Minister of Social Affairs
•
Mr. Sa'sulayman Ali Sahli – Minister of Education
•
Mr. Mustafa Rijbani – Minister of Labor and Vocational Training
•
Mr. Ali Hamidah Ashur – Minister of Justice
•
Dr. Fatimah al Hamrush – Minister of Health
•
Mr. Muhammad al Hadi al Hashimi al Harari – Minister of Local Government
•
Mr. Ibrahim al Suqutri - Minister of Housing and Urban Planning
•
Dr. Anwar Fayturi - Minister of Communication and Information Technology
•
Mr. Yusuf Al Wahishi – Minister of Transport
•
Mr. Sulayman Abdel Hamid Bin Kharuba – Minister of Agriculture and Animal and Sea Resources
•
Dr. Muhammad Mahmud al Fatisi – Minister of Industry
•
Dr. Na'im al Gharyani - Minister for Higher Education and Scientific Research
•
Professor Fathi Tirbil - Minister for Youth and Sports
•
Dr. Abderrahman Habil - Minister of Culture and Civil Society
•
Dr. Awad Burayk Ibrahim - Minister Electricity and Renewable Energy
Source: U.S. Open Source Center Report GMP20111122950093, “Libya's Interim PM Outlines Priorities,
Announces New Cabinet,” Libya TV (Doha), November 22, 2011.
Notes: Limited profiles for some cabinet members are available from CRS.
Congressional Research Service
15
Libya: Transition and U.S. Policy
Ministry has signaled its intent to reorganize military councils and integrate 50,000 fighters into
the national security forces.15
It remains to be seen what influence the incorporation of militia commanders and members in
leadership roles in the security ministries will have over the perceived neutrality or success of
these measures: Minister of Defense Osama al Juwayli was a prominent revolutionary
commander of the Zintan militia, and Minister of Interior Fawzi Abdel Al was a leader of a
Misuratah-based revolutionary group. The TNC has further signaled its intention to take a
inclusive approach with regard to government personnel not known to have been involved in
severe human rights violations or public corruption. The success of the TNC initiatives and the
acceptability of this approach among Libyans also remains to be seen.
The controversy surrounding the killing of Qadhafi, the capture of his son Sayf al Islam and
senior associates, and the reported reluctance of some militia groups to begin disarmament has
reopened questions about military command and control among the TNC and the revolutionaries.
Previously, the July 2011 assassination of rebel military commander and prominent regime
defector Abdelfattah Younis al Ubaydi, reportedly by rival rebel forces, had cast serious doubt on
the unity of TNC-affiliated military forces and led to the resignation of several TNC leadership
figures. Some of those figures, including former TNC Deputy Chairman Ali al Isawi have now
been named as suspects in the Abdelfattah Younis killing.16
Regional Weapons Smuggling
Israeli officials have stated that “weapons are available in Libya as a result of the unstable
situation there, and Hamas has exploited it to buy weapons from Libyan smugglers.”17 According
to unnamed Israeli officials, “thousands” of weapons have entered Gaza from Libya, including
“SA-7 anti-aircraft missiles and rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs),” but the weaponry is “not a
major qualitative enhancement” for Gaza-based armed groups.18 CRS cannot independently
verify these statements, and the Obama Administration has not commented on the record
regarding reports of arms shipments from Libya to Gaza. Authorities in other countries, including
Egypt, Niger, Algeria, and Tunisia continue to express similar concerns. There is no verified
reporting on members of the TNC having been involved with reported shipments of weapons and
material from Libya to Gaza or other countries since the uprising began.
Undeclared Chemical Weapons Raise Questions
The security of Libya’s stockpiles of declared chemical weapons material and its remaining
nuclear materials have been the subject of sustained scrutiny.19 The TNC formally notified the
15 OSC Report GMP20111207950015, “Libyan authorities give militias two week-deadline to leave Tripoli,” Al
Jazirah Television (Doha) December 6, 2011.
16 OSC Report GMP20111130950056, “Libyan Attorney General Names Killers of Late Maj-Gen Yunus,” Birniq
(Benghazi), November 28, 2011.
17 Reuters, “Israel sees Libya as New Source of Arms for Gaza,” July 21, 2011.
18 Reuters, “Israel Says Gaza Gets Anti-Plane Arms from Libya,” August 29, 2011.
19 For an overview of Libya’s declared chemical weapons and nuclear materials see U.S. State Department, Condition
(10) (C) Report - Compliance with the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and
(continued...)
