Tax Rates and Economic Growth
Jane G. Gravelle
Senior Specialist in Economic Policy
Donald J. Marples
Section Research Manager
December 5, 2011
Congressional Research Service
7-5700
www.crs.gov
R42111
CRS Report for Congress
Pr
epared for Members and Committees of Congress
Tax Rates and Economic Growth
Summary
This report summarizes the evidence on the relationship between tax rates and economic growth,
referring in a number of cases to other CRS reports providing more substance and detail.
Potentially negative effects of tax rates on economic growth have been an issue in the debates
about whether to extend the 2001-2003 income tax cuts, whether to increase taxes to reduce the
deficit, and whether to reform taxes by broadening the base and lowering the rate.
Initially, it is important to make a distinction between the effects of policies aimed at short-term
stimulation of an underemployed economy and long-run growth. In the short run, both spending
increases and tax cuts are projected to increase employment and output in an underemployed
economy. These effects operate through the demand side of the economy. In general, the largest
effects are from direct government spending and transfers to lower-income individuals, whereas
the smallest effects are from cutting taxes of high-income individuals or businesses.
Long-run growth is a supply-side phenomenon. In the long run, the availability of jobs is not an
issue as an economy naturally creates jobs. Output can grow through increases in labor
participation and hours, increases in capital, and changes such as education and technological
advances that enhance the productivity of these inputs.
Historical data on labor participation rates and average hours worked compared to tax rates
indicates little relationship with either top marginal rates or average marginal rates on labor
income. Relationships between tax rates and savings appear positively correlated (that is, lower
savings are consistent with lower, not higher, tax rates), although this relationship may not be
causal. Similarly, during historical periods, slower growth periods have generally been associated
with higher, not lower, tax rates.
A review of statistical evidence suggests that both labor supply and savings and investment are
relatively insensitive to tax rates. Small effects arise in part because of offsetting income and
substitution effects (which make the direction of effects uncertain) and in part because each of
these individual responses appears small. Institutional constraints may also have an effect.
Offsetting income and substitution effects also affect savings. Capital gains taxes are often
singled out as determinants of growth, but their effects on the cost of capital are quite small.
International capital flows also appear to have a small effect. Most expenditures that affect the
productivity of labor and capital inputs (research and development, education, or infrastructure)
are already tax favored or provided by the government. Small business taxes are also sometimes
emphasized as important to growth, but the evidence suggests a modest and uncertain effect on
entrepreneurship.
Claims that the cost of tax reductions are significantly reduced by feedback effects do not appear
to be justified by the evidence, where feedback effects are in the range of 3% to 10% and can, in
some cases, be negative. Because of the estimated realizations response, capital gains tax cuts
have in the past been estimated to have a large revenue offset (about 60%), but more recent
empirical estimates suggest one of about 20%. In general, for stand-alone rate reductions the
additions to the deficit would cause tax cuts to have a larger cost both because of debt service and
because of crowding out of investment which would swamp most behavioral effects.
Congressional Research Service
Tax Rates and Economic Growth
Contents
Short-Run Counter-Cyclical Effects Versus Long-Run Growth...................................................... 1
Historical Comparisons of Tax Rates, Labor Supply, Savings, and Growth Rates.......................... 1
Labor Force Participation .......................................................................................................... 2
Savings and Investment and GDP Growth ................................................................................ 4
Review of Evidence on Factors Affecting Growth .......................................................................... 6
Labor Supply ............................................................................................................................. 6
Savings and Investment Response............................................................................................. 7
Technological Progress, Innovation, and Small Business ......................................................... 8
Dynamic Revenue Estimating ......................................................................................................... 9
Figures
Figure 1. Tax Rates and Labor Force Participation ......................................................................... 2
Figure 2. Tax Rates and Hours Worked ........................................................................................... 3
Figure 3. Tax Rates and Net Savings ............................................................................................... 4
Tables
Table 1. Average Top Tax Rates on the Growth Rate of Real GDP and Real Net Fixed
Investment, by Time Period.......................................................................................................... 5
Table 2. Average Top Income Tax Rate on the Growth Rate of Real GDP ..................................... 6
Contacts
Author Contact Information........................................................................................................... 10
Congressional Research Service
Tax Rates and Economic Growth
his report summarizes the evidence on the relationship between tax rates and economic
growth, referring in a number of cases to more-detailed CRS reports. Potentially negative
T effects of tax rates on economic growth have been an issue in the debate about whether to
extend the 2001-2003 income tax cuts, whether to increase taxes to address the budget deficit,
and whether to broaden the base and lower the rates with tax reform. After first distinguishing
between short-run counter-cyclical considerations and long-run growth effects, the following
section provides some historical data on tax rates and measures of factor supply and growth. This
report then reviews the empirical evidence on the major contributors to growth. The final section
concludes with a review of dynamic scoring issues.
