Afghanistan: Politics, Elections, and
Government Performance
Kenneth Katzman
Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs
October 11, 2011
Congressional Research Service
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www.crs.gov
RS21922
CRS Report for Congress
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Afghanistan: Politics, Elections, and Government Performance

Summary
The limited capacity and widespread corruption of all levels of Afghan governance are factors in
congressional debate over the effectiveness of U.S. policy in Afghanistan and in implementing a
transition to Afghan security leadership. That transition is to be completed by the end of 2014, a
timeframe agreed to by the United States, its international partners, and the Afghan government.
While establishing a formal, constitutional governing structure, Karzai has also built an informal
power structure around his closest allies (most of whom are ethnic Pashtuns), as well as other
ethnic and political faction leaders willing to work with him. Some of these faction leaders
oppose Karzai on the grounds that he is too willing to make concessions to insurgent leaders in
search of a settlement—a criticism that grew following the September 20 assassination of the
most senior Tajik leader, former President Burhanuddin Rabbani. Another informal source of
authority, President Karzai’s half-brother Ahmad Wali Karzai who essentially ran southern
Afghanistan on the president’s behalf, was assassinated on July 12, 2011. His death increased
doubts about stability as U.S. troops draw down.
Afghan governing capacity has increased significantly since the Taliban regime fell in late 2001,
but many positions, particularly at the local level, are unfilled. Many governing functions are
performed at least informally by unaccountable power brokers. A dispute over the results of the
2010 parliamentary elections paralyzed governance for nearly a year and was resolved in
September 2011 with the unseating on the grounds of fraud of nine winners of the elected lower
house of parliament. Karzai also has tried, through direct denials, to quell assertions by his critics
that he wants to stay in office beyond the 2014 expiration of his second term, the limits under the
constitution. Widespread illiteracy limits expansion of a competent bureaucracy.
On corruption, President Hamid Karzai has accepted U.S. help to build emerging anti-corruption
institutions, but these same institutions have sometimes caused a Karzai backlash when they have
targeted his allies or relatives. Efforts against corruption also run up against an Afghan culture
that rewards appointing and letting contracts to relatives and friends. Effects of corruption burst
into public view in August 2010 when the large Kabul Bank nearly collapsed due in part to losses
on large, poorly documented loans to major shareholders, many of whom are close to Karzai.
That issue, too, appears closer to resolution with the prosecution of several individuals allegedly
responsible for the scandal and an International Monetary Fund (IMF) announcement in October
that it would restore its credit program for Afghanistan.
Broader issues of human rights often vary depending on the security environment in particular
regions, although some trends prevail nationwide. The State Department human rights report for
2010 attributes many of the human rights abuses in Afghanistan to overall lack of security,
traditional conservative attitudes that are widely prevalent, and the weakness of government
control over outlying localities. Women have made substantial gains in government and the
private sector since the fall of the Taliban but many organizations report substantial backsliding,
particularly in areas where the insurgency operates. Traditional attitudes also continue to prevail,
slowing of efforts to curb such practices as child marriages and contributing to court judgments
against converts from Islam to Christianity and cleric-driven curbs on the sale of alcohol and
Western-oriented programming in the burgeoning Afghan media. See also CRS Report RL30588,
Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy, by Kenneth Katzman; CRS
Report R40747, United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan: Background and Policy
Issues, by Rhoda Margesson; and CRS Report R41484, Afghanistan: U.S. Rule of Law and
Justice Sector Assistance, by Liana Sun Wyler and Kenneth Katzman.
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Contents
Overview: Historic Patterns of Afghan Authority and Politics........................................................ 1
Relations Among Ethnicities and Communities........................................................................ 2
Lack of Affiliation by Party....................................................................................................... 3
Post-Taliban Transition and Political Landscape............................................................................. 4
Establishment of the Afghan Government Structure ................................................................. 4
Bonn Agreement.................................................................................................................. 5
Permanent Constitution/Presidential System and Powers................................................... 5
Karzai Elected in First Post-Taliban Presidential Elections in 2004................................... 6
National Assembly (Parliament) Formed: Structure and Powers........................................ 7
Cross-Cutting Ethnic and Political Rivalries............................................................................. 8
Karzai’s Allies in the National Assembly............................................................................ 8
The Opposition: Dr. Abdullah, His Allies, and His Lower House Supporters .................... 9
Influence of “Independents”.............................................................................................. 12
Karzai Support Significant in the Upper House................................................................ 13
Ethnic and Factional Cooperation in the Security Sector.................................................. 14
Elections in 2009 and 2010 Widen Political Schisms and Produce Institutional
Paralysis ............................................................................................................................... 14
2009 Presidential Election................................................................................................. 15
September 18, 2010, Parliamentary Elections................................................................... 21
Implications for the United States of the Afghan Elections Disputes ............................... 26
Next Presidential Elections: Karzai Says He Will Yield Power........................................ 26
The Informal Power Structure: Influence of Regional and
Factional Leaders/“Warlords” .............................................................................................. 27
Afghan Governing Capacity and Performance.............................................................................. 32
Expanding Central Government Capacity............................................................................... 33
The Afghan Civil Service.................................................................................................. 33
The Afghan Budget Process .............................................................................................. 34
Expanding Local Governance ................................................................................................. 35
Provincial Governors and Provincial Councils ................................................................. 36
District-Level Governance ................................................................................................ 37
Municipal and Village Level Authority............................................................................. 38
U.S. Local Governance Advisory Capacity....................................................................... 38
Reforming Afghan Governance: Curbing Corruption ............................................................. 39
High Level Corruption, Nepotism, and Cronyism ............................................................ 39
Lower-Level Corruption.................................................................................................... 39
Administration Views........................................................................................................ 40
Anti-Corruption Initiatives................................................................................................ 40
Kabul Bank Scandal and Continuing Difficulties ............................................................. 44
Rule of Law Efforts ................................................................................................................. 46
Promoting Human Rights ........................................................................................................ 47
Media and Freedom of Expression/Social Freedoms........................................................ 48
Harsh Punishments............................................................................................................ 48
Religious Freedom ............................................................................................................ 49
Human Trafficking ............................................................................................................ 50
Advancement of Women ................................................................................................... 50
Democracy, Human Rights, Governance, and Elections Funding Issues................................ 53
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Figures
Figure 1. Map of Afghan Ethnicities ............................................................................................. 56

Tables
Table 1. Major Pashtun Tribal Confederations .............................................................................. 54

Contacts
Author Contact Information........................................................................................................... 57
Acknowledgments ......................................................................................................................... 57

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Overview: Historic Patterns of Afghan Authority
and Politics
Through differing regimes of widely varying ideologies, Afghanistan’s governing structure has
historically consisted of weak central government unwilling or unable to enforce significant
financial or administrative mandates on all of Afghanistan’s diverse ethnic communities or on the
80% of Afghans who live in rural areas. Many communities are separated by mountains and wide
expanses that typically take days to reach by traditional transportation means. The tensions
between the central government and the outlying areas have mirrored the struggles between
urban, educated “modernizers” and the rural, lesser-educated traditionalists. Successive
governments have tended to promote modernity and have met resistance from those primarily in
the rural areas who want to preserve their traditions and obey strict Islamic customs. The Taliban
government (1996-2001) was one notable exception in that it opposed modernization and
represented the views of rural Afghans.
At all levels of government, there is an informal power structure of ethnic, regional, tribal, clan,
village, and district leaderships. At the local level, these authority structures governed and secured
Afghanistan until the late 1970s but were weakened by decades of subsequent war and Taliban
rule. Some traditional local authority figures fled or were killed; others were displaced by
mujahedin commanders, militia leaders, Taliban militants, and others. The local power brokers
who displaced some of the tribal structures are far less popular and are widely accused of
selectively applying Afghan law and of using their authority to enrich themselves. Some of the
traditional tribal councils, which are widely respected but highly conservative in orientation,
remained intact. Some of them continue to exercise their writ rather than accept the authority of
the central government or even local government appointees. Still other community authorities
prefer to accommodate local insurgent commanders (whom they often see as wayward but not
irreconcilable members of the community) rather than help the government secure their areas.
The informal power structure has decision-making bodies and processes that do not approximate
Western-style democracy but yet have participatory and representative elements. Meetings called
shuras, or jirgas (consultative councils),1 often composed of designated notables, are key
mechanisms for making authoritative decisions or dispensing justice. Some of these mechanisms
are practiced by Taliban members in areas under their control. On the other hand, some see the
traditional patterns as competing mechanisms that resist change and modernization, generally
minimize the role of women, and do not meet international standards of democratic governance.
At the national level, the convening of a loya jirga, an assembly consisting of about 1,500
delegates from all over Afghanistan, has been used on several occasions. Under the constitution,
decisions of a loya jirga supersede decisions made under any other process, including cabinet
meetings or even elections. In the post-Taliban period, loya jirgas have been convened to endorse
Karzai’s leadership, to adopt a constitution, and to discuss a long-term defense relationship with
the United States. A special loya jirga, called a peace jirga, was held on June 2-4, 2010, to review

1 Shura is the term used by non-Pashtuns to characterize the traditional assembly concept. Jirga is the Pashtun term.
The Afghan constitution provides for a constitutional loya jirga as the highest decisionmaking body, and specifies the
institutions that must be represented at the jirga. If a constitutional jirga cannot be held or is blocked, a traditional jirga
can be convened by the President to discuss major issues, although its ability to render binding decisions on proposals
is unclear.
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government plans to offer incentives for insurgent fighters to end their armed struggle and rejoin
society. However, the constitution specifies who should be delegates at a loya jirga, and in the
absence of elected district councils (whose members are mandated to be included), the standing
of any loya jirga could be subject to question.
At the national level, Afghanistan had few, if any, Western-style democratic institutions prior to
the international intervention that took place after the September 11, 2001, attacks on the United
States. Under the constitution of 1964, King Zahir Shah was to be a constitutional monarch, and
an elected lower house and appointed upper house were set up. However, the parliament during
that era never reached the expectation of becoming a significant check on the king’s power or that
of President Mohammad Daoud, who took power in a 1973 military coup. Lower house elections
were held in 1969, but the parliament was suspended following the April 1978 Communist
seizure of power. The elected institutions and the 2004 adoption of a constitution were part of a
post-Taliban transition roadmap established by a United Nations-sponsored agreement of major
Afghan factions signed in Bonn, Germany, on December 5, 2001 (“Bonn Agreement”),2 after the
Taliban had fallen. Karzai is the first directly elected Afghan president.
Relations Among Ethnicities and Communities
Even though post-Taliban Afghanistan is modernizing politically and economically, patterns of
political affiliation by family, clan, tribe, village, ethnicity, region, and comradeship in battle
often supersede relationships based on ideology or views. These patterns have been evident in
every Afghan election since the fall of the Taliban. Most candidates, including Karzai, have
pursued campaign strategies designed primarily to assemble blocs of ethnic and geographic votes,
although some have also sought to advance specific new programs and ideas. The traditional
patterns have been even more pronounced in province-based campaigns such as those for the
provincial councils and the parliament. In these cases, electorates (the eligible voters of a specific
province) are small and candidates can easily appeal to clan and familial relationships.
While Afghans continue to follow traditional patterns of affiliation, there has been a sense among
Afghans that their country now welcomes members of all political and ethnic groups and factions.
There have been very few incidents of ethnic-based violence since the fall of the Taliban, but
jealousies over relative economic and political positions of the different ethnic communities have
sporadically manifested as clashes or political disputes. As one prominent example, many
Pashtuns are said to be increasingly resentful of the Hazara Shiite minority (about 10% of the
population) that is advancing economically and politically through education; the Hazaras have
historically been looked down upon by the Pashtuns, who have tended to employ Hazaras as
domestic workers and other lower and lower middle class occupations. Ethnic Pashtuns
(pronounced POSH-toons, sometimes referred to as Pathans—pah-TAHNS), as the largest single
ethnicity, have historically asserted a “right to rule.” Pashtuns are about 42% of the population
and, with few exceptions, have governed Afghanistan.
The sentiment of the “right to rule” is particularly strong among Pashtuns of the Durrani tribal
confederation, which predominates in the south and is a rival to the Ghilzai confederation, which
predominates in the east. On a few occasions, non-Pashtuns have ruled—one recent example was
the 1992-1996 presidency of the mujahedin government of Burhanuddin Rabbani, a Tajik (who

2 For text, see http://www.un.org/News/dh/latest/afghan/afghan-agree.htm.
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was assassinated on September 20, 2011). Tajiks are the second-most numerous community,
composing an estimated 25% of the population. Uzbeks, like the Hazaras, are about 10%.
Karzai is a Durrani Pashtun. His cabinet and inner advisory circle has come to be progressively
dominated by Pashtuns, both Ghilzai and Durrani, which has largely minimized the advisory
input of the other communities. However, Karzai is credited by some observers for consulting
with other communities, particularly the Tajiks, before issuing decrees or reaching decisions. The
Taliban government was and its insurgency is composed almost completely of Pashtuns. A table
on major Pashtun clans is provided below (see Table 1), as is a map showing the distribution of
Afghan ethnicities (see Figure 1).
Lack of Affiliation by Party
One major issue that connects post-Taliban and pre-Taliban Afghanistan is that there is little
overarching glue that holds Afghan factions together. The concept of nation is widely held, but
not as strongly as are traditional patterns of affiliation. There is a popular aversion to formal
“parties” as historically tools of neighboring powers—a perception stemming from the war
against the Soviet Union when seven mujahedin parties were funded by and considered tools of
outside parties. Some of these mujahedin parties remain, such as Hizb-e-Islam and Jamiat Islami,
discussed below. Prior to September 2009, when a new political parties law was adopted, there
were 110 registered political parties. However, a September 2009 law required the parties to re-
register, and only five completed the process by the time of the September 18, 2010,
parliamentary election.
Partly because parties are viewed with suspicion, President Hamid Karzai has not formed his own
party, but many of his supporters in the National Assembly (parliament) belong to a moderate
faction of the mostly Pashtun mujahedin-era party Hizb-e-Islam that is committed to working
within the political system. The is grouping was reduced somewhat by the results of the
September 18, 2010, parliamentary elections. The putative leader of this group is Minister of
Economy Abdul Hadi Arghandiwal. The speaker of the Wolesi Jirga (lower house of parliament)
selected in February 2011, Abdul Raouf Ibrahimi, has been a member of this party, even though
he is an ethnic Uzbek (and Hezb-e-Islam is overwhelmingly Pashtun). A militant faction of Hizb-
e-Islam is loyal to pro-Taliban insurgent leader Gulbuddin Hikmatyar; it is called Hizb-e-Islam
Gulbuddin (HIG).
Other large parties that do exist, for example the Junbush Melli of Abdul Rashid Dostam, tend to
be identified with specific ethnic (in his case, Uzbeks) or sectarian factions, rather than
overarching themes. A major party is Jamiat Islami (Islamic Society), a party that grouped Tajik
leaders during the anti-Soviet war, although many Tajik leaders have more recently gravitated to
broader groupings discussed later, such as the United Front and the Hope and Change Movement.
However, these parties do not advertise themselves as “ethnic” parties per se, because Article 35
of the Afghan constitution bans parties based on ethnicity or religious sect.
It was hoped that post-Taliban Afghanistan would produce a substantial number of secular,
democratic parties. Some have formed, such as the Afghanistan Labour and Development Party,
the National Solidarity Party of Afghanistan’s Youth, the Republican Party, and the National
Congress Party of Afghanistan led by Abdul Latif Pedram. Some parties are left wing, such as the
National United Party of Afghanistan, led by former parliamentarian Nur ul-Haq Ulumi.
However, some believe that all the smaller, idea-based parties remain weak because the Single,
Non-Transferable Vote (SNTV) system—in which each voter casts a ballot for only one
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candidate—favors candidates running as independents rather than as members of parties.
Moreover, Western-style parties are generally identified by specific ideologies, ideas, or ideals,
while most Afghans, as discussed above, retain their traditional affiliations. As a result, many of
the parties that have been formed since the fall of the Taliban have centered around personalities
rather than broad idea-driven platforms.
Post-Taliban Transition and Political Landscape
In implementing policy to stabilize Afghanistan—and particularly to prepare Afghanistan’s
government and military to take the lead from the international community—a U.S. priority has
been to increase the capabilities of and extend the authority of Afghanistan’s government. The
policy is predicated on the belief that ineffective and corrupt governance has caused some
Afghans to acquiesce to, or even support, Taliban insurgents as providers of security and impartial
justice. On the other hand, most Afghans perceive the Taliban as reliant on violence and
intimidation and as incapable of or uninterested in providing services; to most Afghans, it is not a
realistic alternative to the Afghan government.
To further clarify the distinction between the government’s positive role and the destructive effect
of the insurgency, since 2007, the U.S. and Afghan focus has been on reforming and reducing
corruption within the central government and on expanding local governance. Then-head of the
U.N. Assistance Mission Afghanistan (UNAMA) Kai Eide said in a departing news conference on
March 4, 2010, that improving governance and political processes are “indispensable” for
resolving the conflict in Afghanistan, and that U.S. and partner efforts have focused too much on
military approaches. Eide was succeeded by Staffan de Mistura in March 2010; his substantive
position on the issue is similar. The need to address continuing deficiencies in Afghan governance
has been repeatedly addressed in Administration reviews of Afghanistan strategy.3
Establishment of the Afghan Government Structure
The 2001 ouster of the Taliban government paved the way for the success of a long-stalled U.N.
effort to form a broad-based Afghan government and for the international community to help
Afghanistan build legitimate governing institutions. In the formation of the first post-Taliban
transition government, the United Nations was viewed as a credible mediator by all sides largely
because of its role in ending the Soviet occupation. During the 1990s, a succession of U.N.
mediators adopted many of former King Zahir Shah’s proposals for a government to be selected
by a traditional assembly, or loya jirga. However, U.N.-mediated cease-fires between warring
factions did not hold. Non-U.N. initiatives made little progress, particularly the “Six Plus Two”
multilateral contact group, which began meeting in 1997 (the United States, Russia, and the six
states bordering Afghanistan: Iran, China, Pakistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan).
Other failed efforts included a “Geneva group” (Italy, Germany, Iran, and the United States)
formed in 2000; an Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC) contact group; and prominent
Afghan exile efforts, including discussion groups launched by Hamid Karzai and his clan, former
mujahedin commander Abd al-Haq, and Zahir Shah (“Rome process”). The sections below
discuss the formation of the post-Taliban governing structure of Afghanistan.