Congressional Research Service
16
Libya: Transition and U.S. Policy
Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) on November 1 that it had
located what it believed to be undeclared chemical weapons at storage depots that reports suggest
are near Hun and Sabha. The Qadhafi government reportedly omitted hundreds of mustard gas-
filled artillery shells from its original declaration to the OPCW in contradiction to the basic
commitments it made as part of the normalization of its relations with the United States and
Europe.20 TNC forces control the sites where key declared and undeclared materials of concern
are stored, and TNC officials have committed to upholding Libya’s commitment to destroy
chemical weapons materials under the mantle of the OPCW.21
In late 2010, Libya had restarted the long-delayed destruction of its declared mustard agent and
precursor stockpiles, although technical problems and the outbreak of the conflict resulted in
Libya missing its May 2011 deadline. In August 2011, the State Department reported that prior to
the conflict, Libya had destroyed over 50% of its declared mustard agent stocks and over 40% of
its declared liquid chemical weapons precursors. The transitional authorities are expected to
reengage with the multilateral Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons to set a new
destruction timetable. Destruction equipment that failed prior to the revolution must be repaired,
and the present target date for the destruction of Libya’s chemical weapons related material is
April 29, 2012.22
Libya destroyed the munitions it possessed for dispersing mustard agent in 2004, and during the
2011 conflict, U.S. officials repeatedly stated publicly that they believed the remaining sulfur
mustard agent and precursor stockpiles were secure.23 The non-weaponized nature of the declared
sulfur mustard agent and precursor materials suggested that the material posed a smaller threat
than otherwise may have been the case.24 However, the revelation that Qadhafi withheld
information about weaponized stockpiles and that the OPCW and U.S. and European intelligence
services appear to have had no knowledge of the omission raises serious questions concerning
intelligence and a key rationale for the Qadhafi government’s international rehabilitation.
Libya’s nuclear materials also have been subject to international and U.S. oversight and joint
operations that removed highly enriched uranium and other proliferation-sensitive items. Libya’s
research reactor east of Tripoli at Tajura was converted with U.S. assistance in 2006 to operate
(...continued)
Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction, August 2011; and, International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
Board of Governors, Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Socialist People’s Libyan Arab
Jamahiriya, GOV/2008/39, September 12, 2008.
20 R. Jeffrey Smith, Joby Warrick, and Colum Lynch, “Iran may have sent Libya shells for chemical weapons,”
Washington Post, November 20, 2011.
21 The OPCW has stated that “the new authorities inherited the obligations of the old regime,” and that the OPCW “will
continue to work with the Libyan authorities to verify and destroy any newly declared stocks.” AFP, “Libya's NTC
Pledges To Destroy Chemical Weapons: OPCW” November 4, 2011, and, OPCW, “OPCW Inspectors Return to
Libya,” November 4, 2011.
22 AFP, “Libya's NTC Pledges To Destroy Chemical Weapons: OPCW” November 4, 2011.
23 The declared chemical materials are stored at Rabta, southwest of Tripoli and Ruwagha, near the Al Jufrah Air Force
Base in central Libya. According to the U.S. State Department, identified mustard and nerve agent precursors present in
Libya included pinacolyl alcohol, isopropanol, phosphorus trichloride, 2-chloroethanol, tributylamine, and thionyl
chloride. See State Department, Office of the Spokesperson, “Libya: Securing Stockpiles Promotes Security,” August
26, 2011.
24 For example, Colonel David Lapan, a Pentagon spokesman argued that “Even if not weaponized, there’s still a threat,
but it’s a smaller threat than if it is weaponized.” Agence France Presse, “Libya Has Mustard Gas, Lacks Delivery
Systems: Monitor,” March 10, 2011.
Congressional Research Service
17
Libya: Transition and U.S. Policy
using low-enriched uranium. Libya also possesses a stored stockpile of at least several hundred
tons of uranium oxide yellowcake, reportedly stored near Sabha. Programs to engage Libyan
nuclear scientists reportedly were disrupted by the recent conflict, but may be restarted as the
transition unfolds.
Libyan Political Dynamics and Islamists
Political Dynamics
Prior to the 2011 revolution, Libya’s political dynamics were characterized by competition among
interest groups seeking to influence policy within the confines of the country’s authoritarian
political system and amid Libya’s emergence from international isolation. Economic reformers
embraced changes to Libya’s former socialist model to meet current needs, even as political
reforms languished amid disputes between hard-line political forces and reform advocates. In
general, the legacies of Italian colonial occupation and Libya’s struggle for independence in the
early-to-mid-20th century continue to influence Libyan politics. Rhetorical references to
preserving sovereignty and resistance to foreign domination are common in political statements
from many individuals and groups. These trends are reflected in the celebration of the legacy of
the anti-colonial figure Omar al Mukhtar, particularly during the 2011 uprising.
Echoes of social networks last active during the Libyan monarchy period now are resurfacing.25
Tribal relationships have remained socially important, particularly in non-urban settings, and had
some political role under Qadhafi with regard to the distribution of leadership positions in
government ministries, in some economic relationships between some social groups and families,
and in political-military relations. Tribal loyalties reportedly remained strong within and between
branches of the armed services, and members of Qadhafi’s tribe, the Qadhafa, have held many
high-ranking government positions. Some members of larger tribes, such as the Magariha,
Misurata, and the Warfalla, sought to advance their broad interests under Qadhafi through control
of official positions of influence, although some of their members opposed the regime on grounds
of tribal discrimination. The reversal of long-standing tribal dynamics and the assertion of tribal
leadership in conjunction with a proliferation of arms has the potential to create instability.
