Navy Irregular Warfare and Counterterrorism
Operations: Background and Issues for
Congress
Ronald O'Rourke
Specialist in Naval Affairs
November 8, 2011
Congressional Research Service
7-5700
www.crs.gov
RS22373
CRS Report for Congress
Pr
epared for Members and Committees of Congress
Navy Role in Irregular Warfare and Counterterrorism
Summary
The Navy for several years has carried out a variety of irregular warfare (IW) and
counterterrorism (CT) activities. Among the most readily visible of the Navy’s recent IW
operations have been those carried out by Navy sailors serving ashore in Afghanistan and Iraq.
Many of the Navy’s contributions to IW operations around the world are made by Navy
individual augmentees (IAs)—individual Navy sailors assigned to various DOD operations.
The May 1-2, 2011, U.S. military operation in Abbottabad, Pakistan, that killed Osama bin Laden
reportedly was carried out by a team of 23 Navy special operations forces, known as SEALs (an
acronym standing for Sea, Air, and Land). The SEALs reportedly belonged to an elite unit known
unofficially as Seal Team 6 and officially as the Naval Special Warfare Development Group
(DEVGRU).
The Navy established the Navy Expeditionary Combat Command (NECC) informally in October
2005 and formally in January 2006. NECC consolidated and facilitated the expansion of a
number of Navy organizations that have a role in IW operations. The Navy established the Navy
Irregular Warfare Office in July 2008, published a vision statement for irregular warfare in
January 2010, and established “a community of interest” to develop and advance ideas,
collaboration, and advocacy related to IW in December 2010.
The Navy’s riverine force is intended to supplement the riverine capabilities of the Navy’s SEALs
and relieve Marines who had been conducting maritime security operations in ports and
waterways in Iraq.
The Global Maritime Partnership is a U.S. Navy initiative to achieve an enhanced degree of
cooperation between the U.S. Navy and foreign navies, coast guards, and maritime police forces,
for the purpose of ensuring global maritime security against common threats.
The Southern Partnership Station (SPS) and the Africa Partnership Station (APS) are Navy ships,
such as amphibious ships or high-speed sealift ships, that have deployed to the Caribbean and to
waters off Africa, respectively, to support U.S. Navy engagement with countries in those regions,
particularly for purposes of building security partnerships with those countries and for increasing
the capabilities of those countries for performing maritime-security operations.
The Navy’s IW and CT activities pose a number of potential oversight issues for Congress,
including the definition of Navy IW activities and how much emphasis to place on IW and CT
activities in future Navy budgets.
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Contents
Introduction...................................................................................................................................... 1
Background...................................................................................................................................... 1
Navy Irregular Warfare (IW) Operations................................................................................... 1
Shift in Terminology from IW to Confronting Irregular Challenges (CIC) ........................ 1
Navy IW Operations in Afghanistan and Iraq ..................................................................... 1
Navy IW Operations Elsewhere.......................................................................................... 2
Navy Individual Augmentees (IAs)..................................................................................... 3
November 2011 Navy Testimony........................................................................................ 3
Navy Counterterrorism (CT) Operations................................................................................... 3
In General............................................................................................................................ 3
May 1-2, 2011, U.S. Military Operation That Killed Osama Bin Laden ............................ 4
Detention of Terrorist Suspects on Navy Ships................................................................... 5
Navy Summary of Its IW and CT Operations ........................................................................... 8
Navy Initiatives to Improve Its IW and CT Capabilities ........................................................... 9
Navy Irregular Warfare Office ............................................................................................ 9
Navy Vision Statement for Countering Irregular Challenges.............................................. 9
Navy Community of Interest for Countering Irregular Challenges................................... 10
Navy Expeditionary Combat Command (NECC) ............................................................. 10
Global Maritime Partnership............................................................................................. 11
Partnership Stations........................................................................................................... 12
Riverine Force................................................................................................................... 12
Other Organizational Initiatives ........................................................................................ 13
IW-Related Programs in FY2012 Navy Budget ...................................................................... 13
Potential Oversight Issues for Congress ........................................................................................ 14
Definition of Navy IW Activities ............................................................................................ 14
Degree of Emphasis on IW and CT in Future Navy Budgets.................................................. 14
Additional Oversight Questions .............................................................................................. 15
Legislative Activity for FY2012.................................................................................................... 16
FY2012 National Defense Authorization Bill (H.R. 1540/S. 1253)........................................ 16
House................................................................................................................................. 16
Senate ................................................................................................................................ 17
FY2012 DOD Appropriations Bill (H.R. 2219) ...................................................................... 19
House................................................................................................................................. 19
Senate ................................................................................................................................ 19
Appendixes
Appendix A. November 2011 Navy Testimony on Navy IW Activities ........................................ 20
Appendix B. Navy Irregular Warfare Vision Statement ................................................................ 24
Contacts
Author Contact Information........................................................................................................... 32
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Introduction
This report provides background information and potential issues for Congress on the Navy’s
irregular warfare (IW) and counterterrorism (CT) operations. The Navy’s IW and CT activities
pose a number of potential oversight issues for Congress, including the definition of Navy IW
activities and how much emphasis to place on IW and CT activities in future Navy budgets.
Congress’ decisions regarding Navy IW and CT operations can affect Navy operations and
funding requirements, and the implementation of the nation’s overall IW and CT strategies.
Background1
Navy Irregular Warfare (IW) Operations
Shift in Terminology from IW to Confronting Irregular Challenges (CIC)
Use of the term irregular warfare has declined within DOD since 2010. DOD’s report on the 2010
Quadrennial Defense Review, for example, avoids the term and instead uses the phrase
counterinsurgency, stability, and counterterrorism operations. Consistent with DOD’s declining
use of the term irregular warfare, the Navy increasingly is using the phrase confronting irregular
challenges (CIC) instead of the term irregular warfare. For purposes of convenience, this report
continues to use the term irregular warfare and the abbreviation IW.
Navy IW Operations in Afghanistan and Iraq
Among the most readily visible of the Navy’s recent IW operations have been those carried out
by Navy sailors serving ashore in Afghanistan and Iraq, which include or have included the
following:
• close air support (CAS) operations, of which Navy carrier strike groups account
for 30% in Afghanistan;
• expeditionary electronic warfare operations, including operations to defeat
improvised explosive devices (IEDs), electronic attack operations (of which
Navy and Marine Corps aircraft account for almost 60% in Afghanistan), and
operations to counter insurgent and extremist network communications;
• intelligence and signals intelligence operations, including operations to identify,
map, and track extremist activity, and operations involving tactical intelligence
support teams that are deployed with special operations forces (SOF);
• explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) operations, including defusing IEDs,
clearing land mines, destroying captured weapon and explosive caches, and
investigating blast scenes so as to obtain evidence for later prosecution;
1 Unless otherwise indicated, information in this section is taken from a Navy briefing to CRS on July 31, 2009, on
Navy IW activities and capabilities.
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• riverine warfare operations to secure waterways such as the Tigris and
Euphrates rivers and the Haditha dam in Iraq;
• maritime security operations, including operations to intercept smugglers and
extremists going to Iraq and Kuwait, and operations to guard Iraqi and U.S.
infrastructure, facilities, and supply lines, such as ports and oil and gas platforms
and pipelines;
• medical and dental services;
• logistics operations, including transporting of 90% of military equipment for
Afghanistan and Iraq on military sealift ships, operating ports in Iraq and Kuwait,
and providing contracting services and reconstruction using Iraqi firms;
• engineering and construction operations, such as rebuilding schools, repairing
roads, reconstructing electrical, water and sewer systems, and training and
equipping Iraqi engineers;
• provincial reconstruction operations in Afghanistan and Iraq; and
• legal operations, including prosecution of special-group criminals and assisting
Iraqis in drafting governing documents.