Short-Run Counter-Cyclical Effects Versus Long-
Run Growth
Initially, it is important to make a distinction between the effects of policies aimed at short-term
stimulation of an underemployed economy and long-run growth. In the short run, both spending
increases and tax cuts are projected to increase employment and output in an underemployed
economy, such as the United States today.1 These effects operate through the demand side of the
economy. In general, the largest effects are from direct spending and transfers to lower-income
individuals, whereas the smallest effects are from cutting taxes of high-income individuals or
businesses.2
Long-run growth is a supply-side phenomenon. In the long run, the availability of jobs is not an
issue as an economy naturally creates jobs. Output can grow through increases in labor
participation and hours, increases in capital, and changes such as education and technological
advances that enhance the productivity of these inputs. The remainder of the report addresses this
longer-term growth issue.
Historical Comparisons of Tax Rates, Labor Supply,
Savings, and Growth Rates
This section summarizes the historical insights about the effect of tax rates on economic growth
and selected factors─labor force participation, savings, and growth in investment─commonly
associated with economic growth. While this type of historical analysis is unable to identify
causal relationships, it can offer suggestive evidence on the magnitude of the tax effect on these
factors. To summarize, the evidence presented in this section suggests that past changes in tax
rates have had no large clear effect on economic growth and selected factors commonly
associated with economic growth.
Since much discussion is focused on the consequences of individuals in the top marginal tax rate
brackets who provide much of the saving and entrepreneurial input in the economy, the following
1 See CRS Report R41332, Economic Recovery: Sustaining U.S. Economic Growth in a Post-Crisis Economy , by
Craig K. Elwell for further information on the current state of the U.S. economy.
2 See multipliers in Table 1 and Table 2 of CRS Report R41849, Can Contractionary Fiscal Policy Be Expansionary?,
by Jane G. Gravelle and Thomas L. Hungerford.
Congressional Research Service
1
Tax Rates and Economic Growth
charts include examinations of the relationship between labor supply, savings, and growth rates
for the top marginal rates. Similarly, there is often a particular focus on capital gains tax rates and
savings so these data presented below include relationships between these variables.
Labor Force Participation
Labor force participation rates for men and women have trended in opposite directions over the
past 60 years. In particular, for men the labor force participation rate has fallen by roughly 15
percentage points (from 86.4% to 71.2%), while the female labor force participation rate has risen
by nearly 25 percentage points (from 33.9% to 58.6%) over the same time period. Also during the
past six decades, the top marginal income tax rate on labor income has trended downward, from a
high of over 90% to today’s top rate of 35%. The effective marginal tax rate has fluctuated in a
narrower range (between 20% and 30%), with no clear trend.3 These relationships are shown in
Figure 1.
Figure 1. Tax Rates and Labor Force Participation
1960-2010
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
62
70
72
80
86
90
98
00
08
1960 19
1964 1966 1968 19
19
1974 1976 1978 19
1982 1984 19
1988 19
1992 1994 1996 19
20
2002 2004 2006 20
2010
Male Labor Force Participation Rate
Female Labor Force Participation Rate
Effective Tax Rate on Labor Income
Top Marginal Tax Rate on Labor Income
Source: Economic Report of the President, Urban-Brookings Tax Policy Center, and National Bureau of
Economic Research.
3 The effective tax rate is the rate applied to the last dollar of labor income and is thus a marginal rate.
Congressional Research Service
2
Tax Rates and Economic Growth
Given the divergent trends in male and female labor force participation rates, it seems unlikely
that the downward trend in top marginal tax rates on labor income or the more stable effective tax
rate on labor income could be a driving factor concerning labor force participation rates.
Taxes could affect the hours (intensity) of work. During the 1965-2010 period (as mentioned
above) the top marginal income tax rate on labor income has trended downward and the effective
tax rate has fluctuated in a narrower range, while average hours worked has steadily declined (see
Figure 2). Some multinational research provides evidence suggesting that the decrease in
marginal tax rates is correlated with decreases in average hours worked.4 This evidence should be
used with caution as hours have trended smoothly downward during the period, while tax changes
have been more abrupt and the composition of the U.S. work force has changed markedly.
