Libya: Transition and U.S. Policy
Christopher M. Blanchard
Analyst in Middle Eastern Affairs
October 25, 2011
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Libya: Transition and U.S. Policy

Summary
After more than 40 years of authoritarian repression and eight months of armed conflict,
fundamental political change has come to Libya. The killing of Muammar al Qadhafi on October
20 and the declaration of Libya’s liberation by the interim Transitional National Council on
October 23 marked the end of the Libyan people’s armed struggle and the formal beginning of the
country’s transition to a new political order. Overcoming the legacy of Qadhafi’s rule and the
effects of the recent fighting is now the principal challenge for the Libyan people, the TNC, and
the international community. The transition period may prove to be as complex and challenging
for Libyans and their international counterparts as the recent conflict. Immediate tasks include
establishing and maintaining security, preventing criminality and reprisals, restarting Libya’s
economy, and taking the first steps in a planned transition to democratic governance. In the
coming weeks and months, Libyans will face key questions about basic terms for transitional
justice, a new constitutional order, political participation, and Libyan foreign policy. Security
challenges, significant investment needs, and vigorous political debates are now emerging.
The U.S. military continues to participate in Operation Unified Protector, the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization (NATO) military operation to enforce United Nations (U.N.) Security
Council Resolution 1973, which authorizes “all necessary measures” to protect Libyan civilians.
On October 23, NATO leaders indicated that the military operation would draw to a close on
October 31, barring any unforeseen developments that require its continuation. U.S. officials
express confidence that nuclear materials and chemical weapons components that are stored in
Libya remain secure and state that remote monitoring will continue. The proliferation of military
weaponry from unsecured Libyan stockpiles—including small arms, explosives, and shoulder-
fired anti-aircraft missiles—remains a serious concern. The Obama Administration is
implementing a program with the TNC to retrieve and disable certain weapons and has reiterated
that it has no intention of deploying U.S. military forces on the ground in Libya. The U.S.
Embassy in Tripoli has reopened with a limited staff. Congress may consider proposals for further
assisting Libya’s transitional authorities or supporting security efforts.
The U.N. General Assembly has recognized the TNC as Libya’s U.N. representative, and the
Security Council adopted Resolution 2009, creating a three-month mandate for a U.N. Support
Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) to assist Libyans with public security and transition arrangements.
The resolution also sets conditions for the sale of arms and training to the Libyan government and
partially lifts the U.N. mandated asset freeze for certain purposes. The TNC continues to call for
the release of Libyan assets seized pursuant to Resolutions 1970 and 1973. Transfers of assets
have begun from multiple governments, including $1.5 billion in previously blocked assets that
the U.S. government has arranged to support Libyan humanitarian, fuel, and salary needs. U.S.
Treasury Department licenses now authorize the release of assets belonging to some Libyan
entities and allow some transactions with some Libyan state institutions, including oil companies.
A TNC stabilization team is leading Libyan efforts to deliver services; assess reconstruction
needs; and begin to reform ministries, public utilities, and security forces. The TNC has issued
orders concerning security and established a high security council to coordinate volunteer forces.
Initial reports from Libya suggest that local militias and some emergent political groups may
oppose certain TNC policies and seek to replace certain TNC personalities. TNC officials remain
confident in Libyan unity, and an interim government is expected to replace the TNC executive
authority within a month. As Libyans work to shape their future, Congress and the Administration
will have the first opportunity to fully redefine U.S.-Libyan relations since the 1960s.
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Libya: Transition and U.S. Policy