Competition for influence among Libya’s regions characterized the pre-Qadhafi period, and some
Libyans saw the 1969 Qadhafi-led revolution as having been partly facilitated by western and
southern Libyan resentments of the Al Sanusi monarchy based in the eastern Libyan region of
Cyrenaica. More recent Libyan politics have not been dominated by overt inter-regional tension,
although pro-Qadhafi forces accused the organizers and leaders of the revolt as having, inter alia,
an eastern regional separatist agenda. The TNC denied these accusations and has quickly moved
representatives westward to Tripoli, while proposing changes to the structure and membership of
the TNC to improve national representation. Some reports suggest that federalism is one model
being explored by some groups, although the TNC has not endorsed federalism to date. The
organization of local representative councils and the arming of locally organized militia groups
during the revolution has further complicated efforts to promote national unity.
Political parties and all opposition groups were banned under Qadhafi. Formal political pluralism
was frowned upon by many members of the ruling elite, even as, in the period preceding the
25 See Lacher, op cit.
Congressional Research Service
18
Libya: Transition and U.S. Policy
unrest, some regime figures advocated for greater popular participation in existing government
institutions. The general lack of widespread experience in formal political organization,
competition, and administration is likely to remain a challenge in the immediate post-Qadhafi era.
Independent NGO reports suggest ad hoc political organization is ongoing across Libya and much
of it reflects a desire for institution-based, democratic governance rooted in the rule of law. Some
nascent political and social groups have sought external training and support to overcome the
legacy of decades of restrictions. The continued openness of newly liberated Libyans to outside
examples and assistance remains to be determined, and different groups are likely to take
different approaches.
Prior to the 2011 uprising, Libya’s opposition movements were often categorized broadly as
Islamist, royalist, or secular nationalist in orientation. Their activities and effectiveness had been
largely limited by government repression and infiltration, disorganization, rivalry, and ideological
differences. New efforts to coordinate opposition activities had begun in response to Libya’s
reintegration to the international community and the emergence of a broader political reform
debate in the Arab world, and gained momentum with the outbreak of region-wide protests and
political change in late 2010 and early 2011. The pairing of domestic popular revolt and regime
defectors to the broadly defined opposition cause was welcomed by many established opposition
groups in exile, even if the specific political demands of newly active opposition supporters and
their compatibility with the agendas of the established groups remain unclear.
The emergence of real political competition in the midst of Libya’s post-conflict recovery and
post-authoritarian transition creates unique challenges for U.S. policymakers. These include
identifying new leaders and groups; determining their relative intentions, goals, and legitimacy;
and assessing the capabilities and intentions of armed elements.
Libyans, Islam, and Islamists
Like citizens in other Middle Eastern societies, Libyans have grappled with questions posed by
Islamist activism, state repression of Islamist groups, and violent Islamist extremism over a
period of decades. As the transition unfolds, Libyans are debating the role of Islamist groups in
political life, the role of Islam in society, and the nature and proper responses to threats posed by
armed extremist groups. These debates may have implications for U.S. policy toward Libya and
the region.
Most Libyans accept a prominent role for Sunni Islamic tradition in public life, but differ in their
personal preferences and interpretations of their faith. Islam is the official religion and the Quran
is the nominal basis for the country’s law and its social code. Since Qadhafi’s downfall, a number
of confrontations between conservative militia forces and local religious communities have
centered around disputed interpretations of Islamic religious and cultural practices.26 In some
cases, armed Salafist groups have destroyed or damaged shrines and tombs.
To date, the leadership of the TNC has not demonstrated rhetorical or material support for Al
Qaeda, the Muslim Brotherhood, or Hamas. On March 30, the TNC released a statement
affirming its support for U.N. Security Council resolutions on Al Qaeda and the Taliban and U.N.
conventions on terrorism. The statement “affirms the Islamic identity of the Libyan People, its
commitment to the moderate Islamic values, its full rejection to the extremist ideas and its
26 Christian Lowe, “Battlelines drawn for fight over Libyan Islam,” Reuters, November 30, 2011.
Congressional Research Service
19
Libya: Transition and U.S. Policy
commitment to combating them in all circumstances, and refuses the allegations aiming to
associate Al Qaeda with the revolutionists in Libya.”
