American Jihadist Terrorism: Combating a
Complex Threat
Jerome P. Bjelopera
Specialist in Organized Crime and Terrorism
November 15, 2011
Congressional Research Service
7-5700
www.crs.gov
R41416
CRS Report for Congress
Pr
epared for Members and Committees of Congress
American Jihadist Terrorism: Combating a Complex Threat
Summary
From May 2009 through October 2011, arrests were made for 32 “homegrown,” jihadist-inspired
terrorist plots by American citizens or legal permanent residents of the United States. Two of
these resulted in attacks—U.S. Army Major Nidal Hasan’s alleged assault at Fort Hood in Texas
and Abdulhakim Muhammed’s shooting at the U.S. Army-Navy Career Center in Little Rock,
AR—and produced 14 deaths. By comparison, in more than seven years from the September 11,
2001, terrorist strikes (9/11) through April 2009, there were 21 such plots. Two resulted in
attacks, and no more than six plots occurred in a single year (2006). The apparent spike in such
activity from May 2009 to October 2011 suggests that at least some Americans—even if a tiny
minority—continue to be susceptible to ideologies supporting a violent form of jihad.
This report describes homegrown violent jihadists and the plots and attacks that have occurred
since 9/11. For this report, “homegrown” and “domestic” are terms that describe terrorist activity
or plots perpetrated within the United States or abroad by American citizens, legal permanent
residents, or visitors radicalized largely within the United States. The term “jihadist” describes
radicalized individuals using Islam as an ideological and/or religious justification for their belief
in the establishment of a global caliphate, or jurisdiction governed by a Muslim civil and religious
leader known as a caliph. The term “violent jihadist” characterizes jihadists who have made the
jump to illegally supporting, plotting, or directly engaging in violent terrorist activity.
The report also discusses the radicalization process and the forces driving violent extremist
activity. It analyzes post-9/11 domestic jihadist terrorism and describes law enforcement and
intelligence efforts to combat terrorism and the challenges associated with those efforts. It also
outlines actions underway to build trust and partnership between community groups and
government agencies and the tensions that may occur between law enforcement and engagement
activities. Appendix A provides details about each of the post-9/11 homegrown jihadist terrorist
plots and attacks. Finally, the report offers policy considerations for Congress.
There is an “executive summary” at the beginning that summarizes the report’s findings,
observations, and policy considerations for Congress.
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Contents
Executive Summary......................................................................................................................... 1
Homegrown Jihadist Terrorists: The Problem ........................................................................... 1
How Do People Become Violent Jihadists? ........................................................................ 2
Analysis of Homegrown Jihadist Plots ............................................................................... 2
Combating Homegrown Violent Jihadists ................................................................................. 3
Preventive Policing ............................................................................................................. 3
State and Local Authorities ................................................................................................. 4
Investigative Approaches .................................................................................................... 4
Trust and Partnership........................................................................................................... 4
Balancing Security and Liberty........................................................................................... 4
Issues for Congress.................................................................................................................... 5
Introduction...................................................................................................................................... 6
Homegrown Violent Jihadists.......................................................................................................... 7
Shortcomings and Strengths ...................................................................................................... 8
Radicalization and Violent Extremism .......................................................................................... 12
From Radicalization to Violent Extremism ............................................................................. 12
Forces and Factors in the Forging of Terrorists....................................................................... 14
Intermediaries.................................................................................................................... 14
Social Networks ................................................................................................................ 19
The Internet ....................................................................................................................... 21
Jailhouse Jihadism............................................................................................................. 23
Overview of Post-9/11 Homegrown Jihadist Terrorism Plots and Attacks.................................... 25
Overarching Themes................................................................................................................ 25
A Variety of Endgames...................................................................................................... 26
Little Stomach for Suicide or Martyrdom ......................................................................... 33
The Success of Lone Wolves............................................................................................. 34
Varied Capabilities ............................................................................................................ 34
Combating Homegrown Terrorism: Enforcement Activities ......................................................... 36
Intelligence Approaches .......................................................................................................... 37
Preventive Policing ........................................................................................................... 38
The Role of State and Local Law Enforcement....................................................................... 43
Investigative Approaches......................................................................................................... 46
The Capone Approach....................................................................................................... 46
Agent Provocateur Cases .................................................................................................. 48
Combating Homegrown Terrorism: Building Trust and Partnership............................................. 53
Engagement with Communities............................................................................................... 53
Federal Activities............................................................................................................... 55
State and Local Government Activities............................................................................. 60
Muslim Community Activities .......................................................................................... 61
Risks and Challenges ........................................................................................................ 62
The Tension Between Enforcement and Engagement Activities............................................. 63
Policy Considerations for Congress............................................................................................... 68
Implementing the Administration’s CVE Strategy and Developing a Cohesive
Domestic Intelligence Program ............................................................................................ 68
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Implementing the CVE Strategy ....................................................................................... 69
Enhancing Domestic Intelligence...................................................................................... 72
Figures
Figure 1. Counterterrorism Context............................................................................................... 37
Figure B-1. Homegrown Jihadist Terrorist Plots and Attacks Since 9/11: Terrorist Profile
and Training.............................................................................................................................. 138
Figure B-2. Homegrown Jihadist Terrorist Plots and Attacks Since 9/11: Targets,
Endgames, and Investigative Tools .......................................................................................... 140
Appendixes
Appendix A. Summary of Post-9/11 Homegrown Violent Jihadist Terrorist Plots........................ 74
Appendix B. Figures.................................................................................................................... 138
Contacts
Author Contact Information......................................................................................................... 141
Acknowledgments ....................................................................................................................... 141
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American Jihadist Terrorism: Combating a Complex Threat
Executive Summary
This report describes homegrown violent jihadists and the plots and attacks that have occurred
since 9/11. It discusses the radicalization process and the forces driving violent extremist activity.
It analyzes post-9/11 domestic jihadist terrorist activity and describes law enforcement and
intelligence efforts to combat terrorism and the challenges associated with those efforts. It also
outlines actions underway to build trust and partnership between community groups and
government agencies and the tensions that may occur between law enforcement and engagement
activities.
The report does not address terrorist activity against the United States conducted by foreigners,
such as the airline bombing attempts by Farouk Abdulmutallab (Christmas Day 2009), the
perpetrators of the Transatlantic Airliners plot (August 2006), or the “shoe bomber” Richard Reid
(December 2001). Nor does the report address domestic terrorism attributed to violent extremists
inspired by right-wing or left-wing ideologies and environmental, animal rights, or anti-abortion
causes.
Specific plots and attacks are described throughout the report to support analytic findings. A full
description of each of the post-9/11 cases is provided in Appendix A of the report. The report
also offers policy considerations for Congress.
Homegrown Jihadist Terrorists: The Problem
“Homegrown” is the term that describes terrorist activity or plots perpetrated within the United
States or abroad by American citizens, legal permanent residents, or visitors radicalized largely
within the United States. The term “jihadist” describes radicalized individuals using Islam as an
ideological and/or religious justification for their belief in the establishment of a global caliphate,
or jurisdiction governed by a Muslim civil and religious leader known as a caliph.
The Congressional Research Service (CRS) estimates that there have been 53 homegrown violent
jihadist plots or attacks in the United States since September 11, 2001 (9/11).1 As part of a much-
discussed apparent expansion of terrorist activity in the United States, from May 2009 through
October 2011, arrests were made for 32 “homegrown,” jihadist-inspired terrorist plots by
American citizens or legal permanent residents of the United States. Two of these resulted in
attacks. Most of the 2009-2011 homegrown plots likely reflect a trend in jihadist terrorist activity
away from schemes directed by core members of significant terrorist groups such as Al Qaeda.
Homegrown violent jihadists may exhibit a number of conventional shortcomings when
compared to international terrorist networks such as Al Qaeda. Homegrown violent jihadists,
some say, possibly lack deep understanding of specialized tradecraft such as bomb making. They
may not have the financing, training camps, support networks, and broad expertise housed in
international organizations. These apparent shortcomings may keep some homegrown violent
jihadists from independently engaging in large-scale suicide strikes. Because of this, they may
turn to violence requiring less preparation, such as assaults using firearms. These shortcomings
pose challenges for law enforcement, intelligence, and security officials charged with detecting,
1 Throughout this report, plots involving persons indicted at either the federal or state level are discussed. This report
does not presume the guilt of indicted individuals in pending cases.
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preventing, or disrupting terrorist plots. It is likely much harder to detect smaller conspiracies that
can develop quickly.
How Do People Become Violent Jihadists?
Individuals can become jihadist terrorists by radicalizing and then adopting violence as a tactic.
“Radicalization” describes the process of acquiring and holding extremist, or jihadist beliefs. This
activity is not necessarily illegal. For this report, “violent extremism” describes violent action
taken on the basis of radical or extremist beliefs. For many, “violent extremism” is synonymous
with “violent jihadist” and “jihadist terrorist.” In other words, when someone moves from simply
believing in jihad to illegally pursuing it via violent methods, he becomes a terrorist. Because the
move from belief to violence is so individualized, there is no single path that individuals follow to
become full-fledged terrorists.
Intermediaries, social networks, the Internet, and prisons have been cited as playing key roles in
the radicalization process. Intermediaries—charismatic individuals—often help persuade
previously law-abiding citizens to radicalize or even become violent jihadists. Social networks,
virtual or actual, support and reinforce the decisions individuals make as they embrace violent
jihad, as does perusal of online materials. While there has been much discussion regarding the
powerful influence online jihadist material may have on the formation of terrorists, no consensus
has emerged regarding the Web and terrorism. Prisons, seen by some as potential hotbeds of
radicalization, have not played a large role in producing homegrown jihadists.
Analysis of Homegrown Jihadist Plots
Homegrown violent jihadist activity since 9/11 defies easy categorization. No workable general
profile of domestic violent jihadists exists. According to CRS analysis, the 53 plots since 9/11
exhibit four broad themes: a variety of endgames, little stomach for suicide or martyrdom among
plotters, successful attacks by lone wolves, and a wide range of capabilities among the plots.
• Endgames: Sixteen plots involved individuals exclusively interested in
becoming foreign fighters in conflict zones involving violent jihad abroad.
Fifteen plots exclusively intended to use explosives or incendiary devices. Three
exclusively intended to use or did use firearms. Nineteen attacks and plots
incorporated multiple, unspecific, or unique tactics. Finally, outside of the 53
violent plots since 9/11, other schemes intended from the start only to fund or
materially support the activities of their jihadist colleagues.
• Suicide or Martyrdom: According to publicly available information, only nine
plots included individuals who clearly professed interest in killing themselves
while engaged in violent jihad.
• Success of Lone Wolves: Lone wolves conducted all four successful homegrown
attacks since 9/11.
• Divergent Capabilities: Among the 53 homegrown plots since 9/11, the
operational capabilities of participants diverged greatly. Some evinced terrorist
tradecraft such as bomb making skills. Others appeared to be far less
experienced.
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Combating Homegrown Violent Jihadists
The spate of recent arrests should not obscure the challenges facing law enforcement in disrupting
homegrown terrorist plotting. Counterterrorism activity exists within two broad contexts. The
first of these involves addressing radicalization, much of which occurs in the open marketplace of
ideas. The second context is more “operational” and encompasses both violent jihadist plots—
largely involving secretive illegal activity—and the police work used to dismantle them. The
latter context, by necessity, also occurs outside of the public’s view. Government efforts to
combat domestic violent jihad straddle both of these arenas.
Preventive Policing
In the post-9/11 environment, the public has expected law enforcement to adopt a proactive
posture in order to disrupt terrorist plots before an attack occurs. Investigative leads about
terrorist plots in the homeland may originate from foreign intelligence sources. But, for the most
part, information about homegrown plots is available only through domestic intelligence
activities. In order to proactively gather intelligence, law enforcement has adopted a preventive
policing approach that focuses not just on crime that has occurred, but on the possibility that a
crime may be committed in the future.
In this context, a major challenge for law enforcement is gauging how quickly and at what point
individuals move from radicalized beliefs to violence so that a terrorist plot can be detected and
disrupted. At the federal level, the Department of Justice (DOJ) and the Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI) have implemented a forward-leaning approach with a revision to the Attorney
General’s Guidelines for Domestic FBI Operations.2 The revision, meant to streamline the FBI’s
investigations and make them more proactive, has at its heart a new investigative tool,
assessments. These allow for the investigation of individuals or groups without factual
predication. The new guidelines have, however, generated some controversy among civil
libertarians.
Also critical among the proactive approaches employed by law enforcement is the monitoring of
Internet and social networking sites. The USA PATRIOT Act (P.L. 107-56) authorizes the FBI to
use National Security Letters to obtain a range of information including data pertaining to e-mail
and Internet use. It appears that U.S. law enforcement has effectively exploited the Internet—
which radicalizing individuals can mine for information and violent jihadists use while plotting—
in its pursuit of terrorists. A review of criminal complaints and indictments in terrorism cases
reveals that the FBI has exploited the Internet and/or e-mail communications to build cases
against defendants in at least 22 of the post-9/11 cases studied in this report. Although much is
said about terrorist use of the Internet for recruitment, training, and communications, these cases
suggest that terrorists and aspiring terrorists will not find the Internet to be a uniformly
permissive environment.
2 The FBI declined to speak with CRS about its counterterrorism programs, investigative activities, or engagement
efforts for this report.
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State and Local Authorities
The role of state, local, and tribal law enforcement in detecting nascent terrorist plotting is
particularly important, especially considering the challenges involved in detecting lone wolves
and homegrown jihadist groups with few connections to larger terrorist organizations. Ten years
after the 9/11 attacks, integrating state, local, and tribal law enforcement into the national
counterterrorism effort continues to be an abiding concern of policymakers. DOJ and the FBI
have established Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTTF) to help coordinate federal, state, and local
investigative activities. States and major urban areas have also established intelligence fusion
centers with federal agencies, in part to share intelligence. The Nationwide Suspicious Activity
Report Initiative (NSI) is a program to push terrorism-related information generated locally
between and among federal, state, local, and tribal levels via fusion centers. NSI is in the process
of being implemented throughout the country.
Investigative Approaches
To counter violent jihadist plots, U.S. law enforcement has employed two tactics that have been
described as the “Al Capone” approach and the use of “agent provocateurs.” These tactics have
long been used in a wide variety of cases but apparently have particular utility in counterterrorism
investigations. As the “Al Capone” moniker suggests, historically, these tactics have been
employed against many types of targets such as mafia bosses, white-collar criminals, and corrupt
public servants. The Capone approach involves apprehending individuals linked to terrorist plots
on lesser, non-terrorism-related offenses such as immigration violations. In agent provocateur
cases—often called sting operations—government undercover operatives befriend suspects and
offer to facilitate their activities. The use of these techniques has generated public controversy
and illustrates a bind that law enforcement faces. It has been charged with preventing homegrown
terrorism, but its use of preemptive techniques spawns concern among community members and
civil libertarians.
Trust and Partnership
Following the 9/11 attacks, law enforcement agencies came to realize that the prevention of
terrorist attacks would require the cooperation and assistance of American Muslim, Arab, and
Sikh communities. At the same time, Muslim, Arab, and Sikh Americans recognized the need to
define themselves as distinctly American communities who, like other Americans, desire to help
prevent another terrorist attack. The concept of building trust through engagement and
partnership is rooted in the community policing model developed by law enforcement
professionals in the 1990s. Currently, numerous U.S. government agencies conduct outreach,
engage, and partner with Muslim Americancommunities. From the community angle, several
Arab, Muslim, Sikh and South Asian Americancommunity groups have formed partnerships with
government officials.
Balancing Security and Liberty
Although many public officials support community engagement, significant challenges may exist
in the development of programs that foster substantive relationships rather than token discussions
or community relations events. Striking a balance between security and liberty—relying on local
communities to provide critical information to further proactive policing while simultaneously
building trust and preserving the freedoms of community members—is seen as difficult. Law
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enforcement investigative activities and tactics may pose particular complications in partnership
building. Especially challenging are law enforcement activities perceived by community
members to be unfairly targeting law-abiding citizens or infringing on speech, religion, assembly,
or due process rights.
The recruitment and management of informants—essential to many law enforcement
investigations—may, however, pose an obstacle to successful community engagement efforts.
Some Muslim community activists fear that law enforcement coerces immigrants into becoming
informants, especially those with legal problems or those applying for green cards. Others fear
that informants target and potentially entice impressionable youth into fictitious terrorist plots.
There has also been public discussion of the trustworthiness of informants with criminal
backgrounds. CRS analysis of open source reports indicate that confidential informants or
undercover operatives were used in at least 25 of the post-9/11 homegrown jihadist terrorism
cases. In some of those cases, the informants had criminal histories. In considering the tradeoff
between security and liberty, policy makers face a judgment in those cases where an investigative
tactic might inflame members of a particular community: Is the impact of that tactic
counterproductive in the long run, or is it necessary, short-term collateral damage?
Issues for Congress
Many agencies at all levels of government are engaged in counterterrorism activities. In 2011, the
Obama Administration articulated two broad strategies that address violent homegrown jihadist
activity. The administration recognized the significance of the homegrown threat in its June 2011
National Strategy for Counterterrorism. Additionally, in August 2011, the Obama Administration
released a strategy for combating violent extremism (CVE). It revolves around countering the
radicalization of all types of potential terrorists. As such, it covers the radicalization of violent
jihadists and focuses on outreach, building trust, and fostering partnerships with U.S. Muslim
communities. In addition to these two new strategies, some critics have suggested that the United
States has to develop a more cohesive domestic intelligence program drawing on local policing
efforts.3 Additionally, critics contend that the CVE strategy is largely philosophical and light on
guidelines for implementation.4 These areas—domestic intelligence and the implementation of
the CVE strategy—may merit oversight from Congress.
3 America’s Domestic Intelligence is Inadequate: The Country Still Lacks A Coherent National Domestic Intelligence-
Collection Effort, Notes prepared by Brian Michael Jenkins, acting chair of a group of unofficial, non-partisan acting
and former senior intelligence and law enforcement officials, practitioners, and terrorism analysts devoted to
intelligence issues. The group serves without compensation or political agenda and does not seek to influence
government, although its observations are circulated among government officials. Hereinafter: America’s Domestic
Intelligence is Inadequate, June 2010. See also: Andrew G. Mills and Joseph R. Clark, Running a Three-Legged
Race:The San Diego Police Department, the Intelligence Community, and Counterterrorism, Homeland Security
Policy Institute, Issue Brief 12, Washington, DC, August 1, 2011, p. 1, http://www.gwumc.edu/hspi/policy/
issuebrief_sdpdintel.pdf. Hereinafter: Mills and Clark, Running.
4 Dina Temple-Raston, “White House Unveils Counter-Extremism Plan,” National Public Radio, August 3, 2011,
http://www.npr.org/2011/08/03/138955790/white-house-unveils-counter-extremism-plan. Hereinafter: Temple-Raston,
“White House Unveils.” See also: Anthony Kimery, “White House Strategy to Counter Violent Extremism Gets Mixed
Reviews,” Homeland Security Today, August 4, 2011, http://www.hstoday.us/briefings/daily-news-briefings/single-
article/white-house-strategy-to-counter-violent-extremism-gets-mixed-reviews/
b8e1b0107b3c136997d2244726f6c165.html.
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Introduction
As part of a much-discussed apparent uptick in terrorist activity in the United States, from May
2009 through October 2011, arrests were made for 32 “homegrown,” jihadist-inspired terrorist
plots by American citizens or legal permanent residents of the United States.5 Two of these
resulted in attacks—U.S. Army Major Nidal Hasan’s alleged assault at Fort Hood in Texas and
Abdulhakim Muhammed’s shooting at the U.S. Army-Navy Career Center in Little Rock, AR—
produced 14 deaths. By comparison, in more than seven years from the September 11, 2001,
terrorist strikes (9/11) through April 2009, there were 21 such plots. Two resulted in attacks, and
never more than six occurred in a single year (2006).6 The apparent spike in such activity after
April 2009 suggests that at least some Americans—even if a tiny minority—are susceptible to
ideologies supporting a violent form of jihad.
How serious is the threat of homegrown, violent jihadists in the United States? Experts differ in
their opinions. In May 2010 congressional testimony, terrorism expert Bruce Hoffman
emphasized that it is, “difficult to be complacent when an average of one plot is now being
uncovered per month over the past year or more—and perhaps even more are being hatched that
we don’t know about.”7 By contrast, a recent academic study of domestic Muslim radicalization
supported by the National Institute of Justice reveals that “the record over the past eight years
contains relatively few examples of Muslim-Americans that have radicalized and turned toward
violent extremism” and concludes that “homegrown terrorism is a serious but limited problem.”8
Another study has suggested that the homegrown terrorist threat has been exaggerated by federal
cases that “rely on the abusive use of informants.”9 Moreover, the radicalization of violent
jihadists may not be an especially new phenomenon for the United States. Estimates suggest that
between 1,000 and 2,000 American Muslims engaged in violent jihad during the 1990s in
5 For this report, “homegrown” or “domestic” describe terrorist activity or plots perpetrated within the United States or
abroad by American citizens, legal permanent residents, or visitors radicalized largely within the United States.
“Jihadist” describes radicalized Muslims using Islam as an ideological and/or religious justification for belief in the
establishment of a global caliphate—a jurisdiction governed by a Muslim civil and religious leader known as a
caliph—via violent means. Jihadists largely adhere to a variant of Salafi Islam—the fundamentalist belief that society
should be governed by Islamic law based on the Quran and adhere to the model of the immediate followers and
companions of the Prophet Muhammad. For more on Al Qaeda’s global network, see CRS Report R41070, Al Qaeda
and Affiliates: Historical Perspective, Global Presence, and Implications for U.S. Policy, coordinated by John Rollins.
6 See Appendix A for a summary of publicly available information regarding these alleged plots and attacks. The
summary is presented in reverse chronological order. The two attacks between 9/11 and May 2009 involved Hasan
Akbar and Mohammed Reza Taheri-Azar. On March 23, 2003, two days after the U.S. invasion of Iraq, U.S. Army
Sergeant Akbar killed two U.S. Army officers and wounded 14 others at U.S. Army Camp Pennsylvania in Kuwait, 25
miles from the Iraq border. On March 3, 2006, Taheri-Azar, a naturalized American citizen from Iran, drove his sport
utility vehicle (SUV) into a crowd at The Pit, a popular student gathering spot at the University of North Carolina at
Chapel Hill. The SUV struck and injured several people.
7 U.S. Congress, House Committee on Homeland Security, Subcommittee on Intelligence, Information Sharing and
Terrorism Risk Assessment, Written Testimony of Bruce Hoffman, Hearing: “Internet Terror Recruitment and
Tradecraft: How Can We Address an Evolving Tool While Protecting Free Speech,” 111th Cong., 2nd sess., May 26,
2010, p. 2., http://homeland.house.gov/SiteDocuments/20100526101502-95237.pdf.
8 David Schanzer, Charles Kurzman, and Ebrahim Moosa, Anti-Terror Lessons of Muslim Americans, January 6, 2010,
p. 1, http://www.sanford.duke.edu/news/Schanzer_Kurzman_Moosa_Anti-Terror_Lessons.pdf. Hereinafter: Schanzer,
et.al, Anti-Terror Lessons of Muslim Americans.
9 Center for Human Rights and Global Justice, Targeted and Entrapped: Manufacturing the “Homegrown Threat” in
the United States (New York: NYU School of Law, 2011), p. 38.
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Afghanistan, Bosnia, and Chechnya.10 More broadly, terrorism expert Brian Michael Jenkins
notes that during the 1970s domestic terrorists “committed 60-70 terrorist incidents, most of them
bombings, on U.S. soil every year—a level of activity 15-20 times that seen in most years since
9/11.”11 Few of the attacks during the 1970s appear to have involved individuals motivated by
jihadist ideas.
But as Dr. Hoffman’s comments suggest, the November 2009 Fort Hood shootings, which killed
13, and the other plots and arrests in 2009, 2010, and 2011, are worrying. Secretary of Homeland
Security Janet Napolitano has said that authorities are “just beginning to confront the reality that
we have this issue ... and that we really don’t have a very good handle on how you prevent
someone from becoming a violent extremist.”12 A single successful attack can incur scores of
casualties and cause considerable socioeconomic disruption. Regardless of their novelty,
frequency, or lethality, violent attacks fostered by violent jihadists radicalized in the United States
remain a security concern.
The bulk of the 2009-2011 homegrown plots likely reflect a trend in jihadist terrorist activity
away from schemes directed by the core leaders of Al Qaeda or other significant terrorist groups.
Marc Sageman, a forensic psychiatrist and former Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) operations
officer who writes about terrorism, has noted a global shift in terrorism toward decentralized,
autonomously radicalized, violent jihadist individuals or groups who strike in their home
countries.13 Global counterterrorism efforts have made it harder for international terrorist
networks to formulate plots, place their recruits in targeted countries, and carry out violent strikes
in locations far from their bases of operation.14 A senior counterterrorism official told the Los
Angeles Times that Al Qaeda and affiliated groups are moving “away from what we are used to,
which are complex, ambitious, multilayered plots.”15
Homegrown Violent Jihadists
This report focuses on geography and citizenship in its characterization of homegrown terrorism
by defining the phenomenon as jihadist terrorist activity or plots perpetrated within the United
States or abroad by American citizens, legal permanent residents, or visitors radicalized largely
10 Quintan Wiktorowicz, Radical Islam Rising: Muslim Extremism in the West (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield
Publishers, Inc., 2005), p. 3. See William Rosenau and Sara Daly, “American Journeys to Jihad: U.S. Extremists
During the 1980s and 1990s,” CTC Sentinel, vol. 3, no. 8 (August 2010) pp. 17-20, http://www.ctc.usma.edu/sentinel/
CTCSentinel-Vol3Iss8.pdf.
11 Brian Michael Jenkins, Would Be Warriors: Incidents of Jihadist Terrorist Radicalization in the United States Since
September 11, 2001 (Santa Monica, CA: The RAND Corporation, 2010), p. viii. Hereinafter: Jenkins, Would-Be
Warriors.
12 Paul West and Julie Bykowicz, “Information-Sharing Still a Roadblock,” Baltimoresun.com, February 22, 2010,
http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/maryland/bal-md.omalley22feb22,0,4661474,print.story.
13 Marc Sageman, Leaderless Jihad: Terror Networks in the Twenty-First Century (Philadelphia: University of
Pennsylvania Press, 2008), pp. 71, 133-146. Hereinafter: Sageman, Leaderless Jihad.
14 Philip Mudd, “Evaluating the Al-Qa!ida Threat to the U.S. Homeland,” CTC Sentinel, vol. 3, no. 8 (August 2010) p.
2, http://www.ctc.usma.edu/sentinel/CTCSentinel-Vol3Iss8.pdf; Dennis C. Blair, Senate Select Committee on
Intelligence: U.S. Intelligence Community Annual Threat Assessment: Statement for the Record, Office of the Director
of National Intelligence, February 2, 2010, pp. 7-8, http://www.dni.gov/testimonies/20100202_testimony.pdf.
Hereinafter: Blair, Annual Threat Assessment, February 2, 2010.
15 Greg Miller, “Al-Qaeda’s New Tactic is to Seize Shortcuts,” Los Angeles Times, March 19, 2010,
http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/world/la-fg-qaeda19-2010mar19,0,1676434.story.
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within the United States.16 These homegrown groups or individuals can focus their plots on
foreign targets. They can have operational ties to foreign terrorist groups, but most of the plots
after April 2009 have not. Homegrown violent jihadists potentially either come from Muslim
immigrant communities or are converts to Islam. A review of the numerous arrests of homegrown
violent jihadists on terrorism-related charges since 9/11 suggests a wide array of incidents. There
have been those who have plotted or attempted terrorist attacks. Others have provided material
support to terrorist groups. Some have recruited individuals to travel abroad—or have gone
themselves—to acquire terrorist training, conduct terrorism, or join in other forms of jihadist
conflict, such as the fighting in Somalia or Afghanistan.
Shortcomings and Strengths
Homegrown violent jihadists may exhibit a number of conventional shortcomings when
compared to international terrorist networks such as Al Qaeda. Because some homegrown
terrorists are not tied to international groups, some say they possibly lack deep, hands-on
understanding of specialized tradecraft such as bomb making and may not have the financing,
training camps, support networks, and broad expertise housed in international organizations with
extensive rosters and greater resources.17 Also, homegrown groups tend to be much less formally
structured than international organizations.18 A former CIA case officer recently commented that
the threat posed by self-radicalized “lone” bombers lacking support networks, “even those who
have been in contact with either Al Qaeda or the Taliban, will be hit or miss at best.”19
These apparent shortcomings may keep some homegrown violent jihadists from independently
planning, coordinating, and implementing large-scale suicide strikes such as 9/11 or the Mumbai
attacks of November 2008.20 Because of this, they may turn to violence involving less planning
and preparation, such as assaults using firearms.21
16 Others have used similar definitions. Rick “Ozzie” Nelson and Ben Bodurian define homegrown as “extremist
violence perpetrated by U.S. legal residents and citizens. See Rick “Ozzie” Nelson and Ben Bodurian, A Growing
Terrorist Threat? Assessing “Homegrown” Extremism in the United States, Center For Strategic and International
Studies, Washington, DC, March 8, 2010, p. v, http://csis.org/publication/growing-terrorist-threat. Hereinafter: Nelson
and Bodurian, A Growing Terrorist Threat? For further discussion of definitions of homegrown terrorism, see Sam
Mullins, “Home-grown Terrorism: Issues and Implications,” Perspectives on Terrorism, vol 1, no. 3 (2007),
http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php?option=com_rokzine&view=article&id=12&Itemid=54. The FBI and
the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) use the term “homegrown violent extremist” instead of homegrown
violent jihadist. They define “homegrown violent extremist” as “a person of any citizenship who has lived and/or
operated primarily in the United States or its territories who advocates, is engaged in, or is preparing to engage in
ideologically-motivated terrorist activities (including providing support to terrorism) in furtherance of political or social
objectives promoted by a foreign terrorist organization, but is acting independently of direction by a foreign terrorist
organization.” This definition appears to differ from the one used in this report by 1. largely focusing on whether or not
an individual was directed by a foreign organization and by 2. including all sorts of terrorists, not just violent jihadists.
See DHS and FBI, Joint Intelligence Bulletin, “Use of Small Arms: Examining Lone Shooters and Small-Unit Tactics,”
August 16, 2011, p. 3.
17 Dina Temple-Raston, “Would-Be Bombers in U.S. Hampered by Logistics,” National Public Radio, June 21, 2010,
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=127909962.
18 Sageman, Leaderless Jihad, pp. 71, 133-146; Scott Stewart, Jihadism: The Grassroots Paradox, STRATFOR, March
18, 2010, http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/20100317_jihadism_grassroots_paradox?ip_auth_redirect=1. Hereinafter:
Stewart, Jihadism.
19 Ibid.
20 On November 26, 2008, ten militants came ashore from the Arabian Sea on small boats and attacked numerous high-
profile targets in Mumbai, India, with automatic weapons and explosives. Among the sites attacked were two luxury
(continued...)
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Al Qaeda appears to have embraced such homegrown lone wolf terrorist plots. In March 2010, As
Sahab, Al Qaeda’s media wing, released an English language video titled “A Call to Arms”
featuring American-born spokesperson Adam Gadahn. In the video directed toward jihadists in
the United States, Israel, and the United Kingdom, Gadahn extols alleged Fort Hood shooter
Nidal Hasan as a “trailblazer” who did not attract law enforcement attention by training abroad or
relying on conspirators.22 Gadahn encourages would-be terrorists to select realistically hittable
targets that are familiar to them and have some broadly symbolic—especially economic—
resonance.23 In an early June 2011 English language video message titled “Do Not Rely on
Others, Take the Task Upon Yourself,” Al Qaeda’s American-born spokesperson Adam Gadahn
even more clearly emphasized lone wolf operations. In the video he suggests possible weapons,
Let’s take America as an example. America is absolutely awash with easily obtainable
firearms. You can go down to a gun show at the local convention center and come away with
a fully automatic assault rifle, without a background check, and most likely without having
to show an identification card. So what are you waiting for?24
Gadahn stresses “targeting major institutions—after a clip showing the logos of such firms as
Exxon, Merrill Lynch and Bank of America—and ‘influential public figures.’”25 At about the
same time as this video was released, users of jihadist websites apparently began posting potential
targets and developing hit lists.26
In the same vein as Gadahn’s video, Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (an Al Qaeda affiliate) has
issued an English language propaganda magazine titled Inspire. The magazine has encouraged
homegrown violent jihadist activity in the West, focusing on smaller scale strategies such as using
a vehicle to run over victims.27 It has featured articles attributed to three prominent violent
jihadist propagandists with strong American ties: Gadahn, radical U.S.-born imam Anwar al-
Awlaki, and Saudi-born American citizen Samir Khan.28 In September 2011, the latter two died in
a widely reported U.S. air strike in Yemen.29
(...continued)
hotels—the Taj Mahal Palace and the Oberoi-Trident—along with the main railway terminal, a Jewish cultural center, a
café frequented by foreigners, a cinema house, and two hospitals. By the time the episode ended some 62 hours later,
about 165 people, along with nine terrorists had been killed (one terrorist was captured), and hundreds more injured.
Six American citizens were among the 26 foreigners reported dead. For more information, see CRS Report R40087,
Terrorist Attacks in Mumbai, India, and Implications for U.S. Interests, by K. Alan Kronstadt.
21 Art Keller, “Why Was Faisal Shahzad a Bad Bombmaker?” AfPak Channel, a special project of Foreign Policy and
the New America Foundation, May 14, 2010, http://afpak.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2010/05/14/bad_bombmakers. See
also Exclusive Analysis, “North American Quarterly Terrorism Update,” December 2009, p. 5.
22 Stewart, Jihadism.
23 Ibid; Exclusive Analysis, “Global Jihad Quarterly Update,” May 2010, pp 6-7.
24 Matthew Cole, “New Al Qaeda Video: American Muslims Should Buy Guns, Start Shooting People,” ABC News,
June 3, 2011, http://abcnews.go.com/Blotter/al-qaeda-video-buy-automatic-weapons-start-shooting/story?id=13704264.
25 Ibid.
26 John Hudson, “A Very Odd Al Qaeda ‘Hit List,’” The Atlantic Wire, June 17, 2011, http://www.theatlanticwire.com/
global/2011/06/very-odd-al-qaeda-hit-list/38967/; Judson Berger, Al Qaeda-Linked Site Posts “‘Hit List’ of U.S.
Targets, Prompting Feds to Send Alert,” Fox News, June 16, 2011, http://www.foxnews.com/us/2011/06/16/feds-send-
alert-after-al-qaeda-linked-site-posts-hit-list-us-targets/#ixzz1QbS44Tc6.
27 Kimberly Dozier, “Yemeni al Qaeda Publishes Second Edition of English Magazine,” Washington Times, Associated
Press, October 12, 2010, http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2010/oct/12/yemeni-al-qaeda-publishes-second-
edition-english-m/print/.
28 Ibid; Judith Miller and David Samuels, “A Glossy Approach to Inciting Terrorism,” Wall Street Journal, November
(continued...)
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This does not mean that homegrown terrorists are incapable of sophisticated, coordinated action
or linking up with international groups. For example, in 2008 foiled New York City subway
bomber Najibullah Zazi received explosives instruction from Al Qaeda in Pakistan. He and co-
conspirators then tried to implement this training in the United States.30 U.S. authorities allege
that senior Al Qaeda official Adnan el-Shukrijumah possibly recruited Zazi and his fellow
plotters.31 Shukrijumah—a Saudi-born, naturalized American citizen who spent part of his youth
in Brooklyn—and others involved in Al Qaeda’s “external operations” program allegedly planned
the attack.32 The relative sophistication of Zazi’s plot may have actually exposed it to greater law
enforcement scrutiny. Authorities likely learned of the plot while monitoring a known Al Qaeda
e-mail account.33
The conventionally perceived shortcomings of homegrown terrorists may actually pose some
challenges for law enforcement, intelligence, and security officials charged with detecting,
preventing, or disrupting terrorist plots. According to terrorism analyst Steve Emerson, “The
smaller cells tend to be less powerful than a central terrorist organization like Al Qaeda, but they
are harder to detect…. When the group of conspirators are [sic] small it’s much more difficult for
the FBI…. The larger the group, the greater the chances the FBI can infiltrate.”34 Former Director
of National Intelligence Dennis C. Blair noted that many of the terrorist schemes disrupted in
2009—including homegrown activity—relied on short-term planning. These quickly generated
schemes are harder to identify and disrupt than more traditional and more highly organized
international terrorist conspiracies, which can gestate for years.35
According to at least one study, homegrown terrorists can be nimble adversaries, because as U.S.
citizens or legal permanent residents, they can travel easily between the United States and foreign
countries.36 While abroad, they could receive training from foreign terrorist organizations,
conduct surveillance operations against foreign targets, and plan attacks. In the case of recent
immigrants to the United States, they are particularly comfortable moving between American and
(...continued)
27, 2010, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703572404575635053157718986.html?mod=
googlenews_wsj. None of the three reside in the United States.
29 Mark Mazzetti, Eric Schmitt, and Robert F. Worth, “Two-Year Manhunt Led to Killing of Awlaki in Yemen,” New
York Times, September 30, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/01/world/middleeast/anwar-al-awlaki-is-killed-in-
yemen.html?pagewanted=all.
30 For 10 years prior to the plot, Zazi, an Afghan immigrant legally present in the United States, lived in the New York
City Borough of Queens. Zazi pled guilty to conspiracy to use weapons of mass destruction against U.S. persons or
property, conspiracy to commit murder in a foreign country, and providing material support to a terrorist organization.
See Department of Justice (DOJ), Press Release, “Najibullah Zazi Pleads Guilty to Conspiracy to Use Explosives
Against Persons or Property in U.S., Conspiracy to Murder Abroad, and Providing Material Support to al Qaeda,”
February 22, 2010, http://newyork.fbi.gov/dojpressrel/pressrel10/nyfo022210.html. Hereinafter: DOJ Press Release,
“Najibullah Zazi Pleads Guilty.” For more on Zazi’s childhood, see Michael Wilson, “From Smiling Coffee Vendor to
Terror Suspect,” New York Times, September 26, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/26/nyregion/26profile.html?
_r=1&pagewanted=print. Hereinafter: Wilson, “From Smiling Coffee Vendor.”
31 William K. Rashbaum, “Al Qaeda Figure to Be Indicted in Subway Plot,” New York Times, July 7, 2010,
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/08/nyregion/08terror.html. Hereinafter: Rashbaum, July 7, 2010.
32 Ibid. Al Qaeda’s external operations program focuses on targeting the United States and the West.
33 “U.S. Officials Link Al Qaeda Operative to New York Plot,” Daily Times (Pakistan), July 2, 2010,
http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2010\07\02\story_2-7-2010_pg7_39.
34 Rashbaum, July 7, 2010.
35 Blair, Annual Threat Assessment, February 2, 2010, p. 7.
36 Nelson and Bodurian, A Growing Terrorist Threat? p. v.
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foreign cultural contexts.37 English language skills, the ability to navigate Western culture,
society, and context are likely key ingredients for successful strikes.38 Three recent cases
involving alleged or actual homegrown terrorists illustrate how these factors possibly facilitate
terrorist plotting:
• In February 2011, Colleen LaRose (aka “Jihad Jane”) pled guilty “to all counts of
a superseding indictment charging her with conspiracy to provide material
support to terrorists, conspiracy to kill in a foreign country, making false
statements, and attempted identity theft.”39 She allegedly discussed with her co-
conspirators how her mainstream American physical appearance would allow her
to “blend in with many people.”40
• On March 18, 2010, David Headley, born Daood Sayed Gilani to an American
mother and Pakistani father, pled guilty to helping plan the 2008 terrorist attacks
in Mumbai, India, and for plotting to attack the offices of a newspaper in
Copenhagen, Denmark. Headley was able to use his American citizenship and
Pakistani heritage to move between the United States and abroad for seven years
during which time he received terrorist training in Pakistan and scouted locations
in India and Denmark for terrorist attacks.41
• For 10 years prior to his involvement in a September 2009 plot to trigger
explosive devices in New York City’s subways, Najibullah Zazi, an Afghan
immigrant legally present in the United States, lived in the New York City
borough of Queens and had family in Pakistan.42
In 2010, the Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS’s) Office of Intelligence and Analysis
warned, “probable terrorist perception of success in challenging the U.S. even through failed
attacks, suggest[s] Al Qaeda and associated groups will try to conduct operations in the United
States with increased frequency.”43 It appears that for the foreseeable future, American citizens
37 Ibid.
38 Michael Kenney, “Organizational Learning and Islamic Militancy,” National Institute of Justice Journal, no. 265
(April 2010), p. 19.
39 DOJ Press Release, “Pennsylvania Woman Pleads Guilty in Plot to Recruit Violent Jihadist Fighters and to Commit
Murder Overseas,” February 1, 2011, http://www.fbi.gov/philadelphia/press-releases/2011/ph020111.htm; Derrick
Nunnally et al., “’Jihad Jane’ Said to Have Confessed, Philly.com, March 18, 2010, http://www.philly.com/philly/news/
breaking/88307227.html
40 United States vs. Colleen R. LaRose, Grand Jury Indictment in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania, filed March 4, 2010, http://intelfiles.egoplex.com/2010-03-04-LaRose-Indictment.pdf.
41 Jane Perlez, “American Terror Suspect Traveled Unimpeded,” New York Times, March 25, 2010,
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/26/world/asia/26pstan.html?scp=1&sq=
American%20Terror%20Suspect%20Traveled%20Unimpeded&st=cse; DOJ Press Release, “Chicago Resident David
Coleman Headley Pleads Guilty to Role in India and Denmark Terrorism Conspiracies,” March 18, 2010,
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2010/March/10-ag-277.html. Hereinafter: DOJ Press Release, March 18, 2010.
42 On February 22, 2010, Zazi pled guilty to conspiracy to use weapons of mass destruction, conspiracy to commit
murder overseas, and providing material support for a terrorist organization. John Marzulli, “Zazi, Al Qaeda Pals
Planned Rush-Hour Attack on Grand Central, Times Square Subway Stations,” New York Daily News, April 12, 2010,
http://www.nydailynews.com/news/ny_crime/2010/04/12/2010-04-
12_zazi_pals_planned_rushhour_attack_on_2_busiest_subway_stations.html; Stephanie Simon, “FBI Again Questions
Immigrant in Terror Probe,” Wall Street Journal, September 18, 2009, http://online.wsj.com/article/
SB125323086773921349.html.
43 DHS, Office of Intelligence and Analysis Note, IA-0291-10, “Evolution of the Terrorist Threat to the United States,”
May 21, 2010, p.1.
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and legal permanent residents of the United States radicalized within the nation’s borders will
continue to pose a sizeable violent jihadist threat.44
Radicalization and Violent Extremism
Radicalization and violent extremism are terms that are sometimes used interchangeably but do
not mean the same thing. Radicalization has been described as the exposure of individuals to
ideological messages and the movement of those individuals from mainstream beliefs to extremist
viewpoints.45 Others say radicalization consists of changes in belief and behavior to justify
intergroup violence and personal or group sacrifice to forward specific, closely held ideas.46 Still
others use the term to more closely link extremist beliefs to violent action, as in this working
definition by the DHS, which states that radicalization “entails the process of adopting an
extremist belief system, including the willingness to use, support, or facilitate violence, as a
method to effect societal change.”47
But there is an important distinction between the terms “radicalization” and “violent extremism”
as it relates to the threshold of U.S. law enforcement interest and action. This is because
Americans have the right under the First Amendment to adopt, express, or disseminate ideas,
even hateful and extremist ones. But when radicalized individuals mobilize their views (i.e., they
move from a radicalized viewpoint to membership in a terrorist group, or to planning, materially
supporting, or executing terrorist activity) then the nation’s public safety and security interests are
activated. Thus, the terms may be differentiated as follows:
• “Radicalization” describes the process of acquiring and holding radical,
extremist, or jihadist beliefs.
• “Violent extremism,” for this report, describes violent action taken on the basis of
radical or extremist beliefs. For many, this term is synonymous with “violent
jihadist” and “jihadist terrorist.”
From Radicalization to Violent Extremism
As the terrorist threat becomes increasingly homegrown, a key way to fight it is to develop an
understanding of how radicalization works and formulate ways to prevent the radicalization from
morphing into violent extremism.48 In 2007, the New York City Police Department’s (NYPD’s)
44 Eileen Sullivan and Devlin Barrett, “Recent Cases Show Challenge of U.S. Terrorists,” Associated Press, March 18,
2010, http://www.google.com/hostednews/ap/article/ALeqM5hvogWD5bjFT7x-mkAwUu2tpIN_cgD9EGKHJ80.
Hereinafter: Sullivan and Barrett, March 18, 2010.
45 Royal Canadian Mounted Police, National Security Criminal Investigations, Radicalization: A Guide for the
Perplexed, Canada, June 2009, p. 1. Hereinafter: Royal Canadian Mounted Police, Radicalization.
46 Clark McCauley and Sophia Moskalenko, “Mechanisms of Political Radicalization: Pathways Toward Terrorism,”
Terrorism and Political Violence, vol. 20, no. 3 (July 2008), p. 416.
47 U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, Written Testimony of Charles
E. Allen, Assistant Secretary of Intelligence and Analysis and Chief Intelligence Officer, Department of Homeland
Security, “Threat of Islamic Radicalization to the Homeland,” 110th Cong., 1st sess., March 14, 2007, p. 4. Hereinafter:
Allen Testimony, March 14, 2007.
48 See Sageman, Leaderless Jihad.
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Intelligence Division released a study of domestic jihadist radicalization that has been widely
circulated within the law enforcement community.
The study describes a general four-step process of radicalization leading to violent extremism.
First, individuals exist in a pre-radicalization phase in which they lead lives unaware of or
uninterested in either violent jihad or fundamentalist Salafi Islam. Next, they go through self-
identification in which some sort of crisis or trigger (job loss, social alienation, death of a family
member, international conflict) urges them to explore Salafism. Third, individuals undergo
indoctrination or adoption of jihadist ideals combined with Salafi views. The study indicates that,
typically, a “spiritual sanctioner” or charismatic figure plays a central role in the indoctrination
process. Finally, radicalizing individuals go through “jihadization,” where they identify
themselves as violent jihadists, and are drawn into the planning of a terrorist attack.49 At this
point, according to the NYPD, they can be considered violent extremists. The FBI’s own four-
stage model of radicalization closely follows that of the NYPD.50
This model and the process it describes—though useful—should, however, be read with caution,
according to some observers. The radicalization process is best depicted in broad brush strokes.
Brian Michael Jenkins has suggested that
There is no easily identifiable terrorist-prone personality, no single path to radicalization and
terrorism. Many people may share the same views, and only a handful of the radicals will go
further to become terrorists. The transition from radical to terrorist is often a matter of
happenstance. It depends on whom one meets and probably on when that meeting occurs in
the arc of one’s life.51
Some experts have warned against viewing the radicalization process as a “conveyer belt,”
somehow starting with grievances and inevitably ending in violence.52 The NYPD report itself
acknowledges that individuals who begin this process do not necessarily pass through all the
stages nor do they necessarily follow all the steps in order, and not all individuals or groups who
begin this progression become terrorists.53 Studies by the DHS Office of Intelligence and Analysis
indicate that the radicalization dynamic varies across ideological and ethno-religious spectrums,
different geographic regions, and socio-economic conditions. Moreover, there are many diverse
“pathways” to radicalization and individuals and groups can radicalize or “de-radicalize” because
of a variety of factors.54
49 Mitchell D. Silber and Arvin Bhatt, Radicalization in the West: The Homegrown Threat, City of New York Police
Department, Intelligence Division, New York, 2007, pp. 6-8, http://sethgodin.typepad.com/seths_blog/files/
NYPD_Report-Radicalization_in_the_West.pdf.
50 Carol Dyer, Ryan E. McCoy, Joel Rodriguez, et al., “Countering Violent Islamic Extremism: A Community
Responsibility,” FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin, December 2007, p. 6.
51 Jenkins, Would-Be Warriors, p. 7.
52 Sophia Moskalenko and Clark McCauley, “Measuring Political Mobilization: The Distinction Between Activism and
Radicalism,” Terrorism and Political Violence, vol. 21, no. 2 (April 2009), pp. 239-40.
53 Silber and Bhatt, Radicalization in the West, pp. 10, 19.
54 Allen Testimony, March 14, 2007, p. 5.
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Forces and Factors in the Forging of Terrorists
What drives radicalization and spurs the creation of terrorists remains open to debate. Poverty,
alienation, brainwashing, or personal humiliation—commonly seen as factors driving
radicalization and terrorism—may not play particularly significant roles. Likewise, failed
multiculturalism or failed integration into the larger society does not predict radicalization or
terrorist activity.55 The radicalization process and jihadist violence may offer participants
powerful but intangible spiritual incentives such as salvation and paradise in the afterlife.
Other forces are key in radicalization and the evolution of jihadist terrorists. Family ties and
socialization are critical. Moral outrage or perceptions that the West is harming the global
community of Muslims (the Ummah),56 or even waging war against it may also spur
radicalization and violence. And travel to regions featuring terrorist activity can foster
radicalization. Religious conversion plays a key role in the radicalization of some individuals.57
CRS analysis of the 53 plots since 9/11 suggests that 22 of them included converts to Islam
(Figure B-1).
As all of this may suggest, in fact, “pre-radicalization” indicators are subtle and may not be
detectable and the forces driving jihadists can be described in only the most general of terms.
Certainly, radicalizing individuals and terrorists connect larger grievances about the world to their
own direct experiences. A study of 2,032 foreign fighters who joined Al Qaeda and its affiliated
organizations broadly suggests that these individuals can be categorized as revenge seekers, status
seekers, identity seekers, or thrill seekers who possessed “an unfulfilled need to define
themselves.”58 Even more broadly and fundamentally, one author has suggested that
psychologically, individual terrorists “see the world in Manichean, black-and-white terms; they
identify with others; and they desire revenge.”59
Overall, many scholars and counterterrorism analysts who have studied post-9/11 jihadist terrorist
attacks have noted the prominence of a number of forces impacting radicalization and extremism.
These include intermediaries (the “spiritual sanctioners” identified by the NYPD report on
radicalization), social networks, the Internet, and prisons.
Intermediaries
Intermediaries are critical in the development of terrorist plots and radicalization. They quicken
the formulation of individual or group beliefs regarding violent jihad. Terrorist recruiters from Al
55 Royal Canadian Mounted Police, Radicalization, pp. 1-9; Sageman, Leaderless Jihad, p. 48, 50-51, 73-88; Aidan
Kirby, “The London Bombers as ‘Self-Starters’: A Case Study in Indigenous Radicalization and the Emergence of
Autonomous Cliques,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, vol. 30, no. 5 (May 2007), p. 422. For more on the spiritual
incentives involved in joining radical Islamic groups see, Quintan Wiktorowicz and Karl Kaltenthaler, “The Rationality
of Radical Islam,” Political Science Quarterly, vol. 121, no. 2 (Summer 2006) pp. 295-300.
56 The Quran uses the term ummah to refer to the community of believers. The term is used to describe both individual
communities, great and small, of faithful Muslims and to refer to the world-wide community of believers. See Richard
Hooker, World Civilizations, Glossary, 1996, http://www.wsu.edu/~dee/GLOSSARY/UMMAH.HTM.
57 Ibid.
58 John M. Venhaus, Why Youth Join al-Qaeda, United States Institute of Peace, Special Report 236, Washington, DC,
May 2010, p. 1, http://www.usip.org/files/resources/SR236Venhaus.pdf.
59 Louise Richardson, What Terrorists Want: Understanding the Enemy, Containing the Threat (New York: Random
House, 2006), p. 41.
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Qaeda or extremist clerics tied to such organizations can play this role in the radicalization
process. They can interact with individuals interested in terrorism either directly (face-to-face
discussion groups) or in online forums. Some recent terrorist plots have included an
intermediary.60 In some cases a key intermediary may be a government informant or undercover
agent. Four charismatic U.S. citizens have played especially prominent roles in international
jihadist propaganda, but determining the impact—if any—of these and other intermediaries can
be difficult.
Anwar al-Awlaki was a radical imam and key international charismatic figure in jihadist circles
prior to being killed in an alleged U.S. air strike in Yemen in September 2011.61 Awlaki allegedly
served as a leader in the terrorist group known as Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP).62
He was a U.S. citizen born in New Mexico in 1971 and had been linked to a number of domestic
jihadist plots. He had also been tied to alleged foreign terrorist Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab’s
failed Christmas Day 2009 bombing attempt.63 However, according to publicly available sources,
his exact connections to these individuals are largely unclear. Accused of propagandizing for Al
Qaeda, Awlaki was associated with the group’s Arabian Peninsula offshoot.64 Before his alleged
November 5, 2009, gun rampage at Fort Hood, TX, U.S. Army Major Nidal Hasan purportedly
exchanged e-mails with Awlaki. It remains publicly unknown how the contact influenced Hasan.
After the Fort Hood shootings, Awlaki issued a statement dubbing Hasan a hero.65
The imam also likely influenced people involved in other violent homegrown jihadist plots. In
December 2010, federal officials charged Antonio Martinez, a Muslim convert, in a plot to bomb
an Armed Forces recruiting station. A sting operation by the Federal Bureau of Investigation
(FBI) ensnared Martinez. He allegedly planned to attack an Armed Forces recruiting station in
Maryland using a sport utility vehicle loaded with what he believed was a bomb. During the
course of his plot, he also allegedly praised Awlaki.66 Naturalized U.S. citizen Farooque Ahmed
was arrested in October 2010 for attempting to assist people he believed to be terrorists in
planning the bombing of Washington, DC, Metrorail stations.67 Ahmed allegedly possessed a
60 Rick “Ozzie” Nelson, Countering Terrorism and Radicalization in 2010 and Beyond: A New Terrorist Threat?
Assessing ‘Homegrown Extremism,’ Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, DC, January 22, 2010,
http://csis.org/publication/homegrown-terrorism-fact-sheet.
61 For context regarding Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, see CRS Report RL34170, Yemen: Background and U.S.
Relations, by Jeremy M. Sharp; CRS Report R41070, Al Qaeda and Affiliates: Historical Perspective, Global
Presence, and Implications for U.S. Policy, coordinated by John Rollins.
62 For context regarding Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, see CRS Report RL34170, Yemen: Background and U.S.
Relations, by Jeremy M. Sharp; CRS Report R41070, Al Qaeda and Affiliates: Historical Perspective, Global
Presence, and Implications for U.S. Policy, coordinated by John Rollins.
63 Greg Miller and Spencer S. Hsu, “Muslim Cleric Tied to Bomb Attempt,” The Washington Post, July 1, 2010,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/06/30/AR2010063005343.html.
64 For details on Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, see CRS Report R41070, Al Qaeda and Affiliates: Historical
Perspective, Global Presence, and Implications for U.S. Policy, coordinated by John Rollins.
65 “Profile: Anwar al-Awlaki,” BBC News, January 3, 2010, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/8438635.stm.
66 Dina Temple-Raston, “Officials Worry About Some Latino Converts To Islam,” National Public Radio, August 24,
2011, http://www.npr.org/2010/12/09/131916271/officials-worry-about-some-latino-converts-to-islam; DOJ Press
Release, “Maryland Man Charged in Plot to Attack Armed Forces Recruiting Center,” December 8, 2010,
http://www.fbi.gov/baltimore/press-releases/2010/ba120810.htm.
67 DOJ Press Release, “Virginia Man Arrested for Plotting Attacks on D.C.-Area Metro Stations with People He
Believed to Be al Qaeda Members,” October 27, 2010, http://washingtondc.fbi.gov/dojpressrel/pressrel10/
wfo102710.htm.
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biography of Awlaki and listened to his online sermons.68 Also apprehended in October 2010,
U.S. citizen Abdel Hameed Shehadeh, who allegedly tried to join overseas extremist groups such
as the Taliban, modeled one of the jihadist websites he managed after Awlaki’s teachings. The
website offered hyperlinks to Awlaki’s online lectures. Shehadeh also discussed Awlaki’s ideas
with an individual he tried (and failed) to recruit for violent jihad.69 Zachary Chesser, who
allegedly tried to join al-Shabaab as late as July 2010 and propagandized online, e-mailed Awlaki.