Figure 2. Tax Rates and Hours Worked
1965-2010
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
65
67
69
75
77
79
1
3
89
91
01
03
09
19
19
19
1971
1973
19
19
19
198
198
1985
1987
19
19
1993
1995
1997
1999
20
20
2005
2007
20
Hours Worked
Effective Tax Rate on Labor Income
Top Marginal Tax Rate on Labor Income
Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis, Urban-Brookings Tax Policy Center, and National Bureau of Economic
Research.
4 Lee Ohanian, Andrea Raffo, and Richard Rogerson, Long Term Changes in Labor Supply and Taxes: Evidence from
OECD Countries, 1956-2004, The Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City- Economic Research Department, December
2006.
Congressional Research Service
3
Tax Rates and Economic Growth
Savings and Investment and GDP Growth
U.S. savings has been generally declining over the past 60 years. Specifically, as shown in Figure
3, savings as a percentage of national income has declined 14 percentage points (from a high of
12.1% in 1951 to -1.9% in 2009) during the time period.
Over the same 60-year period, the top marginal income tax rate and effective tax rate of capital
gains income has fluctuated. In particular, the maximum tax rate on capital gains income was
25% through most of the 1960s before rising in the 1970s, eventually reaching a high of 40%
towards the end of the decade and subsequently falling to roughly 15% today. Similarly, effective
tax rates on capital income fluctuated during the 1960s and 1970s before generally trending lower
since the early 1980s.
Figure 3. Tax Rates and Net Savings
1960-2010
14.0
60.00
12.0
50.00
e 10.0
com
In
8.0
40.00
ational
N
6.0
age of
30.00
ercent
4.0
P
2.0
20.00
ngs as a
vi
et Sa
0.0
N
66
04
10.00
1960 1962 1964 19
1968 1970 1972 1974 1976 1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 20
2006 2008 2010
-2.0
-4.0
0.00
Net Savings as a Percentage of National Income
Top Marginal Tax Rate on Capital Gains Income
Effective Tax Rate on Capital Income
Source: CRS Report RS21706, Historical Effective Marginal Tax Rates on Capital Income; Bureau of Economic
Analysis; and the Urban-Brookings Tax Policy Center.
Given the fluctuation in the tax rates on capital gains income along with the steady decline in
broader income tax rates from Figure 3, it seems unlikely that changes in tax rates caused savings
as a percentage of national income to steadily fall over this period. Note that maximum overall
income tax rates in Figure 1 applied to investment in unincorporated businesses and, during most
of the period, to interest and dividends. During most of the 1970s, although the maximum tax rate
on earned income was capped briefly at 60% and then at 50%, the tax rate on interest and
dividends stayed at 70%.
Congressional Research Service
4
Tax Rates and Economic Growth
Although not pictured in Figure 3, corporate tax rates also declined in this period, ranging
between 50% and 60% in the 1950s, 40% to 50% in the 1960s and 1970s, 30% to 40% in the
1980s, and around 30% since that time.5
Over the past six decades, periods of higher average top tax rates appear on the surface to be
related to periods of lower rates of growth in real gross domestic product (GDP) and real net
fixed investment. As seen in Table 1, the full 60-year time period can be broken into three shorter
time periods (1950-1970, 1971-1986, and 1987-2010) that correspond to periods of relatively
high, moderate, and low taxes on labor income (and moderate, high, and low taxes on capital
gains). The data show that real GDP growth and real growth in net fixed investment have each
declined over the time period, suggesting that periods of lower taxes are not associated with
higher rates of economic growth or increases in investment.
Table 1. Average Top Tax Rates on the Growth Rate of Real GDP
and Real Net Fixed Investment, by Time Period
1950-2010
Average Top
Average Top
Marginal Income
Marginal Tax Rate
Rate of Growth in
Tax Rate on
on Capital Gains
Rate of Growth in
Real Net Fixed
Labor Income
Income
Real GDP
Investment
1950-1970 84.8% 25.6% 3.86% 0.93%
1971-1986 51.8% 30.2% 2.94% 0.32%
1987-2010 36.4% 23.0% 2.85% 0.23%
Source: BEA and the Urban-Brookings Tax Policy Center.