3 http://documents.nytimes.com/the-obama-administrations-overview-on-afghanistan-and-pakistan.
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Bonn Agreement
Immediately after the September 11 attacks, former U.N. mediator Lakhdar Brahimi was brought
back (he had resigned in frustration in October 1999). U.N. Security Council Resolution 1378
(November 14, 2001) called for a “central” role for the United Nations in establishing a
transitional administration and inviting member states to send peacekeeping forces to promote
stability and aid delivery. After the fall of Kabul in November 2001, the United Nations invited
major Afghan factions, most prominently the Northern Alliance and that of the former King—but
not the Taliban—to an international conference in Bonn, Germany.
On December 5, 2001, the factions signed the “Bonn Agreement.”4 It was endorsed by U.N.
Security Council Resolution 1385 (December 6, 2001). The agreement was reportedly forged
with substantial Iranian diplomatic help because Iran had supported the military efforts of the
Northern Alliance faction and had leverage to persuade temporary caretaker Rabbani and the
Northern Alliance to cede the top leadership to Hamid Karzai as leader of an interim
administration. Other provisions of the agreement:
• authorized an international peace keeping force to maintain security in Kabul,
and Northern Alliance forces were directed to withdraw from the capital. Security
Council Resolution 1386 (December 20, 2001, and renewed yearly thereafter)
gave formal Security Council authorization for the international peacekeeping
force (International Security Assistance Force, ISAF);
• referred to the need to cooperate with the international community on counter
narcotics, crime, and terrorism; and
• applied the constitution of 1964 until a permanent constitution could be drafted.5
In December 2011, there will be an international conference on Afghanistan in Bonn, marking the
10th anniversary since the 2001 Bonn Conference. The meeting will, in part, evaluate governance
progress in Afghanistan since the original convention.
Permanent Constitution/Presidential System and Powers
A June 2002 “emergency” loya jirga put a representative imprimatur on the transition; it was
attended by 1,550 delegates (including about 200 women). Subsequently, a 35-member
constitutional commission drafted the constitution, unveiling it in November 2003. It was debated
by 502 delegates, selected in U.N.-run caucuses, at a “constitutional loya jirga (CLJ)” during
December 13, 2003-January 4, 2004. The CLJ, chaired by Sibghatullah Mojadeddi (mentioned
above) ended with approval of the constitution with only minor changes.
The constitution set up a presidential system, with an elected president and a separately elected
National Assembly (parliament). The president serves a five year term, with a two term limit
(Article 62). There are two vice presidents. The constitution and election system (a two round

4 Text of Bonn agreement at http://www.ag-afghanistan.de/files/petersberg.htm.
5 The last pre-Karzai loya jirga that was widely recognized as legitimate was held in 1964 to ratify a constitution.
Najibullah convened a loya jirga in 1987 to approve pro-Moscow policies, but that gathering was widely viewed by
Afghans as illegitimate.
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election if no majority is achieved in the first round) strongly favor the likelihood that an ethnic
Pashtun will be president of Afghanistan.
The president has broad powers under the constitution, including the power to appoint cabinet
ministers and members of the Supreme Court (subject to National Assembly confirmation),
provincial governors and district governors, as well as local security chiefs. The president is
commander-in-chief of the Afghan armed forces. The Tajik-dominated Northern Alliance failed in
its effort to set up a prime ministership (in which the elected parliament would select a prime
minister and a cabinet), but the faction did achieve some limitation to presidential powers by
assigning major authorities to the parliament, as discussed below. The Northern Alliance argued
for a prime ministerial system because that post would presumably be held by a Tajik or other
ethnic minority. In an outcome still debated, the opposition did not achieve the right of elected
provincial and district councils to choose their governors.
The constitution made former King Zahir Shah honorary “Father of the Nation,” a title that is not
heritable. Zahir Shah died on July 23, 2007.6 It (Article 58) also sets up the Afghanistan
Independent Human Rights Commission (AIHRC) to refer cases of human rights violations to
“the legal authorities.” (See further below on this commission.)
Karzai Elected in First Post-Taliban Presidential Elections in 2004
Security conditions precluded the holding of the first post-Taliban elections simultaneously. The
first election, for president, was held on October 9, 2004, missing a June constitutional deadline.
Turnout was about 80%. On November 3, 2004, Karzai was declared winner (55.4% of the vote)
over his 17 challengers on the first round, avoiding a runoff. Parliamentary and provincial council
elections were intended for April-May 2005 but were delayed until September 18, 2005. Because
of the difficulty in confirming voter registration rolls and determining district boundaries,
elections for the 364 district councils, each of which will likely have contentious boundaries
because they will inevitably separate tribes and clans, have not been held to date.
Karzai’s Leadership Style, His Advisers, and Staff
As president, Karzai is advised by what some observers believe is a narrow spectrum of Pashtuns
in the cabinet and in his presidential office. Karzai opponents assert that most of Karzai’s most
influential aides are Islamist, former members of the Hizb-e-Islam (Islamic Party) of radical
mujahedin leader Gulbuddin Hikmatyar, who support the idea of making significant concessions
to achieve reconciliation with Pakistan and the Taliban. An example is his former chief of staff, a
post that serves as key gatekeeper of access to Karzai. The official, Mohammad Umar Daudzai,
was known as an Islamic conservative; during the anti-Soviet war, he fought in the Pashtun
Islamist faction of Gulbuddin Hikmatyar and is said to be a skeptic of Western/U.S. influence
over Afghan decision making. On October 23, 2010, The New York Times asserted that he has
been the presidential office’s liaison with Iran for accepting the approximately $2 million per year
in Iranian assistance that is provided as cash. Karzai acknowledged this financial arrangement;
Daudzai was appointed Ambassador to Pakistan in April 2011. He was replaced by former
Minister of Information and Culture Abdul Karim Kurram, who is perceived as similar in outlook
to Daudzai. Another palace aide is minister-counselor Tajj Ayubi. A top communications aide,

6 Text of constitution at http://arabic.cnn.com/afghanistan/ConstitutionAfghanistan.pdf.
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Waheed Omar, resigned in August 2011, possibly because of the influence of Hizb-e-Islam
supporters on Karzai; he was replaced on an acting basis by Siamak Herawi.
The influences on Karzai in the palace are broader than Islamic conservatives. Karzai relies on
the advice of tribal and faction leaders from southern Afghanistan, such as Sher Mohammad
Akhunzadeh, the former governor of Helmand (until 2005). He also reportedly trusts well-
educated Westernized professionals such as his current Foreign Minister Zalmay Rasool and his
National Security adviser Rangin Spanta, a Pashtun who was in the government during the Soviet
occupation era, was Foreign Minister during March 2006-February 2010, and is said to retain
some leftwing views. The National Security Council, headed by Spanta, is located in the
presidential palace complex and heavily populated by ethnic Pashtuns. Two other trusted NSC
officials (both Pashtuns) are first deputy NSC Adviser Ibrahim Spinzada (a Karzai brother-in-
law), and Shaida Mohammad Abdali, the second deputy NSC adviser.
An administrative unit that is attracting increasing international attention as a possible center of
policymaking is the General Administrative Office, also known as the Cabinet Secretariat.
However, some experts say that, particularly under its current head, a Hazara Shiite named
Mudabir, it is primarily administrative, and without any policy coordination role. It is a holdover
from the Communist era, and contains many longtime bureaucrats. During the 1990s it may have
had as many as 1,800 personnel, but has been trimmed during the Karzai era to about 700 staff
members. The operations of the unit are funded primarily by the United Kingdom.
Some observers assert that the apparatus around Karzai require improved focus and organization.
One idea that surfaced in 2009, and which some Afghans are again raising to help overcome
administrative bottlenecks in the palace, was to prod Karzai to create a new position akin to a
“chief administration officer.” Several potential officials reportedly negotiated with Karzai about
playing that role, including one of Karzai’s 2009 election challengers, Ashaf Ghani. Ghani was
not given this role but he has since advised Karzai on government reform and institution building
after reconciling with him in November 2009 (after the election was settled). Ghani was part of
Karzai’s advisory team during the January 28, 2010, London conference and the July 20, 2010,
Kabul conference that focused on how to improve Afghan governance, and he is now in charge of
managing the transition from the United States and NATO to Afghan lead.
National Assembly (Parliament) Formed: Structure and Powers
A National Assembly was reestablished in post-Taliban Afghanistan as the result of elections held
September 18, 2005. That election was based on a “Single Non-Transferable Vote” System;
candidates stood as individuals, not part of a party list. Voting was for one candidate only,
although the number of representatives varied by province, ranging from 2 (Panjshir Province) to
33 (Kabul Province). Herat has 17; Nangahar, 14; Qandahar, Balkh, and Ghazni, 11 seats each.
It is the National Assembly that has been the key formal institution for non-Pashtuns and political
independents to express political opposition to and to exert influence on Karzai. The Assembly
has been set up by the constitution as a relatively powerful body that can check the powers of the
president—an outcome selected as an alternative to a prime ministerial system. It consists of a
249 all-elected lower house (Wolesi Jirga, House of the People) and a selected 102 seat upper
house (Meshrano Jirga, House of Elders). The upper house is selected as follows: one-third, or 34
seats, appointed by the president (for a five-year term); one-third appointed by the elected
provincial councils (four-year term), and one-third appointed by elected district councils (for a
three-year term). Of the president’s appointments, half (17) are mandated to be women. In the
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absence of elected district councils, two-thirds of the body is selected by the provincial councils
for four year terms. The lower house is mandated to be at least 28% female (68 persons)—an
average of two for each of the 34 provinces.
The lower house has the power to vote no-confidence against ministers (Article 92)—based on a
proposal by 10% of the lower house membership, or 25 parliamentarians. Both the upper and
lower houses are required to pass laws. Under Article 98 of the constitution, the national budget is
taken up by the Meshrano Jirga first and then passed to the Wolesi Jirga for its consideration.
Both houses of parliament, whose budgets are controlled by the Ministry of Finance, are staffed
by about 275 Afghans, reporting to a “secretariat.” There are 18 oversight committees, a research
unit, and a library.
After the National Assembly was inaugurated on December 19, 2005, it immediately
demonstrated institutional strength. In March 2006, it achieved a vote to require Karzai’s cabinet
to be approved individually, rather than en bloc, increasing opposition leverage. However, Karzai
rallied his support and all but 5 of the 25 nominees were confirmed. In May 2006, the opposition
within the Assembly compelled Karzai to change the nine-member Supreme Court, the highest
judicial body, including ousting 74-year-old Islamic conservative Fazl Hadi Shinwari as chief
justice. The proximate justification for the ouster was Shinwari’s age, which was beyond the
official retirement age of 65. (Shinwari later went on to head the Ulema Council, Afghanistan’s
highest religious body before his death in 2011.) The Assembly approved Karzai’s subsequent
court choices in July 2006, all of whom are trained in modern jurisprudence.
The process of confirming Karzai’s second-term cabinet—in which many of Karzai’s nominees
were voted down in several nomination rounds during 2010—demonstrates that the Assembly is
an increasingly strong institution that is pressing for honest, competent governance. These
principles are advocated most insistently, although not exclusively, by the younger, more
technocratic independent bloc in the lower house.
Cross-Cutting Ethnic and Political Rivalries
As discussed above, many intersecting trends—including ethnicity, tribal affiliation, geography,
economic interests, and ideologies—determine politics in Afghanistan. Although they largely
accept that a Pashtun is most likely to hold the top slot in the Afghan government, non-Pashtuns
insist on being and are represented at high levels of the central government. Ethnic minorities
have demanded, and have achieved, a large measure of control over how government programs
are implemented in their geographic regions. Although Karzai has the power to appoint provincial
and district governors, in practice he has not appointed governors of a different ethnicity than the
majority of residents of particular provinces and districts. The Independent Directorate of Local
Governance (IDLG, which recommends to the presidential palace local appointments) often
consults notables of a province on local appointments. This section discusses the political
landscape in Afghanistan that often explains why certain U.S.-led initiatives either succeed or fail.
Karzai’s Allies in the National Assembly
In addition to his allies in the presidential palace and the government writ large, Karzai has about
60-70 core supporters, mostly but not exclusively Pashtuns, in the Wolesi Jirga. Karzai and his
aides hoped to but failed to increase the president’s support base in the September 18, 2010,
elections, but instead the results caused Karzai’s base to shrink by about 20 deputies as compared
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to his support in the 2006-2011 lower house. Of his lower house supporters, about half are former
members of the conservative Pashtun-based Hizb-e-Islam party (the same party as that headed by
insurgent leader Gulbuddin Hikmatyar). Others in Karzai’s camp in the lower house are followers
of Abd-i-Rab Rasul Sayyaf, a prominent Pashtun, Islamic conservative mujahedin era party
leader.7 As a result, Karzai was unable to engineer the selection of Sayyaf to become lower house
speaker in 2011, displacing Yunus Qanooni (Tajik). Neither Sayyaf nor Qanooni was unable to
obtain enough votes to become speaker, instead losing to a compromise candidate, Abdul Raouf
Ibrahimi, who is perceived as weak, and his selection might be temporary.
Several of Karzai’s supporters in parliament are from Qandahar, Karzai’s home province, and
from Helmand province. For example, one pro-Karzai Pashtun who was reelected in the 2010
elections is former militia leader Hazrat Ali (Nangarhar Province), who led the Afghan
component of the failed assault on Osama bin Laden’s purported redoubt at Tora Bora in
December 2001. On the other hand, the 2010 elections resulted in the loss in parliament of Karzai
cousin Jamil Karzai, and Pacha Khan Zadran (Paktia) who, by some accounts, helped Osama bin
Laden escape Tora Bora. A key Karzai brother, discussed further below, is Ahmad Wali Karzai
(chair of the Qandahar provincial council), who was assassinated on July 12, 2011.
The Opposition: Dr. Abdullah, His Allies, and His Lower House Supporters
Broadly, the political opposition to Karzai (putting aside Taliban and other insurgents) consists
mainly of ethnic minorities (Tajik, Uzbek, and Hazara) who, during the Taliban period (1996-
2001), formed an anti-Taliban coalition called the “Northern Alliance.” The Tajik members of the
faction was centered around the legendary Tajik mujahedin commander Ahmad Shah Masoud,
and members of the faction are generally defined by their association with him. Some refer to all
Tajik members of the Alliance as “Panjshiris” because many of them are, like Masoud, from the
Panjshir Valley north of Kabul. (Masoud, who became legendary for preventing Soviet
occupation forces from conquering the Panjshir Valley, was killed by Al Qaeda supporters two
days before the September 11 attacks on the United States, possibly in conjunction with that plot.)
The Tajiks belonged, and still belong, to the Jamiat Islami (Islamic Society) political party, whose
leader was Burhanuddin Rabbani. As such, Rabbani was technically Masoud’s boss although
Masoud was generally perceived as independent and with a larger following than Rabbani, who is
from Badakshan Province (not the Panjshir Valley). Rabbani served as president during the
mujahedin government (1992-96), and served briefly again as Afghanistan’s leader during
November-December 2001, before Karzai was inaugurated as interim leader.
Since the ousting of the Taliban from power, leaders of these groups have long advocated
amending the constitution to give more power to parliament and to empower the elected
provincial councils (instead of the president) to select governors and mayors. Such steps would
ensure maximum autonomy from Kabul for non-Pashtun areas, and serve as a check and balance
on Pashtun dominance of the central government. The leaders of these factions tend to be
vehemently anti-Pakistan, which they see as supporting Taliban and other insurgent groups to
broaden their influence in future Afghan governments.
On the other hand, these factions have differences among themselves that has rendered them
relatively ineffective as an opposition to Karzai. Many “opposition” figures have often joined
Karzai’s government or worked with him on certain issues—a prominent example was former

7 Sayyaf led the Ittihad Islami (Islamic Union) mujahedin party during the war against the Soviet occupation.
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President Rabbani. He agreed in October 2010 to assume the chairmanship of the 70 member
“High Peace Council—the body that is leading Karzai’s effort to reconcile with insurgent leaders.
Rabbani’s September 20, 2011 assassination by an alleged Taliban operative widened the rift
between Karzai and the “Northern Alliance” adherents who believe that Karzai’s outreach to the
Taliban has proved naïve and counterproductive.
Although Rabbani was the elder statesman of the Northern Alliance, he was largely displaced in
recent years by the overall “leader of the opposition” -- former Foreign Minister Dr. Abdullah
Abdullah. Abdullah is about 51 years old; his mother is Tajik and father is Pashtun but his identity
as the foreign envoy of Ahmad Shah Masoud causes him to be identified politically as a Tajik. He
was dismissed from his Foreign Minister post by Karzai in a March 2006 cabinet reshuffle and he
now heads a private foundation named after Ahmad Shah Masoud.
Dr. Abdullah emerged as Afghanistan’s opposition leader after his unsuccessful challenge against
Karzai for president in the August 2009 election in which widespread fraud was demonstrated. He
is not in parliament but he works to promote his agenda through public statements, in direct
meetings with Karzai, and through allies in the lower house, as discussed below. He visited
Washington, DC, one week after Karzai’s May 10-14, 2010, visit, criticizing Karzai’s governance
at various think tanks and in a meeting with the State Department. He visited Washington, DC,
again in April 2011 and held several meetings with the Obama Administration, while using
several think-tank appearances to criticize Afghan governance under Karzai.


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Hamid Karzai, President of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan
Hamid Karzai, born December 24, 1957, was selected to lead Afghanistan at the Bonn Conference because he was a
prominent Pashtun leader who had been involved in Taliban-era political talks among exiled Afghans and was viewed
as a compromiser rather than a “strongman.” However, some observers consider his compromises as Afghanistan’s
leader a sign of weakness and criticize him for indulging members of his clan and other allies with appointments. His
term expires in 2014 and he is constitutionally barred from running again; he told parliamentarians in August 2011
that he would abide by the constitutional requirement to step down at that time.
From Karz village in Qandahar Province, Karzai has led the powerful Popolzai tribe of Durrani Pashtuns since 1999,
when his father was assassinated, allegedly by Taliban agents, in Quetta, Pakistan. Karzai’s grandfather was head of the
consultative National Council during King Zahir Shah’s reign. He attended university in India and supported the
mujahdin party of Sibghatul ah Mojadeddi (still a very close al y) during the anti-Soviet war. He was deputy foreign
minister in the mujahidin government of Rabbani during 1992-1995, but he left the government and supported the
Taliban as a Pashtun alternative to Rabbani. He broke with the Taliban as its excesses unfolded and forged alliances
with other anti-Taliban factions, including the Northern Alliance. Karzai entered Afghanistan after the September 11
attacks to organize Pashtun resistance to the Taliban, supported by U.S. Special Forces. He became central to U.S.
efforts after Pashtun commander Abdul Haq entered Afghanistan in October 2001 without U.S. support and was
captured and hung by the Taliban. Karzai was slightly injured by an errant U.S. bomb in late 2001.
With heavy protection, Karzai has survived several assassination attempts since taking office, including rocket fire or
gunfire at or near his appearances. His wife, Dr. Zenat Karzai, is a gynecologist by profession. They have been married
about 11 years and have a son, Mirwais, born in 2008. He has consistently denied al egations by unnamed U.S. and
other officials that he is taking mood altering medications.
His half brother, Ahmad Wali Karzai, was the most powerful political figure in Qandahar Province until his
assassination on July 12, 2011. He was key to President Karzai’s information network in Qandahar. Ahmad Wali was
widely accused of involvement in or tolerating narcotics trafficking, but reportedly also was a paid informant for the
CIA; some of his property has been used by U.S. Special Forces. Earlier, Ahmad Wali was the apparent target of at
least two bombings in Qandahar in 2009. Karzai’s other brothers have lived in the United States, including Qayyum
Karzai, who won a parliament seat in the September 2005 election but resigned in October 2008 for health reasons.
Another brother, Mahmoud Karzai, is reportedly under U.S. Justice Department investigation—a grand jury
reportedly met in February 2011 to consider various charges against him. He has wide business interests in Qandahar
and Kabul, including auto dealerships, a coal mine, a cement factory, apartment houses, and a stake in Kabul Bank,
which nearly col apsed in September 2010. Other Karzai relatives have profited extensively from international
contracts, including a $2.2 billion U.S. “Host Nation Trucking” contract. The United States banned contracts to one
such firm, Watan Risk Management, as of January 6, 2011; the firm is co-owned by two Karzai cousins Ahmad and
Rashid Popal.
U.S.-Karzai Relations
During 2010, Obama Administration criticism of the shortcomings of the Karzai government, particularly its
corruption, caused substantial frictions in U.S.-Karzai relations. Karzai’s frustrations at what he sees as U.S. and
international pressure on him to reform emerged in his comments throughout 2010, including on April 1, 2010, and
April 4, 2010. In those and other comments, Karzai expressed frustration with what he saw as international meddling
in the August 20, 2009, presidential election and, more generally, subordination to the decisions of international
donors. The April 4, 2010, comments suggested that Western meddling in Afghanistan was fueling support for the
Taliban as a legitimate resistance to foreign occupation8 and nearly derailed the May 10-14, 2010, Karzai visit to
Washington, DC. Another rift emerged in May-June 2011 on the issue of civilian casualties caused by NATO
operations. At each downturn in the relationship, top Administration officials have sought restore the relationship.9
While Karzai is said to be close to General David Petraeus, Karzai’s relations with then Ambassador Eikenberry were
widely assessed as severely strained. Relations are expected to improve now that Ambassador Ryan Crocker
(nominated in April 2011 as Ambassador to Afghanistan and confirmed on June 29, 2011) has arrived.
Source: CRS.

