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Oman: Reform, Security, and U.S. Policy
Kenneth Katzman
Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs
October 18, 2011
Congressional Research Service
7-5700
www.crs.gov
RS21534
CRS Report for Congress
Pr
epared for Members and Committees of Congress
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Oman: Reform, Security, and U.S. Policy
Summary
Prior to the wave of unrest that has swept the Middle East in 2011, the United States had
consistently praised Sultan Qaboos bin Sa’id Al Said for gradually opening the political process
in the Sultanate of Oman, an initiative begun in the early 1980s without evident pressure from the
citizenry. The liberalization allowed Omanis a measure of representation but without significantly
limiting Qaboos’ role as major decision maker. Some Omani human rights activists and civil
society leaders, along with many younger Omanis, were always unsatisfied with the implicit and
explicit limits to political rights and believed the democratization process had stagnated. This
disappointment may have proved deeper and broader than experts believed when protests broke
out in several Omani cities beginning in late February 2011, after the toppling of President Hosni
Mubarak of Egypt on February 11. Still, the generally positive Omani views of Qaboos, coupled
with economic measures and repression of protest actions, appear to have contained the unrest.
Record turnout in the October 15, 2011, elections for the lower house of Oman’s legislative body
suggests the unrest has resulted in a new sense of activism, although with public recognition that
reform will continue to be gradual.
The stakes for the Administration and Congress in Oman’s stability are considerable. A long-time
U.S. ally in the Persian Gulf, Oman has allowed U.S. access to its military facilities for virtually
every U.S. military operation in and around the Gulf since 1980, despite the sensitivities in Oman
about a U.S. military presence there. Oman also has consistently supported U.S. efforts to achieve
a Middle East peace by publicly endorsing the peace treaties that have been achieved between
Israel and some of its Arab neighbors, and by occasionally hosting Israeli political leaders or
meeting with them outside Oman. It was partly in appreciation for this alliance that the United
States entered into a free trade agreement (FTA) with Oman. The FTA is considered pivotal to
helping Oman diversify its economy to compensate for its relatively small reserves of crude oil.
Perhaps because of the extensive benefits the alliance with Oman provides to U.S. Persian Gulf
policy, successive U.S. Administrations have tended not to criticize Oman’s relatively close
relations with Iran. Oman has a tradition of cooperation with Iran dating back to the Shah of
Iran’s regime, and Oman has always been less alarmed by the perceived threat from Iran than
have the other Gulf states. Oman’s leaders view possible U.S. military action against Iran’s
nuclear facilities as potentially more destabilizing to the region than is Iran’s nuclear program or
Iran’s foreign policy that supports Shiite and some other hardline Islamist movements. In
addition, Oman has played the role of broker between Iran and the United States, most recently in
the September 2011 release of two U.S. hikers from Iran after two years in jail there. For further
information on regional dynamics that affect Oman, see CRS Report RL32048, Iran: U.S.
Concerns and Policy Responses, by Kenneth Katzman.
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Contents
Introduction...................................................................................................................................... 1
Democratization, Human Rights, and 2011 Unrest ......................................................................... 2
Representative Institutions and Election History ...................................................................... 3
Electoral History ................................................................................................................. 4
2011 Unrest: Dissatisfaction, but Not Hunger for Major Change....................................... 4
October 2011: Election Following The Unrest.................................................................... 5
Broader Human Rights Issues ................................................................................................... 5
Freedom of Expression/Media ............................................................................................ 6
Labor Rights........................................................................................................................ 6
Religious Freedom .............................................................................................................. 6
Advancement of Women ..................................................................................................... 7
Trafficking in Persons ......................................................................................................... 7
Defense and Security Ties................................................................................................................ 7
U.S. Arms Sales and other Security Assistance to Oman.......................................................... 9
Arms Purchases by Oman ................................................................................................... 9
U.S. Security Aid and Its Uses ............................................................................................ 9
Cooperation Against Islamic Militancy................................................................................... 10
Cooperation on Regional Stability........................................................................................... 11
Iran .................................................................................................................................... 11
Iraq .................................................................................................................................... 13
Arab-Israeli Issues............................................................................................................. 13
Yemen................................................................................................................................ 14
Other GCC and Regional Issues: Bahrain Unrest and Libya ............................................ 14
Economic and Trade Issues............................................................................................................ 15
Figures
Figure 1. Map of Oman.................................................................................................................... 2
Tables
Table 1. Some Key Facts on Oman.................................................................................................. 1
Table 2. Recent U.S. Aid to Oman................................................................................................. 10
Contacts
Author Contact Information........................................................................................................... 16
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Introduction
Oman is located along the Arabian Sea, on the southern approaches to the Strait of Hormuz,
across from Iran. Except for a brief period of Persian rule, Omanis have remained independent
since expelling the Portuguese in 1650. The Al Said monarchy began in 1744, extending Omani
influence into Zanzibar and other parts of East Africa until 1861. A long-term rebellion led by the
Imam of Oman, leader of the Ibadhi sect (neither Sunni or Shiite and widely considered
“moderate conservative”) ended in 1959; Oman’s population is 75% Ibadhi. Sultan Qaboos bin
Sa’id Al Said, born in November 1940, is the eighth in the line of the monarchy; he became
Sultan in July 1970 when, with British support, he forced his father to abdicate.
The United States signed a treaty of friendship with Oman in 1833, one of the first of its kind
with an Arab state. (This treaty was replaced by the Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations, and
Consular Rights signed at Salalah on December 20, 1958.) Oman sent an official envoy to the
United States in 1840. A U.S. consulate was maintained in Muscat during 1880-1915, a U.S.
embassy was opened in 1972, and the first resident U.S. Ambassador arrived in July 1974. Oman
opened its embassy in Washington in 1973. Sultan Qaboos was accorded a formal state visit in
April 1983 by President Reagan. He had previously had a U.S. state visit in 1974. President
Clinton visited briefly in March 2000.