The cleric responded twice, according to court documents.70 In July 2010, Paul Rockwood Jr.,
pled guilty to making false statements in a domestic terrorism investigation. He closely followed
Awlaki’s online pronouncements and developed an “execution” hit list that included 15 people
Rockwood believed had desecrated Islam.71 According to court documents, Shaker Masri
encouraged an FBI cooperating source to “review speeches” by Awlaki.72 Arrested in June 2010
while allegedly trying to join al-Shabaab, Mohamed Alessa and Carlos Almonte, watched videos
of and listened to sermons by Awlaki.73
According to media sources, Faisal Shahzad, a Pakistani immigrant who admitted that he
attempted to detonate an explosives-filled vehicle in New York City’s Times Square on May 1,
2010, cited Awlaki and another cleric, Abdullah Faisal from Jamaica, as key influences on him.74
Also, a surveillance recording from 2007 captured one of six individuals eventually convicted of
plotting to attack Fort Dix in New Jersey talking about an Awlaki lecture.75
U.S. officials believe Awlaki also had contact with Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, the young
Nigerian who concealed an explosive device in his underwear and attempted to detonate it on a
Northwest Airlines flight from Amsterdam to Detroit on Christmas Day 2009.76 In October 2011,
when he pled guilty to his involvement in the plot Abdulmutallab stated, “I was greatly inspired
to participate in jihad by the lectures of the great and rightly guided mujahedeen who is alive,
Sheikh Anwar al-Awlaki, may Allah preserve him and his family and give them victory, Amin,
68 Carol Cratty, “Accused Would-Be DC Metro Bomber Pleads Not Guilty in Federal Court,” CNN.com, November 9,
2010, http://articles.cnn.com/2010-11-09/justice/virginia.bomb.plot_1_qaeda-al-awlaki-speedy-trial?_s=PM:CRIME;
Matt Apuzzo and Adam Goldman, “Officials: Muslim Source Turned in Terror Suspect,” Associated Press, October
28, 2010, http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20101028/ap_on_go_ca_st_pe/us_terror_arrest.
69 United States. v. Abdel Hameed Shehadeh, Criminal Complaint, U.S. District for the Eastern District of New York,
October 21, 2010, http://www.investigativeproject.org/documents/case_docs/1400.pdf .
70 United States. v. Zachary Adam Chesser, Affidavit, 1:10-MJ-504, U.S. District for the Eastern District of Virginia,
July 21, 2010, http://www.investigativeproject.org/documents/case_docs/1343.pdf
71 DOJ Press Release, “Alaska Man Pleads Guilty to Making False Statements in Domestic Terrorism Investigation,
Spouse Pleads Guilty to Making False Statements,” July 21, 2010, http://anchorage.fbi.gov/dojpressrel/pressrel10/
ak072110.htm.
72 United States v. Shaker Masri, Criminal Complaint 10-CR-0655, U.S. District Court Northern District of Illinois
Eastern Division, August 9, 2010, http://jnslp.files.wordpress.com/2010/08/masri-complaint1.pdf.
73 Anti-Defamation League, “New Jersey Residents Arrested for Attempting To Join Somali-Based Terrorist Group,”
June 7, 2010, updated July 22, 2010, http://www.adl.org/main_Terrorism/new_jersey_al_shabaab.htm.
74 Dina Temple-Raston, “Jamaican Imam Said to Inspire Times Square Suspect,” National Public Radio, May 19,
2010, http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=126962091. For more on Shahzad’s suspected ties to
Awlaki, see, Scott Shane and Mark Mazzetti, “Times Sq. Bomb Suspect Is Linked to Militant Cleric,” New York Times,
May 6, 2010.
75 Scott Shane, “Born in U.S., a Radical Cleric Inspires Terror,” New York Times, November 18, 2009,
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/19/us/19awlaki.html.
76 Jeanne Meserve, “Anti-Terrorism Chief, U.S.-Born Cleric had Major Role in Airline Bombing Try,” CNN.com, June
30, 2010, http://www.cnn.com/2010/US/06/30/leiter.al.awlaki/index.html.
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and Allah knows best.”77 A U.S. official, who spoke on the condition of anonymity because of the
topic’s sensitivity, told The Washington Post that Awlaki was the first U.S. citizen added to a list
of suspected terrorists the CIA is authorized to kill.78
Samir Khan—before he was killed in the same alleged airstrike as Awlaki—served as the editor
of Inspire magazine, launched in 2010 by AQAP.79 Inspire has been described as “a slick
magazine for jihadists ... that featured political and how-to articles written in a comfortable
American vernacular.”80 The magazine is intended to attract would-be jihadists in the West.
The Saudi-born Khan lived in Queens, NY, and Charlotte, NC. He radicalized after the Al Qaeda
attacks on September 11, 2001, and moved with his parents to Charlotte in 2004. He left Charlotte
in 2009 and joined AQAP in Yemen.81 Prior to leaving the United States, Khan had gained some
notoriety as a jihadist blogger and as creator of the online magazine, Jihad Recollections—
Inspire’s forerunner.82
Reportedly, Khan and his online publications may have influenced homegrown jihadists. In July
2011, U.S. Army private Naser Abdo was arrested near Fort Hood in Texas for allegedly plotting
a shooting spree and bombing in the area. Abdo intended to kill soldiers near the same place
where Army Major Nidal Hasan reportedly killed 13 individuals in 2009. Federal officials noted
that Abdo also possessed an article on how to construct an explosive device, among other items.
The article was from Inspire.83 In November 2010, Mohamed Osman Mohamud, a Somali-born
naturalized U.S. citizen, was arrested as part of an FBI sting operation, moments after he tried to
detonate a van he believed was packed with explosives in Portland’s Pioneer Courthouse
Square.84 According to DOJ, Mohamud wrote articles for Khan’s first magazine, Jihad
Recollections.85Aside from editing Inspire Khan also contributed to it. Additionally, the magazine
77 See “Transcript: Read Abdulmutallab’s Statement on Guilty Plea,” Detroit Free Press, October 12, 2011,
http://www.freep.com/article/20111012/NEWS01/111012038/Transcript-Read-Abdulmutallab-s-statement-guilty-plea.
See Monica Davey, “Would-Be Plane Bomber Pleads Guilty, Ending Trial,” October 12, 2011,
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/13/us/umar-farouk-abdulmutallab-pleads-guilty-in-plane-bomb-attempt.html.
78 Greg Miller, “Muslim Cleric Awlaki is 1st U.S. citizen on List of Those CIA is Allowed to Kill,” The Washington
Post, April 7, 2010, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/04/06/AR2010040604121.html.
79 Kimberly Dozier, “Yemeni al Qaeda Publishes Second Edition of English Magazine,” Washington Times, Associated
Press, October 12, 2010, http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2010/oct/12/yemeni-al-qaeda-publishes-second-
edition-english-m/print/.
80 Robbie Brown and Kim Severson, “2nd American in Strike Waged Qaeda Media War,” New York Times, September
30, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/01/world/middleeast/samir-khan-killed-by-drone-spun-out-of-the-
american-middle-class.html. Hereinafter: Brown and Severson, “2nd American.” Mark Schone and Matthew Cole,
“American Jihadi Samir Khan Killed with Awlaki,” ABC News, September 30, 2011, http://abcnews.go.com/Blotter/
american-jihadi-samir-khan-killed-awlaki/story?id=14640013. Herafter: Schone and Cole, “American Jihadi.”
81 Brown and Severson, “2nd American.”
82 Schone and Cole, “American Jihadi”; Aaron Y, Zelin, “American Jihadi,” Foreign Policy, September 30, 2011,
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/09/30/samir_khan_dead_inspire_magazine?page=full.
83 DOJ Press Release, “Naser Jason Abdo Charged Federally in Bomb Plot,” July 29, 2011, http://www.justice.gov/
usao/txw/press_releases/2011/Abdo.pdf; David Goodman, “Soldier Held Amid Claim of Terror Plot at Fort Hood,”
New York Times, July 28, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/29/us/29awol.html?_r=1.
84 Jerry Markon, “FBI Foils Elaborate Bomb Plot in Oregon,” Washington Post, November 28, 2010,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/11/27/AR2010112700546.html.
85 United States v. Mohamed Osman Mohamud, Affidavit, U.S. District Court for the District of Oregon, November 26,
2010, p. 3.
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included commentary from Awlaki and another American Al Qaeda propagandist, Adam
Gadahn.86
Adam Gadahn has served as a translator and English-language propagandist for Al Qaeda and
has been charged with treason by the United States. He has appeared in a number of the
organization’s videos widely circulated on the Web. Born in 1978 and raised in California,
Gadahn converted to Islam as a teenager and moved to Pakistan by 1999. As a young convert in
California, Gadahn was influenced by two jihadists involved with a discussion group he attended.
One of these men also likely introduced him into Al Qaeda circles in Pakistan and Afghanistan. In
2004, he first appeared in a widely released video threatening attacks on the United States, and in
another dispatch he urged Americans to convert to Islam. In a recent video, posted on June 20,
2010, Gadahn rails against President Barack Obama describing him as, “treacherous, bloodthirsty,
and narrow-minded.”87
Omar Hammami, also known as “Abu Mansour al-Amriki,” is originally from Daphne, AL. He
has emerged as a key international intermediary for the Somali terrorist group al-Shabaab. The
son of a Syrian-born father and an American mother, he has been featured in propagandist videos
distributed by the group. In one he instructs recruits in urban warfare. Zachary Chesser saw
Hammami as a role model. He even imitated Hammami’s adoption of “al-Amriki” (the American)
as part of his own jihadist name—“Abu Talhah Al-Amrikee.” Somali officials tie Hammami to al-
Shabaab recruitment and financial management. He may also have led battlefield skirmishes. On
August 5, 2010, DOJ unsealed a 2009 superseding indictment against him.88
As a child, Hammami lived between the Christian world of his mother and the Muslim beliefs of
his father. He converted to Islam in high school, and while a student at the University of South
Alabama, he led the Muslim Student Association and began adhering to Salafi doctrine. His
Salfism sprang in part from a desire to rebel against his father. In 2002, he dropped out of school,
and by 2004 he had found his way to Toronto, Canada, where American combat in Iraq and
Afghanistan encouraged him to reconsider his nonviolent Salafi views. One of his friends alleges
that Hammami began surfing the Web for information on jihad at this time. While in Canada, he
86 Ibid; Judith Miller and David Samuels, “A Glossy Approach to Inciting Terrorism,” Wall Street Journal, November
27, 2010, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703572404575635053157718986.html?mod=
googlenews_wsj. None of the three reside in the United States.
87 “American-Born al Qaeda Spokesman Appears in New Video,” CNN.com, June 20, 2010, http://www.cnn.com/2010/
US/06/20/al.qaeda.video/index.html; Raffi Khatchadourian, “Azzam the American: The Making of an Al Qaeda
Homegrown,” The New Yorker, January 22, 2007, http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2007/01/22/
070122fa_fact_khatchadourian; “Al Qaeda’s ‘American Voice of Islam,” STRATFOR, September 5, 2006,
http://www.stratfor.com/al_qaedas_american_voice_islam?fn=8415719516; Evan Kohlmann, “American Greases al-
Qaida Media Machine,” MSNBC, July 14, 2006, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/13842265/.
88 Spencer S. Hsu, “Arrest of Va. Man Spotlights al-Qaeda’s New American Recruiter,” The Washington Post, August
1, 2010; DOJ Press Release, “Fourteen Charged with Providing Material Support to Somalia-Based Terrorist
Organization al Shabaab,” August 5, 2010, http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2010/August/10-ag-898.html; Andrea Elliott,
“The Jihadist Next Door,” New York Times Magazine, January 31, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/31/
magazine/31Jihadist-t.htm; John Goddard, “Terrorist Leader Lived in Toronto,” The Hamilton Spectator, Ontario,
Canada, January 4, 2010; Brendan Kirby, “Report: Former Daphne High and USA Student Has Been Charged in a
Secret Indictment in Mobile with Providing Material to Terrorists,” Mobile Register, September 5, 2009,
http://blog.al.com/live/2009/09/report_former_daphne_high_and.html; The Nine Eleven Finding Answers (NEFA)
Foundation, “Shabaab al-Mujahideen Releases Footage of ‘Abu Suleim Training Camp,’” September 2009,
http://www.nefafoundation.org/multimedia-prop.html.
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married a Somali woman. In 2005 they moved to Cairo, and by late 2006 he was in Somalia
pursuing violent jihad.89
Social Networks
Social networks appear to be central to the radicalization process and to terrorist plots as well.
Networks can be actual groups—encompassing intimate kinship ties, bonds of friendship, links
forged in student associations, or cliques tied to radical mosques. They may also be virtual and
fostered by the Internet. Group loyalties can form around jihadist messages entailing moral
outrage over the perceived suffering of fellow Muslims and a sense that the West is at war with
Islam. Networks help place these messages into the context of an individual’s personal
experiences.90
Beyond the radicalization experience, the development and strengthening of affective ties with
like-minded individuals may play a prominent role in the formation of terrorist groups.91
According to The New York Times, Faisal Shahzad befriended Shahid Hussain, a fellow Pakistani,
while the two were enrolled at the University of Bridgeport in Connecticut in the early 2000s.
Shahzad appears to have started to radicalize in the United States by 2004. During trips to
Pakistan prior to his attempted Times Square bombing, Shahzad reestablished ties with Hussain.
The latter had also returned to Pakistan. Together, the two grew more militant, especially when in
2007 Pakistani forces stormed Lal Masjid, the “Red Mosque,” a center of Islamic
fundamentalism. The two friends socialized with a third individual, Muhammad Shouaib Mughal.
The three were keenly interested in global jihad. Mughal eventually trained with the Pakistani
Taliban, the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan. He brought Shahzad and Hussain into the group’s camps
for training in 2009.92
Intermediaries within Networks
Social networks often feature their own internal intermediaries or charismatic leaders. Daniel
Boyd and six other North Carolina residents were indicted on terrorism charges in 2009. In June
2010, another individual, who was living in Mitrovica, Kosovo, was charged in a criminal
complaint linked to the case.93 This small social network included Dylan and Zakariya Boyd, sons
of Daniel Boyd. A charismatic leader, the elder Boyd allegedly led a conspiracy from November
2006 to 2009 to radicalize, recruit, and assist young men interested in overseas terrorism. The
conspiracy also purportedly included fundraising for and provision of material support to terrorist
groups. Using stories of his supposed past violent jihadist exploits in Pakistan and Afghanistan,
Boyd recruited and trained individuals for violent terrorist activity, according to FBI courtroom
testimony. From 1989-1992, Boyd supposedly trained at terrorist camps in Afghanistan and
89 Ibid.
90 Sageman, Leaderless Jihad, pp. 71-85.
91 Max Abrahms, “What Terrorists Really Want: Terrorist Motives and Counterterrorism Strategy,” International
Security, vol. 32, no. 4 (Spring 2008), p. 96.
92 Andrea Elliott, “Militant’s Path From Pakistan to Times Square,” New York Times, June 22, 2010,
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/23/world/23terror.html. Hereinafter: Andrea Elliott, June 22, 2010.
93 DOJ Press Release, “Kosovar National Charged with Terrorism Violations,” June 17, 2010, http://www.justice.gov/
opa/pr/2010/June/10-nsd-706.html.
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Pakistan and may have been a fighter in Afghanistan.94 In 2011, the Boyds pled guilty to charges
related to the case.95
Jihadi Cool
Recent plots suggest that intermediaries and social networks can emphasize persuasive messages
featuring elements outside of jihadist religious rhetoric. Adventurism and romanticized notions of
revolution seem to have some prominence in the radicalization process. A desire to protect the
Ummah against what he perceived as Western incursion may have been more important to Faisal
Shahzad than more overtly religious rhetoric.96 Terrorist recruiters are also promoting “jihadi
cool” by producing rap videos advocating terrorism and releasing them on the Web. In 2007,
Cabdulaahi Ahmed Faarax, a charismatic recruiter for the Somali terrorist group al-Shabaab,
enticed young Somali men in Minnesota with a jihadi cool message replete with war stories.
According to federal court documents, he emphasized jihad but also stressed the sense of
brotherhood he had experienced while fighting. He detailed his own experiences in guerilla
combat and reassured his listeners that it was fun and not to be afraid. He further underscored that
recruits would get the chance to use firearms.97
“Jihadi cool” may have also played a role in pushing five young Northern Virginia Muslim men
to travel in 2009 to Pakistan, where they were arrested for allegedly attempting to join jihadist
organizations in the region. On June 24, 2010, the five were convicted on terrorism charges and
sentenced to 10 years in prison in Pakistan.98 Muslim leaders from Alexandria, VA, indicated that
they had no inkling of radicalization among the five.99 Abroad, as early as 2006, Dutch officials
noted an “intensification of radicalization tendencies” among young Muslims in the Netherlands
and a perception that jihad was “cool.”100
94 Mike Baker, “Feds Play Audio Tapes at Tense NC Terror Hearing,” Associated Press, in SCnow.com, August 5,
2009, http://www2.scnow.com/news/2009/aug/05/feds_play_audio_tapes_at_tense_nc_terror_hearing-ar-350281/; DOJ
Press Release, “Seven Charged with Terrorism Violations in North Carolina,” July 27, 2009, http://www.justice.gov/
opa/pr/2009/July/09-nsd-725.html (Hereinafter: DOJ Press Release, July 27, 2009)
95 DOJ Press Release, “North Carolina Man Pleads Guilty to Terrorism Charge,” September 14, 2011,
http://www.fbi.gov/charlotte/press-releases/2011/north-carolina-man-pleads-guilty-to-terrorism-charge-1; DOJ Press
Release, “North Carolina Man Pleads Guilty to Terrorism Charge,” June 7, 2011, http://www.fbi.gov/charlotte/press-
releases/2011/north-carolina-man-pleads-guilty-to-terrorism-charge; DOJ Press Release, “Raleigh-Area Man Pleads
Guilty to Terrorism Charges,” February 9, 2011, http://www.fbi.gov/charlotte/press-releases/2011/ce020911.htm.
96 Andrea Elliott, June 22, 2010.
97 United States v.Cabdulaahi Ahmed Faarax and Abdiweli Yassin Isse, Criminal Complaint, U.S. District Court State
and District of Minnesota, October 8, 2009, http://graphics8.nytimes.com/packages/pdf/us/
20091124_TERROR_DOCS/faarax.pdf; See Dina Temple-Raston, “Jihadi Cool: Terrorist Recruiters’ Latest Weapon,”
National Public Radio, March 26, 2010, http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=125186382&ft=1&f=
1001.
98 Shaiq Hussain and Brigid Schulte, “5 N.Va. Men Convicted on Terrorism Charges in Pakistan, Given 10 Years in
Prison,” The Washington Post, June 25, 2010, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/story/2009/12/10/
ST2009121002234.html?sid=ST2009121002234.
99 Mary Beth Sheridan and Spencer S. Hsu, “Arrests Suggest U.S. Muslims, Like Those in Europe, Can Be Radicalized
Abroad,” The Washington Post, December 12, 2009, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/12/
11/AR2009121104404.html
100 Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations, The Netherlands, Violent Jihad in the Netherlands: Current Trends
in the Islamist Terrorist Threat, The Hague, March 2006, p. 8, http://www.fas.org/irp/world/netherlands/violent.pdf.
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The Internet
The Web may also play a role in the experiences of many would-be and actual terrorists, just as it
does in the lives of so many people. The interactivity of chat rooms, blogs, social networking
sites, message boards, video hosting sites, and e-mail blurs the lines between readership and
authorship that previous generations of terrorists and sympathizers encountered with pamphlets,
newspapers, and newsletters.101 This blurring possibly encourages people who interact in such
forums to more easily see themselves as part of broader jihadist movements and not just casual
readers or online spectators. They may eventually engage in more substantive activity—actual
propagandizing, financial support, or joining a terrorist network.102
The Web’s impact on individual would-be jihadists likely varies. In some cases accessing and
engaging in online jihadist rhetoric possibly prods an individual toward violence. One author
asserts that Internet activity has been central in the development of a “self-starter” phenomenon103
and offers would-be violent jihadists what has been described as a “de-formalized” radicalization
experience.104 “Self-starters” are groups that lack ties to major international terrorist networks and
do not receive orders from such organizations.105 However, instances of solely virtual
radicalization without face-to-face interaction seem to be rare. Most radicalization apparently
requires experience with real-world social networks.106
In other instances, terrorist “wannabes” may see online activity as a suitable substitute for direct
violence and face-to-face contact with hardcore terrorists. Simply, individuals interested in
violent jihad no longer have to physically travel to formal terrorist camps for indoctrination and
rudimentary training. One author has also indicated that activity in the virtual realm may even
play a much more profound, “cathartic” role, “allow[ing] aspiring jihadists to be part of the
broader global jihad but crucially without engaging in direct violence.”107 In essence, online
activity may channel individuals away from the violent expression of their radical beliefs by
allowing them to air their grievances. While such activity may be seen in terrorist circles as an
increasingly legitimate option—instead of violent jihad—it does not come without repercussions
for online supporters of terrorism. Individuals absorbed in such activities may run afoul of law
enforcement for materially aiding terrorist organizations.108
Regardless of whether jihadist online activity drives individuals to violence, the Internet arguably
serves to spur radicalization in three ways. First, it allows jihadists to augment their messages
with suggestive audio and video. Second, it makes it easier for would-be jihadists to find and
101 Maura Conway, “Terrorism and Mass Communication: Nitro to the Net,” The World Today, vol. 60, no. 8/9
(Aug/Sep 2004), pp. 19-22, http://doras.dcu.ie/513/1/nitro_to_net_2004.pdf.
102 Gilbert Ramsay, “Relocating the Virtual War,” Defence Against Terrorism Review, vol. 2, no. 1 (Spring 2009), p.
34, http://www.tmmm.tsk.tr/publications/datr3/03_Gilbert%20Ramsay.pdf.
103 Aiden Kirby, “The London Bombers as ‘Self-Starters: A Case Study in Indigenous Radicalization and the
Emergence of Autonomous Cliques,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, vol. 30, issue 5 (May 2007), p. 416,
http://pdfserve.informaworld.com/122510_731260637_773633171.pdf.
104 Ibid, p. 425.
105 Ibid, p. 415.
106 Tim Stevens, “Regulating the ‘Dark Web:’ How a Two-Fold Approach Can Tackle Peer-to-Peer Radicalisation,”
The RUSI Journal, vol. 154, no. 2 (April 2009), p. 29.
107 Akil N. Awan, “The Virtual Jihad: An Increasingly Legitimate Form of Warfare,” CTC Sentinel, vol. 3, no. 5 (May
2010), p. 11, http://www.ctc.usma.edu/sentinel/CTCSentinel-Vol3Iss5.pdf. Hereinafter: Awan, “The Virtual Jihad.”
108 Awan, “The Virtual Jihad,” p. 12.
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interact with like-minded people around the world. Finally, the Internet “normal[izes] behaviors
considered unacceptable or inappropriate in real-world environments.”109 Terrorists publish
rhetoric online that displaces culpability for their violent actions, which they commonly describe
as inevitable responses when faced with overpowering enemies such as the West.110
Radicalizing material is readily accessible online, as are virtual communities in which one can
discuss violent jihad. Since 2005, video sharing websites have broadened the availability of jihadi
video material. All sorts of other texts and graphic images supporting violent jihad exist on the
Web, as does a great volume of tradecraft, such as bomb-making guides.
Social networking, now inherently part of the Internet, is likely a tool that is used in the
development of contacts among radicalized individuals and recruitment into violent jihadist
groups. Before he died, Anwar al-Awlaki circulated jihadist lectures online and managed his own
popular Facebook page and blog.111 The five Virginia men convicted on June 24, 2010, in
Pakistan on terrorism charges allegedly contacted an Al Qaeda operative via social networking
websites, according to press coverage of their trial in the city of Sarghoda.112
Another case that highlights Internet-related issues involves Tarek Mehanna. Mehanna, a
pharmacist living with his parents in Sudbury, a wealthy Boston suburb, was arrested on terrorism
charges in October 2009.113 Among other alleged activities, Mehanna and co-conspirators
translated from Arabic to English documents advocating terrorism and posted them on jihadist
websites.114 They viewed themselves as the “media wing” for Al Qaeda in Iraq. In the eyes of
some terrorism experts, the Mehanna case highlights the shift away from core members of Al
Qaeda toward Internet-inspired, homegrown radicalization and self-starting terrorists. The
Mehanna case emphasizes how recruiters from foreign terrorist organizations no longer seem
necessary to shepherd radicalized individuals into terrorist training abroad. (Mehanna, himself,
allegedly tried but failed to get into such camps.) Sam Rascoff, a former New York Police
Department terrorism specialist, notes that “there is a sense that these guys are radicalizing on
their own.”115 Frank J. Cilluffo notes that the Web has supplanted mosques as a recruitment
venue, especially as terrorists try to draw Westerners into their organizations.116
109 Gabriel Weimann, Terror on the Internet: The New Arena, the New Challenge (Washington, DC: United States
Institute of Peace Press, 2006), p. 116. Hereinafter: Weimann, Terror on the Internet; Awan, “The Virtual Jihad,” p.
12.
110 Ibid.
111 NEFA Foundation, “Anwar al Awlaki: Pro Al-Qaida Ideologue with Influence in the West,” February 5, 2009,
http://www.nefafoundation.org/miscellaneous/FeaturedDocs/nefabackgrounder_alawlaki.pdf.
112 Brigid Schulte, “5 Va. Men Facing Terrorism Charges in Pakistan Write of ‘Noble’ Motivation,” The Washington
Post, May 16, 2010, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/05/15/AR2010051503548.html
113 Denise Lavoie, “Mass. Terror Suspect Taught Kids at Muslim School,” Guardian.co.uk, Associated Press, foreign,
October 21, 2009, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/feedarticle/8766970.
114 Shelley Murphy, “Taking Refuge Where His Woes Began: Sudbury Terror Suspect Presses Case on Internet,” The
Boston Globe, February 1, 2010, http://www.boston.com/news/local/massachusetts/articles/2010/02/01/
web_is_now_refuge_for_man_caught_online/?page=1 (Hereinafter: Murphy, Feb 1, 2010); Denise Lavoie, Abby
Goodnough, and Liz Robbins, “Mass. Man Arrested in Terrorism Case,” New York Times, October 21, 2009,
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/10/22/us/22terror.html; Superseding Indictment, U.S. v. Tarek Mehanna and Ahmad
Abousamra, Cr. No. 09-CR-10017 GAO, U.S. District Court District of Massachusetts, 2009,
http://www.investigativeproject.org/documents/case_docs/1121.pdf.
115 Dina Temple-Raston, “Mass. Arrest Spurs Fear of Homegrown Terrorism,” National Public Radio, October 22,
2009, http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=114020731.
116 Murphy, February 1, 2010.
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Aside from its possible impact on the radicalization process, the Internet potentially offers
terrorists operational capabilities.117 Its decentralized form mirrors the flattened, cellular
structures of most terrorist organizations. Among other things, it could help them to collect
intelligence about their targets, communicate with one another, propagandize, recruit foot
soldiers, provide training, raise funds, and communicate operational direction.118
Jailhouse Jihadism
In the last several years, terrorism experts and some Members of Congress have shown interest in
jihadist prison radicalization.119 But the research is decidedly unclear regarding the threat posed
by radicalization behind bars. A scholar of the prison phenomenon in the United Kingdom notes
that jail time potentially accelerates the radicalization process for many individuals. Prison brings
together disaffected people who may be receptive to anti-social messages offering “clear, albeit
intolerant, solutions to complex problems of identity and belonging.”120 Experts have sounded
warnings about the unknown level of threat posed by radicalization and terrorist recruitment in
U.S. jails.121
Others are quick to point out, however, that while conversion to Islam and radicalization occur
among incarcerated populations, the jump to terrorist plotting in the United States is rare.122 This
is at least partly due to prison officials’ efforts to counter jailhouse jihadism, according to a study
involving interviews with 210 prison officials and 270 inmates mostly from state correctional
systems.123 The Federal Bureau of Prisons acknowledges the possibility of inmate radicalization
but “do[es] not believe that there is widespread terrorist-inspired radicalization or recruiting in
federal prisons,” where between 5% and 6% of prisoners identify as Muslims.124 Based on CRS
analysis of the 53 violent jihadist plots and attacks since 9/11, only one involved radicalization in
prison. A study of 117 homegrown jihadist terrorists from the United States and United Kingdom
117 Weimann, Terror on the Internet, pp. 56.
118 Weimann, Terror on the Internet, pp. 111-140.
119 U.S. Congress, House Committee on Homeland Security, Threat of Muslim-American Radicalization in U.S.
Prisons, 112th Cong., 1st sess., June 15, 2011; U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Homeland Security and
Governmental Affairs, Prison Radicalization: Are Terrorist Cells Forming in U.S. Cell Blocks? 109th Cong., 2nd sess.
September 19, 2006, S. Hrg. 109–954 (Washington, DC: GPO, 2007), pp. 1-6, http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/
getdoc.cgi?dbname=109_senate_hearings&docid=f:30597.pdf.
120 James Brandon, “The Danger of Prison Radicalization in the West,” Combating Terrorism Center Sentinel, vol. 2,
no. 12 (December 2009), pp. 1-3, http://ctc.usma.edu/sentinel/CTCSentinel-Vol2Iss12.pdf. Hereinafter: Brandon, “The
Danger of Prison.”
121 See George Washington University Homeland Security Policy Institute (HSPI) and The University of Virginia
Critical Incident Analysis Group (CIAG), “Out of the Shadows: Getting Ahead of Prisoner Radicalization,” HSPI and
CIAG, Washington, DC, September 2006, http://www.healthsystem.virginia.edu/internet/ciag/publications/
out_of_the_shadows.pdf.
122 Brandon, “The Danger of Prison,” p. 4; Mark S. Hamm, “Prisoner Radicalization: Assessing the Threat in U.S.
Correctional Institutions,” National Institute of Justice Journal, no. 261 (October 2008), p. 18, http://www.ncjrs.gov/
pdffiles1/nij/224085.pdf.
123 Bert Useem and Obie Clayton, “Radicalization of U.S. Prisoners,” Criminology & Public Policy, vol. 8, no. 3
(August 2009), pp. 586-587, http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1745-9133.2009.00574.x/pdf. Hereinafter:
Useem and Clayton, “Radicalization of U.S. Prisoners.”
124 Gary Fields and Suzanne Sataline, “Bomb Case Raises Issue of Islam in Jails,” Wall Street Journal, May 23, 2009;
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB124303841574048865.html.
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found only seven cases in which prison had a significant impact on an individual’s radicalization
process.125
The lack of conclusive prison-based radicalization among the jihadist terrorism plots and foiled
attacks since 9/11 suggests that the threat emanating from prisons does not seem as substantial as
some experts may fear. One of the recent cases, commonly known as the Newburgh Four plot,
included at least two individuals who converted to Islam while in state prison, but it remains
unclear whether they radicalized behind bars, and whether the plot itself took form outside of
jail.126
The most prominent post-9/11 example of domestic violent jihadist activity inspired in prison
implicated the group, Jamiyyat Ul-Islam Is-Saheeh (JIS or the “Authentic Assembly of God”).
Kevin James, Levar Washington, Gregory Patterson, and Hammad Samana were arrested and
charged in August 2005 for their participation in a plot to attack Jewish institutions and other
targets in the Los Angeles area, including synagogues, the Israeli Consulate, Los Angeles
International Airport (LAX), U.S. military recruiting offices, and military bases.
According to DOJ, the incarcerated James founded JIS in 1997 based on his interpretation of
Islam. His views are apparent in several of his prison writings, including a 104-page document
titled the “JIS Protocol.” In this document, James supports the establishment of an Islamic
Caliphate in the United States and describes “Jihad [as] the only true ‘anti-terrorist action[,]’ a
defensive battle against the aggression of theological imposters led by Zionism.” The document
also advocated the killing of “lawful targets,” including non-Muslims. Reportedly, James met
Washington in prison in 2004 and introduced him to JIS and its beliefs. After his release,
Washington, who converted to Islam while he was in prison, recruited Patterson, an employee at
LAX, and Samana at the Jamaat-E-Masijudal mosque in Inglewood, CA, where they all
worshipped. Both Patterson and Samana swore allegiance to Washington and pledged to serve as
“mujahideen,” according to court documents.127 One study has pointed out that James’
radicalization manifested itself in prison but may not have been heavily influenced by his
experiences behind bars. Two points suggest that factors outside of prison may have at least partly
125 Daveed Gartenstein-Ross and Laura Grossman, Homegrown Terrorists in the U.S. and U.K.: An Empirical
Examination of the Radicalization Process, Foundation for Defense of Democracies, Center for Terrorism Research,
Washington, DC, April 2009, pp. 14-15, http://www.defenddemocracy.org/downloads/
HomegrownTerrorists_USandUK.pdf. Hereinafter: Gartenstein-Ross and Grossman, Homegrown Terrorists in the U.S.
and U.K.
126 Eric Gorski and Rachel Zoll, “Plot Renews Fears of Radical Islam in Prison,” Associated Press, in msnbc.com, May
22, 2009, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/30891721/; Daniel J. Wakin, “Imams Reject Talk That Islam Radicalizes
Inmates,” New York Times, May 24, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/24/nyregion/24convert.html.
127 DOJ Press Release, “Man Who Formed Terrorist Group that Plotted Attacks on Military and Jewish Facilities
Sentenced to 16 Years in Federal Prison,” March 6, 2009, http://losangeles.fbi.gov/dojpressrel/pressrel09/
la030609ausa.htm (Hereinafter: DOJ Press Release, March 6, 2009); Anti-Defamation League, “Two Sentenced in Los
Angeles Terror Plot against Jewish Institutions,” adl.com, August 24, 2008, updated 2009, http://www.adl.org/
main_Terrorism/los_angeles_sentenced.htm; DOJ Press Release, “Man Involved in Domestic Terrorism Plot Targeting
Military and Jewish Facilities Sentenced to 22 Years,” July 23, 2008, http://losangeles.fbi.gov/dojpressrel/pressrel08/
la062308usa.htm; DOJ Press Release, “Second Man Involved in Domestic Terrorism Plot Targeting Military, Jewish
Facilities Sentenced to Prison,” July 21, 2008, http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2008/July/08-nsd-634.html; DOJ Press
Release, “Four Men Indicted on Terrorism Charges,” August 31, 2005, http://www.dodig.mil/IGInformation/
IGInformationReleases/fourmen_090105.pdf. Hereinafter: DOJ Press Release, August 31, 2005.
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driven his radicalization: his “JIS Protocol” does not focus on jailhouse conditions, and his father
had been a member of the Black Panther Party.128
Overview of Post-9/11 Homegrown Jihadist
Terrorism Plots and Attacks
Scholars and law enforcement officials have noted that no workable general profile of domestic
violent jihadists exists. According to the NYPD’s Intelligence Division, there is no effective
profile to predict exactly who will radicalize.129 Another study found only broad trends among
domestic jihadist terrorists, specifically that they are overwhelmingly male and about two-thirds
of them are younger than 30 years old.130 As the above discussion may suggest, generalizing
about the individuals involved is problematic.
Indeed, there does not appear to be a common thread connecting the U.S. Army psychiatrist
Major Nidal Hasan with the Caucasian convert, Daniel Patrick Boyd; the Afghan immigrant
Najibullah Zazi with Carlos Bledsoe, an African American of a happy childhood who converted
to Islam and renamed himself Abdulhakim Muhammed; David Headley, who was born Daood
Gilani to a successful Pakistani immigrant father and American mother, with Talib Islam, who
was born Michael Finton and raised in multiple foster homes; or the educated pharmacist Tarek
Mehanna, with the Somali American from Minneapolis Shirwa Ahmed, who traveled to the land
of his birth and became the first U.S. citizen suicide bomber. The plots and attacks drew in first-
and second-generation Muslim Americanimmigrants and native-born Americans who converted
to the faith. Some included individuals acting alone, while others had multiple co-conspirators.
Some plots were aspirational. Others appear to have been pushed along by government
informants or undercover agents, and still others were serious and calculating until uncovered by
intelligence and/or law enforcement officials (see Appendix A for details on the cases).
Figure B-1 provides information about the profile and training of individuals involved in
domestic jihadist terrorist plots and attacks. Figure B-2 documents the specific plots and attacks,
including the intended endgame (use of firearms, explosives, or fight abroad), target
(within/outside the United States), and tools used by investigators to disrupt the plotting.
Overarching Themes
Homegrown violent jihadist activity since 9/11 defies easy categorization. For example,
conventional notions of “homegrown” may suggest plots that are hatched and executed solely
within the United States. But in a globalized environment, many domestic jihadist terrorist plots
have some sort of international dimension. For example, some plotters train abroad. Some receive
cues from terrorist Internet propagandists operating in foreign lands. And as suggested above,
homegrown terrorists can focus their violent plans on domestic or international entities. Since
9/11, 32 homegrown plots featured domestic targets, 18 focused on foreign ones, and three
conspiracies had both domestic and foreign targeting elements. From another perspective, 30
128 Useem and Clayton, “Radicalization of U.S. Prisoners,” pp. 581-582.
129 Silber and Bhatt, Radicalization in the West, p. 8.
130 Schanzer, et.al, Anti-Terror Lessons of Muslim Americans, p. 10.
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involved intent or actual travel abroad for training or to plan for terrorist attacks. The 53
homegrown jihadist attacks and plots since 9/11 do exhibit four broad themes: a variety of
endgames, little stomach for suicide or martyrdom among plotters, successful attacks by lone
wolves, and varied capabilities among the plots.
A Variety of Endgames
Homegrown violent jihadists pursue a number of endgames. Some seek involvement in foreign
conflicts or insurgencies. Others plan and attempt to execute either bombings or assaults with
firearms. Finally, some jihadists apparently intended from the start only to fund or materially
support the activities of their brethren.
Foreign Fighters
Sixteen of the post-9/11 homegrown plots have featured individuals exclusively seeking to
become foreign fighters with terrorist groups entangled in insurgency-type conflicts. Al-Shabaab-
related cases concerning young men leaving the United States to fight in Somalia are the
paramount example. Other cases include the following:
• In a case mentioned elsewhere in this report, five men from Northern Virginia
(Northern Virginia Five) were arrested in Sarghoda, Pakistan, in December 2009.
They purportedly traveled there hoping to join jihadist groups and battle U.S.
troops in Afghanistan. On June 24, 2010, they were convicted of terrorism
charges in a special Pakistani anti-terror court. Prosecutors say the five men also
began planning attacks against a Pakistani nuclear plant and an air base and other
targets in Afghanistan and “territories of the United States.”131
• In February 2006, three residents of Toledo, OH—Mohammad Zaki Amawi, a
dual U.S. and Jordanian citizen; Marwan Othman El-Hindi, a naturalized U.S.
citizen from Jordan; and Wassim Mazloum, a legal permanent resident from
Lebanon (Toledo, Ohio Plotters)—were charged with conspiracy to kill or maim
persons in locations outside the United States, to include U.S. Armed Forces
personnel serving in Iraq.132 On June 13, 2008, a federal jury convicted all three
of conspiring to commit terrorist acts against Americans overseas and material
support to terrorists.133
Explosives and Firearms
Fifteen of the 53 homegrown jihadist plots targeting the United States since 9/11 exclusively
involved explosives or incendiary devices. Suspects at least discussed the use of bombs, hand
grenades, or missiles in these cases.134 From a broader perspective, 27 cases involved plotting
131 Jerry Markon, et al., “Pakistan Charges 5 Northern Virginia Men in Alleged Terrorism Plot,” Washington Post,
March 18, 2010, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/03/17/AR2010031700430_pf.html.
132 United States v. Mohammad Zaki Amawi, et al., Indictment, 3:06CR0719, U.S. District Court for the Northern
District of Ohio Western Division, 2006, p. 2, http://www.justice.gov/opa/documents/indictment_22006.pdf.
133 Anti Defamation League, “Three Men Face Terrorism Charges in Ohio,” adl.org, October 21, 2009,
http://www.adl.org/main_Terrorism/Ohio_men_trial.htm.
134 This includes one case involving a surface-to-air missile (to be supplied by an undercover agent).
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revolving around explosives or incendiary devices coupled with another endgame—either the use
of firearms or plans to become foreign fighters. Historically, most terrorist incidents in the United
States have involved bombs or fires. According to research drawn from the National Consortium
for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism’s Global Terrorism Database, about 83%
of all terrorist incidents on U.S. soil between 1970 and 2007—including violent jihadists as well
as non-jihadists—have included explosives or incendiary devices. Roughly 9% involved
firearms.135
The Zazi case (as mentioned elsewhere) and the attempt by Faisal Shahzad to detonate an
explosives-filled 1993 Nissan Pathfinder in New York City’s Times Square stand out as examples
of plots incorporating explosive or incendiary devices. On May 1, 2010, investigators discovered
fireworks, clocks, wiring, filled propane tanks, gasoline canisters, and fertilizer that Shahzad had
rigged for explosion in his vehicle.136 The Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan helped facilitate the failed
attack by training Shahzad and sending him $12,000 in funding.137
Three plots intended to use firearms exclusively, while 16 plots involved in whole or in part the
use of firearms. The three plots that focused on firearms include two of the successful post-9/11
attacks. The deadlier of the two attacks was the shooting at Fort Hood, TX, on November 5, 2009.
U.S. Army Major Nidal Hasan was charged in the attack which killed 13 and wounded or injured
43 others.138 Abdulhakim Muhammad was arrested on June 1, 2009, in connection with a
shooting at the U.S. Army-Navy Career Center in Little Rock, AR, that killed one soldier and
wounded another.139 The third case that centered on firearms involved six men. They were
arrested in May 2007 in a plot against Fort Dix, a U.S. Army base in New Jersey. The plan
focused on firearms and included attacking and killing soldiers. In December 2008, a jury found
five of the six guilty of conspiring to kill military personnel but cleared them of attempted
murder.140
135 Gary LaFree, “Terrorist Attacks Against the United States Homeland from 1970 to 2007,” p. 57, in Appendix B,
“Community-Level Indicators of Radicalization: A Data and Methods Task Force,” Report to Human
Factors/Behavioral Sciences Division, Science and Technology Directorate, U.S. Department of Homeland Security,”
National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, College Park, MD, February16, 2010,
http://www.start.umd.edu/start/publications/START_HFD_CommRadReport.pdf.
136 DOJ Press Release, “Faisal Shahzad Pleads Guilty in Manhattan Federal Court to 10 Federal Crimes Arising from
Attempted Car Bombing in Times Square,” June 21, 2010, http://newyork.fbi.gov/dojpressrel/pressrel10/
nyfo062110.htm. Hereinafter: DOJ Press Release, June 21, 2010; DOJ Press Release, “Manhattan U.S. Attorney
Charges Faisal Shahzad with Attempted Car Bombing in Times Square,” May 4, 2010, http://newyork.fbi.gov/
dojpressrel/pressrel10/nyfo050410a.htm; United States v.Faisal Shahzad, Criminal Complaint 01:10-mj-00928-UA,
U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York, June 17, 2010, http://cryptome.org/shahzad/usa-v-
shahzad.htm.
137 DOJ Press Release, June 21, 2010; Anne Flaherty, “White House Says Pakistan Taliban Behind N.Y. Bomb,”
Associated Press in abcnews.com, May 9, 2010, http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/wireStory?id=10596709.
138 “Fort Hood Shooting Suspect to Remain Confined,” Associated Press State and Local Wire, in msnbc.com,
November 21, 2009, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/34084622; “Fort Hood Shooting Suspect Out of Intensive Care,”
CNN.com, December16, 2009, http://www.cnn.com/2009/CRIME/12/16/texas.fort.hood.hasan/index.html?iref=
allsearch.
139 NEFA, “Target America Series #18: The Little Rock Arkansas Recruiting Station Shooting,” June 2009,
http://www.nefafoundation.org/miscellaneous/FeaturedDocs/NEFA_littlerockrecruitingshooting.pdf; James Dao, “Man
Claims Terror Ties in Little Rock Shooting,” New York Times, January 22, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/22/
us/22littlerock.html.
140 Christopher Dela Cruz, “Three convicted in Fort Dix terror plot are sentenced to life in prison,” NJ.com, April 28,
2009, http://www.nj.com/news/index.ssf/2009/04/judge_sentences_fort_dix_defen.html. Hereinafter: Dela Cruz,
NJ.com April 28, 2009.
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Multiple, Unclear, or Unique Tactics
In total, 19 attacks and plots incorporated multiple or unique tactics or the tactics were not clear
from the public record. One attack involving multiple tactics occurred abroad but targeted
members of the U.S. Armed Forces at a base. In that attack, which occurred on March 23, 2003,
U.S. Army Sergeant Hasan Akbar used hand grenades (explosives) and his military-issued M-4
rifle to kill two fellow U.S. servicemen and wound 14 others at Camp Pennsylvania in Kuwait.141
Other examples of multiple, unique, or unspecified tactics include the following:
• Members of the plot involving Daniel Boyd allegedly attempted to travel abroad
to engage in jihad as foreign fighters and also likely prepared to attack a domestic
site—the U.S. Marine Corps Base in Quantico, VA, using firearms.142
• Bryant Vinas, who plotted to blow up (explosives) the Long Island railroad in
New York, admitted to U.S. officials that he met with Al Qaeda leaders in
Pakistan and, between March and July 2008, attended three Al Qaeda training
courses.143 In September 2008, as a foreign fighter he took part in a rocket attack
targeting a U.S. military base in Afghanistan.144
• Even though the plotters discussed using explosives, the four individuals tied to
JIS and arrested in 2005 used firearms in robberies to generate funding for their
scheme.145
• In a case involving unspecified tactics, Ehsanul Islam Sadequee, a U.S. citizen
born in Virginia, and Syed Haris Ahmed, a naturalized U.S. citizen from
Pakistan, scouted targets in Washington, DC, in 2005.146
• In an attack that did not feature guns or bombs, on March 3, 2006, Mohammed
Reza Taheri-Azar, a naturalized U.S. citizen, crashed his SUV into a crowd near
the University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill. No one was seriously injured in
the attack, and he pled guilty to two counts of attempted murder. The assailant
allegedly hoped to avenge the deaths of Muslims abroad that he believed were
caused by the United States.147
141 Convicted and sentenced to death in military court, Akbar was at least in part motivated by extremist Islamic beliefs.
He had converted to Islam as an adult. Madeline Gruen, “Backgrounder: Sgt. Hasan Akbar,” PowerPoint presentation,
NEFA, Jan 2010, http://www.nefafoundation.org/miscellaneous/nefa_akbarbackgrounder.pdf; Manuel Roig-Franzia,
“Army Soldier Is Convicted in Attack on Fellow Troops,” The Washington Post, April 22, 2005,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A7210-2005Apr21.html.
142 DOJ Press Release, “Superseding Indictment in Boyd Matter,” September 24, 2009, http://charlotte.fbi.gov/
dojpressrel/2009/ce092409.htm; DOJ Press Release, July 27, 2009.
143 Paul Cruickshank, Nic Robertson, and Ken Shiffman, “From Long Island to Lahore: The Plot to Bomb New York,”
cnn.com, May 21, 2010, http://edition.cnn.com/2010/CRIME/05/14/bryant.neal.vinas.part2/index.html; Hereinafter:
Cruickshank, Robertson, and Shiffman, “From Long Island to Lahore;” Sebastian Rotella and Josh Meyer, “U.S.-born
Militant Who Fought for Al Qaeda Is In Custody,” Los Angeles Times, July 23, 2009, http://articles.latimes.com/2009/
jul/23/nation/na-american-jihad23.
144 Cruickshank, Robertson, and Shiffman, “From Long Island to Lahore.”
145 DOJ Press Release, March 6, 2009; DOJ Press Release, August 31, 2005.
146 DOJ Press Release, “Terrorism Defendants Sentenced,” December 14, 2009, http://atlanta.fbi.gov/dojpressrel/
pressrel09/at121409a.htm.
147 “Iranian Ex-UNC Student Gets 33 Years in Prison for Plowing SUV into Crowd to Avenge Muslim Deaths,”
Associated Press, in FoxNews.com, August 26, 2008, http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,410904,00.html; “Driver
Charged for Plowing Through Crowd,” msnbc.com, March 5, 2006, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/11660817/.
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Material Support
Although this report largely focuses on radicalization and violent jihadist plotting, there is at least
one other illegal method for individuals to assist terrorists. Radicalization may lead people to help
terrorist organizations by illegally providing them material support unrelated to specific violent
jihadist plots. How frequently this has occurred since 9/11 is difficult to discern, because material
support148 charges are often part of the illegal activity in violent plots. DOJ has publicly released
information on unsealed terrorism convictions between September 11, 2001, and March 18,
2010.149 CRS analysis of this information indicates that homegrown jihadists unconnected to any
specific violent plots were prosecuted for materially supporting terrorists in at least six
schemes.150 The six schemes supported violent jihadist or jihadist-linked groups such as Al
Qaeda, Jemaah Islamiyah, Abu Sayyaf, and Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (LeT). They included the
following:
• Rahmat Abdhir: A U.S. citizen living in San Jose, CA, Abdhir was indicted in
2007 for providing material support to his brother, Zulkifli Abdhir, a member of
Jemaah Islamiyah based in the Philippines. The U.S. government accused
148 As described in U.S. Code, Title 18, Part I, Chapter 113B, 2339A and 2339B. For more information, see CRS
Report R41333, Terrorist Material Support: An Overview of 18 U.S.C. 2339A and 2339B, by Charles Doyle.
149 DOJ, “National Security Division Statistics on Unsealed International Terrorism-Related Convictions 9/11/01-
3/18/10,” http://theplumline.whorunsgov.com/wp-content/uploads/2010/03/March-26-2010-NSD-Final-Statistics.pdf.
150 For this measure, 1) Homegrown jihadists were convicted under either section 2339A or 2339B of U.S. Code, Title
18, Part I, Chapter 113B, and no other “Category I”*(see definition below) conviction charges were tied to their cases.
2) The scheme or the radicalization of the individuals involved had to have largely occurred after 9/11. 3) The scheme
was jihadist in nature, eliminating material support cases involving non-jihadist terrorist groups. 4) The scheme did not
include a violent plot as reported publicly. So, for example, the August 2004 Albany, New York plot implicating
Yassin M. Aref and Mohammed Mosharref Hossain in an FBI sting involving material support to a Pakistani terrorist
group is not included among the six material support cases. This is because the case involved a scheme to launder
through Hossain’s pizza shop and real estate holdings the proceeds of the sale of a shoulder-fired surface-to-air missile
which was purportedly to be used in a fictitious plot to assassinate Pakistan’s United Nation’s envoy.
*The introduction included with DOJ’s “National Security Division Statistics,” enumerates two categories of offenses
involved in the 403 terrorism and terrorism-related prosecutions listed between 9/11/01 and 3/18/10. According to the
Department of Justice document, “Category I Offenses” are “violations of federal statutes that are directly related to
international terrorism and that are utilized regularly in international terrorism matters.” The statistical portion of the
document includes 105 individuals who had material support charges under 18 U.S.C. §2339A or 18 U.S.C. §2339B
among their conviction charges. Appendix A in the Department of Justice, “National Security Division Statistics,”
describes the following as Category I Offenses: Aircraft Sabotage (18 U.S.C. §32); Animal Enterprise Terrorism (18
U.S.C. §43); Crimes Against Internationally Protected Persons (18 U.S.C. §§112, 878, 1116, l201(a)(4)); Use of
Biological, Nuclear, Chemical or Other Weapons of Mass Destruction (18 U.S.C. §§175, 175b, 229, 831, 2332a);
Production, Transfer, or Possession of Variola Virus (Smallpox) (18 U.S.C. §175c); Participation in Nuclear and WMD
Threats to the United States (18 U.S.C. §832); Conspiracy Within the United States to Murder, Kidnap, or Maim
Persons or to Damage Certain Property Overseas (18 U.S.C. §956); Hostage Taking (18 U.S.C. §1203); Terrorist
Attacks Against Mass Transportation Systems (18 U.S.C. §1993); Terrorist Acts Abroad Against United States
Nationals (18 U.S.C. §2332); Terrorism Transcending National Boundaries (18 U.S.C. §2332b) Bombings of places of
public use, Government facilities, public transportation systems and infrastructure facilities (18 U.S.C. §2332f); Missile
Systems designed to Destroy Aircraft (18 U.S.C. §2332g); Production, Transfer, or Possession of Radiological
Dispersal Devices (18 U.S.C. §2332h); Harboring Terrorists (18 U.S.C. §2339); Providing Material Support to
Terrorists (18 U.S.C. §2339A); Providing Material Support to Designated Terrorist Organizations (18 U.S.C. §2339B);
Prohibition Against Financing of Terrorism (18 U.S.C. §2339C); Receiving Military-Type Training from an FTO (18
U.S.C. §2339D); Narco-Terrorism (21 U.S.C. §1010A); Sabotage of Nuclear Facilities or Fuel (42 U.S.C. §2284);
Aircraft Piracy (49 U.S.C. §46502); Violations of IEEPA (50 U.S.C. §1705(b)) involving E.O. 12947 (Terrorists Who
Threaten to Disrupt the Middle East Peace Process); E.O. 13224 (Blocking Property and Prohibiting Transactions With
Persons Who Commit, Threaten to Commit, or Support Terrorism or Global Terrorism List); and E.O. 13129 (Blocking
Property and Prohibiting Transactions With the Taliban).
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Rahmat of sending to his brother more than $10,000 in supplies, including
chocolates, underwear, knives, guns, and radios.151
• Ahmed Abdellatif Sherif Mohamed: According to DOJ, during a routine traffic
stop in Goose Creek, SC, on August 4, 2007, law enforcement officials found
explosive materials (PVC pipe containing potassium nitrate and kitty litter as
well as about 20 feet of fuse) during a consensual search of the trunk of the
Toyota Camry Mohamed was driving. A laptop retrieved from the car yielded a
video produced by Mohamed depicting how components from a remote
controlled toy car could be used to fashion a detonator for an explosive device.
Mohamed had uploaded the recording to YouTube. Although no specific terrorist
group was linked to Mohamed, he did admit that he intended the recording as
instruction to “suiciders” on how to spare themselves in attacks. An Egyptian
resident of Tampa, FL, Mohamed entered the United States on an F-1 student
visa.152
• Tarik Shah, Rafiq Abdus Sabir, Mahmud Faruq Brent: In an investigation
stretching back at least to December 2001, the FBI infiltrated a group of
acquaintances interested in supporting international jihadist terrorist
organizations. Shah and Brent pled guilty to material support in 2007 and Sabir
was convicted of the charge the same year. In 2005, Shah, a Bronx, New York
City, jazz musician and martial arts instructor, had sworn allegiance to Al Qaeda
in the presence of an FBI agent who posed as a recruiter for the group. He had
also allegedly offered to train Al Qaeda fighters in hand-to-hand combat. Shah
purported to have been interested in traveling to Afghanistan in 1998 to attend
terrorist training camps.153 Sabir, a doctor from Florida, swore allegiance to Al
Qaeda in the same ceremony as his friend, Shah. Sabir also offered his medical
skills to treat injured Al Qaeda fighters.154 Brent, a Washington, DC, cab driver,
traveled to Pakistan in 2002 to attend a Lashkar-i-Taiba training camp.155 A fourth
individual was arrested in the investigation but did not get convicted of material
support.156
151 Bob Egelko, “Bail Denied for Man Accused of Aiding Brother Tied to Terror,” February 16, 2008; DOJ Press
Release, “Specially Designated Global Terrorist and His Brother Indicted for Providing Material Support to Terrorists,”
August 3, 2007, http://www.nefafoundation.org/miscellaneous/FeaturedDocs/U.S._v_Abdhir_DOJPRIndictment.pdf.
152 DOJ Press Release, “Ahmed Abdellatif Sherif Mohamed Pleads Guilty to Providing Material Support to Terrorists,”
June 18, 2008, http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2008/June/08-nsd-544.html; United States v. Ahmed Abdellatif Sherif
Mohamed, Sentencing Memorandum, Case No. U.S. District Court Middle District of Florida, 2008,
http://www.investigativeproject.org/documents/case_docs/718.pdf.
153 Joseph Goldstein, “Bronx Man Pleads Guilty to Pledging Fealty to Qaeda,” New York Sun, April 5, 2007,
http://www.nysun.com/new-york/bronx-man-pleads-guilty-to-pledging-fealty/51890/; DOJ Press Release, “Bronx
Martial Arts Instructor Pleads Guilty to Conspiring to Support Al Qaeda,” April 4, 2007, http://www.justice.gov/usao/
nys/pressreleases/April07/shahpleAprilpdf.
154 DOJ Press Release, “Florida Doctor Sentenced to 25 Years for Conspiring and Attempting to Support Al Qaeda,”
November 28, 2007, http://media-newswire.com/release_1058218.html; Stephen W. Smith, “Fla. Doctor Convicted in
NY Terror Case,” CBSNews.com, May 21, 2007, http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2007/05/21/terror/
main2833349.shtml.
155 DOJ Press Release, “Maryland Man Sentenced to 15 Years for Providing Material Support to Terrorist
Organization,” July 25, 2007, http://www.justice.gov/usao/nys/pressreleases/July07/brentsentencingpr.pdf.
156 Larry Neumeister, “Moroccan-Born Bookseller Sentenced to 13 Years in Terror Case by Federal Judge in New
York,” Associated Press in Worldstream, April 16, 2007.