8 An exact English translation of his April 4 comments, in which he purportedly said that even he might consider
joining the Taliban if U.S. pressure on him continues, is not available.
9 Dreazen, Yochi, and Sarah Lynch. “U.S. Seeks to Repair Karzai Tie.” Wall Street Journal, April 12, 2010.
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The pro-Abdullah/anti-Karzai bloc in parliament has gone through several iterations. During
2007-2009, the bloc called itself the United Front (UF), although some accounts refer to it as the
“National Front” or “United National Front.” It was formed in April 2007 by then Wolesi Jirga
speaker Yunus Qanooni (former adviser to Ahmad Shah Masoud and Northern Alliance stalwart;
he was Karzai’s main challenger in the 2004 presidential election) and the late former Afghan
President Burhanuddin Rabbani. The United Front included some Pashtuns, such as Soviet-
occupation era security figures Sayed Muhammad Gulabzoi and Nur ul-Haq Ulumi, head of the
National United Party. Ulumi was not reelected to parliament in 2010.
The United Front bloc underwent changes during 2009-2010 as Abdullah emerged as a national
opposition figure, and Rabbani and other Northern Alliance figures reached accommodations with
Karzai. In late May 2010, Abdullah created a formal, national democratic opposition organization
called the “Hope and Change Movement.” Running in the September 18, 2010, elections under
that name, Abdullah supporters sought to increase their numbers in the new Assembly and hold a
commanding position that would enable them to block Karzai initiatives or achieve passage of its
own alternative proposals. The 2010 elections results suggest this objective was not achieved, and
the number of Abdullah supporters is roughly the same as it was in the previous Assembly—
about 60 supporters. This is also a bloc similar in size to Karzai’s core support base. Still, as
noted, Qanooni unsuccessfully sought reelection as lower house speaker in February 2011.
Some Tajik and other figures outside the Assembly are, if not challenging Abdullah for opposition
leadership, at least emerging as strong voices. The issue that may be galvanizing them is the
concept of a peace agreement with the Taliban. The Tajik and other ethnic minority leaders fear
that Karzai’s plans will increase the Pashtun predominance in government and lead to
marginalization of the Tajiks and other non-Pashtun minorities. In June 2011, several key
Northern Alliance leaders joined with former Vice President Ahmad Zia Masoud (Ahmad Shah
Masoud’s brother) to announce a new opposition centered around this issue. Even before this new
opposition was formed, Masoud, as well as ousted intelligence leader Amrollah Saleh (see below)
were increasingly outspoken against a potential conflict settlement that they fear will give Taliban
figures or Pakistan enhanced influence. Dr. Abdullah is perceived as sympathetic to this new
alliance, but he apparently did not play a key public role in forming it. The view of this grouping
against compromise with the Taliban was hardened by the killing in June 2011 of a key Tajik
security figure, General Daud Daud, at a bombing in normally quiet Takhar Province.
In part to mollify this ethnic unrest on this issue, in September 2010 Karzai appointed a 70-
member broad based High Peace Council that would oversee any negotiations with Taliban
leaders. As noted, Rabbani, the most senior Tajik faction leader, was appointed council chairman
on October 10, 2010. No replacement has been named since Rabbani’s death on September 20,
and it is believed that Karzai will have difficulty finding a replacement of Rabbani’s stature who
can at the same time blunt some of the Northern Alliance’s misgivings about the reconciliation
concept. The Karzai strategy of giving high level appointments to his critics has, to date, proved
successful in keeping his opposition divided and off balance.
Influence of “Independents”
Karzai and Abdullah compete for the support of the “independents” in the political elite, both
within the National Assembly and other institutions. Among them are a number of outspoken
women, intellectuals, and business leaders. Of the independents that were present in the 2005-
2010 parliament, one, the 43-year-old Malalai Joya (Farah Province), was a leading critic of war-
era faction leaders. In May 2007 the lower house voted to suspend her for this criticism for the
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duration of her term and she did not seek reelection in 2010. Others in this independent camp
have included Ms. Fauzia Gailani (Herat Province, not returned to parliament); Ms. Shukria
Barekzai, editor of Woman Mirror magazine and possible presidential candidate in 2014 (not
returned); and Mr. Ramazan Bashardost, a former Karzai minister who champions parliamentary
powers and has established a “complaints tent” near the parliament building to highlight and
combat official corruption. (He ran for president in the 2009 elections on an anti-corruption
platform and drew an unexpectedly large amount of votes.) Bashardost was returned to
parliament in the September 2010 election. U.S.-based International Republican Institute (IRI)
has helped train the independents; the National Democratic Institute (NDI) has assisted the more
established factions.
Some other leading independents are present in the 2011-2015 lower house. They include Rafiq
Shahir from Herat, a well-known civil-society activist; Dr. Saleh Seljuki; and Ahmad Behzad (all
from Herat). Other independents reelected include Shakiba Hashemi and Khalid Pashtun, both
from Qandahar. Ms. Fawzia Koofi, at one time a deputy lower house speaker, also remains in the
Assembly and she continues to represent an outspoken leader on women’s rights and human
rights more generally. Dr. Roshanak Wardak was not reelected, but he is expected to remain
active publicly.
Karzai Support Significant in the Upper House
Karzai has relatively fewer critics in the 102-seat Meshrano Jirga (House of Elder, upper house),
partly because of his bloc of 34 appointments (one-third of that body). In 2005, he engineered the
appointment of an ally as speaker: Sibghatullah Mojadeddi, a noted Islamic scholar and former
mujahedin party leader (Afghanistan National Liberation Front, ANLF), who headed the post-
Communist mujahedin government for one month (May 1992). Mojadeddi resigned in February
2010 and was replaced by another Karzai ally, then deputy speaker Fazl Hadi MuslimYaar.
Because it is composed of more elderly, established, notable Afghans who are traditionalist in
their political outlook, the Meshrano Jirga has tended to be more Islamist conservative than the
lower house, advocating a legal system that accords with Islamic law, and restrictions on press
and Westernized media broadcasts. As an example of the upper house’s greater support for
Karzai, it voted on April 3, 2010, not to act on the election decree that the lower house had
rejected on March 31, 2010, meaning that the decree applied to the September 18 parliamentary
election.
Karzai also has used his bloc of appointments to the upper house to co-opt potential antagonists
or reward his friends. In 2006, he appointed Northern Alliance military leader Muhammad Fahim
to the upper body, perhaps to compensate for his removal as defense minister, although he
resigned after a few months and later joined the UF. (He was Karzai’s primary running mate in
the 2009 elections and is now first vice president.) In 2006, Karzai also named a key ally, former
Helmand governor Sher Mohammad Akhunzadeh, to the body.
Karzai was scheduled to make his 34 new upper house appointments (five year terms) prior to the
January 26, 2011, seating of the new parliament. However, Karzai delayed naming his choices
while the 2010 election remained in dispute. Because two thirds of the body serve four-year
terms—and the provincial councils that were elected in 2009 were able to appoint their 68
members of the upper house—the body continued to operate even though Karzai had not
submitted his 34 appointments. On January 27, 2011, the body reaffirmed Muslim Yaar as upper
house speaker. On February 19, 2011, Karzai made his 34 selections, reappointing 18 incumbents
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and appointing 16 new members to the body. In line with the constitution, 17 of Karzai’s
appointments are women.
Ethnic and Factional Cooperation in the Security Sector
The security organs are considered an arena where Pashtuns, Tajiks, and others, of all factional
affiliations, have worked together relatively well. The National Directorate for Security (NDS, the
intelligence directorate) was headed by a non-Pashtun (Amrollah Saleh, a Tajik) during 2006-
2010, although he was dismissed on June 6, 2010, by Karzai for disagreements over whether and
how to engage insurgent leaders in political settlement negotiations. He was replaced by a
Pashtun, Rehmat Nabil, who has no previous intelligence experience but is perceived as more
consultative than was Saleh. Still, he inherited a service dominated by Tajiks (although some left
when Saleh was ousted) and by a mix of personnel that served during the Soviet occupation era
(the service was then called Khad), and in the mujahedin government of 1992-1996. During
2002-2007, the Central Intelligence Agency reportedly paid for all of the NDS budget.10
Perhaps to preserve the tradition of ethnic balance in the security sector of government, the chief
of staff of the Afghan National Army, Bismillah Khan (a Tajik), was named interior minister on
June 26, 2010. He replaced Mohammad Hanif Atmar, a Pashtun, who was fired the same day and
on roughly the same grounds as Saleh. By all accounts, Khan is widely respected, even among
Pashtuns. The security ministries tend to have key deputies who are of a different ethnicity than
the minister or top official.
Some observers take a different view, asserting that Tajiks continue to control many of the
command ranks of the Afghan security institutions, giving Pashtuns only a veneer of control of
these organizations. U.S. commanders in Afghanistan say the composition of the national security
forces—primarily the Afghan National Army and Afghan National Police—has been brought
broadly into line with the population. However, Pashtuns from the south (Durranis) remain
underrepresented, in part because of the fears that insurgents might target their relatives if they
join the security forces. Many of the Pashtuns in the security forces are from the Jalalabad area.
Elections in 2009 and 2010 Widen Political Schisms and Produce
Institutional Paralysis
Elections are widely considered a key harbinger of the durability and extent of Afghanistan’s
political development—and a metric to judge the legitimacy and popularity of the Afghan partner
in the U.S. mission. The 2009 presidential and provincial elections were the first post-Taliban
elections run by the Afghan government itself in the form of the Afghanistan Independent
Electoral Commission. Donors, including the United States, invested almost $500 million in 2009
to improve the capacity of the Afghan government to conduct the elections.11 Both it and the
September 2010 National Assembly elections were flawed, as discussed below, and widened
differences between Karzai and the National Assembly to the point where, as of July 2011, the
Assembly was considering impeachment of Karzai under Article 29 of the constitution. However,

10 Filkins, Dexter, and Mark Mazzetti. “Key Karzai Aide in Graft Inquiry is Linked to C.I.A.” New York Times, August
26, 2010.
11 Report by the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR), September 9, 2010.
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that article states grounds for impeachment as crimes against humanity, national treason, or other
crimes that would seem to present a high threshold to Karzai’s actual removal from office.
2009 Presidential Election
The 2009 election was plagued, from the start, by assertions of a lack of credibility of the IEC.
Most of its commissioners, including then-Chairman Azizullah Ludin, were selected by and
politically close to Karzai. As a check and balance to ensure electoral credibility, there was also a
U.N.-appointed Elections Complaints Commission (ECC) that reviewed fraud complaints. Under
the 2005 election law, there were three ECC seats for foreign nationals, appointed by the Special
Representative of the U.N. Secretary General/head of U.N. Assistance Mission–Afghanistan,
UNAMA. The two Afghans on the ECC governing council12 were appointed by the Supreme
Court and Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission, respectively.
Furthermore, as the election process began, there were arguments over the election date. On
February 3, 2009, Afghanistan’s Independent Election Commission (IEC) set August 20, 2009, as
the election date (a change from a date mandated by Article 61 of the Constitution as April 21,
2009, in order to allow at least 30 days before Karzai’s term expired on May 22, 2009). The IEC
decision on the latter date cited Article 33 of the Constitution as mandating universal accessibility
to the voting—and saying that the April 21 date was precluded by difficulties in registering
voters, printing ballots, training staff, advertising the elections, and the dependence on
international donor funding, in addition to the security questions.13
In response to UF insistence that Karzai’s presidency ended May 22, and that a caretaker
government should run Afghanistan until elections, Karzai issued a February 28, 2009, decree
directing the IEC to set the elections in accordance with all provisions of the constitution. The
IEC reaffirmed on March 4, 2009, that the election would be held on August 20, 2009. Karzai
argued against his stepping down, saying that the Constitution does not provide for any transfer of
power other than in case of election or death of a president. The Afghan Supreme Court backed
that decision on March 28, 2009, and the Obama Administration publicly backed these rulings.
Election Modalities and Processes
Despite the political dispute between Karzai and his opponents, enthusiasm among the public
appeared high in the run-up to the election. Registration, which updated 2005 voter rolls, began in
October 2008 and was completed as of the beginning of March 2009. About 4.5 million new
voters registered, and about 17 million total Afghans were registered. However, there were
widespread reports of registration fraud (possibly half of all new registrants), with some voters
registering on behalf of women who do not, by custom, show up at registration sites, and others
selling registration cards. U.S./NATO military operations in some areas, including in Helmand in
January 2009, were conducted to secure registration centers; however, some election observers
noted that there was insufficient international assistance to the IEC, which ran the election, to
ensure an untainted registration process.

12 ECC website, http://www.ecc.org.af/en/.
13 Statement of the Independent Election Commission Secretariat, February 3, 2009, provided to CRS by a Karzai
national security aide.
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Presidential candidates filed to run during April 24-May 8, 2009. A total of 44 registered to run
for president, of which three were disqualified for various reasons, leaving a field of 41 (later
reduced to 32 after several dropped out). In the provincial elections, 3,200 persons competed for
420 seats nationwide. Although about 80% of the provincial council candidates ran as
independents, some of Afghanistan’s parties, including Hezb-i-Islam, fielded multiple candidates
in several different provinces. The provincial elections component of the election received little
attention, in part because the role of these councils is unclear. About 200 women competed for the
124 seats reserved for women (29%) on the provincial councils, although in two provinces
(Qandahar and Uruzgan) there were fewer women candidates than reserved seats. In Kabul
Province, 524 candidates competed for the 29 seats of the council.
The European Union, supported by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
(OSCE) sent a few hundred observers, and the International Republican Institute and National
Democratic Institute sent observers as well. About 8,000 Afghans assisted the observation
missions, according to the U.N. Nations Development Program. Because much of Afghanistan is
inaccessible by road, ballots were distributed (and were brought for counting) by animals in
addition to vehicles and fixed and rotary aircraft.
Security was a major issue for all the international actors supporting the Afghan elections process,
amid open Taliban threats against Afghans who vote. In the first round, about 7,000 polling
centers were to be established (with each center having multiple polling places, totaling about
29,000), but, of those, about 800 were deemed too unsafe to open, most of them in restive
Helmand and Qandahar provinces. A total of about 6,200 polling centers opened on election day.
The total cost of the Afghan elections in 2009 were about $300 million. Other international
donors contributing funds to close the gap left by the U.S. contribution of about $175 million.
The Political Contest and Campaign
The presidential competition took shape in May 2009. In the election-related political deal-
making,14 Karzai obtained an agreement from Fahim to run as his first vice presidential running
mate. Karzai, Fahim, and incumbent second Vice President Karim Khalili (a Hazara) registered
their ticket on May 4, 2009, just before Karzai left to visit the United States. Karzai convinced
several prominent Pashtuns not to run, including Ghul Agha Shirzai, a member of the powerful
Barakzai clan; and Anwar al-Haq Ahady, the former finance minister and Central Bank governor.
Anti-Karzai Pashtuns failed to coalesce around one challenger, such as Former Interior Minister
Ali Jalali and former Finance Minister (2002-2004) and Karzai critic Ashraf Ghani. Ghani
decided to run without Jalali or prominent representation from other ethnicities in his vice
presidential slots.
The UF had difficulty forging a united challenge to Karzai. Dr. Abdullah registered to run with
UF backing. His running mates were Dr. Cheragh Ali Cheragh, a Hazara who did poorly in the
2004 election, and a little known Pashtun, Homayoun Wasefi. However, the presence of a key
Tajik, Fahim, on Karzai’s ticket showed the UF to be split.

14 Some of the information in this section obtained in CRS interviews with a Karzai national security aide, December
2008.
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The Campaign
Karzai went into the election as a clear favorite, but the key question was whether he would win
in the first round (more than 50% of the vote). IRI and other pre-election polls showed him with
about 45% support and Dr. Abdullah his nearest competitor at about 25%. During the campaign,
Karzai railed against civilian casualties resulting from U.S./NATO operations and pledged to hold
a loya jirga, including Taliban figures, to try to reach a settlement with the insurgency. He
restated that intent in his November 19, 2009, inaugural speech and has fulfilled that pledge. Still,
he was criticized for a campaign that relied on personal ties to ethnic faction leaders rather than a
retail campaign based on public appearances. Karzai at first agreed to public debates with rivals,
but backed out of a July 23 debate with Abdullah and Ghani (on the private Tolo Television
network) on the grounds that the event was limited to only those three. Abdullah and Ghani
debated without Karzai. Karzai attended the next debate (on state-run Radio-Television
Afghanistan) on August 16, debating Ghani and Bashardost, but without Abdullah. Karzai was
said to benefit from his ready access to the media, which focuses on his presidential schedule.
Dr. Abdullah stressed his background of mixed ethnicity to appeal to Pashtuns, but he
campaigned extensively in his key base in the north and west, which are populated mainly by
Tajiks. Both Karzai and Abdullah held large rallies in Kabul and elsewhere.
Ghani polled at about 6% just before the election, according to surveys. Ghani appeared
frequently in U.S. and Afghan media broadcasts criticizing Karzai for failing to establish
democratic and effective institutions, but he had spent much time in the United States and Europe
and many average Afghans viewed him as out of touch. Ghani tried to make extensive use of the
Internet for advertising and fundraising, even though most Afghans do not even have access to
electricity, and he was advised by James Carville.15
A candidate who polled unexpectedly well was 54-year-old anti-corruption parliamentarian
Ramazan Bashardost, an ethnic Hazara. He was polling close to 10% just before the election. He
ran a low-budget campaign with low-paid personnel and volunteers, but attracted a lot of media.
This suggests that, despite most Hazara ethnic leaders, such as Mohammad Mohaqiq, endorsing
Karzai, Bashardost would do well among Hazaras, particularly those who are the most educated.
Some believe the Shiite personal status law, discussed above, was an effort by Karzai to win
Hazara Shiite votes. According to the preliminary results, Bashardost carried several Hazara
provinces, including Ghazni and Dai Kondi, but Mohaqiq’s backing apparently helped Karzai
carry the Hazara heartland of Bamiyan province. Other significant candidates are shown below.
The Election Results
Taliban intimidation and voter apathy appear to have suppressed the total turnout to about 5.8
million votes cast, or about a 35% turnout, far lower than expected. Twenty-seven Afghans,
mostly security forces personnel, were killed in election-day violence. Turnout was said by
observers and U.S. and other military personnel based there to have been very low in Helmand
Province, despite the fact that Helmand was the focus of a U.S. military-led offensive. Some
observers said that turnout among women nationwide was primarily because there were not
sufficient numbers of female poll workers recruited by the IEC to make women feel comfortable

15 Mulrine, Anna, “Afghan Presidential Candidate Takes a Page From Obama’s Playbook,” U.S. News and World
Report, June 25, 2009.
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enough to vote. In general, however, election observers reported that poll workers were generally
attentive and well trained, and the voting process appeared orderly. In normally secure Kabul,
turnout was said to be far lighter than in the 2004 presidential election. Turnout might have been
dampened by a suicide bombing on August 15, 2009, outside NATO/ISAF military headquarters
and intended to intimidate voters not to participate. In addition, several dozen provincial council
candidates, and some workers on the presidential campaigns, were killed in election-related
violence. A convoy carrying Fahim (Karzai vice presidential running mate, see below) was
bombed, although Fahim was unharmed.
Clouding the election substantially were the widespread fraud allegations coming from all sides.
Dr. Abdullah held several news conferences after the election, purporting to show evidence of
systematic election fraud by the Karzai camp. Karzai’s camp made similar allegations against
Abdullah as applied to his presumed strongholds in northern Afghanistan. The ECC, in
statements, stated its belief that there was substantial fraud likely committed, and mostly by
Karzai supporters. However, the low turnout in the presumed Karzai strongholds in southern
Afghanistan led Karzai and many Pashtuns to question the election’s fairness as well, on the
grounds that Pashtuns were intimidated from voting in greater proportions than were others.
The IEC released vote results slowly. Preliminary results were to be announced by September 3.
However, the final, uncertified total was released on September 16, 2009. It showed Karzai at
54.6% and Dr. Abdullah at 27.7%. Bashardost and Ghani received single-digit vote counts (9%
and 3% respectively), with trace amounts for the remainder of the field.
Vote Certified/Runoff Mandated
The constitution required that a second-round runoff, if needed, be held two weeks after the
results of the first round are certified. Following the release of the vote count, the complaints
evaluation period began which, upon completed, would yield a “certified” vote result. On
September 8, 2009, the ECC ordered a recount of 10% of polling stations (accounting for as many
as 25% total votes) as part of its investigations of fraud. Polling stations were considered
“suspect” if the total number of votes exceeded 600, which was the maximum number allotted to
each polling station; or where any candidate received 95% or more of the total valid votes cast at
that station (assuming more than 100 votes were cast there). Perhaps reflecting political
sensitivities, the recount consisted of a sampling of actual votes.16
On October 20, 2009, the ECC determined, based on its investigation, that about 1 million Karzai
votes, and about 200,000 Abdullah votes, were considered fraudulent and were deducted from
their totals. The final, certified, results of the first round were as follows: Karzai—49.67%
(according to the IEC; with a slightly lower total of about 48% according to the ECC
determination); Abdullah—30.59%; Bashardost—10.46%; Ghani—2.94%, Yasini—1.03%, and
lower figures for the remaining field.17
During October 16-20, 2009, U.S. and international officials, including visiting Senator John
Kerry, met repeatedly with Karzai to attempt to persuade him to acknowledge that his legitimate
vote total did not exceed the 50%+ threshold to claim a first-round victory. On October 21, 2009,
the IEC accepted the ECC findings and Karzai conceded the need for a runoff election. A date

16 “Afghan Panel to Use Sampling in Recount,” USA Today, September 22, 2009.
17 See IEC website for final certified tallies, http://www.iec.org.af/results.
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was set as November 7, 2009. Abdullah initially accepted. In an attempt to produce a fair second
round, UNAMA, which provided advice and assistance to the IEC, requested that about 200
district-level election commissioners be replaced and that there be fewer polling stations—about
5,800, compared to 6,200 previously—to eliminate polling stations where very few votes were
expected to be cast.
After a runoff was declared, no major faction leader switched support of either candidate. Prior to
the ECC vote certification, Dr. Abdullah told CRS at a meeting in Kabul on October 15, 2009,
that he might be willing to negotiate with Karzai on a “Joint Program” of reforms—such as direct
election of provincial governors—to avoid a runoff. However, some said the constitution does not
provide for a negotiated settlement and that the runoff must proceed. Others said that a deal
between the two, in which Abdullah dropped his candidacy, could have led the third-place
finisher, Bashardost, to assert that he must face Karzai in a runoff. Still others say the issue could
have necessitated resolution by Afghanistan’s Supreme Court.
The various pre-runoff scenarios were mooted on November 1, 2009, when Dr. Abdullah refused
to participate in the runoff on the grounds that the problems that plagued the first round were
unresolved. He asserted that Karzai, in negotiations during October 2009, was refusing to replace
the IEC head, Azizullah Ludin, or to fire several cabinet ministers purportedly campaigning for
Karzai. Some believe Abdullah pulled out because of his calculation that he would not prevail in
the second round. On November 2, 2009, the IEC issued a statement saying that, by consensus,
the body had determined that Karzai, being the only candidate remaining in a two-person runoff,
should be declared the winner. The Obama Administration accepted the outcome as “within
Afghanistan’s constitution,” on the grounds that the fraud had been investigated. On that basis,
the United States, as well as U.N. Secretary General Ban Ki Moon (visiting Kabul), and several
governments, congratulated Karzai on the victory. Secretary of State Clinton praised Dr. Abdullah
for his relatively moderate speech announcing his pullout, in particular his refusal to call for
demonstrations or violence. However, the marred elections process was a major factor in a
September-November 2009 high-level U.S. strategy reevaluation because of the centrality of a
credible, legitimate partner Afghan government to U.S. strategy.18
As noted above, the election for the provincial council members were not certified until
December 29, 2009. The council members took office in February 2011.
Post-Election Cabinet
The exposure of widespread fraud in the election appeared to weaken Karzai politically and
further alienated him from his opponents in the National Assembly. In the confirmation process of
his post-election cabinet, National Assembly members, particularly the well-educated
independents, objected to many of his nominees as “unknowns,” as having minimal
qualifications, or as loyal to faction leaders who backed Karzai in the 2009 election. Karzai’s
original list of 24 ministerial nominees (presented December 19) was generally praised by the
United States for retaining the highly praised economic team (and most of that team was
confirmed). However, overall, only 7 of the first 24 nominees were confirmed (January 2, 2010),
and only 7 of the 17 replacement nominees were confirmed (January 16, 2010), after which the
Assembly went into winter recess. Although then UNAMA head Kai Eide called the vetoing of
many nominees a “setback” to Afghan governance, Pentagon Press Secretary Geoff Morrell said