Contents
Background...................................................................................................................................... 1
Status as of October 25, 2011 .......................................................................................................... 2
Qadhafi’s Death, Liberation, and Interim Government....................................................... 3
Congressional Action and Legislation................................................................................. 3
Assessment and Key Issues ....................................................................................................... 5
United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) and Other
Stabilization Efforts.......................................................................................................... 7
Conventional Weapons and Chemical and Nuclear Materials ............................................ 7
Military Support and Disarmament..................................................................................... 9
Libyan Assets, TNC Funding, and Oil Exports................................................................. 10
Humanitarian Conditions and Relief................................................................................. 12
International Criminal Court and United Nations Human Rights
Council Investigations.................................................................................................... 13
Prospects and Challenges for U.S. Policy...................................................................................... 14
Possible Questions................................................................................................................... 15
Libyan Political Dynamics and Profiles ........................................................................................ 16
Political Dynamics................................................................................................................... 16
Interim Transitional National Council (TNC) ................................................................... 17
Prominent TNC Figures .................................................................................................... 18
Armed Forces .................................................................................................................... 20
Exiles and Al Sanusi Monarchy Figures ........................................................................... 22
Libyan Islamists and the TNC ................................................................................................. 23
The Muslim Brotherhood.................................................................................................. 23
Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG)/Libyan Islamic Movement for
Change (LIMC).............................................................................................................. 24
Al Qaeda in the Lands of the Islamic Maghreb (AQLIM/AQIM) .................................... 26
Transitional National Council Positions and Statements .................................................. 27

Figures
Figure 1. Political Map of Libya...................................................................................................... 4

Contacts
Author Contact Information........................................................................................................... 28

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Libya: Transition and U.S. Policy

Background
Political change in neighboring Tunisia and Egypt helped bring long-simmering Libyan reform
debates to the boiling point in January and early February 2011. In recent years, leading Libyans
had staked out a broad range of positions about the necessary scope and pace of reform, while
competing for influence and opportunity under the watchful eye of hard-liners aligned with the
enigmatic leader of Libya’s September 1969 revolution, Muammar al Qadhafi. Qadhafi had long
insisted that he held no formal government position, but by all accounts he maintained his 40-
plus-year hold on ultimate authority, until recently, as the “reference point” for Libya’s byzantine
political system. Ironically, that system cited “popular authority” as its foundational principle and
organizing concept, but it denied Libyans the most basic political rights. Tribal relations and
regional dynamics, particularly long-held resentments of Qadhafi among residents in the east,
also influence Libyan politics. Rivalries are emerging among locally organized revolutionary
groups with differing experiences during Qadhafi’s rule and the recent conflict. Political groups
with differing priorities will also shape Libya’s transition (see “Political Dynamics” below).
Qadhafi government policy reversals on weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and terrorism led
to the lifting of most international sanctions in 2003 and 2004, followed by economic
liberalization, oil sales, and foreign investment that brought new wealth to some in Libya. U.S.
business gradually reengaged amid continuing U.S.-Libyan tension over terrorism concerns that
were finally resolved in 2008. During this period of international reengagement, political change
in Libya remained elusive and illusory. Some observers argued that Qadhafi supporters’
suppression of opposition had softened, as Libya’s international rehabilitation coincided with
steps by some pragmatists to maneuver within so-called “red lines.” The shifting course of those
red lines had been increasingly entangling reformers in the run-up to the outbreak of unrest in
February 2011. Government rehabilitation of imprisoned Islamist militants and the return of some
exiled opposition figures were welcomed by some observers. Ultimately, inaction on the part of
the government in response to calls for guarantees of basic political rights and for the drafting of
a constitution suggested a lack of consensus, if not outright opposition to meaningful reform.
The recent conflict was triggered in mid-February 2011 by a chain of events in Benghazi and
other eastern cities that quickly spiraled out of Qadhafi’s control. The government’s loss of
control over key eastern cities became apparent in mid-February, and broader unrest emerged in
other regions. A number of military officers, their units, and civilian officials abandoned Qadhafi
for the cause of the then-disorganized and amorphous opposition. Qadhafi and his supporters
denounced their opponents as drug-fueled traitors, foreign agents, and Al Qaeda supporters. Until
August, Qadhafi and allied forces maintained control over the capital, Tripoli, and other cities.
The cumulative effects of attrition by NATO airstrikes against military targets and a coordinated
offensive by rebels in Tripoli and from across western Libya then turned the tide, sending Qadhafi
and his supporters into retreat and exile. September and early October were marked by sporadic
and often intense fighting with Qadhafi supporters in and around Qadhafi’s birthplace, Sirte, and
the town of Bani Walid and neighboring military districts. NATO air operations continued as
rebel fighters engaged in battles of attrition with Qadhafi supporters.
Qadhafi’s death at the hands of rebel fighters in Sirte on October 23 brought the conflict to an
abrupt close, with some observers expressing concern that a dark chapter in Libyan history ended
violently, with an uncertain path ahead.
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Libya: Transition and U.S. Policy