One concern when using a long historical view for economy-wide analysis is that the choice of
time periods may lead to misleading conclusions, as the size and composition of the economy
today differs in many ways from the economy in the 1950s. To examine whether this lack of an
apparent clear relationship between top tax rates and the rate of economic growth is due to
changes in the economy over time, a shorter time period can be used.
Table 2 decomposes the most recent time period from Table 1 into three shorter time periods
(1987-1992, 1993-2002, and 2003-2007) that correspond to periods of relatively low, high, and
moderate income tax rates. Note that the average top marginal income tax rates in Table 2 are
more tightly clustered than the tax rates in Table 1 and the time period used ends before the
recent recession. Again the data do not appear to support a clear relationship between lower taxes
and higher economic growth; if anything, they suggest the opposite (although we do not believe
that relationship is causal, in light of other evidence presented in the following section).
5 CRS Report RS21706, Historical Effective Marginal Tax Rates on Capital Income, by Jane G. Gravelle.
Congressional Research Service
5
Tax Rates and Economic Growth
Table 2. Average Top Income Tax Rate on the Growth Rate of Real GDP
1987-2007
Average Top Marginal
Rate of Growth
Income Tax Rate
in Real GDP
1987-1992 33.3%
2.31%
1993-2002 39.5%
3.68%
2003-2007 35.0%
2.79%
Source: BEA and the Urban-Brookings Tax Policy Center.
Review of Evidence on Factors Affecting Growth
This section summarizes the theoretical insights and empirical evidence on the forces driving
output and growth which supplement the information provided in the historical comparisons.
More detailed discussion of various issues is contained in cited CRS reports.
Labor Supply6
An increase in wages or a decrease in taxes may increase or decrease labor supply. The increased
after-tax income will, in theory, promote the consumption of more leisure which reduces labor
supply, while the substitution effect (labor effort now pays more) promotes an increase in labor
supply. The outcome depends on the strength of these opposing forces and is an empirical matter.
Empirical evidence has generally found small and uncertain labor supply effects from higher
wages. Historical evidence over a long period of time suggests that increased wages result in less
work. In 1856 the average workweek was 70 hours, which had declined to 40 hours a week by
1940. Participation has declined for men, although it has increased for women (which may be
related to changes in social norms, birth control, marriage, and economies in household
production). Econometric studies have found small, and often negative, labor supply responses
for men. In the past, a larger and positive response has been found for women, especially married
women, but more recent research has indicated small responses for women as well; women are
increasingly becoming more like men in their response.7
Marginal tax rate reductions are more likely than average tax rate reductions to induce a positive
supply response because marginal reductions have greater proportional effects on substitution
than on income, although this difference becomes small at very high income levels. In general,
however, tax cuts still lead to similar effects as wages because both income and substitution
effects are small. A study specifically focusing on the affluent found that tax changes have no
6 Labor supply is reviewed in CRS Report RL31949, Issues in Dynamic Revenue Estimating, by Jane G. Gravelle.
7 See Bradley T. Heim, “The Incredible Shrinking Elasticities: Married Female Labor Supply, 1978-2002, Journal of
Human Resources, Vol. 42, No. 4, Fall 2007, pp. 881-918; Kelly Bishop, Bradley Heim, and Kata Mihaly, “Single
Women’s Labor Supply Elasticities: Trends and Policy Implications.” Industrial and Labor Relations Review. Vol. 63
No. 1, October, 2009, pp.146-168.
Congressional Research Service
6
Tax Rates and Economic Growth
measurable effect on the labor supply of high income men, who tend to be relatively
unresponsive.8
Savings and Investment Response9
The effect of taxes on savings is also, in theory, ambiguous. While substitution effects cause a
preference for future consumption that increases savings, income effects mean that a given target
can be achieved with smaller savings because the after-tax return is larger.