18 Fidler, Stephen and John W. Miller, “U.S. Allies Await Afghan Review,” Wall Street Journal, September 25, 2009.
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on January 6, 2010, that the vetoing by parliament reflected a “healthy give and take” among
Afghanistan’s branches of government. Another five (out of seven nominees) were confirmed on
June 28, 2010, although one was a replacement for the ousted Interior Minister Atmar.
The major developments in the cabinet selection process—and with seven ministries remaining
unfilled by permanent appointees as of August 2011—included the following:
• The main security ministers—Defense Minister Abdal Rahim Wardak and
Interior Minister Mohammad Hanif Atmar—were renominated by Karzai and
confirmed on January 2, 2010. They work closely with the U.S. military to
expand and improve the Afghan national security forces. (Atmar was later
dismissed, as discussed previously.)
• Three key economic/civilian sector officials who work very closely with USAID
and U.S. Embassy Kabul—Finance Minister Omar Zakhiwal, Agriculture
Minister Mohammad Rahimi, and Education Minister Ghulam Faruq Wardak—
were renominated and also were confirmed on January 2. The highly praised
Minister of Rural Rehabilitation and Development (Ehsan Zia), who runs the
widely praised National Solidarity Program, was not renominated, to the chagrin
of U.S. officials. His named replacement (Wais Barmak, a Fahim and Dr.
Abdullah ally) was voted down. The second replacement, Jarullah Mansoori, was
confirmed on January 16, 2010.
• The U.S.-praised Commerce Minister Wahidollah Sharani was selected to move
over to take control of the Mines Ministry from the former minister, who is under
investigation for corruption. Sharani was confirmed on January 2, 2010. Also
confirmed that day was Minister of Culture Seyyed Makhdum Raheen, who had
been serving as Ambassador to India.
• The clan of former moderate mujahedin party leader Pir Gaylani was favored by
Karzai in the December 19 list. Gaylani son-in-law Anwar al Haq Al Ahady (see
above) was named as Economy Minister and Hamid Gaylani (Pir Gaylani’s son)
was named as Minister of Border and Tribal Affairs. However, neither was
confirmed and neither was renominated, although Ahady was later confirmed to
another position, as discussed below.
• Ismail Khan was renominated as Minister of Energy and Water on December 19,
2009, disappointing U.S. officials and many Afghans who see him as a faction
leader (Tajik leader/mujahedin era commander, Herat Province) with no technical
expertise. He was voted down but remains in an acting capacity.
• Karzai initially did not nominate a permanent foreign minister, leaving Spanta in
place as a caretaker. However, in the second nomination round, Karzai selected
his close ally Zalmay Rassoul, who has been national security adviser since 2004,
to the post. Rassoul was confirmed on January 16, 2010. Spanta is head of the
National Security Council.
• Minister of Women’s Affairs Ghazanfar was renominated to remain the only
female minister, but was voted down (January 2, 2010). In the cabinet
renominations, Karzai named three women—Suraiya Dalil to Public Health,
Pelwasha Hassan to Women’s Affairs, and Amina Afzali (minister of youth in an
earlier Karzai cabinet) to Labor and Social Affairs. Of those, only Afzali was
confirmed on January 16, 2010. Ghazanfar and Dalil are heading those ministries
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in an acting capacity. In the December 16, 2009, list, Karzai proposed a woman
to head a new Ministry of Literacy, but parliament did not vote on this
nomination because it had not yet acted to approve formation of the ministry.
• Of the other nominees confirmed on January 16, 2010, at least one has previously
served in high positions. The Assembly confirmed that day: Zarar Moqbel (who
previously was interior minister) as Counternarcotics Minister; Economy
Minister Abdul Hadi Arghandiwal, who heads a moderate faction of the Hizb-e-
Islam party of pro-Taliban insurgent leader Gulbuddin Hikmatyar; Yousaf Niazi,
minister of Hajj and Waqf (religious endowments) affairs; and Habibullah
Ghalib, Minister of Justice.
• The following 10 were voted down on January 16: (1) Palwasha Hassan,
nominated to head the Ministry of Women’s Affairs; (2) Dalil, Public Health,
now acting minister, mentioned above; (3) Muhammad Zubair Waheed,
Commerce; (4) Muhammad Elahi, Higher Education; (5) Muhammad Laali,
Public Works; (6) Abdul Rahim, who was telecommunications minister in the
first Karzai cabinet, as Minister of Refugee Affairs (acting); (7) Arsala Jamal,
formerly the governor of Khost Province who was widely praised in that role by
Secretary Gates, as Minister of Border and Tribal affairs (and now is acting
minister); (8) Abdul Qadus Hamidi, Minister of Communications; (9) Abdur
Rahim Oraz, Minister of Transport and Aviation; and (10) Sultan Hussein Hesari,
Minister of Urban Development (acting).
• On June 28, 2010, Karzai obtained parliamentary approval for five positions out
of seven nominees. Approved were Bismillah Khan as Interior Minister (see
above); Al Ahady (see above) as Commerce Minister; former Qandahar governor
Asadullah Khalid as Minister of Border and Tribal affairs; Hamidi (see above) as
Minister of Public Works; and Jamahir Anwari as Minister of Refugees and
Repatriation. Voted down were two Hazara Shiites: Sarwar Danesh as Minister of
Higher Education, and former IEC chief Daud Ali Najafi as Minister of
Transportation. Their rejection caused Hazara members in the Assembly to
demonstrate their disapproval of the vote, and Karzai called for Hazaras to be
approved in the future to ensure all-ethnic participation in government. Both head
those ministries in an acting capacity.
September 18, 2010, Parliamentary Elections
The split over the conduct of the presidential elections widened in the run-up to the September
18, 2010, parliamentary elections. Mechanisms to prevent fraud were not fully implemented and
the results continue to be disputed as of July 2011, largely paralyzing the institutional functioning
of the Assembly and its role as a check and balance on the Karzai government. As a result, the
political structure of Afghanistan has continued to fragment, even as the government assumers
greater responsibility in the context of a transition to Afghan security leadership beginning in July
2011. The July 20, 2010, Kabul conference final communiqué included an Afghan government
pledge to initiate, within six months, a strategy for long-term electoral reform.
Election Timing
On January 2, 2010, the IEC had initially set National Assembly elections for May 22, 2010. The
IEC view was that this date was in line with a constitutional requirement for a new election to be
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held well prior to the expiry of the current Assembly’s term. However, U.S., ECC, UNAMA, and
officials of donor countries argued that Afghanistan’s flawed institutions would not be able to
hold free and fair elections under this timetable. Among the difficulties noted were that the IEC
lacks sufficient staff, given that some were fired after the 2009 election; that the IEC lacks funds
to hold the election under that timetable; that the U.S. military buildup will be consumed with
securing still restive areas at election time; and that the ECC’s term expired at the end of January
2010. A functioning ECC was needed to evaluate complaints against registered parliamentary
candidates because there are provisions in the election law to invalidate the candidacies of those
who have previously violated Afghan law or committed human rights abuses.
The international community pressed for a delay of all of these elections until August 2010 or,
according to some donors, mid-2011.19 Bowing to funding and the wide range of other
considerations mentioned, on January 24, 2010, the IEC announced that the parliamentary
elections would be postponed until September 18, 2010. Other experts said that the security
issues, and the lack of faith in Afghanistan’s election institutions, necessitated further
postponement.20
About $120 million was budgeted by the IEC for the parliamentary elections, of which at least
$50 million came from donor countries, giving donors leverage over when the election might take
place. The remaining $70 million was funds left over from the 2009 elections. Donors had held
back the needed funds, possibly in an effort to pressure the IEC to demonstrate that it is
correcting the flaws identified in the various “after-action” reports on the 2009 election. With the
compromises and Karzai announcements below, those funds were released as of April 2010.
Election Decree/Reform
With the dispute between the Karzai government and international donors continuing over how to
ensure a free and fair election, in February 2010 Karzai signed an election decree that would
supersede the 2005 election law and govern the 2010 parliamentary election.21 The Afghan
government argued that the decree supersedes the constitutional clause that any new election law
not be adopted less than one year prior to the election to which that law will apply.
Substantively, some of the provisions of the election decree—particularly the proposal to make
the ECC an all-Afghan body—caused alarm in the international community. Another
controversial element was the registration requirements of a financial deposit (equivalent of about
$650), and that candidates obtain signatures of at least 1,000 voters. On March 14, 2010, after
discussions with outgoing UNAMA head Kai Eide, Karzai reportedly agreed to cede to UNAMA
two “international seats” on the ECC, rather than to insist that all five ECC members be Afghans.
Still, the majority of the ECC seats were Afghans.
The election decree became an issue for Karzai opponents and others in the National Assembly
who seek to assert parliamentary authority. On March 31, the Wolesi Jirga voted to reject the
election decree. However, on April 3, 2010, the Meshrano Jirga decided not to act on the election

19 Trofimov, Yaroslav, “West Urges Afghanistan to Delay Election,” Wall Street Journal, December 11, 2009.
20 Rondeaux, Candace, “Why Afghanistan’s September Elections Ought to Be Postponed.” Washington Post, July 11,
2010.
21 Partlow, Joshua, “Afghanistan’s Government Seeks More Control Over Elections,” Washington Post, February 15,
2010.
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decree, meaning that it was not rejected by the Assembly as a whole and governed the September
18, 2010, National Assembly elections. Karzai upheld his pledge to implement the March 2010
compromise with then UNAMA head Eide by allowing UNAMA to appoint two ECC members
and to implement a requirement that at least one non-Afghan ECC member concur in decisions.
Among other steps to correct the mistakes of the 2009 election, the Afghan Interior Ministry
planned instituted a national identity card system to curb voter registration fraud. However,
observers say that registration fraud still occurred. On April 17, 2010, Karzai appointed a new
IEC head, Fazel Ahmed Manawi, a Tajik, who drew praise from many factions (including
“opposition leader” Dr. Abdullah, who is half Tajik and identifies with that ethnicity) for
impartiality. The IEC also barred 6,000 poll workers who served in the 2009 election from
working the 2010 election.
Preparations and the Vote
Preparations for the September 18 election proceeded without major disruption, according to the
IEC. Candidates registered during April 20-May 6, 2010. A list of candidates was circulated on
May 13, 2010, including 2,477 candidates for the 249 seats.22 These figures included 226
candidates who registered but whose documentation was not totally in order; and appeal restored
about 180 of them. On May 30, 2010, in a preliminary ruling, 85 candidates others were
disqualified as members of illegal armed groups. However, appeals and negotiations restored all
but 36 in this latter category. A final list of candidates, after all appeals and decisions on the
various disqualifications, was issued June 22. The final list included 2,577 candidates, including
406 women. Sixty-two candidates were invalidated by the ECC, mostly because they did not
resign their government positions, as required.
Voter registration was conducted June 12-August 12. According to the IEC, over 375,000 new
voters were registered, and the number of eligible voters was about 11.3 million. Campaigning
began June 23. Many candidates, particularly those who are women, said that security difficulties
have prevented them from conducting active campaigning. At least three candidates and 13
candidate supporters were killed by insurgent violence.
On August 24, 2010, the IEC announced that the Afghan security forces say they would only be
able to secure 5,897 of the planned 6,835 polling centers. To prevent so-called “ghost polling
stations” (stations open but where no voters can go, thus allowing for ballot-stuffing), the 938
stations considered not secure were not opened. The IEC announcement stated that further
security evaluation could lead to the closing of still more stations and, on election day, a total of
5,355 centers opened (304 of those slated to open did not, and for 157 centers there was no
information available). In part to compensate, the IEC opened extra polling stations in centers in
secure areas near to those that were closed.
On election day, about 5.6 million votes were cast out of about 17 million eligible voters. Turnout
was therefore about 33%. A major issue suppressing turnout was security. At first, it appeared as
though election-day violence was lower than in the 2009 presidential election. However, on

22 The seat allocation per province is the same as it was in the 2005 parliamentary election—33 seats up for election in
Kabul; 17 in Herat province; 14 in Nangarhar, 11 each in Qandahar, Balkh, and Ghazni; 9 in Badakhshan, Konduz, and
Faryab, 8 in Helmand, and 2 to 6 in the remaining provinces. Ten are reserved for Kuchis (nomads).
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September 24, NATO/ISAF announced that there were about 380 total attacks, about 100 more
than in 2009. However, voting was generally orderly and the attacks did not derail the election.
Parliamentary Election Outcome
Preliminary results were announced on October 20, 2010, and final, IEC-certified results were to
be announced by October 30, 2010, but were delayed until November 24, 2010, due to
investigation of fraud complaints. While the information below illustrates that there was
substantial fraud, the IEC and ECC have been widely praised by the international community for
their handling of the fraud allegations.
Of the 5.6 million votes cast, the ECC invalidated 1.3 million (about 25%) after investigations of
fraud complaints. The ECC prioritized complaints filed as follows: 2,142 as possibly affecting the
election, 1,056 as unable to affect the result, and 600 where there will be no investigation. Causes
for invalidation most often included ballot boxes in which all votes were for one candidate. About
1,100 election workers were questioned by ECC personnel, and 413 candidates were referred by
the ECC to the Attorney General for having allegedly committed election fraud.
The results, as certified by the IEC, resulted in substantial controversy within Afghanistan and led
to a political crisis. The certified results were as follows.
• About 60% of the lower house (148 out of 249) winners were new members.
• As noted above, Karzai’s number of core supporters was reduced from about 90
to 60-70. This was in part because the number of Pashtuns elected was 94, down
from 120 in the outgoing lower house. Several pro-Karzai candidates lost in
Qandahar Province, and because many Pashtuns did not vote due to security
reasons, in mixed Ghazni Province. The low Pashtun turnout in Ghazni caused
Hazara candidates to win all 11 seats from the province, instead of 6 Pashtuns
and 5 Hazaras in the outgoing lower house; this was a big factor in the reduction
of the number of Pashtuns who won election. Several prominent pro-Karzai
deputies were defeated, including Jamil Karzai, Pacha Khan Zadran, Mahmud
Khan Suleimankhel (Paktika Province), and Muin Mirastyal (Konduz Province).
• The lower house is more diverse politically than the outgoing one, and less
predictable in its votes. The Hazara strength has no clear impact because many
Hazaras support Karzai, although their increased political strength has caused
ethnic tensions with the Pashtuns. Other Hazaras oppose Karzai as a
representative of the political strength of the Pashtuns.
• Some observers note that some local militia commanders won election, adding to
or replacing similar figures in past parliaments: the newly elected include
Amanullah Guzar (Kabul) who may have been behind May 2006 rioting in Kabul
against NGO offices; and Haji Abdul Zahir (Nangarhar), a member of the well-
known “Eastern Shura” once headed by the assassinated Hajji Abdul Qadir and
one time Kabul governor Hajji Din Mohammad. Other “mujahedin-era figures
were reelected, including Iqbal Safi (Kapisa), Zalmai Mujaddedi (Badakhshan),
Fukkuri Beheshti (Bamiyan), and Shahzada Shahed (Kunar).
• Two ex-Taliban figures, Mullah Salam Rocketi, and Musa Wardak, were
defeated.
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• A date of the inauguration of the new parliament was set for January 20, 2011, at
which time, under Afghan law, President Karzai would formally open the session.
Special Tribunal, Related Political Crisis, and Possible Resolution
The certified results triggered a major political crisis, caused primarily by Pashtuns who felt they
lost the election due to fraud. The issue brought the operations of the National Assembly to a
virtual halt, with Karzai ruling by decree, with seven cabinet posts and a few Supreme Court seats
remaining unfilled by permanent appointees, and, as discussed above, with certified election
winners in the Assembly threatening to impeach him in July 2011.
Immediately after the election results were certified, Karzai took steps to address Pashtun
grievances, but with its own interest in increasing the number of Pashtuns elected, in December
2010 the Karzai government (office of the Attorney General) indicted all seven IEC
commissioners as well as the three Afghan members of the ECC. The deputy Attorney General,
that same month urged election results to be voided and the Afghan Supreme Court to order a
recount. There were weekly demonstrations against the fraud by about 300 candidates who felt
deprived of victory, under a banner called the “Union of Afghan Wolesi Jirga Candidates 2010,”
led by defeated Ghazni candidate Daud Sultanzoy.
On December 28, 2010, at the instruction of the Supreme Court, Karzai issued a decree
empowering a five-member tribunal to review fraud complaints. This deepened the crisis
considerably. Many Afghans, including an independent watchdog group, “Free and Fair Election
Foundation,” maintained that the tribunal had no legal authority under the constitution to review
the election. The IEC and EC, backed by UNAMA and the international community, insisted that
the certified results stand, asserting they are the only bodies under Afghan electoral law that have
legitimate jurisdiction over election results. Still, on January 19, 2011, the day before the
parliament was to convene, the tribunal leader, Judge Sediqullah Haqiq, announced it would need
another month to evaluate the fraud allegations. On that basis, following the recommendation, the
Karzai government postponed the inauguration of the new parliament by one month.
Defying Karzai and the special tribunal, about 213 of the certified winners met at the
Intercontinental Hotel in Kabul on January 20, 2011, and reportedly decided to take their seats on
Sunday, January 23, 2011, without Karzai’s formal inauguration. Elected deputies at the meeting
said they would try to convene at the parliament building but would meet elsewhere, if blocked.
They elected an interim speaker, Hajji Mohammad Sarwar Osmani, from Farah Province. This
would have rendered unclear the legal status of a self-convened parliament.
During January 20-25, 2011, with the lower house threatening to convene on its own, a
compromise was found. Karzai agreed to inaugurate the lower house on January 26, 2011; that
event took place. However, the ongoing fraud investigation by the special tribunal remained
active, despite insistence by declared winners to terminate it. As noted, after its inauguration, the
lower house elected a compromise candidate, Abdul Raouf Ibrahimi, as speaker. This fell short of
Karzai’s goal of engineering selection of Sayyaf but accomplished his aim of denying Qanooni
reselection to that post. The upper house was completed as of February 19, 2011, when Karzai
made his 34 appointments.
The special tribunal process continued to investigate and to recount votes in several provinces.
The crisis became acute on June 23, 2011, when the special tribunal ruled that 62 defeated
candidates be reinstated. The National Assembly—containing the 62 persons who would lose
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their seats if the tribunal’s order were followed—subsequently passed a no-confidence vote
against Attorney General Aloko. On August 10, 2011, Karzai appeared to defuse the eight month-
long crisis; he issued a decree declaring that special court does not have jurisdiction to change
election results, and that such changes are the role of the IEC. Subsequently, on August 21, 2011,
the IEC implemented elements of a compromise urged by UNAMA by ruling that nine winners
had won their seats through fraud and must be removed. This decision, with IEC chairman
Manawi acknowledged was partly due to politics, removed fewer than the 17 that UNAMA had
urged but more than the 5 the IEC reportedly thought would defuse the crisis. The nine
disqualifications seemed to many observers to be few enough to calm the dispute and allow
governance to move forward, but the lower house subsequently voted to refuse any seat
alterations at all. Some of the nine newly declared winners were sworn in on September 4, 2011,
and the nine whose victories were overturned were barred from entering the parliament building.
However, in protest of the decision, about 70 parliamentarians refused to convene and the
Assembly was unable to obtain a quorum to act on legislation or government nominees, including
Supreme Court vacancies. The boycotting parliamentarians ended their protest on October 8,
2011, possibly paving the way for passage of pending laws, including a 2010 budget.
In the aftermath of the decision, there has been reported discussion in Kabul of selecting a new
lower house speaker to replace Ibrahimi. There is some talk that he might be replaced by Hajji
Zahir, who was the governor of Marjah city of Helmand Province just after the U.S.-led 2010
offensive to oust insurgents from that area, but who reputedly served jail time during his long
exile in Germany during the Taliban period.
Implications for the United States of the Afghan Elections Disputes
U.S. officials express clear U.S. neutrality in all Afghan elections. However, U.S. officials
remained concerned that the 2009 and 2010 elections, and subsequent political crisis, were
complicating the July 2011 start of the transition to Afghan security leadership, which began in
seven areas (three provinces and four cities). According to President Obama on June 22, 2011, as
part of the transition, 10,000 U.S. troops will leave Afghanistan (of the 99,000 that are there) by
the end of 2011, and an additional 23,000 by September 2012. The election fraud and disputes
have purportedly affected the perceptions of the Afghan people about the legitimacy of the
Afghan government and its ability to take the lead on security by the end of 2014, according to
current plans. The August 10, 2011, Karzai decree may serve to alleviate some of these concerns.
Afghans close to Karzai believe that the U.S. posture on the Afghan elections strained relations
between the two countries. In the 2009 presidential election, Karzai reportedly believed the
United States was hoping strong candidates might emerge to replace him. The United States
repeatedly stated its neutrality in all Afghan elections, and Ambassador Timothy Carney headed
the 2009 U.S. election support effort at U.S. Embassy Kabul, tasked to ensure that the United
States was even-handed.
Next Presidential Elections: Karzai Says He Will Yield Power
In part because of fears that any successor might purge Karzai allies from the governing structure,
some had alleged that Karzai has been planning to alter the constitution to allow himself to run
for a third time, or possibly engineer a loya jirga to ask him to stay in office after 2014. At a June
15, 2011, Senate Appropriations Committee hearing, then Secretary of Defense Gates said Karzai
had abandoned any such thinking and would leave office in 2014. Some U.S. officials sought to
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persuade Karzai to make a more public and definitive declaration to that effect. On August 12,
2011, the palace issued a statement that Karzai had told a group of parliamentarians that he would
end his presidency in 2014 as prescribed by the constitution and had begun to search for a
potential successor to endorse.
The Informal Power Structure: Influence of Regional and
Factional Leaders/“Warlords”
Alongside the formal political structure constituted by post-Taliban elections sits the informal
power structure that is centuries old. This informal power structure consists of the influence and
informal and often arbitrary governing role of well-funded, locally popular, and sometimes well-
armed faction leaders. In some cases, these faction leaders have been elected or appointed
through constitutional processes that have been established, but exercise influence beyond those
formal roles. Most of these leaders are from the north and west, where non-Pashtun minorities
predominate, but there are some major Pashtun faction leaders as well. Some of these faction
leaders—most of whom the United States and its partners regularly deal with and have good
working relations with—cause resentment among some sectors of the population and complicate
U.S. stabilization strategy. A number of them are alleged to own or have equity in security or
other Afghan firms that have won business from various U.S. and other donor agencies and fuel
allegations of nepotism and other forms of corruption. On the other hand, some Afghans and
outside experts believe that the international community’s strategy of dismantling local power
structures, particularly in northern Afghanistan, and instead to empower the central government,
has caused the security deterioration noted since 2006.
Some assert that the Obama Administration’s criticism of Karzai has caused him to become ever
more reliant on these factional power brokers. Karzai’s position is that confronting faction leaders
outright would likely cause their followers—who usually belong to ethnic or regional
minorities—to go into armed rebellion. Even before the Obama Administration came into office,
Karzai argued that keeping the faction leaders on the government side is needed in order to keep
the focus on fighting “unrepentant” Taliban insurgents (who are almost all ethnic Pashtuns).
In February 2007, both houses of parliament passed a law (officially titled the National
Reconciliation, General Amnesty, and National Stability Law) giving amnesty to faction leaders
and others who committed abuses during Afghanistan’s past wars. Karzai sent back to parliament
an altered draft to give victims the right to seek justice for any abuses. Even though the revised
draft contained that amendment, Karzai did not sign the final version in May 2007, leaving the
status unclear. However, in December 2009, the Afghan government published the law in the
official gazette (a process known as “gazetting”), giving it the force of law.
The following sections analyze some of the main faction leaders.
Vice President Muhammad Fahim
Karzai’s choice of Muhammad Fahim as his first vice presidential running mate in the August
2009 elections might have been a manifestation of Karzai’s growing reliance on faction leaders.
Dividing the United Front/Northern Alliance might have been another. Fahim is a Tajik from the
Panjshir Valley region who was named military chief of the Northern Alliance/UF faction after
Ahmad Shah Masoud’s death. The Fahim choice was criticized by human rights and other groups
because of Fahim’s long identity as a mujahedin commander/militia faction leader. A New York
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Times story of August 27, 2009, said that the Bush Administration continued to deal with Fahim
when he was defense minister (2001-2004) despite reports that he was involved in facilitating
narcotics trafficking in northern Afghanistan. Other allegations suggest he has engineered
property confiscations and other benefits to feed his and his faction’s business interests. During
2002-2007, he reportedly withheld turning over some heavy weapons to U.N. disarmament
officials who have been trying to reduce the influence of local strongmen such as Fahim. Obama
Administration officials have not announced any limitations on dealings with Fahim now that he
is vice president. In August 2010, NDS director Nabil appointed a Fahim relative to a senior NDS
position. In August 2010, Fahim underwent treatment in Germany for a heart ailment. In January
2011, he began performing his duties again.
Fahim’s brother, Abdul Hussain Fahim, was a beneficiary of concessionary loans from Kabul
Bank, a major bank that has faced major losses due to its lending practices and may need to be
recapitalized (see below). The Fahim brother is also reportedly partnered with Mahmoud Karzai
on coal mining and cement manufacturing ventures.
Abdurrashid Dostam: Uzbeks of Northern Afghanistan
Some observers have cited Karzai’s handling of prominent Uzbek leader Abdurrashid Dostam as
evidence of political weakness. Dostam commands numerous partisans in his redoubt in northern
Afghanistan (Jowzjan, Faryab, Balkh, and Sar-I-Pol provinces), where he was, during the Soviet
and Taliban years, widely accused of human rights abuses of political opponents. To try to
separate him from his armed followers, in 2005 Karzai appointed him to the post of chief of staff
of the armed forces. On February 4, 2008, Afghan police surrounded Dostam’s villa in Kabul in
response to reports that he attacked an ethnic Turkmen rival, but Karzai did not order his arrest
for fear of stirring unrest among Dostam’s followers. To try to resolve the issue without stirring
unrest, in December 2008 Karzai purportedly reached an agreement with Dostam under which he
resigned as chief of staff and went into exile in Turkey in exchange for the dropping of any case
against him.23
Dostam returned to Afghanistan on August 16, 2009, and subsequently held a large pro-Karzai
election rally in his home city of Shebergan. Part of his intent in supporting Karzai was to
potentially oust a strong rival figure in the north, Balkh Province governor Atta Mohammad
Noor, see below. Noor is a Tajik but, under a 2005 compromise with Karzai, is in control of a
province that is inhabited by many Uzbeks—a source of irritation for Dostam and other Uzbeks.
Dostam’s support apparently helped Karzai carry several provinces in the north in the 2009
election, including Jowzjan, Sar-i-Pol, and Faryab. In January 2010, he was restored to his
previous, primarily honorary, position of chief of staff of the armed forces. Although he was not
nominated by Karzai to the post-election cabinet, two members of his “Junbush Melli” (National
Front) party were—although they were voted down by the National Assembly because the
Assembly insisted on competent officials rather than party loyalists in the new cabinet. Dostam’s
failure to secure posts for his allies could account for his decision to join the new opposition
grouping formed in June 2011, discussed above. He continues to alternate his time between
Afghanistan and Turkey; he is said to be suffering from health problems.
Dostam’s reputation is further clouded by his actions during the U.S.-backed war against the
Taliban. On July 11, 2009, the New York Times reported that allegations that Dostam had caused