Navy IW Operations Elsewhere
In addition to participating in U.S. military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, the Navy states
that its IW operations also include the following:
• security force assistance operations, in which forward-deployed Navy ships
exercise and work with foreign navies, coast guards, and maritime police forces,
so as to improve their abilities to conduct maritime security operations;
• civic assistance operations, in which forward-deployed Navy units, including
Navy hospital ships, expeditionary medical teams, fleet surgical teams, and naval
construction units provide medical and construction services in foreign countries
as a complement to other U.S. diplomatic and development activities in those
countries;
• disaster relief operations, of which Navy forces have performed several in
recent years; and
• counter-piracy operations, which have increased since 2008.2
The Navy states that enduring areas of focus for the Navy’s role in IW include the following:
• enhancing regional awareness, which enables better planning, decision making,
and operational agility;
• building maritime partner capability and capacity, so as to deny sanctuaries
to violent extremists; and
2 For more on counter-piracy operations, see CRS Report R40528, Piracy off the Horn of Africa, by Lauren Ploch et al.
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• outcome-based application of force, so as to maintain continuous pressure on
extremist groups and their supporting infrastructure.
Navy Individual Augmentees (IAs)
Many of the Navy’s contributions to IW operations around the world are made by Navy
individual augmentees (IAs)—individual Navy sailors assigned to various DOD operations. The
Department of the Navy (DON) states that:
The Navy provides sailors in the form of IAs, including personnel in the training pipeline, to
fulfill the OCO mission requirements of the Combatant Commanders (COCOMs). As IAs,
they fulfill vital roles, serving in non-core missions such as provincial reconstruction teams,
detainee operations, civil affairs, training teams, customs inspections, counter Improvised
Explosive Device (IED), and combat support. IAs also support adaptive core and maritime
missions including base operations, military police, combat support, counter IED, maritime
and port security, airlift support, and Joint Task Force (JTF)/COCOM staff support. IAs are
making a significant impact in more than 20 countries around the worldproviding COCOMS
with mission-tailored, globally distributed forces. In FY 2012, the funding for 3,836 Navy
non-core IAs has been shifted from the OCO budget to the base budget.3
November 2011 Navy Testimony
The Navy outlined its IW activities in its prepared statement for a November 3, 2011, hearing on
the services’ IW activities before the Emerging Threats and Capabilities subcommittee of the
House Armed Services Committee. For the text of the Navy’s prepared statement, see Appendix
A.
Navy Counterterrorism (CT) Operations
In General
Navy CT operations include the following:
• Operations by Navy special operations forces, known as SEALs (an acronym
standing for Sea, Air, and Land), that are directed against terrorists;4
• Tomahawk cruise missile attacks on suspected terrorist training camps and
facilities, such as those reportedly conducted in Somalia on March 3 and May 1,
3 Department of the Navy, Highlights of the Department of the Navy FY 2012 Budget, February 2011, pp. 1-10 and 1-
11.
4 For an account of a series of missions reportedly conducted by SEALS over a six-week period in November and
December 2003 to plant cameras in Somalia for the purpose of conducting surveillance on terrorists, see Sean D.
Naylor, “Hunting Down Terrorists,” Army Times, November 7, 2011: 22.
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2008,5 and those conducted in 1998 in response to the 1998 terrorist bombings of
U.S. embassies in East Africa;6
• surveillance by Navy ships and aircraft of suspected terrorists overseas;
• maritime intercept operations (MIO) aimed at identifying and intercepting
terrorists or weapons of mass destruction at sea, or potentially threatening ships
or aircraft that are in or approaching U.S. territorial waters—an activity that
includes Navy participation in the multilateral Proliferation Security Initiative
(PSI);7
• working with the Coast Guard to build maritime domain awareness (MDA)—a
real-time understanding of activities on the world’s oceans;
• assisting the Coast Guard in port-security operations;8
• protection of forward-deployed Navy ships, an activity that was intensified
following the terrorist attack on the Navy Aegis destroyer Cole (DDG-67) in
October 2000 in the port of Aden, Yemen;9
• protection of domestic and overseas Navy bases and facilities;
• developing Global Maritime Intelligence Integration (GMII) as part of Joint
Force Maritime Component Command (JFMCC) and Maritime Domain
Awareness (MDA); and
• engaging with the U.S. Coast Guard to use the National Strategy for Maritime
Security to more rapidly develop capabilities for Homeland Security, particularly
in the area of MDA.
May 1-2, 2011, U.S. Military Operation That Killed Osama Bin Laden
The May 1-2, 2011, U.S. military operation in Abbottabad, Pakistan, that killed Osama bin
Laden—reportedly called Operation Neptune’s Spear—reportedly was carried out by a team of 23
Navy special operations forces, known as SEALs (an acronym standing for Sea, Air, and Land).
The SEALs reportedly belonged to an elite unit known unofficially as Seal Team 6 and officially
as the Naval Special Warfare Development Group (DEVGRU). The SEALs reportedly were
flown to and from Abbottabad by Army special operations helicopters. Bin Laden’s body
5 Edmund Sanders, “U.S. Missile Strike in Somalia Kills 6,” Los Angeles Times, March 4, 2008; Stephanie
McCrummen and Karen DeYoung, “U.S. Airstrike Kills Somali Accused of Links to Al-Qaeda,” Washington Post,
May 2, 2008: A12; Eric Schmitt and Jeffrey Gettleman, “Qaeda Leader Reported Killed In Somalia,” New York Times,
May 2, 2008.
6 For a recent article on the 1998 strikes, see Pamela Hess, “Report: 1998 Strike Built bin Laden-Taliban Tie,”
NavyTimes.com (Associated Press), August 22, 2008.
7 For more on the PSI, see CRS Report RL34327, Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), by Mary Beth Nikitin.
8 See, for example, Emelie Rutherford, “Navy’s Maritime Domain Awareness System ‘Up And Running’,” Defense
Daily, September 4, 2008; and Dan Taylor, “New Network Allows Navy To Track Thousands of Ships Worldwide,”
Inside the Navy, September 8, 2008. For more on the Coast Guard and port security, see CRS Report RL33383,
Terminal Operators and Their Role in U.S. Port and Maritime Security, by John Frittelli and Jennifer E. Lake, and
CRS Report RL33787, Maritime Security: Potential Terrorist Attacks and Protection Priorities, by Paul W. Parfomak
and John Frittelli.
9 For a discussion of the attack on the Cole, see CRS Report RS20721, Terrorist Attack on USS Cole: Background and
Issues for Congress, by Raphael F. Perl and Ronald O'Rourke.
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reportedly was flown by a U.S. military helicopter from Abbottabad to a base in Afghanistan, and
from there by a Marine Corps V-22 tilt-rotor aircraft to the aircraft carrier Carl Vinson (CVN-70),
which was operating at the time in the Northern Arabian Sea. A few hours later, in the same
general area, bin Laden’s body reportedly was buried at sea from the ship. Differing accounts
have emerged regarding certain details of the operation.10
Press reports in July 2010 stated that U.S. forces in Afghanistan included at that time a special
unit called Task Force 373, composed of Navy SEALs and Army Delta Force personnel, whose
mission is “the deactivation of top Taliban and terrorists by either killing or capturing them.”11
Another CRS report provides additional background information on the SEALs,12 and another
provides further discussion of the operation that killed Osama bin Laden.13
Detention of Terrorist Suspects on Navy Ships
On July 6, 2011, it was reported that
The U.S. military captured a Somali terrorism suspect [named Ahmed Abdulkadir Warsame]
in the Gulf of Aden in April and interrogated him for more than two months aboard a U.S.
Navy ship before flying him this week to New York, where he has been indicted on federal
charges....
Other U.S. officials, interviewed separately, said Warsame and another individual were
apprehended aboard a boat traveling from Yemen to Somalia by the U.S. military’s Joint
Operations Command. The vessel was targeted because the United States had acquired
intelligence that potentially significant operatives were on board, the officials said. Court
documents said the capture took place April 19.
One of the senior administration officials who briefed reporters said that the other suspect
was released “after a very short period of time” after the military “determined that Warsame
was an individual that we were very much interested in for further interrogation.”
According to court documents, Warsame was interrogated on “all but a daily basis” by
military and civilian intelligence interrogators. During that time, officials in Washington held
a number of meetings to discuss the intelligence being gleaned, Warsame’s status and what
to do with him.