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• Ronald Grecula: In an FBI sting operation, Grecula negotiated to build and sell
an explosive device with individuals he believed were tied to Al Qaeda.157
• Ilyas Ali: In a drugs-for-arms case, Ali, a naturalized U.S. citizen born in India,
admitted to conspiring in 2002 with two Pakistanis to supply Al Qaeda with anti-
aircraft missiles bought using proceeds from the sale of heroin and hashish.158
• Cedric Carpenter and Lamont Ranson: In February 2005, the duo from New
Orleans pled guilty to conspiring to sell false Mississippi Driver’s licenses,
Social Security cards, and birth certificates to undercover informants they
believed were members of the Abu Sayyaf terrorist organization.159
Aside from the convictions derived from the DOJ’s list covering the period between 9/11 and
March 18, 2010, several material support cases have come to light recently. It is unclear what
accounts for this recent flurry of arrests. It may be a parallel to the uptick in violent jihadist
plotting. Some of the cases include the following:
• In May 2011, FBI agents arrested Hafiz Khan (a naturalized U.S. citizen and
resident of Miami) and two of his sons Izhar Khan and Irfan Khan (both
naturalized U.S. citizens). They were allegedly involved in efforts to provide
financing and other material support to the Pakistani Taliban. The trio was
assisted by three other indicted individuals at large in Pakistan. This second
group included Amina Khan—Izhar Khan’s daughter—and her son, Alam Zeb,
as well as an individual named Ali Rehman. Hafiz and Izhar Khan are imams in
South Florida mosques.160
• Nima Ali Yusuf: A permanent resident of the United States living in San Diego,
Yusuf was arrested on November 12, 2010, on charges of conspiracy to provide
material support to al-Shabaab and for making false statements to a government
agency regarding an international terrorism matter.161
• Mohamud Abdi Yusuf, Abdi Mahdi Hussein, and Duwayne Mohamed Diriye
participated in a scheme to provide material support to al-Shabaab, according to
an indictment unsealed November 3, 2010. Yusuf, a resident of St. Louis, MO, is
accused of sending funds to people tied to the terrorist organization in Somalia,
157 DOJ Press Release, “Ronald Grecula Pleads Guilty to Attempting to Provide Material Support to Al-Qaeda,”
September 22, 2006. http://www.nefafoundation.org/miscellaneous/FeaturedDocs/
US_v_Grecula_DOJPRGuiltyPlea.pdf.
158 Kelly Thornton, “Man Sentenced in Drugs-for-Missiles Plot,” San Diego Union-Tribune, April 14, 2006; Thornton,
“Drugs-for-Arms Plot Nets Prison,” San Diego Union-Tribune, April 5, 2006, http://legacy.signonsandiego.com/
uniontrib/20060405/news_2m5missile.html; ‘“Al-Qaeda Dealers’ Face US Trial,” BBC News, January 6, 2003,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/2630849.stm.
159 U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement Press Release, “Two New Orleans Men Admit Offering to Sell False
Identities to Assist Members of Terrorist Organization,” February 28, 2005.
160 Jay Weaver, “No Decision from Judge on Bail for Accused South Florida Muslim Clerics,” Miami Herald, July 1,
2011, http://www.miamiherald.com/2011/07/01/2294392/accused-south-florida-muslim-clerics.html; Julie K. Brown,
“Imam’s Arrest Stuns Mosque Members,” Miami Herald, May 14, 2011, http://www.miamiherald.com/2011/05/14/
2217517/mosque-members-imam-doesnt-have.html; DOJ Press Release, “Six Individuals Charged for Providing
Material Support to the Pakistani Taliban,” May 14, 2011, http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2011/May/11-nsd-621.html.
161 DOJ Press Release, “San Diego Woman Charged with Conspiracy to Provide Material Support to al Shabaab,”
November 15, 2010, http://sandiego.fbi.gov/dojpressrel/pressrel10/sd111510.htm; United States v. Nima Ali Yusuf,
Indictment, Case Number: 10-CR-4551, U.S. District Court, Southern District of California, November 12, 2010.
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including Diriye. Yusuf purportedly worked with Hussein to structure financial
transactions while the latter was an employee of a licensed money-remitting
business.162 In November 2011, Yusuf “pled guilty to providing material support
to a foreign terrorist organization.”163
• According to an indictment unsealed on November 2, 2010, San Diego residents,
Basaaly Saeed Moalin, Mohamed Mohamed Mohamud, and Issa Doreh
conspired to provide material support to al-Shabaab. The indictment states that
Moalin received a request for financial support from one of al-Shabaab’s military
leaders in December 2007 and subsequently worked with Mohamud and Doreh
to fill the request.164 In a separate indictment unsealed on December 3, 2010,
Anaheim resident Ahmed Nasir Taalil Mohamud was tied to the scheme.165
• Barry Bujol: According to DOJ, Bujol, a U.S. citizen living in Texas, allegedly
attempted to provide money, pre-paid telephone calling cards, and global
positioning system receivers (among other items), to Al Qaeda in the Arabian
Peninsula after he had communicated with radical cleric Anwar al-Awlaki.166 He
was arrested on May 30, 2010.167 In November 2011, he was convicted of
attempting to provide material support or resources to a designated foreign
terrorist organization as well as aggravated identity theft.168
• Khalid Quazzani: On May 19, 2010, Ouazzani, a naturalized U.S. citizen
originally from Morocco and living in Kansas City, MO, pled guilty to
participating in a material support scheme that provided more than $23,000 to Al
Qaeda.169
• Syed Hashmi: A Pakistan-born U.S. citizen, Hashmi pled guilty to material
support charges on April 27, 2010. He admitted that while he was a graduate
student in London, he allowed a roommate to store in his apartment ponchos,
162 DOJ Press Release, “Two Indicted in Missouri on Charges of Providing Material Support to a Terrorist
Organization,” November 3, 2010, http://stlouis.fbi.gov/dojpressrel/pressrel10/sl110310.htm.
163 DOJ Press Release, “Local Man Pleads Guilty to Providing Material Support to Terrorist Organization,” November
3, 2011, http://www.fbi.gov/stlouis/press-releases/2011/local-man-pleads-guilty-to-providing-material-support-to-
terrorist-organization?utm_campaign=email-Immediate&utm_medium=email&utm_source=st-louis-press-releases&
utm_content=44103.
164 DOJ Press Release, “Three California Men Charged with Conspiracy to Provide Material Support to al Shabaab,”
November 2, 2010, http://sandiego.fbi.gov/dojpressrel/pressrel10/sd110210.htm; United States v. Basaaly Saeed
Moalin, et al., Indictment, Case Number: 10-CR-4246, U.S. District Court, Southern District of California, November
2, 2010, http://www.investigativeproject.org/documents/case_docs/1409.pdf.
165 DOJ Press Release, “California Man Charged with Conspiracy to Provide Material Support to al Shabaab,”
December 3, 2010, http://sandiego.fbi.gov/dojpressrel/pressrel10/sd120310a.htm.
166 Evan Perez, “U.S. Terror Suspect Arrested,” Wall Street Journal, June 3, 2010, http://online.wsj.com/article/
SB10001424052748703340904575285310199323440.html; DOJ Press Release, “Texas Man Indicted for Attempting
to Provide Material Support to Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula,” June 3, 2010, http://houston.fbi.gov/dojpressrel/
pressrel10/ho060310.htm.
167 Ibid.
168 DOJ Press Release, “Texas Man Convicted for Attempting to Provide Material Support to Al Qaeda,” November 14,
2011, http://www.justice.gov/usao/txs/1News/Releases/2011%20November/111114%20Bujol.htm.
169 DOJ Press Release, “Al Qaeda Supporter Pleads Guilty to Supporting Terrorist Organization,” May 19, 2010,
http://kansascity.fbi.gov/dojpressrel/pressrel10/kc051910.htm. Terry Frieden, “U.S. Citizen Pleads Guilty to Sending
Funds to al Qaeda,” CNN.com, May 19, 2010, http://www.cnn.com/2010/CRIME/05/19/
missouri.al.qaeda.funding.plea/index.html.
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sleeping bags, and waterproof socks destined for Al Qaeda. Hashmi also loaned
the individual $300 to travel to Waziristan, Pakistan, to deliver the goods.170
• Raja Lahrasib Khan: On March 25, 2010, Khan, a naturalized U.S. citizen born
in Pakistan, was charged with providing material support (in the form of money)
to Al Qaeda. The criminal complaint alleges that Khan accepted $1,000 from an
undercover agent and assured him that the money would be used to purchase
weapons and possibly other supplies.171
• Between November 2007 and March 2010, U.S. citizens Wesam El-Hanafi and
Sabirhan Hasanoff allegedly engaged in a scheme to, among other things,
provide computer expertise to and purchase seven Casio digital watches for Al
Qaeda.172
Little Stomach for Suicide or Martyrdom
Few of the terrorist conspiracies examined in this report clearly contained suicidal or martyrdom
overtones. Two terrorist plots clearly had suicide missions as core elements. Najibullah Zazi and
his associates planned their attack on New York’s subways as suicide missions. Also, some
Americans recruited into al-Shabaab have reportedly committed suicide attacks. On October 29,
2008, al-Shabaab recruit Shirwa Ahmed became the first known American suicide bomber when
he drove an explosives-laden truck into a government building in Somalia, one of five
simultaneous assaults that killed 22 U.N. aid workers and others.173 The FBI also identified Farah
Mohamed Beledi as a suicide bomber who died as he tried to detonate his suicide vest in a May
2011 attack in Mogadishu, Somalia.174 According to media reports, al-Shabaab has claimed that
Abdisalan Hussein Ali purportedly blew himself up while attacking African Union troops in
Mogadishu in October 2011.175 Reportedly, the FBI is also investigating whether a Seattle man
was responsible for a suicide truck bombing in Mogadishu, Somalia on September 17, 2009, that
killed 21 peacekeepers and himself.176
170 DOJ Press Release, “U.S. Citizen Sentenced in Manhattan Federal Court to 15 Years in Prison for Conspiring to
Provide Material Support to Al Qaeda,” June 9, 2010, http://newyork.fbi.gov/dojpressrel/pressrel10/nyfo060910.htm;
Benjamin Weiser, “Former Brooklyn College Student Admits He Conspired to Help Al Qaeda,” New York Times, April
28, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/28/nyregion/28hashmi.html; Allison Gendar, “Plea Gets Terror Thug 15
Years,” New York Daily News, April 28, 2010.
171 Mike Robinson, “Chicago Terrorism Suspect Pleads Not Guilty,” Associated Press, April 5, 2010,
http://www.google.com/hostednews/ap/article/ALeqM5i8cDBcu_QALQpoeOTNk3X03l3L9AD9ET4U6O0; DOJ
Press Release, “Chicago Man Charged with Providing Material Support to Al Qaeda by Attempting to Send Funds
Overseas,” March 26, 2010, http://www.justice.gov/usao/iln/pr/chicago/2010/pr0326_01.pdf.
172 DOJ Press Release, “Manhattan U.S. Attorney Charges Two Brooklyn Men with Conspiring to Provide Material
Support to al Qaeda,” April 30, 2010, http://newyork.fbi.gov/dojpressrel/pressrel10/nyfo043010.htm; Benjamin
Weisser, “2 Ex-Brooklyn Men Charged in Terror Plot,” New York Times, April 30, 2010; http://www.nytimes.com/
2010/05/01/nyregion/01terror.html.
173 DOJ Press Release, “Terror Charges Unsealed in Minnesota Against Eight Defendants,” November 23, 2009,
http://minneapolis.fbi.gov/dojpressrel/pressrel09/mp112309.htm.
174 FBI Press Release, “FBI Announces Identity of Transitional Federal Government Checkpoint Suicide Bomber,”
June 9, 2011, http://www.fbi.gov/minneapolis/press-releases/2011/fbi-announces-identity-of-transitional-federal-
government-checkpoint-suicide-bomber.
175 Josh Kron, “American Identified as Bomber in Attack on African Union in Somalia,” New York Times, October 30,
2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/31/world/africa/shabab-identify-american-as-bomber-in-somalia-attack.html.
176 Mike Carter, “Somali Bomb Suspect Tied to Seattle,” The Seattle Times, September 24, 2009.
http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/localnews/2009930567_somalia24m.html.
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Eight others clearly expressed a willingness to perform a suicide mission. For example, Daniel
Maldonado told authorities that he would be willing to become a suicide bomber if he were
wounded and could not otherwise fight.177 Al Qaeda member and U.S. citizen Bryant Neal Vinas
wanted to become a suicide bomber but was rebuffed by the group.178 In e-mails intercepted by
law enforcement authorities, Colleen LaRose (“Jihad Jane”) wrote that she was prepared to be a
martyr. And, in recordings of his conversations with an informant, Shaker Masri stated that he
would be willing to walk up to a group of U.S. Army soldiers and blow himself up as a martyr.179
The Success of Lone Wolves
Lone wolves (Nidal Hasan, Abdulhakim Muhammad, Hasan Akbar, and Mohammed Taheri-
Azar) have conducted the four successful homegrown attacks since 9/11. Three other plotters
acted alone. The remaining disrupted or failed plots have involved two or more participants in a
group or network of one type or another. Three of the four lone wolf attacks involved firearms
and they targeted U.S. military personnel.
It is difficult to generalize from such a small pool of cases. However, the success of four solo
actors may highlight two contrasting points. First, law enforcement may face significant
challenges in identifying and stopping lone wolf terrorists involved in technically uncomplicated
plots unconnected to terrorist groups. Second, U.S. Law enforcement has been successful in
disrupting and dismantling homegrown terrorist groups or networks since 9/11. Bolstering this
point, undercover agents or cooperating witnesses infiltrated and monitored groups involved in 14
of the plots.
Varied Capabilities
Among the 53 homegrown plots since 9/11, the operational capabilities of participants diverge
greatly. Some evinced terrorist tradecraft such as bomb making skills. Others appeared to be far
less experienced. For instance, long before Derrick Shareef was apprehended in 2006, he likely
intended to commit terrorist acts. However, he appears not to have possessed the capability to do
so on his own until he was approached by an undercover FBI informant.
Shareef, a Muslim convert and 22 years old at the time of his arrest, plotted to set off hand
grenades at a shopping mall in Rockford, Illinois. FBI informant William “Jamaal” Chrisman
played a central part in the plot. At the behest of authorities, Chrisman befriended Shareef in
September 2006 while the latter was working in a video store and had nowhere to live. Chrisman
invited the young man to move in with him and began reporting to his law enforcement handlers
regarding Shareef’s jihadist tendencies.180 Shareef was unaware that Chrisman secretly recorded
177 United States v. Daniel Joseph Maldonado, Superseding Criminal Complaint , Case Number: H-07-125M, U.S.
District Court, Southern District of Texas, February 13, 2007, pp. 4-5, http://www.foxnews.com/projects/pdf/
Maldonado_Complaint.pdf.
178 Michael Powell, “U.S. Recruit Reveals How Qaeda Trains Foreigners,” New York Times, July 23, 2009,
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/24/nyregion/24terror.html.
179 United States v. Shaker Masri, Affidavit in support of Criminal Complaint 10-CR-0655, U.S. District Court
Northern District of Illinois Eastern Division, August 9, 2010, p. 22, http://jnslp.files.wordpress.com/2010/08/masri-
complaint1.pdf.
180 Michael Mayko, “FBI Informant Testifies in Terror Case,” Connecticut Post, November 30, 2007, quoted in NEFA
Foundation, “The Illinois Shopping Mall Plot,” December 2007, p. 2, http://nefafoundation.org/miscellaneous/
(continued...)
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their conversations. The duo talked about violent jihad against civilians, public buildings, and a
judge in DeKalb, IL.181 They concocted a plan to attack a local shopping mall. Chrisman told the
young jihadist of a friend who could procure weapons for them. Unknown to Shareef, the
“friend” was an undercover FBI agent.182 On December 6, 2006, the duo met the undercover FBI
agent in the mall’s parking lot where Shareef attempted to trade stereo speakers for hand grenades
and was arrested.183 Shareef, who pled guilty to one count of attempting to use a weapon of mass
destruction, was sentenced in September 30, 2008, to 35 years in prison.184
Conversely, two of the homegrown jihadist terrorist plots appear to stand out for the capability
their plotters. Both came to public attention in 2009. Both involved homegrown jihadists who had
strong ties to foreign terrorist organizations. Attorney General Eric Holder characterized one of
those plots—Najibullah Zazi’s plan to blow up explosives on the New York City subway—as
one of the most serious terrorist threats to our nation since September 11th, 2001, and were it
not for the combined efforts of the law enforcement and intelligence communities, it could
have been devastating. This attempted attack on our homeland was real, it was in motion,
and it would have been deadly. We were able to thwart this plot because of careful analysis
by our intelligence agents and prompt actions by law enforcement.185
While a complete picture of Zazi’s radicalization process is not publicly available, some details
regarding his plot have emerged. In his youth, he may have listened to the radical messages of
Saifur Rahman Halimi, an imam who advocated jihad, attended the same mosque as Zazi’s
family, and lived in the same Queens building.186 Regardless, Zazi pled guilty on February 22,
2010, to a number of terrorism charges. As mentioned above, the young man admitted to
receiving Al Qaeda training in the Waziristan region of Pakistan in 2008. There, he learned about
explosives and discussed specific targets with Al Qaeda members. He returned to the United
States in January 2009 and moved to Denver. He also traveled to New York to discuss the timing
for the attacks with a network of conspirators. In July and early September in Denver, he gathered
materials for detonator components and assembled them based on the detailed training he had
received in Afghanistan. Zazi admitted to bringing the explosive Triacetone Triperoxide (TATP)
into New York on Thursday September 10, 2009. He intended to finish bomb construction over
the weekend and planned to target New York’s subway lines early the next week.187
(...continued)
FeaturedDocs/ChicagoPlot1207.pdf; John Christoffersen, “After September 11, 3 Muslim Converts Take Different
Paths,” Associated Press, December 2, 2007. Hereinafter: Christoffersen, December 2, 2007.
181 Pierre Thomas and Jason Ryan, “‘Lone Wolf’ Charged With Plotting Attack During Christmas Rush,”
abcnews.com, December 8, 2006. http://abcnews.go.com/TheLaw/story?id=2710776&page=1.
182 United States v. Derrick Shareef, Affidavit, 06-CR-919, U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois,
2006, http://www.investigativeproject.org/documents/case_docs/348.pdf.
183 Melissa Bailey, “Ode to Osama,” New Haven Independent, November 28, 2007.
http://www.newhavenindependent.org/index.php/archives/entry/ode_to_osama/; Thomas and Ryan, “‘Lone Wolf’
Charged.”
184 Anti-Defamation League, “Illinois Man Sentenced for Planning Holiday Mall Attack,” October 13, 2008,
http://www.adl.org/main_Terrorism/darrick_shareef.htm.
185 DOJ Press Release, February 22, 2010.
186 Samantha Gross, David Caruso, and Michael Rubinkam, “Radical Influences All Around NYC Terror Suspect,”
Associated Press, in abcnews.com, October 4, 2009, http://abcnews.go.com/US/wireStory?id=8741604.
187 Zazi pled guilty to conspiracy to use weapons of mass destruction against U.S. persons or property, conspiracy to
commit murder in a foreign country, and a provision of material support to a terrorist organization. See DOJ Press
(continued...)
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On March 18, 2010, David Headley pled guilty to terrorism charges. He admitted that he helped
plan two plots for the Pakistani terrorist group, Lashkar-i-Taiba (LET)—the November 2008
Mumbai attack and an un-executed conspiracy targeting a Danish newspaper. He received
training from LeT and claimed membership in the organization. Headley attended the group’s
training camps five times between 2002 and 2005. These stints in Pakistan provided him with
weapons training, indoctrination in jihad as well as instruction in close combat, survival skills,
and counter-surveillance, among other things.
Between 2005 and 2008, he received extensive direction from LeT members and engaged in
reconnaissance for the group in preparation for its Mumbai attack. To provide cover for his
surveillance activity, Headley encouraged a co-conspirator in Chicago, who owned an
immigration services business, to open a satellite office in Mumbai.188 Headley conducted video
surveillance of potential Mumbai targets for LeT, and using a global positioning system device,
he pinpointed landing sites for a waterborne assault. At the behest of LeT, Headley also
conducted reconnaissance of the offices of the Danish newspaper Morgenavisen Jyllands-Posten.
Representatives of both LeT and Al Qaeda schemed with him to strike the newspaper after it had
published unflattering cartoons of the Prophet Muhammad.189
Combating Homegrown Terrorism:
Enforcement Activities
The Obama Administration has recognized the significance of the homegrown jihadist threat in its
June 2011 National Strategy for Counterterrorism.190 The strategy focuses on Al Qaeda, its
affiliates (groups aligned with it), and its adherents (individuals linked to or inspired by the
terrorist group).191 John Brennan, President Obama’s top counterterrorism advisor, publicly
described the strategy as the first one, “that designates the homeland as a primary area of
emphasis in our counterterrorism efforts.”192 The Strategy states:
(...continued)
Release, February 22, 2010. For more on Zazi’s childhood, see Michael Wilson, “From Smiling Coffee Vendor.”
188 In June 2011, the friend, Tahawwur Hussain Rana, was convicted of conspiracy in the Danish plot and for providing
material support to LeT. However, he was acquitted of involvement in the Mumbai plot. See DOJ Press Release,
“Chicago Businessman Tahawwur Hussain Rana Guilty of Providing Material Support to Terror Group and Supporting
Role in Denmark Terrorism Conspiracy,” June 9, 2011, http://www.fbi.gov/chicago/press-releases/2011/chicago-
businessman-tahawwur-hussain-rana-guilty-of-providing-material-support-to-terror-group-and-supporting-role-in-
denmark-terrorism-conspiracy; United States v. David Coleman Headley, Plea Agreement, 09 CR 830-3. U.S. District
Court, Northern District of Illinois, 2010, http://www.hindu.com/nic/headleyplea.pdf; DOJ Press Release, March 18,
2010.
189
190 White House, National Strategy for Counterterrorism, June 2011, http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/
counterterrorism_strategy.pdf. Hereinafter: National Strategy.
191 Ibid, p. 3.
192 Mathieu Rabechault, “U.S. Refocuses on Home-Grown Terror Threat,” AFP, June 29, 2011,
http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5hLyJyB7khhqIxWOOlm1mCj7fYsRQ?docId=
CNG.3f90005700ea65e0b05509a135c7a3a8.471; Karen DeYoung, “Brennan: Counterterrorism Strategy Focused on
al-Qaeda’s Threat to Homeland,” Washington Post, June 29, 2011, http://www.washingtonpost.com/national/national-
security/brennan-counterterrorism-strategy-focused-on-al-qaedas-threat-to-homeland/2011/06/29/
AGki1LrH_story.html.
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We know al-Qa‘ida and its affiliates continue to try to identify operatives overseas and
develop new methods of attack that can evade U.S. defensive measures. At the same time,
plots directed and planned from overseas are not the only sort of terrorist threat we face.
Individuals inspired by but not directly connected to al-Qa‘ida have engaged in terrorism in
the U.S. Homeland. Others are likely to try to follow their example, and so we must remain
vigilant.193
The spate of recent arrests and other counterterrorism successes should not obscure the challenges
facing law enforcement in disrupting homegrown terrorist plotting. Counterterrorism efforts exist
within two broad contexts. Many of the legal behaviors associated with radicalization occur in the
open marketplace of ideas where consumers weigh competing ideologies within the context of
free speech. Conversely, the operational aspects of violent jihadist plots largely involve illegal
activity. In this secretive realm involving criminality, law enforcement pursues terrorists in a real-
world version of hide-and-seek.
The divergent nature of these two contexts may imply a distinct wall between the public realm
and the secretive operational realm. In reality, the barrier is far from distinct. What happens
operationally has significant impacts in the marketplace of ideas (Figure 1). The success of
terrorist plots may spur radicalization, while effective policing may make terrorism a less popular
option for radicals. High levels of radicalization may expand the potential pool of terrorist
recruits.
Figure 1. Counterterrorism Context
Source: CRS
Intelligence Approaches
A group of intelligence and terrorism experts argues that “to infiltrate terrorist conspiracies,
identify and head off future terrorist attacks, and build the knowledge base required to rapidly
193 National Strategy, p. 11.
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investigate when terrorist incidents do occur requires human intelligence.”194 The DOJ and FBI
operate 104 Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTTF) in the United States—69 created since 2001.195
These interagency entities include more than 4,000 federal, state, and local law enforcement
officers and agents who “investigate acts of terrorism that affect the U.S., its interests, property
and citizens, including those employed by the U.S. and military personnel overseas.”196 As this
suggests, their operations are highly tactical and focus on investigations, developing human
sources (informants), and gathering intelligence to thwart terrorist plots.
JTTFs offer an important conduit for the sharing of intelligence developed from FBI-led
counterterrorism investigations with outside agencies. These task forces also connect state and
local law enforcement with the U.S. Intelligence Community on terrorism-related matters. To
help facilitate this, especially as the threat of homegrown jihadists has emerged, the number of
top-secret security clearances issued to local police working on JTTFs has increased from 125 to
878 between 2007 and 2009.197
A significant dilemma for law enforcement and intelligence officials who straddle the public
realm of ideas and the secretive realm of terrorist operations is how to sift the law-abiding, non-
violent radical attracted to jihadist rhetoric from the would-be terrorist who merits targeting. The
vast amount of terrorist-related material available on the Internet in a relatively anonymous
setting attracts homegrown individuals open to radicalization. Many of these individuals may
show great interest in radical content, engage in radical discourse, but not become terrorists.198 A
growing pool of those who view jihadism as “cool” and engage in online “talk” may make it
harder for police to identify actual terrorists.
Preventive Policing
Since the 9/11 attacks, law enforcement has taken a more proactive, intelligence-driven posture in
its investigations. While serving as Deputy Attorney General, Paul McNulty described the Justice
Department’s aggressive, proactive, and preventative course as
the only acceptable response from a department of government charged with enforcing our
laws and protecting the American people. Awaiting an attack is not an option. That is why
the Department of Justice is doing everything in its power to identify risks to our Nation’s
194 America’s Domestic Intelligence is Inadequate, June 2010.
195 FBI, “The FBI: A Decade in Numbers,” September 14, 2011, http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/ten-years-after-the-fbi-
since-9-11/just-the-facts-1/the-fbi-a-decade-in-numbers.
196 Brig Barker and Steve Fowler, “The FBI Joint Terrorism Task Force Officer,” The FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin,
vol. 77, no. 11 (November 2008), pp. 12-15; FBI, “Protecting America Against Terrorist Attack: A Closer Look at Our
Joint Terrorism Task Forces,” May 2009, http://www.fbi.gov/page2/may09/jttfs_052809.html.
197 Kevin Johnson, “FBI Issues More Top Secret Clearance for Terrorism Cases,” USA Today, August 12, 2010,
http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2010-08-12-secret-clearances_N.htm; STRATFOR, A Decade of Evolution in
U.S. Counterterrorism Operations, Special Report, December 2009, http://www.stratfor.com/memberships/150745/
analysis/20091216_us_decade_evolution_counterterrorism_operations?ip_auth_redirect=1; CRS Report RL33033,
Intelligence Reform Implementation at the Federal Bureau of Investigation: Issues and Options for Congress, by
Alfred Cumming.
198 Gilbert Ramsay, “Relocating the Virtual War,” Defence Against Terrorism Review, Vol. 2, No. 1 (Spring 2009), p.
35, http://www.tmmm.tsk.tr/publications/datr3/03_Gilbert%20Ramsay.pdf.
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security at the earliest stage possible and to respond with forward-leaning—preventative—
prosecutions.199
One observer has described intelligence gathering in this context as “driven by a theory of
preventive policing: in order to anticipate the next terror attack, authorities need to track legal
activities…. It focuses not on crime, but on the possibility that a crime might be committed at
some future date.”200
The FBI and DOJ emphasized their forward-leaning approach with its September 29, 2008,
revision of the Attorney General’s Guidelines for Domestic FBI Operations which they claim
“make the FBI’s operations in the United States more effective by providing simpler, clearer, and
more uniform standards and procedures.”201 This revision went into effect on December 1, 2008.
In large part, the guidelines sprang from the post-9/11 national security context in which the FBI
surmised that it could not simply react to crimes. It had to preemptively search for criminal,
counterintelligence, and terrorist threats to the homeland.202 In 2008, as then FBI General Counsel
Valerie Caproni stated in congressional testimony:
We believe that this will allow the FBI to take additional necessary steps to becoming a more
proactive organization. One of the key issues that we think the FBI needs to be able to do is
assess potential risks and vulnerabilities. Having these additional techniques available at the
assessment level, we think, will be key to the FBI’s ability to efficiently and effectively
answer those questions and assess risks.203
The 2008 guidelines represent a consolidation of several other previously stand-alone documents
that had governed FBI investigations. The FBI’s document governing the bureau’s
implementation of the ideas embodied in the guidelines is the 2008 Domestic Investigations and
Operations Guide (DIOG). The DIOG has been modified recently.204
199 Prepared Remarks of Deputy Attorney General Paul J. McNulty at the American Enterprise Institute, Washington,
DC, May 24, 2006, http://www.justice.gov/archive/dag/speeches/2006/dag_speech_060524.html.
200 Thomas Cincotta, “From Movements to Mosques, Informants Endanger Democracy,” The Public Eye,
http://www.publiceye.org/magazine/v24n2/movements-to-mosques.html. Hereinafter: Cincotta, “From Movements to
Mosques.”
201 DOJ Press Release, “Memorandum for the Heads of Department Components: The Attorney General’s Guidelines
for Domestic FBI Operations,” September 29, 2008, http://www.justice.gov/ag/readingroom/guidelines-memo.pdf.
202 Prepared Statement of Elisebeth Collins Cook, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Policy, DOJ and Valerie
Caproni, General Counsel, FBI, U.S. Congress, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Attorney General Guidelines
for FBI Criminal Investigations, National Security Investigations, and the Collection of Foreign Intelligence, 110th
Cong., 2nd sess., September 23, 2008, S. HRG. 110–846 (Washington: GPO, 2009), p. 10, http://intelligence.senate.gov/
pdfs/110846.pdf.
203 Congress, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Attorney General Guidelines for FBI Criminal Investigations,
National Security Investigations, and the Collection of Foreign Intelligence, 110th Cong., 2nd sess., September 23, 2008,
S. HRG. 110–846 (Washington: GPO, 2009), p. 17, http://intelligence.senate.gov/pdfs/110846.pdf.
204 For information on the most recent revisions, see Charlie Savage, “F.B.I. Agents Get Leeway to Push Privacy
Bounds,” New York Times, June 12, 2011, https://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/13/us/13fbi.html?adxnnl=1&adxnnlx=
1319655619-5RliYhVcCzmR4+L5MeT77Q; Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General, Oversight and
Review Division, Investigation of Allegations of Cheating on the FBI’s Domestic Investigations and Operations Guide
(DIOG) Exam, Washington, DC, September 2010, pp. 1, 34, http://www.justice.gov/oig/special/s100927.pdf.
Interestingly, this report discusses the findings of an investigation into a string of incidents in which FBI employees
cheated on a mandatory exam covering the DIOG. See FBI, Domestic Investigations and Operations Guide, (DIOG)
redacted, December 16, 2008, p. 2, http://www.eff.org/fn/directory/8364/354. Hereinafter: DIOG, redacted.
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The most prominent changes embodied in the 2008 guidelines and DIOG concern “assessments”
that agents and analysts may now use outside of investigations. Investigations require some level
of factual predication,205 while an assessment does not.206 However, assessments are to follow a
specifically articulated purpose. The guidelines have established six authorized purposes:207
• check leads on individuals or activities,
• check leads on groups or organizations,
• collect information to analyze potential threats and vulnerabilities,
• gather information for intelligence analysis or planning,
• vet and manage the agency’s confidential human sources (informants), and
• collect foreign intelligence.
Assessments are not to be based on “arbitrary or groundless speculation, nor can an assessment be
based solely on the exercise of First Amendment protected activities or on the race, ethnicity,
national origin or religion of the subject.”208 Assessments offer terrorism investigators a variety of
techniques, including public surveillance and the use of confidential informants to penetrate
conspiracies.209
Civil libertarians and Muslim community organizations have voiced broad concerns about the
new guidelines.210 According to media reporting, Farhad Khera, executive director of the
nonprofit Muslim Advocates, has suggested that the Attorney General Guidelines are invasive and
based on “generalized suspicion and fear on the part of law enforcement, not on individualized
evidence of criminal activity.”211 The American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) has criticized the
FBI’s amassing of racial and ethnic data based on the new guidelines.212 As written, the guidelines
205 Ibid. Factually predicated investigations include preliminary and full investigations. Preliminary investigations can
be opened with “‘allegation or information’ indicative of possible criminal activity or threats to the national security.”
Opening a full investigation requires an “‘articulable factual basis’ of possible criminal or national threat.” See DIOG,
redacted, pp. 76, 85.
206 According to the DIOG, “Although difficult to define, ‘no particular factual predication’ is less than ‘information or
allegation’ as required for the initiation of a preliminary investigation. For example, an assessment may be conducted
when there is a basis to know: (i) whether more information or facts are required to determine if there is a criminal or
national security threat; and (ii) there is a rational and articulable relationship between the stated authorized purpose of
the assessment on the one hand and the information sought and the proposed means to obtain that information on the
other. Regardless of whether specific approval or specific documentation is required, an FBI employee should be able
to explain the purpose of an assessment and the reason for the methods used to conduct the assessment. Those FBI
employees who conduct assessments are responsible for assuring that assessments are not pursued for frivolous or
improper purposes and are not based solely on First Amendment activity or on the race, ethnicity, national origin, or
religion of the subject of the assessment.” DIOG, redacted, p. 39.
207 DIOG, redacted, pp. 44-56. See Andrew Kalloch, “FBI General Counsel Defends New Guidelines,” Harvard Law
Record, December 4, 2008, updated September 29, 2009, http://www.hlrecord.org/2.4463/fbi-general-counsel-defends-
new-guidelines-1.577396.
208 DIOG, redacted, p. 39.
209 Charlie Savage, “Wider Authority for F.B.I. Agents Stirs Concern,” New York Times, October 29, 2009.
210 See Emily Berman, Domestic Intelligence: New Powers, New Risks, Brennan Center for Justice at New York
University School of Law, 2011, pp. 8-9, 11.
211 Yost, July 27, 2010.
212 Letter from Laura W. Murphy, Director Washington Legislative Office, Michael German, Policy Counsel, and Hina
Shamsi, Director National Security Project, to Hon. Eric H. Holder, Jr., U.S. Attorney General, October 20, 2011,
http://www.aclu.org/files/assets/aclu_letter_to_ag_re_rm_102011_0.pdf; Brent Jones, “ACLU Seeks Information
(continued...)
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allow for the collection of information about ethnic or racial communities and justify the
gathering of such information for proactive purposes. The guidelines state that it should be done
if it “will reasonably aid the analysis of potential threats and vulnerabilities, and, overall, assist
domain awareness for the purpose of performing intelligence analysis.”213 One ACLU official has
described this as “racial profiling of entire communities.”214
Detecting the Shift from Radical to Violent Jihadist
A major challenge for law enforcement is to gauge how quickly and at what point individuals
move from radicalized beliefs to violence.215 Because not all terrorist suspects follow a single
radicalization roadmap on their way to executing plots, U.S. law enforcement also faces the task
of discerning exactly when radicalized individuals become real threats.
Among the tools employed by law enforcement is the monitoring of Internet and social
networking sites. The USA PATRIOT Act (P.L. 107-56) authorizes the FBI to use National
Security Letters to obtain a range of information including data pertaining to e-mail and Internet
use from Internet Service Providers.216 In addition, according to an internal Justice Department
document obtained under the Freedom of Information Act by the Electronic Frontier Foundation,
law enforcement agents may also go undercover into social networking sites with false online
profiles to exchange messages with suspects, identify a target’s friends or relatives, and browse
private information such as postings, personal photographs and video clips.217 The Obama
Administration is seeking approval from Congress to expand FBI authority to obtain records
related to the context of e-mails and other Internet-based communications without first obtaining
a warrant from a judge. “The proposal would add ‘electronic communication transaction
records’—like e-mail addresses used in correspondence and Web pages visited—to a list of the
categories of information that FBI agents can demand.”218
A review of criminal complaints and indictments in terrorism cases reveal that the FBI has
exploited the Internet and/or e-mail communications to build cases against defendants in at least
19 of the post-9/11 cases studied in this report. Although much is said about terrorist use of the
(...continued)
About FBI Racial, Ethnic Data Collection,” Baltimore Sun, July 28, 2010, http://articles.baltimoresun.com/2010-07-28/
news/bs-md-aclu-fbi-20100728_1_ethnic-data-profiling-aclu-representatives; Pete Yost, “FBI Defends Guidelines on
Eve of Senate Testimony,” Associated Press, in boston.com, July 27, 2010. Hereinafter: Yost, July 27, 2010.
http://www.boston.com/news/nation/washington/articles/2010/07/27/
fbi_defends_guidelines_on_eve_of_senate_testimony/
213 DIOG, redacted, p. 32.
214 Michael German, “Three Faces of Racial Profiling: Profiling Communities is Bad Law Enforcement,” ACLU Blog
of Rights, October 24, 2011, http://www.aclu.org/blog/racial-justice/three-faces-racial-profiling-profiling-communities-
bad-law-enforcement.
215 Eileen Sullivan and Devlin Barrett, “Recent Cases Show Challenge of US Terrorists,” Associated Press, in
abcnews.com, March 17, 2010, http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/wireStory?id=10121734.
216 For a discussion of the use of National Security Letters, see Laura K. Donohue, The Costs of Counterterrorism:
Power, Politics, and Liberty, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008), pp. 236-243.
217 Richard Lardner, “Break the Law and Your New ‘Friend’ May Be the FBI,” Associated Press cited by
abcnews.com, March 16, 2010. http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/wireStory?id=10111664.
218 Charlie Savage, “White House Seeks to Clarify F.B.I. Powers vis-à-vis E-Mail,” New York Times, July 29, 2010.
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/30/us/30fbi.html.
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Internet for recruitment, training, and communications, these cases suggest that terrorists and
aspiring terrorists will not find the Internet a uniformly permissive environment.
The case involving Mohamed Alessa and Carlos Almonte highlights the complexities in detecting
transitions from radicalization to violent extremism. Investigators arrested the duo on June 5,
2010, at John F. Kennedy Airport (JFK) in New York as they allegedly tried to fly to Egypt. They
hoped to eventually link up with the Somali terrorist organization, al-Shabaab.219 The case started
with an e-mail tip to the FBI on October 9, 2006, which stated,
[e]very time [Alessa and Almonte] access the Internet all they look for is all those terrorist
videos about the Islam holly [sic] war and where they kill US soldiers and other terrible
things…. They keep saying that Americans are their enemies, that everybody other than
Islamic followers are their enemies … and they all must be killed.220
This statement suggests that in 2006, the two young men engaged in radical behavior, perusing
jihadist websites and discussing terrorist activity.
Between 2006 and 2010, investigators monitored the duo’s actions as their beliefs arguably
morphed into something more dangerous. Initially it was unclear whether the pair was just
engaged in radical talk or actually planning for violent jihad.221 In 2006 and 2007, investigators
debated the level of threat posed by Alessa and Almonte. A key shift occurred when law
enforcement discovered after the fact that the duo had travelled to Jordan in 2007 but failed to get
recruited as mujahedeen fighters. This helped convince authorities of the two plotters’ actual
intent to do harm. By 2009, the case included an undercover investigator from the NYPD
interacting with the two suspects.222
The U.S. government’s criminal complaint against Alessa and Almonte lays out the alleged overt
activities marking the duo’s change from radicals to terrorist suspects worthy of arrest. Back in
New Jersey, Alessa and Almonte supposedly trained for jihad by lifting weights and rehearsing
combat techniques using paintball guns. The government claims that they gathered equipment,
including tactical-brand flashlights and combat boots. The pair also purportedly saved over
$7,000 to fund their foreign violent jihad. The criminal complaint describes how the two
discussed violent jihad and downloaded jihadist rhetoric. For example, Almonte is said to have
kept a lecture by radical cleric Anwar al-Awlaki on his cell phone. The U.S. government contends
that Alessa viewed a video including scenes of Al-Qaeda spokesperson Adam Gadahn praising
Nidal Hasan, the alleged Ft. Hood shooter. Also, according to the criminal complaint, Almonte
possessed computer files of violent jihadist documents authored by Osama Bin Ladin and his
second-in-command Ayman al-Zawahiri. For the government, Alessa and Almonte’s
219 Richard Esposito, “Terror Raids at JFK Airport Net American Alleged Terror Plotters Headed for Somalia,”
abcnews.com, June 6, 2010, http://abcnews.go.com/Blotter/terror-raids-jfk-airport-net-alleged-terror-plotters/story?id=
10839045.
220 U.S. v. Mohamed Alessa and Carlos E. Almonte, Criminal Complaint, Magistrate No. 10-8109 (MCA), U.S. District
Court, District of New Jersey, June 4, 2010, p. 11, http://www.scribd.com/doc/32643121/US-v-Alessa-and-Almonte.
Hereinafter: U.S. v. Alessa and Almonte, Criminal Complaint.
221 Peter Finn and Jerry Markon, “N.J. Men Arrested Are Latest From U.S. Tied To Terrorist Groups,” The Washington
Post, June 7, 2010. http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/06/06/AR2010060600418.html.
Hereinafter: Finn and Markon, June 7, 2010.
222 Ted Sherman, “FBI Followed Every Move of Two N.J. Terror Suspects for Years, Culminating in Airport Arrests,”
Star-Ledger, June 13, 2010, http://www.nj.com/news/index.ssf/2010/06/authorities_followed_every_mov.html.
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transformation from radicals to terrorists likely culminated when the two allegedly booked
reservations for separate flights to Egypt scheduled for June 5, 2010.223
Two successful plots emphasize the difficulty of discerning when radicals become terrorist
threats. Even if a suspect comes to the attention of law enforcement, evaluating the person’s
intent and capability remains challenging. Prior to the Fort Hood shooting, over the course of
several months, Nidal Hasan allegedly sent a number of e-mails to Awlaki (who reportedly
replied to only two of them). The e-mail exchange was assessed by investigators to be in line with
the psychiatrist’s research into Muslim U.S. soldiers’ reactions to the wars in Iraq and
Afghanistan, thus, presumably protected speech.224 In retrospect it appears Hasan’s intentions
were far more menacing.
Prior to Abdulhakim Muhammed’s arrest for the June 1, 2009, shooting incident in Little Rock,
Arkansas, the FBI interviewed him on several occasions. Muhammad spent 16 months in Yemen
starting in the fall of 2007. While there, he married a woman from the southern part of the
country. He allegedly taught English and learned Arabic during his time in the country. Yemeni
officials imprisoned him in November 2008 on a visa overstay. He also supposedly possessed a
fraudulent Somali visa.225 Yemen deported him to the United States in January 2009.226 The FBI is
reported to have interviewed him before the shooting, including while he was in prison in Yemen
and then again in Nashville soon after he returned.227 According to law enforcement officials, the
episode in Yemen prompted a preliminary investigation by the FBI and other American law
enforcement agencies into whether he had ties to extremist groups. But that investigation was
inconclusive, leaving the FBI with insufficient evidence to wiretap his phone or put him under
surveillance.228
The Role of State and Local Law Enforcement
A terrorist attack in the United States, whether committed by homegrown or foreign terrorists,
will occur in a community within a state or tribal area. Since the plotting and preparation for
domestic terrorist attacks (such as surveillance of a target, acquisition and transport of weapons or
explosives, and even the recruitment of participants) will also occur within local communities,
preventing such attacks is not only a federal responsibility but also a state, local, and tribal one. In
2010 testimony to Congress, Brian Michael Jenkins says that
The diffuse nature of today’s terrorism threat and the emphasis on do-it-yourself terrorism
challenge the presumption that knowledge of terrorist plots will come first to federal
223 Finn and Markon, June 7, 2010.
224 David Tarrant, “Suspects in Dallas Plot, Fort Hood Shootings Were on FBI’s Radar, But Only One Was Taken
Down,” The Dallas Morning News, November 22, 2009, http://www.dallasnews.com/sharedcontent/dws/news/
texassouthwest/stories/112209dnentlonewolf.450512f.html Hereinafter: Tarrant, November 22, 2009; Ann Scott Tyson
and Dana Priest, “Army Sought Ways to Channel Hasan’s Absorption with Islam,” The Washington Post, November
12, 2009, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/11/11/AR2009111128106.html
225 Ibid.
226 James Dao, “Man Claims Terror Ties in Little Rock Shooting” New York Times, January 22, 2010,
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/22/us/22littlerock.html, Hereinafter: Dao, January 22, 2010.
227 See Ibid; and Dina Temple-Raston, “FBI Encountered Accused Ark. Shooter In Yemen,” National Public Radio,
June 8, 2009, http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=105128523.
228 James Dao and David Johnson, “Suspect in Soldier Attack was Once Detained in Yemen,” New York Times, June 3,
2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/04/us/04recruit.html.
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authorities, who will then share this information with state and local authorities. It is just as
likely—perhaps more likely—that local law enforcement could be the first to pick up clues
of future conspiracies.229
Every day, officers at over 17,000 state and local law enforcement agencies collect and document
information regarding behaviors, incidents, and other suspicious activity associated with crime
including terrorism.230 A joint study by the Departments of Justice and Homeland Security, and
senior law enforcement officials concluded that “[t]he gathering, processing, reporting, analyzing,
and sharing of suspicious activity is critical to preventing crimes, including those associated with
domestic and international terrorism.”231 A former police chief observed that
On the beat or mobile, cops are sensitive to things that do not look right or do not sound right
… [r]emember, it was a rookie cop on a routine check that resulted in the arrest of Eric
Robert Rudolph in North Carolina despite the enormous commitment of federal resources.232
Another example is the case of Oklahoma City bomber Timothy McVeigh. He was arrested after a
traffic stop when Oklahoma State Trooper Charles J. Hanger noticed that McVeigh’s yellow 1977
Mercury Marquis had no license plate.233 Using his home state as an example, a former U.S.
Attorney maintains that “evidence of a potential terrorist threat or organized criminal enterprise is
far more likely to be found in the incidental contact with the 10,000 police officers in the state of
Washington than by the less than 150 FBI agents assigned to the Seattle Field Division.”234
The role of state, local, and tribal law enforcement in detecting nascent terrorist plotting is
particularly important considering the challenges noted elsewhere in this report in detecting
terrorist lone wolves. The four successful homegrown jihadist terrorist attacks that have occurred
229 U.S. Congress, House Committee on Homeland Security, Subcommittee on Intelligence, Information Sharing, and
Terrorism Risk Assessment, Internet Terror Recruitment and Tradecraft: How Can We Address an Evolving Tool
While Protecting Free Speech?, Written Testimony of Brian Michael Jenkins, 111th Cong., 2nd sess., May 26, 2010, p.
7. http://homeland.house.gov/SiteDocuments/20100526101532-91592.pdf. Hereinafter: Jenkins Testimony, May 26,
2010.
230 Findings and Recommendations of the SAR Support and Implementation Project, Final Draft, June 2008, p. 6. The
SAR Support and Implementation Project was a joint effort of DOJ’s Bureau of Justice Assistance, the Major Cities
Chiefs Association, DOJ’s Global Justice Information Sharing Initiative, the Criminal Intelligence Coordinating
Council, and DHS to develop recommendations to be used by law enforcement agencies to improve identification and
reporting of suspicious activity and the sharing of that information with fusion centers and Joint Terrorism Task Forces.
See pp. 1-2. http://online.wsj.com/public/resources/documents/mccarecommendation-06132008.pdf.
231 Ibid, p. 2.
232 U.S. Congress, House Committee on Homeland Security, Subcommittee on Intelligence, Information Sharing, and
Terrorism Risk Assessment, Homeland Security Intelligence: Its Relevance and Limitations, Statement of John W.
Gaissert, Chief of Police; Commerce, Georgia, 111th Cong., 1st sess., March 18, 2009, http://homeland.house.gov/
SiteDocuments/20090318101123-58795.pdf.
233 Trooper Hanger had no reason to suspect a connection between McVeigh and the bombing in Oklahoma City. But,
the trooper’s suspicions were raised when the driver looked at his bumper when told why he had been pulled over. Says
Trooper Hanger: “I thought if he knew he didn’t have a tag, why did he look at the back of the car like that? It just
didn’t seem right.” In addition, McVeigh was unable to provide proof of insurance and a bill of sale for the vehicle and
then disclosed that he had a firearm. Trooper Hanger arrested McVeigh for five misdemeanors and took him into
custody. McVeigh was awaiting arraignment when the FBI connected him to the bombing. See National Law
Enforcement Officers Memorial at http://www.nleomf.com/TheFund/programs/OOM/hanger_oct01.htm.
234 U.S. Congress, House Committee on Homeland Security, Subcommittee on Intelligence, Information Sharing, and
Terrorism Risk Assessment, A Report Card on Homeland Security Information Sharing, Statement of John McKay,
Former U.S. Attorney for the Western District of Washington, 110th Cong., 2nd sess., September 24, 2008. Hereinafter:
McKay Testimony, September 24, 2008, http://homeland.house.gov/SiteDocuments/20080924102041-86400.pdf.
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since 9/11 were all committed by lone wolves. Jenkins believes that preventing future terrorist
attacks requires effective domestic intelligence collection that is best accomplished by local
authorities.235
Integrating state, local, and tribal law enforcement into the national counterterrorism effort
continues to be an abiding concern of policymakers. After the National Commission on Terrorist
Attacks Upon the United States (9/11 Commission) cited breakdowns in information sharing and
the failure to fuse pertinent intelligence (i.e., “connecting the dots”) as key factors in the failure to
prevent the 9/11 attacks236 several efforts were made to improve the sharing of terrorism
information between federal, state, local, and tribal law enforcement agencies:
• States and major urban areas established intelligence fusion centers.237 Congress
has defined fusion centers as a “collaborative effort of two or more Federal, state,
local, or tribal government agencies that combines resources, expertise, or
information with the goal of maximizing the ability of such agencies to detect,
prevent, investigate, apprehend, and respond to criminal or terrorist activity.”238
At the end of 2009, there were 72 DHS/FBI designated state and Urban Area
Security Initiative (UASI) fusion centers.239
• In the 2004 Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act (P.L. 108-458),
Congress mandated the creation of an Information Sharing Environment
(commonly known as the “ISE”)240 to provide and facilitate the means of sharing
terrorism information among all appropriate federal, state, local, and tribal
entities, and the private sector through the use of policy guidelines and
technologies.241
• Congress made information sharing a priority of the new DHS intelligence
organization, requiring it “to disseminate, as appropriate, information analyzed
by the Department within the Department, to other agencies of the Federal
government with responsibilities related to homeland security, and to agencies of
State and local government and private sector entities, with such responsibilities
in order to assist in the deterrence, prevention, preemption of, or response to,
terrorist attacks against the United States.”242
• Congress mandated that DHS support fusion centers in the Implementing
Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 (P.L. 110-53).243 DHS
supports these centers through its State, Local, and Regional Fusion Center
235 Jenkins Testimony, May 26, 2010, p. 5.
236 National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, The 9/11 Commission Report, July 22, 2004,
pp. 353-356 and 416-418. http://www.9-11commission.gov. Hereinafter: 9/11 Commission Report.
237 For a full discussion of fusion centers, see CRS Report RL34070, Fusion Centers: Issues and Options for Congress,
by John Rollins. For an informative discussion of one of the earliest efforts at local law enforcement collaboration and
intelligence fusion and analysis, see John Sullivan and Alain Bauer, Los Angeles Terrorist Early Warning Group,
published by the Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department in 2008.
238 P.L. 110-53, §511, 121 STAT. 322. Amends Homeland Security Act of 2002 by adding §210A(j).
239 National Criminal Intelligence Resource Center; Tallahassee, Florida; November 4, 2009.
240 P.L. 108-458, December 17, 2004, §1016(b), 118 STAT. 3665
241 Ibid.
242 Ibid., §201d(1), 116 STAT. 2146.
243 P.L. 110-53, §511, 121 STAT. 318. Amends Homeland Security Act of 2002 by adding §210A(a).
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Initiative by providing operational, analytic, reporting, and management advice
and assistance; training; information technology systems and connectivity; and
intelligence officers and analysts.244
The Nationwide Suspicious Activity Report Initiative (NSI) is a program to push terrorism-related
information generated locally between and among federal, state, local, and tribal levels.
Specifically, it is a framework to support the reporting of suspicious activity—from the point of
initial observation to the point where the information is available in the information sharing
environment.245 It is a standardized, integrated approach to gathering, documenting, processing,
analyzing, and sharing information about suspicious activity that is potentially terrorism-related
while protecting the privacy and civil liberties of Americans.246 The intent is for this locally
generated suspicious activity reporting to be combined in a systematic way with other sources of
intelligence at the federal level to uncover criminal activity, including terrorism.
Investigative Approaches
To counter violent jihadist plots, U.S. law enforcement has employed two tactics that have been
described by one scholar as the “Al Capone” approach and the use of “agent provocateurs.”247
The Capone approach involves apprehending individuals linked to terrorist plots on lesser, non-
terrorism-related offenses such as immigration violations. In agent provocateur cases—often
called sting operations—government undercover operatives befriend suspects and offer to
facilitate their activities. As the “Al Capone,” moniker suggests, historically, these tactics have
been employed against many types of targets such as mafia bosses, white-collar criminals, and
corrupt public servants. While these techniques combined with the cultivation of informants as
well as surveillance (especially in and around mosques) may be effective in stymieing rapidly
developing terrorist plots, their use has fostered concern within U.S. Muslim communities.
The Capone Approach
As mentioned, the Capone approach involves apprehending individuals linked to terrorist plots on
lesser, non-terrorism-related offenses such as immigration violations. This approach fits within a
preventative mode of counterterrorism prosecution and has received media scrutiny.248 Experts
have noted that immediately after 9/11, DOJ often leveled lesser charges against terrorist suspects
to preemptively squelch potential attacks. However, according to the Center on Law and Security
244 Ibid. 121 STAT. 319. Amends Homeland Security Act of 2002 by adding §210A(b) and (c).
245 NSI Project Overview Briefing by Russ Porter, Chairman of the Criminal Intelligence Coordinating Council of the
Global Justice Information Sharing Initiative.
246 See Ibid, p. A1-6, and PM-ISE, Fact Sheet: Nationwide Suspicious Activities Reporting Initiative, December 23,
2008,
p. 1, http://www.ise.gov/docs/sar/Fact_Sheet_NSI_-_December_23_2008_Final.pdf National Strategy for Information
Sharing,
247 Lorenzo Vidino, “Homegrown Jihadist Terrorism in the United States: A New and Occasional Phenomenon?”
Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, vol. 32, no. 1, January 2009, p. 13, http://pdfserve.informaworld.com/
738522_731260637_907926062.pdf.
248 Dan Eggen and Julie Tate, “U.S. Campaign Produces Few Convictions on Terrorism Charges,” The Washington
Post, June 12, 2005, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/06/11/AR2005061100381.html;
Andrew Adams, “FBI’s New Approach: Minor Charges Now Stop Terrorism Later,” Lodi News-Sentinel, June 17,
2005.
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at New York University School of Law, DOJ has moved toward trying suspected terrorists as
terrorists instead of leaning heavily on lesser charges. In 2001 and 2002, 8% of defendants
labeled as terrorists in the media were charged under terrorism statutes, this figure rose to 47% by
2006 and 2007.249 Regardless, the Capone approach is still used in terrorism cases.
Lying to an FBI Special Agent is one of the violations reminiscent of the Capone approach.250 A
recent example stands out. On July 21, 2010, Paul Rockwood, Jr., a U.S. citizen and Muslim
convert, pled guilty to making false statements to the FBI. Rockwood’s wife, Nadia Rockwood,
also pled guilty to making false statements related to her husband’s case. By early 2010, while
living in King Salmon, AK, Paul Rockwood had developed a list of 15 people he planned to kill,
believing that they had desecrated Islam. He had also researched explosives and shared with
others ideas about mail bombs or using firearms to kill his targets. It appears that prosecutors
could not pursue a case based on more substantive terrorism charges and opted to neutralize a
threat—someone apparently preparing to kill people—by using the Capone approach.
The utility of this preventative technique coupled with actual terrorism charges was exhibited by
the FBI in its case against Najibullah Zazi. As mentioned above, Zazi arrived in New York on
September 10, 2009, with explosive material and plans to detonate bombs in New York’s subway
system. Zazi feared authorities had caught up to him and returned to Denver on September 12.
Between September 10 and 19, the FBI monitored his activities and bolstered its case with
searches of a vehicle and locations linked to him in New York and Denver. Zazi also agreed to
interviews with the FBI in Denver. On September 19, Special Agents first arrested Zazi in Aurora,
CO, for knowingly and willfully lying to the FBI. Presumably this was done because he might
flee. Four days later, a grand jury returned a more substantive one-count indictment against him
on weapons of mass destruction charges.251
DOJ used similar charges against Ahmad Wais Afzali, an imam from Queens. He was arrested for
tipping off Zazi to the FBI’s investigation. On March 4, 2010, Afzali pled guilty to lying to
federal officials. He admitted that he warned Zazi that the FBI had asked about him. Afzali also
stated that during the phone conversation he simply cautioned Zazi not to “get involved in
Afghanistan garbage.”252 He stated in court that he misled the FBI about a telephone conversation
he had with Zazi. Afzali claimed that by lying to investigators he had hoped to protect himself,
not Zazi. Afzali had been a source of information for federal and New York City investigators in
the past.253
In another instance of the Capone approach, in 2008 the federal government charged Tarek
Mehanna for lying to FBI agents regarding his relationship to Daniel Maldonado, subsequently
convicted and jailed for terrorism-related offenses. Mehanna’s 2008 arrest occurred at Boston’s
249 The Center on Law and Security New York University School of Law, Terrorist Trial Report Card: September 11,
2001-September 11, 2009, New York, NY, January 2010, p. ii, http://www.lawandsecurity.org/publications/
TTRCFinalJan142.pdf.