Status as of October 25, 2011
On October 23, interim Transitional National Council (TNC) chief Mustafa Abdeljalil announced
the liberation of Libya and stated that an interim government would be named within one month.
Accordingly, NATO-led military operations to enforce U.N. Security Council Resolution 1970
and 1973 are drawing to a close, and may end by October 31.1 NATO air and sea patrol
operations continue, with no air-to-ground strikes reported since October 20. The rebel capture of
the Qadhafi military compound at Bab al Aziziyah in the capital Tripoli on August 23 signaled the
symbolic end of Qadhafi’s reign. Qadhafi’s death outside of his hometown of Sirte on the central
coast on October 20 brought an end to the fighting that had continued in isolated areas of central
and southern Libya between Qadhafi supporters and rebel forces. It is not immediately apparent
whether any remaining Qadhafi supporters will seek to rekindle an irregular warfare campaign
against the TNC, although the possibility of fighting among rebel factions exists.
The TNC has asserted nominal control over developments in Tripoli and has begun the task of
coordinating the diverse collection of armed groups that made the rebel capture of the city
possible, but which did not previously necessarily coordinate their actions with the TNC or each
other. A “high security council” serves as a coordinating mechanism for disparate volunteer
groups and regime defectors, including armed factions from communities like Zintan and
Misuratah and those led by Islamist figures, such as former Libyan Islamic Fighting Group
commander Abdelhakim Belhajj (see “Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG)/Libyan Islamic
Movement for Change (LIMC)” below).2
TNC figures have issued repeated calls for armed groups and citizens to avoid destruction of
public property, looting, and reprisals, in a conscious effort to avoid some of the immediate
security problems that plagued Iraq in the wake of the collapse of Saddam Hussein’s government.
The TNC has signaled its intention to take a inclusive approach with regard to government
personnel not known to have been involved in severe human rights violations or public
corruption. The success of the TNC initiatives and the acceptability of this approach among
Libyans remains to be seen. TNC officials remain concerned about their ability to provide
services and maintain security, although the resumption of water service in Tripoli, deliveries of
fuel, and infusions of seized assets have improved their position. TNC leaders estimate that over
20,000 Libyans have been killed in the recent conflict, with a further 50,000 injured.3 These
statistics have not been independently verified by any international third party.