10 For one account, see Nicholas Schmidle, “Getting Bin Laden,” The New Yorker, August 8, 2011, accessed online
August 10, 2011 at http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2011/08/08/110808fa_fact_schmidle. For a press report
commenting on Schmidle’s sources for the article, see Paul Farhi, “Journalist Details Raid On Bin Laden Camp,”
Washington Post, August 3, 2011: C1. For a very different account, see Chuck Pfarrer, SEAL Target Geronimo: The
Inside Story of the Mission to Kill Osama bin Laden (St. Martin’s Press, 2011), 240 pp. For news reports based on this
book, see Susannah Cahalan, “Real Story Of Team 6’s Charge,” New York Post, November 6, 2011: 18; Christina
Lamb, “Bitter Seals Tell of Killing ‘Bert’ Laden,” The Australian (www.theaustralian.com.au), November 6, 2011. See
also Chris Carroll, “Pentagon Says New Bin Laden Raid Book Gets Details Wrong,” Stripes.com, November 7, 2011.
11 Matthias, et al, “US Elite Unit Could Create Political Fallout For Berlin,” Spiegel (Germany), July 26, 2010. See also
C. J. Chivers, et al, “Inside the Fog Of War: Reports From The Ground In Afghanistan,” New York Times, July 26,
2010: 1.
12 CRS Report RS21048, U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF): Background and Issues for Congress, by Andrew
Feickert.
13 CRS Report R41809, Osama bin Laden’s Death: Implications and Considerations, coordinated by John Rollins.
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The options, one official said, were to release him, transfer him to a third country, keep him
prisoner aboard the ship, subject him to trial by a military commission or allow a federal
court to try him. The decision to seek a federal indictment, this official said, was unanimous.
Administration officials have argued that military commission jurisdiction is too narrow for
some terrorism cases - particularly for a charge of material support for terrorist groups - and
the Warsame case appeared to provide an opportunity to try to prove the point.
But some human rights and international law experts criticized what they saw as at least a
partial return to the discredited “black site” prisons the CIA maintained during the Bush
administration....
Warsame was questioned aboard the ship because interrogators “believed that moving him to
another facility would interrupt the process and risk ending the intelligence flow,” one senior
administration official said.
The official said Warsame “at all times was treated in a manner consistent with all
Department of Defense policies” - following the Army Field Manual - and the Geneva
Conventions.
Warsame was not provided access to an attorney during the initial two months of
questioning, officials said. But “thereafter, there was a substantial break from any
questioning of the defendant of four days,” court documents said. “After this break, the
defendant was advised of his Miranda rights” - including his right to legal representation –
“and, after waiving those rights, spoke to law enforcement agents.”
The four-day break and separate questioning were designed to avoid tainting the court case
with information gleaned through un-Mirandized intelligence interrogation, an overlap that
has posed a problem in previous cases. The questioning continued for seven days, “and the
defendant waived his Miranda rights at the start of each day,” the documents said....
U.S. Navy Vice Adm. William H. McRaven alluded to the captures in testimony before a
Senate committee last week in which he lamented the lack of clear plans and legal approvals
for the handling of terrorism suspects seized beyond the war zones of Iraq and Afghanistan.
At one point in the hearing, Sen. Carl Levin (D-Mich.), the chairman of the Senate Armed
Services Committee, referred to “the question of the detention of people” and noted that
McRaven had “made reference to a couple, I think, that are on a ship.”
McRaven replied affirmatively, saying, “It depends on the individual case, and I'd be more
than happy to discuss the cases that we've dealt with.”14
Another press report on July 6, 2011, stated:
In a telephone briefing with reporters, senior administration officials said Mr. Warsame and
another person were captured by American forces somewhere “in the Gulf region” on April
19. Another official separately said the two were picked up on a fishing trawler in
international waters between Yemen and Somalia. That other person was released.
Mr. Warsame was taken to a naval vessel, where he was questioned for the next two months
by military interrogators, the officials said. They said his detention was justified by the laws
14 Karen DeYoung, Greg Miller,and Greg Jaffe, “Terror Suspect Detained On Ship,” Washington Post, July 6, 2011: 6.
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of war, but declined to say whether their theory was that the Shabab are covered by
Congress’s authorization to use military force against the perpetrators of the Sept. 11, 2001,
attacks; whether the detention was justified by his interactions with Al Qaeda’s Yemen
branch; or something else.
The officials also said interrogators used only techniques in the Army Field Manual, which
complies with the Geneva Conventions. But they did not deliver a Miranda warning because
they were seeking to gather intelligence, not court evidence. One official called those
sessions “very, very productive,” but declined to say whether his information contributed to
a drone attack in Somalia last month.
After about two months, Mr. Warsame was given a break for several days. Then a separate
group of law enforcement interrogators came in. They delivered a Miranda warning, but he
waived his rights to remain silent and have a lawyer present and continued to cooperate, the
officials said, meaning that his subsequent statements would likely be admissible in court.
Throughout that period, administration officials were engaged in deliberations about what to
do with Mr. Warsame’s case. Eventually, they “unanimously” decided to prosecute him in
civilian court. If he is convicted of all the charges against him, he would face life in prison.
Last week, Vice Adm. William H. McRaven, who was until recently in charge of the
military’s Joint Special Operations Command, told a Senate hearing that detainees are
sometimes kept on Navy ships until the Justice Department can build a case against them, or
they are transferred to other countries for detention.
Another senior administration official said Tuesday that such detentions are extremely rare,
and that no other detainees are now being held on a Navy ship.15
A July 7, 2011, press report stated:
In interrogating a Somali man for months aboard a Navy ship before taking him to New
York this week for a civilian trial on terrorism charges, the Obama administration is trying
out a new approach for dealing with foreign terrorism suspects.
The administration, which was seeking to avoid sending a new prisoner to Guantánamo Bay,
Cuba, drew praise and criticism on Wednesday [July 6] for its decisions involving the
Somali suspect, Ahmed Abdulkadir Warsame, accused of aiding Al Qaeda’s branch in
Yemen and the Shabab, the Somali militant group.16
A July 6, 2011, entry in a blog that reports on naval-related events stated that the U.S. Navy ship
to which Warsame was taken was the amphibious assault ship Boxer (LHD-4).17
15 Charlie Savage and Eric Schmitt, “U.S. To Prosecute A Somali Suspect In Civilian Court,” New York Times, July 6,
2011: 1.
16 Charlie Savage, “U.S. Tests New APproach To Terrorism Cases On Somali Suspect,” New York Times, July 7, 2011:
10. See also Dave Boyer, “Interrogation At Sea Skirts Obama Pledge,” Washington Times, July 7, 2011: 1.
17 See “The STRATCOM [Strategic Communications] Opportunity of Ahmed Abdulkadir Warsame,” Information
Dissemination (www.informationdissemination.net), July 6, 2011, accessed online July 6, 2011, at
http://www.informationdissemination.net/2011/07/stratcom-opportunity-of-ahmed.html.
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Navy Summary of Its IW and CT Operations
DON summarized Navy IW and CT activities in early 2011 as follows:
Beyond the 20,000 participating in counterinsurgency, security cooperation, and civil-
military operations in Afghanistan, on any given day there are approximately 12,000 Sailors
ashore and another 10,000 afloat throughout U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM). These
Sailors are conducting riverine operations, maritime infrastructure protection, explosive
ordnance disposal, combat construction engineering, cargo handling, combat logistics,
maritime security, customs inspections, detainee operations, civil affairs, base operations and
other forward presence activities. In collaboration with the U.S. Coast Guard, the Navy also
conducts critical port operations, port and oil platform security, and maritime interception
operations. Included in our globally sourced forces are IAs [individual augmentees] serving
in a variety of joint or coalition billets, either in the training pipeline or on station. As these
operations unfold, the size and type of naval forces committed to them will likely evolve,
thereby producing changes to the overall force posture of naval forces. Long after the
significant land component presence is reduced, naval forces will remain forward.
While forward, acting as the lead element of our defense-in-depth, naval forces will be
positioned for increased roles in combating terrorism. They will also be prepared to act in
cooperation with an expanding set of international partners to provide humanitarian
assistance and disaster response, as well as contribute to global maritime security. Expanded
Maritime Interdiction Operations (EMIO) are authorized by the President and directed by the
Secretary of Defense to intercept vessels identified to be transporting terrorists and/or
terrorist-related materiel that poses an imminent threat to the United States and its allies.