250 18 U.S.C. §1001.
251 DOJ Press Release, “Najibullah Zazi Pleads Guilty,” Feb 22, 2010, http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2010/February/
10-ag-174.html; Nicole Vap, “Timeline of Terror Plot Investigation,” KUSA TV, NBC affiliate, September 2009,
http://www.9news.com/news/specials/terrorplot/article.aspx?storyid=123658&catid=207.
252 A.G. Sulzberger, “Imam Snared in Terror Plot Admits He Lied to the F.B.I.” New York Times, March 4, 2010,
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/05/nyregion/05terror.html.
253 Al Baker, Karen Zraick, “Lawyer Defends Queens Imam Arrested in Terror Inquiry,” New York Times, September
21, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/21/nyregion/21imam.html.
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Logan International Airport as he was preparing to leave the country, according to news reports.
He was subsequently released on bail. His defense attorney claimed that the FBI wanted Mehanna
to become an informant, and his refusal precipitated his 2009 indictment and re-arrest on
terrorism charges.254
Agent Provocateur Cases
Agent provocateur cases rely on expert determination by law enforcement that a specific
individual or group is likely to move beyond radicalized talk and engage in violent jihad. The
ultimate goal is to catch a suspect committing an overt criminal act such as pulling the proverbial
trigger but on a dud weapon. By engaging in such strategy, investigators hope to obtain ironclad
evidence against suspects.
Three recent FBI investigations exemplify the utility of this approach. On November 26, 2010,
Mohamed Osman Mohamud was arrested after he attempted to set off what he believed was a
vehicle bomb at an annual Christmas tree lighting ceremony in Portland, OR. Mohamud thought
he had plotted with terrorists to detonate the bomb. In actuality the device was a dud assembled
by his co-conspirators, FBI undercover operatives. Mohamud offered the target for the strike,
provided components for assembly of the device, gave instructions for the operation, and mailed
passport photographs for his getaway plan to FBI undercover operatives.255
On September 24, 2009, a Jordanian immigrant named Hosam Smadi was arrested for attempting
to detonate what he thought was a car bomb in the parking lot of a 60-story skyscraper in Dallas,
TX. On May 26, 2010, he pled guilty to one count of attempted use of a weapon of mass
destruction.256 Smadi’s apprehension resulted from an FBI operation including at least three
undercover employees. The operation duped Smadi into believing he was planning an attack with
Al Qaeda operatives. It ended with Smadi driving a truck he believed to contain a live bomb into
the underground garage of 60-story Fountain Place in Dallas, TX. He used a cell phone to try and
trigger the dud.257
The same day of Smadi’s arrest, the FBI apprehended Michael C. Finton in Springfield, IL, on
similar but unrelated charges. Finton’s case also relied heavily on undercover FBI personnel.
Allegedly they supplied him with a van Finton believed contained almost one ton of high
explosives. According to the DOJ, he drove and parked the van near the Paul Findley Federal
254 Laura Crimaldi, “Many Rally for Alleged Terrorist,” The Boston Herald, November 13, 2009,
http://bh.heraldinteractive.com/news/regional/view.bg?articleid=1211567&srvc=next_article.
255 DOJ Press Release, “Oregon Resident Arrested in Plot to Bomb Christmas Tree Lighting Ceremony in Portland,”
November 27, 2010, http://portland.fbi.gov/dojpressrel/pressrel10/pd112610.htm. Hereinafter: DOJ Press Release,
November 27, 2010.
256 DOJ Press Release, “Man Admits Attempting to Use a Weapon of Mass Destruction to Bomb a Skyscraper in
Downtown Dallas,” May 26, 2010, http://dallas.fbi.gov/dojpressrel/pressrel10/dl052610.htm.
257 United States v. Hosam Maher Husein Smadi, Affidavit, 3: 09-MJ-286, U.S. District Court Northern District of
Texas, September 24, 2009, http://www.investigativeproject.org/documents/case_docs/1074.pdf. Hereinafter: U.S. v.
Smadi, Affidavit; Jon Nielsen, “Officials: Teen Cut Video for bin Laden Tape, Other Evidence Leads Magistrate to
Continue Smadi’s Case,” The Dallas Morning News, October 6, 2009; “Timeline of Dallas Terror Case,” Fort Worth
Star-Telegram, October 5, 2009, http://www.star-telegram.com/2009/10/05/1662752/timeline-of-dallas-terror-
case.html.
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Building and Courthouse in downtown Springfield. FBI Special Agents arrested Finton after he
tried to detonate the bogus bomb using a cell phone.258
Initially, the FBI appears to have just tracked the activities of Finton and Smadi. How Mohamud’s
case played out is less certain, based on publicly available information. However, the
investigations—particularly the Finton and Smadi cases—likely reached tipping points
encouraging the bureau to initiate much more proactive agent provocateur-type operations. Finton
had converted to Islam while in prison on aggravated robbery and battery charges. According to
court documents, he was released in 2006 but in 2007 was re-arrested and returned to prison
because of a parole violation. At the time, a search of Finton’s vehicle revealed passages he wrote
that championed martyrdom as well as attempted correspondence with John Walker Lindh, a U.S.
citizen who pled guilty in federal court to serving in the Taliban army and carrying weapons. In
2008, after Finton was released from prison for his parole violation, members of the FBI’s
Springfield JTTF interviewed him. The JTTF also used an informant to monitor Finton, who
engaged in radical rhetoric after his release. In January 2009, the informant reported that Finton
planned to travel to the Gaza strip to fight Israelis. At this juncture in the investigation, the FBI
allegedly initiated its agent provocateur strategy to nab Finton.259
The tipping point in the Smadi investigation is a little less specific. He allegedly had come to the
agency’s attention because the jihadist sentiment he displayed among an online group of
extremists supposedly “stood out.”260 Investigators claim Smadi exhibited “vehement intention to
conduct terror attacks in the United States and ... zealous devotion to Osama Bin Ladin and Al
Qaeda.”261 As a result, an FBI undercover employee communicated with Smadi. More than 10
exchanges between the two emphasized Smadi’s desire to conduct violent jihad on behalf of Al
Qaeda. Thus, the FBI determined he was a “legitimate threat,” introduced him to another
undercover employee who posed as a senior member of an Al Qaeda sleeper cell, and ostensibly
set the sting in motion.262
The tipping point in the Mohamud investigation is even less clear due to ambiguity in the publicly
available information regarding the timeline of the case. At some point, someone from the local
Muslim community alerted the FBI to Mohamud, a 19-year-old Somali-born naturalized U.S.
citizen. Media reports have suggested that a family member, perhaps Mohamud’s father, relayed
concerns about the young man to officials.263 According to DOJ, in December 2009 Mohamud
communicated with an individual the U.S. government believed to be a terrorist located in
Pakistan. The duo allegedly discussed Mohamud traveling to Pakistan to prepare for violent jihad.
258 DOJ Press Release “Illinois Man Arrested in Plot to Bomb Courthouse and Murder Federal Employees: Vehicle
Bomb Placed at Scene Was Inactive and Posed No Danger to Public,” September 24, 2009, http://springfield.fbi.gov/
dojpressrel/2009/si092409.htm.
259 Bruce Rushton, “Man Accused in Bombing Plot Known for Strong Stance on Islam,” pjstar.com, September 24,
2009, http://www.pjstar.com/archive/x1800826354/Man-accused-in-bombing-plot-known-for-strong-stance-on-Islam;
United States v. Michael C. Finton, Affidavit, 09: 3048-M, U.S. District Court for the Central District of Illinois,
September 24, 2009, http://www.investigativeproject.org/documents/case_docs/1073.pdf. Hereinafter: U.S. v. Finton,
Affidavit.
260 U.S. v. Smadi, Affidavit.
261 Thomas D. Petrowski, et al., “Case Study: The Hosam Smadi Case, An Example of Success,” FBI Law Enforcement
Bulletin, September 2011, p. 14.
262 U.S. v. Smadi, Affidavit.
263 Caryn Brooks, “Portland’s Bomb Plot: Who Is Mohamed Mohamud?” November 28, 2010, Time Magazine,
http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,2033372,00.html.
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When exactly the FBI learned this information is unknown. However, after Mohamud was not
allowed to board a flight from Portland to Kodiak, Alaska, on June 14, 2010, the FBI interviewed
him. He purportedly told the FBI that he planned to take a fishing job in Alaska for the summer
and that he had previously wanted to travel to Yemen but had neither purchased tickets nor
obtained a visa. According to court documents, shortly thereafter, on June 23, an FBI undercover
employee professing to be an associate of the Pakistan-based terrorist e-mailed Mohamud. It is
unclear whether or not Mohamud’s attempt to travel to Alaska and his interview precipitated the
undercover operation.264
Court documents in the Smadi, Finton, and Mohamud cases allege that FBI undercover
employees tested the suspects to ascertain the depth of their intent to do harm. The FBI evaluated
Mohamud’s resolve on a number of occasions. Two stand out. Mohamud’s first meeting with an
undercover FBI operative entailed a discussion in which the would-be violent jihadist was told
that he could help “the cause” in “a number of ways … ranging from simply praying five times a
day to becoming a martyr.” The young man responded, saying that he wanted to become
“operational” and needed help in staging an attack. When in a following meeting Mohamud
suggested the Christmas tree lighting ceremony as his intended target, an FBI undercover
employee noted that children attend such events. Mohamud responded by saying that he wanted a
large crowd “that will ... be attacked in their own element with their families celebrating the
holidays.”265
In the Smadi and Finton cases, the suspects received reassurances that if they quit the schemes,
they would face no repercussions from their fellow (sham) plotters. FBI undercover operatives
repeatedly tried to discourage Smadi’s violent jihadist sentiments. In July 2009, an undercover
employee (the fictitious senior member of an Al Qaeda sleeper cell), offered Smadi a way out of
the plot. The mock Al Qaeda operative counseled Smadi by saying that different types of jihad
existed, and he did not have to follow through on the plot if he was uncomfortable with it. He
reassured Smadi by stressing that if he backed out, he would remain part of Al Qaeda’s
“brotherhood.” Regardless, Smadi steadfastly believed in the plot and refused to quit.266 Like
Smadi, Finton was given at least one opportunity to abandon his scheme. He allegedly understood
that, “anytime he felt uncomfortable, he could walk out the door and still be a brother.”267
The “Bind” for Law Enforcement
Not all agent provocateur cases appear as thorough in their efforts to reveal the harmful intent of
suspects. Some cases have raised controversy about the extent to which government informants or
agents have entrapped suspects and/or supported or pushed along terrorist plots. These instances
illustrate what Philadelphia Inquirer reporter and author, Stephan Salisbury, describes as the
“bind” the FBI finds itself in. “On one hand it is being charged by the Justice Department to go
out and stop this stuff [terrorism] before it happens. But on the other, it is getting criticized for the
techniques it is using to do that.”268 The 2008 Attorney General’s Guidelines for Domestic FBI
264 DOJ Press Release, November 27, 2010.
265 Ibid; United States v. Mohamed Osman Mohamud, Criminal Complaint, U.S. District Court for the District of
Oregon, November 26, 2010, p. 2, http://media.oregonlive.com/portland_impact/other/USAFFIDAVIT.pdf.
266 U.S. v. Smadi, Affidavit.
267 U.S. v. Finton, Affidavit.
268 Stephan Salisbury, “Leather Glove,” Audio Interview, tomdispatch.com, July 5, 2010.
http://tomdispatch.blogspot.com/2010/07/leather-glove.html. Hereinafter: Salisbury, “Leather Glove.”
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Operations address the same competing forces, and as mentioned their implementation has
spurred concerns among civil liberties groups.
Investigations of the so-called Newburgh Four and Liberty City Seven plots illustrate this bind. In
each, law enforcement has been criticized for its use of undercover informants. To counter this, in
both cases, officials emphasized the importance of prevention—neutralizing threats posed by the
groups involved. For example, in a press conference related to the Newburgh plot, New York City
Mayor Michael Bloomberg reassured the public by stating that the plotters did not have ties to a
larger terrorist organization. However, he went on to stress the preemptive aspects of the case,
“I’ve always thought of our police department’s primary job, not as first responders but as first
preventers.”269 Cognizant of criticisms that the Liberty City men neither were competent nor their
plotting viable, former Attorney General Gonzalez cautioned that
our philosophy here is that we try to identify plots in the earliest stages possible, because we
don't know what we don't know about a terrorist plot ... it’s dangerous for us to make an
evaluation case by case ... well, this is a really dangerous group, this is really not a dangerous
group. And we felt that the combination of the planning and the overt acts taken were
sufficient to support this prosecution.270
Newburgh Four
The Newburgh Four case has kindled controversy regarding the use of an agent provocateur. In
the investigation, an FBI informant allegedly offered plotters $250,000 and a luxury car, among
other inducements to trigger explosives near a synagogue and to shoot down military aircraft.271
On June 14, 2010, the federal judge hearing the trial delayed its start, because prosecutors may
have failed to provide to defense attorneys relevant case information. Days earlier the defense
received an FBI document suggesting that the lead plotter, James Cromitie, was not a threat.272
News accounts suggest the plotters may have been heavily influenced by the FBI’s informant.273
They have also raised questions about the informant in the case, alleged to be a man named
Shahed Hussain.274 According to the Village Voice, Hussain duped the Newburgh Four into their
269 Chris Dolmetsch and Edvard Pettersson, “N.Y. Bomb Suspects Said to Have No Terror Group Link,” Bloomberg,
May 21, 2010, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=aj43cfOgpp_A.
270 Salisbury, “Leather Glove.”
271 Chris Herring, “Bomb Case Bail Hearing,” Wall Street Journal, June 22, 2010, http://online.wsj.com/article/
SB10001424052748704256304575321131297175098.html?mod=WSJ_hpp_sections_newyork; A.G. Sulzberger,
“Defense Cites Entrapment in Terror Case,” New York Times, March 17, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/18/
nyregion/18newburgh.html. Hereinafter: Sulzberger, “Defense Cites Entrapment.”
272 Chris Dolmetsch, “Synagogue Bomb Plot Trial Delayed for Medical Review,” Bloomberg Businessweek, September
13, 2010, http://www.businessweek.com/news/2010-09-13/synagogue-bomb-plot-trial-delayed-for-medical-
review.html; William Glaberson, “Newburgh Terrorism Case May Establish a Line for Entrapment,” New York Times,
June 15, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/16/nyregion/16terror.html.
273 Timothy O’Connor, “Lawyers for 4 Accused in Synagogue Terror Plot Say Government Informant Enticed Them
with Cash, Food,” The Journal News (Westchester County, NY), September 18, 2009, http://pqasb.pqarchiver.com/
lohud/access/1865253521.html?FMT=ABS&date=Sep+18%2C+2009; Jim Fitzgerald, “NYC Synagogue Bomb
Defendants May Claim Entrapment,” Associated Press in abcnews.com, September 17, 2009, http://abcnews.go.com/
US/wireStory?id=8606330.
274 Graham Rayman, “The Alarming Record of the FBI’s Informant in the Bronx Bomb Plot,” The Village Voice, July
8, 2009, http://www.villagevoice.com/2009-07-08/news/the-alarming-record-of-the-f-b-i-s-informant-in-the-bronx-
bomb-plot/ (Hereinafter: Rayman, July 8, 2009); Tony Allen-Mills, “FBI ‘Lured Dimwits’ into Terror Plot,” The
Sunday Times, London, May 24, 2009, http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/us_and_americas/
article6350389.ece
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plot. The Voice suggested that the quartet of smalltime felons had no grand terrorist ambitions,
and Hussain had plied them with cash and suggestions.275
The Newburgh Four were arrested in May 2009. They purportedly had attempted to detonate
explosives near a synagogue in the Riverdale section of the Bronx in New York City. The federal
government asserts the plotters also planned to shoot down military airplanes at the New York Air
National Guard Base at Stewart Airport in Newburgh, NY. Hussain allegedly passed himself off
as a member of a Pakistani terrorist organization, Jaish-e-Mohammed, and provided the four
suspects with inert C-4 explosives and an inactive Stinger surface-to-air missile.276 The Newburgh
Four were found guilty of the plot on October 18, 2010.277
According to other news reports, Hussain, a Pakistani immigrant, became an FBI informant in
2002 to win leniency and avoid deportation on fraud charges. They stemmed from when he
worked as a translator for the New York Department of Motor Vehicles. Hussain pled guilty to
production and transfer of false government identification documents—illegally helping
immigrants obtain licenses. He had also served as the key informant in the 2003 and 2004 FBI
sting operation implicating Mohammed Hossain and Yassin Aref in a plot to launder money
related to the sham sale of surface to air missiles to terrorists.278
Liberty City Seven
Like the Newburgh Four case, the Liberty City Seven investigation also generated questions
regarding informant use by the FBI. Seven Miami-area men were arrested in 2006 for allegedly
plotting to blow up the Sears Tower (now called Willis Tower) in Chicago, the FBI building in
North Miami Beach, and other government buildings in Miami-Dade County. Defense attorneys
called the case an outrageous example of government entrapment claiming that the men had
neither the will nor the means to carry out the crimes.279 An FBI informant posing as an Al Qaeda
member in the case, offered the men $50,000 as part of their plot. He also obtained warehouse
space for the group’s activities, led a ceremony in which the conspirators swore allegiance to Al
Qaeda, gave the group video cameras for surveillance activities, and suggested targeting Miami’s
FBI offices.280
275 Graham Rayman, July 8, 2009.
276 Sulzberger, “Defense Cites Entrapment”; Murray Weiss, Dan Mangan, “Informant Fingered $$ Launderer Duo,”
New York Post, May 22, 2009, http://www.nypost.com/p/news/regional/
item_6C8LbZXechQkuNGyAkHfGL;jsessionid=D864E8F8E05AB7CE4443B7C98281CEF1; Brendan Lyons,
“Mosque Welcomed in Informant,” Albany Times Union, August 8, 2004, http://www.timesunion.com/ASPStories/
story.asp?StoryID=273922. Hereinafter, Weiss, Mangan, “Informant Fingered $$.”
277 DOJ Press Release, “Four Men Found Guilty of Plotting to Bomb New York Synagogue and Jewish Community
Center and to Shoot Military Planes with Stinger Missiles,” October 18, 2010, http://newyork.fbi.gov/dojpressrel/
pressrel10/nyfo101810.htm.
278 Sulzberger, “Defense Cites Entrapment”; Weiss, Mangan, “Informant Fingered $$.”
279 Carol J. Williams, “A Case of Terror or Entrapment,” Los Angeles Times, November 30, 2007,
http://articles.latimes.com/2007/nov/30/nation/na-liberty30.
280 “5 Convicted in ‘Liberty City’ Terror Trial,” CNN.com, May 12, 2009, http://www.cnn.com/2009/CRIME/05/12/
liberty.seven/index.html “Sears Tower Bomb Plot Leader Narseal Batiste Jailed,” BBC News, November 20, 2009,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8371671.stm; Amanda Ripley, “Preemptive Terror Trials: Strike Two,” Time Magazine,
December 13, 2007, http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,1694430,00.html; “Seven Charged over ‘Chicago
Plot,’” BBC News, June 23, 2006, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/5110342.stm. Walter Pincus, “FBI Role in
Terror Probe Questioned,” The Washington Post, September 2, 2006, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/
(continued...)
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One of the two FBI informants in the investigation, Abbas al-Saidi, was jailed after reportedly
having extorted $7,000 from a friend who raped his girlfriend and then, after accepting the
money, beat her up.281 The other informant, Elie Assad, also had a domestic battery charge on his
record. According to FBI agents, Assad failed a polygraph test administered while he was
working for them on a previous case in Chicago. A 35-year veteran of the FBI, who was hired as
an expert witness by the Liberty City defense team, stated that Assad never should have been
authorized to work on the [Liberty City] case at all. However, at trial, the former FBI agent was
not allowed to testify nor did the judge permit the testimony about Assad’s failed polygraph
test.282 After juries in the first two trials failed to reach a verdict, six of the seven Liberty City
men were convicted at a third trial and sentenced to long prison sentences.
Combating Homegrown Terrorism: Building Trust
and Partnership
Scholars who have studied the circumstances that are associated with voluntary cooperation by
Muslim-Americans in anti-terror policing efforts have identified strong evidence that when
authorities are viewed as more legitimate, their rules and decisions are more likely to be
accepted.283 Engagement is one strategy by law enforcement to build trust and enhance
community perceptions of legitimacy.
In August 2011, the Obama Administration released a strategy for combating violent extremism
(CVE).284 It revolves around countering the radicalization of all types of potential terrorists. As
such, the radicalization of violent jihadists falls under its purview. Federal CVE efforts often
depend on government agencies cooperating with local groups. In fact, the Obama
Administration’s national CVE strategy highlights a “community-based approach” for the federal
government, and much of the activity it describes will take place in the “marketplace of ideas”
described in Figure 1. To this end, the federal government most effectively acts as a “facilitator,
convener, and source of information.”285 As this may suggest, to date, the bulk of federal-level
CVE work has revolved around community engagement.
Engagement with Communities
The concept of building trust through engagement and partnership is rooted in the community
policing model developed by law enforcement professionals in the 1990s, and community
(...continued)
article/2006/09/01/AR2006090101764.html.
281 Ibid.
282 Ibid.
283 Tom R. Tyler, Stephen Schulhofer, and Aziz Huq, “Legitimacy and Deterrence Effects in Counter-Terrorism
Policing,” New York University School of Law, Public Law Research Paper No. 10-15, February 23, 2010, p. 2,
http://lsr.nellco.org/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1182&context=nyu_plltwp.
284 Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism in the United States, August 2011, p. 1,
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/empowering_local_partners.pdf. Hereinafter: Empowering Local
Partners.
285 Empowering Local Partners, p. 3.
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policing is mentioned in the Administration’s CVE strategy.286 Following the 9/11 attacks, law
enforcement agencies came to realize the prevention of terrorist attacks would require the
cooperation and assistance of American Muslim, Arab, and Sikh communities. “Embedded within
these communities,” notes Professor Deborah Ramirez, “are the linguistic skills, information, and
cultural insights necessary to assist law enforcement in its efforts to identify suspicious behavior.
In order to have access to these critical tools and information, law enforcement recognized the
need to build bridges required for effective communication with these groups.”287 At the same
time, Muslim, Arab, and Sikh Americans recognized the need to define themselves as distinctly
American communities who, like all Americans, desire to help prevent another terrorist attack.288
A study by the Homeland Security Institute found that “[c]ommunity policing has been applied
with notable success in places such as New York City, Chicago, Boston, and San Diego, and has
been widely adopted (at least in name) throughout the United States.”289 A Homeland Advisory
Council (HSAC) working group290 chaired by Maryland Governor Martin O’Malley found that
Community-Oriented Policing works:
Effective public-private partnerships, designed to enable civic engagement, problem-solving,
and violent crime mitigation provide the foundation for efforts to prevent, protect against and
respond to violent criminal activity—including that which may be motivated by ideological
objectives.291
286 Ibid., pp. 3, 6. The Justice Department defined community policing as “a philosophy that promotes organizational
strategies, which support the systematic use of partnerships and problem-solving techniques, to proactively address the
immediate conditions that give rise to public safety issues such as crime, social disorder, and fear of crime.” One of its
key features is the establishment of collaborative partnerships between law enforcement agencies and individuals and
organizations they serve to develop solutions to problems and increase trust in police. See DOJ Office of Community
Oriented Policing Services, Community Policing Defined. April3, 2009., p. 3, http://www.cops.usdoj.gov/files/RIC/
Publications/e030917193-CP-Defined.pdf.
287 Deborah A. Ramirez, Sasha Cohen O’Connell, and Rabia Zafar, The Partnering for Prevention and Community
Safety Initiative, A Promising Practices Guide Executive Summary, 2004, p. 2, http://www.cps.neu.edu/pfp/downloads/
PFP_Executive_Summary__cover.pdf.
288 Ibid
289 Rosemary Lark (Task Lead), Richard Rowe, and John Markey, Community Policing Within Muslim Communities:
An Overview and Annotated Bibliography of Open-Source Literature, Homeland Security Institute, December 27,
2006, p. iii. This study, prepared for the DHS Science and Technology Directorate, sought to identify the literature that
examined community policing initiatives underway within Muslim Communities in the U.S., and the extent to which
they were successful in achieving the objectives of (1) inclusiveness, promoting integration, and potentially minimize
the disaffection that can lead to radicalization, particularly among Muslim youth; (2) serve as early warning to identify
incipient radicalization or terrorist activities; and (3) open a new channel of communication with individuals who can
navigate the linguistic and cultural complexities of Islam, providing needed context to inform intelligence analysis,
http://www.homelandsecurity.org/hsireports/Task_06-99_Community_Policing_within_Muslim_Communities.pdf.
290 The Homeland Security Advisory Council (HSAC) provides advice and recommendations to the Secretary of
Homeland Security. The chair of the council is Judge William Webster, former Director of the CIA and Director of the
FBI. Other members include leaders from state and local government, first responder communities, the private sector,
and academia. The Countering Violent Extremism Working Group originated from a tasking by Secretary Napolitano
to the HSAC in February 2010 to work with state and local law enforcement and relevant community groups to develop
and provide recommendations on how DHS can better support community-based efforts to combat violent extremism
domestically. See Countering Violent Extremism Working Group, Spring 2010, p. 2.
291 Homeland Security Advisory Council, Countering Violent Extremism Working Group, Spring 2010, p. 5.
Hereinafter: HSAC CVE Working Group, Spring 2010.
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Federal Activities
Currently, numerous U.S. government agencies engage and partner with Muslim
Americancommunities. Some of the efforts by DHS, DOJ, and FBI are detailed below.
Department of Homeland Security
DHS has stated that public outreach to local communities plays a major role in the department’s
mission.292 Engagement activities are centered in its Office of Civil Rights and Civil Liberties
(CRCL), which began its outreach in 2003.293 Its work involves counterterrorism and CVE-
related matters but is broader. The office is also responsible for294
• advising DHS leadership, personnel, and partners about civil rights and civil
liberties issues;
• communicating with individuals and communities whose civil rights and civil
liberties may be affected by DHS activities, informing them about policies and
avenues of redress, and promoting appropriate attention within DHS to their
experiences and concerns; and
• investigating and resolving civil rights and civil liberties complaints filed by the
public.
CRCL has a Community Engagement Section. Recent domestic CVE-related295 outreach events
coordinated by CRCL and its Community Engagement Section include the following:
• Community Roundtables. DHS describes these as “the core of CRCL’s
engagement efforts.” These “regular location-based” meetings include
representatives from federal, state, and local government agencies as well as
individuals from the private sector and community leaders “whose communities
have civil rights concerns.”296 In the past, these roundtables have focused on
leaders from the American Arab, Muslim, South Asian, Middle Eastern, and Sikh
communities, but in 2010, CRCL broadened them to include other immigrant
communities.297 Some of the roundtables discussed how local communities could
292 Office of Civil Rights and Civil Liberties, “Engagement with Key Communities Team,” August 14, 2009.
Hereinafter: CRCL Engagement Team, August 14, 2009.
293 CRCL, Newsletter, vol. 2, no. 1 (September 2011), http://www.aila.org/content/default.aspx?docid=36956.
Hereinafter: CRCL, Newsletter, September 2011.
294 The mission of the DHS Officer for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties is outlined in 6 U.S.C. 345,
http://www.dhs.gov/xabout/structure/editorial_0481.shtm. See DHS, Office of Civil Rights and Civil Liberties,
http://www.dhs.gov/xabout/structure/crcl.shtm.
295 Much like CRCL, the Section’s mission involves more than CVE. It reaches out to other communities whose issues
are not necessarily tied to radicalization.
296 CRCL, Fiscal Year 2010 Annual and Consolidated Quarterly Reports to Congress, September 20, 2011, pp. 14-15,
http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/crcl-annual-report-fy-2010.pdf. Hereinafter: CRCL, Fiscal Year 2010.
297 According to CRCL, “Regular roundtables were held in FY 2010 in Washington, DC; Chicago, IL; Los Angeles,
CA; Boston, MA; Detroit, MI; Columbus, OH; and three new cities that were added in late 2010—Seattle, WA;
Atlanta, GA; and Minneapolis, MN. In addition, special meetings were held in Tucson, AZ; Fremont, CA; San Diego,
CA; San Jose, CA; Hartford, CT; Tampa, FL; Portland, ME; Raleigh, NC; Albuquerque, NM; New York, NY;
Cleveland, OH; Portland, OR; Kingston, RI; Dallas, TX; and San Antonio, TX.” See ibid.
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partner with government in CVE efforts.298 Between January and September
2011, CRCL had conducted more than 150 roundtables and similar events.299
• The Somali-American Initiative. This initiative has involved DHS officials
engaging Somali communities and organizations in Columbus, OH; Seattle, WA;
and San Jose, CA. Issues discussed in these meetings included fighting in the
Horn of Africa and other items relevant to the local Somali communities.300
• Special Issue-Focused Engagement. Efforts in this area have included meetings
about policing, civil rights, and engagement held with leaders of national-level
interest groups such as the Muslim Public Affairs Council.301
• Youth Programs. For one event in this area, DHS led a meeting in Los Angeles,
California that included American Arab, Muslim, Sikh, South Asian, Middle
Eastern, and Somali youth and discussed civil rights issues and CVE.302
• The Incident Communication Coordination Team (ICCT). The ICCT
provides a venue for government officials and community leaders to work
together to exchange information and resolve issues immediately after terrorist
attacks or other significant incidents. ICCT members include officials from DHS,
the Departments of State, Justice, and Defense. Also involved are FBI
representatives and leaders of the Arab, Muslim, Sikh, Middle Eastern, Somali,
and South Asian Americancommunities. When an incident occurs, the ICCT is
assembled via conference call. It has been activated numerous times since its
establishment including after the Fort Hood shootings in November 2009 and the
attempted bombing of Northwest Airlines flight #253 in December 2009.303
Department of Justice
DOJ’s CVE-related engagement activities largely appear to come from the Civil Rights Division,
the Community Relations Service, and United States Attorneys. DOJ has stated that its
engagement efforts:
have two central components. First [DOJ] seek[s] to build trust by working with Muslim
elders to find out how we can better serve the community on issues like civil rights
enforcement to anti-bullying efforts. In addition, we work to equip and empower local
298 Ibid.
299 CRCL, Newsletter, September 2011.
300 CRCL, Fiscal Year 2010, p. 15.
301 CRCL, Fiscal Year 2010, p. 16.
302 Ibid.
303 Ibid., p. 17. See CRCL Engagement Team, August 14, 2009. DHS also provides law enforcement training related to
CVE in the United States. With DOJ, DHS has instructed more than 46,000 “front line officers” on suspicious activity
reporting. As of September 2011, CRCL has taught over 2,000 law enforcement officials in the area of CVE. CRCL
CVE training highlights topics such as understanding violent radicalization, cultural awareness, and community
engagement. The training was developed “in response to concerns from attendees at community roundtables.” See
DHS, Fact Sheet, “The Department of Homeland Security’s Approach to Countering Violent Extremism,”
http://www.dhs.gov/files/fact-sheet-approach-to-countering-violent-extremism.pdf DHS; CRCL, Fiscal Year 2010, pp.
18-19; CRCL, Fiscal Year 2010, p. 19; CRCL, Newsletter, vol. 1, no. 8 (June 2011), http://www.aila.org/content/
default.aspx?docid=36057.
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Muslim elders to help them guard against violent extremists who are targeting young people
in their communities for recruitment to misguided, violent causes.304
According to its website, since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 (9/11), the Civil Rights
Division of DOJ has prioritized prosecution of bias crimes and discrimination against Muslims,
Sikhs, and persons of Arab and South-Asian descent, as well as individuals perceived to be
members of these groups. These types of incidents are commonly referred to as “backlash.” The
division has also educated people in these communities about their rights and available
government services.305
Senior Civil Rights Division officials have met with Muslim, Sikh, Arab, and South Asian
community leaders regarding backlash discrimination issues. The division has also provided
convention speakers and participated in other community events. It hosts a quarterly meeting that
brings together leaders from these communities with officials from a variety of federal
departments and agencies including DHS, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and the
Department of Transportation to address civil rights issues.306
Like the Civil Rights Division, DOJ’s Community Relations Service is involved in outreach.
Since 9/11, the service has held more than 750 meetings around the country to address backlash-
related issues.307 For example, in March 2010, it brought together the U.S. Attorney and leaders
from Muslim and Arab communities in the Seattle, Washington area to address racial tensions.308
Also, the service has employed conflict resolution specialists in more than 50 communities to
“alleviate tensions in the wake of backlash incidents.”309 In addition, the Community Relations
Service does the following:310
• Provides technical assistance and targeted training efforts toward establishing
dialogue between government officials and Arab, Muslim, and Sikh communities
in the United States.
• Runs the Arab, Muslim, and Sikh Cultural Awareness Program for law
enforcement officials, and has offered this training to well over 500 law
enforcement departments and agencies across the country.
• Conducts train-the-trainer programs, often in conjunction with the Cultural
Awareness Program, to train volunteers from the Arab, Muslim, and Sikh
communities. These volunteers then conduct trainings for law enforcement
officials and first responders, providing them with an understanding of Arab,
304 DOJ, “Attorney General Holder Meets with Muslim Leaders in Portland,” September 30, 2011,
http://blogs.usdoj.gov/blog/archives/1617?print=1. Hereinafter: DOJ, “Attorney General Holder Meets.”
305 Civil Rights Division, “Initiative to Combat Post-9/11 Discriminatory Backlash,” http://www.justice.gov/crt/
legalinfo/discrimupdate.php. Hereinafter: Civil Rights Division, “Initiative.”
306 Ibid.
307 Ibid.
308 Community Relations Service, America’s Peacemaker, Community Relations Service, U.S. Department of Justice,
Annual Report, Fiscal Year 2010, http://www.justice.gov/crs/pubs/annualreport2010.pdf.
309 DOJ, Ten Years Later: The Justice Department After 9/11, Partnering with the Muslim, Arab, and Sikh
Communities, http://www.justice.gov/911/partnerships.html. Herafter: DOJ, Ten Years Later.
310 Civil Rights Division, “Initiative.” See Ondray T. Harris, Director, DOJ Community Relations Service, “Creating
Positive Perception of Sikh Identity in the U.S. Public,” speech at the 2nd Global Sikh Civil Rights Conference in
Toronto, Canada, December 19, 2009, http://www.justice.gov/crs/united-sikhs.pdf.
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Muslim, and Sikh cultures that will enable them to more effectively work in these
communities.
• Trains law enforcement officials on racial profiling to identify best practices
to prevent illegal discrimination against Arabs, Muslims, and Sikhs and to
improve daily contact and strengthen mutual trust and effective policing
practices in these communities.
• Posts on its website two films it developed for law enforcement officers: The
First Three to Five Seconds - Law Enforcement Roll Call Training Video on Arab
and Muslim Cultural Awareness, and On Common Ground - Law Enforcement
Training Video on Sikhism.311
Also, Attorney General Eric Holder has pushed the U.S. Attorneys to enhance their outreach
efforts to Muslim, Sikh, and Arab Americancommunities.312 U.S. Attorneys are “the nation’s
principal litigators under the direction of the Attorney General.”313 Within their districts across the
country, U.S. Attorneys have met with Muslim communities regarding specific situations and
trends.314 For example, in September 2011, the U.S. Attorney for the District of Oregon and
Attorney General Holder met with Arab and Muslim community representatives Portland, OR.315
In a similar vein, the District of Minnesota has established the Young Somali-American Advisory
Council. This responded to al-Shabaab’s316 recruitment of young men within the greater
Minneapolis-St. Paul’s Somali community. The council includes more than a dozen people
between the ages of 18 and 30. Among the outreach activities tied to the council, the U.S.
Attorney’s office instructed council members on civics issues. Comparable outreach has been
pursued by other U.S. Attorneys. For example, the U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of
Florida and Assistant Attorney General Thomas E. Perez met with Muslim and Arab leaders in
Miami in February 2011.317 In November 2010, an alleged jihadist terrorist plotter was arrested
for purportedly attempting to bomb a Christmas tree lighting ceremony in Portland, OR. In its
wake, the state’s U.S. Attorney repeatedly met with local Muslim leaders.318
Federal Bureau of Investigation
The FBI has publicly suggested that since 9/11, it has been formulating an “extensive program” to
bolster its relationship with Arab, Muslim, Sikh, and South Asian communities in the United
States.319 In March 2010, the Chief of the Community Relations Unit of the FBI’s Office of
311 Ibid.
312 DOJ, “Arab and Muslim Engagement: U.S. Attorneys’ Outreach Efforts,” http://www.justice.gov/usao/
briefing_room/crt/engagement.html. Hereinafter: DOJ, “Arab and Muslim.”
313 DOJ, “United States Attorneys’ Mission Statement,” http://www.justice.gov/usao/about/mission.html.
314 DOJ, Ten Years Later.
315 DOJ, “Attorney General Holder Meets.”
316 A terrorist group in Somalia.
317 DOJ, “Arab and Muslim.”
318 Peter Neumann, Preventing Violent Radicalization in America, Bipartisan Policy Center, (June 2011), p. 37
http://www.bipartisanpolicy.org/sites/default/files/NSPG.pdf. Hereinafter: Neumann, Preventing Violent
Radicalization.
319 Scott Atran, Senate Armed Services Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities: Countering Violent
Extremism: Statement for the Record, Addendum-2, 111th Cong., 2nd sess., March 10, 2010, http://armed-
services.senate.gov/statemnt/2010/03%20March/Atran%2003-10-10.pdf. Hereinafter: Atran Testimony, March 10,
(continued...)
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Public Affairs testified to Congress that the primary purpose of the agency’s outreach program
was “to enhance public trust and confidence in the FBI.”320 This involves fostering a positive
image of law enforcement among U.S. organizations that have condemned terrorism and violent
radicalization.
The FBI relies on programs at the field office level to foster interaction with a wide variety of
local groups. As the chief of the FBI’s Community Relations Unit stated to Congress in 2010:
It is very important to make sure that we engage with a number of different communities,
because terrorism really is just fear, and that fear comes in different shapes, forms and
fashion depending on what environment that you’re—that you’re looking at. So whether
you’re talking about gang activity, whether you’re talking about Klan activity, the bottom
line—it’s terrorism. And that’s one of the things I—we do at the FBI. We take a look at the
various communities. And it—I would say it’s a customized outreach program. What I mean
by that is we have 56 FBI field offices that serve, again, across this country, and they have to
tailor their outreach efforts based on the demographics of the area of responsibilities that
they serve. That’s the only effective way to do engagement, because there is not one shoe fits
all.321
In 2003, the FBI Washington Field Office (WFO) established one such program, the Arab,
Muslim, and Sikh Advisory Council (AMSAC), to create transparency and stronger
communication between its office and multiple religious communities. According to the WFO, on
a quarterly basis its officials and AMSAC executives share cultural, linguistic, and contextual
expertise and work to prevent hate crimes by building relationships with community members
who are not afraid to come forward with information.322
An outreach program developed by the Community Relations Unit at FBI Headquarters is the
Specialized Community Outreach Team (SCOT). It is described as an effort to, “engage
communities that are particularly insular or where barriers of fear or suspicion of law
enforcement exist.” The SCOT was piloted with Somali Americancommunities in Minneapolis;
Denver, CO; Columbus, OH; San Diego, CA; Seattle; and Washington, DC.323 This effort helped
the FBI address a Somali-linked threat to the 2009 Presidential Inauguration, and in this instance
SCOT outreach in Columbus facilitated FBI investigative work.324
(...continued)
2010.
320 Brett Hovington, House Committee on Homeland Security, Subcommittee on Intelligence, Information Sharing, and
Terrorism Risk Assessment: Working with Communities to Disrupt Terror Plots: Statement for the Record, 111th Cong.,
2nd sess., March 17, 2010, http://homeland.house.gov/SiteDocuments/20100317103507-03554.pdf. Hereinafter:
Hovington Testimony, March 17, 2010.
321 Hovington Testimony, March 17, 2010.
322 FBI, “Building Trust: The Arab, Muslim, and Sikh Advisory Council,” June 1, 2009, http://washingtondc.fbi.gov/
trust060109.htm.
323 Ibid.
324 Atran Testimony, March 10, 2010.
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Aside from the FBI’s inclusion of Muslim Americans in broad outreach programs,325 some FBI
field offices have formally interacted with local Muslim communities regarding specific cases.
One case involved the agency’s top official at the New York Field Office meeting with 40
community leaders regarding Najibullah Zazi, who has confessed to plotting to bomb subway
trains in New York City. Other field offices have held town hall meetings to interact with the
communities.326 At the national level, FBI headquarters representatives have engaged in liaison
with Arab and Muslim American advocacy groups and have regular issue-focused conference
calls with community leaders.327 The FBI is also a member of the Incident Coordination
Communications Team managed by DHS CRCL. Finally, CRS discussions with Muslim
community leaders revealed that the FBI has partnered with community members in specific
cases where the FBI has detected radicalization in an effort to prevent those individuals from
transitioning to acts of violent extremism.328
State and Local Government Activities
In addition to federal engagement efforts, state and local governments also engage with Muslim
communities. Minneapolis and St. Paul, MN, stand out as examples. The cities and surrounding
region have the largest Somali American community in the United States.329 Since 2007,
numerous people have been charged in an ongoing Justice Department investigation into the
recruitment of Somali Americanyouth from the Minneapolis area by al-Shabaab. Recognizing that
youth violence—not just terrorism and radicalization—is a public health epidemic that requires a
holistic, multi-faceted response, Minneapolis has promoted an “enterprise-wide” approach to the
challenge. Drawing on a mix of law enforcement and public health strategies, the city, in
partnership with a host of community stakeholders, created the “Blueprint for Action.”330 The
Blueprint’s goals are to
• connect every youth with a trusted adult,
• intervene at the first sign that youth are at risk for violence,
• restore youth who have gone down the wrong path, and
• unlearn the culture of violence in the community.331
The Minneapolis Police Department is actively involved in community outreach initiatives and
has full-time liaisons to the Somali and Latino communities. In addition, in 2009, the city
established the Neighborhood and Community Relations Department staffed with outreach
325 Programs such as the FBI’s Citizens’ Academy acquaint local civic leaders with FBI operations. The Citizens’
Academy, sponsored by FBI Field Offices, has given thousands of local community leaders a chance to learn about the
FBI mission and capabilities. See “FBI Citizens’ Academies: An Eye-Opening Experience,” October 26, 2009,
http://www.fbi.gov/page2/oct09/citizens_academies_102609.html; and “In Your Community: FBI Citizens’ Academy,”
http://www.fbi.gov/hq/ood/opca/outreach/academy.htm.
326 Hovington Testimony, March 17, 2010.
327 Atran Testimony, March 10, 2010.
328 Discussions with CRS held on May 12 and 18, 2010.
329 City of Minneapolis, “Blueprint for Action: Preventing Youth Violence in Minneapolis,”
http://www.ci.minneapolis.mn.us/dhfs/yv.asp.
330 Ibid.
331 Ibid.
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specialists who speak several East African languages.332 An example of this department’s
outreach work was its participation in a community forum on December 1, 2010. Hosted by the
British Broadcasting Corporation’s “BBC Somali,” a popular radio service among Somalis, the
discussion was prompted by a spate of high-profile crimes involving young Somali-Americans,
including the November 26, 2010, arrest of a 19-year-old Portland, OR, resident accused of
plotting a bomb attack in that city’s Pioneer Courthouse Square.333 At the meeting, broadcast to a
worldwide audience, about 40 mothers, fathers, and community leaders spoke passionately about
the challenges of raising kids in the United States.
The St. Paul Police Department began its engagement with local Somalis in 2004. Much of this
effort eventually morphed into the department’s African Immigrant Muslim Community Outreach
Program (AIMCOP). In 2009, AIMCOP received funding from the Bureau of Justice
Assistance.334 AIMCOP involves meetings between the St. Paul Police Department and local
Somali community leaders as well as youth-oriented programming such as after-school study
programs, gym activities, arts and crafts programs, and camping trips.335 Additionally, the city’s
Police Athletic League has more than 300 Somali Americanyouth participating in soccer, flag
football, softball, and volleyball. The league relies on city police officers as coaches, referees, and
organizers.336
Muslim Community Activities
As Attorney General Eric Holder has stated publicly, “Members of the American Muslim
community have been—and continue to be—strong partners in fighting this emerging threat [of
terrorism]. They have regularly denounced terrorist acts and those who carry them out. And they
have provided critical assistance to law enforcement in helping to disrupt terrorist plots and
combat radicalization.”337 “One of the most important benefits of trusted partnerships,” says
Alejandro Beutel of the Muslim Public Affairs Council, “is the ability of community members to
feel comfortable enough to step forward and provide critical information to prevent any crime,
including terrorism.”338 In an October 2011 background paper, he documents 19 instances since
9/11 in which Muslims provided information to U.S. government authorities regarding terrorist
plots tied to Al Qaeda.339
A partial list of community initiatives to tackle the problem of violent extremism includes the
following:
332 Briefing for CRS by Neighborhood and Community Relations Department official, Dec. 2, 2010.
333 Allie Shah, “Somalis Bring Fears for their Youth to Radio,” Minneapolis Star-Tribune, December 1, 2010,
http://www.startribune.com/local/111166374.html
334 See http://stpaul.gov/index.aspx?NID=3393.
335 Thomas E. Smith, House Committee on Homeland Security: Al-Shabaab: Recruitment and Radicalization within the
Muslim American Community and the Threat to the Homeland: Statement for the Record, 112th Cong., 1st sess., July
27, 2011, http://chsdemocrats.house.gov/SiteDocuments/20110727094311-57068.pdf.
336 Ibid.
337 Attorney General Eric Holder, DOJ Press Release, August 5, 2010, http://www.justice.gov/ag/speeches/2010/ag-
speech-100805.html.
338 Alejandro Beutel, Data on Post 9/11 Terrorism in the United States, Muslim Public Affairs Council, October 2011,
p. 10, http://www.mpac.org/publications/policy-papers/post-911-terrorism-database.php.
339 Ibid, p. 12. Some of these plots did not involve homegrown jihadists.
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• Muflehun. Describing itself as an “independent think-and-do tank,” Muflehun
seeks to use faith-based values for empowerment and continued integration of the
Muslim community within the larger society. It focuses on two main research
areas: radicalization prevention in the United States, and horizon scanning for
emerging trends within the Muslim American community.340
• The Straight Path Initiative. Founded by The Muslim American Society, the
initiative seeks to engage all components of the Muslim American community,
with a special focus on youth ages 15-30. It seeks to pinpoint the roots of
extremism, the ways in which individuals are radicalized, and the tools needed to
address these challenges, including an honest and open dialogue about
radicalization and extremism in Muslim American communities; research to
pinpoint the root causes of radicalization and extremism among Muslim
American youth in particular; engagement with the Muslim American
community in monitoring and detecting extremist trends and their impact on
vulnerable members of the community.341
• National Grassroots Campaign to Fight Terrorism. An initiative of The Muslim
Public Affairs Council (MPAC), it seeks to (1) [raise] religious awareness and
education to create a strong Islamic environment that does not allow terrorism to
be considered as a form of struggle in Islam; (2) control the inter-mosque
environment and activities to prevent intruders and unauthorized, unknown
persons from exploiting the open environment of [mosques]; and (3) acquire
skills to detect any potential criminal activity to be able to thwart them.342
Risks and Challenges
Although there is considerable support among public officials for community engagement, some
experts warn of significant challenges in the development of programs that foster substantive
relationships rather than token discussions or community relations events. A study of policing in
Arab Americancommunities sponsored by the National Institute of Justice, for example,
highlighted four key obstacles hindering outreach between U.S. Arabs (Christian and Muslim)
and law enforcement: “Distrust between Arab communities and law enforcement, lack of cultural
awareness among law enforcement officers, language barriers, and concerns about immigration
status and fears of deportation.”343
Terrorism expert Marc Sageman cautions that engagement can be a sign of government focus on
Muslim communities when instead it should be stressed that Muslims are Americans just like
340 Humera Khan and Mohamed Magid, Muflehun: Community Building Through Values, Social Responsibility, and
Civic Engagement, http://www.muflehun.org.
341 The Muslim American Society, The Straight Path Initiative, http://muslimamericansociety.org/main/content/
straight-path-initiative.
342 Muslim Public Affairs Council, National Grassroots Campaign to Fight Terrorism Handbook, 2005, p. 7,
http://www.mpac.org/publications/campaign-to-fight-terrorism/campaign-to-fight-terrorism-brochure.pdf.
343 Nicole J. Henderson et al., Policing in Arab-American Communities After September 11, National Institute of
Justice, Washington, DC, July 2008, p. ii. For the full study, see Nicole J. Henderson et al., Law Enforcement and Arab
American Community Relations After September 11, 2001: Engagement in a Time of Uncertainty, Vera Institute of
Justice, New York, NY, June 2006, http://www.vera.org/policerelations. As its title clearly suggests, this project
examined the experiences of Arab-Americans, two thirds of whom are Christian.
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everyone else.344 He sees another challenge arise when engagement on the government side is led
by federal law enforcement and intelligence agencies. “It can send the message that we are only
interested in Muslims because they are potential law breakers. No other foreign or religious
communities in the United States get this type of scrutiny.”345
Mohamed Elibiary, the President of the Freedom and Justice Foundation, a Muslim community
group based in Carrollton, TX, has told Congress that “while the government has publicly
claimed a desire for ‘partnership’ with the mainstream American Muslim community, law
enforcement has only offered the community a conduit to ‘inform’ on community members of
concern.”346 He argues that this “securitization” of government interactions with Muslim
Americancommunities would be counterproductive.
Outreach may be most effective when U.S. Muslim communities initiate it and community-
government contact revolves around countering the extremist messages popular among
homegrown violent jihadists.347 Marc Sageman suggests it would be more appropriate for local
authorities, such as a mayor’s office, to perform the engagement role because they know these
communities better than federal officials. An important role at the federal level is to lead efforts to
combat discrimination against Muslim-Americans,348 an activity in which the Civil Rights
Division of the Department of Justice is currently engaged.349
The Tension Between Enforcement and Engagement Activities
An inherent challenge to building trust and partnership involves law enforcement investigative
activities and tactics that can be perceived to unfairly target law-abiding citizens or infringe on
speech, religion, assembly, or due process rights. One expert has noted that “counter-
radicalization is not about intelligence-gathering nor is it primarily about policing.”350 The HSAC
Countering Violent Extremism Working Group found that
There can be tension between those involved in law enforcement investigations and those
collaborating to establish local partnerships to stop violent crime. Community policing can
be impeded if other enforcement tactics are perceived as conflicting with community
partnership efforts.351
This challenge is evident in law enforcement efforts to recruit and manage informants. One
Muslim community leader who has published widely on domestic terrorism, states that “many
344 Discussion with CRS, April 7, 2010.
345 Ibid.
346 U.S. Congress, House Committee on Homeland Security, Subcommittee on Intelligence, Information Sharing, and
Terrorism Risk Assessment, Hearing: “Working with Communities to Disrupt Terror Plots,” Testimony of Mohamed
Elibiary, President and CEO of the Freedom and Justice Foundation, 111th Cong., 2nd sess., March 17, 2010, p. 2,
http://homeland.house.gov/SiteDocuments/20100317103442-74422.pdf. Hereinafter: Elibiary Testimony, March 17,
2010.
347 Gartenstein-Ross and Grossman, Homegrown Terrorists in the U.S. and U.K, p. 60.
348 Discussion with CRS, April 7, 2010.
349 DOJ Civil Rights Division, “Initiative to Combat Post-9/11 Discriminatory Backlash,” July 25, 2008,
http://www.justice.gov/crt/legalinfo/nordwg_mission.php.
350 Neumann, Preventing Violent Radicalization., p. 19.
351 HSAC CVE Working Group, Spring 2010, p 6.
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Muslim Americans fear that paid FBI informants specifically target impressionable youth and that
law enforcement agents coerce community members to become informants themselves to avoid
complications with immigration procedures.”352
Community leaders report numerous attempts by the FBI to recruit Muslims as informers. In
virtually all cases, the Muslims in question had immigration and other legal problems or were
applying for green cards according to Shakeel Syed of the Islamic Shura Council of Southern
California, an umbrella organization of 68 area mosques. Syed said the FBI told Muslims, “We
will make your problems vanish if you cooperate.” He goes on to say that “For some individuals
who have refused recruitment, there is startling evidence that the FBI has actually retaliated
against them.”353
Two cases that are often cited to support these allegations are those of Foad Farahi and Yassine
Ouassif. Farahi is an imam at a mosque in North Miami Beach, FL, who has lived in the United
States since 1993. Although an Iranian citizen, he does not speak Farsi because he grew up as a
Sunni Muslim in Kuwait speaking Arabic. He applied for political asylum in the United States in
2002 after it was determined that he could be removed from the country because he had failed to
maintain his student status. He sought asylum based upon a fear of persecution if deported to Iran
because he is a Sunni Muslim and Iran is overwhelmingly Shia.
In 2004, when he was first approached by the FBI, Farahi said he told them that he was willing to
work with them, but the relationship would need to be public. He claimed the FBI wanted him to
be a secret informant instead and promised him residency and money for school.354 But Farahi
declined saying “People trust you as a religious figure, and you’re trying to kind of deceive them.
That’s where the problem is.”355
In the summer of 2007, Farahi declined a second request from the FBI to become a secret
informant. The consequences for this followed later that year at a hearing on his asylum case.
Four Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) agents, armed and wearing bullet proof vests,
followed him into the Miami Immigration Court. They allegedly told his attorney they had a file
with evidence that he was supporting or involved in terrorist groups and gave him an ultimatum:
Drop the asylum case and leave the United States voluntarily or be charged as a terrorist. Farahi
reported that these threats led to the involuntary and coerced withdrawal of his asylum application
before the Immigration Court.356
According to Farahi’s attorneys, the government has never shared any information or evidence
that he was involved in terrorism, nor has the government charged him for any terrorist offenses.
He has appealed the withdrawal of his asylum application to the U.S. Court of Appeals. Farahi
352 Alejandro J. Beutel, “Muslim Americans and U.S. Law Enforcement: Not Enemies, But Vital Partners,” The
Christian Science Monitor, December 30, 2009, http://www.csmonitor.com/Commentary/Opinion/2009/1230/Muslim-
Americans-and-US-law-enforcement-not-enemies-but-vital-partners..
353 Council on American-Islamic Relations, Greater Los Angeles Chapter, “The FBI’s Use of Informants, Recruitment
and Intimidation Within Muslim Communities,” March 26, 2009. p. 1, http://ca.cair.com/losangeles/campaign/
fbi_instigators_in_the_american_muslim_community.
354 Trevor Aronson, “FBI Tries to Deport Muslim Man for Refusing to be an Informant,” miaminewtimes.com, Oct 8,
2009, http://www.miaminewtimes.com/2009-10-08/news/unholy-war-fbi-tries-to-deport-north-miami-beach-imam-
foad-farahi-for-refusing-to-be-an-informant/. Hereinafter: Aronson, October 8, 2009.
355 Ibid.
356 Ibid.
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believes that “People have two choices. Either they end up working with the FBI or they leave the
country on their own. It’s just sometimes when you’re in that situation, not many people are
strong enough to stand up and resist and fight—to reject their offers.”357
Farahi’s assertion that the government tried to coerce him to become an informant cannot be
verified independently because the FBI won't comment on his case. When asked by a journalist
who has written on the case, a Miami FBI Special Agent stated: “It is a matter of policy that we
do not confirm or deny who we have asked to be a source.”358
In a case reported by The Wall Street Journal, a 24-year-old Moroccan, Yassine Ouassif, was
stopped in November 2005 and questioned for several hours by immigration officials as he
crossed into New York from Canada. His legal permanent resident card was taken from him and
he was told to contact an individual when he returned home to San Francisco. Ouassif complied
with the immigration officials’ instructions and the individual he contacted turned out to be an
FBI agent. The agent told him that he had been monitoring Ouassif and his friends for many
months.359
According to Ouassif, the FBI agent offered him the opportunity to become an informant and
regularly report to the FBI on what his Muslim friends in San Francisco were saying and doing.