Table 1. Some Key Facts on Oman
Population
2.97 million, which includes 577,000 expatriates (July 2010 estimate)
Religions
Ibadhi Muslim, 75%; other, 25% (Sunni Muslim, Shi te Muslim, Hindu)
GDP (purchasing power
$76.53 billion (2010)
parity, PPP)
GDP per capita (PPP)
$25,800 (2010)
GDP Real Growth Rate
3.6% (2010)
Unemployment Rate
15%
Inflation Rate
4.0% (2010), down from 12.5% in 2008
Oil Production
863,000 barrels per day
Oil Reserves
5-5.5 billion barrels (2011 estimate)
Oil Exports
750,000 barrels per day (bpd)
Natural Gas Production
875 billion cubic feet/yr (2009)
Natural Gas Reserves
30 trillion cubic feet
Natural Gas Exports
407 billion cubic feet/yr
Foreign Exchange and
$14 billion (as of the end of 2010)
Gold Reserves
Energy Structure
Petroleum Development Oman (PDO) controls most oil and natural gas resources.
PDO is a partnership between the Omani government (60%), Royal Dutch Shel
(34%), Total (4%), and Partx (2%). Oman Oil Company is the investment arm of the
Ministry of Petroleum.
Sources: CIA, The World Factbook; Energy Information Administration Country Analysis Brief, 2011.
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Figure 1. Map of Oman
Source: CRS.
Democratization, Human Rights, and 2011 Unrest1
Oman remains a monarchy in which decision-making still is largely concentrated with Sultan
Qaboos, even though he has a reputation for benevolence and has been considered highly popular.
Along with political reform issues, the question of succession had long been central to observers
of Oman. Qaboos’ brief marriage in the 1970s produced no children, and the Sultan, who was
born in November 1940, therefore has no heir apparent. According to Omani officials, succession
would be decided by a “Ruling Family Council” of his relatively small Al Said family (about 50
male members). If the council fails to reach an agreement, a succession letter written by Qaboos
1 Information in this section is from several State Department reports: The Human Rights report for 2010 (April 8,
2011); the International Religious Freedom Report for July – December, 2010 (September 13, 2011); and the
Trafficking in Persons Report for 2011 (June 27, 2011).
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prior to his death, likely to be influential for the council deliberations, would be determinative.
The presumed successor is Minister of Heritage and Culture Sayyid Haythim bin Tariq Al Said,
although some assess him as indecisive and often absent from his post. In part to have an
effective governing structure in place should Qaboos leave the scene suddenly, some are pressing
Qaboos to name a prime minister (Qaboos himself holds this position). Among the possibilities
mentioned is the secretary general of the Foreign Ministry, Sayyid Badr bin Harib Al Busaidi,
who is said to be efficient and effective.2
Despite the three-decade-long opening of the political process discussed below, in recent years
some Omanis, particularly younger, well-educated professionals, considered the pace of
liberalization too slow. Many older Omanis, on the other hand, tend to compare the current degree
of “political space” favorably with that during the reign of the Sultan’s father. Under the Sultan’s
father, Omanis needed the Sultan’s approval to wear spectacles, for example. Among those who
have been critical of the pace of political liberalization, some, even within the government and
official establishment, noted that many top positions have been filled in recent years by former
security officials, replacing academics or other professionals. Others saw progress in the holding
in April 2009 of a two-day workshop in Muscat to discuss freedom of speech.3 However,
evidence that the pace of change has been perceived as slow was demonstrated in 2011 in the
form of protest in several cities, following unrest sweeping other parts of the region.
Representative Institutions and Election History
Many have praised Sultan Qaboos for creating legislative institutions and an election process long
before there was any evident public pressure to do so, although the process has advanced
incrementally. Under a 1996 “Basic Law,” Qaboos created a bicameral “legislative” body called
the Oman Council—consisting of an elected Consultative Council (Majlis As Shura), and an
appointed State Council (Majlis Ad Dawla). The Consultative Council was first established in
November 1991, replacing a 10-year-old advisory council, and had an initial size of 59 seats. It
has been gradually expanded and now has 84 elected members. The State Council, which had 53
members at inception, has 59 appointed members as of 2005. Many of the appointees tend to be
former high-ranking government or military officials, such as ex-ambassadors.
The Oman Council’s scope of authority has long been constrained. When it was created, it was
not given power to draft legislation, lacked binding power to overturn the Sultan’s decrees or
government regulations, and was generally confined to economic and social issues. Within the
Oman Council, the State Council serves as a further check and balance on actions by the
Consultative Council, although some believe it acted to limit impulsive excess of the elected
body. Prior to the outbreak of unrest in Oman in 2011, some Omanis were saying in interviews
that the Oman Council’s influence over policy had diminished over time—to the point where
many experts said Oman was lagging the other Gulf states on political liberalization. As in the
other Gulf states, formal political parties are not allowed. Unlike Bahrain or Kuwait, there are no
clear currents or factions within either of the two chambers that make up the Oman Council.
2 Author conversation with Omani Foreign Ministry consultant and unofficial envoy. May 5, 2011. This official has a
name nearly identical to that of the Minister of State for Defense, but they are two different officials.
3 Slackman, Michael. “With Murmurs of Change, Sultan Tightens His Grip.” New York Times, May 15, 2009.
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Electoral History
Beyond expanding the size of the two chambers, Qaboos has gradually enfranchised Omanis to
select the membership of the elected Consultative Council. In the 1994 and 1997 selection cycles
for the council, “notables” in each of Oman’s districts chose up to three nominees, with Qaboos
making a final selection for the council. The first direct elections to it were held in September
2000 (then a three-year term), but the electorate was limited (25% of all citizens over 21 years
old). In November 2002, Qaboos extended voting rights to all citizens, male and female, over 21
years of age, and the October 4, 2003, Consultative Council elections—in which 195,000 Omanis
voted (74% turnout)—resulted in a council similar to that elected in 2000, including the election
of the same two women as in the previous election (out of 15 women candidates).
In the October 27, 2007, election (after changing to a four-year term), Qaboos allowed public
campaigning. Turnout among 388,000 registered voters was 63%, including enthusiastic
participation by women, but none of the 21 female candidates (out of 631 candidates) won.