23 CRS e-mail conversation with a then National Security aide to President Karzai, December 2008.
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the death of several hundred Taliban prisoners during the major combat phase of OEF (late 2001)
were not investigated by the Bush Administration. In responding to assertions that there was no
investigation of the “Dasht-e-Laili” massacre because Dostam was a U.S. ally,24 President Obama
said any allegations of violations of laws of war need to be investigated. Dostam responded to
Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (which carried the story) that only 200 Taliban prisoners died
and primarily because of combat and disease, not intentional actions of his forces.
Atta Mohammad Noor: Balkh Province
Atta Mohammad Noor, who is about 51 years old, has been the governor of Balkh Province,
whose capital is the vibrant city of Mazar-e-Sharif, since 2005. Mazar-e-Sharif is one of the four
cities to be transitioned to Afghan security leadership in June 2011. He is an ethnic Tajik and
former mujahedin commander who openly endorsed Dr. Abdullah in the 2009 presidential
election. However, Karzai has kept Noor in place because he has kept the province secure,
allowing Mazar-e-Sharif to become a major trading hub, and because displacing him could cause
ethnic unrest. Observers say that Noor exemplifies the local potentate, brokering local security
and business arrangements that enrich Noor and his allies while ensuring stability and
prosperity.25 Some reports say that he commands two private militias in the province that, in at
least two districts (Chimtal and Charbolak), outnumber official Afghan police, and which prompt
complaints of abuses (land seizures) by the province’s Pashtuns.
Isma’il Khan: Western Afghanistan/Herat
Another strongman that Karzai has sought to simultaneously engage and weaken is prominent
Tajik political leader and former Herat governor Ismail Khan. Herat is one of the four cities that
was transitioned to Afghan security leadership in July 2011. In 2006, Karzai appointed him
minister of energy and water, taking him away from his political base in the west. However, Khan
remains influential in the west, and maintaining ties to Khan helped Karzai win Tajik votes in
Herat Province that might otherwise have gone to Dr. Abdullah. Certified results showed Karzai
winning that province, indicating that the deal with Khan was helpful to Karzai.
Still, Khan is said to have several opponents in Herat, and a bombing there on September 26,
2009, narrowly missed his car. U.S. officials purportedly preferred that Khan not be in the cabinet
because of his record as a local potentate, although some U.S. officials credit him with
cooperating with the privatization of the power sector of Afghanistan. Karzai renominated Khan
in his ministry post on December 19, 2009, causing purported disappointment by
parliamentarians and western donor countries who want Khan and other faction leaders
weakened. His renomination was voted down by the National Assembly and no new nominee for
that post was presented on January 9, 2010. New questions about Khan were raised in November
2010 when Afghan television broadcast audio files purporting to contain Khan insisting that
election officials alter the results of the September 18, 2010, parliamentary elections.26 Khan
remains as head of the ministry but in an acting capacity. Khan is on the High Peace Council.

24 This is the name of the area where the Taliban prisoners purportedly died and were buried in a mass grave.
25 Gall, Carlotta, “In Afghanistan’s North, Ex-Warlord Offers Security.” New York Times, May 17, 2010.
26 Partlow, Joshua, “Audio Files Raise New Questions About Afghan Elections.” Washington Post, November 11,
2010.
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Sher Mohammad Akhundzadeh and “Koka:” Southern
Afghanistan/Helmand Province
Karzai’s relationship with another Pashtun strongman, Sher Mohammad Akhundzadeh,
demonstrates the dilemmas facing Karzai in governing Afghanistan. Akhunzadeh was a close
associate of Karzai when they were in exile in Quetta, Pakistan, during Taliban rule. Karzai
appointed him governor of Helmand after the fall of the Taliban, but in 2005, Britain demanded
he be removed for his abuses and reputed facilitation of drug trafficking, as a condition of Britain
taking security control of Helmand. Karzai reportedly has sought to reappoint Akhundzadeh, who
Karzai believes was more successful against militants in Helmand using his local militiamen than
Britain has been with its more than 9,500 troops there. Akhunzadeh said in a November 2009
interview that many of his followers joined the Taliban insurgency after Britain insisted on his
ouster. However, Britain and the United States have strongly urged Karzai to keep the existing
governor, Ghulab Mangal, who has won wide praise for his successes establishing effective
governance in Helmand (discussed further under “Expanding Local Governance”) and for
reducing poppy cultivation there. The capital of Helmand, Lashkar Gah, is one of the four cities
to be transitioned to Afghan security leadership in June 2011, and it is unlikely that Karzai would
remove governor Mangal in advance of that major change. Akhunzadeh attempted to deliver large
numbers of votes for Karzai in Helmand, although turnout in that province was very light partly
due to Taliban intimidation of voters.
An Akhunzadeh ally, Abdul Wali Khan (nicknamed “Koka”), was similarly removed by British
pressure in 2006 as police chief of Musa Qala district of Helmand. However, Koka was reinstated
in 2008 when that district was retaken from Taliban control. The Afghan government insisted on
his reinstatement and his militia followers subsequently became the core of the 220-person police
force in the district. Koka is mentioned in a congressional report as accepting payments from
security contractors who are working under the U.S. Department of Defense’s (DOD’s) “Host
National Trucking” contract that secures U.S. equipment convoys. Koka allegedly agrees to
secure the convoys in exchange for the payments.27
Ahmad Wali Karzai: Southern Afghanistan/Qandahar Province and
Implications of His July 12, 2011, Assassination
Governing Qandahar, a province of about 2 million, of whom about half live in Qandahar city, is
a sensitive issue in Kabul because of President Karzai’s active political interest in his home
province. Qandahar governance is particularly crucial to ongoing U.S. military-led operations to
increase security in surrounding districts, giving the July 12, 2011, assassination of Karzai’s half
brother, Ahmad Wali Karzai, crucial significance. The assassin was allegedly a close aide and
bodyguard who pulled him aside to talk and then fielded a concealed weapon to shoot him at
point blank range. The assassin was killed by other bodyguards.
In Qandahar, Ahmad Wali Karzai was chair of the provincial council, a post with relatively
limited formal power, but he was always more powerful than any appointed governor of
Qandahar. President Karzai frequently rotated the governors of Qandahar to ensure that none of

27 House of Representatives. Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs, Committee on Oversight and
Government Reform. “Warlord, Inc.: Extortion and Corruption Along the U.S. Supply Chain in Afghanistan.” Report
of the Majority Staff, June 2010.
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them will impinge on Ahmad Wali’s authority. Perceiving him as the key power broker in the
province, many constituents and interest groups met him each day, requesting his interventions on
their behalf. Numerous press stories have asserted that he protected narcotics trafficking in the
province, and some press stories say he was also a paid informant and facilitator for CIA and
Special Operations Forces in the province.28 Some Afghans explained Ahmad Wali Karzai’s
activities as an effort to ensure that his constituents in Qandahar have financial means to sustain
themselves, even if through narcotics trade, before there are viable alternative sources of
livelihood. Observers report that President Karzai repeatedly rebuffed U.S. and other suggestions
to convince his brother to step down as provincial council chairman, and U.S. officials reportedly
had ceased making those suggestions as of August 2010. Before his death, some observers say
Ahmad Wali had been taking U.S. and other advice and was bringing rivals and various tribes
into the decisionmaking process, to the point where many tribal figures had sought to persuade
President Karzai to appoint him as governor.
Qandahar, and President Karzai’s influence there, suffered an additional blow on July 27, 2011,
when the appointed mayor of Qandahar city, Ghulam Haider Hamidi, was assassinated. Hamidi
was an Afghan-American accountant by training and, like Ahmad Wali Karzai, received mixed
reviews depending on whether the observer benefitted or was harmed by his decisions.
Before Ahmad Wali’s assassination, U.S. officials had been trying to bolster the clout of the
appointed Qandahar governor, Tooryalai Wesa, to the point where petitioners seek his help on
their problems. The United States and its partners have sought to do so by funding and supporting
Wesa’s efforts to equitably distribute development funds and build local governing structures out
of the tribal councils he has been holding. U.S. officials reportedly sought to prevent Ahmad Wali
from interfering in that.29 Karzai had appointed Wesa—a Canadian-Afghan academic—in
December 2008, perhaps hoping that his ties to Canada would convince Canada to continue its
mission in Qandahar beyond 2011. If that was partly the intent of Wesa’s appointment, it did not
succeed. However, Qandahar’s recently appointed police chief, Colonel Abdul Razziq, is
perceived as having substantial weight, as well as a reputation for corruption. He was appointed
to that post earlier in 2011 when his predecessor was killed in an insurgent attack.
The death of Ahmad Wali Karzai might serve to empower governor Wesa over the long term.
Over the shorter term, however, many observers fear tribal conflict and a struggle to fill the void
left by Ahmad Wali, and compounded by the killing of mayor Hamidi. There are fears that the
progress achieved in stabilizing Qandahar and other southern provinces since 2009 could now be
jeopardized at a time when U.S forces are beginning to draw down. To try to curb the uncertainty,
President Karzai quickly installed another relative, Shah Wali Karzai, as titular head of the
Popolzai clan and informal Qandahar power broker. However, observers say Shah Wali lacks the
acumen and clout of Ahmad Wali. Some observers say that Karza might, instead of relying on
Shah Wali, try to reconstitute Ahmad Wali’s strong leadership by appointing Ghul Agha Shirzai as
Qandahar governor. Shirzai, currently governor of Nangarhar, is from the powerful Barakzai clan
of Qandahar.

28 Filkins, Dexter, Mark Mazetti and James Risen, “Brother of Afghan Leader Is Said to be on C.I.A. Payroll,” New
York Times, October 28, 2009.
29 Partlow, Joshua, “U.S. Seeks to Bolster Kandahar Governor, Upend Power Balance,” Washington Post, April 29,
2010.
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Ghul Agha Shirzai: Eastern Afghanistan/Nangarhar
A key gubernatorial appointment has been Ghul Agha Shirzai as governor of Nangarhar. He is a
Pashtun from Qandahar Province, previously serving as governor of that province, where he
reportedly continued to exercise influence in competition with Ahmad Wali Karzai. As noted
above, Ahmad Wali Karzai’s death on July 12, 2011, could prompt Sherzai and his allies to assert
themselves in the province. In Nangarhar, Sherzai is generally as an interloper. But, much as has
Noor in Balkh, Shirzai has exercised effective leadership, particularly in curbing poppy
cultivation there. At the same time, Shirzai is also widely accused of arbitrary action against
political or other opponents, and he reportedly does not remit all the customs duties collected at
the Khyber Pass/Torkham crossing to the central government. He purportedly uses the funds for
the benefit of the province, not trusting that funds remitted to Kabul would be spent in the
province. As noted above, Shirzai had considered running against Karzai in 2009 but then opted
not to run as part of a reported “deal” that yielded unspecified political and other benefits for
Shirzai.
Afghan Governing Capacity and Performance30
Since 2001, U.S. policy has been to help expand the capacity of Afghan governing institutions,
most of which were nearly non-existent during Taliban rule. No parliament was functioning
during that time, and Afghanistan was run by a small, Qandahar based group around Mullah
Mohammad Umar, who remained there. Those government offices that were functioning were
minimally staffed, and virtually none had modern equipment, according to observers in Kabul.
Since 2007, but with particular focus during the Obama Administration, U.S. policy has been to
not only try to expand Afghan governing capacity and the abilty of the government to deliver
services—at the central and local levels—but to push for its reform, transparency, and oversight.
However, the formal governing structure continues to compete with the informal and traditional
power structures discussed above, limiting the government’s writ and effectiveness.
In two major Afghanistan policy addresses—March 27, 2009, and December 1, 2009—President
Obama stressed that more needed to be done to promote the legitimacy and effectiveness of the
Afghan government at both the Kabul and local levels. In the latter statement, he said: “The days
of providing a blank check [to the Afghan government] are over.” The December 16, 2010,
summary of an Administration review of Afghanistan policy says that the United States is
supporting Afghan efforts to “better improve national and sub-national governance, and to build
institutions with increased transparency and accountability to reduce corruption—key steps in
sustaining the Afghan government.” The President did not raise this issue directly in his June 22,
2011, announcement of a U.S. troop drawdown, but the implication of his speech is that the
Afghan government will be expected to assume full responsibility for more of its own functions,
not limited to security but including revenue generation, oversight, service delivery, and provision
of justice. In concert, U.S. efforts to promote and expand Afghan governance are likely to become
less expansive.