Strike operations are conducted to damage or destroy objectives or selected enemy
capabilities. Recent examples include simultaneous close air support missions that are
integrated and synchronized with coalition ground forces to protect key infrastructure, deter
and disrupt extremist operations or hostile activities, and provide oversight for reconstruction
efforts in support of Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and Operation New Dawn (OND).
Additionally, we have done small, precise attacks against terrorist cells and missile attacks
against extremist sanctuaries. Among the various strike options, our sea-based platforms are
unique and provide preeminent capabilities that will be maintained.
This versatility and lethality can be applied across the spectrum of operations, from
destroying terrorist base camps and protecting friendly forces involved in sustained
counterinsurgency or stability operations, to defeating enemy anti-access defenses in support
of amphibious operations. We are refocusing this strategic capability more intensely in
Afghanistan in an effort to counter the increasing threat of a well-armed anti-Coalition
militia including Taliban, al Qaeda, criminal gangs, narcoterrorists, and any other anti-
government elements that threaten the peace and stability of Afghanistan. Our increased
efforts to deter or defeat aggression and improve overall security and counter violent
extremism and terrorist networks advance the interests of the U.S. and the security of the
region. The FY 2012 contingency operations request supports sufficient capabilities to secure
Afghanistan and prevent it from again becoming a haven for international terrorism and
associated militant extremist movements.
The Navy has over 40,000 active and reserve sailors continually deployed in support of the
contingency operations overseas serving as members of carrier strike groups, expeditionary
strike groups, Special Operating Forces, Seabee units, Marine forces, medical units, and as
IAs. Our Sailors and Marines are fully engaged on the ground, in the air, and at sea in
support of operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. All forces should be withdrawn from OND by
the end of 2011. Navy Commanders are leading seven of the thirteen U.S.-lead Provincial
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Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan. A significant portion of the combat air missions over
Afghanistan are flown by naval air forces. Our elite teams of Navy SEALs are heavily
engaged in combat operations, Navy Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) platoons are
defusing IEDs and landmines. Our SEABEE construction battalions are rebuilding schools
and restoring critical infrastructure. Navy sealift is delivering the majority of heavy war
equipment to CENTCOM, while Navy logisticians are ensuring materiel arrives on time. Our
Navy doctors are providing medical assistance in the field and at forward operating bases.
Navy IAs are providing combat support and combat service support for Army and Marine
Corps personnel in Iraq and Afghanistan. As IAs they are fulfilling vital roles by serving in
traditional Navy roles such as USMC support, maritime and port security, cargo handling,
airlift support, Seabee units, and as a member of joint task force/Combatant Commanders
staffs. On the water, Navy Expeditionary Combat Command (NECC) Riverine forces are
working closely with the Iraqi Navy to safeguard Iraqi infrastructure and provide maritime
security in key waterways. Navy forces are also intercepting smugglers and insurgents and
protecting Iraqi and partner nation oil and gas infrastructure. We know the sea lanes must
remain open for the transit of oil, the lifeblood of the Iraqi economy, and our ships and sailor
are making that happen.18
Navy Initiatives to Improve Its IW and CT Capabilities
The Navy in recent years has implemented a number of organizational and program initiatives
intended to improve its IW and CT capabilities and activities, including those discussed below.
Navy Irregular Warfare Office
The Navy in July 2008 established the Navy Irregular Warfare Office, which is intended, in the
Navy’s words, to “institutionalize current ad hoc efforts in IW missions of counterterrorism and
counterinsurgency and the supporting missions of information operations, intelligence operations,
foreign internal defense and unconventional warfare as they apply to [CT] and
[counterinsurgency].” The office works closely with U.S. Special Operations Command, and
reports to the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for information, plans, and strategy.19
Navy Vision Statement for Countering Irregular Challenges
The Navy in January 2010 published a vision statement for countering irregular challenges, which
states in part:
The U.S. Navy will meet irregular challenges through a flexible, agile, and broad array of
multi-mission capabilities. We will emphasize Cooperative Security as part of a
comprehensive government approach to mitigate the causes of insecurity and instability. We
will operate in and from the maritime domain with joint and international partners to enhance
regional security and stability, and to dissuade, deter, and when necessary, defeat irregular
forces.20
18 Department of the Navy, Highlights of the Department of the Navy FY 2012 Budget, February 2011, pp. 2-1 to 2-4.
19 Zachary M. Peterson, “New Navy Irregular Warfare Office Works to Address ISR Shortfall,” Inside the Navy,
September 1, 2008.
20 Department of the Navy, Chief of Naval Operations, The U.S. Navy’s Vision for Confronting Irregular Challenges,
January 2010, p. 3.
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The full text of the vision statement is reproduced in the Appendix B.
Navy Community of Interest for Countering Irregular Challenges
The Navy in December 2010 established “a community of interest to develop and advance ideas,
collaboration and advocacy related to confronting irregular challenges (CIC).” The community,
which includes a number of Navy organizations, is to be the Navy’s “standing authority to
facilitate: implementation of the U.S. Navy Vision for Confronting Irregular Challenges (Vision);
promotion of increased understanding of confronting irregular challenges; and synchronization of
CIC-related initiatives within the navy and with its external partners.”21
Navy Expeditionary Combat Command (NECC)
The Navy Expeditionary Combat Command (NECC), headquartered at Naval Amphibious Base,
Little Creek, VA, was established informally in October 2005 and formally on January 13, 2006.
NECC consolidated and facilitated the expansion of a number of Navy organizations that have a
role in IW operations. Navy functions supported by NECC include the following:
• riverine warfare;
• maritime civil affairs;
• expeditionary training;
• explosive ordnance disposal (EOD);
• expeditionary intelligence;
• naval construction (i.e., the naval construction brigades, aka CBs or “Seabee”);
• maritime expeditionary security;
• expeditionary diving;
• combat camera;
• expeditionary logistics;
• guard battalion; and
• expeditionary combat readiness.
DON states that:
Navy Expeditionary Combat Command (NECC) is a global force provider of expeditionary
combat service support and force protection capabilities to joint warfighting commanders,
centrally managing the current and future readiness, resources, manning, training, and
equipping of a scalable, self-sustaining and integrated expeditionary force of active and
reserve sailors. Expeditionary sailors are deployed from around the globe in support of the
21 Source: Memorandum dated December 22, 2010, from S. M. Harris, Director, Navy Irregular Warfare Office, on the
subject, “Confronting Irregular Challenges Community of Interest (COI) Charter.” A copy of the memorandum was
posted at InsideDefense.com (subscription required). For an article discussing the Navy’s establishment of this
community of interest, see Christopher J. Castelli, “Navy Taps Other Services, Elite Forces For Irregular Warfare
Advice,” Inside the Navy, January 17, 2011.
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new “Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower.” NECC forces and capabilities are
integral to executing the maritime strategy which is based on expanded core capabilities of
maritime power: forward presence, deterrence, sea control, power projection, maritime
security, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief. To enable these, NECC provides a full
spectrum of operations, including effective waterborne and ashore anti-terrorism force
protection; theater security cooperation and engagement; and humanitarian assistance and
disaster relief. NECC is also a key element of the Navy’s operational Irregular Warfare (IW)
efforts in the area of operational support to the Navy forces in OIF and OEF.
NECC provides our most highly integrated force, smoothly combining active and reserve
forces, highlighted by the seamlessly integrated operational forces of naval construction
(Seabees), maritime expeditionary security (formerly coastal warfare), navy expeditionary
logistics (Cargo Handling Battalions), and the remaining mission capabilities throughout the
command. Beginning in FY2012 three Seabee Battalions and two Mobile Expeditionary
Security Force Squadrons are converting from Active units to Reserve units.