Qaboos appoints the Consultative Council president (he appointed a new president in September
2007, Shaykh Ahmad bin Mohammad Al Isa’i, replacing a 16-year incumbent), although the
Consultative Council chooses two vice presidents. On March 17, 2011, two new vice presidents
were selected by the council membership—Yunis bin Sabil Al Balushi, and Abdullah bin Khalifa
Al Majali.
2011 Unrest: Dissatisfaction, but Not Hunger for Major Change
Although observers have long assessed Omanis as willing to overlook the limits to their political
rights, evidence has appeared in 2011 that many Omanis are dissatisfied with the pace of political
change. About two weeks after Egyptian protests toppled President Hosni Mubarak, protests
broke out in the northern industrial town of Sohar, Oman. On February 26, 2011, several hundred
demonstrators gathered there demanding better pay and more job opportunities; two were killed
when security forces fired rubber bullets. Protests expanded in Sohar over the next few days,
including the burning of cars and some shops, and spread to the capital, Muscat. Although most
protesters said their demonstrations were motivated by economic factors—particularly a lack of
available good jobs—some say they wanted the powers of the Majles expanded to approximate
those of a Western legislature. However, few, if any, called for Qaboos to step down, even after
the deaths of some protesters. Some protesters even displayed posters with his picture. Protests
continued in Sohar and in Muscat throughout most of March, including establishment of an
encampment in Sohar’s main square.
By the end of March, Qaboos appeared to have calmed much of the unrest through a series of
measures. On March 29, 2011, he sent security forces to clear the protesters from their gathering
places in Sohar. However, he also tried to address grievances in several ways, including with a
minor cabinet reshuffle on February 26 and then a more extensive change of 12 out of 29
ministries on March 7, 2011. In the first of the cabinet changes, he added a woman (Madiha bint
Ahmad bin Nasser) as education minister. He also sent representatives to meet with protesters,
ordered that 50,000 new public sector jobs be created immediately, raised the minimum wage by
about one-third (to about $520 per month), and ordered that about $400 be given to unemployed
job seekers. He also decreed that the office of public prosecutor will have independence from
government control, that there will be new consumer protections, and, as noted above, expanded
the powers of the Oman Council. These moves followed an earlier mandated increase in private
sector minimum wages of 43% at the beginning of February.
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Protests abated by April 1, but did not end totally, and tensions remained high. On April 7, a small
group of protesters outside the Oman Council headquarters in Muscat called for an investigation
of the security forces for the killing of the two protesters in March (see above). Activists using e-
mail and other electronic media called for protests in Sohar on Friday, April 8, but a heavy
security presence prevented fresh protests. During late April until mid-May, protests, some said to
be large, were held after each Friday prayers in the city of Salalah. Salalah is the capital of the
Dhofar region, which was in rebellion against the Omani central government until the mid-1970s.
Protests have been relatively few, but not absent, since. Possibly as a signal that the government
is committed to ensuring economic well-being and to head off any revival of major protests, in
August 2011, the government announced plans to increase spending by 9% in 2012 to finance
construction projects and more jobs for nationals. A freeze on prices of certain goods, imposed
August 18, 2011, could also have been intended to dampen further unrest.
The U.S. reaction to the unrest in Oman has been muted, possibly because Oman is a key ally of
the United States and perhaps because the unrest appeared minor relative to the rest of the region.
There have not been critical U.S. statements issued about Oman’s responses to the unrest.
October 2011: Election Following The Unrest
The unrest affected the political landscape in the run-up to the October 2011 scheduled
Consultative Council elections. As part of his reaction to 2011 unrest, on March 13, 2011, Qaboos
issued a decree granting the Oman Council legislative and regulatory powers. Even though a
committee formed to recommend new powers has not made recommendations seven months after
its formation, there is public expectation that the council formed after the October 2011 election
could be at least somewhat more influential in decisionmaking than is the current council. This
perception raised the stakes for candidates and voters in the Consultative Council elections and
State Council appointments. The election date was set as October 15, 2011.
As of the filing deadline, a total of 1,330 candidates had announced their candidacies. This is a
70% increase from the number of candidates in the 2007 vote and suggests that the 2011 unrest
had increased political activism and attracted candidates inspired by the increase in the Oman
Council’s powers. A record 77 women filed candidacies, compared to the 21 that filed in the 2007
vote.
The high turnout in the election (about 76%, substantially higher than the 2007 vote) suggested
increased citizen enthusiasm for participation and appeared to rebut analysis from critics who felt
that the citizenry would shun the political process that produces only gradual reform. Of the
520,000 Omanis who registered to vote, about 400,000 voted. Hopes among many Omanis that at
least several women would win were dashed—only one was elected, a candidate from Seeb
(suburb of the capital, Muscat). However, two political activists—Salim bin Abdullah Al Oufi,
and Talib Al Maamari, an academic, were elected. The government hailed the turnout as evidence
of its popularity and an endorsement of its handling of the 2011 protest movement.
Broader Human Rights Issues
The government’s practices on numerous other issues affect popular sentiment in Oman. The
State Department human rights report for 2010 repeated previous years’ assertions that “the
government generally respect[s] the human rights of its citizens.” However, there are restrictions
by law, by custom, and in practice. On November 17, 2008, Oman set up its first human rights
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commission as an “autonomous body” attached to the State Council. U.S. funds from the Middle
East Partnership Initiative and the Near East Regional Democracy account (both State
Department accounts) have been used to fund civil society and political process strengthening,
judicial reform, election management, media independence, and women’s empowerment.
Freedom of Expression/Media
Press criticism of the government is tolerated, but criticism of the Sultan (and by extension,
government officials in general) is not. Private ownership of radio and television stations is not
prohibited, but there are very few privately owned stations, with the exception of Majan TV, and
three radio stations: HiFM, HalaFM, and Wisal. However, availability of satellite dishes has made
foreign broadcasts accessible to the public. There are some legal or practical restrictions to
Internet usage, and only about 8%-13% of the population has subscriptions to Internet service.
Many Internet sites are blocked, primarily for offering sexual content, but many Omanis are able
to bypass restrictions by accessing their Internet over smart cell phones.