30 Some information in this section is from the State Department report on human rights in Afghanistan for 2009,
March 11, 2010; for text, see http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2009/sca/136084.htm and the International Religious
Freedom Report, released October 26, 2009, http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/irf/2009/127362.htm.
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Expanding Central Government Capacity
The international community has attempted to shift authority in Afghanistan from traditional
leaders and relationships, such as those discussed above, to transparent and effective state
institutions. That process is proceeding, although with mixed success to date. In the context of the
2011-2014 transition to Afghan leadership, some question whether the stated U.S. goal—denying
a safehaven for international terrorists in Afghanistan—requires substantial internationally
promoted and funded institution-building. Others say Afghanistan will revert to a terrorist haven
unless effective governance is well established.
Afghan ministries have greatly increasing their staffs and technological capabilities (many
ministry offices now have modern computers and communications, for example). Afghan-led
governmental reform and institution-building programs under way, all with U.S. and other donor
assistance, include training additional civil servants, instituting merit-based performance criteria,
basing hiring on qualifications rather than kinship and ethnicity, and weeding out widespread
governmental corruption. However, the government still faces a relatively small recruitment pool
of workers with sufficient skills and many are reluctant to serve in the provincial offices of the
central government ministries, particularly in provinces where there is still substantial violence.
The Obama Administration has developed about 45 different metrics to assess progress in
building Afghan governance and security, as it was required to do (by September 23, 2009) under
P.L. 111-32, an FY2009 supplemental appropriation.31 The latest reports submitted under this
requirement, released April 5, 2011, says that “During [October 1-December 31, 2010], there was
improvement in Afghanistan’s service delivery, institutional capacity, and economic growth.”32 To
date, and under separate authorities such as provisions of supplemental appropriations and foreign
aid appropriations, only small amounts of U.S. aid have been made conditional on Afghanistan’s
performance on such metrics, and no U.S. aid has been permanently withheld.
The Afghan Civil Service
The low level of Afghan bureaucratic capacity is being addressed in a number of ways, but
slowly. There are about 500,000 Afghan government employees, although the majority of them
are in the security forces. A large proportion work in the education sector. According to the April
2011 version of a mandated DOD report on Afghanistan,33 the Afghan government continues to
make progress building human capital needed to improve governance. During late 2010-early
2011, the government resumed merit-based appointments for senior positions, such as deputy
provincial governors and district governors, and converted those positions to civil servants rather
than political appointees. It also has instituted new training programs for district and provincial
officials that are adding quality to the ranks of public service.
The United States and its partners do not have in place a broad program to themselves train
Afghan government officials, but instead fund Afghan institutions to conduct such training. A key
institution that is deciding on merit based appointments discussed above, standardizing job

31 “Evaluating Progress in Afghanistan-Pakistan” Foreign Policy website, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2009/
09/16/evaluating_progress_in_afghanistan_pakistan.
32 http://www.fas.org/man/eprint/afpak-0311.pdf.
33 U.S. Department of Defense. “Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan.” April 2011.
http://www.defense.gov/news/1230_1231Report.pdf. (Hereinafter cited as DOD 1230 report.)
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descriptions, salaries, bonuses, and benefits is the Afghan Independent Administrative Reform
and Civil Service Commission (IARCSC). The commission has thus far redefined more than
80,000 civil servant job descriptions. The Afghan cabinet is drafting a revised civil service law,
according to a U.N. report of December 10, 2010.34
Under a USAID program called the Civilian Technical Assistance Plan, the United States is
providing technical assistance to Afghan ministries and to the commission. From January 2010
until January 2011, the USAID, under a February 2010 memorandum of understanding, gave $85
million to programs run by the commission to support the training and development of Afghan
civil servants. One of the commission’s subordinate organizations is the Afghan Civil Service
Institute, which trained over 16,000 bureaucrats during 2010, according to the DOD 1230 report,
and which has instituted an internship program for 1,000 interns in national civil service jobs and
2,000 interns in provincial and district offices.
Many Afghan civil service personnel undergo training in India, building on growing relations
between Afghanistan and India. Japan and Singapore also are training Afghan civil servants on
good governance, anti-corruption, and civil aviation. Singapore and Germany will, in 2011,
jointly provide technical assistance in the field of civil aviation. Some of these programs are
conducted in partnership with the German Federal Foreign Office and the Asia Foundation. In
order to address the problem of international donors luring away Afghan talent with higher
salaries, the July 20, 2010, Kabul conference included a pledge by the Afghan government to
reach an understanding with donors, within six months, on a harmonized salary scale for donor-
funded salaries of Afghan government personnel.
The Afghan Budget Process
The international efforts to build up the central government are reflected in the Afghan budget
process. The Afghan government controls its own funds as well as those of directly supplied
donor funds. The Afghan budget year follows the solar year, which begins on March 21 of each
year, which also corresponds to the Persian New Year (“Nowruz”). In early February 2011, the
National Assembly adopted a 2011 national budget in-line with its responsibilities. However, the
lack of a quorum in the Assembly in mid-late 2011 could impinge on consideration of a budget
for 2012.
According to observers, the Afghan budget is a “unitary” system. Once a budget is adopted by the
full National Assembly (first the upper house and then the lower house, and then signed by
Karzai), the funds are allocated to central government ministries and other central government
entities. Elected provincial councils, appointed provincial governors, and district governors
formulate their local budget requirements and therefore shape the national budget process, but the
localities do not control their own budgets. They do approve the disbursement of funds by the
central entities. There are accounting offices, called mustofiats, in each of Afghanistan’s 34
provinces, that carry out those disbursements. All revenue is collected by central government
entities which, according to experts, contributes to the widespread observation that local officials
sometimes seek to retain or divert locally collected revenues. A U.N. report of June 23, 2011, says

34 “The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security.” Report of the Secretary-
General. U.N. document number A/65/612-S/2010/630, December 10, 2010, available at http://unama.unmissions.org/
Portals/UNAMA/SG%20Reports/SG%20REPORT_10DEC2010.pdf. (Hereinafter cited as the December 10, 2010,
U.N. report.)
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the government is initiating a pilot program to disburse more funds to the provinces than was the
case previously.
Donor Involvement in the Afghan Budget
Because of the paucity of funds taken in by the Afghan government—about $1.4 billion for
2010—about two-thirds of the total Afghan government budget (operating budget and
development budget) is provided by international donors. Donor funds cover 45% of the Afghan
government operating budget, which is about $2.2 billion. The United States is the largest donor
to Afghanistan. Partly because of corruption, only about 40% of U.S. aid is being channeled
through the Afghan government during FY2011, although that is up from 21% in FY2009,
according to a June 8, 2011, staff report of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (“Evaluating
U.S. Foreign Assistance to Afghanistan.”). This is close to the target figure of 50% of total donor
funds to be channeled through the government was endorsed at the July 20, 2010, Kabul
conference. Currently, according to that Foreign Relations Committee staff report, 14 Afghan
ministries have received USAID and State Department funds, and these ministries have received
over $300 million in direct U.S. funding as of June 2011.
The fact that a progressively higher percentage of U.S. funds are channeled through the Afghan
government might ease tension between the international community and President Karzai. He
emphasized this theme in his speech on February 6, 2011, at an international security conference
in Munich, Germany,35 in which he said that the previously low level of funding provided directly
had stunted the growth of Afghan government capacity. Many international development experts
concur that only through direct funding will the Afghan government be able to develop the
capacity and eventually the transparency to govern and deliver services effectively.
Expanding Local Governance
As U.S. concerns about corruption in the central government increased after 2007, U.S. policy
has increasingly emphasized building local governance. This accords with U.S. strategy in
Afghanistan, which is to build institutions that can govern and secure areas cleared by U.S. and
NATO forces, preventing Taliban re-infiltration. The U.S. shift in emphasis complements that of
the Afghan government, which asserts that it has itself long sought to promote local governance
as the next stage in Afghanistan’s political and economic development.
A key indicator of the Afghan intent came in August 2007 when Karzai placed the selection
process for local leaders (provincial governors and down) in a new Independent Directorate for
Local Governance (IDLG)—and out of the Interior Ministry. As noted above, the IDLG was
headed until early 2011 by Jelani Popal, a member of Karzai’s Popolzai tribe and a close Karzai
ally. Some international officials say that Popal packed local agencies with Karzai supporters,
where they were able to fraudulently produce votes for Karzai in the August 2009 presidential
elections. He was replaced by Abdul Khaliq Farahi, a former diplomat who was kidnapped in
Peshawar, Pakistan, and held for nearly three years (2008-2011) allegedly by militants linked to
Al Qaeda.

35 Statement by President Hamid Karzai at the 47th Munich Security Conference. February 6, 2011.
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On the other hand, senior civilians in southern Afghanistan say that local governance is
improving and expanding, particularly in areas secured by the 2010 U.S. “troop surge.” He and
other officials say that Afghans are forming local councils and building ties to appointed local
leaders in these cleared and secured areas. The April 2011 DOD 1230 report, looks in particular at
138 districts that are highly restive, and says that 49% of the population of these districts now live
in areas rated as having “emerging” or “full authority”—up from 38% in September 2010.
Provincial Governors and Provincial Councils
Many believe that the key to effective local governance is the appointment of competent
governors in all 34 Afghan provinces. U.N., U.S., and other international studies and reports all
point to the beneficial effects (reduction in narcotics trafficking, economic growth, lower
violence) of some of the strong Afghan civilian appointments at the provincial level. However,
many of the governors are considered weak, ineffective, or corrupt. Others, such as Ghul Agha
Shirzai and Atta Mohammad Noor, discussed above in the section on faction leaders, are
considered effective, but also relatively independent of central authority. As noted above, progress
is being made in implementing a merit-based appointment system for deputy provincial governors
and district governors. Provincial governors, however, are still political appointees selected
mostly for loyalty to Karzai.
One of the most widely praised gubernatorial appointments has been the March 2008 replacement
of a weak and ineffective governor of Helmand with Gulab Mangal, who is from Laghman
Province. The U.N. Office of Drugs and Crime (UNODC) praised Mangal in its September 2009
report for taking effective action to convince farmers to grow crops other than poppy. The
UNODC report said his efforts account for the 33% reduction of cultivation in Helmand in 2009,
as compared with 2008. Mangal has played a key role in convening tribal shuras and educating
local leaders on the benefits of the U.S.-led offensive to remove Taliban insurgents from Marjah
town and install new authorities there. A key Mangal ally, who has reportedly helped bring
substantial stability to the Nawa district, is Abdul Manaf.
Still, there are widespread concerns about governing capacity at the local level. For example, out
of over 200 job slots available for the Qandahar provincial and Qandahar city government, only
about 30% are filled. In four key districts around Qandahar city, there are 44 significant jobs,
including district governors, but only about 12 officials are routinely present for work.36 As noted
above, only a few dozen of the 150 local representative positions of the various ministry positions
of the central government in Qandahar are filled. Similar percentages are reported in neighboring
Helmand Province, the scene of substantial U.S.-led combat during 2010.
As far as the relationship between local representatives of the central government ministries and
district governments, some difficulties have been noted. As noted above, the provincial governors
and district governors do not control Afghan government funds; all budgeting and budget
administration is done through the central government, either at ministry headquarters or through
provincial offices of those ministries. Local officials sometimes disagree on priorities or on
implementation mechanisms.

36 Partlow, Joshua and Karen DeYoung. “Afghan Government Falters in Kandahar.” Washington Post, November 3,
2010.
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Provincial Councils
One problem noted by governance experts is that the role of the elected provincial councils is
unclear. The elections for the provincial councils in all 34 provinces were held on August 20,
2009, concurrent with the presidential elections. The previous provincial council elections were
held concurrent with the parliamentary elections in September 2005. In most provinces, the
provincial councils do not act as true local legislatures and are considered weak compared to the
power and influence of the provincial governors.
Perhaps the most significant role the provincial councils play is in choosing the upper house of
the National Assembly (Meshrano Jirga). In the absence of district councils (no elections held or
scheduled), the provincial councils elected in 2009 have chosen two-thirds (68 seats) of the 102-
seat body. Karzai appointed the remaining 34 seats in February 2011.
District-Level Governance
District governors are appointed by the president, at the recommendation of the IDLG. As of
March 2011, 18 district governors have been appointed through the merit-based appointment
system in which qualifications are assessed by the IARCSC (see above). In some districts of
Helmand that had fallen under virtual Taliban control until the July 2009 U.S.-led offensives in
the province, there were no district governors in place at all. Some of the district governors,
including in Nawa and Now Zad district, returned after the U.S.-led expulsion of Taliban
militants. The difficulty plaguing the expansion of district governance, in addition to security
issues, is lack of resources. Only about half of all district governors (there are 364 districts) have
any staff or vehicles. A March 9, 2011, U.N. report said that the Afghan government has increased
the number of operating district offices by 10, to 179, from January 2009 to March 2011—
seemingly representing slow progress.
The ISAF campaign plan to retake the Marjah area of Helmand (Operation Moshtarak), which
ended Taliban control of the town, included recruiting, in advance, civilian Afghan officials who
would govern the district once military forces had expelled Taliban fighters from it. Haji Zahir, a
businessman who was in exile in Germany during Taliban rule, took up his position to become the
chief executive in Marjah (which is to become its own district). Zahir was replaced in early July
2010, apparently because of his inability to obtain cooperation from Marjah tribal leaders.
However, British civilian representatives in Marjah reported in October 2010 that many central
government ministries now have personnel in place in Marjah and they live there and are showing
up daily. General Petraeus testified during March 15-16, 2011, that on March 1, 2011, Marjah
held elections for a village council in which 76% of those eligible voted, suggesting growing
stability. That council remains in place as of October 2011, according to U.S. commanders.
District Councils
No elections for district councils have been held due to boundary and logistical difficulties.
However, in his November 19, 2009, inaugural speech, Karzai said the goal of the government is
to hold these elections along with the 2010 parliamentary elections. However, subsequently,
Afghan officials have said that there would not be district elections in September 2010 when the
parliamentary elections were to be held. No date for these elections has been set.
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Municipal and Village Level Authority
As are district governors, mayors of large municipalities are appointed. There are about 42
mayors nationwide, many with deputy mayors. Karzai pledged in his November 2009 inaugural
that “mayoral” elections would be held “for the purpose of better city management.” However, no
municipal elections have been held and none is scheduled.
As noted throughout, there has traditionally been village-level governance by groups of tribal
elders and other notables. That structure remains, particularly in secure areas, while village
councils have been absent or only sporadically active in areas where there is combat. As noted
above, a U.S. official in southern Afghanistan Henry Ensher said in January 2011 that councils
have been formed in areas where security has been established by the 2010 U.S. “troop surge.”
The IDLG, with advice from India and other donors, is also in the process of empowering
localities to decide on development priorities by forming Community Development Councils
(CDCs). Thus far, there are about 30,000 CDCs established, and they are eventually to all be
elected.
U.S. Local Governance Advisory Capacity
As a consequence of the March 2009 Obama Administration review, to help build local governing
capacity, the Administration recruited about 500 U.S. civilian personnel from the State
Department, USAID, the Department of Agriculture, and several other agencies—and many
additional civilians from partner countries will join them—to advise Afghan ministries, and
provincial and district administrations. That effort raised the number of U.S. civilians in
Afghanistan to about 975 by early 2010 and to 1,330 by August 2011. Of these, nearly 400 are
serving outside Kabul, up from 67 in early 2009.
Although many U.S. civilian officials now work outside Kabul, there are about 1,200 employees
at the U.S. Embassy in Kabul. To accommodate the swelling ranks, in early November 2010 a
$511 million contract was let to Caddell Construction to expand it, and two contracts of $20
million each were let to construct U.S. consulates in Herat and Mazar-e-Sharif.
Senior Civilian Representative Program
The Administration also has instituted appointments of “Senior Civilian Representatives”
(SCR),37 who are counterparts to the military commanders of each NATO/ISAF regional
command (there are currently five of them). Each Senior Civilian Representative has 10-30
personnel on his/her team. For example, the SCR for Regional Command South is based at
Qandahar airfield and interacts closely with the military command of the southern sector. The
SCR for Regional Command East (RC-E) is based at Bagram Airfield.

37 For more information, see U.S. Department of Defense. “Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in
Afghanistan,” April 2011; http://www.defense.gov/news/1230_1231Report.pdf, pp. 19-20.
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Reforming Afghan Governance: Curbing Corruption38
Partly because many Afghans view the central government as “predatory,” many Afghans and
international donors have lost faith in Karzai’s leadership. A U.N. Office of Drugs and Crime
report released in January 2010 said 59% of Afghans consider corruption as a bigger concern than
the security situation and unemployment. NATO estimates that about $2.5 billion in total bribes
are paid by Afghans each year. Transparency International, a German organization that assesses
governmental corruption worldwide, ranked Afghanistan in 2008 as 176th out of 180 countries
ranked in terms of government corruption.
High Level Corruption, Nepotism, and Cronyism
At the upper levels of government, some observers have asserted that Karzai deliberately tolerates
officials who are allegedly involved in the narcotics trade and other illicit activity, and supports
their receipt of lucrative contracts from donor countries, in exchange for their support. Karzai’s
brother, Mahmoud, as discussed above, has apparently grown wealthy through real estate and
auto sales ventures in Qandahar and Kabul, purportedly by fostering the impression he can
influence his brother. In October 2010 it was reported that a Justice Department investigation of
Mahmoud Karzai’s dealings (he holds dual U.S.-Afghan citizenship) had begun, and reported
grand jury consideration of charges (racketeering, tax evasion) against him began in mid-
February 2011. Several other high officials, despite very low official government salaries, have
acquired ornate properties in west Kabul since 2002, according to Afghan observers. This raises
the further question of the inadequacy of and possible corruption within Afghanistan’s land titling
system. Other observers who have served in Afghanistan say that Karzai has appointed some
provincial governors to “reward them” and that these appointments have gone on to “prey”
economically on the populations of that province.
Lower-Level Corruption
Aside from the issue of high-level nepotism, observers who follow the issue say that most of the
governmental corruption takes place in the course of performing mundane governmental
functions, such as government processing of official documents (e.g., passports, drivers’ licenses),
in which processing services routinely require bribes in exchange for action.39 Other forms of
corruption include Afghan security officials’ selling U.S./internationally provided vehicles, fuel,
and equipment to supplement their salaries. In other cases, local police or border officials may
siphon off customs revenues or demand extra payments to help guard the U.S. or other militaries’
equipment shipments. Other examples security commanders’ placing “ghost employees” on
official payrolls in order to pocket their salaries. Corruption is fed, in part, by the fact that
government workers receive very low salaries (about $200 per month, as compared to the pay of
typical contractors in Afghanistan that might pay as much as $6,500 per month). Many observers
say there is a cultural dimension to the corruption—that it is expected that those Afghans who
have achieved government positions will reward their relatives and friends with favors,
appointments, and contracts.

38 For more information, particularly on Rule of Law programs, see CRS Report R41484, Afghanistan: U.S. Rule of
Law and Justice Sector Assistance, by Liana Sun Wyler and Kenneth Katzman.
39 Filkins, Dexter, “Bribes Corrode Afghan’s Trust in Government,” New York Times, January 2, 2009.
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Administration Views
As noted throughout, there is a consensus within the Administration on the wide scope of the
corruption in Afghan government and the deleterious effect the corruption has on winning the
Afghan population over to the government side. The Administration wrestled throughout 2010
with the degree to which to press an anti-corruption agenda with the Karzai government, but press
accounts in January 2011 indicated that, henceforth, the Administration would prioritize reducing
low-level corruption, and less so on investigations of high-level allies of Karzai.40 The latter
investigations have sometimes come into conflict with other U.S. objectives by causing a Karzai
backlash. In addition, such investigations may complicate efforts to obtain the cooperation of
Afghans who can help stabilize areas of the country. Some of these Afghans are said to be paid by
the CIA for information and other support, and the National Security Council reportedly issued
guidance to U.S. agencies to review this issue.41
Yet, U.S. officials believe that anti-corruption efforts must be pursued because corruption is
contributing to a souring of Western publics on the mission as well as causing some Afghans to
embrace Taliban insurgents. General Petraeus, the former top U.S. and NATO commander in
Afghanistan, said he made anti-corruption a top priority to support his counter-insurgency
strategy. A key deputy, General H.R. McMaster, has formed several DOD task forces to focus on
anti-corruption (Shafafiyat, Task Force Spotlight, and Task Force 2010) from a U.S.
military/counter-insurgency perspective. These task forces, in part, review U.S. contracting
strategies so as to enhance Afghan capacity and reduce the potential for corruption. Some
observers assert that anti-corruption efforts are more appropriately an issue to be handled by U.S.
civilian officials, not the U.S. military.
Anti-Corruption Initiatives
Obama Administration officials have credited Karzai with allowing the United States and other
donors to help develop oversight bodies to curb corruption. However, the credit is tempered by
congressional and some Administration criticism of slow implementation and allegations that he
continues to shield his closest allies from investigation or prosecution. At the July 20, 2010,
Kabul conference—following onto the January 28, 2010, London conference—the Afghan
government finalized a National Anti-Corruption Strategy (“Azimi report”) and committed to
enacting 37 laws to curb corruption. As of March 2011, none of these laws has been enacted,
according to the DOD 1230 report, although the December 10, 2010, U.N. report says the Afghan
cabinet has drafted new anti-corruption and auditing laws (p. 8). There has been implementation
of some steps by Karzai, using his executive authority (decree).
• Assets Declarations and Verifications. During December 15-17, 2009, Karzai
held a conference in Kabul to combat corruption. It debated, among other ideas,
requiring deputy ministers and others to declare their assets, not just those at the
ministerial level. That requirement was imposed. Karzai himself earlier declared
his assets on March 27, 2009. On June 26, 2010, Karzai urged anti-corruption
officials to monitor the incomes of government officials and their families,
including his, to ensure their monies are earned legally. The July 20, 2010, Kabul