In exchange, his legal permanent resident card would be returned and he could resume his
education, bring his Moroccan wife to America, and pursue his dream of buying a car, moving to
Sacramento, and becoming an engineer. If he refused, according to an account written by Ouassif
soon after the meeting, the FBI agent told him, “I will work hard to deport you to Morocco as
soon as possible.”360
According to the Los Angeles Times, “this account of Ouassif’s ordeal is based largely on
interviews with him and his lawyer, as well as his own written chronicle. Immigration officials
declined to comment, since no formal action was taken against Ouassif. FBI officials also
declined to discuss the investigation, saying it is classified.”361
Two cases involving one FBI informant have roiled the Muslim Americancommunity in Southern
California.362 The bureau employed a convicted con man, Craig Monteilh, as an informant in an
investigation called “Operation Flex.” Monteilh claimed in interviews and court documents that
he served the FBI as a paid informant from July 2006 to October 2007 and used concealed audio
and video equipment to record thousands of hours of conversations with Muslims in homes,
restaurants and mosques in Irvine, Tustin, Mission Viejo and elsewhere.363 Monteilh, who has a
357 Ibid.
358 Aronson, October 8, 2009.
359 Peter Waldman, “A Muslim’s Choice: Turn U.S. Informant or Risk Losing Visa,” Wall Street Journal, July 11,
2006, http://www.legalsanctuary.org/doc/article13970.pdf.
360 Ibid.
361 Lee Romney, “Immigrant Says FBI Tried Threats to Make Him Spy,” Los Angeles Times, August 12, 2006.
http://www.chron.com/disp/story.mpl/front/4112103.html.
362 Teresa Watanabe and Paloma Esquivel, “L.A. area Muslims say FBI surveillance has a chilling effect on their free
speech and religious practices.” Los Angeles Times, March 1, 2009, http://articles.latimes.com/2009/mar/01/local/me-
muslim1. Hereinafter: Watanabe and Esquivel, March 1, 2009.
363 Salvador Hernandez, “Release terms eased for man accused of lying about alleged terrorist ties,” The Orange
County Register, June 11, 2010, http://www.ocregister.com/articles/niazi-252994-fbi-case.html?pic=1. Hereinafter:
Hernandez, June 11, 2010.
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lawsuit pending against the FBI, has also claimed that he signed a non-disclosure agreement with
the FBI in exchange for $25,000. The Washington Post reports that an FBI letter to Monteilh’s
attorney on file in U.S. District Court in Santa Ana says Monteilh signed the non-disclosure
agreement in 2007.364 Additionally, the ACLU of Southern California and the Los Angeles
chapter of the Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR), which describes itself as an
“Islamic advocacy group,”365 have filed a lawsuit against the FBI regarding Monteilh’s
activities.366 The lawsuit alleges Monteilh’s activity at the behest of his FBI handlers violated the
religious freedom of people he monitored.367
While working for the FBI, Monteilh allegedly posed as a new convert and arrived at the Irvine
Islamic Center in 2006. He purportedly wore robes and a long beard and used the name Farouk
al-Aziz. Monteilh had a criminal record that included serving 16 months in state prison on two
grand theft charges. Members of the Islamic Center of Irvine were reportedly alarmed about
Monteilh and his talk of jihad and plans for a terrorist attack. The local chapter of the Council on
American-Islamic Relations reported him to the Irvine police and obtained a three-year
restraining order against him.368
Monteilh’s role as an FBI informant was first revealed in a bail hearing for Ahmadullah Niazi, a
U.S. citizen born in Afghanistan, who was accused in a February 2009 indictment of lying about
ties to terrorist groups on immigration documents among other charges. Much of the evidence
was FBI testimony about Niazi’s recorded conversations with an FBI informant, who sources say
was Monteilh.369 On September 30, 2010, prosecutors summarily moved to dismiss the case
against Niazi, and a judge agreed. The U.S. attorney’s office in Los Angeles cited the lack of an
overseas witness and “evidentiary issues.” Sources familiar with the decision said Monteilh’s
role—and his potential testimony for the defense—was also a factor.370
An editorial in the Orange County Register, the largest circulation newspaper in the Southern
California county where Monteilh’s activities occurred, made the following points:
Everyone understands the need for legitimate undercover activities in response to credible
evidence. But we cannot fathom the justification for fishing expeditions and entrapment.…
Muslims are afraid to talk about politics or civil liberties issues within their mosques or even
among their friends because of fear that it will draw attention from undercover agents …
there should not be a presumption of guilt among an entire community.”371
364 Jerry Markon, “Mosque Infiltration Feeds Muslims’ Distrust of FBI,” Washington Post, December 5, 2010,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/12/04/AR2010120403720.html. Hereinafter: Markon,
December 5, 2010.
365 CAIR, “Who We Are,” June 2010, http://www.cair.com/CivilRights/CAIRWhoWeAre.aspx.
366 Jerry Markon, “Lawsuit Alleges FBI Violated Muslims’ Freedom of Religion,” Washington Post, February 22,
2011, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2011/02/22/AR2011022206975.html.
367 Ibid.
368 Thomas Cincotta, “From Movements to Mosques, Informants Endanger Democracy,” The Public Eye, Summer
2009, http://www.publiceye.org/magazine/v24n2/movements-to-mosques.html. Hereinafter; Cincotta, “From
Movements to Mosques.”
369 Markon, December 5, 2010.
370 Ibid.
371 “FBI Creates Climate of Fear” An Orange County Register Editorial, March 22, 2009, http://www.ocregister.com/
articles/fbi-18893-ocprint-fear-.html.
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The use of informants can be a controversial issue, especially those with criminal records who
may be working on behalf of authorities in exchange for reduced jail time. According to open
source reports, confidential informants or undercover agents were used in 20 of the post-9/11
homegrown jihadist cases. In eight of those cases, the informants had criminal histories. The use
of informants poses the following risks:
Informants do not merely observe and collect data. They make things happen…. Informants
can cause confusion and dissatisfaction among members of groups and communities they
infiltrate, discrediting leaders, and fostering factionalism as people wonder if any of their
colleagues are spies. Their handlers’ structure of incentives—raises, promotions, transfers,
financial rewards, waived jail time—creates a system where informants consciously or
subconsciously create and then destroy terrorist threats that would not otherwise exist. These
pressures can push them from passive observer to aggressive actor, with serious
consequences for constitutionally protected free speech. Another unplanned result:
government loses legitimacy and support in the eyes of targeted communities, if they feel
they have been manipulated.372
Acknowledging the challenge, FBI Director Robert Mueller said in 2009, “Oftentimes, the
communities from which we need the most help are those who trust us the least. But it is in these
communities that we ... must redouble our efforts.”373 Then-FBI spokesman John Miller has said
the agency values its relationships with Muslims and has worked hard on outreach efforts that
range from town hall meetings to diversity training for FBI agents.374 Miller said there is no
factual basis for claims the FBI infiltrates mosques or conducts blanket surveillance of Muslim
leaders. “Based on information of a threat of violence or a crime, we investigate individuals, and
those investigations may take us to the places those individual go.”375
Former FBI agents and federal prosecutors note that informants are “still one of the government’s
best weapons to thwart terrorists and that the benefit to national security is likely to far outweigh
any embarrassment to the agency.” They claim that “although the law places almost no
constraints on the use of informants, the agency takes sending an informant into a mosque very
seriously and imposes a higher threshold for such requests.”376 Former FBI counterterrorism chief
Robert Blitzer, states that “What matters to the FBI is preventing a massive attack that might be
planned by some people ... using the mosque or church as a shield because they believe they're
safe there. That is what the American people want the FBI to do. They don't want some type of
attack happening on U.S. soil because the FBI didn't act on information.”377
Maher Hathout from the Muslim Public Affairs Council counters by saying that “People cannot
be suspects and partners at the same time. Unless the FBI’s style changes, the partnership with the
Muslim community will not be fruitful.”378 The Homeland Security Advisory Council’s
372 Cincotta, “From Movements to Mosques.”
373 Quoted in Matthai Kuruvila, “U.S. Muslims Debate How Much to Help FBI,” San Francisco Chronicle, April 6,
2009, http://articles.sfgate.com/2009-04-06/news/17193854_1_american-muslim-taskforce-muslim-community-
american-islamic-relations.
374 Quoted in Samantha Henry, “Some Muslims Rethink Close Ties to Law Enforcement,” Associated Press, May 4,
2009, http://www.breitbart.com/article.php?id=D97VH09O0&show_article=1.
375 Ibid.
376 Gillian Flaccus, “Calif. Case Highlights Use of Mosque Informants,” Associated Press, March 1 2009,
http://www.breitbart.com/article.php?id=D96LD2A81&show_article=1.
377 Ibid.
378 Watanabe and Esquivel, March 1, 2009.
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Countering Violent Extremism Working Group also cautions that “Law enforcement should be
sensitive to the fact that perceptions regarding enforcement actions and intelligence gathering can
impact community-oriented policing goals.”379
In considering the tradeoff between security and liberty, policy makers face a choice in those
cases where an investigative tactic might inflame members of a particular community: Is the
impact of that tactic counterproductive in the long run, or is it necessary, short-term collateral
damage?
The Obama Administration’s national CVE strategy mentions the Building Communities of Trust
Initiative (BCOT) as a study that can serve as a model for alleviating tension between
enforcement and engagement activities. BCOT offers guidance for fostering relationships among
three sets of actors—fusion centers, law enforcement, and the communities in which they
operate.380 The initiative’s recommendations included items such as
• training of fusion center analysts in cultural sensitivity so that they can
distinguish behavior that is constitutionally protected from criminal or terrorist
activity;
• encouraging law enforcement to “embrace” community policing by
“emphasizing partnerships and problem solving”; and
• encouraging communities to view information sharing with fusion centers and
law enforcement as key to crime prevention and counterterrorism.381
Policy Considerations for Congress
Implementing the Administration’s CVE Strategy and Developing
a Cohesive Domestic Intelligence Program
“The United States has made great strides,” says one federal counterterrorism official, “in what
might be called tactical counterterrorism—taking individual terrorists off the streets, and
disrupting cells and their operations ... an effective counterterrorism strategy must go beyond this
... (to address) the threat of violent extremism.”382 With the announcement of the CVE strategy,
the Obama Administration has begun to address this concern. Additionally, in spite of the
progress in “tactical counterterrorism” suggested by the official, some critics have noted that the
United States has to develop a more cohesive domestic intelligence program. These areas—CVE
and domestic intelligence—may merit oversight from Congress.
379 HSAC CVE Working Group, Spring 2010, p. 6.
380 See Robert Wasserman, Guidance for Building Communities of Trust, July 2010, pp. 4-5, http://nsi.ncirc.gov/
documents/e071021293_BuildingCommTrust_v2-August%2016.pdf.
381 Ibid.
382 Robert F. Godec, Principal Deputy Director for Counterterrorism at the Department of State, “U.S. Counterterrorism
Policy,” an address before the Global Young Leaders Conference, Washington, DC; June 30, 2010,
http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/rm/2010/143809.htm.
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Implementing the CVE Strategy
The Administration’s CVE strategy lacks specifics. The strategy’s domestic focus includes
general philosophical statements about the importance of protecting civil rights, federal
cooperation with local leaders in the private and public sectors, and the insistence that the strategy
does not center solely around fighting one particular radical ideology.383 However, the eight-page
document does not detail programs. One radicalization expert described the U.S. strategy as “very
aspirational.”384 By comparison, the unclassified United Kingdom’s counter-radicalization
strategy, known as “Prevent,” describes specific programs and is over 100 pages long.385
As mentioned elsewhere in this report, federal CVE activity emphasizes engagement with
Muslim communities across the country. Beyond recognizing this as a key component of CVE,
the strategy does not suggest specific initiatives to combat radicalization. Because of this, a
number of areas may call for oversight from Congress.
Intervention with At-Risk Individuals
There appears to be little federally driven guidance to community groups on how to intervene
with people vulnerable to radicalization. Such an intervention effort, the Channel Program, has
been a key element of the United Kingdom’s counter radicalization strategy since 2007. The
British government describes Channel as a “multi-agency programme to identify and provide
support to people at risk of radicalisation” and involvement in “all forms of terrorism.”386
Channel “relies on close collaboration between police, partners and other key stakeholders ... and
where necessary, provides an appropriate support package tailored to an individual’s needs.”387
Channel may be too “aggressive” of a government program to be adopted whole-cloth for the
American context.388 However, it is unclear whether the Obama Administration considers some
variant of Channel workable or even necessary in the United States.
The U.S. CVE strategy does cite the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention
(OJJDP) Comprehensive Gang Model as an example of “locally-based initiatives that connect
communities and government to address community challenges through collaboration and the
development of stakeholder networks.”389 OJJDP—a component of DOJ’s Office of Justice
Programs—describes the model as “one of the few approaches to gangs that encompasses a
multidisciplinary response to gangs on multiple levels.”390 The preventative model is intended as
383 Eileen Sullivan, “New White House Strategy to Hit Violent Extremism,” Associated Press, August 3, 2011,
http://www.google.com/hostednews/ap/article/ALeqM5hLU4EFgXfCXmXryTs3Z3UpSRO8CA?docId=
a159313d96c14cff94e4b5a87bc53730.
384 Temple-Raston, “White House Unveils.” For more on what a counter-radicalization strategy for the U.S. should
broadly entail see Neumann, Preventing Violent Radicalization.
385 Home Office, Prevent Strategy, June 2011, p. 108, http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/publications/counter-terrorism/
prevent/prevent-strategy/prevent-strategy-review?view=Binary. Hereinafter: Prevent Strategy.
386 Prevent Strategy, p. 54.
387 Association of Chief Police Officers, National Channel Referral Figures, http://www.acpo.police.uk/
ACPOBusinessAreas/PREVENT/NationalChannelReferralFigures.aspx.
388 Neumann, Preventing Violent Radicalization, p. 41.
389 Empowering Local Partners, p. 4.
390 OJJDP, OJJDP Comprehensive Gang Model: Planning for Implementation, May 2009, p. 2. Hereinafter: OJJDP,
Comprehensive Gang Model.
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a blueprint for organizing local counter-gang efforts that do not necessarily result in law
enforcement-driven outcomes, such as investigations, arrests, and prosecutions. For intervention,
it targets young adult and teen gang members, not entities such as hate groups, prison gangs, or
ideologically driven gangs consisting of adults.391 The model involves five strategies:
Community Mobilization: Involvement of local citizens, including former gang members
and community groups and agencies, and the coordination of programs and staff functions
within and across agencies.
Opportunities Provision: The development of a variety of specific education, training, and
employment programs targeting gang-involved youth.
Social Intervention: Youth-serving agencies, schools, street outreach workers, grassroots
groups, faith-based organizations, law enforcement agencies, and other criminal justice
organizations reaching out and acting as links between gang-involved youth and their
families, the conventional world, and needed services.
Suppression: Formal and informal social control procedures, including close supervision or
monitoring of gang youth by agencies of the criminal justice system and also by community-
based agencies, schools, and grassroots groups.
Organizational Change and Development: Development and implementation of policies and
procedures that result in the most effective use of available and potential resources to better
address the gang problem.392
The model is designed to focus on youth active in gangs or those who exhibit factors indicating
potential gang involvement. It also advocates engagement with the families of such youth.
Among its many suggestions, the model discusses interventions such as job training,
employment, family counseling, academic tutoring, and anger management classes for young
people at-risk. It also calls on law enforcement agencies and courts to move beyond traditional
roles in the suppression of gangs—urging them to consider more intervention-oriented activities
such as referring youth to social service programs.393
The CVE strategy provides little detail about how the Comprehensive Gang Model may be
applied to keep vulnerable people from radicalizing and becoming terrorists. Congress may wish
to consider examining the utility and feasibility of developing a CVE intervention model for the
United States.
Identifying Programs and Federal Contacts to Assist Grassroots CVE Efforts
The Administration’s CVE strategy stresses that “The best defenses against violent extremist
ideologies are well-informed and equipped families, local communities, and local institutions.”394
Determining and explaining how local entities—whether public or private—should interact with
391 OJJDP, Comprehensive Gang Model, p. 6.
392 National Gang Center, “About the OJJDP Comprehensive Gang Model,” http://www.nationalgangcenter.gov/
Comprehensive-Gang-Model/About. “Suppression” was not emphasized in the Obama Administration’s national CVE
strategy’s description of the Comprehensive Gang Model. The other components of the model were mentioned. See
Empowering Local Partners, p. 4.
393 OJJDP, Comprehensive Gang Model, p. 6.
394 Empowering Local Partners, p. 2.
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federal partners may pose quite a challenge. For example, what existing federal grant programs
can be harnessed by local actors to develop a CVE intervention program? A publicly available
comprehensive list of grant programs that can be harnessed for CVE activities does not exist.
Congress may be interested in asking the Obama Administration to formalize a roster or designate
a clearinghouse available to local entities to identify such programs.
Even more fundamentally, when radicalization arises as an issue in a locality or a particular
community, to which government officials or offices should citizens turn? As mentioned
elsewhere in this report, DOJ has pushed the U.S. Attorneys to become larger players in
community outreach. Is it appropriate to have the nation’s principal litigators be key players in the
federal government’s CVE outreach efforts? Can the same people responsible for prosecuting
terrorism cases effectively broker trust among community members who may be wary of federal
law enforcement? More broadly should particular government agencies or officials coordinate
counter-radicalization efforts at the state and local level? Congress may wish to explore these
questions with Administration officials.
At the national level, it may be of value to have a single federal agency in charge of the
government’s CVE efforts. One expert has stated as much:
The White House should designate a single agency that serves as the principal hub for
collecting, disseminating, and evaluating information on counter-radicalization. Its main
function would be to collect, analyze, and share best practices with a wide range of
governmental and non-governmental actors, including community leaders and non-profits.395
Congress may wish to consider developing legislation that designates a CVE lead, if the
Administration does not.
Countering Extremist Ideas
As the United Kingdom has clearly stated in its counter-radicalization program, extremist
ideologies play a role in radicalization.396 Furthermore, the National Security Council’s Quintan
Wiktorowicz has stated that “We will push back against the full scope of different violent
ideologies with an inclusive, positive narrative.”397However, in the United States, mere belief in
these notions, no matter how reprehensible they are, is not necessarily illegal. The ACLU’s
Michael German has stated that the ACLU is “deeply concerned about the potential for
government censorship of Internet content based on the [CVE] strategy’s proposal for countering
violent extremist propaganda.”398 The task of countering extremist ideas raises a number of
questions regarding the implementation of the CVE strategy that may be of interest to Congress.
Should the federal government determine which ideologies are dangerous? If so, which agencies
should participate in this effort? If the development of a counter-narrative challenging terrorist
ideologies is necessary, how should the federal government partner with state and local
395 Neumann, Preventing Violent Radicalization, p. 41.
396 Prevent Strategy, p. 7.
397 Temple-Raston, “White House Unveils.”
398 “ACLU Lens: Obama Plan to Fight Violent Extremism a Step in the Right Direction, But…” ACLU Blog of Rights,
August 3, 2011, http://www.aclu.org/blog/national-security/aclu-lens-obama-plan-fight-violent-extremism-step-right-
direction.
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government and civilian counterparts? How do government entities keep a counter-narrative from
being publicly viewed as propaganda?
Measuring Input and Results
In an era of budgetary constraint, Congress may wish to question the Administration about the
levels of federal funding devoted to CVE efforts. Are there mechanisms to track federal
expenditure in this area? Which federal body is responsible for this? On the other side of these
budgetary questions, how will the Administration evaluate the effectiveness of federal CVE
efforts? The British have struggled with measurement issues related to their Prevent Strategy.
U.K. officials have made “progress ... in measuring outputs but not always in measuring
outcomes.”399 In other words, counting the number of engagement events is one thing. It is quite
another evaluating their impact.
Enhancing Domestic Intelligence
The production of timely and actionable intelligence is essential to the effort to combat violent
extremism. This is important if one considers the concerns of a group of terrorism experts and
former and current intelligence and law enforcement officials:
Despite the expansion of the Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTTFs) and the proliferation of
fusion centers, the United States still lacks a coherent national domestic intelligence
collection effort. There is no national estimate of domestic terrorist threats. Creating one
could admittedly be a politically perilous undertaking, but without all parts of the federal
government having a common understanding of the threat, domestic intelligence efforts will
continue to flounder. There is no national, as opposed to local or regional, domestic
intelligence-collection plan, no national domestic intelligence collection requirements, no
priorities, no national or regional coordination. A national domestic intelligence effort seems
unlikely to emerge in the absence of some central direction.400
These experts believe that local police are in the best position to collect domestic intelligence and
so their role in the national effort—as well as that of federal agencies such as the FBI and DHS—
needs to be carefully delineated. The results they say would be “a more coordinated, better
connected national domestic intelligence effort [that] would better protect the nation against a
continuously morphing jihadist foe, possible surges in terrorist capabilities, and potential future
domestic terrorist threats from other directions.”401 A recent study drove these issues home by
stating that aside from large jurisdictions such as New York City, “local police departments
remain all but absent from the counterterrorism efforts of America’s intelligence community.”402
Congress, therefore, may also wish to consider requiring the Director of National Intelligence to
examine whether and how to develop a national domestic intelligence framework or plan as part
of a unified strategy to combat violent extremism within the United States.
399 Prevent Strategy, p. 36.
400 America’s Domestic Intelligence is Inadequate, June 2010.
401 Ibid.
402 Mills and Clark, Running, p. 1.
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In Appendix A that follows, details about each of the 40 post-9/11 homegrown jihadist plots and
attacks are provided in chronological order.
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Appendix A. Summary of Post-9/11 Homegrown
Violent Jihadist Terrorist Plots403
Rezwan Ferdaus—Plot to Attack U.S. Capitol and Pentagon—
September 2011
On September 28, Rezwan Ferdaus, a U.S. citizen from Ashland, MA, was arrested on terrorism
charges. He allegedly plotted to attack the Pentagon and the U.S. Capitol with explosives-laden
remote-controlled airplanes. According to DOJ, he also planned a ground assault in conjunction
with his aerial attack, intending to use firearms and to involve six conspirators in this phase of his
plot. Ferdaus also purportedly attempted to provide Al Qaeda with modified cell phones he
believed would be used as detonators for improvised explosive devices intended to harm U.S.
soldiers abroad. As described by DOJ, FBI undercover employees acting as members of Al Qaeda
supplied Ferdaus with money, fake explosives for the airplanes, firearms, and hand grenades. In
turn, (among other things) Ferdaus provided the cell phone detonators to these phony Al Qaeda
recruiters as well as a training video on how to construct them.404
Ferdaus supposedly began plotting in 2010. In January 2011, he discussed his plans with an FBI
informant. In May 2011, he visited the Washington, DC, area to conduct surveillance of his
targets and view the site from which he intended to launch his remote-controlled airplanes.405
According to the FBI, Ferdaus believed that one of his airplanes could collapse the Capitol dome.
It appears that Ferdaus did not view his domestic plot as a suicide mission. The FBI stated that in
April 2011, it recorded Ferdaus discussing his desire to go abroad once he completed his attack in
the United States. Aside from the undercover aspects of the sting operation, the bureau also relied
on Ferdaus’s e-mail and telephone records to build its case.406
Agron Hasbajrami—Plot to Fight in Pakistan—September 2011
On September 6, 2011, Agron Hasbajrami was arrested at John F. Kennedy International Airport
in New York City as he tried to board a flight to Turkey. Hasbajrami, a legal permanent resident
in the United States and an Albanian citizen, allegedly planned to join a jihadist fighting group in
the Federally Administered Tribal Areas of Pakistan. He also purportedly sent more than $1,000
to Pakistan to support the efforts of a militant with whom he communicated.407
403 Appendix A is based on unsealed DOJ indictments and other open source reporting.
404 Department of Justice, Press Release, “Ashland Man Charged With Plotting Attack on Pentagon and U.S. Capitol
and Attempting to Provide Material Support to Foreign Terrorist Organization,” September 28, 2011,
http://www.fbi.gov/boston/press-releases/2011/massachusetts-man-charged-with-plotting-attack-on-pentagon-and-u.s.-
capitol-and-attempting-to-provide-material-support-to-a-foreign-terrorist-organization.
405 Evan Perez, “U.S. Man Charged in Pentagon, Capitol Plot,” Wall Street Journal, September 28, 2011,
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970204138204576599133895661752.html.
406 United States v. Rezawan Ferdaus, Criminal Complaint, United States District Court for the District of
Massachusetts, September 28, 2011.
407 Department of Justice, Press Release, “New York City Resident Indicted for Providing Material Support to
Terrorists,” September 9, 2011, http://www.justice.gov/usao/nye/pr/2011/2011sep09.html.
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Naser Abdo—Plot to Attack Targets Near Fort Hood—July 2011
On July 27, 2011, U.S. Army Private Naser Abdo was arrested near Fort Hood in Texas for
allegedly plotting a shooting spree and bombing in the area—near the same place where Army
Major Nidal Hasan reportedly killed 13 individuals in 2009. The circumstances surrounding
Abdo’s plot remain somewhat unclear. Abdo, described in the media as a Muslim soldier in the
101st Airborne Division at Fort Campbell, KY, was supposedly absent without leave from the
Army after applying for conscientious objector status.408 A November 2011 superseding
indictment charged Abdo with one count of attempted use of a weapon of mass destruction, one
count of attempted murder of officers or employees of the United States, two counts of possession
of a firearm in furtherance of a federal crime of violence, and two counts of possession of a
destructive device in furtherance of a federal crime of violence.409
Abdo allegedly purchased gunpowder, shotgun ammunition, and a magazine for a semi-automatic
pistol at a gun store near Fort Hood.410 An employee at the gun store supposedly brought Abdo to
the attention of law enforcement officers. Federal officials have noted that Abdo also possessed a
.40 caliber handgun, bomb making materials, and an article on how to construct an explosive
device, among other items. The article was from Inspire, an English-language magazine produced
by Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula.411
Emerson Begolly—Plot to Encourage Jihadist Acts in the United
States—July 2011
On July 14, 2011, Emerson Begolly, a U.S. citizen from New Bethlehem, PA, was indicted for
allegedly attempting to encourage jihadists to commit acts of terrorism within the United States
and distributing information related to explosives online. In August 2011, he pled guilty to
“soliciting others to engage in acts of terrorism within the United States and to using a firearm
during and in relation to an assault on FBI agents.”412 According to DOJ, Begolly posted “links to
a 101-page document that contain[ed] information on how to set up a laboratory, conduct basic
chemistry, and manufacture explosives.” Begolly had also allegedly bitten two FBI agents
attempting to execute search warrants in January 2011. Reputedly, during the altercation, he was
in possession of a concealed firearm.413
408 Peter Finn and Jason Ukman, “AWOL Soldier Accused of Plotting Fort Hood Attack,” Washington Post, July 28,
2011, http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/awol-soldier-accused-of-plotting-fort-hood-attack/2011/
07/28/gIQAvml1fI_story.html.
409 DOJ Press Release, “Federal Grand Jury Returns Superseding Indictment Against Naser Jason Abdo in Connection
with Bomb Plot,” November 8, 2011, http://www.fbi.gov/sanantonio/press-releases/2011/federal-grand-jury-returns-
superseding-indictment-against-naser-jason-abdo-in-connection-with-bomb-plot?utm_campaign=email-Immediate&
utm_medium=email&utm_source=san-antonio-press-releases&utm_content=45727.
410 “Official: Soldier Said He Wanted to Attack Fort Hood Troops,” CNN.com, July 29, 2011, http://www.cnn.com/
2011/CRIME/07/28/fort.hood.arrest/.
411 DOJ Press Release, “Naser Jason Abdo Charged Federally in Bomb Plot,” July 29, 2011; David Goodman, “Soldier
Held Amid Claim of Terror Plot at Fort Hood,” New York Times, July 28, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/29/
us/29awol.html?_r=1.
412 DOJ Press Release, “Pennsylvania Man Pleads Guilty to Terrorist Solicitation and Firearms Offense,” August 9,
2011, http://www.fbi.gov/washingtondc/press-releases/2011/pennsylvania-man-pleads-guilty-to-terrorist-solicitation-
and-firearms-offense.
413 DOJ Press Release, “Pennsylvania Man Indicted for Soliciting Jihadists to Kill Americans,” July 14, 2011,
(continued...)
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Abu Khalid Abdul-Latif and Walli Mujahidh—Plot to Attack
Seattle Military Processing Center—June 2011
On June 22, 2011, Abu Khalid Abdul-Latif and Walli Mujahidh, were arrested on terrorism and
firearms charges for plotting to attack a Seattle military processing center. Law enforcement first
learned of the duo’s plotting from a citizen who reported their activities. An FBI sting operation
apprehended the two as they took possession of machine guns they had purchased for the plot.
The firearms had been rendered inert as part of the sting operation. Assistant Attorney General for
National Security Todd Hinnen described the plot as, “driven by a violent, extreme ideology.”414
While the two reportedly had not worked out all of the details of their plot, they allegedly were
frustrated by “American war policies” and hoped for an attack that would garner wide
attention.415
Yonathan Melaku—Plot to Shoot Targets in Washington, DC,
Area—June 2011
On June 23, 2011, DOJ announced that Yonathan Melaku, an Ethiopian native living in
Alexandria, VA, had been charged with destruction of property and firearm violations. These
charges stemmed from five shootings at military installations in Northern Virginia between
October and November 2010. No one was harmed in the shootings.416 It is unclear to what extent
Melaku, a Marine Corps reservist, was driven by jihadist motivations; however, investigators
linked Melaku to a “spiral notebook with numerous Arabic statements referencing the Taliban, Al
Qaeda, Osama bin Laden, ‘The Path to Jihad,’ as well as a list of several other individuals
associated with foreign terrorist organizations.”417 Law enforcement officials also found a video
when they searched Melaku’s bedroom. It reportedly depicted “Melaku in an automobile driving
near what appears to be the U.S. Marine Corps Heritage Museum and repeatedly firing a handgun
out the passenger-side window.” In the video, he allegedly states, “that’s my target. That’s the
military building. It’s going to be attacked,” and then he shouts, “Allahu Akbar.”418
(...continued)
http://www.fbi.gov/philadelphia/press-releases/2011/pennsylvania-man-indicted-for-soliciting-jihadists-to-kill-
americans.
414 DOJ Press Release, “Two Men Charged in Plot to Attack Seattle Military Processing Center,” June 23, 2011,
http://seattle.fbi.gov/dojpressrel/pressrel11/se062311.htm.
415 William Yardley, “Officials Say Two Planned Armed Attack in Seattle,” New York Times, June 23, 2011,
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/24/us/24seattle.html.
416 DOJ Press Release, “Alexandria Man Charged with Shooting at Military Buildings in Northern Virginia,” June 23,
2011, http://www.fbi.gov/washingtondc/press-releases/2011/alexandria-man-charged-with-shooting-at-military-
buildings-in-northern-virginia. Hereinafter: DOJ, “Alexandria.” See Sean Collins Walsh, “Reservist Charged in ’10
Building Shootings,” New York Times, June 23, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/24/us/24reservist.html.
417 DOJ, “Alexandria.”
418 Ibid. Because the publicly available information about this case is incomplete, it is not counted as a successful attack
in this report. It is unclear whether Melaku wanted to harm anyone.
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Ahmed Ferhani and Mohamed Mamdouh—Plot to Attack New
York City Targets—May 2011
On May 12, 2011, Ahmed Ferhani (an Algerian native living in Queens, NY) and Mohamed
Mamdouh (a naturalized U.S. citizen from Morocco) were arrested for plotting to blow up a
synagogue as well as churches in New York City. However, the duo had not chosen a specific
target. New York City officials alleged that Ferhani was “driven by a hatred of Jews and a belief
that Muslims are mistreated the world over.” He and Mamdouh allegedly had purchased firearms
and a hand grenade from an undercover detective posing as a gun dealer. The two were charged
under a New York state terrorism statute and do not face federal charges.419
Khalid Ali-M Aldawsari—Plot to Bomb U.S. Targets—
February 2011
On February 23, 2011, FBI agents arrested Khalid Ali-M Aldawsari, a citizen of Saudi Arabia and
resident of Lubbock, TX. He was charged with attempted use of a weapon of mass destruction.
He also allegedly plotted to purchase material to make an improvised explosive device and had
researched potential U.S. targets. A chemical supplier provided information to the FBI about a
suspicious attempted purchase by Aldawsari.420 Prosecutors have also stated that Aldawsari
documented his interest in violent jihad and martyrdom in blog postings and a personal journal.421
Allegedly among the targets Aldawsari researched were “the names and home addresses of three
American citizens who had previously served in the U.S. military and had been stationed for a
time at Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq.”422 Aldawsari’s lawyers have indicated that they plan to use an
insanity defense in the case.423
Antonio Martinez—Plot to Attack an Armed Forces Recruiting
Station in Maryland—December 2010
On December 8, 2010, federal officials charged Antonio Martinez, a Muslim convert, with the
attempted murder of federal officers and employees and attempted use of a weapon of mass
destruction against federal property. Caught by the FBI in a sting operation, Martinez allegedly
planned to attack an Armed Forces recruiting station in Maryland using a sport utility vehicle
loaded with what he believed was a bomb.424 In late September 2010, Martinez had allegedly
419 William K. Rahsbaum and Al Baker, “Suspects in Terror Case Wanted to Kill Jews, Officials Say,” New York
Times, May 12, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/13/nyregion/two-men-arrested-in-new-york-terror-case-police-
say.html?pagewanted=1&_r=1.
420 DOJ Press Release, “Texas Resident Arrested on Charge of Attempted Use of Weapon of Mass Destruction,”
February 24, 2011, http://www.fbi.gov/dallas/press-releases/2011/dl022411.htm.
421 Ibid.
422 Ibid.
423 Logan G. Carver, “Terror Suspect Aldawsari To Use Insanity Defense,” Lubbock Avalanche-Journal, November 10,
2011, http://lubbockonline.com/crime-and-courts/2011-11-09/terror-suspect-aldawsari-use-insanity-
defense#.TsJ4aEfh_y1.
424 Dina Temple-Raston, “Officials Worry About Some Latino Converts To Islam,” National Public Radio, August 24,
2011, http://www.npr.org/2010/12/09/131916271/officials-worry-about-some-latino-converts-to-islam; DOJ Press
Release, “Maryland Man Charged in Plot to Attack Armed Forces Recruiting Center,” December 8, 2010,
(continued...)
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posted a statement on his Facebook account, “calling for violence to stop the oppression of
Muslims.”425 During the course of his plot, he also allegedly tried to recruit others to join him,
discussed martyrdom, and praised the now-dead radical U.S.-born imam, Anwar al-Awlaki,
among other things.426
Mohamed Osman Mohamud—Plot to Detonate Van Packed with
Explosives in Portland, Oregon—November 2010
Mohamed Osman Mohamud, a Somali-born naturalized U.S. citizen, was arrested on November
26, 2010, moments after he tried to detonate a van he believed was packed with explosives in
Portland’s Pioneer Courthouse Square. The square was crowded with thousands of people who
had gathered for an annual Christmas tree lighting event.427
According to federal officials, Mohamud came to the attention of the FBI after a tip from the
Muslim community. This led officials to discover an e-mail exchange that occurred in 2009
between Mohamud and an unindicted associate located in Pakistan. The two communicated
regularly and in December 2009 it is alleged that they discussed the possibility of Mohamud
traveling there to prepare for violent jihad428 presumably targeting U.S. troops.
The FBI subsequently developed a “sting” operation that involved recorded meetings between
Mohamud and undercover FBI operatives beginning in the summer of 2010. In an August 19,
2010, meeting with two FBI undercover operatives, Mohamud stated that “he had been thinking
of committing some form of violent jihad since the age of fifteen.”429 As part of the sting, the
undercover agents went along with Mohamud’s plotting for a terrorist attack. This included a
“trial run” where Mohamud and the undercover operatives detonated a bomb in a backpack in a
remote Oregon location. In addition, Mohamud bought various bomb components and mailed
them to the undercover agents.430
During another meeting with an undercover operative, Mohamud identified Portland’s Pioneer
Courthouse Square Christmas lighting event as a potential target for a bomb. When the
undercover operative pointed out that “there would be lots of children at such an event …
(...continued)
http://www.fbi.gov/baltimore/press-releases/2010/ba120810.htm.
425 Ibid.
426 Anti-Defamation League, “Baltimore Man Arrested for Attempting to Bomb Army Recruiting Center,” December 9,
2010, http://www.adl.org/main_Terrorism/Antonio_Martinez.htm. Anwar al-Awlaki is a radical imam and key
international charismatic figure in jihadist circles. He is a U.S. citizen born in New Mexico in 1971 and has been linked
to a number of domestic jihadist plots. He has also been tied to alleged foreign terrorist Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab’s
failed Christmas Day 2009 bombing attempt.
427 Jerry Markon, “FBI Foils Elaborate Bomb Plot in Oregon,” Washington Post, November 28, 2010,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/11/27/AR2010112700546.html. Hereinafter: Markon,
November 28, 2010.
428 United States v. Mohamed Osman Mohamud, Criminal Complaint, U.S. District Court for the District of Oregon,
November 26, 2010, p. 2, http://media.oregonlive.com/portland_impact/other/USAFFIDAVIT.pdf (Hereinafter: U.S. v.
Mohamud, Criminal Complaint).
429 Ibid, p. 3. Mohamud was 19 years old at the time of his arrest.
430 Winston Ross, “The Oregon Bomb Plot Kid,” The Daily Beast, November 28, 2010, http://www.thedailybeast.com/
blogs-and-stories/2010-11-28/oregon-bombing-the-teenager-behind-the-plot/2/.
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Mohamud replied he was looking for a ‘huge mass that will … be attacked in their own element
with their families celebrating the holidays.’”431
On November 26, undercover operatives showed Mohamud a white van with a dummy explosive
device inside that was actually supplied by the FBI. He was reported to have said the device
looked “beautiful.”432 They later drove the van to Pioneer Courthouse Square where Mohamud
allegedly attempted to detonate the device on two separate occasions using a cell phone. After the
second attempt he was taken into custody. Officials stated that at no time did the device pose a
danger to the public.433
At a hearing in Federal District Court in Portland on November 29, 2010, Mohamud plead not
guilty to the charges. His lawyers suggested that the government might be “manufacturing crime”
and accused authorities of timing the plot for maximum publicity and effect.434 Attorney General
Eric Holder was quoted as saying of the case, “I am confident that there is no entrapment here,
and no entrapment claim will be found to be successful.”435
Farooque Ahmed—Plot to Bomb Washington, DC, Subway
Stations—October 2010
Farooque Ahmed, a naturalized U.S. citizen born in Pakistan, was arrested on October 27, 2010,
and charged with conspiring with others he believed to be al Qaeda operatives to bomb subway
stations in Washington, DC. In fact, his co-conspirators were really undercover law enforcement
officers. They provided Ahmed with a Quran with code words for locations of future meetings
which were held in various hotel rooms in the Northern Virginia area and recorded by the FBI.436
In April 2011, Ahmed was sentenced to 23 years in prison for his plotting.437
The allegations against Ahmed were contained in an indictment unsealed on October 27, 2010.438
According to the indictment, between April and October of 2010, Ahmed met with individuals he
thought were representatives of a terrorist organization at several Northern Virginia hotels. At
these meetings, Ahmed agreed to conduct surveillance and assess the security of Washington, DC,
Metrorail stations in the Arlington County area. He allegedly wanted to wanted to “kill as many
military personnel as possible.” Ahmed later gave to undercover operatives posing as terrorists a
thumb drive containing video images of some of the stations as well as sketches of the stations.
431 U.S. v. Mohamud, Criminal Complaint, p. 4.
432 U.S. v. Mohamud, Criminal Complaint, p. 6.
433 Markon, November 28, 2010.
434 William Yardley, “Entrapment is Argued in Defense of Suspect,” New York Times, November 29, 2010,
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/30/us/30mohamud.html.
435 Ibid.
436 Matt Apuzzo and Adam Goldman, “Officials: Muslim Source Turned in Terror Suspect,” Associated Press cited on
msnbc.com, October 28, 2010, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/39894024/ns/us_news-security. Hereinafter: Apuzzo and
Goldman, October 28, 2010.
437 DOJ Press Release, “Virginia Man Sentenced to 23 Years in Prison for Plotting Attacks on D.C. - Area Metro
Stations With People He Believed To Be Al-Qaeda Members,” April 11, 2011, http://www.justice.gov/usao/vae/news/
2011/04/20110411ahmednr.html.
438 United States v. Farooque Ahmed, 1:10cr 413, United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia,
October 26, 2010, http://www.lawfareblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2010/10/Ahmed_indictment.pdf. Hereinafter: U.S.
v. Farooque Ahmed, Criminal Complaint.
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He also discussed at these meetings the best time and location for an attack in order to cause the
most casualties.439
According to court documents, Ahmed told undercover operatives that “he wished to fight in
jihad himself, and has trained to do so using various firearms.” He also claimed to have studied
martial arts for four years and learned knife, gun, and disarming techniques. He is alleged to have
said that he planned to travel to engage in jihad after his upcoming trip for the Hajj pilgrimage.
Court documents allege that Ahmed also “discussed his desire to provide financial assistance” to
jihadists fighting abroad.440
Ahmed immigrated with his family from Pakistan in 1993. He graduated from the College of
Staten Island in New York. He is a married father of one who was working for a
telecommunications company in Northern Virginia at the time of his arrest. The FBI and White
House have said the public was never in danger because FBI agents had Ahmed under tight
surveillance before the sting began and until his arrest. Law enforcement officials have also said
that the tip that led the FBI to Ahmed came from a source in the Muslim community.441
Abdel Hameed Shehadeh—Travel Abroad to Wage Jihad—
October 2010
Abdel Hameed Shehadeh, a U.S. citizen born in New York City to a Palestinian Americanfamily,
was arrested on October 22, 2010, in Honolulu, HI. Among the accusations against him was that
he tried to join the U.S. military so he could be deployed to Iraq but would desert and fight with
anti-American insurgency forces.
A criminal complaint unsealed on October 25, 2010, accused Shehadeh of making false
statements in a matter involving international terrorism.442 According to the complaint, in early
2008 Shehadeh devised a plan to travel to Pakistan in order to join the Taliban or a similar
fighting group. In furtherance of his plan, on June 13, 2008, Shehadeh flew on a one-way airline
ticket from John F. Kennedy International Airport (JFK), New York, to Islamabad, Pakistan.
Upon landing in Pakistan, Shehadeh was denied entry into the country by Pakistani officials and
he returned to the United States. He was questioned by FBI agents and New York Police
Department (NYPD) detectives on multiple occasions about the purpose of his trip to Pakistan.
He told them that he had traveled to Pakistan in order to visit an Islamic university and to attend a
friend’s wedding. The complaint alleges that Shehadeh subsequently admitted to FBI agents in
Hawaii that the true purpose of his trip to Pakistan was to join a fighting group such as the
Taliban.
According to the complaint, several weeks after Shehadeh was denied entry to Pakistan, he
attempted to enlist in the U.S. Army at the Times Square recruiting station in New York City.
Shehadeh’s application was denied when it was discovered that he had concealed his prior trip to
439 Ibid.
440 Affidavit in Support of Application for Search Warrant, Case Number 1:10-sw-569, U.S. District Court for the
Eastern District of Virginia, October 26, 2010, http://www.cbsnews.com/htdocs/pdf/Ahmed_warrant_affidavit.pdf.
441 Apuzzo and Goldman, October 28, 2010.
442 DOJ Press Release, “Hawaii Resident Charged with Making False Statements in a Matter Involving International
Terrorism,” October 26, 2010, http://honolulu.fbi.gov/dojpressrel/pressrel10/hn102610.htm.
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Pakistan. Although Shehadeh claimed that he attempted to enlist for career opportunities and
benefits, the complaint alleges that his true motive was to deploy to Iraq, where he intended to
desert and fight against the U.S. military alongside Iraqi insurgent forces.443
In addition, the complaint alleges that Shehadeh created and administered multiple websites
dedicated to spreading violent jihadist ideology. The content of these websites included, among
other things, speeches from known Al Qaeda leaders such as Abu Yahya al-Libi and Ayman al-
Zawahiri. In December Shehadeh was indicted for lying to FBI agents.444
The New York Times reported that relatives of Shehadeh were surprised by the charges. Although
he seemed “confused and lost,” according to one relative, he was nevertheless aware, as was the
whole family, that he was being tracked by investigators. “He was trying to outsmart the FBI,”
said the relative, who spoke on condition of anonymity. “He thought it was a game.”445 A federal
court in Brooklyn, NY, ordered Shehadeh held without bail.446
Omar Hammami—al-Shabaab Figure—August 2010
In an indictment unsealed in August 2010,447 Omar Hammami, an American citizen from Daphne,
AL, was accused of supporting al-Shabaab, a designated foreign terrorist organization.448
According to public reports, Hammami has appeared in several propaganda videos on behalf of
al-Shabaab that have been distributed worldwide. One shows him allegedly instructing recruits in
urban warfare. Somali officials believe he is involved with al-Shabaab’s recruitment strategy and
financial management. He is also believed to be a ranking member of the al-Shabaab organization
with operational responsibilities.449
443 Ibid.
444 Mitchel Maddux, “SI Man Indicted on Terror Charges,” December 23, 2010, New York Post,
http://www.nypost.com/p/news/local/si_man_indicted_on_terror_charges_S9CIMVjQiVkvOrpSDKfJ0J.
445 Kareem Fahim and William K. Rashbaum, “Former City Resident is Accused of Trying to Join Terrorists,” New
York Times, October 26, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/27/nyregion/27terror.html.
446 John Marzulli, “Terrorist Wannabe Charged With Lying About Attempt to Become Taliban Jihadist Held Without
Bail,” New York Daily News, November 2, 2010, http://www.nydailynews.com/news/ny_crime/2010/11/02/2010-11-
02_terrorist_wannabe_charged_with_lying_about_attempt_to_become_taliban_jihadist_he.html#ixzz16gGo9JG8.
447 United States v. Omar Shafik Hammami, 07-00384KD, U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Alabama
Southern Division, September 24, 2009 (unsealed August 5, 2010), http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/paperchase/
Hammami%20Indictment%208-5-10.pdf
448 Al-Shabaab is a group on the Department of State’s list of designated terrorist organizations. It is waging an
insurgency in Somalia.
449 DOJ Press Release, “Fourteen Charged with Providing Material Support to Somalia-Based Terrorist Organization al
Shabaab,” August 5, 2010, http://www.justice.gov/ag/speeches/2010/ag-speech-100805.html; Spencer S. Hsu, “Arrest
of Va. Man Spotlights al-Qaeda’s New American Recruiter,” The Washington Post, August 1, 2010,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/07/31/AR2010073102680.html; Andrea Elliott, “The
Jihadist Next Door,” New York Times Magazine, January 31, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/31/magazine/
31Jihadist-t.html; John Goddard, “Terrorist Leader Lived in Toronto,” The Hamilton Spectator, Ontario, Canada,
January 4, 2010; Brendan Kirby, “Report: Former Daphne High and USA Student Has Been Charged in a Secret
Indictment in Mobile with Providing Material to Terrorists,” Mobile Register, September 5, 2009, http://blog.al.com/
live/2009/09/report_former_daphne_high_and.html; The Nine Eleven Finding Answers (NEFA) Foundation, “Shabaab
al-Mujahideen Releases Footage of ‘Abu Suleim Training Camp,’” September 2009, http://www1.nefafoundation.org/
multimedia-prop.htm.
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As a child, Hammami lived between the Christian world of his American mother and the Muslim
beliefs of his Syrian-born father. He converted to Islam in high school, and while a student at the
University of South Alabama, led the Muslim Student Association and began adhering to Salafi
doctrine. His Salafism sprang in part from a desire to rebel against his father. In 2002, he dropped
out of school, and by 2004 he had found his way to Toronto, Canada, where the American
involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan encouraged him to reconsider his nonviolent Salafi views.
One of his friends alleges that Hammami began surfing the web for information on jihad. While
in Canada, he married a Somali woman. In 2005 they moved to Cairo, and by late 2006 he was in
Somalia in pursuit of violent jihad.450
Jehad Mostafa—Attempted Travel to Somalia to Fight—
August 2010
Few details are publicly available about Jehad Mostafa, a U.S. citizen who grew up in San Diego,
CA, and allegedly left the United States to fight with al-Shabaab in Somalia. The indictment in
Mostafa’s case mentions little specifically about his alleged terrorist activity but ties him to al-
Shabaab between March 2008 and June 2009. News sources suggest that he left the United States
in December 2005.451
Shaker Masri—Attempted Travel to Somalia or Afghanistan to
Fight—July 2010
Shaker Masri, a U.S. citizen born in Alabama but raised abroad, was arrested by the Federal
Bureau of Investigation (FBI) on August 3, 2010, just before he was allegedly planning to travel
to Somalia or Afghanistan to join either al-Shabaab or Al Qaeda. The FBI used a cooperating
source who met Masri in November 2008 and subsequently consensually recorded conversations
with him for the investigation. According to court documents,452 Masri encouraged the
cooperating source to “review speeches” by Anwar al-Awlaki.
Zachary Chesser—Attempted Travel to Somali to Fight,
Encouraging Violent Jihadists to Kill U.S. Citizens—July 2010
On July 21, 2010, Zachary Chesser, a U.S. citizen from Fairfax County, Virginia, was arrested on
terrorism-related charges. According to DOJ, Chesser told FBI agents that on two occasions he
tried to travel to Somalia to join al-Shabaab. In his last attempt, Chesser allegedly brought his
infant son with him to John F. Kennedy International Airport (JFK) in New York City to
potentially disguise his intentions.453
450 Ibid.
451 Greg Moran, “Former SD Man Among 14 Charged with Aiding Terror Group,” San Diego Union-Tribune, August
5, 2010, http://www.sandiegounion-tribune.com/news/2010/aug/05/san-diegan-among-those-charged-aiding-somalian-
ter/; United States v. Jehad Serwan Mostafa, Indictment, 09-CR-3726 U.S. District Court for the Southern District of
California, October 2009 (unsealed August 6, 2010).
452 United States v. Shaker Masri, Criminal Complaint 10-CR-0655, U.S. District Court Northern District of Illinois
Eastern Division, August 9, 2010, http://jnslp.files.wordpress.com/2010/08/masri-complaint1.pdf.
453 DOJ Press Release, “Fairfax County Man Accused of Providing Material Support to Terrorists,” July 21, 2010,
(continued...)
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Three months later, on October 20, 2010, Chesser pled guilty to charges that he communicated
threats against the writers of the South Park television show, solicited violent jihadists to
desensitize law enforcement, and attempted to provide material support to al-Shabaab.454 He
received a 25-year sentence.455 According to court documents filed with his plea agreement,
“Chesser maintained several online profiles dedicated to extremist jihadist propaganda ... took
repeated steps in April 2010 to encourage violent jihadists to attack the writers of South Park for
their depiction of Muhammad … solicit[ed] others to desensitize law enforcement by placing
suspicious-looking but innocent packages in public places … and twice attempt[ed] to leave the
United States and travel to Somalia for the purpose of joining al-Shabaab and engage in violent
jihad as a foreign fighter.”456
Federal investigators have linked two others to Chesser’s activities. His wife, Proscovia
Kampire Nzabanita, pled guilty to making a false statement to an FBI agent during the course of
the bureau’s investigation of her husband.457 In May 2011, Jesse Curtis Morton (aka Younus
Mohammad), a onetime Brooklyn resident and co-founder of the extremist group Revolution
Muslim, was also charged with threatening the writers of South Park online. He and Chesser
allegedly cooperated in drafting an “clarification statement” regarding Chesser’s initial postings
targeting the writers of South Park. In court documents, DOJ argues that the “clarification
statement” was actually a threat.458 Morton was reportedly arrested by Moroccan officials in May
2011.459
According to the DOJ affidavit, Chesser first showed interest in Islam in 2008 and developed a
fascination with extremist views, sending Anwar al-Awlaki e-mails and receiving two replies
from the radical cleric. He also started his own YouTube.com account and operated his own blog
where he promoted violent jihad.460
(...continued)
http://www.justice.gov/usao/vae/Pressreleases/07-JulyPDFArchive/10/20100721chessernr.html; United States. v.
Zachary Adam Chesser, Affidavit, 1:10-MJ-504, U.S. District for the Eastern District of Virginia, July 21, 2010,
http://www.investigativeproject.org/documents/case_docs/1343.pdf. Hereinafter: U.S. v. Chesser, Affidavit.
454 DOJ Press Release, “Virginia Man Pleads Guilty to Providing Material Support to a Foreign Terrorist Organization
and Encouraging Violent Jihadists to Kill U.S. Citizens,” October 20, 2010, http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2010/
October/10-nsd-1174.html. Hereinafter: DOJ Press Release, “Virginia Man Pleads.”
455 DOJ Press Release, “Virginia Man Sentenced to 25 Years in Prison for Providing Material Support and Encouraging
Violent Jihadists to Kill U.S. Citizens,” February 24, 2011, http://www.fbi.gov/washingtondc/press-releases/2011/
wfo022411a.htm.
456 DOJ Press Release, “Virginia Man Pleads.”
457 DOJ Press Release, “Wife of Zachary Chesser Pleads Guilty to Making False Statement,” November 8, 2010,
http://www.fbi.gov/washingtondc/press-releases/2010/wfo110810b.htm.
458 “Muslim Convert Charged with Threats to ‘South Park’ Creators,” CNN.com, May 19, 2011, http://articles.cnn.com/
2011-05-19/justice/us.terror.charge_1_online-threats-postings-radical-islamic-group?_s=PM:CRIME. Since November
2010, Revolution Muslim has morphed into a group called “Islam Policy.”
459 “Muslim Convert Arrested in ‘South Park’ Case,” CNN.com, May 30, 2011, http://articles.cnn.com/2011-05-30/
world/us.terror.charge_1_online-threats-revolution-muslim-website?_s=PM:WORLD.
460 U.S. v. Chesser, Affidavit.
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Paul Rockwood, Jr. and Nadia Rockwood—Plot to Kill People on a
Hit List—July 2010
On July 21, 2010, Paul Rockwood, Jr., a U.S. citizen and Muslim convert, pled guilty to making
false statements to the FBI in connection with a terrorism investigation. On the same day,
Rockwood’s wife, Nadia Rockwood, also pled guilty to making false statements related to her
husband’s case.
According to DOJ, Paul Rockwood, Jr. converted to Islam in late 2001 or early 2002 while living
in Virginia and followed the teachings of radical cleric Anwar al-Awlaki.461 They allege that after
he moved to Alaska in 2006, he visited websites to research explosive components, construction
of remote triggering devices, such as cell phones, and construction of bombs to be delivered by
common mail carriers. Authorities also said that in late 2009, he began discussing using mail
bombs and possibly killing targets by gunshot to the head. They said that by early this year, he
had formalized his list of targets for execution.”462
Paul Rockwood received the maximum sentence of eight years in prison, consistent with his plea
agreement. His wife was allowed to return to the United Kingdom and serve five years of
probation there and may not return to the United States without prior approval.463
Mohamed Alessa and Carlos Almonte—Attempted Travel to
Somalia To Fight—June 2010
On June 5, 2010, two New Jersey residents Mohamed Alessa (a U.S. citizen from a Palestinian
Americanfamily) and Carlos Almonte (a Dominican Americanand Muslim convert)—were
arrested at JFK in New York prior to boarding separate flights to Egypt. Authorities allege the two
had hoped to eventually link up with al-Shabaab in Somalia.464 The following day, they were
charged with conspiracy to kill Americans abroad. They are alleged to have vowed to “slice up”
troops in “a thousand pieces,” according to the criminal complaint which cites conversations
secretly recorded by a NYPD undercover officer.465 In March 2011, the duo pled guilty to
conspiring to murder individuals overseas on behalf of al-Shabaab.466
461 DOJ Press Release, “Alaska Man Pleads Guilty to Making False Statements in Domestic Terrorism Investigation,
Spouse Pleads Guilty to Making False Statements,” July 21, 2010, http://anchorage.fbi.gov/dojpressrel/pressrel10/
ak072110.htm.
462 Mary Pemberton, “Alaska Couple Accused of Terrorism Pleads Guilty to Charges of Lying About Alleged Hit
List,” Associated Press, July 21, 2010, http://www.newser.com/article/d9h3qhh80/alaska-couple-accused-of-terrorism-
pleads-guilty-to-charges-of-lying-about-alleged-hit-list.html#ixzz0wOUH9tRq.
463 Colleen Kelly, “Alaskan Couple in Domestic Terrorism Plot Sentenced, ktva.com (Anchorage, Alaska), August 23,
2010, http://www.ktva.com/ci_15870578
464 Richard Esposito, “Terror Raids at JFK Airport Net American Alleged Terror Plotters Headed for Somalia,” ABC
News, June 6, 2010, http://abcnews.go.com/Blotter/terror-raids-jfk-airport-net-alleged-terror-plotters/story?id=
10839045.
465 U.S. v. Mohamed Alessa and Carlos E. Almonte, Criminal Complaint, Magistrate No. 10-8109 (MCA), U.S. District
Court, District of New Jersey, June 4, 2010, p. 11, http://www.scribd.com/doc/32643121/US-v-Alessa-and-Almonte.
Hereinafter: U.S. v. Alessa and Almonte, Criminal Complaint.
466 DOJ Press Release, “Two New Jersey Men Plead Guilty to Conspiring to Kill Overseas for Designated Foreign
Terrorist Organization al Shabaab,” March 3, 2011, http://www.fbi.gov/newark/press-releases/2011/nk030311.htm.