Human rights organizations, including Human Rights Watch, criticized and called for an
overturning of an Omani lower court decision in September 2011 to close for one month a
prominent newspaper, Az Zaman, and to jail two of its editors. The sentences were for allegedly
insulting the justice minister in articles about corruption and abuses in that ministry.
Labor Rights
On labor issues, the State Department notes improving workers’ rights, in conjunction with the
U.S.-Oman FTA, and the labor laws permit collective bargaining and prohibit employers from
firing or penalizing workers for union activity. Workers have the legal right to strike, but strikes
are subject to requirements, including an absolute majority of workers in an enterprise needed to
call a strike. Labor rights are regulated by the Ministry of Manpower.
Religious Freedom
The 1996 Basic Law affirmed Islam as the state religion, but provides for freedom to practice
religious rites as long as doing so does not disrupt public order. The State Department’s religious
freedom report for July-December 2010 noted “no change in the status of respect for religious
freedom by the government during the reporting period.” According to the report, “There were no
significant reports of societal abuses or discrimination based on religious affiliation, belief, or
practice [during the reporting period].” Non-Muslims are free to worship at temples and churches
built on land donated by the Sultan, but there are some limitations on non-Muslims’ proselytizing
and on religious gatherings in other than government-approved houses of worship.
All religious organizations must be registered with the Ministry of Endowments and Religious
Affairs (MERA). Among non-Muslim sponsors recognized by MERA are the Protestant Church
of Oman; the Catholic Diocese of Oman; the al Amana Center (interdenominational Christian);
the Hindu Mahajan Temple; and the Anwar al-Ghubairia Trading Co. Muscat (for the Sikh
community). The government agrees in principle to allow Buddhists to hold meetings if they can
find a corporate sponsor. Members of all religions and sects are free to maintain links with
coreligionists abroad and travel outside Oman for religious purposes. Private media have
occasionally published anti-Semitic editorial cartoons.
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Advancement of Women
Sultan Qaboos has given major speeches on the equality of women and their importance in
national development, and they now constitute about 30% of the workforce. Since 2004, there
have been four women of ministerial rank, of whom three are in the cabinet (the ministers of
higher education, of tourism, and of social development). They were joined in February 2011 by a
new minister of education, as discussed below. The first woman ever of ministerial rank in Oman
was appointed in March 2003; she heads the national authority for industrial craftsmanship. In
April 2004, Qaboos placed five women among the 29 appointees to the public prosecutors office.
Also, the U.S. ambassador is a woman.
There were 14 women in the 2007-2011 State Council, appointed following the 2007 election, up
from nine in the 2003-2007 council. As noted, no woman was elected to the Consultative Council
in 2007, reducing the female representation from the two that had been selected in the previous
cycles, although one was elected in the election held on October 15, 2011.
At the citizen level, allegations of spousal abuse and domestic violence are fairly common, with
women finding protection primarily through their families. Omani women also continue to face
social discrimination often as a result of the interpretation of Islamic law.
Trafficking in Persons
In October 2008, President Bush directed (Presidential Determination 2009-5) that Oman be
moved from “Tier 3” on trafficking in persons (worst level, assessed in the June 4, 2008, State
Department report on that issue), to “Tier 2/Watch List.” That determination was made on the
basis of Omani pledges to increase efforts to counter trafficking in persons. In the report for 2010,
issued June 14, 2010, Oman’s “grade” remained at Tier 2—the level it was assigned in the 2009
report. The Tier 2 ranking was repeated in the trafficking report for 2011, released June 27, 2011.
The 2009-2011 rankings were based on an assessment that Oman is making significant efforts to
comply with minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking and its prosecutions for those
trafficking in persons. Still, Oman is considered a destination and transit country for men and
women primarily from South and East Asia, in conditions indicative of forced labor.
Defense and Security Ties
Sultan Qaboos, who is Sandhurst-educated and is respected by his fellow Gulf rulers as a defense
strategist, has long seen the United States as the key security guarantor of the region. He also has
consistently advocated expanded defense cooperation among the Gulf states. Oman was the first
Gulf state to formalize defense relations with the United States after the Persian Gulf region was
shaken by Iran’s 1979 Islamic revolution, which it was at first feared would spread throughout the
Middle East and lead to the downfall of monarchy states there. Oman signed an agreement to
allow U.S. forces access to Omani military facilities on April 21, 1980. Three days later, the
United States used Oman’s Masirah Island air base to launch the failed attempt to rescue the U.S.
embassy hostages in Iran. During the September 1980–August 1988 Iran-Iraq War, the United
States built up naval forces in the Gulf to prevent Iranian attacks on international shipping. Oman
played the role of quiet intermediary between the United States and Iran for the return of Iranians
captured in clashes with U.S. naval forces in the Gulf during that war.
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Under the U.S.-Oman access agreement, which was renewed in 1985, 1990, 2000, and 2010, the
United States reportedly can use—with advance notice and for specified purposes—Oman’s
military airfields in Muscat (the capital), Thumrait, and Masirah Island. Some U.S. Air Force
equipment, including lethal munitions, is stored at these bases.4 During the renewal negotiations
in 2000, the United States acceded to Oman’s request that the United States fund a $120 million
upgrade of a fourth air base (Khasab) at Musnanah (50 miles from Muscat).5
In conjunction with the 2010 renewal, the U.S. military sought to respond to an Omani request to
move some U.S. equipment to expanded facilities at Musnanah, from the international airport at
Seeb, to accommodate commercial development at Seeb. Conferees on the DOD authorization act
for FY2010 (P.L. 111-84) did not incorporate into that law a DOD request for $116 million to
carry out that move, on the grounds that U.S. Central Command had not formulated a master
plan—or obtained an Omani contribution—for the needed further construction at Musnanah. One
complication could be the fact that, according to observers, about 200 British military personnel
are slated to move to Musnanah from Seeb,6 and it is unclear whether the facility can
accommodate both U.S. and British personnel. However, some of the issues were apparently
cleared up because the DOD authorization act for FY2011 (H.R. 6523, P.L. 111-383, signed
January 7, 2011) authorized $69 million in military construction funding for the Musnanah
facility. Perhaps sensing that the Obama Administration was attempting to accommodate the
request, the access agreements were renewed in November 2010.7
More broadly, however, some Omani officials may want to further reduce the visibility of the
U.S. military footprint in Oman. That view could reflect an Omani calculation that the U.S.
military presence angers Islamist Omanis, Iran, and members of anti-U.S. terrorist organizations
that may operate throughout the Gulf. Some Omanis reportedly are discussing with U.S. officials
the possibility for the U.S. military to relocate most of its personnel to Masirah Island, which is
one of the locations covered under the Access Agreement but which is offshore and sparsely
inhabited. On the other hand, Masirah’s runway is shorter than that of Thumrait, the main location
used by the U.S. Air Force, and some U.S. military officials may consider Masirah less suitable
than Thumrait.