Empirical evidence suggests a negligible and possibly negative savings response. Historically the
savings rate had been relatively constant until the early 1980s, after which it declined. It declined
at the point that reductions in capital income taxes and an expansion of tax preferred savings
vehicles (such as individual retirement accounts) were enacted. Studies that examined the savings
rate over time found results that were small in magnitude, but uncertain in direction, with a
central tendency suggesting no response. Moreover, even at the highest of these elasticity
estimates, the savings response would have a very modest effect on output. Completely
eliminating capital income taxes would increase output by 4/10 of 1% after 10 years and 9/10 of
1% after 25 years. In the latter case the average increase is 4/100 of 1% per year, or about 1% to
2% of normal growth rate.10
Inter-temporal models, which are popular with academic researchers, sometimes predict large
savings responses to certain tax changes, but these models are complex and highly stylized,
making assumptions that individuals have perfect information and foresight, and are affected by
various assumptions built into the model.11
In a closed economy, capital accumulation depends on domestic saving. In an open economy
capital can be increased by investment from abroad although the benefits of that inflow are
largely captured by foreigners. This inflow would generally not be affected by individual income
taxes but could be affected by corporate rate cuts. These estimates are also small, given the
imperfect mobility of capital and size of the capital stock. The effect of a ten-percentage point cut
8 See Robert A. Moffitt and Mark O. Wilhelm, “Taxation and the Labor Supply Decisions of the Affluent,” In Does
Atlas Shrug? the Economic Consequences of Taxing the Rich,” Ed. Joel B. Slemrod, Russell Sage Foundation, New
York, pp. 193-239.
9 Savings response is also reviewed in CRS Report RL31949, Issues in Dynamic Revenue Estimating, by Jane G.
Gravelle. See also CRS Report RL33378, Would Tax Reform Alter the Economy’s Growth?, by Marc Labonte and CRS
Report RL33482, Saving Incentives: What May Work, What May Not, by Thomas L. Hungerford.
10 These estimates are in Eric Engen, Jane Gravelle, and Kent A. Smetters, “Dynamic Tax Models: Why They Do the
Things They Do,” National Tax Journal, Vol. 50, No. 3, September 1997, pp. 631-656.
11 In addition to assuming perfect foresight and perfect information, and a variety of arbitrary assumptions (such as
hours available for work), these models do not allow for marriage and, where labor is variable, barriers to entering and
leaving the work force. These models in some cases cannot permit recessions, since the perfect equilibrium and
information means there is no involuntary unemployment. Note also that in the short term, effects on savings from
reducing taxes on capital income arise from shifting labor supply through time in response to rates of return, a response
that seems unlikely given the consequences for employment of a spotty work history. For further technical discussion,
in addition to CRS Report RL31949, Issues in Dynamic Revenue Estimating, by Jane G. Gravelle, see Eric Engen, Jane
Gravelle, and Kent A. Smetters, “Dynamic Tax Models: Why They Do the Things They Do,” National Tax Journal,
Vol. 50, No. 3, September 1997, pp. 631-656.
Congressional Research Service
7
Tax Rates and Economic Growth
in the corporate income tax is estimated to eventually increase output by about 15/100 of 1% of
output, but U.S. citizens would have a benefit of less than 2/100 of 1% of output.12
Sometimes the capital gains tax is singled out as being particularly important to savings.13
However, this tax is no different from any other tax on capital income, and its share of the tax
burden is relatively small. According to estimates of tax rates, moving from a 15% to a 20% tax
on capital gains would raise the tax rate on corporate equity capital from 34.7% to 35.2%, about
6/10 of a percentage point. The change would raise the overall tax rate in the economy (since
corporate equity is about a third of capital) by about 2/10 of 1%. It would change the overall cost
of capital before tax by about 6 basis points. These effects take into account that about half of
equity income is in tax-preferred savings accounts.14
Technological Progress, Innovation, and Small Business
The same factors of production (labor and capital) can lead to larger output with technological
and productivity enhancements. These factors include technological advances, organizational
innovations (one historical example is the assembly line), education and training of the labor
force, and public infrastructure. Economists are less able to determine the causes of technological
advances and organizational innovation (accidental discovery, results of spending on research,
etc.). Investment in research and development are, however, favorably treated by the tax code:
most research costs are deducted when incurred, which is the same as a zero tax rate on the return
to capital, and they are also eligible for a credit. Education is also favorably treated and education
and infrastructure are supported by public spending and loan guarantees.15
Some arguments have been made that raising the top rates may especially harm small businesses
who create most of the jobs. However, as noted earlier, job creation is a short-term issue. In any
case, an examination of the evidence suggests that small businesses do not create a
disproportionate share of jobs, that only a small fraction of unincorporated businesses would be
affected by changes in the two top rates (around 2% to 3%), and that 80% of the reduced taxes are
likely to accrue to non-business income and almost 90% to either non-business income or
businesses without employees. Finally, while evidence is mixed, most evidence suggests that
higher tax rates encourage self-employment.16
In summation, the evidence in this section suggests that changing tax rates is likely to have small
effects on supply of labor and capital and on output.