NECC is not a standalone or combat force, but rather a force protection and combat service
force of rapidly deployable mission specialists that fill the gaps in the joint battle space and
compliment joint and coalition capabilities.22
DON also states that:
The Reserve Component expeditionary forces are integrated with the Active Component
forces to provide a continuum of capabilities unique to the maritime environment within the
NECC. Blending the AC and RC brings strength to the force and is an important part of the
Navy’s ability to carry out the Naval Maritime Strategy from blue water into green and
brown water and in direct support of the Joint Force. The Navy Reserve trains and equips
over half of the Sailors supporting NECC missions, including naval construction and
explosive ordnance disposal in the CENTCOM AOR, as well as maritime expeditionary
security, expeditionary logistics (cargo handling battalions), maritime civil affairs,
expeditionary intelligence, and other mission capabilities seamlessly integrated with
operational forces around the world.23
Global Maritime Partnership
The Global Maritime Partnership is a U.S. Navy initiative to achieve an enhanced degree of
cooperation between the U.S. Navy and foreign navies, coast guards, and maritime police forces,
for the purpose of ensuring global maritime security against common threats. The Navy states
that
The creation and maintenance of maritime security is essential to mitigating threats short of
war, including piracy, terrorism, weapons proliferation, drug trafficking, and other illicit
activities. Countering these threats far from our nation’s shores protects the American
homeland, enhances global stability and secures freedom of navigation for all nations. While
our FY 2012 budget supports meeting this challenge, the future of maritime security depends
more than ever on international cooperation and understanding. Piracy is an international
problem and requires an international solution. The U. S. Navy will continue to function as
part of a larger international endeavor combining efforts of governments, militaries and
maritime industry to stop piracy on the high seas. The Navy remains engaged in
22 Department of the Navy, Highlights of the Department of the Navy FY 2012 Budget, February 2011, p. 4-15.
23 Department of the Navy, Highlights of the Department of the Navy FY 2012 Budget, February 2011, p. 4-25.
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counterpiracy operations, utilizing surface ships as well as long range P-3 Maritime
Surveillance aircraft, as part of longstanding efforts to combat crime on the high seas.
Disruptions to the global system of trade, finance, law, information, and immigration can
produce cascading and harmful effects far from their sources. The increase in piracy off the
Somali coast is a good example. The Navy is leading a multinational effort to patrol the
waters near the Horn of Africa. A combined task force has been established to deter, disrupt
and suppress piracy in support of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1851, protect
the global maritime environment, enhance maritime security and secure freedom of
navigation for all nations.
There is no one nation that can provide a solution to maritime security problems alone. A
global maritime partnership is required that unites maritime forces, port operators,
commercial shippers, and international, governmental and nongovernmental agencies to
address our mutual concerns. This partnership increases all of our maritime capabilities, such
as response time, agility and adaptability, and is purely voluntary, with no legal or
encumbering ties. It is a free-form, self-organizing network of maritime partners – good
neighbors interested in using the power of the sea to unite, rather than to divide.24
Partnership Stations
The Southern Partnership Station (SPS) and the Africa Partnership Station (APS) are Navy ships,
such as amphibious ships or high-speed sealift ships, that have deployed to the Caribbean and to
waters off Africa, respectively, to support U.S. Navy engagement with countries in those regions,
particularly for purposes of building security partnerships with those countries, and for increasing
the capabilities of those countries for performing maritime-security operations. The SPS and APS
can be viewed as specific measures for promoting the above-discussed global maritime
partnership. A July 2010 Government Accountability Office (GAO) report discusses the APS.25
Riverine Force
The riverine force is intended to supplement the riverine capabilities of the Navy’s SEALs (the
Navy’s Sea-Air-Land special operations forces) and relieve Marines who had been conducting
maritime security operations in ports and waterways in Iraq. The riverine force currently consists
of three active-duty squadrons of 12 boats each, and includes a total of about 900 sailors. The
Navy established Riverine Group 1 (which oversees the three squadrons) at the Naval
Amphibious Base, Little Creek, VA, in May 2006. The three current riverine squadrons were
established in 2006-2007.
The Navy’s proposed FY2011 budget requested funding for “the establishment of a new RC
[reserve component] riverine training squadron which will compliment the three existing AC
[active component] riverine squadrons. The fourth riverine squadron will increase the riverine
capacity to conduct brown water training and partnership activities in order to meet COCOM
demands.”26 The Navy stated that the creation of the fourth riverine squadron is to involve the
24 Department of the Navy, Highlights of the Department of the Navy FY 2012 Budget, February 2011, pp. 1-5 and 1-6.
For more on the Navy’s contribution to multinational antipiracy operations near the Horn of Africa, see CRS Report
R40528, Piracy off the Horn of Africa, by Lauren Ploch et al.
25 Government Accountability Office, Defense Management[:]Improved Planning, Training, and Interagency
Collaboration Could Strengthen DOD’s Efforts in Africa, GAO-10-794, July 2010, 63 pp.
26 Department of the Navy, Highlights of the Department of the Navy FY 2011 Budget, February 2010, p. 4-24.
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realignment of 238 Full Time Support and Selected Reservist billets, and that the new squadron is
to be the first-ever reserve component riverine training squadron within NECC.27
Other Organizational Initiatives
Other Navy initiatives in recent years for supporting IW and CT operations include establishing a
reserve civil affairs battalion, a Navy Foreign Area Officer (FAO) community consisting of
officers with specialized knowledge of foreign countries and regions, a maritime interception
operation (MIO) intelligence exploitation pilot program, and an intelligence data-mining
capability at the National Maritime Intelligence Center (NMIC).
IW-Related Programs in FY2012 Navy Budget
The FY2012 DON budget highlights books28 states the following regarding elements of the
proposed FY2012 DON budget that support Navy IW capabilities and operations:
The request [for FY2012 funds to cover the incremental costs of military operations]
continues support for the fighting force in Afghanistan and the refurbishment costs
associated with equipment returning from theater. Operational realities have maintained the
demand signal for Departmental assets in theater for irregular capabilities as well as outside
of the more traditional boots-on-the-ground support. ISR, airborne electronic attack, combat
support missions flown from carrier decks with long transit times, and expanded counter-
piracy missions are all areas that have shown persistent high demand signals from
CENTCOM. (page 2-7)
The wide range of goods and services provided by NWCF [Navy Working Capital Fund]
activities are crucial to the DON’s conventional and irregular warfare capabilities as well as
its ongoing roles in OCO [overseas contingency operations]. (page 6-8)
The FY 2012 budget continues investment in platforms and systems that maintain the
advantage against future threats and across the full spectrum of operations. Procurement of
the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS), Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR),
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) and other programs that support irregular warfare and
capacity building also continue to be emphasized. (page 5-1)
The Navy’s shipbuilding budget increases since the FY 2011 FYDP and procures 55 battle
force ships from FY 2012 to FY 2016 and one Oceanographic Research Ship. The budget
funds a continuum of forces ranging from the covert Virginia class submarine, the multi-
mission DDG-51 destroyer, the multi-role Landing Platform Dock (LPD 27), to the LCS and
the Joint High Speed Vessel (JHSV) with its greater access to littoral areas. This balance
continues to pace future threat capabilities while fully supporting current irregular warfare
operations and supporting maritime security and stability operations in the littorals. (page 5-
2)
We continue to examine options for the LCS [Littoral Combat Ship] to help address
emerging and ever evolving irregular threats. While naval forces are conducting combat and
combat-support missions in Iraq and Afghanistan, the Navy and the Marine Corps also stand
ready to answer our nation’s call across the full spectrum of military operations through
27 Department of the Navy, Highlights of the Department of the Navy FY 2011 Budget, February 2010, p. 3-7.
28 Department of the Navy, Highlights of the Department of the Navy FY 2012 Budget, February 2011.
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sustained pre-deployment training and enhanced Irregular Warfare (IW) training capabilities.
(page 1-9)
Sustainment of the missions performed by the fatigued P-3 Orion fleet remains a priority for
the Department. The P-8A Multi-Mission Maritime Aircraft (MMA), based on the Boeing
737 platform, begins replacing the P-3, with an Initial Operating Capability (IOC) in 2013.
The P-8A’s ability to perform undersea warfare, surface warfare and ISR missions make it a
critical force multiplier for the joint task force commander. Additionally, the P-8A, which is
authorized by the Defense Acquisition Board to have a Full Rate Production (FRP) award of
eleven aircraft in FY 2012, will have increased capabilities over the P-3 as it addresses
emerging technologies and ever evolving irregular threats. (page 5-9)
RDT&E, N [research, development, test and evaluation] initiatives support both traditional
and irregular warfare demands in several aviation programs. (page 5-13)
The FY 2012 S&T [science and technology] portfolio [for DON] is aligned to support 13
discrete naval S&T focus areas composed of:… 4) asymmetric and irregular warfare….