The TNC's draft interim constitutional charter, released in August, states in Article One that
"Libya is an independent Democratic State wherein the people are the source of authorities.…
Islam is the Religion of the State and the principal source of legislation is Islamic Jurisprudence
(sharia).… The State shall guarantee for non-Muslims the freedom of practicing religious rights
and shall guarantee respect for their systems of personal status.” The content of TNC chairman
Abdeljalil’s statement on Libya’s liberation attracted domestic and international interest,
particularly his emphasis on the population’s Islamic character and the extent to which Libyan
law might be based on religious law in the future.27 Libyans hold a wide array of views on these
questions and are now freely sharing them.
The Libyan Muslim Brotherhood
Like other political organizations and opposition groups, the Muslim Brotherhood was banned in
Libya under Qadhafi. However, its membership worked clandestinely at home and remained
active abroad. The group has renewed its public activity in Libya since the start of the revolution.
A statement attributed to the Libyan Muslim Brotherhood in late February 2011 welcomed the
formation of the TNC but called for a future, non-tribal government to “be formed by those who
actually led the revolution on the ground” and to exclude supporters of the original Qadhafi coup
or officials involved in human rights violations.28 The group’s newly elected general guide,
Bashir Abdelsalam al Kabti, returned to Libya after 33 years in the United States in February
2011. In interviews since his November 2011 election at the Brotherhood’s first public conference
in decades, Al Kabti has called for weaponry to be returned to military depots and has referred to
Islam “a complete way of life for individuals and society.” He also has spoken in favor of “a civil
state in which Islam is the reference” including “a multi-party system … the separation of powers
and … free media.”29
Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG)/Libyan Islamic Movement for
Change (LIMC)
The LIFG is a U.S.-designated Foreign Terrorist Organization and Islamist movement that used
violence in past attempts to overthrow Muammar al Qadhafi and his government.30 Over the last
20-plus years, members of the LIFG were reported to have fought in various conflicts around the
27 In his remarks, Abdeljalil stated that “We, as a Muslim state, have taken the Islamic sharia as the main source of
legislation, and therefore, any law which contravenes the Islamic principles of sharia, is legally void.” He gave as
examples policies prohibiting men from marrying more than one wife and allowing interest-based financial
transactions. The draft charter that the TNC has proposed to guide the interim transition period states that “Islam is the
religion of the state and the principal source of legislation is Islamic jurisprudence (sharia) .... The State shall guarantee
for non-Moslems the freedom of practicing religious rights and shall guarantee respect for their systems of personal
status.”
28 OSC Report GMP20110228405001, “Libyan Muslim Brotherhood Group Supports ‘Glorious Revolution,’” February
28, 2011.
29 OSC Report GMP20111121950082, “Libyan Muslim Brotherhood Leader Says Islam ‘Complete Way Of Life,’”
November 21, 2011.
30 The United States froze the LIFG’s U.S. assets under Executive Order 13224 in September 2001, and formally
designated the LIFG as a Foreign Terrorist Organization in December 2004.
Congressional Research Service
20
Libya: Transition and U.S. Policy
world involving Muslims, including in Afghanistan during the 1980s, the Balkans during the
1990s, and Iraq after 2003. According to the U.S. State Department, members of the group at
times have demonstrated distinct and competing priorities: “some members maintained a strictly
anti-Qadhafi focus … others … aligned with Osama bin Laden, and are believed to be part of the
Al Qaeda leadership structure or active in international terrorism.”31 According to the 2010 State
Department report on terrorism released in August 2011, many LIFG members in Europe and
Libya rejected a 2007 statement by Ayman al Zawahiri and the late Abu Layth Al Libi
announcing the merger of the LIFG with Al Qaeda.32 In a July 2009 statement, LIFG members in
Britain characterized the November 2007 Al Qaeda affiliation announcement as “a personal
decision that is at variance with the basic status of the group,” and sought to “clearly emphasize
that the group is not, has never been, and will never be, linked to the Al Qaeda organization.”33
Prior to the recent unrest, many leading LIFG figures had been imprisoned and released after
renouncing the use of violence as part of a dialogue and reconciliation process with the Qadhafi
government.34 Some figures affiliated with the LIFG, such as current Tripoli-based militia
commander Abdelhakim Belhajj, participated in this reconciliation process and have reiterated
their rejection of Al Qaeda and its ideology in public interviews in 2011. Some Libya-based
members of the LIFG responded to the release of leading figures on February 16 by announcing
the reorganization of the group as the Libyan Islamic Movement for Change (LIMC). The LIMC
demands political change and an end to corruption, and has underscored its decision to “enter a
new stage of struggle in which we do not adopt an armed program but a belief in the Libyan
people’s ability to bring about the change to which we are aspiring.”35
Al Qaeda in the Lands of the Islamic Maghreb (AQLIM/AQIM)36
U.S. government officials and their regional counterparts remain focused on the potential for the
unrest in Libya to provide opportunities to Al Qaeda’s regional affiliate, Al Qaeda in the Lands of
the Islamic Maghreb (AQLIM/AQIM). Some press reports suggest that AQIM personnel have
obtained weaponry from looted Libyan military stockpiles, including surface-to-air missiles. The
Algerian, Malian, and Chadian governments continue to express concern about the potential for
instability in Libya to weaken security along Libya’s long borders, which could allow AQIM
operatives and criminal networks that provide services to AQIM to move more freely. While the
Libya-based leaders of the LIFG participated in reconciliation with Qadhafi’s government while
in prison and renounced violence as a domestic political tool, some of their supporters are
reported to have sent Libyans abroad to participate in insurgencies and terrorism. This has raised