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Law enforcement interest in Alessa and Almonte began when an e-mail tip was received by the
FBI on October 9, 2006. It suggested that the two young men were engaged in radical behavior,
perusing jihadist websites, and discussing terrorist activity.467 They were then monitored by
authorities for the next four years. Initially it was unclear whether the pair was just engaged in
radical talk or actually planning for violent jihad. However, in 2007, the two traveled to Jordan
where they wanted to be recruited to fight in Iraq, but were rejected and “were upset at the
individuals who failed to recruit them.”468 By 2009, the case included an undercover investigator
from the NYPD interacting with the two suspects.469
In the criminal complaint, the two allegedly participated in several activities that had officials
concerned that they were moving further from radicalization to violent extremism. This included
lifting weights and rehearsing combat techniques using paintball guns, and gathering equipment,
including tactical-brand flashlights and combat boots, among other things.470 According to
officials, when the duo booked separate flights in June 2010 to Egypt, they were arrested because
they were preparing to leave the country to fight overseas.471
Faisal Shahzad—Attempted Car Bombing in Times Square, New
York City—May 1, 2010
On May 1, 2010, Faisal Shahzad—a naturalized U.S. citizen born in Pakistan—parked his Nissan
Pathfinder sport utility vehicle (SUV) containing a crude incendiary device along West 45th Street
near Times Square in New York City. A t-shirt vendor in the area observed smoke coming from
the vehicle and alerted police. The device within the SUV did not explode or ignite and was
subsequently rendered safe by the New York City Police bomb squad.472
Shahzad was arrested three days later at JFK after he had boarded an Emirates Air flight bound
for Dubai. At a news conference to announce the arrest, Attorney General Eric Holder stated “[i]t
was clear that the intent behind this terrorist act was to kill Americans.” Law enforcement
officials reported that the information that led to Shahzad’s arrest centered on evidence gathered
about the sale of the Nissan Pathfinder that was used in the attempted attack. Police discovered
that Shahzad had purchased the vehicle through an Internet listing. Although he gave the seller a
false name, police were able to trace back to him a disposable cell phone number that he also
gave the seller.473
467 Peter Finn and Jerry Markon, “New Jersey Men Arrested Are Latest From U.S. Tied to Terrorist Groups ”
Washington Post, June 7, 2010, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/06/06/
AR2010060600418.html. Hereinafter: Finn and Markon, June 7, 2010.
468 Ibid.
469 Ted Sherman, “FBI Followed Every Move of Two N.J. Terror Suspects for Years, Culminating in Airport Arrests,”
Star-Ledger, June 13, 2010, http://www.nj.com/news/index.ssf/2010/06/authorities_followed_every_mov.html.
470 Ibid, pp. 8-9.
471 Finn and Markon, June 7, 2020.
472 New York City Police Department (NYPD) Counterterrorism Bureau, “Times Square Car Bomb,” May 2, 2010.
473 Anne E. Kornblut, Jerry Markon, and Spencer Hsu, “U.S. Citizen from Pakistan Arrested in Times Square Bomb
Case.” The Washington Post, May 4, 2010, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/05/03/
AR2010050300847.html.
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On June 21, 2010, Shahzad pled guilty to 10 terrorism charges that were contained in a
superseding indictment handed down by a grand jury in New York and which added five
additional counts to the original May 5, 2010, indictment.474 He was charged with attempting to
use a weapon of mass destruction, acts of terrorism transcending national boundaries, use of a
destructive device in connection with criminal violence, transporting and receiving explosives,
and damaging and destroying property by means of fire.475 Since his arrest, DOJ reports that
Shahzad has not only admitted his role in the plot, but continued to cooperate with authorities,
and provided valuable intelligence.476
Shortly after the failed attack, the Pakistan Taliban group Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP)
claimed responsibility in a message on an audiotape posted on the Internet.477 Days later, U.S.
officials said that investigators had developed evidence to support the TTP claim.478 Pakistani
authorities have arrested or detained at least 13 people in Pakistan in connection with the case.
One of those arrested was reported to have provided an “independent stream” of evidence that the
Pakistani Taliban was behind the attempt and has admitted to helping Faisal Shahzad travel into
Pakistan’s tribal belt for bomb training.479
In the courtroom where he pled guilty, Shahzad admitted to having received explosives training
from the TTP at a camp in Pakistan’s Waziristan region.480 However the device found inside the
Nissan Pathfinder was crudely constructed. It consisted of three 20-gallon propane tanks, 152 M-
88 (consumer-grade) fireworks, one 4-foot by 2-foot metal gun locker filled with 250 pounds of
urea-based fertilizer, and two alarm clocks connected by wires.481 The fertilizer was inert and not
usable as an explosive. Had the device been viable, police say it could have produced a
“significant fireball” and sprayed shrapnel with enough force to kill pedestrians and knock out
windows in the crowded theater district in midtown Manhattan.482
It has been reported that no plea deal in exchange for Shahzad’s guilty plea was made by the U.S.
government in the case. The U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of New York released a letter
sent to Shahzad’s attorneys making it clear that there was no plea deal and that their client would
474 Benjamin Weiser, “Guilty Plea in Times Square Bomb Plot,” New York Times, June 21, 2010.
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/22/nyregion/22terror.html. Hereinafter: Weiser, June 21, 2010.
475 United States of America vs. Faisal Shahzad, Criminal Complaint 10 MAG 928, U.S. District Court, Southern
District of New York, May 5, 2010, http://www.cbsnews.com/htdocs/pdf/shahzad.pdf.
476 See “Times Square Suspect Charged, Admits Role in Failed Attack, ” wync.com, May 4, 2010.
http://www.wnyc.org/news/articles/154447; and DOJ Press Release, “Faisal Shahzad To Appear In Manhattan Court,”
May 18, 2010, http://www.justice.gov/usao/nys/pressreleases/May10/shahzadfaisalcourtpr.pdf.
477 NEFA Report, May 2010.
478 Anne Kornblut and Karin Brulliard, “U.S. Blames Pakistani Taliban For Times Square Bomb Plot,” The Washington
Post, May 10, 2010, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/05/09/AR2010050901143.html.
479 Greg Miller, “Pakistan Arrests Man With Militant Ties Who Says He Aided Times Square Bomb Suspect” The
Washington Post, May 14, 2010, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/05/13/
AR2010051305032.html.
480 “Times Square Suspect Had Explosives Training, Documents Say” CNN.com, May 5, 2010, http://edition.cnn.com/
2010/CRIME/05/04/new.york.car.bomb/?hpt=T2.
481 Nine Eleven Finding Answers (NEFA) Foundation, “The 2007 London and 2010 Times Square Bomb Plots,” May
2010, http://www.nefafoundation.org/miscellaneous/londontimesq0510.pdf. Hereinafter: NEFA Report, May 2010.
482 Tom Hays and Colleen Long, “NYC Bomb Suspect Nabbed Aboard Dubai-bound plane, Associated Press, in
standard.net, May 4, 2010, http://www.standard.net/topics/crime/2010/05/02/nyc-bomb-suspect-nabbed-aboard-dubai-
bound-plane.
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face a mandatory life term, the maximum sentence in this case. Shahzad is scheduled to be
sentenced in October 2010.483
Two other individuals have been indicted in connection with this terrorist plot:
• Mohammad Younis, of Long Island, NY, was arrested in September 2010 and
accused of operating an unlicensed money transmitting business which provided
funds to Faisal Shahzad. There are no allegations, however, that Younis was
aware of the intended use of the money. In the indictment, he was charged with
operating an unlicensed money transfer business between the United States and
Pakistan and conspiracy to operate an unlicensed money transfer business. In
August 2011, he pled guilty to the former charge.484
• Aftab Ali, a Pakistani citizen residing in Watertown, MA, was charged in a
criminal complaint in November 2010 with immigration fraud and making false
statements.485 The complaint alleges that Ali entered the United States in August
2009 and began working at a gas station without obtaining a work permit. It also
alleges that Ali provided $4,900 to Shahzad in February 2010 as part of a
hawala486 transaction in which Ali’s family in Pakistan received an equivalent
amount of money in Pakistan. The complaint does not allege that Ali was aware
of the intended use of the $4,900 by Shahzad. In April 2011, Ali pled guilty to
charges of unlicensed money transmitting and immigration document fraud. He
was sentenced to time served and ordered to be deported.487
Colleen LaRose (“Jihad Jane”)—Conspiracy to Kill and Material
Support to Terrorism—March 2010
On March 4, 2010, a Pennsylvania woman, Colleen LaRose, was charged with providing material
support to terrorism, conspiracy to commit murder outside the United States, lying to federal
agents, and transferring a U.S. passport for the purposes of facilitating a terrorist act.488 LaRose
483 Weiser, June 21, 2010.
484 Chad Bray, “Plea in Bomb-Link Case,” Wall Street Journal, August 19, 2011, http://online.wsj.com/article/
SB10001424053111903596904576516790620314306.html; U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of New
York, Press Release, “Manhattan U.S. Attorney Charges Long Island Man with Engaging in Hawala Activity That
Funded Attempted Times Square Bomber,” September 15, 2010, http://newyork.fbi.gov/dojpressrel/pressrel10/
nyfo091510a.htm.
485 DOJ Press Resease, “Pakistani Man Charged with Immigration Fraud and False Statements,” November 16, 2010,
http://boston.fbi.gov/dojpressrel/pressrel10/bs111610.htm
486 Hawala is an alternative or parallel remittance system. It exists and operates outside of, or parallel to ‘traditional’
banking or financial channels. It was developed in India, before the introduction of western banking practices, and is
currently a major remittance system used around the world The components of hawala that distinguish it from other
remittance systems are trust and the extensive use of connections such as family relationships or regional affiliations.
Unlike traditional banking, Hawala makes minimal (often no) use of any sort of negotiable instrument. Transfers of
money take place based on communications between members of a network of hawaladars, or hawala dealers. See
Interpol, “The Hawala Alternative Remittance System and its Role in Money Laundering, January 2000,
http://www.interpol.int/public/financialcrime/moneylaundering/hawala/default.asp.
487 DOJ Press Release, “Pakistani Man Sentenced on Unlicensed Money Transmitting and Immigration Fraud
Charges,” April 12, 2011, http://www.fbi.gov/boston/press-releases/2011/pakistani-man-sentenced-on-unlicensed-
money-transmitting-charges-and-immigration-fraud.
488 United States vs. Colleen R. LaRose, Grand Jury Indictment in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of
(continued...)
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was arrested in October 2009, but her case was kept under seal. She is alleged to have used the
Internet to recruit others to “wage violent jihad” where she was known by the aliases, “Jihad
Jane” and “Fatima LaRose.” She has also been tied to a plot to assassinate a Swedish cartoonist
who depicted the prophet Muhammad atop the body of a dog.489 In February 2011, LaRose pled
guilty to guilty “to all counts of a superseding indictment charging her with conspiracy to provide
material support to terrorists, conspiracy to kill in a foreign country, making false statements, and
attempted identity theft.”490
Three others have been publicly linked to the case. In March 2011, a Colorado woman, Jamie
Paulin-Ramirez, pled guilty to one count of conspiracy to provide material support to
terrorists.491 According to the indictment, LaRose recruited Paulin-Ramirez to join the plot to kill
the Swedish cartoonist and invited her to Europe to attend a “training camp.”492 Mohammed
Khalid—a citizen of Pakistan, a U.S. lawful permanent resident, and a minor at the time of his
reported arrest—also allegedly conspired with LaRose as did Algerian national Ali Damache.
Damache resided in Ireland at the time of his arrest.493 As part of his alleged support role, Khalid
hid a U.S. passport that LaRose had stolen and was purportedly asked by Damache to recruit
supporters online. DOJ further asserts that “Paulin-Ramirez married Damache on the day she
arrived with her minor child in Europe to live and train with jihadists, even though she had never
met Damache in person.”494
Five Northern Virginian Men Convicted of Terrorism Offenses in
Pakistan—December 2009
Five men from Northern Virginia were convicted of terrorism charges on June 24, 2010, by a
special Pakistani anti-terrorism court and sentenced to 10 years in prison.495 They were arrested in
Sarghoda (near Lahore), Pakistan, in December 2009, where they are alleged to have traveled
hoping to work with jihadist groups and battle U.S. troops in Afghanistan. Prosecutors say they
(...continued)
Pennsylvania, filed March 4, 2010, pp. 3-4, http://intelfiles.egoplex.com/2010-03-04-LaRose-Indictment.pdf
489 Charlie Savage, “Pennsylvania Woman Tied to Plot on Cartoonist,” New York Times, March 9, 2010,
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/10/us/10pennsylvania.html
490 DOJ Press Release, “Pennsylvania Woman Pleads Guilty in Plot to Recruit Violent Jihadist Fighters and to Commit
Murder Overseas,” February 1, 2011, http://www.fbi.gov/philadelphia/press-releases/2011/ph020111.htm; Derrick
Nunnally et al., “’Jihad Jane’ Said to Have Confessed, Philly.com, March 18, 2010, http://www.philly.com/philly/news/
breaking/88307227.html
491 DOJ Press Release, “Colorado Woman Pleads Guilty to Conspiracy to Provide Material Support to Terrorists,”
March 8, 2011, http://www.fbi.gov/philadelphia/press-releases/2011/ph030811.htm.
492 Michael Hinkelman, “Mum’s the Word: Accused Jihadist Nods Her ‘Not Guilty,’” Philadelphia Daily News, April
8, 2010, http://nl.newsbank.com/nl-search/we/Archives?p_action=doc&p_docid=12EF67E54DA7CDC8&p_docnum=1
493 DOJ Press Release, “Two Indicted for Conspiracy to Provide Material Support to Terrorists,” October 20, 2011,
http://www.fbi.gov/philadelphia/press-releases/2011/two-indicted-for-conspiracy-to-provide-material-support-to-
terrorists?utm_campaign=email-Immediate&utm_medium=email&utm_source=fbi-in-the-news&utm_content=39253.
Hereinafter: DOJ Press Release, October 20, 2011. John Shiffman, “Teen Tied to Jihad Jane Allegedly Plotted School
Shooting,” Philadelphia Inquirer, August 28, 2011, , http://articles.philly.com/2011-08-28/news/29938534_1_jihad-
jane-mohammed-terror-cases.
494 DOJ Press Release, October 20, 2011.
495 Shaig Hussain and Brigid Schulte, “5 N.Va. Men Convicted on Terrorism Charges in Pakistan, Given 10 years in
Prison,” The Washington Post, June 25, 2010, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/06/24/
AR2010062400843.html?hpid=topnews
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were in the planning stages of attacks against a Pakistani nuclear plant, an air base, and other
targets in Afghanistan as well as “territories of the United States.”496 Police reportedly recovered
jihadist literature, laptop computers, and maps of parts of Pakistan when the men were arrested
near Lahore. The maps included areas where the Taliban train.
The story of the five men from the Alexandria, Virginia area—Uman Chaudhry, Ramy
Zamzam, Ahmad A. Minni, Waqar Khan, and Aman Hassan Yemer—became public when
the Council on American-Islamic Relations got their families in touch with the FBI after the five
left the United States without telling their families. The men were arrested at the home of
Chaudhry’s father, Khalid Farooq Chaudhry, and the terror allegations began immediately.497
Attorneys for the men mounted an aggressive defense contending that the five were tortured by
Pakistani jailers.498 In addition, they allege that police in Pakistan fabricated incriminating
evidence.499
The motives for the group’s trip to Pakistan are unclear. Zamzam claimed in a Pakistani court that
the young men were in the country for jihad, not terrorism, and wanted to provide medical and
financial assistance to Afghan Muslims.500 The group reportedly met with representatives from
two militant organizations, Jaish-e-Muhammad (tied to Al Qaeda) and Jamaat-ud-Dawa.501 They
were arrested in a house allegedly tied to Jaish-e-Muhammad after failing to link up with any
terrorists. It has been reported that the two groups they approached rejected them because they
lacked references from other trusted terrorists.502 According to a news report citing Pakistani
investigators, the five communicated online and visited websites that included footage of reputed
terrorist attacks on U.S. forces in Afghanistan. Families, neighbors, and friends of the five young
men are reported to have had difficulty believing that the five had tried to link up with terrorist
groups.503
Al-Shabaab Minnesota Recruits—2007-2011
“Operation Rhino,” is an ongoing FBI investigation of al-Shabaab-related recruitment of
individuals in Minnesota—the Minneapolis area has the largest community of Somali Americans
496 Jerry Markon, et.al, “Pakistan Charges 5 Northern Virginia Men in Alleged Terrorism Plot,” The Washington Post,
March 18, 2010, p. A1. http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/03/17/
AR2010031700430_pf.html
497 Ibid.
498 Ibid.
499 Saeed Shah, “American Jihadi Suspects ‘Set Up’ by Police, Say Lawyers,” The Guardian (London), April 11, 2010,
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/apr/11/us-pakistan-jihadi-suspects-set-up
500 Kamran Haider, “Pakistani Court Rejects Americans’ Bail Request,” Reuters, February 17, 2010,
http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE61F1IQ20100217; “Americans Detained in Pakistan Defend ‘Jihad’ Plans,”
USA Today, January 4, 2010, http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/2010-01-03-pakistan-americans-court_N.htm.
501 Waqar Gillani, “Pakistani Court Approves Arrests of 5 Americans,” New York Times, December 16, 2009,
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/16/world/asia/16inquire.html.
502 Margaret Neighbour, “Al-Qaeda ‘Rejected US Muslims Because They Lacked References,’” The Scotsman,
December 11, 2009, http://news.scotsman.com/world/AlQaeda-39rejected-US-Muslims.5903482.jp; Lolita C. Baldor,
“Americans Held in Pakistan Straddled 2 Worlds,” The Guardian, December 12, 2009, (AP),
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/feedarticle/8854274. Hereinafter: Baldor, December 12, 2009.
503 Baldor, December 12, 2009.
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in the United States.504 Reportedly, some of individuals indicted in the case began their terrorism-
related activities in 2007, around the time al-Shabaab stepped up its insurgency against Somalia’s
transitional government and its Ethiopian supporters. The Minnesota recruits who traveled to
Somalia received weapons training alongside individuals from other countries, including Britain,
Australia, Sweden and Canada.505 The indicted American recruits face a variety of accusations
including recruiting and raising funds for the trips, engaging in terrorist acts in Somalia, and
perjury. Nine individuals have been arrested by U.S. or foreign law enforcement. Five defendants
have pled guilty to charges.506
Documents associated with the ongoing federal investigation into the recruitment of these
individuals from the Minneapolis area reveal the importance of a local al-Shabaab support
network that provided the organization financing and foot soldiers. It included older individuals
who helped in the radicalization process and aided in supplying the young men with equipment
and money to go to Somalia. At least five individuals appear to have played important roles:507
• In July 2011, Omer Abdi Mohamed pled guilty to conspiring to provide
material support to a conspiracy to murder, kidnap, and maim abroad. Among his
activities, he helped some recruits obtain airplane tickets.508
• In October 2011, two women, Amina Ali and Hawo Hassan, were convicted as
part of a scheme to raise money for al-Shabaab by soliciting funds door-to-door
and via teleconferences. According to DOJ, in some instances, Ali raised money
by misleading donors into believing the funds were destined for “the poor and
needy.”509 Ali and Hassan are both naturalized U.S. citizens from Somalia.510
• Mahamud Said Omar is a Somali citizen who was granted permanent U.S.
resident status in 1994. He is accused of providing money to young men to travel
from Minneapolis to Somalia to train with and fight for al-Shabaab. He also
allegedly visited an al-Shabaab safe house and provided hundreds of dollars to
504 DOJ Press Release, “Minneapolis Man Pleads Guilty to Terrorism Offense,” July 18, 2011, http://www.fbi.gov/
minneapolis/press-releases/2011/minneapolis-man-pleads-guilty-to-terrorism-offense. Hereinafter: DOJ Press Release,
July 18, 2011. DOJ Press Release, “Fourteen Charged with Providing Material Support to Somalia-Based Terrorist
Organization,” August 5, 2010, http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2010/August/10-ag-898.html. Hereinafter: DOJ Press
Release, August 5, 2010; DOJ Press Release, “Terror Charges Unsealed Against Eight Defendants,” November 23,
2009, http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2009/November/09-nsd-1267.html. Hereinafter: DOJ Press Release, November
23, 2009.
505 Anti-Defamation League (ADL), “Al Shabaab’s American Recruits: Introduction,” June 7, 2010,
http://www.adl.org/main_Terrorism/al_shabaab_american_recruits.htm. Hereinafter: ADL, All Shabaab’s American
Recruits.
506 DOJ Press Release, “Fourteen Charged”; “Netherlands Terror Suspect Fights U.S. Extradition,” Associated Press in
FOXNews.com, February 22, 2010, http://www.foxnews.com/world/2010/02/22/netherlands-terror-suspect-fights-
extradition/.
507 Raffaello Pantucci, “American Jihad: New Details Emerge About al-Shabaab Recruitment in North America,” The
Jamestown Foundation, December 3, 2009, http://www.jamestown.org/programs/gta/
single/?tx_ttnews[tt_news]=35797&cHash=f6e78a6e93.
508 DOJ Press Release, July 18, 2011.
509 DOJ Press Release, “Two Minnesota Women Convicted of Providing Material Support to al Shabaab,” October 20,
2011, http://www.fbi.gov/minneapolis/press-releases/2011/two-minnesota-women-convicted-of-providing-material-
support-to-al-shabaab?utm_campaign=email-Immediate&utm_medium=email&utm_source=minneapolis-press-
releases&utm_content=39314; DOJ Press Release, August 5, 2010.
510 Ibid.
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fund the purchase of AK-47 rifles for the men.511 Omar was held in a high-
security Dutch prison after his arrest at the request of the U.S. government in
November 2009. In May 2010, a Rotterdam District Court ruled that Omar may
be extradited to the United States.512 He appeared in U.S. federal court in August
2011.513
• Abdiweli Yassin Isse is a legal resident of the United States. An October 9,
2009, criminal complaint charged Isse with encouraging others to travel to
Somalia to fight Ethiopians. At a gathering of co-conspirators, he purportedly
described his plans to wage jihad against Ethiopians. He also raised money to
buy airplane tickets for others to make the trip to Somalia for the same purpose.
In raising that money, he allegedly misled community members into thinking
they were contributing money to send young men to Saudi Arabia to study the
Quran.514
• Cabdulaahi Ahmed Faarax is a Somali-born naturalized U.S. citizen. An
affidavit filed in support of an October 9, 2009, criminal complaint states that in
the fall of 2007, Faarax attended a meeting with co-conspirators at a Minneapolis
residence, where he encouraged others to travel to Somalia to fight and told them
how he had experienced true brotherhood while fighting a jihad in Somalia.515 He
detailed his own experiences in guerilla combat and reassured his listeners that it
was fun and not to be afraid. He further underscored that recruits would get the
chance to use firearms.516
There is some suggestion that interest among young U.S. citizens in joining al-Shabaab may be
waning from a high point in 2007-2008 as reports of recruits who had died in terrorist actions
reached U.S. Somali communities.517 The Director of the National Counterterrorism Center has
told Congress that at least seven Americans have been killed in fighting in Somalia.518 In October
2008, Shirwa Ahmed, 27, a college student from Minneapolis, became the first known American
suicide bomber when he drove an explosives-laden truck into a government building in Somalia,
one of five simultaneous attacks that killed 22 U.N. aid workers and others.519 Additionally,
Farah Mohamed Beledi was identified as a suicide bomber who died as he tried to detonate his
suicide vest in a May 2011 attack in Mogadishu, Somalia.520 Also, according to media reports, al-
511 DOJ Press Release, November 23, 2009.
512 “Terror Suspect’s Extradition to the U.S. to be Appealed,” Associated Press, June 1, 2010, http://www.google.com/
hostednews/ap/article/ALeqM5heU1OoqeTWyr3O1YtURr-yIeZv8QD9G2J1QG1.
513 DOJ Press Release, “Man Extradited from Netherlands Appears in Federal Court on Charges of Supporting
Terrorists,” August 15, 2011, http://www.fbi.gov/minneapolis/press-releases/2011/man-extradited-from-netherlands-
appears-in-federal-court-on-charges-of-supporting-terrorists.
514 DOJ Press Release, November 23, 2009.
515 Ibid.
516 Criminal Complaint, U.S. v.Cabdulaahi Ahmed Faarax and Abdiweli Yassin Isse, (D. Minn. 2009). See Dina
Temple-Raston, “Jihadi Cool: Terrorist Recruiters’ Latest Weapon,” National Public Radio, March 26, 2010,
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=125186382&ft=1&f=1001.
517 Eric Schmitt, “Islamic Extremist Group Recruits Americans for Civil War, Not Jihad,” New York Times, June 6,
2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/07/nyregion/07shabaab.html.
518 “The Threat from Somalia,” The Washington Post, November 2, 2009. http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/
content/article/2009/11/01/AR2009110101774.html.
519 DOJ Press Release, November 23, 2009.
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Shabaab has claimed that Abdisalan Hussein Ali purportedly blew himself up while attacking
African Union troops in Mogadishu in October 2011.521
Nidal Malik Hasan—Fort Hood, Texas, Shooting—November 5,
2009
A mass shooting took place on November 5, 2009, at the Soldier Readiness Center at the U.S.
Army’s Fort Hood, located outside Killeen, TX. Thirteen people were killed and 43 others were
wounded or injured.522 In July 2011, Fort Hood’s commander ordered a court-martial for Hasan,
who may also face the death penalty if convicted of premeditated murder and attempted
premeditated murder charges.523
The accused perpetrator is Nidal Malik Hasan, a U.S. Army major who was serving as a
psychiatrist. He is reported to have fired 100 rounds at soldiers processing through cubicles in the
center. He was seriously wounded in an exchange of gunfire during the incident. Hasan was
armed with an FN FiveseveN® 5.7 millimeter pistol524 and an older model Smith and Wesson
.357 revolver. However, law enforcement officials do not believe the latter gun was fired by
Hasan.525
Hasan is the son of Palestinian immigrants and was born and grew up in Virginia.526 He is
reported to have expressed radical beliefs on several occasions during his Army career. In a 2007
presentation to Walter Reed physicians, Hasan said that the Army should allow Muslim soldiers
to claim conscientious objector status to forgo fighting other Muslims. However, there is no
record of disciplinary action having been taken by the U.S. Army nor did they ever consider him
unfit for duty or a security threat. A Pentagon review found that officers failed to comply with
applicable policies in Hasan’s career evaluations.527
(...continued)
520 FBI Press Release, “FBI Announces Identity of Transitional Federal Government Checkpoint Suicide Bomber,”
June 9, 2011, http://www.fbi.gov/minneapolis/press-releases/2011/fbi-announces-identity-of-transitional-federal-
government-checkpoint-suicide-bomber.
521 Josh Kron, “American Identified as Bomber in Attack on African Union in Somalia,” New York Times, October 30,
2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/31/world/africa/shabab-identify-american-as-bomber-in-somalia-attack.html.
522 Department of Defense (DOD), Report of the DOD Independent Review, Protecting the Force: Lessons from Fort
Hood, January 2010, p. 1.
523 Jeremy Schwartz, “Hasan To Face Court-Martial, Possible Death Penalty,” Austin American-Statesman, July 6,
2011, http://www.statesman.com/blogs/content/shared-gen/blogs/austin/blotter/entries/2011/07/06/
hasan_to_face_courtmartial_pos.html; Manny Fernandez, “Major Is Arraigned in Fort Hood Killings,” New York
Times, July 20, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/21/us/21hood.html.
524 The FN Five-seveN® single-action autoloading pistol is designed and manufactured in Belgium by FN Herstal. It
fires the low-recoil 5.7x28mm cartridge.
525 “Ft. Hood Shooter Nidal Hasan Used Private, Legally-Bought Pistol—Not Military Weapon—in Rampage,”
Associated Press in New York Daily News, November 7, 2009. http://www.nydailynews.com/news/national/2009/11/
07/2009-11-07_ft_hood_shooter_nidal_hasan_used_private_legallybought_pistol__not_military_weap.html.
526 Elisabeth Bumiller and Scott Shane, “Pentagon Report on Fort Hood Details Failures, New York Times, January 16,
2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/16/us/politics/16hasan.html.
527 William H. McMichael, “Review of Ft. Hood Slayings Faults Hasan’s Supervisors,” Army Times, January 25, 2010.
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The FBI discovered e-mail correspondence between Hasan and Anwar al-Awlaki, a radical Imam
accused of recruiting for Al Qaeda. Over the course of several months, Hasan sent 16 e-mails to
Awlaki (who reportedly replied to only two of them). The e-mail exchange was assessed by
investigators to be in line with the psychiatrist’s research into Muslim U.S. soldiers’ reactions to
the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.528 After the Fort Hood shootings, Awlaki issued a statement
dubbing him a hero but denying that he had incited Hasan.529
David Headley—Plots to Attack Offices of Newspaper in
Copenhagen and Support Mumbai Terrorist Attacks—October 2009
On March 18, 2010, David Coleman Headley pled guilty to numerous criminal charges including
a plot to attack employees of the Jyllands-Posten newspaper in Copenhagen, Denmark; helping
plan the 2008 Mumbai terrorist attack; and providing material support to Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT),
a militant Pakistani Islamist group. As part of the plea agreement, prosecutors would not pursue
the death penalty against him if he cooperates with law enforcement and intelligence officials.530
Headley was born Daood Sayed Gilani in Washington, DC, to a Pakistani father and an American
mother. He reportedly changed his Muslim name to a Judeo-Christian name to hide his Muslim
identity. Arrested in October 2009, Headley allegedly attended LeT terrorism training camps in
Pakistan in 2002 and 2003 and also conducted extensive surveillance for both the Copenhagen
and Mumbai plots. In late 2005 a LeT handler and another LeT-linked individual conspired with
Headley to have him perform advanced surveillance and scouting for the Mumbai attacks. The
LeT personnel discussed the idea of opening an immigration office in Mumbai as cover for his
scouting activities. Using the sham office as cover, between September 2006 and July 2008,
Headley made five trips to the city, photographed and videotaped potential targets following the
instructions of LeT. He also received an additional $3,000 and a GPS device from LeT. In
November 2008, LeT attacked Mumbai targets killing 164 individuals.531
Headley was also involved in a plot to attack the facilities of Danish newspaper, Morgenavisen
Jyllands-Posten. The plot involved attacking an editor and a cartoonist involved in the publication
of controversial editorial cartoons depicting the Prophet Muhammad which sparked protests
throughout the Muslim world. Headley met with an LeT member in Pakistan in 2008 to discuss
surveillance of the newspaper. In January 2009 he cased the newspaper and met with its
528 David Tarrant, “Suspects in Dallas Plot, Fort Hood Shootings Were on FBI’s Radar, But Only One Was Taken
Down,” The Dallas Morning News, November 22, 2009, http://www.dallasnews.com/sharedcontent/dws/news/
texassouthwest/stories/112209dnentlonewolf.450512f.html.
529 Andy Soltis, “Fiend Laughed 4 Times, but Not Last,” New York Post, October, 1, 2011, http://www.nypost.com/p/
news/international/fiend_laughed_times_but_not_last_e2Gf2P0zP0luSuiX1K8tgP.
530 Carrie Johnson, “U.S. Citizen, David Coleman Headley Admits Role in Mumbai Attacks,” The Washington Post,
March 19, 2010, p. A16. http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/03/18/AR2010031805407.html.
531 DOJ Press Release, “Two Chicago Men Charged in Connection with Alleged Roles in Foreign Terror Plot That
Focused on Targets in Denmark,” October 27, 2009, http://chicago.fbi.gov/dojpressrel/pressrel09/cg102709.htm; DOJ
Press Release, “Chicagoan David Headley Charged with Conspiracy in 2008 Mumbai Attacks in Addition to Foreign
Terror Plot in Denmark,” December 7, 2009, http://www.justice.gov/usao/iln/pr/chicago/2009/pr1207_01.pdf; DOJ
Press Release, “Chicagoans Tahawwur Rana and David Headley Indicted for Alleged Roles in India and Denmark
Terrorism Conspiracies: Ilyas Kashmiri and Retired Pakistani Major Charged in Denmark Plot,” January 14, 2010,
http://www.justice.gov/usao/iln/pr/chicago/2010/pr0114_01.pdf. Hereinafter: DOJ Press Releases, dated October 27,
2009; December 7, 2009; and January 14, 2010.
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representatives. In July and August 2009, he met in Europe with contacts of Ilyas Kashmiri, a
member of a terrorist organization in Pakistan, to conduct additional surveillance.532
Three others alleged to have collaborated with Headley have been charged by U.S. authorities in
the Mumbai and Copenhagen plots:
• Tahawwur Hussain Rana is a Canadian citizen who immigrated from Pakistan,
was trained as a physician, and resided in Chicago until his arrest in October
2009. According to Headley’s plea agreement, he shared with Rana—a longtime
friend—details of his trips to Pakistan and his association with LeT.533 In turn,
Rana helped Headley disguise his surveillance activity in India.534 Rana also
provided cover for Headley’s reconnaissance work in Denmark.535 In June 2011,
Rana was convicted of conspiracy in the Danish plot and for providing material
support to LeT. However, he was acquitted of involvement in the Mumbai plot.536
• Ilyas Kashmiri was killed in June 2011, reportedly in a missile strike by a U.S.
unmanned aerial vehicle.537 He had been a leader of Harakat-ul Jihad Islami a
terrorist organization in Pakistan and was believed to be in contact with Al Qaeda
leaders. In February 2009, he allegedly met with Headley in Waziristan. He also
purportedly reviewed Headley’s Denmark surveillance footage and suggested the
use of a truck bomb. According to DOJ, he met with Headley again in May 2009
and directed him to link up with his operatives in Europe. He also advised cutting
out LeT from the operation. LeT reportedly agreed.538 Kashmiri was charged in
the plots.
• Abdur Rehman Hashim Syed is a retired major in the Pakistani military and is
alleged to have coordinated Headley’s travel to Denmark and helped plan the
attack. He connected Headley with Kashmiri.539 Like Kashmiri, Syed has been
charged in the plot but is not in U.S. custody.
Apparently Headley’s life swung widely between the strictures of conservative Islam and the
wide-open excesses of the West. Born in 1960 in Washington, DC, he is the son of a Pakistani
father, Syed Saleem Gilani, who worked at the Pakistani Embassy. Headley’s mother, Serrill
Headley, a Bryn Mawr, Pennsylvania native, also worked at the embassy. Soon after
David/Daood was born, the family moved to Pakistan. But Serrill left Syed and Pakistan in 1968,
532 Ibid.
533 United States v. David Coleman Headley, Plea Agreement, 09-CR 830-3, U.S. District Court, Northern District of
Illinois (undated).
534 Ibid. See “Tahawwra Hussain Rana’s Pre-Trial Conference Tomorrow,” zeenews.com (India), March 28, 2010,
http://www.zeenews.com/news614664.html
535 DOJ Press Release, “Chicago Businessman Tahawwur Hussain Rana Guilty of Providing Material Support to Terror
Group and Supporting Role in Denmark Terrorism Conspiracy,” June 9, 2011, http://www.fbi.gov/chicago/press-
releases/2011/chicago-businessman-tahawwur-hussain-rana-guilty-of-providing-material-support-to-terror-group-and-
supporting-role-in-denmark-terrorism-conspiracy.
536 Ibid.
537 Brian Bennett, “U.S. Has Verified Al Qaeda Operative’s Death, Official Says,” July 8, 2011,
http://articles.latimes.com/2011/jul/08/world/la-fg-pakistan-kashmiri-20110708.
538 DOJ Press Releases, dated October 27, 2009; December 7, 2009; and January 14, 2010.
539 Ibid.
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because she could not abide by their conservative views of married women. She returned to
Philadelphia in the early 1970s and opened up a bar called Khyber Pass.
In 1977, after Pakistan suffered a military coup, Headley’s mother brought David/Daood back to
the United States. He struggled to fit in, at times espousing extremist views while developing a
heroin habit. In 1985, his mother made him manager of the bar she owned. He reportedly failed at
this role and his mother was forced to sell the bar. That same year, he married a bartender whom
he divorced in 1987 because of cultural differences. His wife at that time said that David/Daood
was torn between two cultures—calling Indians “infidels,” for example. A Khyber Pass employee
remembered him discussing infidels and Islam taking over the world. The Drug Enforcement
Administration (DEA) nabbed him twice (1988 and 1997) on heroin smuggling charges, and he
worked as an informant for them and served prison sentences.540
Tarek Mehanna—Plot to Assassinate Politicians and Attack
Shopping Malls—October 2009
Tarek Mehanna, a dual U.S. and Egyptian citizen,541 from the Boston suburb of Sudbury, MA,
was arrested on October 21, 2009, on charges that he plotted to kill two prominent U.S.
politicians and shoot people at American shopping malls. He was accused of conspiring with two
other men—Ahmad Abousamra, a friend from childhood who authorities say is now in Syria,
and an unnamed man who is reported to be cooperating with authorities.
Mehanna graduated from the Massachusetts College of Pharmacy in 2008 where his father is a
professor. Mehanna and his co-conspirators were said to have found inspiration in the 2002
Washington, DC, sniper attacks.542 Mehanna taught math and religion at a Muslim school in
Worcester, MA.543
Abousamra is the son of a physician who worked at Massachusetts General Hospital for 21 years
and was president of the Islamic Center of New England before moving to the Detroit area in
2007. Abousamra was named in an FBI affidavit filed on October 21, 2009, in federal court in
Boston as a conspirator with Mehanna, but was not charged. He allegedly fled to Syria three years
ago after being questioned by the FBI. The FBI affidavit alleges Abousamra tried to join a
terrorist training camp in Pakistan in 2002 and 2003, but was rejected by the Taliban because of a
“lack of experience.’’544
540 Joseph Tanfani, John Shiffman, and Kathleen Brady Shea, “American Suspect in Mumbai Attack Was DEA
Informant,” McClatchy Washington Bureau, December 14, 2009, http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2009/12/14/v-pring/
80622 american-suspect-in-mumbai-attack.html; Ginger Thompson, “A Terror Suspect With Feet in East and West,”
New York Times, November 22, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/22/us/22terror.html.
541 Denise Lavoie, “Mass. Terror Suspect Taught Kids at Muslim School,” Associated Press foreign, in guardian.co.uk,
October 21, 2009, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/feedarticle/8766970. Hereinafter: Denise Lavoie, October 21,
2009.
542 Abby Goodnough and Liz Robbins, “Mass. Man Arrested in Terrorism Case,” New York Times, October 21, 2009,
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/10/22/us/22terror.html.
543 Denise Lavoie, October 21, 2009.
544 Shelley Murphy and Milton J. Valencia, “Details Emerge on Plot Suspects,” The Boston Globe, October 23, 2009.
http://www.boston.com/news/local/massachusetts/articles/2009/10/23/details_emerge_on_plot_suspects/. Hereinafter:
Murphy and Valencia, October 23, 2009.
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Much of the case against Mehanna involves material support to terrorism.545 According to DOJ,
“Beginning in or about 2001, and continuing until in or about May 2008, Mehanna conspired
with Ahmad Abousamra, and others to provide material support and resources for use in carrying
out a conspiracy to kill, kidnap, maim or injure persons or damage property in a foreign country
and extraterritorial homicide of a U.S. national.”546 Specifically, the complaint affidavit alleges
that Mehanna and co-conspirators discussed their desire to participate in violent jihad against
American interests and that they would talk about fighting jihad and their desire to die on the
battlefield. The complaint further alleges that the co-conspirators attempted to radicalize others
and inspire each other by, among other things, watching and distributing jihadi videos.547
At the time of his 2009 arrest Mehanna was free on bail from an earlier arrest that occurred in
November 2008, at Logan International Airport in Boston. In the prior incident, he was charged
with lying to federal investigators during a 2006 interview about his ties to Daniel Maldonado,
who subsequently pled guilty to participating in terrorism training in Somalia. Maldonado is
serving a 10-year prison sentence on that charge.548 According to the complaint affidavit, the
conspirators had
multiple conversations about obtaining automatic weapons and randomly shooting people in
a shopping mall, and that the conversations went so far as to discuss the logistics of a mall
attack, including coordination, weapons needed and the possibility of attacking emergency
responders. It is alleged that the plan was ultimately abandoned, because of their inability to
obtain the automatic weapons they deemed necessary to effectively carry out the attacks.549
Hosam Smadi—Plot to Bomb a Dallas, Texas, Skyscraper—
September 2009
On September 24, 2009, Hosam Maher Husein Smadi, a Jordanian citizen who is reported to have
remained in the United States illegally for one year after his visa expired, parked an SUV packed
with what he thought were explosives outside Fountain Place, a 60-story office tower at Ross
Avenue and Field Street in Dallas, TX. When Smadi dialed a cellphone that he thought would
detonate the “truck bomb,” he was arrested by undercover FBI agents who had been posing as
fellow anti-American terrorists.
The arrest was part of an FBI sting operation that began after an agent, monitoring an online
extremist website, discovered Smadi espousing jihad against the United States. Smadi was
charged on October 7, 2009, with attempting to use a weapon of mass destruction. David Kris,
Assistant Attorney General for National Security, reported that “The Criminal complaint alleges
that Hosam Smadi sought and attempted to bomb the Fountain Place office tower, but a
coordinated undercover law enforcement action was able to thwart his efforts and ensure no one
545 U.S. Code, Title 18, Part I, Chapter 113B, Section 2339A. For more information on this statute, see CRS Report
R41333, Terrorist Material Support: An Overview of 18 U.S.C. 2339A and 2339B, by Charles Doyle.
546 DOJ Press Release, “Massachusetts Man Charged with Conspiracy to Provide Material Support to Terrorists”
October 21, 2009. http://boston.fbi.gov/dojpressrel/pressrel09/bs102109a.htm. Hereinafter: DOJ, “Massachusetts
Man.”
547 Ibid.
548 Murphy and Valencia, October 23, 2009.
549 DOJ, “Massachusetts Man.”
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was harmed.”550 Undercover FBI agents, posing as members of an Al Qaeda “sleeper cell” were
introduced to Smadi, who repeatedly indicated to them that he came to the U.S. for the specific
purpose of committing “Jihad for the sake of God.” Smadi clarified that he was interested in
“self-jihad” because it was “the best type of jihad.” The investigation determined Smadi was not
associated with other terrorist organizations.551
DOJ also claims that “undercover FBI agents repeatedly encouraged Smadi to reevaluate his
interpretation of jihad, counseling him that the obligation of jihad can be satisfied in many ways.
Every time this interaction occurred, Smadi aggressively responded that he was going to commit
significant, conspicuous acts of violence as his jihad.”552
In late August 2009, while meeting with one of the undercover FBI agents in Dallas, authorities
allege that
Smadi discussed the logistics and timing of the bombing, stating that he would have
preferred to do the attack on “11 September,” but decided to wait until after the month of
Ramadan, which ended on September 20, 2009. At the conclusion of the meeting, Smadi
decided that a vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (VBIED) would be placed at the
foundation of the Fountain Place office tower. Unbeknownst to Smadi, the FBI ensured the
VBIED contained only an inert/inactive explosive device which contained no explosive
materials.553
Dallas Mayor Tom Leppert said local authorities were notified of the operation before it
happened. “We were clearly communicated to that there was not going to be danger to
anybody.”554
On May 26, 2010, Smadi plead guilty to one count of attempted use of a weapon of mass
destruction. He was sentenced on October 20, 2010, to 24 years in prison.555
Michael Finton—Plot to Bomb the Springfield, Illinois, Federal
Building—September 2009
On September 23, 2009, Michael C. Finton, who had converted to Islam and changed his name to
Talib Islam, was arrested after he drove a van he thought was loaded with explosives—but was
actually provided to him by the FBI—to the Paul Findley Federal Building in Springfield, IL.
Prosecutors say he parked and locked the vehicle, then moved a few blocks away before twice
making cell phone calls he believed would trigger a blast that would kill or injure people inside
550 DOJ Press Release, “FBI Arrests Jordanian Citizen for Attempting to Bomb Skyscraper in Downtown Dallas,”
September 24, 2009, http://dallas.fbi.gov/dojpressrel/pressrel09/dl092409.htm.
551 Ibid
552 Ibid
553 Ibid.
554 Jason Trahon, Todd J. Gillman, and Scott Goldstein, “Dallas Bomb Plot Suspect Told Landlord He Was Moving
Out,” The Dallas Morning News, September 26, 2009, http://www.dallasnews.com/sharedcontent/dws/dn/latestnews/
stories/092409dnmetbombarrest.1b177db8b.html.
555 Jason Trahan, “Dallas Bombing Plotter Hosam Smadi Sentenced to 24 Years in Prison, The Dallas Morning News,
October 20, 2010, http://www.dallasnews.com/sharedcontent/dws/news/localnews/stories/DN-
smadi_20met.ART0.State.Edition1.33928b1.html.
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the building. In May 2011, he pled guilty to attempting to bomb the building and was sentenced
to 28 years in prison.556
Finton reportedly had converted to Islam while in an Illinois prison from 2001 to 2006, serving a
sentence for aggravated robbery and aggravated battery. He came to the attention of federal
authorities in August 2007 when a search of his vehicle turned up a letter about his dreams of
being a shahid, or martyr.
According to the affidavit filed in support of the criminal complaint, “after his arrest it was
discovered that Finton had written a letter to John Walker Lindh, an American who was captured
fighting for the Taliban and is imprisoned on terrorism violations. In a January 2008 interview
with the FBI after his release from prison on a parole violation, Finton allegedly explained that he
idolized Lindh. The affidavit further alleges that, in March 2008, Finton received funds from an
individual in Saudi Arabia that he used to travel to Saudi Arabia the following month. He returned
to the United States in May 2008.”557
In February 2009, Finton was introduced to an undercover FBI special agent posing as a low-
level Al Qaeda operative. Finton expressed his desire to receive military training at a camp and to
fight in Pakistan, Afghanistan, Somalia, or other locations. The undercover agent told Finton
several times that it was Finton’s decision and that he could walk away from the decision
anytime. According to the affidavit, Finton indicated that he was excited and had no second
thoughts about attending a camp.”558
In the ensuing months, the affidavit alleges that Finton discussed possibly targeting locations in
the United States and ultimately suggested the Paul Findley Federal Building and Courthouse in
downtown Springfield as a primary target. He conducted surveillance of the building and
proposed a remotely detonated car bomb for the attack. Further, according to the affidavit, Finton
observed that U.S. Congressman Aaron Schock’s office, located at the corner of East Monroe and
6th Streets, would be a secondary target.559
On September 1, 2009, Finton met with the undercover FBI officer and was told the vehicle for
the attack would be carrying close to one ton of explosives. According to the affidavit, Finton
indicated an awareness that the bomb would cause civilian casualties, but expressed his view that
such casualties were justified. Unbeknownst to him, the FBI ensured that the vehicle for the
attack contained no actual explosive materials.560
556 DOJ Press Release, “Illinois Man Admits Plotting to Bomb Federal Courthouse and Is Sentenced to 28 Years in
Prison,” May 9, 2011, http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2011/May/11-nsd-590.html; DOJ Press Release, “Illinois Man
Arrested in Plot to Bomb Courthouse and Murder Federal Employees Vehicle Bomb Placed at Scene Was Inactive and
Posed No Danger to Public,” September 24, 2009, http://springfield.fbi.gov/dojpressrel/2009/si092409.htm.
557 Ibid.
558 Ibid.
559 Ibid.
560 Ibid.
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Najibullah Zazi—Plot to Bomb the New York City Subway—
September 2009
Najibullah Zazi, a citizen of Afghanistan and a legal resident of the United States, has admitted
that he plotted to bomb New York City subway trains in September 2009. Zazi told investigators
that he and two friends planned to strap explosives to their bodies, board trains at the Grand
Central and Times Square stations—two of the busiest in New York City—and explode their
bombs during the crowded rush hour.561
On February 22, 2010, Zazi pled guilty to conspiracy to use weapons of mass destruction,
conspiracy to commit murder overseas, and providing material support for a terrorist
organization. There is no complete picture of Zazi’s radicalization process, but there are details
regarding his plot. In his youth, he may have listened to the radical messages of Saifur Rahman
Halimi—an Imam who advocated jihad, attended the same mosque as Zazi’s family, and lived in
the same Queens building.562 Zazi has admitted that he and others agreed to travel to Afghanistan
to join Taliban forces. In August 2008, he and others flew from Newark to Peshawar, Pakistan,
and instead of training with the Taliban, Al Qaeda recruited and trained them in the Waziristan
region of Pakistan. Al Qaeda asked Zazi and his companions to return to the United States and
engage in suicide operations.563
While training, Zazi received instruction on explosives, discussed specific targets, and took
detailed notes. He returned to the United States in January 2009 and moved to Colorado, taking a
job driving a shuttle bus at Denver International Airport. Between July and early September, he
and others purchased chemicals at beauty supply stores in Denver. Investigators suggest that Zazi
used the same hotel suite twice to try and produce bomb-making chemicals using handwritten
bomb making notes developed while in Pakistan to guide his production of triacetone triperoxide
(TATP).564 He even supposedly called an individual for production guidance. In the hotel’s
ventilation system, the FBI gathered residue from the chemicals Zazi had heated. Beauty store
surveillance footage also recorded Zazi’s activities.565 He also searched the website of a Queens
store that carried muriatic acid, which can be used to develop TATP.
561 John Marzulli, “Zazi, Al Qaeda Pals Planned Rush-Hour Attack on Grand Central, Times Square Subway Stations,”
New York Daily News, April 12, 2010. http://www.nydailynews.com/news/ny_crime/2010/04/12/2010-04-
12_zazi_pals_planned_rushhour_attack_on_2_busiest_subway_stations.html.
562 Samantha Gross, David Caruso, and Michael Rubinkam, “Radical Influences All Around NYC Terror Suspect,”
Associated Press, October 4, 2009, http://abcnews.go.com/US/wireStory?id=8741604. For more on Zazi’s childhood
see, Michael Wilson, “From Smiling Coffee Vendor to Terror Suspect,” New York Times September 26, 2009,
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/26/nyregion/26profile.html?_r=1&pagewanted=print. Hereinafter: Wilson,
September 26, 2009.
563 Ibid.
564 TATP (also known as acetone peroxide) has been used by suicide bombers in Israel, as a detonator by the thwarted
“shoe bomber” Richard Reid, and as the explosive in the July 7, 2005 London public transport system bombings. TATP
is relatively easy to make compared to other explosives. Although it is highly susceptible to heat, friction, and shock, it
can be prepared in a basement lab using commercially available materials obtained from hardware stores, pharmacies,
or stores selling cosmetics. See GlobalSecurity.org. http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/munitions/tatp.htm,
and Philippe Naughton, “TATP is suicide bombers’ weapon of choice,” Times Online (London), July 15, 2005,
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/uk/article544334.ece.
565 William K. Rashbaum, “Terror Suspect Is Charged with Preparing Explosives,” New York Times, September 25,
2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/25/nyregion/25terror.html.
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On September 8, 2009, Zazi rented a car and departed for New York the next day. Upon arriving
in New York City on September 10, Zazi’s car was stopped by Port Authority of New York Police
at the behest of the FBI as he crossed the George Washington Bridge. It has been reported that to
avoid tipping him off, the police pretended the stop was a random drug checkpoint.566 Authorities
initially stated that they found nothing incriminating. However, court papers indicated that law
enforcement subsequently found a laptop in the car containing an image of nine pages of
handwritten notes on how to make and handle bombs. When FBI agents interviewed Zazi, he
claimed that he drove to New York from Aurora, CO, to deal with an issue involving a coffee cart
business his family operated in Manhattan. He then falsely stated he had never seen the notes.567
Zazi has subsequently admitted that he planned to finish bomb construction over the September
12-13 weekend, and then target New York’s subway lines on September 14, 15, or 16. However
when he suspected that the police were on to him, he claimed he shut down the operation.568
During this time, the NYPD was showing Zazi’s photograph to people in his old neighborhoods
in Queens and, at one point, the police towed Zazi’s car. The New York Times reported that with
their interest exposed, “law enforcement agents feared that some part of a plot they had not yet
uncovered might be aborted and evidence destroyed. They moved fast, raiding four homes in
Queens beginning late in the night on Sept. 20.”569 Zazi was arrested and charged on September
24, with one count of conspiring with others to use weapons of mass destruction, including
bombs or other explosives.570
Others arrested in this case are
• Mohammed Wali Zazi, Najibullah Zazi’s father, a naturalized U.S. citizen, was
arrested in the Fall of 2009 for lying to investigators. On February 1, 2010, he
was indicted for conspiring to dispose of his son’s bomb-making materials and
chemicals. In a new eight-count superseding indictment unsealed on November
29, 2010, he was also charged with obstruction of justice, witness tampering,
making false statements, and visa fraud.571 In July 2011, the elder Zazi was found
guilty in federal court on one count of conspiracy to obstruct justice and one
count of obstruction of justice.572
• Ahmad Wais Afzali, a Queens Imam, was arrested for tipping off Zazi to the
FBI investigation. Afzali had been a source of information for federal and New
566 Sean Gardiner, “Police Let Terrorist Slip Through,” Wall Street Journal, April 26, 2010, http://online.wsj.com/
article/SB10001424052748703441404575205954118455716.html?mod=
WSJ_hpp_MIDDLENexttoWhatsNewsSecond.
567 David Johnston and William K. Rashbaum, “Terror Suspect Had Bomb Guide, Authorities Say,” New York Times,
September 21, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/21/us/21terror.html.
568 Ibid.
569 “Najibullah Zazi,” New York Times, February 22, 2010, http://topics.nytimes.com/topics/reference/timestopics/
people/z/najibullah_zazi/index.html.
570 Ibid. Zazi was originally arrested on the charge of making false statements to the FBI.
571 Chad Bray, “Father of NY Bomb-Plotter Faces More Charges, Wall Street Journal, November 30, 2010,
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704679204575646842735976282.html; and John Marzulli,
“Mohammed Wali Zazi, Father of Terror Suspect Najibullah Zazi, Free On Bail,” New York Daily News, February 18,
2010, http://www.nydailynews.com/news/ny_crime/2010/02/18/2010-02-
18_terror_suspect_zazis_dad_free_on_bail.html.
572 Jessica Dye, “Zazi’s Father Guilty in New York Bomb Plot Coverup,” Reuters, July 22, 2011,
http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/07/22/us-usa-zazi-idUSTRE76L4TQ20110722. Hereinafter: Dye, “Zazi’s Father.”
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York City investigators in the past.573 On March 4, 2010, Afzali, pled guilty to
lying to federal officials. He stated in court that he lied about a conversation he
had with Zazi tipping him off to the FBI’s investigation. Afzali hoped to protect
himself, not Zazi. Afzali claimed that during his phone conversation with Zazi,
he simply cautioned him not to “get involved in Afghanistan garbage.”574 During
sentencing on April 15, 2010, Afzali told the judge, “Honest to God, it was never
my intention to help those idiots for what they do in the name of Islam.”575 On
July 5, 2010, he left the United States as specified in his plea agreement. He may
not return without special permission.576
• Naqib Jaji, Zazi’s uncle, was secretly arrested in the case.577 In 2010, he pled
guilty to obstructing justice in the investigation.578
• Zarein Ahmedzay and Adis Medunjanin, who were classmates of Zazi’s at
Flushing High School in Queens, NY, were also indicted in the case. They
allegedly accompanied Zazi on a flight from Newark to Peshawar, Pakistan, in
late August 2008 where it is claimed they received military-style training from Al
Qaeda. Ahmedzay and Medunjanin, both U.S. citizens, were charged in a five-
count superseding indictment unsealed on February 25, 2010, with conspiracy to
use weapons of mass destruction (explosive bombs) against persons or property
in the United States. Specifically, they are charged with conspiring with Zazi to
conduct an attack on Manhattan subway lines that would have taken place on
Sept. 14, 15, or 16, 2009.579 On April 23, 2010, Ahmedzay pled guilty to the
charges. On August 6, 2010, Medunjanin pled not guilty to charges in the plot
and an additional charge of “trying to take out another car in a desperate suicide
bid on the Whitestone Expressway when authorities tried to arrest him in January
2010.”580
• In March 2011, DOJ announced the unsealing of an indictment charging Ferid
Imam—a Canadian citizen—with aiding in Zazi, Ahmedzay, and Medunjanin’s
receipt of training from al Qaeda when the three men traveled to Pakistan in
2008.581
573 Al Baker and Karen Zraick, “Lawyer Defends Queens Imam Arrested in Terror Inquiry,” New York Times,
September 21, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/21/nyregion/21imam.html.
574 A.G. Sulzberger, “Imam Snared in Terror Plot Admits He Lied to the F.B.I.” New York Times, March 4, 2010.
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/05/nyregion/05terror.html.
575 A.G. Sulzberger, “Imam and Informant Tells Why He Lied,” New York Times, April 15, 2010.
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/16/nyregion/16imam.html?scp=1&sq=
%E2%80%9CImam%20and%20Informant%20Tells%20Why%20He%20Lied,%E2%80%9D%20&st=cse
576 Colleen Long, “Imam Entangled in Terrorism Case Leaves U.S.” Associated Press, in CBSNews.com, July 6, 2010,
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2010/07/06/national/main6650661.shtml?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=
feed&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+FromTheRoadCBSNews+(From+The+Road%3A+CBSNews.com).