12 CRS Report R41743, International Corporate Tax Rate Comparisons and Policy Implications, by Jane G. Gravelle.
13 For additional discussion see CRS Report R40411, The Economic Effects of Capital Gains Taxation, by Thomas L.
Hungerford.
14 These estimates assume that the effective corporate tax rate is 30%, that half of capital gains are never realized and
assets where gains are realized are held for five years, that the real return to equity after corporate tax is 7%, that
dividends are 4% and the inflation rate is 2%. The effects would be twice as large if marginal investment is assumed to
be financed only from taxable accounts. For further discussion of measuring effective tax rates see CRS Report
RS21706, Historical Effective Marginal Tax Rates on Capital Income, by Jane G. Gravelle.
15 One major cost of education is foregone earnings, which are not affected by taxes. There are also a number of
education and training tax benefits such as the tuition tax credit.
16 CRS Report R41392, Small Business and the Expiration of the 2001 Tax Rate Reductions: Economic Issues, by Jane
G. Gravelle.
Congressional Research Service
8
Tax Rates and Economic Growth
Dynamic Revenue Estimating
Claims that the cost of tax reductions is significantly reduced through feedback effects, because
of increases in economic growth (and that gains from tax increases are significantly reduced)
have been made. As indicated in the previous analysis, however, these effects are limited.17 While
various dynamic models can potentially produce larger results, the models with responses most
consistent with empirical evidence suggest a revenue feedback effect of about 1% for the 2001-
2004 Bush tax cuts.18 Feedback effects could arise from shifts of taxable income outside of
changes in real output (such as increasing itemized deductions such as charitable contributions,
realizing more income in fringe benefits, and similar responses). A series of studies providing
direct relationships between tax rates and tax revenues designed to measure these responses
initially found large effects. Subsequent critiques of the methodological problems with these
studies and new estimates found much smaller results. Another problem with this approach is that
it would vary depending on the type of tax change (for example, feedback effects would be less
likely for a tax increase that broadened the base than from a rate increase). In any case, the
evidence suggests feedback effects from 3% to 10%.19 In addition, studies that estimated
significant responses to two important types of tax provisions, charitable contributions and capital
gains, have recently been found to be much smaller.20
Capital gains taxes have been scored for some time as having a significant feedback effect
through changes in realizations, one that had a revenue offset of around 60%. More recent
estimates, however, have suggested a feedback effect of about 20%.21
Claims have been made that a corporate rate cut would pay for itself through capital flows from
abroad. However, using estimates from an international general equilibrium model with capital
flow responses consistent with empirical evidence to simulate a ten percentage point cut in the
corporate tax rate, this factor offset corporate revenue losses by about 5%.22
Any positive feedback effects would be much more than offset, for a stand-alone tax change, by
the interest and crowding out effects of debt. For example, in the corporate rate cut, interest
payments increased the effect of the change on the deficit by 25% in the budget horizon, and
reduced output from crowding out reduced revenue by another 20%.
17 See CRS Report RL31949, Issues in Dynamic Revenue Estimating, by Jane G. Gravelle for a general discussion.
18 See CRS Report RL33672, Revenue Feedback from the 2001-2004 Tax Cuts, by Jane G. Gravelle, p. 7-11.
19 See CRS Report RL33672, Revenue Feedback from the 2001-2004 Tax Cuts, by Jane G. Gravelle.
20 See CRS Report R41364, Capital Gains Tax Options: Behavioral Responses and Revenues, by Jane G. Gravelle and
CRS Report R40518, Charitable Contributions: The Itemized Deduction Cap and Other FY2011 Budget Options, by
Jane G. Gravelle and Donald J. Marples.
21 CRS Report R41364, Capital Gains Tax Options: Behavioral Responses and Revenues, by Jane G. Gravelle.
22 CRS Report R41743, International Corporate Tax Rate Comparisons and Policy Implications, by Jane G. Gravelle.
Congressional Research Service
9
Tax Rates and Economic Growth
Author Contact Information
Jane G. Gravelle
Donald J. Marples
Senior Specialist in Economic Policy
Section Research Manager
jgravelle@crs.loc.gov, 7-7829
dmarples@crs.loc.gov, 7-3739
Congressional Research Service
10