31 See U.S. Department of State, “Terrorist Organizations: LIFG,” Country Reports on Terrorism 2010, August 2011.
32 OSC Report FEA20071104393586, “Al-Zawahiri, Al-Libi: Libyan Islamic Fighting Group Joins Al-Qa’ida,”
November 3, 2007.
33 OSC Report GMP20090703825003, “Libyan Islamic Fighting Group Abroad Issues Statement Supporting Regime
Dialogue,” July 3, 2009.
34 Through this process, over 200 LIFG members were released from jail, including senior leaders and former
commanders who have been active during the recent unrest. Prominent prisoners released under the auspices of the
reconciliation program include former LIFG leader Abdelhakim Belhajj, former military director Khaled Sharif, and
leading LIFG ideologue Sami Sa’idi. OSC Report GMP20100323950045, “Three leaders of Libyan Fighting Group
freed – paper,” March 23, 2010.
35 OSC Report GMP20110217825017, “Libya: IFG Elements Establish New Group Aiming for Peaceful Regime
Change,” February 17, 2011.
36 For more information on AQIM and its relationship to Al Qaeda, see CRS Report R41070, Al Qaeda and Affiliates:
Historical Perspective, Global Presence, and Implications for U.S. Policy, coordinated by John Rollins.
Congressional Research Service
21
Libya: Transition and U.S. Policy
concerns among officials and analysts about the potential for cooperation between AQIM and
some Libyan Islamists. Al Qaeda figures have endorsed such cooperation in public statements in
recent months, offering a range of unsolicited political and military advice to any Libyans who
will listen.
• On April 16, London-based pan-Arab newspaper Al Hayat published an email
interview with a reported spokesman for AQIM named Salah Abu Muhammad,
who stated that AQIM had obtained weaponry from Libyan military stockpiles
and claimed that AQIM had cooperative relationships with Al Hasadi and so-
called “emirates” in several eastern Libyan cities. A subsequent statement from
another reported AQIM source accused Algerian intelligence services of
fabricating the Abu Muhammad interview.37 Neither source could be
independently verified.
• A March 17 statement attributed to AQIM leader Abdelmalik Droukdel (aka Abu
Mus’ab al Wadud) addressed Libyan rebels and sought to associate the Libyan
uprising with Al Qaeda’s campaign against Arab and Western governments.38 The
statement advised Libyans to avoid cooperation with the United States and “to
rally around the revolutionary leaders who are holding fast to their Islamic faith
and whose readiness to make sacrifices has been proven on the battlefield.” Other
AQIM figures have sought to explain that their organization is not seeking to
direct or claim credit for the Libyan uprising, but that AQIM is supportive of the
campaign against Qadhafi.
• On October 29, Al Qaeda leader Abu Yahya al Libi released a forty minute
videotape that invited the “Muslim people in Libya to keep their arms within
reach,” and “to use these arms to defend their religion, themselves, their honor,
and their properties, while adhering to the clear and precise laws of sharia
(Islamic law), free of tribalism and pre-Islamic disagreements.”39
United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL)
The Obama Administration has not publicly disclosed plans for U.S. participation in multilateral
post-conflict security, stability, or reconstruction operations in Libya or highlighted requests for
new funding to support such efforts by third-parties, including the new United Nations Support
Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) established by Resolution 2009.40 U.N. Secretary General Ban Ki-
moon has named UK-born Ian Martin as the director for UNSMIL. Martin is continuing the work
he began in mid-2011 as the Secretary General’s special adviser for post-conflict and transition
issues in Libya. A sector-by-sector post-conflict needs assessment is planned under the auspices
of the TNC, the United Nations, the European Union, the World Bank, and the International
37 See OSC Report GMP20110416825001, “Al-Qa’ida in Islamic Maghreb Spokesman Says There Are Islamic
Amirates in Libya,” April 16, 2011; and, OSC Report AFP20110418950070, “AQIM accuses Al-Hayat newspaper of
falsifying interview with spokesman,” April 18, 2011.
38 Droukdel said “the battle you are fighting now with the tyrant ... It is itself the battle we fought yesterday and are
fighting today.” See OSC Report GMP20110318405002, “AQIM Amir’s Audio Message to Libya, ‘The Descendants
of Umar al-Mukhtar,’” March 17, 2011.
39 OSC Report GMP20111205405002, “Abu-Yahya al-Libi Video Calls on Libyans To Keep Arms, Institute Shari'ah,”
December 5, 2011.