Oman’s facilities contributed to U.S. major combat operations in Afghanistan (Operation
Enduring Freedom, OEF) and, to a lesser extent, Iraq (Operation Iraqi Freedom, OIF), even
though Omani leaders said that invading Iraq could “incite revenge” against the United States in
the Arab world. According to the Defense Department, during OEF there were about 4,300 U.S.
personnel in Oman, mostly Air Force, and U.S. B-1 bombers, indicating that the Omani facilities
were used extensively for strikes during OEF. The U.S. presence fell slightly to 3,750 during OIF;
other facilities closer to Iraq, such as in Kuwait, were used more extensively for OIF. There are
approximately 35 U.S. military personnel in Oman, well below the pre-September 11, 2001,
figure of 200 U.S. personnel. Since 2004, Omani facilities reportedly have not been used for air
support operations in either Afghanistan or Iraq.
4 Hajjar, Sami. U.S. Military Presence in the Gulf: Challenges and Prospects. U.S. Army War College, Strategic
Studies Institute. P. 27.
5 Finnegan, Philip. “Oman Seeks U.S. Base Upgrades.” Defense News, April 12, 1999.
6 Author conversation with Muscat Daily reporter about Musnanah. April 28, 2011.
7 Author conversation with State Department officer responsible for Oman. January 6, 2011.
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U.S. Arms Sales and other Security Assistance to Oman8
Oman’s 43,000-person armed force is the third largest of the Gulf Cooperation Council states
(GCC, including Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, UAE, Oman, Bahrain, and Qatar). Its force is widely
considered one of the best trained but not the best equipped. However, Oman is trying to expand
and modernize its arsenal with purchases from the United States. Because of his historic ties to
the British military, Qaboos early on relied on seconded British officers to command Omani
military services, and much of its arsenal still is British-made. British officers are now mostly
advisory.
Arms Purchases by Oman
In an effort to modernize its Air Force, in October 2001, after years of consideration, Oman
purchased (with its own funds) 12 U.S.-made F-16 C/D aircraft from new production. Along with
associated weapons (Harpoon and AIM missiles), a podded reconnaissance system, and training,
the sale was valued at about $825 million; deliveries were completed in 2006. Oman made the
purchase in part to keep pace with its Gulf neighbors, including UAE and Bahrain, that had
bought F-16s. In July 2006, according to the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA),
Oman bought the JAVELIN anti-tank system, at a cost of about $48 million.
Some major U.S. sales to Oman have been expected as part of an estimated $20 billion sales
package to the Gulf states under the U.S. “Gulf Security Dialogue” intended to contain Iran,
although most of the sales notified thus far are to the much wealthier Saudi Arabia and UAE. As
part of that effort, the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) notified Congress on
August 4, 2010, of a potential sale to Oman of up to 18 additional F-16s and associated
equipment and support. The sale could be worth up to $3.5 billion to the main manufacturer,
Lockheed Martin, which said in May 2011 that it hopes to have a firm contract in place with
Oman by early 2012.9
Earlier, in June 2009, Lockheed Martin said it had received a contract from Oman to buy the C-
130J “Super Hercules” military transport aircraft. The terms were not disclosed. In November
2010, DSCA notified Congress of a possible sale of up to $76 million worth of countermeasures
equipment and training to protect the C-130J that Oman is buying from Lockheed. The prime
manufacturer of the countermeasures equipment is Northrop Grumman.
Regarding purchases from other countries, in the past three years, Oman has continued to buy
some British equipment, including Typhoon fighter aircraft and patrol boats. It has also bought
some Chinese-made armored personnel carriers and other gear.
U.S. Security Aid and Its Uses
U.S. Foreign Military Financing (FMF)—recent amounts of which are shown below—has been
used to help Oman buy U.S.-made coastal patrol boats for anti-narcotics and anti-smuggling
8 Section 564 of Title V, Part C of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act for FY1994 and FY1995 (P.L. 103-236)
banned U.S. arms transfers to countries that maintain the Arab boycott of Israel during those fiscal years. As applied to
the GCC states, this provision was waived on the grounds that doing so was in the national interest.
9 Andrea Shalal-Esa. “Lockheed Hopes to Finalize F-16 Sales to Iraq, Oman.” Reuters, May 16, 2011.
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missions, as well as aircraft munitions, night-vision goggles, upgrades to coastal surveillance
systems, communications equipment, and de-mining equipment. The International Military
Education and Training program (IMET) program is used to promote U.S. standards of human
rights and civilian control of military and security forces, as well as to fund English language
instruction, and promote inter-operability with U.S. forces. Nonproliferation, Antiterrorism,
Demining, and Related Programs (NADR) funds are used to help Oman develop controls and
train and equip personnel to prevent proliferation and combat terrorism. In FY2011, DOD funds
(“Section 1206” funds) are being used to help Oman’s military develop its counterterrorism
capability through deployment of biometric data collection devices. A small portion of the funds
($48,000) will be used to give a human rights seminar to unit commanders and key staff of
Oman’s military.
The United States phased out development assistance to Oman in 1996. At the height of that
development assistance program in the 1980s, the United States was giving Oman about $15
million per year in Economic Support Funds (ESF) in loans and grants, mostly for conservation
and management of Omani fisheries and water resources.