40 Strobel, Warren and Marisa Taylor. “U.S. Won’t Pursue Karzai Allies in Anti-Corruption Campaign.” McClatchy
Newspapers, January 6, 2011.
41 Chandrasekaran, Rajiv. “A Subtler Takc to Fight Afghan Corruption.” Washington Post, September 13, 2010.
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conference communiqué42 included an Afghan pledge to verify and publish these
declarations annually, beginning in 2010. As of March 2011, according to the
U.N. report of March 9, 2011, 1,995 senior Afghan officials had declared their
assets.
• A Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Committee to evaluate the government’s
performance in combatting corruption was mandated by the Kabul conference
communiqué to be established within three months of the conference (by October
2010). According to the June 23, 2011, U.N. report, the committee, supported by
UNDP, was inaugurated on May 11, 2011. It was established by decree and is
composed of three Karzai nominees and three international nominees.
• Establishment of High Office of Oversight. In August 2008 Karzai, with reported
Bush Administration prodding, set up the “High Office of Oversight for the
Implementation of Anti-Corruption Strategy” (commonly referred to as the High
Office of Oversight, HOO) with the power to identify and refer corruption cases
to state prosecutors, and to catalogue the overseas assets of Afghan officials. On
March 18, 2010, Karzai, as promised during the January 28, 2010, international
meeting on Afghanistan in London, issued a decree giving the High Office direct
power to investigate corruption cases rather than just refer them to other offices.
The United States gave the High Office about $1 million in assistance during
FY2009 and its performance was audited by the Special Inspector General for
Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR), in an audit released in December 2009.43
USAID will provide the HOO $30 million total during FY2011-FY2013 to build
capacity at the central and provincial level, according to USAID officials.
USAID pays for salaries of 6 HOO senior staff and provides some information
technology systems as well.
• Establishment of Additional Investigative Bodies: Major Crimes Task Force and
Sensitive Investigations Unit. Since 2008, several additional investigative bodies
have been established under Ministry of Interior authority. The most prominent is
the “Major Crimes Task Force,” tasked with investigating public corruption,
organized crime, and kidnapping. A headquarters for the MCTF was inaugurated
on February 25, 2010. According to the FBI press release that day, the MTCF is
Afghan led, but it is funded and mentored by the FBI, the DEA, the U.S. Marshal
Service, Britain’s Serious Crimes Organized Crime Agency, the Australian
Federal Police, EUPOL (European police training unit in Afghanistan), and the
U.S.-led training mission for Afghan forces. The MCTF has 169 investigators
working on 36 cases, according to the late SRAP’s July 28, 2010, testimony.
A related body is the Sensitive Investigations Unit (SIU), run by several dozen
Afghan police officers, vetted and trained by the DEA.44 This body led the arrest
in August 2010 of a Karzai NSC aide, Mohammad Zia Salehi, on charges of
soliciting a bribe from the New Ansari Money Exchange in exchange for ending
a money-laundering investigation of the firm. The middle-of-the-night arrest
prompted Karzai, by his own acknowledgment on August 22, 2010, to obtain

42 Communiqué text at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/21/world/asia/21kabultext.html.
43 http://www.sigar.mil/reports/pdf/audits/SIGAR20Audit-10-2.pdf.
44 Nordland, Ron and Mark Mazzetti. “Graft Dispute in Afghanistan Is Test for U.S.” New York Times, August 24,
2010.
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Salehi’s release and to say he would establish a commission to place the MCTF
and SIU under more thorough Afghan government control. Following U.S.
criticism that Karzai is protecting his aides (Salehi reportedly was involved in
bringing Taliban figures to Afghanistan for conflict settlement talks), Karzai
pledged to visiting Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman John Kerry on
August 20, 2010, that the MCTF and SIU would be allowed to perform their
work without political interference. In November 2010, the Attorney General’s
office said it had ended the prosecution of Salehi.
• Anti-Corruption Unit,” and an “Anti-Corruption Tribunal.” These investigative
and prosecutory bodies were established by decree in 2009. Eleven judges have
been appointed to the tribunal. The tribunal, under the jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court, tries cases referred by an Anti-Corruption Unit of the Afghan
Attorney General’s office. However, of the approximately 2,000 cases
investigated by the Anti-Corruption Unit, only 28 officials have been convicted
as of October 2011. One of the cases that was shut down due to high-level
opposition to any prosecution is Kapisa Province governor Ghulam Qawis Abu
Bakr. One of the laws pledged during the July 20, 2010, Kabul conference would
be enacted (by July 20, 2011) included a law to empower the Anti-Corruption
Tribunal and the Major Crimes Task Force. That has been held up, in part, by the
lack of a quorum in the National Assembly discussed above.
• Implementation: Prosecutions and Investigations of High-Level Officials.
According to the Afghanistan Attorney General’s office on November 9, 2010,
there were, at that time, ongoing investigations of at least 20 senior officials,
including two sitting members of the cabinet. The two were Minister of Mining
Sharani, and his father, who is a cabinet-rank adviser to Karzai on religious
affairs. Two former ministers under investigation are former Commerce Minister
Amin Farhang for allegedly submitting inflated invoices for reimbursement, and
former Transportation Minister Hamidullah Qadri. There have also been
investigations of former Minister of Mines Mohammad Ibrahim Adel, who
reportedly accepted a $30 million bribe to award a key mining project in Lowgar
Province (Aynak Copper Mine) to China;45 and former Minister of the Hajj
Mohammad Siddiq Chakari, under investigation for accepting bribes to steer
Hajj-related travel business to certain foreign tourist agencies. Chakari was able
to flee Afghanistan to Britain. Karzai publicly criticized the December 2009
embezzlement conviction of then Kabul Mayor Abdul Ahad Sahibi. On
December 13, 2009, the deputy Kabul mayor (Wahibuddin Sadat) was arrested at
Kabul airport for alleged misuse of authority.
• Relatedly, Afghanistan has signed up as a candidate to the Extractive Industries
Transparency Initiative (EITI) which is intended to ensure that contracting for
Afghanistan’s mineral resources is free of corruption. Afghanistan hopes to
become fully EITI compliant by April 2012. The World Bank gave Afghanistan a
three year grant of $52 million to manage its natural resources effectively.
• Salary Levels. The government has tried to raise salaries, particularly of security
forces, in order to reduce their inclination to solicit bribes. In November 2009,

45 Partlow, Joshua, “Afghanistan Investigating 5 Current and Former Cabinet Members,” Washington Post, November
24, 2009.
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the Afghan government announced an increase in police salaries (from $180 per
month to $240 per month). The Interior Minister, Bismillah Khan, is credited by
DOD with instituting transparency and accountability in promotions and
assignments.
• Bulk Cash Transfers. At the July 2010 Kabul conference, the government pledged
to adopt regulations and implement within one year policies to govern the bulk
transfers of cash outside the country. This is intended to grapple with issues
raised by reports, discussed below, of officials taking large amounts of cash out
of Afghanistan (an estimated $3 billion per year taken out). U.S. officials say that
large movements of cash are inevitable in Afghanistan because only about 5% of
the population use banks and 90% use informal cash transfers (“hawala” system).
The late Ambassador Holbrooke testified on July 28, 2010 (cited earlier), that the
Afghan Central Bank has begun trying to control hawala transfers; 475 hawalas
have been licensed, to date. None were licensed as recently as three years ago. In
June 2010, U.S. and Afghan officials announced establishment of a joint task
force to monitor the flow of money out of Afghanistan, including monitoring the
flow of cash out of Kabul International Airport. On August 21, 2010, it was
reported that Afghan and U.S. authorities would implement a plan to install U.S.-
made currency counters at Kabul airport to track how officials had obtained their
cash (and ensure it did not come from donor aid funds).46 Secretary of Homeland
Security Janet Napolitano visited Afghanistan January 2, 2011, to discuss a plan
to triple the number of Homeland Security personnel devoted to training Afghan
customs and border employees to curb bulk transfers and smuggling. On the
other hand, press reports in mid-2011 said that some Afghan officials are refusing
to have their cash counted upon departure from Kabul airport.
• Auditing Capabilities. The U.S. Special Inspector General for Afghanistan
Reconstruction (SIGAR) has assessed that the mandate of Afghanistan’s Control
and Audit Office is too narrow and lacks the independence needed to serve as an
effective watch over the use of Afghan government funds.47 At the Kabul
conference, the government pledged to submit to parliament an Audit Law within
six months, to strengthen the independence of the Control and Audit Office, and
to authorize more auditing by the Ministry of Finance. As noted above, the
December 10, 2010, U.N. report says an audit law has been drafted, but it is not
yet enacted, partly because of the election dispute that has delayed most
legislative consideration by the National Assembly.
• Legal Review. The Kabul conference communiqué committed the government to
establish a legal review committee, within six months, to review Afghan laws for
compliance with the U.N. Convention Against Corruption. Afghanistan ratified
the convention in August 2008.
• Local Anti-Corruption Bodies. Some Afghans have taken it upon themselves to
oppose corruption at the local level. Volunteer local inspectors, sponsored
originally by Integrity Watch Afghanistan, are reported to monitor and report on
the quality of donor-funded, contractor implemented construction projects.

46 Miller, Greg and Joshua Partlow. “Afghans, U.S. Aim to Plug Cash Drain.” Washington Post, August 21, 2010.
47 Madhani, Aamer. “U.S. Reviews Afghan Watchdog Authority.” USA Today, May 12, 2010.
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However, these local “watchdog” groups do not have an official mandate, and
therefore their authority and ability to rectify inadequacies are limited.
Kabul Bank Scandal and Continuing Difficulties
The near-collapse of Kabul Bank is a prime example of how well-connected Afghans have
avoided regulations and other restrictions in order to garner personal profit. Mahmoud Karzai is a
major (7%+) shareholder in the large Kabul Bank, which is used to pay Afghan civil servants and
police, and he reportedly received large loans from the bank to buy his position in it. Another big
shareholder is Abdul Hussain Fahim, mentioned above, the brother of First Vice President Fahim
and partner of Mahmoud Karzai on other ventures. The insider relationships were exposed in
August and September 2010 when Kabul Bank reported large losses ($500 million initially
reported, according to the Afghan Central Bank) primarily from shareholder investments in Dubai
properties, prompting President Karzai to appoint a Central Bank official to run the Kabul Bank.
However, the government moves did not prevent large numbers of depositors from moving their
money out of it. With the United States and other donors refusing to recapitalize the bank, the
Afghan government said on November 27, 2010, that it had injected “far less” than $500 million
into the Bank to keep it solvent. The United States offered to finance an audit of Afghan banks,
including Kabul Bank, but the Finance Ministry said on November 27, 2010, it would hire its
own auditor—a move that suggested to some that high Afghan officials seek to avoid sharing the
results with international donors.
The International Monetary Fund (IMF) suspended its credit program for the Afghan government
in November 2010 because of the scandal and demanded the entire Afghan banking industry
undergo an outside forensic audit and that those responsible be held accountable. That caused the
holding up of $70 million World Bank/Afghan Reconstruction Fund (ARTF) in donor funds due
to be paid June 11, 2011. Other donors suspended as much as $1.8 billion because of the IMF
suspension.
Amid Afghan confirmation that the questionable loans of the bank total over $925 million
(including interest due), the IMF—as a condition of resuming its credit program—subsequently
pushed for the bank to be sold. Afghan officials initially refused to sell the bank on the grounds
that doing so would cause a renewed run on the bank. However, the Central Bank agreed to
separate the bank’s performing from non-performing assets and then dissolve or restructure the
bank.48 A version of the plan, which was subject to approval by an Afghan government
committee, was formally approved and announced on April 21, 2011. The section of the bank
holding non-performing assets (“bad bank”) is focusing on recouping the bad loans, which
Afghan officials said on May 30, 2011, would likely total about $575 million ($925 million in
questionable loans minus $347 million expected to be repaid). About $300 million of the losses
are said to be untraceable because of a lack of documentation. As of October 2011, only about
$100 million has actually been recovered.
The political fallout is continuing, but possibly also producing some resolution. On January 15,
2011, the office of Afghan Attorney General Ishaq Aloko announced an investigation into what
led to the near-collapse of the bank and the principals involved. The investigating commission
briefed reporters on its findings on May 30, 2011, placing much of the blame on lax controls by
the Central Bank and its governor, Abdul Qadir Fitrat. The government commission also largely

48 Ernesto Londono. “Afghan Officials Opt to Dissolve Bank Draped in Scandal.” Washington Post, March 27, 2011.
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absolved Mahmoud Karzai of any wrongdoing, saying he had paid off his loans, and naming
other key figures, such as Dostam, as taking out $100,000 in unsecured loans. The following day,
Central Bank governor Fitrat disputed the commission’s conclusions. He had previously told
parliament that Mahmoud Karzai owed $22 million. In part because of his feuding with the
beneficiaries of the Kabul Bank lending, Fitrat fled Afghanistan for the United States and
announced his resignation on June 27, 2011. Karzai reportedly subsequently barred U.S. advisers
from the Central Bank.
Until late June 2011, no one had been prosecuted for the Bank’s difficulties. However, on June
30, 2011, the government announced the arrest of two former Kabul Bank executives, Sherkhan
Farnood and Khalilullah Frouzi, who allegedly allowed the concessionary loans to the high-level
Afghans and their relatives. The two are no longer detained but are being investigated and
potentially prosecuted. On August 1, 2011, the Attorney General’s office sent the names of about
15 people allegedly responsible for the scandal to Afghan courts for trial.
The prosecutions, coupled with the start of a forensic audit of the bank, suggested Afghanistan
was moving to meet the IMF conditions for the restart of its credit program. On October 6, 2011,
the IMF issued a statement that it would restore its credit program because of the investigations
and because of the Afghan efforts to recover some of the Bank’s funds. The “good bank” (part of
the bank with deposits and which still functions) has been financed by a Central Bank loan of
$800 million. The Afghan Finance Ministry has promised to pay back the loan with recovered
assets and tax revenues.
The IMF also wants a timetable for another bank found by the Central Bank to be vulnerable to
collapse, Azizi Bank, to shore up its finances. Another Afghan entity suspected of corruption is
the New Ansari Money Exchange, a large money-trading operation. On February 18, 2011, the
Treasury Department designated the New Ansari, and persons affiliated with it, as major money
laundering entities under the “Kingpin Act,” a designation that bans U.S. transactions with the
designees. The Treasury Department accused the New Ansari and affiliates of serving as a vehicle
for narcotics trafficking organizations.
Moves to Penalize Lack of Progress on Corruption
Several of the required U.S. “metrics” of progress, cited above, involve Afghan progress against
corruption. A FY2009 supplemental appropriation (P.L. 111-32) mandated the withholding of
10% of about $90 million in State Department counter-narcotics funding subject to a certification
that the Afghan government is acting against officials who are corrupt or committing gross human
rights violations. No U.S. funding for Afghanistan has been withheld because of this or any other
legislative certification requirement. In FY2011 legislation in the 111th Congress, in June 2010,
the Foreign Operations Subcommittee of the House Appropriations Committee deferred
consideration of some of the nearly $4 billion in civilian aid to Afghanistan requested for
FY2011, pending the outcome of a committee investigation of the issue. The subcommittee’s
action came amid reports that as much as $3 billion in funds have been allegedly embezzled by
Afghan officials over the past several years.49 In part on the basis of the findings of the House
Appropriations Committee investigation, the Senate Appropriations Committee’s FY2011
omnibus appropriation marked up in December 2010 required Administration certifications of

49 Rosenberg, Matthew. “Corruption Suspected in Airlift of Billions in Cash From Kabul.” Wall Street Journal, June
28, 2010.
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progress against corruption as a condition of providing aid to Afghanistan. Some of this
conditionality was included in the FY2011 continuing appropriations (P.L. 112-10).
Rule of Law Efforts
U.S. efforts to curb corruption go hand-in-hand with efforts to promote rule of law. As of July
2010, the U.S. Embassy has an Ambassador rank official, Hans Klemm, heading a “Rule of Law
Directorate.” U.S. funding supports training and mentoring for Afghan justice officials, direct
assistance to the Afghan government to expand efforts on judicial security, legal aid and public
defense, gender justice and awareness, and expansion of justice in the provinces. At the July 20,
2010, Kabul conference, the Afghan government committed to:
• Enact its draft Criminal Procedure Code into law within six months. This is one
of the 37 laws pledged at the Kabul Conference would be enacted. This has not
been accomplished, to date.
• Improve legal aid services within the next 12 months. The December 10, 2010,
U.N. report says that the Ministry of Justice has opened legal aid offices in some
provinces in recent months.
• Strengthen judicial capabilities to facilitate the return of illegally seized lands.
Separate from the Kabul conference issues, USAID has provided $56 million
during FY2005-2009 to facilitate property registration. An additional $140
million is being provided from FY2010-2014 to inform citizens of land processes
and procedures, and to establish a legal and regulatory framework for land
administration.
• Align strategy toward the informal justice sector (discussed below) with the
National Justice Sector Strategy.
Informal Justice and Dispute Resolution
One concern is how deeply the international community should become involved in the informal
justice sector. Afghans turn often to local, informal mechanisms (shuras, jirgas) to adjudicate
disputes, particularly those involving local property, familial or local disputes, or personal status
issues, rather than use the national court system. Some estimates say that 80% of cases are
decided in the informal justice system. In the informal sector, Afghans can usually expect
traditional practices of dispute resolution to prevail, including those practiced by Pashtuns. Some
of these customs, including traditional forms of apology (“nanawati” and “shamana”) and
compensation for wrongs done, are discussed at http://www.khyber.org/articles/2004/
JirgaRestorativeJustice.shtml.
However, the informal justice system is dominated almost exclusively by males. For example,
some disputes are resolved by families’ offering to make young girls available to marry older men
from the family that is the counter-party to the dispute, resulting in numerous forced marriages
and child marriages. This practice is known as baad.
Some informal justice shuras take place in Taliban-controlled territory, and some Afghans may
prefer Taliban-run shuras when doing so means they will be judged by members of their own
tribe or tribal confederation.
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U.S. programs have focused primarily on the formal justice system, but there has been increasing
attention to the informal system because its use is so prevalent. According to the April 2011 DOD
report cited earlier, USAID is implementing a pilot program to assist local shuras in four districts
to establish a system to transmit their judicial rulings, in writing, to the district government. The
rule of law issue is discussed in substantially greater depth in CRS Report R41484, Afghanistan:
U.S. Rule of Law and Justice Sector Assistance, by Liana Sun Wyler and Kenneth Katzman.
Promoting Human Rights50
On human rights issues, the overall State Department judgment is that the country’s human rights
record remains plagued by numerous human rights problems, according to the department’s
report for 2010 (issued April 8, 2011). However, as do previous years’ State Department reports,
the report for 2010 attributes these deficiencies to the overall lack of security, loose control over
the actions of Afghan security forces, and to the actions of local faction leaders and insurgents.
None of the Obama Administration strategy reviews in 2009 or 2010 specifically changed U.S.
policy on Afghanistan’s human rights practices. U.S. policy has been to build capacity in human
rights institutions in Afghanistan and to promote civil society and political participation.
One of the institutional human rights developments since the fall of the Taliban has been the
establishment of the Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission (AIHRC). It is headed
by a woman, Sima Simar, a Hazara Shiite from Ghazni Province. It acts as an oversight body but
has what some consider to be too cozy relations with Karzai’s office and is not as aggressive as
some had hoped. The July 20, 2010, Kabul conference communiqué contained a pledge by the
Afghan government to begin discussions with the AIHRC, within six months, to stabilize its
budgetary status. USAID has given the AIHRC about $10 million per year since the fall of the
Taliban. The December 10, 2010, U.N. report says the Afghan cabinet has approved inserting a
line item in the annual Afghan budget for the AIHRC.
Influence of National Ulema Council
Counterbalancing the influence of post-Taliban modern institutions such as the AIHRC are
traditional bodies such as the National Ulema Council. It is a network of 3,000 clerics throughout
Afghanistan, has increasingly taken conservative positions more generally, thereby limiting free
expression and social freedoms. The council had been headed by the former Supreme Court Chief
Justice Fazl Hadi Shinwari, but he died in India of a brain hemorrhage in February 2011. No
replacement for him has been named by the government.
Each cleric in the council is paid about $100 per month and, in return, is expected to promote the
government line. However, in August 2010, 350 members of the council voted to demand that
Islamic law (Sharia) be implemented. If the government were inclined to adopt that
recommendation, either on its own or as part of a peace agreement with major Taliban leaders, it
is likely that doing so would require amending the Afghan constitution, which does not
implement Sharia.