577 William K. Rashbaum, “Uncle Who Vouched for Terror Suspect Arrested,” New York Times, January 27, 2010,
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/28/nyregion/28zazi.html.
578 Dye, “Zazi’s Father.”
579 DOJ Press Release, “Two Charged with Terror Violations in Connection with New York Subway Plot,” February
25, 2010, http://newyork.fbi.gov/dojpressrel/pressrel10/nyfo022510a.html.
580 Janon Fisher, “Suspect in Subway Terror Plot Pleads Not Guilty,” New York Post, August 6, 2010,
http://www.nypost.com/p/news/local/queens/
suspect_in_subway_terror_plot_pleads_ul5seb9NDPmxETe4ewIyBK#ixzz0wUo8qs77.
581 DOJ Press Release, “Indictment Unsealed Charging Additional Member of al Qaeda Plot,” March 15, 2011,
(continued...)
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On July 7, 2010, DOJ announced the indictments of four additional men in the plot and revealed
that it was directed by senior al-Qaeda leadership in Pakistan, and was related to a scheme by al-
Qaeda plotters in Pakistan to use Western operatives to attack a target in the United Kingdom.582
The superseding indictment charged Adnan El Shukrijumah, Abid Naseer; Tariq Ur Rehman;
and a defendant known as “Ahmad,” “Sohaib” or “Zahid” with several terrorism offenses.583
It is alleged that the plot was organized by el-Shukrijumah and two others—Saleh al-Somali and
Rashid Rauf, who were described as leaders of Al Qaeda’s “external operations” program
dedicated to terrorist attacks in the United States and other Western countries.584 The Saudi-born,
El-Shukrijumah, is a naturalized U.S. citizen who has been sought for several years by U.S.
authorities who have offered $5 million for information leading to his capture.585 Specifically he
is alleged to have recruited Zazi and Zazi’s co-conspirators, Adis Medunjanin and Zarein
Ahmedzay. Al-Somali and Rauf are believed to have been killed in U.S. drone attacks.586
Abid Naseer, a British citizen, is alleged to have exchanged coded e-mails with the same account
that “Ahmad” was using to communicate with the Zazi cell. He and Tariq Ur Rehman were
arrested in Britain in April 2009. A search of their residences yielded large amounts of flour and
oil in addition to surveillance photos and maps of public areas of Manchester, England.587
Betim Kaziu—Plot to Join Foreign Jihadist Groups—August 2009
In July 2011, Betim Kaziu, a U.S. citizen from Brooklyn, NY, was convicted on charges related to
his attempts to join Al Qaeda-linked groups. In February 2009, Kaziu and a friend named Sulejah
Hadzovic (also a U.S. citizen and Brooklyn native) traveled to Cairo, Egypt, where they planned
to link up with either al-Shabaab or other terrorist organizations operating in places such as Iraq,
Afghanistan, or Pakistan. Believing he had made a mistake, Hadzovic returned home and
cooperated with federal officials. Kaziu journeyed to Kosovo where he was apprehended by the
Kosovo Police Service in August 2009.588
(...continued)
http://www.fbi.gov/newyork/press-releases/2011/indictment-unsealed-charging-additional-member-of-al-qaeda-plot.
582 DOJ Press Release, “Charges Unsealed Against Five Alleged Members of Al-Qaeda Plot to Attack the United States
and United Kingdom,” July 7, 2010, http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2010/July/10-nsd-781.html. Hereinafter: DOJ Press
Release, July 7, 2010.
583 The indictment also includes charges related to Medunjanin’s attempt to cause an accident on the Whitestone
Expressway, mentioned above.
584 Ibid.
585 William K. Rashbaum, “Qaeda Leader Indicted in Subway Plot,” New York Times, July 7, 2010,
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/08/nyregion/08terror.html.
586 Dina Temple-Raston, “Feds: N.Y. Subway Bomb Plot Included U.K. Targets,” National Public Radio, July 8, 2010,
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=128368594. Hereinafter: Temple-Raston, July 8, 2010.
587 Julia Love, “Alleged Al Qaeda Operatives in New York Plot,” Los Angeles Times, July 8, 2010,
http://articles.latimes.com/2010/jul/08/nation/la-na-ny-terror-20100708. Hereinafter: Love, July 8, 2010.
588 Tom Hays, “NYC Terror Witness Tells of Friendship, Betrayal,” Associated Press, July 5, 2011; DOJ Press
Release, “Brooklyn Man Convicted of Conspiracy to Kill U.S. Soldiers Abroad and Attempting to Provide Material
Support to al Shabaab,” July 7, 2011, http://www.fbi.gov/newyork/press-releases/2011/brooklyn-man-convicted-of-
conspiracy-to-kill-u.s.-soldiers-abroad-and-attempting-to-provide-material-support-to-al-shabaab.
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Daniel Boyd and Others—Plot to Attack Quantico Marine Base and
Conspiracy to Commit Murder Abroad—July 2009
In 2009, Daniel Patrick Boyd, members of his family, and others residing in North Carolina were
charged with plotting to attack the U.S. Marine Corps base in Quantico, VA, and for providing
material support to terrorists and conspiring to murder persons abroad.
On July 22, 2009, a federal grand jury in North Carolina indicted the following eight individuals,
charging them with conspiring to provide material support to terrorists and conspiring to murder,
kidnap, maim, and injure persons abroad:
• Daniel Patrick Boyd, a U.S. citizen and resident of North Carolina;
• Hysen Sherifi, a native of Kosovo and a U.S. legal permanent resident located in
North Carolina;
• Anes Subasic, a naturalized U.S. citizen and resident of North Carolina;
• Zakariya Boyd, a U.S. citizen and resident of North Carolina;
• Dylan Boyd, a U.S. citizen and resident of North Carolina;
• Mohammad Omar Aly Hassan, a U.S. citizen and resident of North Carolina;
• Ziyad Yaghi, a U.S. citizen and resident of North Carolina; and
• Jude Kenan Mohammad, a U.S. citizen, believed to be in Pakistan.
The indictment alleges that Daniel Boyd is a veteran of terrorist training camps in Pakistan and
Afghanistan who conspired with others to recruit and help young men travel overseas in order to
kill.589
According to the indictment, during the period from 1989 through 1992, Daniel Boyd traveled to
Pakistan and Afghanistan where he received military-style training in terrorist training camps for
the purpose of engaging in violent jihad. Following this training, he allegedly fought in
Afghanistan. From roughly November 2006 through at least July 2009, the indictment alleges that
Daniel Boyd and the other defendants conspired to provide material support and resources to
terrorists, including currency, training, transportation, and personnel. The defendants also
conspired to murder, kidnap, maim, and injure persons abroad during this period. The object of
the conspiracy, according to the indictment, was to advance violent jihad, including supporting
and participating in terrorist activities abroad and committing acts of murder, kidnapping, or
maiming persons abroad.590 The indictment also alleges that Daniel Boyd obtained a variety of
weapons in furtherance of the conspiracy to murder persons overseas and provide material
support to terrorists.
In a superseding indictment unsealed on September 24, 2009, additional charges were made
against Boyd, his son Zakariya, and Hysen Sherifi. They are accused in a plot to attack the
589 DOJ Press Release, “Seven Charged with Terrorism Violations in North Carolina,” July 27, 2009,
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2009/July/09-nsd-725.html; DOJ Press Release, “Kosovar National Charged with
Terrorism Violations,” June 17, 2010, http://charlotte.fbi.gov/dojpressrel/pressrel10/ch061710.htm. Hereinafter: DOJ
Press Release, “Kosovar.”
590 Ibid.
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Marine Corps Base at Quantico, VA. Charges included conspiracy to murder U.S. military
personnel, possession of weapons in furtherance of a crime of violence, and providing weapons to
a convicted felon. The superseding indictment alleges, among other things, that as part of the
conspiracy, Boyd undertook reconnaissance of the Marine Corps Base in Quantico, and obtained
maps of the base in order to plan an attack. It also alleges that Boyd possessed armor piercing
ammunition, stating it was “to attack the Americans.”591
In an April 19, 2010, criminal complaint unsealed in June 2010, a ninth person, Bajram Asilani,
was charged with being a member of the conspiracy involving the above defendants. He was
arrested by authorities in Kosovo on June 17, 2010, at the request of the United States, which
sought his extradition to Raleigh, NC, to stand trial.592 However, a Judge of the European Union
Rule of Law Mission denied the extradition request, ruling that Kosovo does not have an
extradition treaty with the United States.593
In February 2011, Daniel Boyd pled guilty to conspiracy to provide material support to terrorists
and conspiracy to murder, kidnap, maim, and injure persons in a foreign country.594 In June 2011,
Zakariya Boyd pled guilty to one count of conspiracy to provide material support to terrorists.595
In September 2011, Dylan Boyd pled guilty to one count of aiding and abetting a conspiracy to
provide material support to terrorists.596
Abdulhakim Muhammad—Shooting at the Little Rock, Arkansas,
Military Recruiting Center—June 1, 2009
On June 1, 2009, Abdulhakim Muhammad was arrested in connection with a shooting at the U.S.
Army-Navy Career Center in Little Rock, AR, that killed one soldier and wounded another. The
police recovered from Muhammad’s sport utility vehicle (SUV) a Mossberg rifle with a scope and
rifle sight, an SKS assault rifle,597 and a Lorcin L380 semiautomatic handgun.598 The Little Rock
resident and Muslim convert who changed his name from Carlos Leon Bledsoe, was charged with
capital murder, attempted capital murder, and 10 counts of unlawful discharge of a firearm.599 In
591 DOJ Press Release, “Superseding Indictment in Boyd Matter Charges Defendants with Conspiring to Murder U.S.
Military Personnel, Weapons Violations,” September 24, 2009, http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2009/September/09-nsd-
1023.html.
592 DOJ Press Release, “Kosovar.”
593 Kelcey Carlson, “Report: Judge Denies Extradition of Triangle Terrorism Suspect,” wral.com, June 21, 2010,
http://www.wral.com/news/local/story/7821448/.
594 DOJ Press Release, “Raleigh-Area Man Pleads Guilty to Terrorism Charges,” February 9, 2011, http://www.fbi.gov/
charlotte/press-releases/2011/ce020911.htm.
595 DOJ Press Release, “North Carolina Man Pleads Guilty to Terrorism Charge,” June 7, 2011, http://www.fbi.gov/
charlotte/press-releases/2011/north-carolina-man-pleads-guilty-to-terrorism-charge.
596 DOJ Press Release, “North Carolina Man Pleads Guilty to Terrorism Charge,” September 14, 2011,
http://www.fbi.gov/charlotte/press-releases/2011/north-carolina-man-pleads-guilty-to-terrorism-charge-1.
597 The Russian-designed Simonov SKS (Samozariadnyia Karabina Simonova) is a gas operated, self-loading, semi-
automatic rifle that fires the 7.62 mm cartridge.
598 The NEFA Foundation, “Target America Series #18: The Little Rock Arkansas Recruiting Station Shooting,” June
2009, http://www.nefafoundation.org/miscellaneous/FeaturedDocs/NEFA_littlerockrecruitingshooting.pdf.
599 James Dao, “Man Claims Terror Ties in Little Rock Shooting,” New York Times, January 22, 2010,
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/22/us/22littlerock.html. Hereinafter: Dao, January 22, 2010.
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Arkansas state court, in July 2011, Muhammad pled guilty to these charges. He did so to avoid
the death penalty.600
Muhammad called the June 1, 2009, shooting another “Jihadi Attack.” “I wasn’t insane or post
traumatic nor was I forced to do this Act,” he stated in a January 12, 2010, handwritten note to the
presiding judge in his court case. In the letter, he claimed ties to Al Qaeda in the Arabian
Peninsula (AQAP) and dubbed himself a soldier for them. His father is a Memphis businessman
who doubts that his son had ties to AQAP but could have been radicalized in Yemen.601 His sister,
who was stunned by the shooting, has stated publicly that a week before the shooting he seemed
upbeat. In press reporting, his family has described Muhammad as a “happy-go-lucky” teen who
had become a “deeply observant Muslim in college.”602
In seven handwritten letters he sent to the Memphis, TN, Commercial Appeal newspaper between
May-October 2010, Muhammad provided insights into his motivation for the June 2009 shooting:
It’s a war against Islam and Muslims and I’m on the side of the Muslims point blank….The
U.S. has to pay for the rape, murder, bloodshed, blasphemy it has done and still doing to the
Muslims and Islam. So consider this a small retaliation the best to come Allah willing. This
is not the first attack and won’t be the last.603
Muhammad spent 16 months in Yemen starting in the fall of 2007. While he was in the country,
he married a woman from South Yemen. He allegedly taught English and learned Arabic while
there. Yemeni officials imprisoned him in November 2008 on a visa overstay, and he also
supposedly possessed a fraudulent Somali visa.604 Yemen deported him to the United States in
January 2009.605
The FBI is reported to have interviewed him before the shooting, including while he was in
prison in Yemen and then again in Nashville soon after he returned.606 According to law
enforcement officials, the episode in Yemen prompted a preliminary inquiry by the FBI and other
American law enforcement agencies into whether he had ties to extremist groups. But that
investigation was inconclusive reportedly leaving the FBI with insufficient evidence to wiretap
his phone or place him under surveillance.607
600 “Man Pleads Guilty to Recruiting Center Killing, Gets Life,” CNN.com, July 25, 2011, http://articles.cnn.com/2011-
07-25/justice/arkansas.recruiter.shooting_1_capital-murder-quinton-ezeagwula-carlos-bledsoe?_s=PM:CRIME.
601 Ibid.
602 James Dao, “A Muslim Son, a Murder Trial, and Many Questions,” New York Times, February 16, 2010,
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/17/us/17convert.html. Hereinafter: Dao, February 16, 2010.
603 Kristina Goetz, “Muslim Who Shot Soldier in Arkansas Says He Wanted to Cause More Death,” knoxnews.com,
November 13, 2010, http://www.knoxnews.com/news/2010/nov/13/muslim-who-shot-solider-arkansas-says-he-
wanted-ca/.
604 Ibid.
605 Dao, January 22, 2010.
606 See Dao, February 16, 2010; and Dina Temple-Raston, “FBI Encountered Accused Ark. Shooter In Yemen,”
National Public Radio, June 8, 2009, http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=105128523.
607 James Dao and David Johnson, “Suspect in Soldier Attack was Once Detained in Yemen,” New York Times, June 3,
2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/04/us/04recruit.html.
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The Newburgh Four—Plot to Bomb Bronx, New York, Synagogue
and Jewish Center, and Attack Stewart Air National Guard Base—
May 2009
On May 20, 2009, the FBI and the NYPD arrested four men for plotting to blow up a Bronx
synagogue and Jewish Center while simultaneously shooting a plane out of the sky. The men
allegedly parked car bombs wired to cell phones outside the Riverdale Temple and nearby
Riverdale Jewish Center in the Bronx. They were also heading to Stewart Air National Guard
Base in Newburgh, NY.608 However, the explosives in the car bombs and Stinger missile they
intended to use in the attack were phony. The explosives had been supplied by undercover agents
posing as Pakistani militants linked to Al Qaeda. The four “were petty criminals who appeared to
be acting alone, not in concert with any terrorist organization,” according to the New York City
Police Commissioner.609
The suspects were three U.S.-born citizens—James Cromitie, David Williams, and Onta
Williams (no relation to David)—and one Haitian immigrant, Laguerre Payen. At least three of
the four were said to be jailhouse converts to Islam and were reportedly angry about the deaths of
Muslims in Afghanistan.
An FBI cooperating witness played a key role in the quartet’s efforts to obtain the explosives and
missile components for the planned attacks. According to the indictment in the case,610 the four
defendants met with the cooperating witness repeatedly beginning in October 2008 and discussed
attacking military aircraft at the Air National Guard base. Starting in April 2009, the four selected
the synagogue, the Jewish community center, and the air base as targets. They cased their targets,
taking photographs and developing plans. Together with the cooperating witness, they purchased
cell phones and a handgun for the operation. The cooperating witness also helped them obtain
three improvised explosive devices (IED) containing fake C-4 explosives and gave the group an
inactive stinger missile, informing them that it came from Jaish-e-Mohammed, a Pakistan-based
terrorist group.611
Some questioned whether the Newburgh Four were actually capable of pulling off the terrorist
plot without the involvement of the cooperating witness, a Pakistani man named Shahed Hussain,
who agreed to work for the FBI to obtain leniency after he was arrested in 2002 for fraud.612 One
commentator has described the Newburgh Four as a group of struggling, disaffected petty
criminals, who bonded at a Newburgh mosque over having spent time in prison and were taken in
by a Pakistani immigrant looking to win leniency for a crime of his own. “There’s little doubt the
bumbling would-be bombers went far enough with the plot to demonstrate that they had the
608 United States v. James Cromitie, David Williams, Onta Williams, Laguerre Payen, Indictment 09-Cr558, U.S.
District Court, Southern District of New York (undated). http://www.investigativeproject.org/documents/case_docs/
990.pdf. Hereinafter: U.S. v. Cromitie, et al.
609 Javier C. Hernandez and Sewell Chan, “N.Y. Bomb Plot Suspects Acted Alone, Police Say,” New York Times, May
21, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/22/nyregion/22terror.html?ref=nyregion.
610 U.S. v. Cromitie, et al.
611 DOJ Press Release, “Four Arrested for Plot To Bomb Synagogue and Jewish community center and to Shoot
Military Planes with Stinger Missiles,” May 20, 2009, http://newyork.fbi.gov/dojpressrel/pressrel09/nyfo052009.htm.
612 Graham Rayman, “The Alarming Record of the FBI’s Informant in the Bronx Bomb Plot,” The Village Voice, July
8, 2009, http://www.villagevoice.com/2009-07-08/news/the-alarming-record-of-the-f-b-i-s-informant-in-the-bronx-
bomb-plot/3. Hereinafter: Ravman, July 8, 2009.
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intention to commit terror, and for that they'll pay the price. But the whole tale comes off perhaps
more as a sad glimpse into the lives of a loose group of aimless and obscurely embittered
Americans than as a dire illustration of the threat of home-grown terrorism.”613
Graham Ravman, writing in the Village Voice, suggests that the Newburgh Four were smalltime
felons who had no grand terrorist ambitions until Hussain plied them with cash and suggestions.
Moreover, this was not the first time [Hussain] went undercover to help the government. “He
played a similar role four years ago in an Albany case, in which he helped the FBI arrest a man
named Mohammed Hossain, a cash-poor pizzeria owner, and his Imam, Yassin Aref, after
persuading them to launder $50,000 in a made-up plot to bring a missile to the United States and
assassinate a Pakistani prime minister [the target of the invented plot was actually against the
Pakistani United Nations Representative]…. In both cases, it is claimed that [Hussain] did not
stumble upon active terror cells plotting to bring destruction on American soil [rather he] needed
long periods of time to recruit his Muslim contacts, spin elaborate tales about his terror contacts,
and develop solid plans of action, all the while providing the defendants with large amounts of
resources and cash incentives.”614
The trial of the four began on August 24, 2010. It had been delayed earlier in the summer by the
federal judge in the case saying prosecutors had failed to turn over information that should have
been given to the defense. In June 2010, prosecutors turned over to defense attorneys a 2008
memorandum from the FBI written by the lead agent on the case. The agent reportedly wrote that
he had told officials at Stewart Airport that James Cromitie, the alleged leader of the Newburgh
Four, would be looking over the airport for a potential attack but that he would pose no danger
without the assistance of the informant. U.S. District Court Judge Colleen McMahon said the
memorandum should have been turned over to the defense months earlier.615
Defense attorneys at the trial argued that the case crossed the line into entrapment. But the jury
rejected the entrapment defense and convicted the four on October 18, 2010.616
Bryant Neal Vinas—Plot to Bomb Long Island Railroad, Rocket
Attack on U.S. Base in Afghanistan—September 2008
In a November 22, 2008, sealed indictment617 (unsealed on July 22, 2009), Bryant Vinas, an
American Muslim convert who grew up on Long Island, NY, was charged with conspiracy to
613 Zachary Roth, “The Newburgh Four—And The Government Mole Who Betrayed Them,” TPM Muckraker, May
22, 2009. http://tpmmuckraker.talkingpointsmemo.com/2009/05/the_newburgh_four_--
_and_the_goverment_mole_who_be.php?ref=m1.
614 Ravman, July 8, 2009.
615 William Glaberson, “Trial of Newburgh Men Accused of Terror Plot Delayed,” New York Times, June 14, 2010,
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/15/nyregion/15terror.html.
616 Kareem Fahim, “4 Convicted of Attempting to Blow Up 2 Synagogues,” New York Times, October 18, 2010,
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/19/nyregion/19plot.html. See DOJ Press Release, “Three Men Each Sentenced in
Manhattan Federal Court to 25 Years in Prison for Plotting to Bomb Bronx Synagogues and Shoot Down U.S. Military
Planes,” June 29, 2011, http://www.fbi.gov/newyork/press-releases/2011/three-men-each-sentenced-in-manhattan-
federal-court-to-25-years-in-prison-for-plotting-to-bomb-bronx-synagogues-and-shoot-down-u.s.-military-planes. The
convictions have been upheld on appeal. See Adam Wisnieski and Graham Kates, “Newburgh Four Appeal Denied,
Riverdale Press, May 4, 2011, http://www.riverdalepress.com/stories/Newburgh-Four-appeal-denied-,48521?page=1&
content_source=.
617 United States v. John Doe, Cr. No. 08-823, U.S. District Court, Eastern District of New York, November 22, 2008,
(continued...)
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murder U.S. nationals, providing material support to Al Qaeda, and receiving military-type
training from Al Qaeda. He pled guilty to all three counts on January 28, 2009.618
The charges stem from Vinas’ activities in Pakistan from his arrival in the Fall of 2007 until his
arrest by Pakistani police in November 2008 following a tip provided by U.S. authorities. Vinas
was subsequently extradited to the United States and has cooperated extensively with
counterterrorism officials.619 Vinas has admitted that he met with Al Qaeda leaders in Pakistan
and, between March and July 2008, attended three Al Qaeda training courses focused on
weapons, explosives, and rocket-based or propelled weaponry.620 In September 2008, he took part
in firing rockets at a U.S. military base in Afghanistan. He told officials, “Although we intended
to hit the military base and kill American soldiers, I was informed the rockets missed and the
attack failed.”621 Vinas also testified in court, “I consulted with a senior Al Qaeda leader and
provided detailed information about the operation of the Long Island Railroad system, which I
knew because I had ridden the railroad on so many occasions ... the purpose of providing
information was to help plan a bomb attack on the Long Island Railroad system.”622 This led U.S.
officials to issue a security alert in November 2008 and beefed up security on the New York area
commuter rail system.623
The arrest of Vinas was kept secret until his indictment was unsealed in July 2009 probably
because of the significance of the information he has provided to U.S. counterterrorism
authorities. That information has reportedly helped U.S. forces target Al Qaeda camps with drone
attacks and understand how Al Qaeda provides its members with training in assassinations,
poison, kidnappings, forgery, and advanced bomb-making.624 Vinas has also submitted a witness
statement that was entered into evidence in the trial of an alleged Belgian Al Qaeda cell in
Brussels.625
Vinas is the son of immigrants from Peru and Argentina, who was raised as a Catholic and loved
to play baseball. After 9/11, he joined the Army but was discharged before completing basic
training. Reportedly dispirited after returning to Long Island, he met the relative of a friend who
was a Muslim convert. Shortly thereafter, Vinas also converted. He eventually began visiting
extremist websites and was reported to have become increasingly influenced by another
religiously conservative acquaintance. One of the websites led Vinas to the Islamic Thinkers
(...continued)
http://intelfiles.egoplex.com/2009-07-22-Bryant-Neal-Vinas-Court-Docs.pdf.
618 United States against Bryant Neal Vinas, Cr. No. 08-823 NGG, Unsealing Application, U.S. District Court, Eastern
District of New York, July 22, 2009, http://intelfiles.egoplex.com/2009-07-22-Bryant-Neal-Vinas-Court-
Docs.pdf#page=13.
619 Sebastian Rotella and Josh Meyer, “U.S.-born Militant Who Fought For Al Qaeda Is In Custody,” Los Angeles
Times, July 23, 2009, http://articles.latimes.com/2009/jul/23/nation/na-american-jihad23.
620 Paul Cruickshank, Nic Robertson, and Ken Shiffman, “From Long Island to Lahore: The Plot to Bomb New York,”
CNN.com, May 21, 2010, http://edition.cnn.com/2010/CRIME/05/14/bryant.neal.vinas.part2/index.html. Hereinafter:
CNN, May 21, 2010.
621 Ibid.
622 Ibid.
623 Anti Defamation League, “New Yorker Pleads Guilty to Providing NYC Transit Information to Al Qaeda,” July 23,
2009, http://www.adl.org/main_Terrorism/vinas_guilty_plea.htm.
624 Ibid.
625 CNN, May 21, 2010.
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Society, an extremist group in New York reportedly supportive of Al Qaeda. His deeply religious
acquaintance was already a member and Vinas began to move within its circles.626
Mitch Silber, the director of intelligence analysis for the NYPD, has expressed the belief that
“there has been an acceleration in radicalization in the United States.” He notes that “Vinas is
almost a poster child for the process, the unremarkable nature of the people who might go
through this process and frankly the potential to link up with Al Qaeda and the danger that
presents.”627
Vinas is reported to be in the custody of the U.S. Marshals Service at an undisclosed location in
the state of New York.628
Plot to Bomb Jet Fuel Artery at Kennedy International Airport in
New York—June 2007
On June 2, 2007, authorities announced they had broken up a plot by four men to blow up a jet
fuel artery that runs through residential neighborhoods to the JFK Airport in New York. Russell
Defreitas, a U.S. citizen originally from Guyana, was arrested as the ring leader of the plot.
Defreitas had worked as a cargo handler at JFK until 1995, but was described as hapless and
episodically homeless and whom friends say supported himself by selling incense on street
corners and collecting welfare.629 According to court documents filed on January 5, 2010,
Defreitas allegedly admitted to being the “brain of everything.”630
The others charged in the plot are Abdul Kadir, a citizen of Guyana and former member of its
parliament, Kareem Ibrahim, a citizen of Trinidad and Tobago; and Abdel Nur, a citizen of
Guyana.631 The latter three were arrested in Trinidad and eventually extradited to the United
States in June 2008. All four were indicted with conspiracy to cause death, serious bodily injury
and extensive destruction.632
The FBI said the alleged plot never got beyond the planning stages633 and there is some dispute
over how serious any attack against the 40-mile pipeline would have been. The pipeline
originates in Linden, NJ, crosses Staten Island, and goes underwater to Brooklyn traveling mostly
626 Ibid.
627 Ibid.
628 Claire Suddath, “Bryant Neal Vinas: An American in Al Qaeda,” Time Magazine, July 24, 2009,
http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,1912512,00.html.
629 Carol Eisenberg, “JFK Terror Plot: Credibility of Case in Question,” Newsday, June 6, 2007. Hereinafter: Eisenberg,
June 6, 2007.
630 John Marzulli, “”I Was Brain of It All ... ” New York Daily News, January 6, 2010, http://www.nydailynews.com/
news/ny_crime/2010/01/06/2010-01-06_untitled__pipeline06m.html.
631 Chris Michaud, “Four Charged in Plot to Blow Up JFK Airport,” Reuters, June 2, 2007, http://www.reuters.com/
article/idUSN0238499820070602. Another individual, Donald Nero, admitted early involvement in the plot but broke
with Defreitas and the others, testifying against them. See Thom Weidlich and Cullen Wheatley, “JFK Airport Bomb
Plotter From Guyana Gets Four-Year Sentence,” Bloomberg Businesweek, October 28, 2011,
http://www.businessweek.com/news/2011-10-28/jfk-airport-bomb-plotter-from-guyana-gets-four-year-sentence.html.
632 “4 indicted in terror plot to blow up JFK airport,” Newsday, June 29, 2007.
633 “Four Charged over JFK Bomb Plot, BBC News, June 3, 2007, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/6715443.stm.
Hereinafter: BBC News, June 3, 2007.
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along the Long Island Rail Road right-of-way to the airport. Because of their thickness and
safeguards, such pipelines are difficult to damage, an official said.634
However, at a news conference announcing the arrests, U.S. Attorney, Roslynn Mauskopf called
it “one of the most chilling plots imaginable. Had the plot been carried out, it could have resulted
in unfathomable damage, deaths and destruction.”635 But safety experts have criticized the
government’s description of the plot’s danger. John Goglia, a former member of the National
Transportation Safety Board, describes the plot as a “fantasy,” saying, “You could definitely reach
the tank, definitely start a fire, but to get the kind of explosion they were thinking they were going
to get ... this is virtually impossible to do.”636
The Washington Post reported that the alleged conspirators were initially detected via information
gathered by the CIA in South America and the Caribbean. That led federal and local authorities in
the New York region to launch a 16-month sting operation focused on the activities of Defreitas.
According to the complaint filed in the case, Defreitas conducted surveillance of the airport four
times in January, focusing on fuel tanks, noting security precautions and reviewing an escape
plan.637
Defreitas was apparently unaware that one of the plotters with him much of the time was a law
enforcement informant who recorded much of what he said. It has been reported that Defreitas
said in one recorded conversation, “Any time you hit Kennedy, it is the most hurtful thing to the
United States.... To hit John F. Kennedy, wow ... they love John F. Kennedy like he’s the man ... if
you hit that, this whole country will be mourning. You can kill the man twice.”638
According to The Smoking Gun, which obtained and posted on its website a copy of the criminal
complaint in the case, a paid “confidential source” was credited with infiltrating the terror cell
and gathering critical information on the alleged plot—via tape recordings, documents, videos,
and photographs. The government informant is a longtime New York City drug trafficker who
began cooperating with federal investigators after NYPD detectives arrested him on a Bronx
street and charged him with possession of about $2 million in cocaine. A footnote in the criminal
complaint notes that the source had two prior drug convictions and was, through his cooperation,
seeking leniency in sentencing on the drug trafficking charge.639
In opening arguments for the July 2010 trial of two of the defendants—Defreitas and Kadir—
Defreitas’ attorney accused prosecutors of being “overzealous.” The government, he said, took a
“poor lonely, bitter old man that talked big game,” and, through an informant, nudged him into
incriminating himself. “Without the government, Russell Defreitas is nothing. His words were ‘all
634 Anthony Faiola and Steven Mufson, “NY Airport Target of Plot, Officials Say,” The Washington Post, June 3, 2007,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/06/02/AR2007060200606_pf.html. Hereinafter: The
Washington Post, June 3, 2007.
635 BBC News, June 3, 2007.
636 John Goglia quoted in “Plot to Destroy New York Airport Considered Overhyped,” History Commons., June 2,
2007, http://www.historycommons.org/entity.jsp?entity=russell_defreitas_1.
637 The Washington Post, June 3, 2007.
638 BBC News, June 3, 2007.
639 “Meet the JFK Informant,” The Smoking Gun.com, June 14, 2007, http://www.thesmokinggun.com/archive/years/
2007/0614071jfkplot1.html.
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sizzle and no steak.’”640 After five days of deliberation, however, the jury convicted both men of
five counts of conspiring to commit acts of terrorism.641
In December 2010, Kadir received a life sentence for his involvement in the plot. In February
2011, Defreitas was also sentenced to life in prison. Nur, who had pled guilty to a separate charge
of material support to terrorism, received a 15-year sentence in January 2011. Kareem Ibrahim,
was tried separately and was convicted of involvement in the conspiracy. He awaits sentencing.642
Plot to Attack Soldiers at Fort Dix, New Jersey—May 2007
Six men were arrested in a plot against Fort Dix, a U.S. Army base in New Jersey. In December
2008, a jury found five of the six guilty of conspiring to kill military personnel but cleared them
of attempted murder. Four received life sentences without parole and the other received a 33-year
sentence. A sixth man pled guilty to a lesser charge and was sentenced to 20 months in prison. As
far as is known, the group had no connection to any foreign terrorist organization.
The arrests were made after a 16-month FBI operation that included infiltrating the group. The
investigation began in January 2006 with a tip from an electronics store clerk in Mount Laurel,
PA. Two men dropped off an 8-millimeter tape and wanted it converted to a DVD. The tape
showed the defendants firing rifles and shouting Islamic battle cries. The clerk called police. FBI
agents and two paid informants who had criminal records spent the next 15 months shadowing
the suspects, recording conversations and searching their computers. During the investigation,
authorities recorded hundreds of conversations with the defendants with help from the two
informants.643
The plotters and verdicts in their cases:
• Mohamad Ibrahim Shnewer, a U.S. citizen born in Jordan. Guilty of conspiracy
to kill military personnel, not guilty of attempted murder and guilty of possession
or attempted possession of a firearm in furtherance of the conspiracy. Sentenced
to life in prison without parole.644
640 Basil Katz, “Trial Opens for Accused NY Airport Bomb Plotters,” Reuters, June 30, 2010, http://www.reuters.com/
article/idUSTRE65T6PK20100630.
641 A.G. Sulzberger, “Two Men Convicted in Kennedy Airport Plot,” New York Times, August 2, 2010,
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/08/03/nyregion/03kennedy.html?_r=1&ref=russell_m_defreitas.
642 John Marzulli, “Brooklyn Jury Convicts Imam Kareem Ibrahim in Kennedy Airport Plot,” May 27, 2011, New York
Daily News, http://articles.nydailynews.com/2011-05-27/news/29606238_1_defreitas-and-co-defendant-fuel-lines-and-
fuel-abdel-nur; DOJ Press Release, “Russell Defreitas Sentenced to Life in Prison for Conspiring to Commit Terrorist
Attack at JFK Airport,” February 17, 2011, http://www.fbi.gov/newyork/press-releases/2011/russell-defreitas-
sentenced-to-life-in-prison-for-conspiring-to-commit-terrorist-attack-at-jfk-airport; A.G. Sulzberger, “3 Years Later,
Trial to Start in JFK Bomb Plot,” New York Times, June 29, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/30/nyregion/
30terror.html.
643 Christopher Dela Cruz, “Three convicted in Fort Dix terror plot are sentenced to life in prison” NJ.com, April 28,
2009, http://www.nj.com/news/index.ssf/2009/04/judge_sentences_fort_dix_defen.html. Hereinafter: Dela Cruz,
NJ.com April 28, 2009.
644 “Raw Data: Charges in Fort Dix Terror Trial,” Associated Press in FoxNews.com, December 22, 2008,
http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,470897,00.html. Hereinafter: “Raw Data in Fort Dix Trial,” December 22,
2008; and Dela Cruz, NJ.com, April 28, 2009.
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• Dritan “Tony” Duka, illegal immigrant born in the former Yugoslavia. Guilty of
conspiracy to kill military personnel, not guilty of attempted murder, guilty of
possession or attempted possession of a firearm in furtherance of the conspiracy,
guilty of possession or attempted possession of a machine gun and guilty of two
counts of possession or attempted possession of a firearm by an illegal alien.
Sentenced to life in prison without parole.645
• Eljvir Duka, illegal immigrant born in the former Yugoslavia. Guilty of
conspiracy to kill military personnel, not guilty of attempted murder, not guilty of
possession or attempted possession of a firearm in furtherance of the conspiracy
and guilty of possession or attempted possession of a firearm by an illegal alien.
Sentenced to life in prison without parole.646
• Shain Duka, illegal immigrant born in the former Yugoslavia. Guilty of
conspiracy to kill military personnel, not guilty of attempted murder, guilty of
possession or attempted possession of a firearm in furtherance of the conspiracy,
guilty of possession or attempted possession of a machine gun and guilty of two
counts of possession or attempted possession of a firearm by an illegal alien.
Sentenced to life in prison without parole.647
• Serdar Tatar, a Turkish-born legal permanent resident of the United States.
Guilty of conspiracy to kill military personnel and not guilty of attempted
murder. Sentenced to 33 years in prison.648
• Agron Abdullahu, a Kosovo-Albanian who arrived with his family as a refugee
from Kosovo (ironically, first arriving in the United States at a refugee center at
Fort Dix). He was charged with letting the brothers Dritan, Eljvir and Shain Duka
shoot various weapons at a firing range in Pennslyvania. The indictment states
that the weapons used were an SKS semi automatic rifle, a Baretta Storm semi
automatic rifle, a Mossberg 12-gauge pump and a 9mm Baretta handgun. These
were all firearms that Abdullahu owned legally. However, it is a crime for illegal
immigrants like the Duka brothers to possess guns. He pled guilty to the charge
and was sentenced March 31, 2008, to 20 months in prison.649
Daniel Maldonado—Training with Al Qaeda in Somalia—
February 2007
An indictment unsealed on February 14, 2007, charged Daniel Joseph Maldonado with receiving
training from a foreign terrorist organization and conspiring to use an explosive device outside
the United States. According to a Justice Department official, “This case represents the first
645 Ibid.
646 Ibid.
647 Ibid.
648 Raw Data in Fort Dix Trial,” December 22, 2008; “The Fifth Man Convicted of Plotting to Kill Military Personnel
at Fort Dix in New Jersey Has Been Sentenced to 33 Years in Prison,” Associated Press in FoxNews.com, April 29,
2009, http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,518337,00.html.
649 Geoff Mulvihill, “Man sentenced in Fort Dix plot case” Associated Press in USA Today, March 31, 2008.
http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2008-03-31-619191134_x.htm.
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criminal prosecution of an American suspected of joining forces with Islamic extremist fighters in
Somalia.”650
Maldonado had been captured by the Kenyan military on January 21, 2007, as he fled into Kenya
to avoid Ethiopian and Somalian forces. He was turned over to American authorities the
following month. On April 19, 2007, Maldonado pled guilty to receiving training from a foreign
terrorist organization in exchange for prosecutors agreeing not to file any more federal charges
against him.651 In June 2007, Maldonado was sentenced to 10 years in prison.652
According to DOJ, Maldonado admitted that in November 2005 he had traveled from Houston,
TX, to Africa, eventually making it to Somalia in December 2006 to join the Islamic Courts
Union (ICU)653 and elements of Al Qaeda to fight “jihad” against the Somali Transitional Federal
Government. While in Somalia, authorities say Maldonado was provided an AK-47, equipped
with military combat uniforms and boots in Mogadishu, and participated in training camps in
Kismaayo and Jilib, Somalia. The camps included physical fitness, firearms and explosives
training all in preparation to go to the front to fight for the ICU. Al Qaeda members were present
at the training camps. The ICU and Al Qaeda worked together to train fighters in the camps to
fight jihad to establish an independent Islamic state in Somalia.654
The criminal complaint in the case alleges that Maldonado admitted that while training at camps
in Somalia, he watched and learned techniques for manufacturing small explosive devices. He
also admitted to participating in the interrogation of a spy who was later killed—a flight attendant
who had a cell phone camera and was observed taking pictures of jihadis as they arrived by
airplane in Kismaayo, Somalia. Maldonado also admitted that he would be willing to become a
suicide bomber if he were wounded and could not otherwise fight.655
Derrick Shareef—Plot to Attack Shopping Mall in Rockford,
Illinois—December 2006
On December 6, 2006, Derrick Shareef, an American Muslim convert, was arrested in Rockford,
IL, after he attempted to swap two stereo speakers for four (non-functioning) hand grenades, a
650 U.S. Attorney Southern District of Texas, Press Release, “U.S. Citizen Pleads Guilty to Training to Fight Jihad,”
April 19, 2007, http://nefafoundation.org/miscellaneous/FeaturedDocs/U.S._v_Maldonado_DOJPR_GuiltyPlea.pdf.
Hereinafter: U.S. Attorney Press Release, April 19, 2007.
651 “American Citizen Charged With Training in Somalia With Al Qaeda, Learning to Become Homicide Bomber,”
Foxnews.com, February 14, 2007, http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,251820,00.html.
652 Shelley Murphy and Milton J. Valencia, “Details Emerge on Plot Suspects,” The Boston Globe, October 23, 2009,
http://www.boston.com/news/local/massachusetts/articles/2009/10/23/details_emerge_on_plot_suspects/.
653 Following the collapse of the Somali government in the 1990’s, a group of Sharia Courts functioned as quasi-
governmental entities. In the late 1990’s, they united to form the Islamic Courts Union (ICU), a rival administration to
the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) of Somalia. Until the end of 2006, they controlled most of southern
Somalia and the capital, Mogadishu. In December 2006, they lost several battles and were driven from Mogadishu by
Somali forces supporting the TFG and the Ethiopian army which intervened to support the TFG against the ICU.
Hardline Islamists broke ranks from the ICU and formed other militant groups, such as al-Shabaab and Hizbul Islam, to
continue the war against the government. The less-militant members of the ICU went into exile.
654 U.S. Attorney Press Release, April 19, 2007.
655 United States v. Daniel Joseph Maldonado, Superseding Criminal Complaint , Case Number: H-07-125M, U.S.
District Court, Southern District of Texas, February 13, 2007, pp. 4-5, http://www.foxnews.com/projects/pdf/
Maldonado_Complaint.pdf.
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9mm handgun, and several rounds of (non-functioning) ammunition with an undercover FBI
agent posing as a weapons dealer. Prior to his arrest, Shareef had plotted to set off hand grenades
in a garbage can at the CherryVale Shopping Mall near Rockford on the Friday before Christmas
2006. Shareef was charged with attempting to use a weapon of mass destruction against
persons and property and with attempting to maliciously damage and destroy, by means of fire
and an explosive, a building and real and personal property used in interstate commerce.656
The case began in September 2006, when the FBI assigned a cooperating witness, William
“Jamaal” Chrisman, to befriend Shareef. Chrisman had converted to Islam in prison where he
served time for armed robbery and car theft convictions.657 Chrisman claimed that he decided to
help the government because “after 9/11 Muslim scholars in Saudi Arabia and Morocco said that
it was incumbent on Muslims to stop terrorists.”658 They met at the video store where Shareef was
working and hours later moved into Chrisman’s home. According to Chrisman, “He was
supposed to move in with his manager. I told him he was better off staying with me, a Muslim
staying with a Muslim.”659
Shareef was unaware that Chrisman was secretly recording their conversations which included his
confiding to Chrisman that he wanted to commit acts of violent jihad against civilians. Shareef
also discussed shooting a judge in DeKalb, IL, and attacking local buildings including city hall,
the federal courthouse and the shopping center.660 Shareef also told Chrisman that he wanted to
obtain weapons to commit violent jihad. Chrisman said he had a friend who could do so and
would introduce them. However, the “friend” was an undercover FBI agent.661
On November 30, and December 1, 2006, Shareef and Chrisman cased the CherryVale mall and
allegedly plotted a grenade attack. The following day, Shareef and Chrisman made video tapes
that included a last will and testament for each. On the video, Shareef again mentioned jihad and
said, “This is a warning to those who disbelieve, that we are here for you and I am ready to give
my life.”662 On December 6, 2006, Shareef and the undercover agent met in the mall parking lot
to exchange the speakers for four dud grenades and the handgun and ammunition. After the
exchange, Shareef was arrested.
During an FBI interview on December 7, 2006, Shareef told FBI agents that he had been
“pushing himself to conduct the attack on the mall” and that “no one could have stopped” him,
“not even his mother.” He believed “it was the right jihad.” But he also told the agents that he
656 United States vs. Derrick Shareef, No. 06 CR 919, U.S. District Court, Northern District of Illinois, Eastern District,
January 4, 2007, http://www.justice.gov/usao/iln/indict/2007/us_v_shareef_indictment.pdf.
657 Melissa Bailey, “Ode to Osama,” New Haven Independent, November 28, 2007,
http://www.newhavenindependent.org/index.php/archives/entry/ode_to_osama/.
658 Michael Mayko, “FBI Informant Testifies in Terror Case,” Connecticut Post, November 30, 2007, quoted in NEFA
Foundation, “The Illinois Shopping Mall Plot,” December 2007, p. 2, http://nefafoundation.org/miscellaneous/
FeaturedDocs/ChicagoPlot1207.pdf. Hereinafter: NEFA Foundation, December 2007.
659 Ibid.
660 Pierre Thomas and Jason Ryan, “’Lone Wolf’ Charged With Plotting Attack During Christmas Rush,”
abcnews.com, December 8, 2006, http://abcnews.go.com/TheLaw/story?id=2710776&page=1. Hereinafter: Thomas
and Ryan, December 8, 2006.
661 Affidavit of Jared Ruddy, FBI, filed December 8, 2006 regarding criminal complaint, United States vs. Derrick
Shareef, No. 06 CR 919, U.S. District Court, Northern District of Illinois, Eastern District,
http://www.thesmokinggun.com/archive/1208061shareef1.html.
662 Thomas and Ryan, December 8, 2006.
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“viewed his arrest by the FBI as a blessing from Allah because the FBI stopped him from doing
something that Allah would have chastised him for.” Aware that “he does not have the authority to
speak on behalf of Islam,” Shareef asserted that he would “rather spend the rest of his life in jail
than live with the torment of having killed innocent people and having acted against Allah’s
desires.”663
On November 28, 2007, Shareef pled guilty to one count of attempting to use a weapon of mass
destruction. He was sentenced on September 30, 2008, to 35 years in prison.
Houston Taliban Plot—November 2006
In November 2006, the government alleged that four men—Kobie Diallo Williams, an American
Muslim convert; and three foreign national students, Adnan Baber Mirza, Syed Maaz Shah, and
Shiraz Syed Qazi—conspired to support the Taliban, unlawfully possess firearms, and to train
with firearms to prepare to join the Taliban “to engage in battlefield jihad.”664 Specifically they
were accused of meeting at shooting ranges and camp sites in Texas on at least eight occasions in
2005 and 2006 “for the purpose of conducting firearms and paramilitary training to hone their
skills with weapons and to assist fighters engaging United States forces in Afghanistan, Pakistan,
and Iraq.” They were also accused of making a contribution of goods and services to the
Taliban.665
The government used two informants to build the case against the four. One of the informants
told federal agents he was concerned that some of the men were preparing for armed conflict
overseas. A 2005 camping trip was part of a government setup using the informants to catch the
men.666
• Kobie Diallo Williams, a former University of Houston student, pled guilty soon
after his arrest to conspiring to unlawfully possess firearms and supporting the
Taliban. On August 7, 2009, he was sentenced to 4-1/2 years in prison.667
• Syed Maaz Shah, a Pakistani national studying at the University of Texas,
Dallas, was convicted on May 24, 2007, on firearms charges, was sentenced to
six years in prison, and will be deported after he has served his sentence.668
• Shiraz Syed Qazi, a Pakistani national who was a student at Houston
Community College, was convicted on January 21, 2007, on a firearms charge
663 United States v. Hassan Abujihaad, U.S. District Court for Connecticut, Crim. No. 3:07-CR-57; Exhibit 3, Federal
Bureau of Investigation FD-302 of Derrick L. Shareef, Interview conducted December 7, 2006; in NEFA Foundation,
December 2007, p. 5.
664 Anti Defamation League, “Houston Man Sentenced for Supporting the Taliban, adl.com, May 27, 2010,
http://www.adl.org/main_Terrorism/houston_taliban.htm. Hereinafter: ADL, May 27, 2010.
665 United States vs. Kobie Diallo Williams and Adnan Babar Mirza, H06-421, U.S. District Court, Southern District of
Texas, November 22, 2006 (unsealed Nov 28, 2006), http://nefafoundation.org/miscellaneous/FeaturedDocs/
U.S._v_Williams_Indictment.pdf.
666 Mary Flood, “Houston Taliban Supporter Gets 4-1/2 Years in Prison,” Houston Chronicle, Aug 7, 2009,
http://www.chron.com/disp/story.mpl/metropolitan/6564474.html.
667 Ibid.
668 Jason Trahan, “UTD Student Convicted for Having Weapon,” The Dallas Morning News, May 24, 2007,
http://www.dallasnews.com/sharedcontent/dws/news/localnews/stories/052507dntexterrorcharges.271768e.html.
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and sentenced to 10 months in prison. He was released in September 2007 after
credit for time served.669
• Adnan Baber Mirza, a Pakistani national who was a student at Houston
Community College but had overstayed his student visa, was convicted on May
27, 2010, of two conspiracy counts and seven firearms violations. He faces up to
five years in prison on each conspiracy count and 10 years on the weapons counts
when he is sentenced.670
The Liberty City Seven—Plot to Bomb Sears Tower in Chicago—
June 2006
On June 22, 2006, seven men—Narseal Batiste, Patrick Abraham, Stanley Grant Phanor,
Naudimar Herrera, Burson Augustin, Lyglenson Lemorin, and Rotschild Augustine—were
arrested for allegedly plotting to blow up the Sears Tower in Chicago, the FBI building in North
Miami Beach, and other government buildings in Miami-Dade County. Five of the men are U.S.
citizens, Abraham is a legal permanent resident from Haiti, and Lemorin is a Haitian national
illegally present in the United States. Each were charged with four counts: conspiracy to provide
material support to a terrorist organization, namely Al Qaeda; conspiracy to provide material
support and resources to terrorists; conspiracy to maliciously damage and destroy buildings by
means of an explosive device; and conspiracy to levy war against the government of the United
States.671
The indictment alleges that Batiste intended to recruit and supervise individuals to organize and
train for a mission of war against the United States, which included a plot to destroy by
explosives the Sears Tower in Chicago, IL.672 It also alleges that Batiste and his co-conspirators
attempted to obtain the support of Al Qaeda for their plot.673 The indictment further alleges that
Batiste detailed (to an FBI informant posing as an ‘Al Qaeda representative’) “his mission to
wage a ‘full ground war’ against the United States in order to ‘kill all the devils we can,’ in a
mission that would ‘be just as good or better than 9/11,’ beginning with the destruction of the
Sears Tower.”674
The arrests resulted from an investigation involving two FBI informants and recordings and
videotapes of the conspirators discussing their plot. The Washington Post cites court papers that
indicate that one of the informants took a key role in the plotting. “Not only did government
informants provide money and a meeting place for Batiste and his followers, but they also gave
them video cameras for conducting surveillance, as well as cell phones, and suggested that their
669 ADL, May 27, 2010.
670 Mary Flood, “Ex-HCC Student Convicted of Trying to Help Taliban,” Houston Chronicle, May 28, 2010,
http://www.chron.com/disp/story.mpl/metropolitan/7026012.html.
671 DOJ, “Transcript of Press Conference Announcing Florida Terrorism Indictments,” June 23, 2006. Hereinafter: DOJ
Press Conference, June 23, 2006. http://www.nefafoundation.org/miscellaneous/Miami_Plot.pdf.
672 United States v. Narseal Batiste, et al., Case No. 06-20373, U.S. District Court, Southern District of Florida, June
22, 2006, p. 3, http://nefafoundation.org/miscellaneous/FeaturedDocs/U.S._v_Batiste_GovtsResponse.pdf.
673 Ibid, p.4.
674 Ibid, pp. 5-6.
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first target be a Miami FBI office.”675 Both informants were paid for their services and one was
given approval of his petition for political asylum in the United States.676
Defense attorneys for the Liberty City Seven men called the case an outrageous example of
government entrapment claiming they had neither the will nor the means to carry out the
crimes.677 In 2007, the jury in the first trial of the defendants acquitted Lyglenson Lemorin of all
charges, but could not reach a verdict on the others. Lemorin was subsequently taken into
immigration custody and was ordered deported in 2009. A second trial was held in 2008 and
again the jury failed to reach verdicts against the six remaining defendants.
A third trial was held in 2009. The jury in that trial acquitted Naudimar Herrera of all charges, but
convicted alleged ringleader Narseal Batiste on all four counts; Patrick Abraham on three counts;
and Stanley Grant Phanor, Burson Augustin, and Rotschild Augustine on two counts each.678 In
November 2009, Narseal Batiste was sentenced to 13-1/2 years in prison. Burson Augustin and
Rotschild Augustine were sentenced to six and seven years, respectively. Stanley Phanor and
Patrick Abraham were sentenced to eight and nine years, respectively. In November 2011, a
federal appeals court upheld the convictions of all five men.679
Ehsanul Islam Sadequee and Syed Haris Ahmed—Plot to Attack
Buildings in Washington, DC—April 2006
Two men living in Atlanta, GA—Ehsanul Islam Sadequee, a U.S. citizen born in Virginia, and
Syed Haris Ahmed, a naturalized U.S. citizen from Pakistan, were charged in April 2006 with
conspiracy to provide material support to a designated foreign terrorist organization and lying to
the FBI. Prosecutors alleged that in 2005, when Ahmed and Sadequee were ages 18 and 20
respectively, they discussed violent jihad on several web forums which later grew into an active
conspiracy to commit terrorist acts. Specifically, they were accused of traveling to Canada to
discuss potential terrorist targets with members of the “Toronto 18,”680 a group alleged by the
government of Canada to be members of an Islamic terrorist cell that had plotted a series of
attacks against targets in Ontario until their arrests in June 2006.681
According to a Canadian Security Intelligence Service informant, the two Americans also
discussed with the group whether they would be able to hide in Canada if they were to carry out
attacks in the United States.682 Sadequee and Ahmed were also alleged to have videotaped
675 Pincus, September 2, 2006.
676 Walter Pincus, “FBI Role in Terror Probe Questioned,” The Washington Post, September 2, 2006,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/09/01/AR2006090101764.html. Hereinafter: Pincus,
September 2, 2006,
677 Carol J. Williams, “A Case of Terror or Entrapment,” Los Angeles Times, November 30, 2007,
http://articles.latimes.com/2007/nov/30/nation/na-liberty30.
678 Damien Cave and Carmen Gentile, “Five Convicted in Plot to Blow Up Sears Tower,” New York Times, May 13,
2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/13/us/13miami.html.
679 Curt Anderson, “Court Upholds Convictions of 5 in Fla. Terror Plot,” Associated Press, November 1, 2011.
680 For an overview and status of the “Toronto 18” cases, see “Toronto 18: Key Events in Case,” CBC News,
http://www.cbc.ca/canada/story/2008/06/02/f-toronto-timeline.html.
681 DOJ Press Release, “Terrorism Defendants Sentenced in Atlanta,” December 14, 2009, http://www.justice.gov/opa/
pr/2009/December/09-nsd-1338.html. Hereinafter: DOJ Press Release, December 14, 2009.
682 PBS, Frontline, “Canada: The Cell Next Door,” January 30, 2007, http://www.pbs.org/frontlineworld/about/
(continued...)
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potential targets in the Washington, DC, area including the U.S. Capitol and the World Bank
headquarters, the Masonic Temple, and a fuel farm. Later, Sadequee sent several of the videos to
Younis Tsouli, a propagandist and recruiter for Al Qaeda and Asbid Hussein Khan, a facilitator
for Lashkar-e-Taiba, both of whom are serving prison sentences in Great Britain for terrorism-
related offenses.683
The two men pled not guilty to the charges, but were convicted in separate trials in August 2009.
In December, Sadequee was sentenced to 17 years and Ahmed to 13 years in prison.684
Mohammed Reza Taheri-Azar—Attempted Vehicular Murder at the
University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill—March 2006
On March 3, 2006, Mohammed Reza Taheri-Azar, a naturalized American citizen from Iran,
drove his sport utility vehicle (SUV) into a crowd at The Pit, a popular student gathering spot at
the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. The SUV struck several people, although none
were injured seriously. Taheri-Azar was charged the next day with nine counts of attempted
murder.
It was reported that police found a letter in Taheri-Azar’s apartment that said he wanted revenge
for the deaths of Muslims overseas that he said were caused by the United States. He said he
rented a Jeep Cherokee because it was better equipped for what he planned to do.685 The chief of
the University’s police department confirmed that Taheri-Azar told investigators that he wanted to
“avenge the deaths or murders of Muslims around the world.”686
Taheri-Azar pled guilty to two counts of attempted murder. On August 26, 2008, he was
sentenced to 33 years in prison.687
Toledo, Ohio Plotters—Travel Abroad to Kill Americans—
February 2006
On February 21, 2006, three residents of Toledo, OH—Mohammad Zaki Amawi, a dual U.S.
and Jordanian citizen; Marwan Othman El-Hindi, a naturalized U.S. citizen from Jordan; and
Wassim I. Mazloum, a legal permanent resident from Lebanon, were charged with conspiracy to
kill or maim persons in locations outside the United States, to include U.S. Armed Forces
personnel serving in Iraq.688 The indictment alleges several overt acts in furtherance of the
conspiracy. These acts included meeting another individual called “the trainer” (who was actually
(...continued)
episodes/602_transcript.html.
683 DOJ Press Release, December 14, 2009.
684 Ibid.
685 Ibid.
686 “Driver Charged for Plowing Through Crowd,” msnbc.com, March 5, 2006, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/
11660817/.
687 Associated Press, August 26, 2008.
688 U.S.A. vs. Mohammad Zaki Amawi, et al., Indictment 3:06CR0719, U.S. District Court for the Northern District of
Ohio, Western Division, February 16, 2006, p. 2, http://www.justice.gov/opa/documents/indictment_22006.pdf.