(page 5-31)
Potential Oversight Issues for Congress
Definition of Navy IW Activities
Potential oversight questions for Congress regarding the definition of Navy IW activities include
the following:
• Should security force assistance operations, civic assistance operations, disaster
relief operations, and counter-piracy operations be included in the definition of
Navy IW operations?
• Should operations to build partnerships, and to build partner capacities for
conducting maritime security operations, be included in the definition of Navy
IW operations?
• Has the Navy included the kinds of operations listed in the two previous points in
its definition of Navy IW operations in part to satisfy a perceived requirement
from the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) to show that the Navy is
devoting a certain portion of its personnel and budgets to irregular warfare?
• Should the Navy’s CT operations be considered a part of its IW operations? What
is the relationship between the navy’s IW and CT operations?
Degree of Emphasis on IW and CT in Future Navy Budgets
Another potential oversight issue for Congress is how much emphasis to place on IW and CT
activities in future Navy budgets.
Supporters of placing increased emphasis on IW and CT activities in future Navy budgets could
argue that the experience of recent years, including U.S. operations in Afghanistan and Iraq,
suggests that the United States in coming years will likely need to be able to conduct IW and CT
operations, that the Navy has certain specialized or unique IW and CT capabilities that need to be
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supported as part of an effective overall U.S. IW or CT effort, and that there are programs relating
to Navy IW and CT activities that could be funded at higher levels, if additional funding were
made available.
Opponents of placing an increased emphasis on IW and CT activities in future Navy budgets
could argue that these activities already receive adequate emphasis on Navy budgets, and that
placing an increased emphasis on these activities could reduce the amount of funding available to
the Navy for programs that support the Navy’s role in acting, along with the Air Force, as a
strategic reserve for the United States in countering improved Chinese maritime military forces
and otherwise deterring and if necessary fighting in potential conventional inter-state conflicts
Potential oversight questions for Congress include the following:
• To what degree can or should Navy IW and CT activities be used to reduce the
burden on other services for conducting such activities?
• Are the Navy’s steps to increase its role in IW and CT partly motivated by
concerns about its perceived relevance, or by a desire to secure a portion of IW
and CT funding?
• Is the Navy striking an appropriate balance between IW and CT activities and
other Navy concerns, such as preparing for a potential future challenge from
improved Chinese maritime military forces?29
Additional Oversight Questions
In addition to the issues discussed above, the Navy’s IW and CT activities pose some additional
potential oversight issues for Congress, including the following:
• How many Navy personnel globally are involved in IW and CT activities, and
where are they located? How much funding is the Navy expending each year on
such activities?
• Is the Navy adequately managing its individual augmentee (IA) program?30
• Is the Navy devoting sufficient attention and resources to riverine warfare?31
• Aside from the establishment of the riverine force and a reserve civil affairs
battalion, what implications might an expanded Navy role in IW and CT have for
Navy force-structure requirements (i.e., the required size and composition of the
Navy)?
• Is the Navy adequately coordinating its IW and CT activities and initiatives with
other organizations, such as the Special Operations Command (SOCOM) and the
Coast Guard?
29 For additional discussion of this issue, see CRS Report RL33153, China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S.
Navy Capabilities—Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
30 For a discussion of the Navy’s management of the IA program, see Andrew Scutro, “Fleet Forces Takes Charge of
IA Program,” NavyTimes.com, July 7, 2008.
31 For an article that discusses this question from a critical perspective, see Daniel A. Hancock, “The Navy’s Not
Serious About Riverine Warfare,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, January 2008: 14-19.
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• Are the Navy’s recent IW and CT organizational changes appropriate? What
other Navy organizational changes might be needed?
Legislative Activity for FY2012
FY2012 National Defense Authorization Bill (H.R. 1540/S. 1253)
House
Section 1099 of H.R. 1540 as reported by the House Armed Services Committee (H.Rept. 112-78
of May 17, 2011) states:
SEC. 1099. SENSE OF CONGRESS REGARDING THE KILLING OF OSAMA BIN
LADEN.
(a) Findings- Congress makes the following findings:
(1) Osama bin Laden was responsible for ordering the attacks of September 11, 2001, that
killed almost 3,000 American citizens.
(2) Osama bin Laden and his terrorist organization, al-Qaeda, have been responsible for
carrying out attacks on innocent men and women around the world.
(3) The United States Special Operations Command organizes, trains, and equips Special
Operations Forces and is providing those forces to the United States Central Command under
whose operational control they serve.
(4) Special Operations forces were able to complete the mission to kill Osama bin Laden
without United States casualties.
(5) The killing of Osama bin Laden represents a milestone victory in bringing to justice the
mastermind of September 11, 2001.
(b) Sense of Congress- It is the sense of Congress that—
(1) the Special Operations Forces provide a tremendous service to the Nation; and
(2) the killing of Osama bin Laden is a major victory for international justice and for the
United States in the war against terrorism and radical extremists.
The committee’s report recommends increasing by $60.0 million DOD’s request for $6.9 million
in FY2012 funding in the Procurement, Defense-wide account for SOF combatant craft systems
(page 371).
The committee’s report states:
U.S. Special Operations Command Undersea Mobility Strategy
The committee supports the recent program and strategy shift in the Undersea Mobility
Program by the Commander, U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) and U.S.
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Naval Special Warfare Command (WARCOM). The committee is pleased and supports
recent reprogramming requests by USSOCOM and WARCOM to consolidate and shift
Joint-Multi-Mission Submersible (JMMS) and Advance SEAL Delivery System (ASDS)32
program funds into a consolidated Undersea Mobility Way Ahead program designed to
deliver more platforms sooner and at less cost across the Future Years Defense Program. The
committee recognizes the critical operational importance of this program to provide
technologically advanced undersea mobility platforms and address capability gaps for
operating in denied maritime areas from strategic distances. The committee therefore stresses
the need for continued communication with the congressional defense committees to ensure
programmatic success and prevent previous program shortfalls in undersea mobility platform
strategies. (Page 206)
Senate
Section 155 of S. 1253 as reported by the Senate Armed Services Committee (S.Rept. 112-26 of
June 22, 2011):
SEC. 155. DESIGNATION OF UNDERSEA MOBILITY ACQUISITION PROGRAM OF
THE UNITED STATES SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND AS A MAJOR DEFENSE
ACQUISITION PROGRAM.
(a) Designation- The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics
shall designate the undersea mobility acquisition program of the United States Special
Operations Command as a major defense acquisition program (MDAP).
(b) Elements- The major defense acquisition program designated under subsection (a) shall
consist of the elements as follows:
(1) The Dry Combat Submersible-Light program.
(2) The Dry Combat Submersible-Medium program.
(3) The Shallow Water Combat Submersible program.
(4) The Next-Generation Submarine Shelter program.
Regarding this section, the committee’s report states:
Designation of undersea mobility acquisition program of the United States Special
Operations Command as a Major Defense Acquisition Program (sec. 155)
The committee recommends a provision that would require the Under Secretary of Defense
for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics to designate the undersea mobility program,
including the Dry Combat Submersible-Light (DCSL), Dry Combat Submersible-Medium
(DCSM), Shallow Water Combat Submersible (SWCS), and Next-Generation Submarine
Shelter acquisition programs under U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) as an
Acquisition Category (ACAT) ID Major Defense Acquisition Program.
32 SEALS for many years have used dry deck shelters (DDSs) to covertly deploy ashore from submarines. A DDS
attaches to a hatch on the top surface of a submarine. The ASDS and JMMS programs were intended to provide
improved replacements for the aging DDSs. The ASDS program encountered difficulties and was terminated after
producing one ASDS. The successor JMMS program was terminated before producing any JMMS units.
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Combat submersibles are used for shallow water infiltration and exfiltration of special
operations forces, reconnaissance, resupply, and other missions. As demonstrated by
previous combat submersible acquisition programs, these systems and associated support
equipment are inherently complicated and expensive to develop and procure.