40 The United Nations Department of Political Affairs is responsible for UNSMIL and is funded through assessed
contributions of U.N. member states, including the United States.
Congressional Research Service
22
Libya: Transition and U.S. Policy
Monetary Fund (IMF). A preliminary visit by World Bank and IMF officials took place in early
October. To date, UNSMIL activities have included electoral advisory support, transitional justice
consultation, and public security and economic needs assessments. On December 2, the Security
Council extended the UNSMIL mandate through mid-March 2012 and tasked UNSMIL with
“assisting and supporting Libyan national efforts to address the threats of proliferation of all arms
and related materiel of all types, in particular man-portable surface to air missiles.”
Libyan Assets, TNC Funding, and Oil Exports
The United States and others froze tens of billions of dollars in Libyan state assets, and the
Obama Administration placed targeted sanctions on Libyan oil companies and other entities in
support of Executive Order 13566 and the U.N. Security Council resolutions 1970 and 1973. The
TNC has identified up to $170 billion in Libyan assets around the world to which it is now
seeking access. TNC officials indicate that they plan to prioritize a public financial management
assessment in order to give third parties confidence in their ability to responsibly manage blocked
assets. U.N. Security Council Resolution 2009 adopted in September 2011 reflects this plan and
identifies the World Bank and IMF as partners in conducting the assessment. The
intergovernmental Libya Contact Group created a “temporary financial mechanism” to support
the TNC,41 and several governments have pledged hundreds of millions of dollars in aid via this
channel.
U.N. Security Council Resolution 2009 reiterated the Security Council’s intent to ensure that
frozen assets are made available as soon as possible to and for the benefit of the Libyan people:
• The resolution modifies the existing asset freeze requirements related to certain
Libyan entities, lifting entirely the measures applicable to the Libyan National
Oil Corporation and setting conditions for the release of some frozen assets
belonging to the Central Bank of Libya, the Libya Investment Authority, and
other prominent national financial entities.
• Under the changes, U.N. member states, after consulting with Libyan authorities,
may notify the sanctions committee on Libya of their “intent to authorize access
to funds, other financial assets, or economic resources,” for five purposes:
“humanitarian needs; fuel, electricity and water for strictly civilian uses;
resuming Libyan production and sale of hydrocarbons; establishing, operating, or
strengthening institutions of civilian government and civilian public
infrastructure; or facilitating the resumption of banking sector operations,
including to support or facilitate international trade with Libya.”
• The Libyan authorities or the U.N. sanctions committee (acting on a consensus
basis) may block asset transfer proposals within five days. U.N. asset freezes
affecting named individuals remain in place.
41 Over 20 Contact Group members attended the meeting in Rome including and officials from the Arab League, the
African Union, the World Bank, NATO, the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), the Organization of the Islamic
Conference (OIC), the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Australia, Bahrain, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Jordan,
Morocco, Netherland, Poland, Romania, Malta, Canada, Tunisia, Spain, Turkey, the United Kingdom, the United
States, Sudan and the Holy See. Portugal observed the meeting.
Congressional Research Service
23
Libya: Transition and U.S. Policy
U.S. Policy on Assets and Sanctions
The Obama Administration has begun transferring $1.5 billion of roughly $37 billion in frozen
Libyan assets for the benefit of the Libyan people and the TNC. According to the State
Department, the $1.5 billion was identified in consultation with the TNC for the following
purposes:42
• Transfers to international humanitarian organizations: Up to $120 million for
pending United Nations Appeal requests and up to $380 million more for any
revised U.N. Appeals for Libya and other humanitarian needs.
• Transfers to suppliers for fuel and other goods for strictly civilian purposes: Up
to $500 million to pay for fuel costs for strictly civilian needs (e.g., hospitals,
electricity, and desalinization) and for other humanitarian purchases.
• Transfers to the Temporary Financial Mechanism established by the Libya
Contact Group: Up to $400 million for providing “key social services, including
education and health” and up to $100 million for “food and other humanitarian
needs.”
The U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) has issued
general licenses, effective September 19, that authorize new transactions with Libyan state
entities and maintain the asset freeze established under Executive Order 13566 on named
individuals and state entities, with the exception of the National Oil Corporation and other oil
sector firms. On September 22, the European Union announced that previously frozen funds
belonging to the Central Bank of Libya, the Libyan Investment Authority, the Libyan Foreign
Bank, and the Libya Africa Investment Portfolio were authorized to be released “for humanitarian
and civilian needs, to support renewed activity in the Libyan oil and banking sectors and to assist
with building a civilian government.”43 Resolution 2009 calls on governments to submit
individual notifications of intent to the Libyan authorities and the U.N. sanctions committee as
part of the process for releasing funds.