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an undercover informant) to discuss and plan violent jihadist training. Following those meetings,
the informant engaged in an instructional session on the construction and use of improvised
explosive devices and timing devices, sought explosives, and participated in weapons training and
practiced target shooting on several occasions.689
During a news conference announcing the charges, the agent in charge of the FBI’s
Cleveland office credited the Muslim and Arab Americancommunity for passing along the
information that ultimately led to the arrest of the three. He said individuals within Toledo’s
Muslim community contacted the FBI about what he termed the “violent and radical views” the
suspects were articulating.690
On June 13, 2008, a federal jury convicted all three of conspiring to commit terrorist acts against
Americans overseas and providing material support to terrorists. On October 21, 2009, Amawi
was sentenced to 20 years in prison, El-Hindi to 12 years in prison, and Mazloum to 8 years, 4
months in prison.691
Two cousins from Illinois, Zubair Ahmed and Khaleel Ahmed, who had connections to the
three Toledo men, pled guilty on January 15, 2009, to one count of conspiracy to provide material
support or resources to terrorists. It was alleged that Marwan Othman El-Hindi introduced the
two men to the undercover informant known as “the trainer.” During this meeting, the cousins
allegedly discussed sniper tactics and surveillance techniques, and said they were willing to travel
abroad to carry out terror attacks.692 In 2004, both had traveled to Cairo hoping to eventually go
to Afghanistan or Iraq, but returned home after Zubair’s father, Haris Ahmed, learned of their
intentions. On July 12, 2010, Zubair Ahmed was sentenced to 10 years in prison, while Khaleel
Ahmed received an 8-year, 4-month sentence.693
Jamiyyat Ul-Islam Is-Saheeh (JIS)—Plot to Attack Targets in
Southern California—August 2005
Kevin James, Levar Haley Washington, Gregory Vernon Patterson, and Hammad Riaz Samana,
were arrested and charged in August 2005 for their involvement in a plot to attack Jewish
institutions and other targets in the Los Angeles area, including synagogues, the Israeli Consulate,
Los Angeles International Airport, U.S. military recruiting offices, and military bases.694
689 Ibid, p. 4.
690 “Toledo’s Arab Community Called “Crucial” to Terrorism Investigation,” wtol.com, February 21, 2006,
http://www.wtol.com/Global/story.asp?S=4533250.
691 Anti Defamation League, “Three Men Face Terrorism Charges in Ohio,” adl.org, October 21, 2009,
http://www.adl.org/main_Terrorism/Ohio_men_trial.htm.
692 Anti Defamation League, “Chicago Cousins Plead Guilty in Terrorism Case,” adl.org, January 26, 2009,
http://www.adl.org/main_Terrorism/ahmed_cousins_guilty.htm.
693 Richard A. Serrano, “Cousins Sentence in Ohio on Terrorism Charges,” latimes.com. July 12, 2010,
http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/nation/wire/sc-dc-0713-ohio-terror.-20100712,0,6294758,print.story.
694 Anti-Defamation League, “Two Sentenced in Los Angeles Terror Plot against Jewish Institutions,” adl.com, August
24, 2008, http://www.adl.org/main_Terrorism/los_angeles_sentenced.htm.
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• Kevin James, the apparent leader of the terror cell, pled guilty to conspiring to
levy war against the United States and was sentenced on March 6, 2009, to 16
years in prison.695
• Levar Washington pled guilty to levy war against the United States through
terrorism and conspiracy to possess and discharge firearms and was sentenced to
22 years in prison. He was sentenced to an additional 22 years in prison on
August 25, 2008, on related robbery and weapons charges.696
• Gregory Patterson pled guilty to conspiracy to levy war against the United
States through terrorism and conspiracy to possess and discharge firearms and
was sentenced to 12 years in prison.697
• Hammad Samana, a legal U.S. resident from Pakistan, conducted Internet-based
research of the targets and was the getaway driver for at least one of the gas
station robberies (see below), according to a U.S. federal judge. He was later
convicted and sentenced in August 2009 to 70 months in prison.698
In 1997, James founded Jam’iyyat Ul-Islam Is-Saheeh (JIS)—Arabic for Assembly of Authentic
Islam—a group based on his interpretation of Islam, according to court documents. James’ views
are apparent in several documents he wrote in prison, including a 104-page document titled the
JIS Protocol. In this document, James supports the establishment of an Islamic Caliphate in the
U.S. and describes “Jihad [as] the only true ‘anti-terrorist action’ [,] a defensive battle against the
aggression of theological imposters led by Zionism.”699 The document also advocated the killing
of “lawful targets,” including non-Muslims.
James met Washington in prison in 2004 and introduced him to JIS and its beliefs. Washington,
who converted to Islam while he was in prison, recruited Patterson, an employee at Los Angeles
International Airport, and a fourth defendant, Hammad Riaz Samana, at the Jamaat-E-Masijudal
mosque in Inglewood, California, where they all worshipped. Both Patterson and Samana swore
allegiance to Washington and pledged to serve as “mujahideen,” according to court documents.700
According to the indictment, in July 2005, the men engaged in firearms training and physical
training at a park in Los Angeles in preparation for the attacks. In addition, the defendants
purchased weapons or otherwise tried to acquire weapons in furtherance of their terrorist
conspiracy and made efforts to raise money by robbing gas stations. The indictment alleges that
eleven times beginning on May 30, 2005, the defendants—armed with shotguns—robbed or
attempted to rob gas stations in several cities and towns in Southern California, including Los
Angeles, Torrance, Playa Del Ray, Bellflower, Pico Rivera, Walnut, Orange, Playa Vista, and
Fullerton.701
695 Ibid.
696 Ibid.
697 Ibid.
698 Ibid.
699 Ibid.
700 Ibid.
701 Ibid.
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Part of the funds obtained in these robberies was directly linked by the FBI to Patterson’s
purchase of a .223 caliber rifle. The men were arrested by the Torrance police after Patterson
dropped his cell phone at the scene of one of the robberies in July 2005. Police were able to
connect the robberies to the larger terror plot after authorities searched Washington and
Patterson’s apartment and discovered various Jihadist documents.702
Lodi, California, Case—The Hayats—Travel to Terrorist Training
Camp—June 2005
In Lodi, CA, Umer Hayat and Hamid Hayat, a Pakistani immigrant and his American son, were
arrested on June 5, 2005, after allegedly lying to the FBI about the son’s attendance at a terrorist
training camp in Pakistan. The son, Hamid Hayat was found guilty on April 25, 2006, of one
count of providing material support or resources to terrorists, and three counts of making false
statements to the FBI in matters related to international/domestic terrorism.
Prosecutors alleged that between October 2003 and November, 2004, Hayat attended a jihadi
training camp in Pakistan and ultimately returned to the United States with the intent to wage
violent jihad upon receipt of orders.703 Hayat confessed to FBI agents that he had attended a
terrorist training camp but his attorneys later argued that his admissions were fabrications
intended to appease the federal agents he hoped would let him go home. The nine-week trial was
reported to rely on that contested confession and conversations secretly taped by an FBI
informant who had been paid $200,000 to infiltrate Lodi’s large Muslim community after the 9/11
attacks.704
DOJ issued a press release stating:
According to evidence adduced at trial, between March, 2003 and August, 2003, defendant
Hayat, during the course of numerous recorded conversations with a cooperating witness,
pledged his belief in [violent] jihad, indicated that jihad was the duty of every Muslim,
indicated that he had knowledge of jihadi camps including Jaish-e-Muhammed camps in the
Balakot/Mansehar area, pledged to go to a jihadi training camp, and indicated that he, in fact,
was going to jihadi training after Ramadan in 2003 (which was to occur at the end of
November, 2003).705
In his closing comments to the jury, the Assistant U.S. Attorney stated: “Hamid Hayat had a jihadi
heart and a jihadi mind.”706 In interviews, several jurors said Hayat’s confession and evidence of
what the jury foreman called “un-Americanism” convinced them that he posed a danger.707 In
September 2006, Hamid Hayat was sentenced to 24 years in prison.
702 Ibid.
703 DOJ Press Release, “Hamid Hayat Sentenced to 24 Years in Connection with Terrorism Charges,” September 10,
2007, http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2007/September/07_nsd_700.html. Hereinafter: DOJ Press Release, September 10,
2007.
704 Eric Bailey “Lodi man gets 24 years in terrorism case” Los Angeles Times, September 11, 2007,
http://articles.latimes.com/2007/sep/11/local/me-lodi11. Hereinafter: Bailey, September 11, 2007.
705 DOJ Press Release, September 10, 2007.
706 Bailey, September 11, 2007.
707 Ibid.
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Umer Hayat, Hamid’s father, was tried by a separate federal jury in early 2006 for two counts of
making false statements to the FBI about having first-hand knowledge of terrorist training camps
in Pakistan and that his son had attended a jihadist training camp in Pakistan. That proceeding
ended in a mistrial when the jury was unable to reach a unanimous verdict. Umer Hayat later pled
guilty to making a false statement to the FBI and U.S. Customs and Border Protection about his
attempt to carry $28,000 into Pakistan. He was sentenced to time served.708
Albany, New York, Mosque Plot—August 2004
Two Albany, NY, residents, Yassin M. Aref, an Imam at the Masjid As Salam mosque in the city,
and Mohammed Mosharref Hossain, a pizzeria owner, were convicted of conspiring to aid a
terrorist group and provide support for a weapon of mass destruction, as well as money-
laundering and supporting a foreign terrorist organization. They were sentenced to 15 years in
prison. Aref is a refugee from Iraqi Kurdistan and Hossain is an immigrant from Bangladesh who
has lived in the United States for over two decades.
The case was the result of a sting operation by the FBI which had been watching the Masjid As
Salam mosque since 2002 after one of its founders had been deported following the 9/11 attacks.
The FBI had an undercover informant befriend Hossain, a member of the mosque who was
reported to be having financial problems with his pizza business. The informant was a Pakistani
immigrant facing a long prison sentence and deportation after he had pled guilty to one felony
count of engaging in the production and transfer of false government identification documents.
After a period of time, Hossain asked the informant for a loan. The informant proposed a scheme
to launder through Hossain’s pizza shop and real estate holdings the proceeds of the sale of a
shoulder-fired surface-to-air missile, which was purportedly to be used in a fictitious plot to
assassinate Pakistan’s United Nation’s envoy.709
According to court records, the Kurdish Imam, Yassan Aref, was not approached by the
informant. Rather, Aref was enlisted by Hossain to witness the transactions under Muslim
tradition.710 However, federal authorities admitted that Aref was the “ultimate target” of the sting
operation. Two months after the sting began, American military forces found Aref’s name and
phone number in a notebook at a bombed out encampment in Iraq that the government contended
was occupied by “terrorists.”711 The notebook was said to contain a reference in the Kurdish
language to Aref as “commander” which led prosecutors to believe that Aref might be connected
to the Ansar al-Islam terrorist group. It was also cited by the judge in the case as grounds for
denying bail to the defendants.712
708 DOJ Press Release, September 10, 2007.
709 Brendan Lyons, “Mosque Welcomed In Informant,” timesunion.com, (Albany, NY), August 8, 2004,
http://www.timesunion.com/AspStories/story.asp?storyID=273922.
710 Brendan Lyons, “Terror Suspect Wants Own Trial,” timesunion.com, December 10, 2005,
http://www.timesunion.com/AspStories/story.asp?storyID=428450&category=REGIONOTHER&BCCode=LOCAL&
newsdate=12/10/2005&TextPage=1.
711 Brendan Lyons, “Suspects Raise Domestic Spy Issue,” timesunion.com, January 5, 2006,
http://www.timesunion.com/AspStories/story.asp?storyID=436432&category=REGION&newsdate=1/5/2006
Hereinafter: Lyons, January 5, 2006.
712 Marc Santora, “Key Evidence Cast in Doubt on a Claim of Terrorism,” New York Times, Aug 18, 2004,
http://www.nytimes.com/2004/08/18/nyregion/18missile.html.
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Later, however, federal prosecutors admitted to making an error and acknowledged that the word
in question could be translated as “brother,” rather than “commander.” The U.S. attorney for the
Northern District of New York was quoted as saying that the translation discrepancy was not
terribly significant. He said the heart of the case had to do with Mr. Aref’s and Mr. Hossain’s
failure to turn away from the fake plot even after they knew the intentions of the government
informer.713
Aref and Hossain were arrested on August 5, 2004, on a 19-count indictment charging them with
money laundering. The government subsequently added more charges, including allegations the
men conspired to provide material support to a Pakistani terrorist group.714
The case was not without controversy. Aref and Hossain maintained their innocence throughout
their trials. Defense attorneys claimed the two were entrapped. Pakistan angrily protested to
Washington over the FBI sting operation describing it as “a bizarre mission.”715 Albany’s two
main daily newspapers—the Albany Times Union and the Schenectady Daily Gazette—ran
editorials at the time of the sentencing asking for extreme leniency.716 Two of the columnists who
had followed the trial closely were also very critical of the prosecution.717 And several inmates at
the Rensselaer County Jail, where Aref and Hossain were being held, wrote letters to the judge in
the case vouching for the defendants’ good character and benign influence.718
After the indictment, an article in The New York Times quoted government officials as saying that
Aref’s case resulted from evidence gathered by the warrantless National Security Agency
domestic wiretapping program. On January 5, 2006, defense attorneys filed a motion to suppress
evidence and dismiss the indictment as the fruit of illegal surveillance.719 The district court denied
that motion in a sealed ex parte opinion based on a sealed ex parte submission by the
government. In July 2008, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals in New York affirmed the district
court’s ruling.
Shahawar Matin Siraj and James Elshafay—Plot to Bomb Herald
Square Subway Station in New York City—August 2004
Days before the 2004 Republican National Convention, which was held in New York City, James
Elshafay, a U.S. citizen, and Shahawar Matin Siraj, a Pakistani immigrant, were arrested for
plotting to bomb the Herald Square subway station in New York City. The station, near Madison
Square Garden, is the third busiest in the city’s transit system. The investigation was largely
713 Ibid.
714 Lyons, January 5, 2006.
715 Jim Lobe, “From One Blunder to the Next,” Asia Times, August 11, 2004, http://www.atimes.com/atimes/
South_Asia/FH11Df04.html.
716 The FBI responded by running an op-ed piece in the Daily Gazette upholding the sting operation as legitimate.
717 See Carl Strock, “The View from Here,” Schenectady Daily Gazette, February 4, 2007, http://www.nepajac.org/
Strock.htm; and Fred LeBrun, “History Will Remember Albany Terrorism Sting As A Witch Hunt,” Albany Times
Union, January 12, 2007, http://www.nepajac.org/FredLeBrun.htm.
718 Carl Strock, “Inmates Go To Bat for Aref and Hossain,” Schenectady Daily Gazette, March 22, 2007,
http://www.yassinaref.com/news/03-22-07_Strock.htm.
719 United States v. Aref and Hossain, Brief of Amicus Curiae of the American Civil Liberties Union and the New York
Civil Liberties Union, 07-0981-CR, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, August 24, 2007,
http://www.nyclu.org/node/1051.
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conducted by the NYPD’s Intelligence Division which used a paid informant, Osama Eldawoody,
an Egyptian-born nuclear engineer. Eldawoody testified that he volunteered to troll the city’s
mosques and Muslim communities out of patriotism and a desire to show that violent extremists
are the exception rather than the rule in Islam.720 Prosecutors at the Siraj’s trial played tapes
secretly recorded by Eldawoody in which Siraj discusses the plot to bomb the subway station “at
length and with great zeal.”721
James Elshafay immediately agreed to cooperate with the government and pled guilty to
involvement in the plot. Elshafay testified against Siraj at the latter’s trial. He acknowledged
taking medication for depression and schizophrenia and described the delusions that landed him
in a psychiatric ward just months before he conspired with Siraj to bomb the subway station.722
Elshafay was sentenced to five years in prison.
Siraj rejected a plea agreement and went to trial. His attorneys argued that he was entrapped by
the police informant, Osama Eldawoody. They also attacked the credibility of the informant on
the grounds that he was paid a total of $100,000 by the police. However, prosecutors called an
undercover detective who testified that he had had frequent conversations with Siraj long before
he met Eldawoody. “The conversations, the detective said, were filled with Mr. Siraj’s approval of
suicide bombings and Osama bin Laden.”723 The jury rejected the defense argument of
entrapment and convicted Siraj on four counts of conspiracy, including plotting to bomb a public
transportation system. He was sentenced in January 2007 to 30 years in prison.
Iyman Faris—Plot Against Brooklyn Bridge—June 2003
Iyman Faris, a naturalized U.S. citizen born in Kashmir, Pakistan, and living in Columbus, OH,
pled guilty on May 1, 2003, to casing the Brooklyn Bridge in New York City for Al Qaeda, and
researching and providing information to Al Qaeda regarding the tools necessary for possible
attacks on U.S. targets. According to DOJ, “Faris admitted that in April 2002, he researched “gas
cutters”—the equipment for severing bridge suspension cables—and the New York City bridge
on the Internet. Between April 2002 and March 2003, he sent several coded messages indicating
he had been unsuccessful in his attempts to obtain the necessary equipment. Faris admitted to
traveling to New York City in late 2002 to examine the bridge, and said he concluded that the plot
to destroy the bridge by severing cables was unlikely to succeed because of the bridge’s security
and structure. In early 2003, he sent a message that “the weather is too hot”—a coded message
indicating that the bridge plot was unlikely to succeed.724 He was sentenced to 20 years in prison.
Time Magazine reports that government officials were led to Faris by Khalid Shaikh
Mohammed, the high-ranking Al Qaeda operative and alleged mastermind of the 9/11 attacks
who is in U.S. custody. Reportedly, after Mohammed’s capture in Pakistan, agents discovered the
coded, “the weather is too hot” e-mail sent from the U.S. to one of his associates. The e-mail was
720 William K. Rashbaum, “Guilty Verdict in Plot to Bomb Subway Station,” New York Times, May 25, 2006,
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/05/25/nyregion/25herald.html. Hereinafter: Rashbaum, May 25, 2006.
721 William K. Rashbaum, “Staten Island Man Describes Shattered Life, Then Plot to Bomb Subway Station,” New
York Times, May 19, 2006, http://www.nytimes.com/2006/05/10/nyregion/10herald.html.
722 Ibid.
723 Rashbaum, May 25, 2006.
724 DOJ Press Release, “Iyman Faris Sentenced for Providing Material Support to Al Qaeda,” Oct 28, 2003,
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2003/October/03_crm_589.htm.
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one of the factors that helped investigators pull Faris’ name out of Mohammed during his
interrogations by U.S. authorities. Faris was then secretly detained two weeks later. Faris
acknowledged that he wrote the e-mail and was referring to the impossibility of an Al Qaeda plot
to bring down the sturdy, well-guarded Brooklyn Bridge by cutting its suspension cables.725
Sometime in March 2003, according to DOJ officials, FBI agents persuaded Faris to cooperate
with the government. Time Magazine quotes law-enforcement officials who say that he was
brought to a safe house in Virginia. “Faris sent messages to his bosses via cell phone and e-mail.
‘He was sitting in the safe house making calls for us,’ says a senior Administration official. ‘It
was a huge triumph for law enforcement.’”726
Ahmed Omar Abu Ali—Plot to Assassinate President Bush—
June 2003
Abu Ali, an American-born Muslim raised in Northern Virginia, was convicted on November 22,
2005, on nine terrorism charges, including conspiracy to assassinate President George W. Bush,
conspiracy to commit air piracy, and providing material support to Al Qaeda. Ali was originally
arrested by Saudi Arabian authorities in June 2003, while he was studying at the Islamic
University of Medina.727 The arrest came one month after an Al Qaeda attack on three residential
compounds in Riyadh had killed 27 foreign workers. He was held in Saudi custody for 20 months
without charges or access to an attorney. U.S. officials did not request extradition; however, FBI
agents participated in some of the interrogations.728
In the summer of 2004, Abu Ali’s family brought a civil suit in U.S. District Court seeking a writ
of habeas corpus. While that suit was pending, Abu Ali was returned to the United States and on
February 22, 2005, an indictment was unsealed charging him with six terrorism counts.729 Later, a
superseding indictment added additional charges.
The government’s case against Abu Ali was based primarily on evidence gathered by Saudi
authorities which included a videotaped confession. Although the assassination and hijacking
plots never got past the talking stage, it was alleged that between September 2002 and June 2003,
Abu Ali had met with several unnamed co-conspirators, two of whom were later revealed to be
leaders of an Al Qaeda cell in Medina—Sultan Jubran Sultan al-Qahtani, and Ali Abd al-
Rahman al-Faq’asi al-Ghamdi.730 Among the discussions with the co-conspirators were
“options for assassinating President Bush: (1) an operation in which Abu Ali would get close
enough to the President to shoot him on the street, and (2) an operation in which Abu Ali would
725 Daniel Eisenberg, et al., “The Triple Life of a Qaeda Man,” Time Magazine, June 30, 2003, http://www.time.com/
time/printout/0,8816,1005104,00.html.
726 Ibid.
727 Larry Abramson, “Jury Finds Abu Ali Guilty on Terrorism Charges,” National Public Radio, November 22, 2005,
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=5024013. Hereinafter: Abramson, National Public Radio,
November 22, 2005.
728 Spencer Ackerman, “Suspect Policy,” The New Republic, March 14, 2005, http://www.tnr.com/article/suspect-
policy-0.
729 United States v. Abu Ali, 1:05CR53, In the U.S. District for the Eastern District of Virginia, February 3, 2005,
http://www.foxnews.com/projects/pdf/AliIndictment.pdf. Hereinafter: U.S. vs. Ali, February 3, 2005.
730 United States v Abu Ali, No. 06-4334 and No. 06-4521, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, Jun 6, 2008,
http://pacer.ca4.uscourts.gov/opinion.pdf/064334.P.pdf.
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detonate a car bomb.”731 At trial, Abu Ali’s attorneys countered that while in Saudi custody their
client had been beaten and whipped repeatedly until he agreed to confess.732 But, the judge, jury,
and appellate court rejected that argument. A juror said after the trial that Abu Ali’s videotaped
confession was “chilling” and showed no sign of coercion.733
Abu Ali was originally sentenced to 30 years in prison. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit upheld the conviction and sent the case back for resentencing. The U.S. District judge
increased the sentence to life in prison which he is serving at the federal “Supermax” prison in
Florence, CO.
Virginia “Jihad” Network—June 2003
Eleven men from Northern Virginia were charged on June 27, 2003, with a variety of offenses
including weapons counts, providing material support to terrorist groups, and for violating the
Neutrality Act of 1939,734 which prohibits U.S. citizens and residents from attacking countries
with which the United States is at peace. The men were accused of being part of a jihadist
network whose objective was to wage holy war against nations deemed hostile to Islam. They
were dubbed by some in the media as the “Paintball” terrorists because they were alleged to have
used paintball games in the woods near Fredericksburg, VA, in 2000 and 2001 as military
training.735
After the indictment, 4 of the 11 men pled guilty and cooperated with the government. In a
superseding indictment on September 25, 2003, additional charges were levied against the 7
remaining defendants, including conspiracy to support terrorist organizations, namely Al Qaeda
and Lashkar-e-Taiba, (LeT) a Kashmiri-based group that has been designated by the U.S.
government as a terrorist organization.736 Two of these remaining defendants pled guilty in
January 2004.
In 2004 and 2005, charges were brought against two additional Northern Virginia residents. The
alleged spiritual leader of the group, Ali al-Timimi, was indicted in September 2004 for
counseling and inducing several of the other defendants to conspire to levy war against the United
States along with other charges. He was found guilty on April 26, 2005, on 10 counts and
sentenced to life in prison.737
The Washington Post reported that the heart of the government’s evidence against al-Timimi was
a meeting he attended in Fairfax, Virginia five days after the 9/11 attacks. Al-Timimi told his
731 U.S. vs. Ali, February 3, 2005.
732 Abramson, National Public Radio, November 22, 2005.
733 Jerry Markon, “Falls Church Man’s Sentence in Terror Plot is Increased to Life,” Washington Post, July 28, 2009,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/07/27/AR2009072701384.html.
734 The text of the act may be found within U.S. Department of State Publication 1983, Peace and War: United States
Foreign Policy, 1931-1941 (Washington, DC: U.S., Government Printing Office, 1943, pp. 494-505.
735 “Two ‘Paintball’ Terrorists Sentenced, Associated Press in foxnews.com, April 9, 2004, http://www.foxnews.com/
story/0,2933,116729,00.html.
736 Jerry Markon and Mary Beth Sheridan, “Indictment Expands Va. ‘Jihad’ Charges,” The Washington Post,
September 26, 2003, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A2730-2003Sep25.html.
737 U.S. Attorneys’ Office, Eastern District of Virginia; News Release, April 26, 2005,
http://www.investigativeproject.org/documents/case_docs/73.pdf.
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followers that ‘the time had come for them to go abroad and join the mujaheddin engaged in
violent jihad in Afghanistan,’ according to court papers.738 Defense lawyers claimed his rhetoric
merely reflected his right to free speech. After seven days of deliberation, the jury rejected that
argument. At sentencing, the judge said she was satisfied that the case did not “violate any of al-
Timimi’s First Amendment rights. This is not a case about speech. This is a case about intent.”739
On September 15, 2005, prosecutors also charged Ali Asad Chandia as part of the Virginia Jihad
Network conspiracy. Chandia, a former teacher at a Muslim school in Maryland, was accused of
assisting an LeT operative, Mohammed Ajmal Khan, in procuring military-purpose equipment
for use against India. Evidence was presented at trial that Chandia made a three-month trip to
Pakistan in 2001-2002 where he met and allied with Khan who is currently serving a nine-year
sentence in Britain for his terrorist activities.740 Chandia was convicted on June 6, 2006, and
sentenced to 15 years in prison.
The following is a summary of the disposition of all of the accused defendants:741
• Ali Al-Timimi—an Iraqi AmericanU.S. citizen, was convicted on April 26, 2005,
and sentenced to life in prison for soliciting treason, counseling and inducing
others to wage war against the United States, and using firearms and explosives
in furtherance of those offenses.
• Ali Asad Chandia—a Pakistani AmericanU.S. citizen, was convicted on June 6,
2006, and sentenced to 15 years, for providing material support to the LeT.
• Masaud Khan—a Pakistani AmericanU.S. citizen, was convicted on March 4,
2004, and sentenced to life in prison for conspiring to wage war against the
United States, providing material support to LeT, and using automatic weapons in
furtherance of crimes of violence.
• Seifullah Chapman—a U.S. citizen, was convicted on March 4, 2004, and
sentenced to 85 years (later reduced to 65 years) in prison for conspiring to
provide material support to LeT, violating the Neutrality Act of 1939, using
firearms in furtherance of crimes of violence, and using an automatic weapon in
furtherance of crimes of violence.
• Caliph Basha Abdur-Raheem—a U.S. citizen, was acquitted of all charges on
February 20, 2004.
• Randall Royer—a U.S. citizen, pled guilty in January 2004 and was sentenced
to 20 years in prison for aiding and abetting the use and discharge of a firearm
during and in relation to a crime of violence, and of aiding and abetting the
carrying of an explosive during the commission of a felony.
738 Jerry Markon, “Muslim Lecturer Sentenced to Life,” The Washington Post, July 14, 2005,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/07/13/AR2005071302169.html.
739 Ibid.
740 The Times of India, “Teacher Jailed for Aiding LeT,” August 26, 2006, http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/
articleshow/1929483.cms.
741 DOJ Press Release, April 26, 2005, http://www.investigativeproject.org/documents/case_docs/73.pdf; U.S.
Attorneys’ Office, Eastern District of Virginia; Press Release, “’Virginia Jihad’ Member Sentenced to 121 Months in
Prison,” July 24, 2007, http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/vae/Pressreleases/07-JulyPDFArchive/07/20070724benkahlanr...
7/25/2007.
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• Ibrahim Al-Hamdi—a Yemeni national, pled guilty in January 2004, and was
sentenced to 17 years in prison for unlawfully possessing a firearm, possessing a
firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence, and carrying an explosive—
specifically, a rocket-propelled grenade—during the commission of a crime.
• Yong Ki Kwon—a naturalized U.S. citizen from Korea, pled guilty in August
2003, and was sentenced to 11 years, 6 months for conspiring to commit an
offense against the United States, using a firearm in connection with a crime of
violence, and transferring a firearm for use in a crime of violence.
• Sabri Benkhala, a U.S. citizen, was acquitted in March 2004 of charges related
to the original June 2003 indictment. He was then granted statutory immunity
and testified twice before the grand jury, and submitted to interviews with the
FBI. He was subsequently convicted in February 2007 of making materially false
statements in 2004, both in his grand jury appearances and to the FBI. He was
sentenced to 10 years, 1 month in prison.
• Khwaja Mahmood Hasan—a naturalized U.S. citizen from Pakistan, pled guilty
in August 2003, and was sentenced to 11 years, 3 months in prison for conspiring
to commit an offense against the United States, and using a firearm in connection
with a crime of violence.
• Muhammed Aatique—a legal resident from Pakistan, pled guilty in September
2003, and was sentenced to 10 years, 2 months, for aiding others in commencing
a military expedition against a friendly nation and using and discharging a
firearm in relation to a crime of violence.
• Hammad Abdur-Raheem—a U.S. citizen (and no relation to acquitted
defendant Caliph Basha Abdur-Raheem), was convicted on March 4, 2004, and
was sentenced to 52 months in prison for conspiring to provide material support
to LeT and violating the Neutrality Act of 1939.
• Donald Thomas Surratt—a U.S. citizen, pled guilty in August 2003, and was
sentenced to three years, 10 months for conspiring to commit an offense against
the United States and transporting a firearm in interstate commerce with reason
to know a felony would be committed with it.
Hasan Akbar—Attack on Soldiers at U.S. Army Post in Kuwait—
March 23, 2003
On March 23, 2003, two days after the U.S. invasion of Iraq, U.S. Army Sergeant Hasan Akbar
killed two U.S. Army officers and wounded 14 others at Camp Pennsylvania in Kuwait, 25 miles
from the Iraq border. At approximately 1:30 a.m., Akbar shut off the generator that lit the camp,
then tossed grenades into three tents where officers were asleep or preparing for bed. He is
reported to have yelled, “We are under attack.” As soldiers rushed outside, he opened fire with an
M-4 automatic rifle.742
Akbar was born Mark Fidel Kools in 1971. His mother said she changed his name to Hasan
Akbar after she remarried when he was a young boy. The family into which she married were
742 NEFA Backgrounder: Hasan Akbar, January 2010.
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members of the Nation of Islam. In 1988, Akbar enrolled at the University of California, Davis,
with a double major in aeronautical and mechanical engineering. He graduated nine years later
with a bachelor’s degree and joined the Army in 1998.743
The attack has been attributed to various motivations. Military criminal investigators reported that
Akbar had been recently reprimanded for insubordination and was told he would not join his
unit’s push into Iraq. An Army spokesman said Akbar had been having “an attitude problem.”
Another spokesman stated that the motive in the attack “most likely was resentment.”744
At his April 2005 court martial, Akbar’s attorney argued that Akbar was concerned the invasion
of Iraq would result in the deaths of Muslims and that U.S. soldiers would rape Iraqi women. He
said the prosecution’s depiction of Akbar as a cold-blooded killer ignored that the defendant was
sufficiently mentally ill—though not insane—to be confused and fearful about the impending
invasion of Iraq.745
Writing of his fellow soldiers in a diary entry dated February 4, 2003, he stated:
I suppose they want to punk me or just humiliate me. Perhaps they feel that I will not do
anything about that. They are right about that. I am not going to do anything about it as long
as I stay here. But as soon as I am in Iraq, I am going to try and kill as many of them as
possible.
I will have to decide to kill my Muslim brothers fighting for Saddam Hussein or my battle
buddies. I am hoping to get into a position so I don't have to take any crap from anyone
anymore.746
On April 22, 2005, after two and one-half hours deliberation, a military jury at Fort Bragg
convicted Akbar of two counts of premeditated murder and three counts of attempted
premeditated murder. He was sentenced to death one week later. Akbar is the first American since
the Vietnam era to be prosecuted on charges of murdering a fellow soldier during wartime.747
Lackawanna Six –Training at Al Qaeda Camp –September 2002
Six American citizens of Yemeni descent were arrested on September 13, 2002, and later charged
with providing material support to a terrorist organization. The press dubbed the six suspects—
Sahim Alwan, Yahya Goba, Shafal Mosed, Yasein Taher, Faysal Galab, and Mukhtar al-
Bakri—the “Lackawanna Six” (also the “Buffalo Six” or “Buffalo Cell”) because five of them
were born and raised in Lackawanna, a suburb of Buffalo, NY.
743 “Akbar Convicted of Murder,” Associated Press, in FoxNews.com, April 22, 2005, http://www.foxnews.com/story/
0,2933,154220,00.html. Hereinafter: “Akbar Convicted of Murder,” April 22, 2005.
744 “Army: U.S. Soldier Acted Out of Resentment in Grenade Attack,” Associated Press, in FoxNews.com, March 24,
2003, http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,81898,00.html.
745 Akbar Convicted of Murder,” April 22, 2005.
746 Quoted in Daniel Pipes, “Hasan Akbar’s Chilling Diary Entries,” April 15, 2010, http://www.danielpipes.org/blog/
2005/04/hasan-akbars-chilling-diary-entries.
747 “Akbar Convicted of Murder,” Associated Press in Fox News, April 22, 2005, http://www.foxnews.com/story/
0,2933,154220,00.html.
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Prosecutors alleged that in the spring of 2001, the men traveled to Afghanistan, where they
attended Al Farooq training camp. Three of the men—Taher, Galab, and Mosed—traveled in one
group in April 2001, going from Canada to Pakistan via London and the United Arab Emirates.
The four others—Alwan, Goba, al-Bakri, and Elbaneh—allegedly traveled from New York to
Pakistan in May 2001. Once in Pakistan, they allegedly crossed over the border in Afghanistan to
attend the training camp. The men stayed for five to six weeks, except for Alwan, who left after
10 days.748 The men later admitted to authorities that while at Al Farooq camp they were trained
in the use of automatic weapons, including Kalashnikovs, M-16 rifles, rocket-propelled grenade
launchers, and explosives. They also met Osama bin Laden.749
The Lackawanna Six first came to the attention of authorities in the spring of 2001 when the FBI
received an anonymous, handwritten letter apparently from someone in Lackawanna’s Yemeni
community. The letter said that a group has traveled to “meet bin Laden and stay in his camp for
training.”750 Subsequently, the FBI interviewed one of the men, Sahim Alwan, when he returned
from abroad. Alwan, however, told the FBI that he only traveled to Pakistan for religious training.
Another member, Mukhtar Al-Bakri, came under increased surveillance after the U.S.
government reviewed and analyzed an e-mail he sent while traveling in Saudi Arabia. The e-mail
referred to an upcoming “big meal” that authorities interpreted as a code for an impending
terrorist attack.751 Additional intelligence information was later received that suggested the
Lackawanna suspects were the targets of an Al Qaeda recruitment operation.752 In the tense
atmosphere after the 9/11 attacks, this led to concerns that the group may be a sleeper cell.753
When the FBI learned that al-Bakri had traveled to Bahrain to get married, they asked authorities
there to detain him. During an interview with an Arabic-speaking FBI agent, a-Bakri admitted to
having attended Al Farooq camp and named the other members of the Lackawanna Six, who were
then subsequently arrested on September 13, 2002.
In their joint report, “Chasing the Sleeper Cell,”754 The New York Times and Public Broadcasting
Service’s (PBS’s) Frontline summarized the disposition of the Lackawanna Six and others
associated with the case:
• Sahim Alwan was a college-educated, married man with three children. After he
arrived at Al Farooq camp, Alwan claimed he quickly had a change of heart and
begged the camp authorities to let him return home. He was allowed to leave, but
first was taken to a personal meeting with bin Laden, in which Al Qaeda’s leader
748 Susan Candiotti, “Prosecutors: No bail for six accused of helping al Qaeda,” CNN.com, September 19, 2002,
http://archives.cnn.com/2002/LAW/09/18/buffalo.terror.probe/.
749 DOJ Press Release, “U.S. Attorney’s Office Successfully Concludes Terrorism Case, With Sixth Conviction of Al
Qaeda Supporter,” May 19, 2003, http://www.investigativeproject.org/documents/case_docs/898.pdf.
750 PBS, “Chasing the Sleeper Cell,” October 16, 2003, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/sleeper/etc/
synopsis.html. Hereinafter: PBS, October 16, 2003.
751 Ibid.
752 Ibid.
753 Dina Temple-Raston, “How Great a Threat Were the Lackawanna Six?,” Morning Edition, National Public Radio,
September 10, 2007, based on the book: Dina Temple-Raston, The Jihad Next Door: The Lackawanna Six and Rough
Justice in the Age of Terror, (New York: PublicAffairs, 2007). http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=
14285994.
754 PBS, October 16, 2003.
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asked about the status of Muslims in the United States. He was also asked by a
bin Laden associate to deliver two copies of a videotape showing the bombing of
the USS Cole to a contact in Pakistan, which he did. After being confronted with
information obtained from the arrest and interrogation of Mukhtar al-Bakri,
Alwan confessed to the FBI and in April 2003, pled guilty to material support of
terrorism. He was sentenced to nine and a half years in prison.
• Yahya Goba did not grow up in Lackawanna. He was born in The Bronx, was
raised for a while in Yemen, and moved to Western New York in the late 1996. In
his March 2003 guilty plea, Goba admitted having trained to use firearms,
including a rocket-propelled grenade launcher, as well as explosives. He also said
that Osama bin Laden had spoken at the camp of men “willing to become martyrs
for the cause.” In December 2003, Goba was sentenced to 10 years in prison.
• Shafal Mosed pled guilty in March 2003 to providing material support to Al
Qaeda and was sentenced to eight years in prison.
• Yasein Taher pled guilty in May 2003 to providing material support to Al Qaeda
and was sentenced to eight years in prison.
• Faysal Galab was the first of the Lackawanna Six to pled guilty to material
support of terrorism in January 2003. In his plea, he admitted to traveling to the
camp, knowing that the trip was illegal, and receiving weapons training. He also
acknowledged Osama bin Laden had spoken at the camp. He was sentenced to
seven years in prison.
• Mukhtar al-Bakri was arrested on his wedding night in a hotel room in
Manama, Bahrain. During his FBI interview, he was the first to admit that the
group had not attended religious training in Pakistan, but rather traveled to the
terrorist training camp in Afghanistan. His confession paved the way for the FBI
to bring charges against the Lackwanna men. He also admitted that he trained in
the use of weapons and explosives at an Al Qaeda camp. In June 2003, he was
the last of the six to pled guilty to material support and was sentenced to 10 years
in prison.
Three other men were also implicated in the Lackawanna Six case. Authorities believe the three
played roles in the recruitment of the Lackwanna Six:
• Kemal Derwish was born in Buffalo and raised in Saudi Arabia. He reportedly
had trained in Al Qaeda camps in Afghanistan and fought with Muslims in
Bosnia. U.S. intelligence sources say the Saudi government deported Derwish in
1997 for alleged extremist activities. He spent a year in Yemen before heading
back to his hometown of Lackawanna in 1998 where he began giving informal
talks at a local mosque. The group met in his apartment, where he reportedly told
them that attacks on Muslims around the world obligate them to train for jihad to
defend their Muslim brothers. Authorities believe that the trip by the group to
Afghanistan grew out of religious discussions led by Derwish. He was reportedly
killed in 2002 by a CIA Predator drone that was tracking Qaed Salim Sinan al
Harethi, known as “Abu Ali,” and believed to be one of the planners of the USS
Cole bombing.755
755 Ibid.
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• Juma Al Dosari is described as a Muslim fighter and itinerant Imam from Saudi
Arabia, who is believed to have fought with Derwish in Bosnia. Upon his arrival
in Lackawanna, the reportedly charismatic Al Dosari gave a sermon railing
against Arab governments who do nothing while Muslims die on a daily basis.
According to people in the community, the leaders of the Lackawanna mosque
were so troubled by Al Dosari’s militant tone that he was not invited back. Two
weeks after the 9/11 attacks, Al Dosari left Lackawanna to fight with the Taliban
in Afghanistan. He was captured sometime in the fall of 2001 and declared an
enemy combatant. He was subsequently sent to the special prison camp at the
U.S. Naval Base on Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. His interrogation there led to the
information that the Lackawanna Six were the targets of an Al Qaeda recruitment
operation. In 2007, after five years of the detention at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, he
was released to Saudi Arabia, with no charges against him.756
• Jaber A. Elbaneh, a Yemeni Americanalso attended Al Farooq training camp
with al-Bakri, Alwan and Goba. At the camp, Elbaneh told Alwan that he wanted
to fight with the Taliban and was willing to become a martyr. He never returned
to the U.S. after his trip to Afghanistan and eventually fled to Yemen. In May
2003, the U.S. government unsealed an indictment charging him with providing
material support to Al Qaeda. The FBI also put him on its list of world’s most
wanted terrorism suspects.757 It has been reported that he is in Yemeni custody,
but because there is no extradition treaty between the United States and Yemen, it
is not clear whether he will be returned for trial.758
Jose Padilla—Alleged “Dirty Bomb” Plot—May 2002
Jose Padilla, a former Chicago gang member and convert to Islam, was arrested on May 8, 2002,
at O'Hare Airport in Chicago for suspicion of planning to explode a radiological dispersion
device, or “dirty bomb” (an explosive containing radioactive material) in the United States. A
month later, he would become the first American citizen arrested on U.S. soil to be declared an
“enemy combatant,” and then was held indefinitely without trial or charging him with a crime.
This led to a legal confrontation between the Bush Administration and Padilla’s attorneys as well
as various civil liberties groups that lasted several years and reached all the way to the U.S.
Supreme Court. The constitutional issues involved the extent to which the President, as
commander-in-chief, has the authority to take extraordinary measures for the security of
Americans even if those measures infringe on an accused citizen’s access to legal counsel and
relief from unlawful detention (habeas corpus).759
The government’s initial suspicions about Padilla were based on information provided to
interrogators by Abu Zubaydah, a senior official of Al Qaeda who was in American custody at
an undisclosed location overseas. He did not name Mr. Padilla but described him physically and
referred to him as a Latin American man who went by a Muslim name. Intelligence agents then
756 Ibid.
757 Ibid.
758 Dan Herbeck, “Yemen Holds Lackawanna 6 Figure,” Buffalo News, Jan 20, 2010, http://www.buffalonews.com/
2010/01/20/929584/yemen-holds-lackawanna-6-figure.html.
759 For a detailed discussion, see CRS Report RL33180, Enemy Combatant Detainees: Habeas Corpus Challenges in
Federal Court, by Jennifer K. Elsea and Michael John Garcia.
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were able to link the name given by Abu Zubaydah to “an Arab alias not mentioned by the
detainee.” That “alias” led the agent to Mr. Padilla’s Florida driver’s license. The photo on that
license was shown to “a detainee,” presumed to be Abu Zubaydah, who confirmed that Mr.
Padilla was the “Latin American” he had been describing.760
Padilla remained in custody for one month after his arrest in May 2002 on a material witness
warrant. But, Justice Department officials faced a deadline to release him pursuant to laws that
protect U.S. citizens from indefinite detention. They were also confronted with the challenge of
making a case against Padilla that would stand up in court without bringing Abu Zubaydah or
other captured Al Qaeda officials into an American courtroom.761 Instead, on June 9, 2002,
President George W. Bush approved Padilla’s reclassification as an “enemy combatant,” which
would not entitle him to trial in civilian courts. He was transferred after midnight to the brig of a
South Carolina naval base, where he was held incommunicado, not even allowed visits from his
attorney, for over 3-1/2 years, most of which was spent in solitary confinement.762
In announcing Padilla’s May arrest, then-Attorney General John Ashcroft announced at a June 10,
2002, news conference, “We have disrupted an unfolding terrorist plot to attack the United States
by exploding a radioactive dirty bomb.” He added that the government’s suspicions about
Padilla’s plans came from “multiple, independent, corroborating sources.”763
But shortly thereafter, CBS News reported that FBI sources were “backing off” Ashcroft’s
assertion that there was a specific, developed, and real plan to use a “dirty bomb” in the United
States. According to one law enforcement official speaking on condition of anonymity, “FBI’s
investigation has produced no evidence that Padilla had begun preparations for an attack and little
reason to believe he had any support from Al Qaeda to direct such a plot.”764
Dale Watson, who was then FBI’s executive assistant director for counterterrorism, read the
complete file on Padilla and later said, “My recollection was that this was a rather weak case.
There was some information, but it needed a lot more work on the investigative side to flesh out
all the facts.”765
On June 1, 2004, DOJ responded to a written request by Senator Orrin Hatch, then the chairman
of the Senate Judiciary Committee, “asking the Department of Justice and the Department of
Defense to supply whatever information [they] could about American citizens being held as
enemy combatants here in the United States.”766 In addition, then-Deputy Attorney General James
Comey held a news conference where he laid out a detailed summary of the government’s case
760 Deborah Sontag, “Terror Suspect’s Path From Streets to Brig,” New York Times, April 25, 2004,
http://www.nytimes.com/2004/04/25/us/terror-suspect-s-path-from-streets-to-brig.html. Hereinafter: Sontag, April 25,
2004.
761 This factor was acknowledged by then-Deputy Attorney General James Comey. See “Transcript of News
Conference on Jose Padilla,” CNN.com, June 1, 2004, http://edition.cnn.com/2004/LAW/06/01/
comey.padilla.transcript/. Hereinafter: Transcript of News Conference, June 1, 2004.
762 New York Times, “Times Topics: Jose Padilla,” March 6, 2009, http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/
people/p/jose_padilla/index.html.
763 Dan Collins, “'Dirty Bomb’ Suspect A Nobody?” CBS News, Aug 14, 2002, http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2002/
08/27/attack/main519996.shtml.
764 Ibid.
765 Sontag, April 25, 2004.
766 Transcript of News Conference, June 1, 2004.
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against Padilla. The case was largely derived from statements made by Padilla himself while he
was interrogated in military custody, but which Comey claimed was substantiated by other
sources. At the news conference, Comey traced Padilla’s travel through Egypt, Yemen,
Afghanistan, and Pakistan. He identified Al Qaeda officials he met, which included not only Abu
Zubaydah, but Al Qaeda military commander Mohammed Atef and 9/11 mastermind Khalid
Shaikh Mohammed. He also described the training Padilla received and terrorist plots discussed
including one to blow up apartment buildings in the United States using natural gas as well as an
attack using a dirty bomb.767
Comey also noted that the government could not make a case against Padilla through the criminal
justice system when he was originally arrested two years before “without jeopardizing
intelligence sources.”768 But, he went on to say that the questioning of Padilla was not undertaken
to try and make a criminal case against him. “It was done to find out the truth about what he knew
about Al Qaeda and threats to the United States.”769
Soon after Padilla was declared an enemy combatant, his appointed counsel filed a habeas corpus
petition on his behalf. The case eventually reached the Supreme Court, which held that Padilla
had filed his habeas petition in the wrong court. In 2004, Padilla’s counsel filed a new habeas
corpus petition in the U.S. District Court for South Carolina. The District Court ruled that
Padilla’s detention had not been authorized by Congress and was therefore unlawful. The
government appealed to the Fourth Circuit. On September 9, 2005, the Fourth Circuit Court of
Appeals in Richmond, VA, reversed the trial court’s decision and held that the president was
authorized to detain enemy combatants under the Authorization of Use of Military Force passed
by Congress in the wake of September 11. Padilla then filed a petition for certiorari770 in the
United States Supreme Court.771
In November 2005, while the Supreme Court was considering Padilla’s petition for review, the
Bush Administration suddenly announced that criminal charges had been filed against him in
federal court in Miami. The new indictment made no mention of the dirty bomb or most of the
other original charges. Instead, Padilla was charged with being part of a “North American support
cell” that worked to support violent jihad campaigns in Afghanistan and elsewhere overseas from
1993 to 2001.772
The government then asked the Fourth U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals to vacate its decision
upholding Padilla’s confinement.773 The Fourth Circuit refused to vacate its order or approve of
Padilla’s transfer from military to civilian custody. In an opinion by Judge J. Michael Luttig, the
Fourth Circuit worried about “an appearance that the government may be attempting to avoid
767 Ibid.
768 Ibid.
769 Ibid.
770 Certiorari is the name given to certain appellate proceedings for re-examination of actions of a trial court, or inferior
appeals court.
771 Padilla v. Hanft, American Civil Liberties Union of Virginia, November 30, 2006, http://www.acluva.org/docket/
padilla.html.
772 See Michael McGough, “How Do You Solve a Problem Like Padilla?” Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, January 2, 2006,
http://www.post-gazette.com/pg/06002/631159-108.stm#ixzz0pA44Cy40. Hereinafter, McGough, January 2, 2006.
773 For more information on this case, see CRS Report R41156, Judicial Activity Concerning Enemy Combatant
Detainees: Major Court Rulings, by Jennifer K. Elsea and Michael John Garcia.
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consideration of our decision by the Supreme Court.”774 Judge Luttig also “chastised the
administration for using one set of facts to justify holding Padilla without charges and another set
to persuade a grand jury in Florida to indict him.”775
Padilla’s attorneys, in the meantime, sought to have the criminal charges against him dismissed
on the grounds that the psychological damage he suffered during his confinement from abuse and
extreme isolation had left him incompetent to stand trial. The judge in the case denied the motion,
without ruling on the merits of the defense accusations of abuse. The criminal trial began in
September 2006.776
Padilla was convicted on August 16, 2007, along with two co-defendants, Adham Amin
Hassoun and Kifah Wael Jayyousi, of conspiracy to murder, kidnap and maim people in a
foreign country. In January 2008, Padilla was sentenced to 17 years and 4 months in prison while
his co-defendants were given shorter sentences.777 In September 2011, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, in Atlanta vacated his sentence, deeming it too lenient.778
Portland Seven—Attempted Travel to Afghanistan to Support the
Taliban—October 2001
In the days following the 9/11 attacks, six men reportedly met at various times in the Portland,
OR, area, where they made plans to travel to Afghanistan to fight against the Armed Forces of the
United States. They also conducted weapons training on two occasions at a gravel pit in
Washougal, WA. A seventh person, October Martinique Lewis, admitted that she transferred
funds for the purpose of assisting her ex-husband who was one of the conspirators. The group,
who came to be known as the “Portland Seven,” called themselves, Katibat al Mawt—“The
Squad of Death.”779 They were780
• Habis Abdulla Al Saoub, a Jordanian-born man and reputed militant jihadist,
was considered to be the de facto leader of the group.
• Patrice Lumumba Ford is a U.S. citizen who converted to Islam during a trip to
China. He has been described as an intelligent, gentle, exemplary young man,
well-known in Portland’s African Americancommunity. But prior to the events of
9/11, was so upset by this country’s Middle Eastern policy that he sent an e-mail
774 Padilla v. Hanft, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, CA-04-2221-26AJ, December 21, 2005, p. 4.
775 McGough, Jan 2, 2006.
776 Amanda Ripley, “The Case of the Dirty Bomber” Time Magazine, Jun 16, 2002, http://www.time.com/time/nation/
article/0,8599,262917,00.html#ixzz0p9fME32v.
777 Ibid.
778 Lizette Alvarez, “Sentence for Terrorist Is Too Short, Court Rules,” New York Times, September 19, 2011,
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/20/us/jose-padillas-prison-sentence-too-short-appeals-court-says.html?hp=&
pagewanted=print.
779 Deborah Howlett, “The Two Sides of One Law, The Two Lives of One Man, Newark Star-Ledger, July 24, 2005,
http://web.archive.org/web/20070503154313/http://www.nj.com/news/ledger/index.ssf?/news/ledger/stories/patriotact/
partthree.html. Hereinafter: Howlett, July 24, 2005.
780 Nick Budnick, “The Making of a ‘Terrorist,’” Williamette Week Online, October16, 2002, http://www.wweek.com/
story.php?story=3246.
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to Portland Mayor Vera Katz’s office that was troubling enough in its anti-
Semitism to be forwarded to the police.
• Ahmed Ibrahim Bilal and Muhammad Ibrahim Bilal are American- born
brothers of Saudi descent.
• Jeffrey Leon Battle is a former cosmetics salesman who moved to the Portland
area from Houston.
• Maher “Mike” Hawash is a software engineer and naturalized American citizen
from the West Bank who grew up in Kuwait.
• October Martinique Lewis, Battle’s ex-wife, moved with him from Houston.
Al Saoub, Ford, and Battle first came to the attention of law enforcement authorities on
September 29, 2001, after they were seen engaged in shooting practice in a gravel pit in Skamania
County, Washington, near Washougal. The group was discovered by a deputy sheriff who was
acting on a tip from a neighbor who had heard gunfire in the pit. Deputy Mercer let the men go
after taking their names and reported the incident to the FBI.781
Sometime after February 2002, the FBI reportedly linked a confidential informant with a member
of the group, Jeffrey Battle. The informant was reported to be Khalid Mustafa, a small-time
criminal who agreed to become a confidential FBI informant after being charged with drug and
weapons offenses. Mustafa befriended Battle at the mosque where he prayed and then secretly
recorded numerous conversations with Battle that included details about the group’s trip to China.
Battle is also recorded on tape talking about retaliating against Jews in Portland, “So if every time
they hurt or harm a Muslim over there, you go into that synagogue and hurt one over here.”782
Hundreds of e-mail exchanges between Battle and other members of the Portland Seven provided
further evidence of the conspiracy. The e-mails were reportedly obtained through provisions of
the USA PATRIOT Act (P.L. 107-56) that allow prosecutors access to the data files of Internet
service providers. In court documents, prosecutors acknowledged having taped at least 271
conversations and obtained 31 separate orders from the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act
court.783
In October 2002, five of the men were indicted on multiple charges of aiding or attempting to join
Al Qaeda. Maher Hawash was arrested in March 2003 on a material witness warrant and initially
held without charges. He was subsequently charged with conspiring with the others to travel to
China and join the Taliban. Lewis, the ex-wife of co-defendant Jeffrey Battle, was charged with
money laundering.
Hawash pled guilty on September 6, 2003, to conspiracy to provide material support to the
Taliban and agreed to cooperate with federal prosecutors. At his sentencing in February 2004, he
said, “I do not blame anyone else but myself. This action was done by me, based on a misguided
judgment at the time, a high emotional time for me in my life.”784 He was sentenced to seven
years in prison and was released in early 2009.
781 Ibid.
782 Howlett, July 24, 2005.
783 Ibid.
784 Ibid.
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Muhammad and Ahmed Bilal, pled guilty on September 18, 2003, to conspiracy to contribute
services to the Taliban, as well as federal weapons charges.785 They received 8- and 10-year
sentences respectively.
October Martinique Lewis pled guilty on September 26, 2003, to six counts of money laundering
for transferring money from the United States to a place outside of the country for the purpose of
assisting her ex-husband, Jeffrey Battle, in willfully supplying services to the Taliban.786 She
received a three-year sentence.
Jeffrey Battle and Patrice Lumumba Ford pled guilty on October 16, 2003, to the first of a 15-
count indictment, a charge of conspiracy to levy war against the United States. Both defendants
admitted that they and the other defendants flew to China in an unsuccessful attempt to gain entry
into Pakistan, en route to Afghanistan. They also admitted in their plea that the purpose of the
conspiracy was to travel to Afghanistan to fight alongside Al Qaeda and the Taliban against
American and allied forces. They were each sentenced to 18-year prison terms.787
Habis al Saoub reportedly joined an Al Qaeda cell and was killed by Pakistani forces in
Afghanistan in October 2003.
785 DOJ Press Release, “Two Defendants in ‘Portland Cell’ Case Plead Guilty to Conspiracy to Contribute Services to
the Taliban, Federal Weapons Charges,” September 18, 2003, http://www.fbi.gov/pressrel/pressrel03/
portland092203.htm.
786 DOJ Press Release, “October Martinique Lewis Pleads Guilty to Money Laundering in Portland Cell Case,
September 26, 2003, http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2003/September/03_crm_532.htm.
787 DOJ Press Release, “Jeffrey Battle, Patrice Lumumba Ford Sentenced to 18 Years in Prison for Seditious
Conspiracy,” November 23, 2003, http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_pjus/is_200311/ai_2497879968/.
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Appendix B. Figures
Figure B-1. Homegrown Jihadist Terrorist Plots and Attacks Since 9/11:
Terrorist Profile and Training
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Source: CRS analysis of open source material related to homegrown jihadist plots and attacks after 9/11
through October 2011.
Notes: a. Listed in chronological order. The four attacks are highlighted in bold and Italics.
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Figure B-2. Homegrown Jihadist Terrorist Plots and Attacks Since 9/11: Targets,
Endgames, and Investigative Tools
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Source: CRS analysis of open source material related to homegrown jihadist plots and attacks after 9/11
through October 2011.
Notes: a. Listed in chronological order. The four attacks are highlighted in bold and Italics. b. As indicated in
open source reporting. It is possible that the use of these tools in some cases remains classified information and
thus is not reflected in this figure.
Author Contact Information
Jerome P. Bjelopera
Specialist in Organized Crime and Terrorism
jbjelopera@crs.loc.gov, 7-0622
Acknowledgments
Mark A. Randol, former CRS Specialist in Domestic Intelligence and Counter-Terrorism, was one of the
original authors of this report.
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