According to the Government Accountability Office, approximately $677.5 million was
expended to develop and procure the Advanced SEAL Delivery System (ASDS) to fill
USSOCOM’s requirement for a dry combat submersible for special operations personnel.
The ASDS program suffered from ineffective contract oversight, technical challenges, and
reliability and performance issues. The first and only ASDS platform reached initial
operating capability in 2003, approximately 6 years behind schedule. Unfortunately, the
ASDS was rendered inoperable by a catastrophic battery fire in November 2008 and was
deemed too costly to repair by the Commander of USSOCOM. The Joint Multi-Mission
Submersible (JMMS) program was initiated in fiscal year 2010 to fill the requirement for a
dry combat submersible, but cancelled later that year due to unacceptably high total program
costs. Both the ASDS and JMMS programs were designated ACAT ID programs by the
Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics.
In August 2010, USSOCOM announced a new acquisition strategy to meet its undersea
mobility requirements consisting of the DCSL, DCSM, SWCS, and Next-Generation
Submarine Shelter programs. USSOCOM also announced that these individual programs
would be managed by USSOCOM, with milestone decision authority vested in the
USSOCOM Acquisition Executive. The committee recognizes the enduring requirement for
undersea mobility capabilities for special operations forces and supports USSOCOM’s
efforts to acquire a family of wet and dry submersibles at a lower unit cost relative to
previous programs by utilizing mature and commercial off the shelf technologies where
available. However, the committee believes that the total acquisition costs, potential risks,
and past history of undersea mobility acquisition programs necessitates the program
oversight of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics.
(Pages 15-16)
The committee’s report also states:
High Speed Assault Craft
The budget request included $6.9 million in Procurement, Defense-wide, for maritime
combatant craft systems, but no funding for High Speed Assault Craft (HSAC) for U.S.
Special Operations Command (USSOCOM). Theater Naval Special Warfare (NSW) forces
currently utilize a rapidly aging fleet of Mk V Special Operations Craft (SOC) and Rigid
Inflatable Boats (RIB) to perform a range of functions ranging from maritime interdiction to
infiltration/exfiltration of personnel to partner nation engagement and training. The
combination of Mk V SOC and RIB retirements and unexpected program delays for the
follow-on platform known as the Combatant Craft Medium are expected to create a maritime
combatant craft capability gap in the 2013 to 2015 timeframe. As a result, the Commander of
USSOCOM has identified a $15.0 million shortfall in funding for six HSACs. The HSAC is
currently in the NSW inventory and has been identified as the only existing maritime surface
platform that meets Theater NSW requirements in the near-term.
The committee recommends an increase of $15.0 million in Procurement, Defense-wide, for
HSACs for USSOCOM. The committee also recommends USSOCOM consider service life
extension options for existing Mk V SOC and RIB platforms to mitigate any additional
maritime combatant craft capability gaps. (Page 25)
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FY2012 DOD Appropriations Bill (H.R. 2219)
House
The House Appropriations Committee, in its report (H.Rept. 112-110 of June 16, 2011) on H.R.
2219, recommends increasing by $64.0 million DOD’s request for $6.9 million in FY2012
funding in the Procurement, Defense-wide account for SOF combatant craft systems, with the
increase being for “HSAC [High Speed Assault Craft] unfunded requirement” (pages 197 and
199).
Senate
The Senate Appropriations Committee, in its report (S.Rept. 112-77 of September 15, 2011) on
H.R. 2219, recommends transferring from the Navy’s Title II (i.e. base budget) operations and
maintenance account to its Title IX (Overseas Deployments and Other Programs) operations and
maintenance account $192.8 million in combat support forces funding for NECC and $9 million
in in-service weapons systems support funding for NECC (page 47, lines 1C6C and 1D3D, and
page 251, lines 1C6C and 1D3D).
The report recommends approving DOD’s request for $6.9 million in FY2012 funding in the
Procurement, Defense-wide account for SOF combatant craft systems (page 154). The report
recommends reducing by $4 million the Navy’s FY2012 request for research and development
funding for the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS), with the reduction being for “Defer development of
Irregular Warfare mission package” (page 187).
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Appendix A. November 2011 Navy Testimony on
Navy IW Activities
Below is the text of the Navy’s prepared statement for a November 3, 2011, hearing before the
Emerging Threats and Capabilities subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee on the
IW activities of the military services. The text of the statement, by Rear Admiral Sinclair Harris,
Director, Navy Irregular Warfare Office, is as follows:
Chairman Thornberry, Congressman Langevin, and distinguished members of the House
Armed Services Emerging Threats and Capabilities Subcommittee, it is an honor for me to
be here with you today to address the U.S. Navy’s efforts to institutionalize and develop
proficiency in irregular warfare mission areas. These efforts are vital to our national interests
and, as part of a comprehensive approach for meeting complex global challenges, remain
relevant in a time of uncertainty and constant change. To meet these challenges Admiral
Greenert, Chief of Naval Operations, recently provided his Sailing Directions to our Navy
emphasizing the mission to deter aggression and, if deterrence fails, to win our Nation’s
wars. Today, the Navy is engaged around the world conducting preventive activities that
stabilize, strengthen, and secure our partners and allies providing regional deterrence against
state and non-state actors, while at the same time fighting, and winning, our Nation’s wars.
We expect the demand for these activities to increase in the future security environment as a
capacity constrained Navy seeks to maintain access and presence. Emphasis on increased
training and education will enable our continued readiness to effectively meet global
demand.
As demand for our Navy continues to grow, we continue to leverage our Maritime Strategy
with our partners, the Marine Corps and Coast Guard. The maritime domain supports 90% of
the world’s trade and provides offshore options to help friends in need, and to confront and
defeat aggression far from our shores as part of a defense in depth approach to secure our
homeland. CNO’s Sailing Directions, coupled with an enduring Maritime Strategy,
underscore the Navy’s focus on multi-mission platforms and highly trained Sailors that
conduct activities across the operational spectrum. Key tenets of the force are readiness to
fight and win today while building the ability to win tomorrow; to provide offshore options
to deter, influence, and win; and to harness the teamwork, talent and imagination of our
diverse force. While the Maritime Strategy spans the spectrum of warfare, the Navy’s Vision
for Confronting Irregular Challenges (CIC), released in January 2010, addresses mission
areas of irregular warfare as well as maritime activities to prevent, limit, and interdict
irregular threats and their influence on regional stability through, insurgency, crime, and
violent extremism.
The CIC Vision is derived from our Maritime Strategy with the intention to implement steps
towards increasing the Navy’s proficiency in supporting direct and indirect approaches that
dissuade and defeat irregular actors who exploit uncontrolled or ungoverned spaces in order
to employ informational, economic, technological, and kinetic means against civilian
populations to achieve their objectives. The CIC Vision is guiding the alignment of
organizations, investments, innovation, procedures, doctrine, and training needed to
mainstream CIC capabilities within the Fleet. These efforts are focused on outcomes of
increased effectiveness in stabilizing and strengthening regions, enhancing regional
awareness, increasing regional maritime partner capacity, and expanding coordination and
interoperability with joint, interagency, and international partners. These outcomes support
promoting regional security and stability and advancing the rule of law allowing good
governance and promoting prosperity by helping partners better protect their people and
resources. In addition to preventive activities, the Vision guides efforts to inhibit the spread
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of violent extremism and illicit, terrorist, and insurgent activities. To achieve these outcomes,
the Navy is actively reorienting doctrine and operational approaches, rebalancing
investments and developmental efforts, and refining operations and partnerships to better
support a comprehensive approach to U.S. efforts. These efforts will provide a Navy capable
of confronting irregular challenges through a broad array of multi-mission capabilities and a
force proficient in the CIC missions of security force assistance, maritime security, stability
operations, information dominance, and force application necessary to support
counterinsurgency, counterterrorism, and foreign internal defense missions.