Two factors may influence the decisions of U.S. policymakers, their international counterparts,
and Libyan authorities about the relative urgency and desirability of releasing frozen funds. First,
the TNC’s present need for immediate access to blocked assets may be less severe than earlier in
2011, given aid and asset transfers to the TNC worth several billion dollars that have taken place
since the fall of Tripoli and the changes outlined in Resolution 2009 that facilitate the future sale
of oil and the unblocking of some frozen assets. As of late September, open-source estimates
suggested that more than $15 billion in blocked Libyan assets had been identified by various
governments for transfer to the TNC, and press reports suggested that the TNC had located over
$23 billion in previously unknown domestic assets that were contributing to its ability to spend on
salaries and services. In late November, the U.N. Secretary-General reported that “Libya is
operating with a constrained and uncertain budget envelope for the 2011-2012 period.”
Second, countries holding blocked assets, including the United States, may remain wary about the
immediate transfer of large sums to the control of the TNC, given uncertainty about the make-up
and priorities of the TNC and the interim government. While recent United Nations resolutions on
42 State Department, Office of the Spokesperson, Unfreezing Assets to Meet the Critical Humanitarian Needs of the
Libyan People, Washington, DC, August 25, 2011.
43 European Council, EU implements latest U.N. decisions in support of Libya, September 22, 2011.
Congressional Research Service
24
Libya: Transition and U.S. Policy
Libya clearly underscore that blocked assets remain the property of the Libyan people, Resolution
2009 reiterates that, pending transfer for authorized purposes, assets shall remain blocked. It also
creates a joint consultation mechanism among Libyan leaders, the sanctions committee, and those
governments holding blocked funds.
Libya’s Oil Production, Exports, and Revenue
Libya’s oil production and export infrastructure survived the revolution relatively unscathed,
although some facility damage, the departure of large numbers of laborers and skilled technicians,
and the lack of maintenance during the conflict may limit the speed with which production and
exports can be restarted.44 Prior to the conflict, Libya was exporting 1.3 million barrels of oil per
day; in November, production was roughly 550,000 barrels per day. Experts differ in their
projections about how soon production and exports could return to pre-conflict levels, with
optimistic and pessimistic assumptions differing over expected security conditions, changes to
sanctions, and the return of foreign laborers. The U.S. Energy Information Administration
projects that Libyan output could return to pre-conflict levels by the end of 2012. The importance
of oil exports for Libya cannot be overstated, as the IMF reported in February 2011 that over 90%
of state revenue came from the hydrocarbon sector in 2010. On September 6, National Oil
Company official Nuri Berruien gave an “optimistic forecast” that in 15 months, production
would resume at the pre-war level of 1.6 million barrels per day.
Prior to the rebel victory, the U.S. Treasury Department had issued a Statement of Licensing
Policy allowing U.S. persons to request from OFAC “specific authorization to trade in
hydrocarbon fuel (i.e., oil, gas, and petroleum products) ... to the extent that such hydrocarbon
fuel is exported under the auspices of the Transitional National Council of Libya.”45 The license
further allowed U.S. persons to request permission “to engage in transactions related to the
production of oil, gas, and petroleum products in areas controlled by the Transitional National
Council of Libya.” More recently released general licenses removed restrictions on transactions
with Libyan oil firms.
International Criminal Court and United Nations Human Rights
Council Investigations46
On May 4, Moreno-Ocampo had reported to the Security Council pursuant to the referral of the
situation in Libya since February 15, 2011, to the ICC by Resolution 1970, and stated that the
preliminary investigation conducted by the ICC prosecutor’s office “establishes reasonable
grounds to believe that widespread and systematic attacks against the civilian population,
including murder and persecution as crimes against humanity, have been and continue to be
committed in Libya,” in addition to “war crimes” during the ongoing armed conflict.47 The death
44 The oil terminal at Brega reportedly suffered the most damage, along with support infrastructure elsewhere.
45 Office of Foreign Assets Control, Statement of Licensing Policy on the Trade in Oil, Gas, and Petroleum Products
Exported Under the Auspices of the Transitional National Council of Libya,” (updated April 26, 2011), available at
http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/Programs/Documents/libya_oil_gas.pdf.
46 For more information on the ICC and Africa, see CRS Report R41116, The International Criminal Court (ICC):
Jurisdiction, Extradition, and U.S. Policy, by Emily C. Barbour and Matthew C. Weed and CRS Report RL34665,
International Criminal Court Cases in Africa: Status and Policy Issues, coordinated by Alexis Arieff.