Provision of Excess Defense Articles (EDA)
Oman is eligible for grant U.S. excess defense articles (EDA) under Section 516 of the Foreign
Assistance Act. It received 30 U.S.-made M-60A3 tanks in September 1996 on a “no rent” lease
basis (later receiving title outright). There have been minor EDA grants since 2000, particularly
gear to help Oman monitor its borders and waters and to improve inter-operability with U.S.
forces. In 2004, it turned down a U.S. offer of EDA U.S.-made M1A1 tanks. Some Omani
officers say they need new armor to supplement the 38 British-made Challenger 2 tanks and 80
British-made Piranha armored personnel carriers Oman bought in the mid-1990s.
Table 2. Recent U.S. Aid to Oman
(In millions of dollars)
FY2012
FY2003 FY2004 FY2005 FY2006 FY2007 FY2008 FY2009 FY2010 FY2011 (request)
IMET 0.75 0.83 1.14 1.14 1.11 1.43 1.45 1.525 1.65 1.65
FMF 80.0 24.85
19.84
13.86
13.49 4.712 7.0 8.85 11.98 9.5
NADR
.40 0.554 0.4 1.28 1.593 0.95 1.655 1.5 1.5
1206
0.948
Note: IMET is International Military Education and Training; FMF is Foreign Military Financing; NADR is
Nonproliferation, Anti-Terrorism, De-Mining and Related Programs, and includes ATA (Anti-Terrorism Assistance);
EXBS (Export Control and Related Border Security); and TIP (Terrorism Interdiction Program). Numbers for FY2011
reflect final allocations by State Dept.
Cooperation Against Islamic Militancy
Since September 11, 2001, Oman has cooperated with U.S. legal, intelligence, and financial
efforts against terrorism. According to the State Department report on global terrorism for 2010,
released August 18, 2011, Oman “took significant steps during the year to improve border
security, as demonstrated by a number of training and border security workshops that were
conducted in Oman.” The latest State Department report also credits Oman with transparency
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regarding its anti-money laundering and counterterrorist financing enforcement efforts, and with
steady improvement in its legal system related to those efforts. The previous year’s State
Department report credited Oman with convicting and sentencing to life in prison an Omani
businessman, Ali Abdul Aziz al-Hooti, for helping to plan terrorist attacks in Oman and for
helping to fund a Pakistan-based terrorist group, Lashkar-e-Tayyiba.
Other relatively recent steps include Oman’s enactment of a January 2007 law establishing a
National Committee for Combating Terrorism, a December 2006 agreement with Saudi Arabia to
control cross-border transit, and the establishment of a financial intelligence unit of the
Directorate of Financial Crimes of the Royal Omani Police. In September 2008, it strengthened
its anti-money laundering program by requiring non-banking establishments to verify the identify
of their clients and document financial transactions. In December 2004, the government arrested
31 Ibadhi Muslims (Omani citizens) on suspicion of conspiring to establish a religious state, but
Qaboos pardoned them in June 2005.
On November 22, 2005, Oman joined the U.S. “Container Security Initiative,” agreeing to pre-
screening of U.S.-bound cargo from its port of Salalah for illicit trafficking of nuclear and other
materials, and for terrorists. As discussed above, U.S. aid to Oman (NADR funds) help Oman
establish effective export controls, sustain its counter-terrorism training capabilities, and control
movements of illegal immigrants across its borders.
Cooperation on Regional Stability
Sultan Qaboos has often pursued foreign policies outside an Arab or Gulf consensus. Some of
Oman’s stances, such as that toward Iran, have appeared at odds with U.S. policy. Other of its
positions, such as on the Arab-Israeli dispute, have been highly supportive of U.S. policy,
sometimes to the extent of alienating other Arab leaders. On December 5, 2010, Secretary of
Defense Gates visited Oman and met with Qaboos and Minister of State for Defense Badr bin
Saud bin Harib al-Busaidi (distant relative of Qaboos) to discuss regional issues, reportedly
including Iran and the U.S.-led mission in Afghanistan. Gates also visited the aircraft carrier USS
Abraham Lincoln operating in the Arabian Sea off the coast of Oman.10 On February 24, 2011,
Oman hosted Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Michael Mullen for meetings with
Omani senior defense leaders and discussions there on Afghanistan and Pakistan with Admiral
Mullen’s chief Pakistani counterpart, Chief of Army Staff General Ashfaq Kayani.11
Iran
Of the Gulf states, Oman is perceived as politically closest to and the least critical of Iran. Qaboos
sees no inconsistency between Oman’s alliance with the United States and its friendship with
Iran. This relationship has proved useful to the United States in the past; Oman was an
intermediary through which the United States returned Iranian prisoners captured during U.S.-
Iran skirmishes in the Persian Gulf in 1987-1988. Oman reprised this intermediary role on
September 14, 2010, when Iran released U.S. citizen Sara Shourd, a hiker who was arrested with
two friends in July 2009 for crossing from Iraq onto Iranian territory. A U.S. State Department
spokesman publicly confirmed that Oman had played a brokering role in her release, possibly
10 Gates Meets With Leaders in Oman, Plans Carrier Visit. American Forces Press Service, December 5, 2010.
11 “Mullen, Mattis Meet With Omani Counterparts.” American Forces Press Service. February 24, 2011.
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including paying her $500,000 bail to Iranian authorities, and she flew to Oman after her release.
Omani diplomats subsequently negotiated with Iran for the release of the other two hikers, Josh
Fattal and Shane Bauer, the latter of which had become Sara Shourd’s fiancé during their
incarceration. They were released on September 21, 2011, flying from Iran to Oman on their way
back to the United States. It was subsequently reported that State Department official on Iran
affairs, Philo Dibble, had coordinated with Oman and with Switzerland (which represents U.S.
interests in Iran) to achieve their release; Dibble died one month later.12
At other times, Oman’s attempts to steer a middle ground between Iran and the United States
have caused problems for Oman. For example, in April 1980, within days of signing the
agreement allowing the United States military to use several Omani air bases, the United States
used these facilities—reportedly without prior notification to Oman—to launch the abortive
mission to rescue the U.S. Embassy hostages seized by Iran in November 1979.13
Some accounts say that Oman is in the process of drawing closer to Iran than it has previously.