1 On October 23, NATO Secretary-General Anders Fogh-Rassmussen said, “Our NATO-led operation to protect the
people of Libya, under the historic mandate of the United Nations, is very close to completion. We have taken a
preliminary decision to end Operation Unified Protector on October 31, and we will take a formal decision in the next
few days.” “Statement by the NATO Secretary-General on the Liberation of Libya, October 23, 2011.
2 As of September 8, rebels from Zintan under the command of the Madani clan claimed to have 5,000 armed men in
Tripoli. Fighters from Misuratah reportedly shifted toward the pursuit of pro-Qadhafi forces in Sirte and Bani Walid
and their numbers in Tripoli had declined to 1,500. Belhajj claims to have taken a leading role in the Tripoli operations.
He was released from prison by the Qadhafi government in 2010 as part of a reconciliation agreement with LIFG
fighters in exchange for their renunciation of violence. See Adrien Jaulmes, “The Fragile Patchwork of the Libyan
Rebels,” Le Figaro (Paris), September 8, 2011; U.S. Open Source Center (OSC) Report GMP20110824715001, “Rebel
Commander Balhaj Urges Al-Qadhafi Brigades To ‘Abandon’ Regime,” August 20, 2011; and OSC Report
GMP20100323950045, “Three Leaders of Libyan Fighting Group Freed – Paper,” March 23, 2010.
3 OSC Report GMP20111023001007, “Libya: TNC Chairman Mustafa Abd-al-Jalil on Aftermath of Al-Qadhafi’s
Death,” October 23, 2011.
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Qadhafi’s Death, Liberation, and Interim Government
The death of Muammar al Qadhafi, his son Mutassim al Qadhafi, and defense official Abu Bakr
Yunis Jabr near Sirte on October 20 brought a dramatic end to the conflict and signaled the
irreversibility of political change to Libyans and the international community. Nevertheless, the
uncertain circumstances of Qadhafi’s death have raised questions about the accountability of
armed groups in Libya and the TNC’s nascent control over the country—video footage appeared
to show Qadhafi wounded, but alive in rebel custody prior to his subsequent death by a gunshot
wound. TNC officials have promised to investigate the events leading up to Qadhafi’s death, amid
calls from human rights organizations and other international actors for a full public inquiry.
The formal announcement of Libya’s liberation by TNC leader Mustafa Abdeljalil opened a new
chapter in Libyan political life and illustrated many of the questions and themes that appear likely
to shape the transition period. For example, mild controversy over the TNC’s choice of location
for the announcement—Benghazi—reflects simmering rivalries among locally organized
revolutionary groups for influence over national affairs. Some Libyans argued that Tripoli may
have been a more appropriate location for the declaration, while other observers questioned
whether security concerns in the capital show that the TNC’s authority is more limited than many
outsiders assume.
The content of Abdeljalil’s statement also has attracted domestic and international interest,
particularly his emphasis on the population’s Islamic character and the extent to which Libyan
law may be based on religious law in the future. In his remarks, Abdeljalil stated that “We, as a
Muslim state, have taken the Islamic sharia as the main source of legislation, and therefore, any
law which contravenes the Islamic principles of sharia, is legally void.” He gave as examples
policies prohibiting men from marrying more than one wife and allowing interest-based financial
transactions. The draft charter that the TNC has proposed to guide the interim transition period
states that “Islam is the religion of the state and the principal source of legislation is Islamic
jurisprudence (sharia).... The State shall guarantee for non-Moslems the freedom of practicing
religious rights and shall guarantee respect for their systems of personal status.” (See “Interim
Transitional National Council (TNC)” and “Transitional National Council Positions and
Statements” below.)
Congressional Action and Legislation
Many Members of Congress have welcomed the announcement of Libya’s liberation and
Qadhafi’s death, while expressing concern about security in the country, the potential
proliferation of Libyan weapons, and the prospects for a smooth political transition. The Senate
version of the FY2012 State Department and Foreign Operations appropriations bill (S. 1601)
would provide $20 million in bilateral Economic Support Fund (ESF) account assistance “to
promote democracy, transparent and accountable governance, human rights, transitional justice,
and the rule of law in Libya, and for exchange programs between Libyan and American students.”
The bill prohibits non-loan-based funding for rehabilitation or reconstruction of infrastructure in
Libya. The committee report on the bill directs the use of Nonproliferation, Antiterrorism,
Demining, and Related Programs (NADR) account funding for disarmament and securing Libyan
weapons stockpiles. The Obama Administration has announced its intention to use $40 million in
appropriated funds to support similar efforts that are now ongoing, with U.S. civilian advisers
working with the TNC to locate, secure, and disable shoulder-fired missiles and other weaponry.
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