47 U.N. Document S/PV.6528, Provisional Record of the 6528th meeting of the Security Council, May 4, 2011.
Congressional Research Service
25
Libya: Transition and U.S. Policy
of Muammar al Qadhafi, the arrest in Libya of his son Sayf al Islam, and conflicting reports about
the arrest of former intelligence chief Abdullah al Senussi have complicated efforts to prosecute
these individuals on charges of crimes against humanity issued by the International Criminal
Court (ICC).48 Outstanding ICC arrest warrants notwithstanding, TNC officials have asserted
their intention to prosecute Sayf al Islam al Qadhafi and Abdullah al Senussi in Libyan courts.49
Prior to Qadhafi’s death, some observers argued that the prospect of an ICC trial made it less
likely that he would have agreed to relinquish power or to have surrendered to the opposition.50
On June 1, 2011, the U.N. Human Rights Council’s Commission of Inquiry issued a report
characterizing the Libyan conflict as “a civil war” and concluded that “international crimes, and
specifically crimes against humanity and war crimes, have been committed.”51 With regard to
government forces, it stated,
The commission has found that there have been acts constituting murder, imprisonment,
other forms of severe deprivation of physical liberty in violation of fundamental rules of
international law, torture, persecution, enforced disappearance and sexual abuse that were
committed by Government forces as part of a widespread or systematic attack against a
civilian population with knowledge of the attack.… The consistent pattern of violations
identified creates an inference that they were carried out as a result of policy decisions by
Colonel Qadhafi and members of his inner circle. Further investigation is required in relation
to making definitive findings with regard to the identity of those responsible for the crimes
committed.
With regard to opposition forces, the commission “established that some acts of torture and cruel
treatment and some outrages upon personal dignity in particular humiliating and degrading
treatment have been committed by opposition armed forces, in particular against persons in
detention, migrant workers and those believed to be mercenaries.” These acts could constitute
war crimes. The commission “is not of the view that the violations committed by the opposition
armed forces were part of any ‘widespread or systematic attack’ against a civilian population such
as to amount to crimes against humanity.”
The commission considered its findings in light of the future transitional justice needs of the
Libyan people and recommended that the U.N. Human Rights Council establish a mechanism to
continue the monitoring and investigation of human rights abuses in Libya for a period of one
year. Many observers expect that the Council mechanism will investigate the circumstances of
Qadhafi’s death along with reports of summary executions by both sides of the conflict as part of
its monitoring efforts over the coming year. The U.N. Secretary-General has cited reports
suggesting that both pro- and anti-Qadhafi forces may have engaged in killings that amounted to
48 On June 27, 2011, Pre-Trial Chamber I of the International Criminal Court (ICC) issued arrest warrants for three
individuals: Muammar al Qadhafi, his son Sayf al Islam al Qadhafi, and intelligence chief Abdullah al Senussi, for
“crimes against humanity committed against civilians” not including “war crimes committed during the armed conflict
that started at the end of February.” ICC Prosecutor’s Office, Public Redacted Version of Prosecutor’s Application
Pursuant to Article 58 as to Muammar Mohammed Abu Minyar Gaddafi, Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi, and Abdullah Al
Senussi,” May 16, 2011.
49 ICC Prosecutor Luis Moreno-Ocampo requested the warrants on May 16.
50 For example, see International Crisis Group, “Popular Protest in North Africa and the Middle East (V): Making
Sense of Libya,” Middle East/North Africa Report No. 107, June 6, 2011.
51 The commission members are Cherif Bassiouni of Egypt, Asma Khader of Jordan, and Philippe Kirsch of Canada.
See U.N. Document A/HRC/17/44, “Report of the International Commission of Inquiry to investigate all alleged
violations of international human rights law in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya,” June 1, 2011.
Congressional Research Service
26
Libya: Transition and U.S. Policy
war crimes during fighting in Tripoli, Bani Walid, and Sirte toward the end of the 2011 conflict.52
A final written report is expected in early 2012.
The death of Muammar al Qadhafi, his son Mutassim al Qadhafi, and defense official Abu Bakr
Yunis Jabr near Sirte on October 20 brought a dramatic end to the conflict and signaled the
irreversibility of political change to Libyans and the international community. Nevertheless, the
uncertain circumstances of Qadhafi’s death have raised questions about the accountability of
armed groups in Libya and the TNC’s nascent control over the country—video footage appeared
to show Qadhafi wounded, but alive in rebel custody prior to his subsequent death by a gunshot
wound.53 TNC officials have promised to investigate the events leading up to Qadhafi’s death,
amid calls from human rights organizations and other international actors for a full public inquiry.
Author Contact Information
Christopher M. Blanchard
Analyst in Middle Eastern Affairs
cblanchard@crs.loc.gov, 7-0428
52 Oral Update by the International Commission of Inquiry on Libya to the Human Rights Council, Geneva, September
19, 2011; and, U.N. Security Council Document S/2011/727, Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations
Support Mission in Libya, November 22, 2011.
53 A young Libyan from Benghazi has come forward and identified himself as Qadhafi’s original captor and murderer.
According to the individual in question, he shot Qadhafi when rival militia members from Misuratah tried to prevent
him from taking Qadhafi in custody to Benghazi. CRS cannot verify his account and the circumstances of Qadhafi’s
death remain under investigation.
Congressional Research Service
27