Sultan Qaboos last visited Tehran in August 2009, his first visit there since the 1979 Islamic
revolution. He went forward with the visit even though the June 2009 reelection of President
Mahmoud Ahmadinejad was widely challenged in Iran as fraudulent by large numbers of
demonstrators in Tehran and in other cities. To this extent, the Qaboos visit was viewed as a sign
that Oman was endorsing—or at least deciding to set aside the issue of—Ahmadinejad’s
reelection.
Oman, as have the other GCC states, has long publicly opposed any U.S. attack on Iran’s nuclear
facilities. Not only has Oman rebuffed efforts by the other Gulf states to persuade Oman to
distance itself from Iran politically,14 but, on August 4, 2010, it reportedly signed a security pact
with Iran.15 The pact reportedly commits the two to hold joint military exercises at some point.
The United States did not criticize Oman’s entry into this pact with Iran, possibly believing that
the agreement will not result in much significant new cooperation between the two. The 2010
pact follows an earlier pact, signed in August 2009, that focused on cooperating against
smuggling across the Gulf of Oman, which separates the two countries. The Oman-Iran pacts
were ratified by Iran’s Majles (parliament) on December 20, 2010.
Economically, the two conduct formal trade, supplemented by the informal trading relations that
have long characterized the Gulf region. Oman’s government is said to turn a blind eye to the
smuggling of a wide variety of goods to Iran from Oman’s Musandam Peninsula territory. The
trade is illegal in Iran because the smugglers avoid paying taxes in Iran, but Oman’s local
government collects taxes on the goods shipped.16 Iran and Oman are in discussions about
potential investments to develop Iranian offshore natural gas fields that adjoin Oman’s West
Bukha oil and gas field in the Strait of Hormuz. The Omani field began producing oil and gas in
February 2009.
12 Dennis Hevesi. “Philo Dibble, Diplomat and Iran Expert, Dies At 60.” New York Times, October 13, 2011.
13 CRS conversations with U.S. Embassy officials in Oman. 1995-2003.
14 Slackman, Michael. “Oman Navigates Risky Strait Between Iran and Arab Nations.” New York Times, May 16,
2009.
15 Iran, Oman Ink Agreement of Defensive Cooperation. Tehran Fars News Agency, August 4, 2010.
16 Ibid.
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Many observers ask why Oman is not as wary of Iran as are the other GCC states. Oman has no
sizable Shiite community with which Iran could meddle in Oman, so the fear of Iranian
interference is less pronounced. There are also residual positive sentiments pre-dating Iran’s
Islamic revolution. Oman still appreciates the military help the Shah of Iran provided in helping
end a leftist revolt in Oman’s Dhofar Province during 1964-1975. Others attribute Oman’s
position on Iran to its larger concerns that Saudi Arabia has sought to spread its Wahhabi form of
Islam into Oman, and Oman sees Iran as a rival to and potential counterweight to Saudi Arabia.
Iraq
On Iraq, and generally in line with other GCC states, Omani officials say that the Omani
government and population are dismayed at the Shiite Islamist domination of post-Saddam Iraq
and its pro-Iranian tilt. Yet, despite moves by most of the other GCC states to normalize relations
with Iraq, Oman has not appointed an ambassador in Baghdad. (Saudi Arabia also has not done
so.) This possibly could be attributed to security concerns; a shooting outside Oman’s embassy in
Baghdad in November 2005 wounded four, including an embassy employee. Oman provided
about $3 million to Iraq’s post-Saddam reconstruction, a relatively small amount compared to
some of the other Gulf states.
Arab-Israeli Issues
On the Arab-Israeli dispute, in a stand considered highly supportive of U.S. policy, Oman was the
one of the few Arab countries not to break relations with Egypt after the signing of the Egyptian-
Israeli peace treaty in 1979. All the GCC states participated in the multilateral peace talks
established by the 1991 U.S.-sponsored Madrid peace process, but only Oman, Bahrain, and
Qatar hosted working group sessions of the multilaterals. Oman hosted an April 1994 session of
the working group on water and, as a result of those talks, a Middle East Desalination Research
Center was established in Oman. Participants in the Desalination Center include Israel, the
Palestinian Authority, the United States, Japan, Jordan, the Netherlands, South Korea, and Qatar.
In September 1994, Oman and the other GCC states renounced the secondary and tertiary Arab
boycott of Israel. In December 1994, it became the first Gulf state to officially host a visit by an
Israeli Prime Minister (Yitzhak Rabin), and it hosted then Prime Minister Shimon Peres in April
1996. In October 1995, Oman exchanged trade offices with Israel, essentially renouncing the
primary boycott of Israel. However, there was no move to establish diplomatic relations. The
trade offices closed following the September 2000 Palestinian uprising.
Oman has expressed an openness to renewing trade ties with Israel if there is progress on Israeli-
Palestinian issues. In an April 2008 meeting in Qatar, Omani Foreign Affairs Minister Yusuf bin
Alawi bin Abdullah informed then Israeli Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni that the Israeli trade office
in Oman would remain closed until agreement was reached on a Palestinian state, although the
meeting itself represented a level of diplomatic outreach by Oman to Israel. There was little
follow-up thereafter and Oman, like many other Arab states, considers Israeli Prime Minister
Benjamin Netanyahu, who took office in February 2009, opposed to a settlement that would be
acceptable to the Palestinians. However, Oman reiterated its offer to resume trade contacts with
Israel if Israel agrees to at least a temporary halt in Israeli settlement construction in the West
Bank. Israel did suspend such activity but that suspension was lifted in September 2010; Israel
and Oman have not resumed trade office exchanges. Still, suggesting Oman does not forswear all
contact with Israel, several Israeli officials reportedly visited Oman in November 2009 to attend
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the annual conference of the Desalination Center, and the Israeli delegation held talks with Omani
officials on the margins of the conference.17
Although not a major broker among Palestinian factions, Oman attended a January 2009 meeting
in Qatar called to support Hamas, then at war with Israel in the Gaza strip, which Hamas controls.