50 Information in this section is primarily from Department of State. 2010 Human Rights Report: Afghanistan, April 8,
2011; http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2010/sca/154477.htm.
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Riots over Quran Burning
As an illustration of Afghanistan’s Islamic conservatism, on April 2, 2011, hundreds of Afghans
rioted in the normally quiet (and non-Pashtun) city of Mazar-e-Sharif to protest the burning of a
Quran by a Florida pastor a few weeks earlier. The rioters, who had been instigated by the
sermons of three mullahs (Islamic preachers) at the city’s signature Blue Mosque, stormed the
U.N. compound in the city and killed at least 12 people, including seven U.N workers. Over the
next several days, similar, but less violent, demonstrations, took place in Qandahar and other
Afghan cities until sentiment calmed. Earlier, in September 2010, some National Ulema Council
figures organized protests against plans by the Florida pastor to burn Qurans, although that
burning was not conducted following international and U.S. criticism of the pastor.
Media and Freedom of Expression/Social Freedoms
Afghanistan’s conservative traditions have caused some backsliding in recent years on media
freedoms, which were hailed during 2002-2008 as a major benefit of the U.S. effort in
Afghanistan. A press law was passed in September 2008 that gives some independence to the
official media outlet, but also contains a number of content restrictions, and requires that new
newspapers and electronic media be licensed by the government. According to the State
Department report, there have been intimidation of journalists who criticize the central
government or local leaders, and some news organizations and newspapers have occasionally
been closed for incorrect or derogatory reporting on high officials.
Separately, Islamic conservatives (in and outside government, such as Sayyaf and Shiite cleric
Ayatollah Asif Mohseni), have sometimes asserted control over media content. With the council’s
backing, in April 2008 the Ministry of Information and Culture banned five Indian-produced soap
operas on the grounds that they are too risqué, although the programs were restored in August
2008 under a compromise that also brought in some Islamic-oriented programs from Turkey.
Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty’s “Radio Azadi” service for Afghanistan has distributed 20,000
solar powered radios to poor (and usually illiterate) Afghans to improve their access to
information. In general, the government does not restrict access to the Internet, but it does ban
access to pornographic web sites.
Regarding broader social freedoms, as another example of the growing power of the Islamist
conservatives, alcohol is increasingly difficult to obtain in restaurants and stores, although it is
not banned for sale to non-Muslims. There were reports in April 2010 that Afghan police had
raided some restaurants and prevented them from selling alcoholic beverages at all.
Harsh Punishments
In October 2007, Afghanistan resumed enforcing the death penalty after a four-year moratorium,
executing 15 criminals. In August 2010, the issue of stoning to death as a punishment arose when
Taliban insurgents ordered a young couple who had eloped stoned to death in a Taliban-controlled
area of Konduz Province. Although the punishment was not meted out by the government, it was
reported that many residents of the couple’s village supported the punishment. The stoning also
followed one week after the National Council of Ulema issued a statement (August 10, 2010),
following a meeting with government religious officials, calling for more application of Shariah
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punishments (including such punishments as stoning, amputations, and lashings) in order to better
prevent crime.
In early September 2011, press reports asserted that ISAF had suspended prison transfers to some
Afghan facilities because of alleged torture by Afghan prison authorities. Afghanistan’s Interior
Ministry and National Directorate of Security denied the allegations, which included assertions
that prisoners were being beaten with rubber hoses or given electric shocks.
Religious Freedom
The July – December 2010 International Religious Freedom report (released September 13,
2011)51 says that respect for religious freedom declined throughout the reporting period,
particularly for Christian groups and individuals. Members of minority religions, including
Christians, Sikhs, Hindus, and Baha’i’s, often face discrimination; the Supreme Court declared
the Baha’i faith to be a form of blasphemy in May 2007. Northeastern provinces have a
substantial population of Islamailis, a Shiite Muslim sect often called “Seveners” (believers in the
Seventh Imam as the true Imam). Many Ismailis follow the Agha Khan IV (Prince Qarim al-
Husseini), who chairs the large Agha Khan Foundation that has invested heavily in Afghanistan.
One major case that drew international criticism was a January 2008 death sentence, imposed in a
quick trial, against 23-year-old journalist Sayed Kambaksh for allegedly distributing material
critical of Islam. On October 21, 2008, a Kabul appeals court changed his sentence to 20 years in
prison, a judgment upheld by another court in March 2009. He was pardoned by Karzai and
released on September 7, 2009.
A positive development is that Afghanistan’s Shiite minority, mostly from the Hazara tribes of
central Afghanistan (Bamiyan and Dai Kundi provinces) can celebrate their holidays openly, a
development unknown before the fall of the Taliban. Some Afghan Shiites follow Iran’s clerical
leaders politically, but Afghan Shiites tend to be less religious and more socially open than their
co-religionists in Iran. The Hazaras are also advancing themselves socially and politically through
education in such fields as information technology.52 The former Minister of Justice, Sarwar
Danesh, is a Hazara Shiite, the first of that community to hold that post. He studied in Qom, Iran,
a center of Shiite theology. (Danesh was voted down by the parliament for reappointment on
January 2, 2010, and again on June 28 when nominated for Minister of Higher Education.) The
justice minister who was approved on January 16, 2010, Habibullah Ghalib, is part of Dr.
Abdullah’s faction, but not a Shiite Muslim. Ghaleb previously (2006) was not approved by the
Wolesi Jirga for a spot on the Supreme Court. There was unrest among some Shiite leaders in late
May 2009 when they learned that the Afghan government had dumped 2,000 Iranian-supplied
religious texts into a river when an Afghan official complained that the books insulted the Sunni
majority.
Several conversion cases have earned international attention. An Afghan man, Abd al-Rahman,
who had converted to Christianity 16 years ago while working for a Christian aid group in
Pakistan, was imprisoned and faced a potential death penalty trial for apostasy—his refusal to
convert back to Islam. Facing international pressure, Karzai prevailed on Kabul court authorities

51 http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/irf/2010_5/168240.htm.
52 Oppel, Richard Jr. and Abdul Waheed Wafa, “Hazara Minority Hustles to Head of the Class in Afghanistan,” New
York Times, January 4, 2010.
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to release him (March 29, 2006). His release came the same day the House passed H.Res. 736
calling on protections for Afghan converts. In May 2010, the Afghan government suspended the
operations of two Christian-affiliated international relief groups claiming the groups were
attempting to promote Christianity among Afghans—an assertion denied by the groups (Church
World Service and Norwegian Church Aid). Another case arose in May 2010, when an amputee,
Said Musa, was imprisoned for converting to Christianity from Islam, an offense under Afghan
law that leaves it open for Afghan courts to apply a death sentence under Islamic law (Shariah).
The arrest came days after the local Noorin TV station broadcast a show on Afghan Christians
engaging in their rituals. Following diplomatic engagement by governments and human rights
groups, Musa was quietly released from prison on February 24, 2011, and reportedly went to
Italy, where he is seeking asylum.
Human Trafficking
Afghanistan was again placed in Tier 2: Watch List in the State Department report on human
trafficking issued on June 27, 2011 (Trafficking in Persons Report for 2011). The placement was
the same as it was in the report for 2010 (June 17, 2010) and a downgrade from the Tier 2
placement of the 2009 report. The Afghan government is assessed in the 2011 report as not
complying with minimum standards for eliminating trafficking, but making significant efforts to
do so. However, the government did not increase its efforts to curb trafficking over the previous
year. The State Department report says that women from China, some countries in Africa, Iran,
and some countries in Central Asia are being trafficked into Afghanistan for sexual exploitation,
although, according to the report, trafficking within Afghanistan is more prevalent than
trafficking across its borders. The report asserts that some families knowingly sell their children
for forced prostitution, including for bacha baazi, a practice in which wealthy men use groups of
young boys for social and sexual entertainment. The United States has spent about $500,000 to
eliminate human trafficking in Afghanistan since FY2001.
Advancement of Women
Freedoms for women have greatly expanded since the fall of the Taliban with their elections to
the parliament and their service at many levels of government. The Afghan government pursues a
policy of promoting equality for women under its National Action Plan for Women of
Afghanistan (NAPWA).
Among the most notable accomplishments, women are performing jobs that were rarely held by
women even before the Taliban came to power in 1996, including in the new police force. There
are over 200 female judges and 447 female journalists working nationwide but, in a sign of
difficulty in changing attitudes, the most senior Afghan woman in the police force was
assassinated in Qandahar in September 2008. The first Afghan female pilots arrived for training
in the United States in July 2011. Press reports say Afghan women are increasingly learning how
to drive. Under the new government, the wearing of the full body covering called the burqa is no
longer obligatory, and fewer women are wearing it than was the case a few years ago. In
November 2010, the government opened a USAID-funded women-only park in Kabul called
“Women’s Garden” where women can go, without male escort, and undertake fitness and job
training activities.
A major development in post-Taliban Afghanistan was the formation of a Ministry of Women’s
Affairs dedicated to improving women’s rights, although numerous accounts say the ministry’s
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influence is limited in part because of the relative ineffectiveness of acting minister Husn Banu
Ghazanfar. She remains minister in an acting capacity, having been voted down by the lower
house for reappointment. It promotes the involvement of women in business ventures, and it plays
a key role in trying to protect women from domestic abuse by running a growing number of
women’s shelters across Afghanistan. However, the Afghan government, in January 2011,
launched a plan to regulate the 11 shelters by placing them under government control. This has
raised concerns that the government might seek to limit the access to the shelters by some women
and in some areas.
Other institutions, such as Human Rights Watch, report backsliding due in part to the lack of
security.53 According to the State Department human rights report for 2010, numerous abuses,
such as denial of educational and employment opportunities, continue primarily because of
Afghanistan’s conservative traditions. This is particularly prevalent in rural areas, and less so in
larger urban areas. More than 70% of marriages in Afghanistan are forced, despite laws banning
the practice, and a majority of brides are younger than the legal marriage age of 16. There is no
law specifically banning sexual harassment. Under the penal code, a man convicted of “honor
killing” (of a wife who commits adultery) cannot be sentenced to more than two years in prison.
Many Afghan women are concerned that the efforts by Karzai and the international community to
persuade insurgents to end their fight and rejoin the political process (“reintegration and
reconciliation” process) could result in backsliding on women’s rights. Most insurgents are highly
conservative Islamists who oppose the advancement of women that has occurred. They are
perceived as likely to demand some reversals of that trend if they are allowed, as part of any deal,
to control territory, assume high-level government positions, or achieve changes to the Afghan
constitution. Karzai has said that these concessions are not envisioned, but skepticism remains,
and some Afghan officials close to Karzai do not rule out the possibility of amending the
constitution to accommodate some Taliban demands. Women have been a target of attacks by
Taliban supporters, including attacks on girls’ schools and athletic facilities.
Recent Legal Developments
Some laws passed recently have affected women, both positively and negatively. The Afghan
government tried to accommodate Shiite leaders’ demands in 2009 by enacting (passage by the
National Assembly and signature by Karzai in March 2009) a “Shiite Personal Status Law,” at the
request of Shiite leaders. The law was intended to provide a legal framework for members of the
Shiite minority in family law issues. However, the issue turned controversial when international
human rights groups and governments—and Afghan women in a demonstration in Kabul—
complained about provisions that would appear to sanction marital rape and which would allow
males to control the ability of females in their family to go outside the home. President Obama
publicly called these provisions “abhorrent.” In early April 2009, taking into account the outcry,
Karzai sent the law back to the Justice Ministry for review, saying it would be altered if it were
found to conflict with the Afghan constitution. The offending clauses were substantially revised
by the Justice Ministry in July 2009, requiring that wives “perform housework,” but also
apparently giving the husband the right to deny a wife food if she refuses sex. The revised law
was passed by the National Assembly in late July 2009, signed by Karzai, and published in the

53 “We Have the Promises of the World: Women’s Rights in Afghanistan,” Human Rights Watch, December 2009,
http://www.wluml.org/sites/wluml.org/files/hrw_report_2009.pdf.
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official gazette on July 27, 2009, although it remains unsatisfactory to many human rights and
women’s rights groups.
On August 6, 2009, perhaps in an effort to address some of the criticisms of the Shiite law, Karzai
issued, as a decree, the “Elimination of Violence Against Women” (EVAW) law. Minister of
Women’s Affairs Ghazanfar told CRS in October 2009 that the bill was long contemplated and
not related to the Shiite status law.54 It was enacted by the National Assembly as a law as of
December 2010; it had been held up by the Assembly for final passage because some Islamic
conservatives, such as Sayyaf (cited above), reportedly object to the provisions of the law
criminalizing child marriages. As noted previously, child marriages and forced marriages remain
common.
Women in Key Positions
Despite conservative attitudes, women have moved into prominent positions in all areas of
Afghan governance, although with periodic setbacks. Three female ministers were in the 2004-
2006 cabinet: former presidential candidate Masooda Jalal (Ministry of Women’s Affairs), Sediqa
Balkhi (Ministry for Martyrs and the Disabled), and Amina Afzali (Ministry of Youth). Karzai
named three women to cabinet posts on January 9, 2010, including Afzali (to Labor and Social
Affairs). Of the three, however, only Afzali was confirmed on January 16, 2009; the other two
were opposed by Islamic conservatives. In March 2005, Karzai appointed a former minister of
women’s affairs, Habiba Sohrabi, as governor of Bamiyan province, inhabited mostly by Hazaras.
(She hosted then First Lady Laura Bush in Bamiyan in June 2008.)
Two women ran for president for the August 20, 2009, election, as discussed below, although
each received less than one-half of 1%. Some NGOs and other groups believe that the women
elected by the quota system are not viewed as equally legitimate parliamentarians.
In the National Assembly, the constitution reserves for women at least 17 of the 102 seats in the
upper house and 68 of the 249 seats in the lower house of parliament. There were 23 serving in
the outgoing upper house, 6 more than Karzai’s mandated bloc of 17 female appointees. There
were 68 women in the previous lower house (when the quota was 62), meaning 6 were elected
without the quota. The number elected in the September 18, 2010, election is 69, one more than
the quota. (For the election, about 400 women ran—about 16% of all candidates.) The target ratio
is ensured by reserving an average of two seats per province (34 provinces) for women—the top
two female vote getters per province. (Kabul province reserves 9 female seats.)
About 300 women were delegates to the 1,600-person “peace jirga” that was held during June 2-
4, 2010, which endorsed an Afghan plan to reintegrate insurgents who want to end their fight. The
High Peace Council to oversee the reconciliation process, which met for the first time on October
10, 2010, has 8 women out of 68 members.
U.S. and International Posture on Women’s Rights
U.S. officials say that its policy is to promote women’s rights in Afghanistan rigorously. The
Administration has and is following its “Strategy for Assistance to Women in Afghanistan, 2010-

54 CRS meeting with the Minister of Women’s Affairs, October 13, 2009.
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2013.”55 U.S. officials said aid allocations are geared toward that strategy. Specific earmarks for
use of U.S. funds for women’s and girls’ programs in Afghanistan are contained in recent annual
appropriations, and these earmarks have grown steadily. The United States provided $159 million
to programs for Afghan women in FY2009, slightly more than the $150 million earmarked, and
about $225 million for FY2010, more than the $175 earmarked.56 For FY2010, assistance as
provided in the following “pillars” of the U.S. Strategy: health ($87 million); education ($31
million); economy, work, and poverty ($54.6 million); legal protection and human rights ($12
million); and leadership and political participation ($43 million).
These strategy pillars, and specific programs funded by them, are discussed in State Department
reports on U.S. aid to women and girls, covering FY2001-FY2008, and then FY2008-FY2009.
Some programs focus on training female police officers.57 The latest iteration of the report, for
FY2009-FY2010, was due September 2010; it has been drafted and is in inter-agency review.
Some donors, particularly those of Canada, have financed specific projects for Afghan women
farmers. However, an audit issued in July 2010 by the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan
Reconstruction found that the State Department and USAID did not provide complete and
consistent information about the reported activities in which women and girls were intended
beneficiaries.
The Afghanistan Freedom Support Act of 2002 (AFSA, P.L. 107-327) authorized $15 million per
year (FY2003-FY2006) for the Ministry of Women’s Affairs. Those monies are donated to the
Ministry from Economic Support Funds (ESF) accounts controlled by USAID. S. 229, the
Afghan Women Empowerment Act of 2009, introduced in the 111th Congress, would authorize
$45 million per year in FY2010-FY2012 for grants to Afghan women, for the ministry of
Women’s Affairs ($5 million), and for the AIHRC ($10 million).
Democracy, Human Rights, Governance, and Elections
Funding Issues
U.S. funding for democracy, governance, and rule of law programs has grown, in line with the
Obama Administration strategy for Afghanistan. During FY2002-FY2010, a total of about $3.6
billion was spent on democracy, governance, rule of law and human rights, and elections support.
Of these, by far the largest category was “good governance,” which, in large part, are grant
awards to provinces that make progress against narcotics. Good governance funding accounts for
about half that total. Rule of law and human rights funding accounts for about $935 million for
FY2002-2010, of which some funds come from the International Narcotics and Law Enforcement
(INCLE) account and the remainder is largely Economic Support Funds.
The following funding for these functions is to be spent in FY2011, as appropriated in P.L. 112-
10, the continuing appropriation for FY2011:
• $1.388 billion for all democracy and human rights-related funds, including

55 A draft of this strategy document was provided to CRS by the State Department, April 21, 2011.
56 For prior years, see CRS Report RL30588, Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy, by
Kenneth Katzman, in the section on aid to Afghanistan, year by year.
57 Department of State and U.S. Agency for International Development, “Report on U.S. Government Activities 2008-
2009 For Women and Girls in Afghanistan,” October 20, 2009.
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• $1.01 billion for “good governance.” This program is used to build the
financial and management oversight capability of the central government;
• $248 million for rule of law and human rights;
• $80 million for civil society building; and
• $50 million for political competition and consensus building.
The following is requested for FY2012.
• $1.076 billion for overall democracy and human rights-related funding including
• $789.1 million for good governance;
• $256.6 million for rule of law and human rights ($227 million of which are
INCLE funds);
• $17.3 million for political competition and consensus building; and
• $13.7 million for civil society.
For comprehensive tables on U.S. aid to Afghanistan, by fiscal year and by category and type of
aid, see CRS Report RL30588, Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy,
by Kenneth Katzman.
Table 1. Major Pashtun Tribal Confederations
Clan/Tribal
Confederations
Location Example
Durrani
Mainly southern Afghanistan:

Qandahar, Helmand, Zabol,
Uruzgan,Nimruz
Popalzai
Qandahar
Hamid Karzai, president of Afghanistan; Jelani Popal,
former head of the Independent Directorate of
(Zirak branch
Local Governance; Mul ah Bradar, the top aide to
of Durrani
Mullah Umar, captured in Pakistan in Feb. 2010.
Pashtun)
Two-thirds of Qandahar’s provincial government
posts held by Zirak Durrani Pashtuns
Alikozai
Qandahar
Mullah Naqibullah (deceased, former anti-Taliban
faction leader in Qandahar)
Barakzai
Qandahar, Helmand
Ghul Agha Shirzai (Governor, Nangarhar Province)
Achakzai
Qandahar, Helmand
Abdul Razziq, Police Chief, Qandahar Province
Alozai
Helmand (Musa Qala district)
Sher Mohammad Akhunzadeh (former Helmand
governor); Hajji Zahir, former governor of Marjah
Noorzai
Qandahar
Noorzai brothers, briefly in charge of Qandahar
after the fall of the Taliban in November 2001
Ghilzai
Eastern Afghanistan: Paktia, Paktika,

Khost, Nangarhar, Kunar
Ahmadzai

Mohammed Najibullah (pres. 1986-1992); Ashraf
Ghani, Karzai adviser, Finance Minister 2002-2004
Hotak

Mullah Umar, but hails from Uruzgan, which is
dominated by Durranis
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Afghanistan: Politics, Elections, and Government Performance

Clan/Tribal
Confederations Location
Example
Taraki

Nur Mohammed Taraki (leader 1978-1979)
Kharoti

Hafizullah Amin (leader September-
December1979); Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, founder of
Hezb-e-Islami (Gulbuddin), former mujahedin party
leader now anti-Karzai insurgent.
Zadran
Paktia, Khost
Pacha Khan Zadran; Insurgent leader Jalaluddin
Haqqani
Kodai


Mangal
Paktia, Khost
Ghulab Mangal (Governor of Helmand Province)
Orkazai

Shinwari
Nangarhar province
Fasl Ahmed Shinwari, former Supreme Court Chief
Justice
Mandezai

Sangu Khel


Sipah

Wardak
Wardak Province
Abdul Rahim Wardak (Defense Minister)
(Pashtu-speaking
non-Pashtun)
Afridis
Tirah, Khyber Pass, Kohat

Zaka khel


Jawaki

Adam khel


Malikdin, etc


Yusufzais
Khursan, Swat, Kabul

Akozais

Malizais

Loezais

Khattaks
Kohat, Peshawar, Bangash

Akorai

Terai

Mohmands
Near Khazan, Peshawar

Baizai


Alimzai


Uthmanzais

Khawazais


Wazirs
Mainly in Waziristan

Darwesh khel


Bannu

Source: This table was prepared by Hussein Hassan, Information Research Specialist, CRS.
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Figure 1. Map of Afghan Ethnicities

Source: 2003 National Geographic Society, http://www.afghan-network.net/maps/Afghanistan-Map.pdf. Adapted by Amber Wilhelm, CRS.
Notes: This map is intended to be illustrative of the approximate demographic distribution by region of Afghanistan. CRS has no way to confirm exact population
distributions.

CRS-56

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Afghanistan: Politics, Elections, and Government Performance


Author Contact Information

Kenneth Katzman

Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs
kkatzman@crs.loc.gov, 7-7612

Acknowledgments
The table of major Pashtun tribes was prepared by Hussein Hassan, Information Research Specialist, CRS.

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