In line with its strategy for confronting irregular challenges the Navy has leveraged key force
providers, such as the Navy Expeditionary Combat Command, and established Maritime
Partnership Stations, and Maritime Headquarters with Maritime Operations Centers to meet
the demands and missions consistent with its strategy and vision. The evolution of
intelligence and strike capabilities has enabled the Navy to meet urgent Combatant
Commander requirements for counterterrorism and counterinsurgency operations and
highlighted further opportunities for the Navy as an important joint partner. While these
operational organizations and activities deliver Navy capabilities in theater, the Navy
Irregular Warfare Office, established by the CNO in July 2008, has guided the
implementation and institutionalization of the CIC Vision. The Navy Irregular Warfare
Office, working closely with USSOCOM, other Combatant Commanders, Services,
interagency and international partners, has rapidly identified and deployed Navy capabilities
to today’s fight, and is institutionalizing confronting irregular challenges concepts in the
Navy’s planning, investment, and capability development.
The Navy Irregular Warfare Office operates under three primary imperatives consistent with
the Maritime Strategy, CNO’s Sailing Directions, and the Navy’s Vision for Confronting
Irregular Challenges. They provide integration and institutionalization in CIC mission areas
and are; (1) improve the level of understanding concerning the maritime contribution to the
joint force; (2) increase proficiency of the whole of Navy to confront irregular challenges;
and (3) drive maritime and special operations forces to seamless integration in addressing
irregular challenges. These three imperatives focus the Navy’s implementation efforts and
mainstream the concept that preventing wars is as important as winning them. Our Navy
must be ready to transition seamlessly between operational environments, with the capability
and training inherent in the Fleet.
Department of Defense Directive 3000.07 directs the services to “improve DoD proficiency
for irregular warfare, which also enhances its conduct of stability operations” and directs
reporting to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff annually. Navy efforts to
institutionalize and provide proficiency in confronting irregular challenges, includes
proficiency in irregular warfare missions along with missions of maritime security operations
and information dominance, a key enabler for CIC. Currently, the Navy leverages its access
and persistent presence to both better understand and respond to irregular challenges and is
actively evolving its proficiency to prevent and counter irregular threats while maintaining
its ability to conduct the full spectrum of naval warfare. Its access, presence, and emphasis
on maritime partnerships enable broader government efforts to address underlying conditions
of instability that enhance regional security. Through its mix of multi-mission capabilities,
the Navy provides political leaders with a range of offshore options for limiting regional
conflict through assurance, deterrence, escalation and de-escalation, gaining and maintaining
access, and rapid crisis response. In addition to its inherent ability to protect the maritime
commons, its effectiveness in building maritime partner capability and capacity contributes
to achieving partner security and economic objectives. Operating in and from the maritime
domain with joint and international partners, the Navy is enhancing regional security while
dissuading, deterring, and when necessary, defeating irregular threats.
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The Navy acknowledges the complexity of the future security environment and continues to
explore balanced approaches. Following are the Navy’s current focus areas:
Fleet-SOF Integration: Navy’s afloat basing support to special operations forces has
extended their reach into denied or semi-permissive areas enabling highly successful
counterterrorism missions. Navy provides inherent combat capabilities, multi-mission ships
and submarines collecting mission critical information, approval for 1052 support billets for
Naval Special Warfare, two dedicated HCS squadrons, and shipboard controlled UAV orbits
supporting counterterrorism operations. The Navy is aligned to improve this integration
through pre-deployment training, mission rehearsals, improvements to fleet bandwidth
allocation, shipboard C4I enhancements, and C2 relationships needed to prosecute time
sensitive targets.
Maritime Partnerships: Establishing enduring maritime partnerships is a long-term strategy
for securing the maritime commons. Legal, jurisdictional, and diplomatic considerations
often complicate efforts to secure the maritime commons, especially from exploitation by
highly adaptive irregular actors. In recognition of these considerations, the Navy is
emphasizing partnership engagements with U.S. and international maritime forces to
strengthen regional security.
Information Sharing Initiatives: In an information dominated environment, initiatives that
link joint warfighters, the technology community, and academia are crucial to rapidly
fielding solutions to emerging irregular challenges. These initiatives are the basis for longer-
term efforts to adapt and improve proficiency of Navy platforms to address irregular
challenges.
Doctrine: Development of Tri-Service (Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard) Maritime
Stability Operations doctrine that will enable a more effective response to instability in the
littorals.
Organization: Navy Expeditionary Combat Command, which continues to provide in-
demand capabilities such as Maritime Civil Affairs Teams, Riverine Forces, Maritime
Security Forces, Explosive Ordnance Disposal Teams, and Expeditionary Intelligence
Teams.
Today, the Navy continues to meet planned global operational commitments and respond to
crises as they emerge. Overseas Contingency Operations continue with more than 12,000
active and reserve Sailors serving around the globe and another 15,000 at sea in Central
Command. Navy’s Carrier Strike Groups provide 30 percent of the close air support for
troops on the ground in Afghanistan and our Navy and Marine Corps pilots fly almost 60%
of electronic attack missions. Yet, as our national interests extend beyond Iraq and
Afghanistan, so do the operations of our Navy. Over the last year, more than 50 percent of
our Navy has been underway daily; globally present, and persistently engaged. Last year, our
Navy conducted counter-piracy operations in the Indian Ocean and North Arabian Sea with a
coalition of several nations, trained local forces in maritime security as part of our Global
Maritime Partnership initiatives in Europe, South America, Africa and the Pacific and forces
in the Sixth Fleet supported NATO in complex operations in Libya. Navy responded with
humanitarian assistance and disaster relief to the earthquake in Haiti, the flooding in
Pakistan, and the earthquake and tsunami in Japan; and, conducted the world’s largest
maritime exercise, Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC), which brought together 14 nations and
more than 20,000 military personnel, to improve coordination and trust in multi-national
operations in the Pacific. Our Sailors continue to deploy forward throughout the world,
projecting US influence, responding to contingencies, and building international
relationships that enable the safe, secure, and free flow of commerce that underpins our
economic prosperity and advances the mission areas that address irregular challenges.
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The future vision of the Navy in meeting the uncertain challenges around the globe remains a
force forward, present, and persistent in areas critical to the national interests of the United
States. CNO, in previous testimony,33 stated: Our Navy continues to conduct a high tempo of
global operations, which we expect to continue even as forces draw down in Afghanistan.
Global trends in economics, demographics, resources, and climate change portend an
increased demand for maritime presence, power, and influence. America’s prosperity
depends on the seas… and as disruption and disorder persist in our security environment,
maritime activity will evolve and expand. Seapower allows our nation to maintain U.S.
presence and influence globally and, when necessary, project power without a costly,
sizeable, or permanent footprint ashore. We will continue to maintain a forward-deployed
presence around the world to prevent conflict, increase interoperability with our allies,
enhance the maritime security and capacity of our traditional and emerging partners,
confront irregular challenges, and respond to crises. To continue as a global force in the
preventive and responsive mission areas that confront irregular challenges, including those of
irregular warfare, the Navy will be faced with increasing demand in a fiscally induced
capacity constrained environment. Constrained capacity requires a prioritization of areas
requiring persistent presence, to include those regions of current or forecast instability. Also
required is an understanding of the risk incurred to mission, and to force, if we do not get
that priority correct. We must ensure our Navy remains the finest, best trained, and most
ready in the world to sustain key mission areas that support confronting irregular challenges,
and has the ability to face a highly capable adversary. The Navy looks forward to working
with Congress to address our future challenges and thank you for your support of the Navy’s
mission and personnel at this critical crossroads in U.S. history.34
33 At this point, the statement includes a footnote citing the prepared statement of Admiral Jonathan Greenert before the
House Armed Services Committee on July 26, 2011. Greenert became the Chief of Naval Operations on September 23,
2011.
34 Statement of Rear Admiral (Lower Half) Sinclair Harris, Director, Navy Irregular Warfare Office, before the House
Armed Services Committee, Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities, November 3, 2011. Italics as in
original.
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Appendix B. Navy Irregular Warfare Vision
Statement
This appendix reproduces the Navy’s January 2010 vision statement for irregular warfare.35
35 Department of the Navy, Chief of Naval Operations, The U.S. Navy’s Vision for Confronting Irregular Challenges,
January 2010, 7 pp. (including the cover page).
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Author Contact Information
Ronald O'Rourke
Specialist in Naval Affairs
rorourke@crs.loc.gov, 7-7610
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