Oman’s attendance, to a certain extent, defied a boycott of the meeting by Saudi Arabia and
Egypt, which considered the meeting a political boost to Iran, which is among Hamas’ staunchest
regional supporters. Oman’s attendance could be explained by Oman’s friendly relations with
Iran, discussed above.
Yemen
Oman’s relations with neighboring Yemen have traditionally been troubled, but there are signs of
stability over the past decade. The former People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY),
considered Marxist and pro-Soviet, supported Oman’s Dhofar rebellion in the 1960s and early
1970s. Oman-PDRY relations were normalized in 1983, but there were occasional border clashes
between the two later in that decade. Relations improved after 1990, when PDRY merged with
North Yemen to form the combined modern-day Republic of Yemen. In September 2008, the two
countries began discussions to form a regional center to combat piracy. In May 2009, Oman
signaled support for Yemen’s integrity and the government of President Ali Abdullah Saleh by
withdrawing the Omani citizenship of southern Yemeni politician Ali Salim Al Bidh, who is
believed to be stoking separatist sentiment in south Yemen.
Oman has closely watched the popular uprising in Yemen out of concern that violence might
increase and destabilize the southern Arabian peninsula. According to observers, in 2011, Oman
has built some refugee camps near its border with Yemen to accommodate possible refugees who
might flee an escalation of violence there. As part of the GCC, Oman has backed the GCC efforts
to negotiate a peaceful transition from the rule of Ali Abdullah Saleh, who returned to Yemen in
late September 2011 following recuperation in Saudi Arabia following an attack on him and
several aides in June 2011.
Other GCC and Regional Issues: Bahrain Unrest and Libya
Oman, as did the other members of the GCC, fully backed the Al Khalifa regime in Bahrain in its
confrontation with mostly Shiite opposition protests. Oman supported the GCC consensus to send
forces from the GCC joint “Peninsula Shield” unit into Bahrain on March 14, 2011, to provide
backing to the regime’s beleaguered security forces. The GCC Peninsula Shield consisted of
1,000 Saudi forces and 500 UAE police, as well as Kuwaiti naval units. Omani forces do not
appear to have been part of the contingent that deployed to Bahrain. The GCC forces were
withdrawn in June 2011 after Bahrain lifted the state of emergency that was imposed because of
the unrest. The GCC countries also decided, in March 2011, to set up a $20 billion fund to help
the two members, Bahrain and Oman, that were facing popular unrest, with the funds to be used
to create jobs and take other steps to ease protester anger.
17 Ravid, Barak. “Top Israeli Diplomat Holds Secret Talks in Oman.” Haaretz, November 25, 2009.
http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/1130242.html
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Border disputes and political differences between Oman and the United Arab Emirates (UAE)
have sometimes flared. The two countries finalized their borders only in 2008, nearly a decade
after a tentative border settlement in 1999. In January 2011, Oman arrested several UAE citizens
that it said were spying on Oman. That came a few months after the UAE arrested about 25
Omanis on similar accusations. Some observers believe the two may indeed be spying on each
other because of their differing views on Iran; the UAE is far more suspicious of Iran than Oman
is.
Oman did not appear to have played as active a role in supporting the Libya uprising as its fellow
GCC states Qatar and UAE. According to a wide range of accounts, Oman did not supply
weapons or advice to rebel forces, as Qatar and UAE did to varying degrees. Oman recognized
the opposition Transitional National Council as the legitimate government of Libya only after
Tripoli fell to the rebellion on August 21, 2011.
Economic and Trade Issues18
Despite Omani efforts to diversify its economy, oil exports generate about 60% of government
revenues. Oman has a relatively small 5.5 billion barrels (maximum estimate) of proven oil
reserves, enough for about 15 years, and some energy development firms say that production at
some Omani fields is declining.19 In 2009, Oman exported about 400 million barrels of oil (about
4% of internationally traded oil), of which about 15 million barrels were imported by the United
States. Still, the relatively high price of oil, coupled with higher output in early 2011, helped
Oman’s gross domestic product increase by over 15% in the first quarter of 2011. Some
economists, such as those at HSBC bank, forecast that moderating oil prices later in 2011 will
cause Oman’s GDP to grow about 3.5% for the full 2011.
The United States is Oman’s fourth-largest trading partner, and there was about $1.87 billion in
bilateral trade in 2010, slightly less than the $2.0 billion in trade for 2009. In terms of specific
goods, figures from 2009 show that of the approximately $1.125 billion in U.S. exports to Oman
that year 2009, about 20% consisted of aircraft and related parts, and another 10% consisted of
drilling and oilfield equipment. Of the approximately $907 million worth of goods imported into
the United States from Oman in 2009, $765 million consisted of crude oil—nearly 85%.
Oman is not a member of the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) and is
therefore not bound by an oil export quota set by that organization. Recognizing that its crude oil
fields are aging, Oman is trying to privatize its economy, diversify its sources of revenue, and
develop its liquid natural gas (LNG) sector, for which Oman has identified large markets in Asia
and elsewhere. Gas ventures with Iran that are under discussion were addressed above, in the
“Iran” section. In November 2008, Oman signed a 20-year agreement with Occidental Petroleum
to develop existing gas fields and explore for new ones. Oman is part of the “Dolphin project,”
under which Qatar is exporting natural gas to UAE (by replacing Omani gas supplies, at 135
million cubic feet per day, to the UAE). The need to diversify may have gained further urgency in
18 For more information on Oman’s economy and U.S.-Oman trade, see CRS Report RL33328, U.S.-Oman Free Trade
Agreement, by Mary Jane Bolle.
19 Gerth, Jeff and Stephen Labaton. “Oman’s Oil Yield Long in Decline, Shell Data Show.” New York Times, April 8,
2004.
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August 2011 when Reliance Energy Ltd. of India abandoned plans to develop an offshore oil
block six years after signing a production sharing agreement with the government.
Oman was admitted to the WTO in September 2000. The U.S.-Oman Free Trade Agreement was
signed on January 19, 2006, and ratified by Congress (P.L. 109-283, signed September 26, 2006).
Oman has balked at a Gulf state plan to form a monetary union by the end of 2010.
Author Contact Information
Kenneth Katzman
Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs
kkatzman@crs.loc.gov, 7-7612
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