Libya: Unrest and U.S. Policy
Christopher M. Blanchard
Analyst in Middle Eastern Affairs
September 29, 2011
Congressional Research Service
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www.crs.gov
RL33142
CRS Report for Congress
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epared for Members and Committees of Congress

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Libya: Unrest and U.S. Policy

Summary
After more than 40 years of authoritarian repression and over seven months of armed conflict,
fundamental political change has come to Libya. The Libyan people, their interim Transitional
National Council (TNC), and the international community are now shifting their attention from
their struggle with the remnants of Muammar al Qadhafi’s defeated regime to longer-term
challenges posed by a planned transition to democratic governance. The rebel military victory
over pro-Qadhafi forces signals the beginning of a period that may prove more complex and
challenging for Libyans and their international supporters alike. Immediate tasks include
establishing and maintaining security, preventing criminality and reprisals, restarting Libya’s
economy, and taking the first steps toward defining a new political system. In the coming weeks
and months, Libyans will face key questions about basic terms for transitional justice, a new
constitutional order, political participation, and Libyan foreign policy. Security challenges,
significant investment needs, and vigorous political debates are likely to emerge.
As of September 29, increasingly isolated areas in central and southern Libya remain contested.
Muammar al Qadhafi has not been located or detained, and small groups of pro-Qadhafi forces
are capable of armed resistance. The U.S. military continues to participate in Operation Unified
Protector, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) military operation to enforce United
Nations (U.N.) Security Council Resolution 1973, which authorizes “all necessary measures” to
protect Libyan civilians. On September 21, NATO extended the military operation for a further 90
days, if necessary. U.S. officials express confidence that nuclear materials and chemical weapons
components that are stored in Libya remain secure and state that remote monitoring will continue.
The proliferation of military weaponry from unsecured Libyan stockpiles—including small arms,
explosives, and shoulder-fired anti-aircraft missiles—remains a serious concern. The Obama
Administration has reiterated that it has no intention of deploying U.S. military forces on the
ground in Libya. The U.S. Embassy in Tripoli has reopened with a limited staff. Congress may
consider proposals for assisting Libya’s transitional authorities or supporting security efforts.
The U.N. General Assembly has recognized the TNC as Libya’s U.N. representative, and the
Security Council has adopted Resolution 2009, creating a three-month mandate for a U.N.
Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) to assist Libyans with public security and transition
arrangements. The resolution also sets conditions for the sale of arms and training to the Libyan
state and partially lifts the asset freeze for certain purposes. The TNC continues to call for the
release of Libyan assets seized pursuant to Resolutions 1970 and 1973. Transfers have begun
from multiple governments, including $1.5 billion in previously blocked assets that the U.S.
government has arranged to support Libyan humanitarian, fuel, and salary needs. U.S. Treasury
Department licenses now authorize the release of assets belonging to some Libyan entities and
allow some transactions with Libyan financial institutions.
A TNC stabilization team is leading Libyan efforts to deliver services; assess reconstruction
needs; and begin to reform ministries, public utilities, and security forces. The TNC has issued
orders concerning security and established a high security council to coordinate volunteer forces.
Initial reports from Libya suggest that local militias and some emergent political groups may
oppose certain TNC policies and may seek to replace certain TNC personalities. Overall, TNC
officials continue to express confidence in Libyan unity and plan changes to the membership of
the interim government. As Libyans work to shape their future, Congress and the Administration
will have the first opportunity to fully redefine U.S.-Libyan relations since the 1960s.
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Contents
Background...................................................................................................................................... 1
Status as of September 29, 2011 ...................................................................................................... 2
U.S. Military Operations and Costs .................................................................................... 4
Congressional Action and Legislation................................................................................. 5
Assessment and Key Issues ....................................................................................................... 6
United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) and Other Stabilization
Efforts............................................................................................................................... 7
Conventional Weapons and Chemical and Nuclear Materials ............................................ 8
Military Support and Disarmament..................................................................................... 9
Libyan Assets, TNC Funding, and Oil Exports................................................................. 10
Humanitarian Conditions and Relief................................................................................. 12
International Criminal Court and United Nations Human Rights
Council Investigations.................................................................................................... 13
Prospects and Challenges for U.S. Policy...................................................................................... 14
Possible Questions................................................................................................................... 15
Libyan Political Dynamics and Profiles ........................................................................................ 16
Political Dynamics................................................................................................................... 16
Interim Transitional National Council (TNC) ................................................................... 17
Prominent TNC Figures .................................................................................................... 18
Armed Opposition Forces ................................................................................................. 19
Exiles and Al Sanusi Monarchy Figures ........................................................................... 21
Libyan Islamists and the TNC ................................................................................................. 22
The Muslim Brotherhood.................................................................................................. 22
Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG)/Libyan Islamic Movement for
Change (LIMC).............................................................................................................. 23
Al Qaeda in the Lands of the Islamic Maghreb (AQLIM/AQIM) .................................... 25
Transitional National Council Positions and Statements .................................................. 26

Figures
Figure 1. Political Map of Libya...................................................................................................... 3

Contacts
Author Contact Information........................................................................................................... 27

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Background
For a summary of recent events and conflict assessment, see “Status as of September 29, 2011.”
Political change in neighboring Tunisia and Egypt helped bring long-simmering Libyan reform
debates to the boiling point in January and early February 2011. In recent years, leading Libyans
had staked out a broad range of positions about the necessary scope and pace of reform, while
competing for influence and opportunity under the watchful eye of hard-liners aligned with the
enigmatic leader of Libya’s September 1969 revolution, Muammar al Qadhafi. Qadhafi had long
insisted that he held no formal government position, but by all accounts he maintained his 40-
plus-year hold on ultimate authority, until recently, as the “reference point” for Libya’s byzantine
political system. Ironically, that system cited “popular authority” as its foundational principle and
organizing concept, but it denied Libyans the most basic political rights. Tribal relations and
regional dynamics, particularly long-held resentments among residents in the east, also influence
Libyan politics (see “Political Dynamics” below).
Qadhafi government policy reversals on weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and terrorism led
to the lifting of most international sanctions in 2003 and 2004, followed by economic
liberalization, oil sales, and foreign investment that brought new wealth to some in Libya. U.S.
business gradually reengaged amid continuing U.S.-Libyan tension over terrorism concerns that
were finally resolved in 2008. During this period of international reengagement, political change
in Libya remained elusive and illusory. Some observers argued that Qadhafi supporters’
suppression of opposition had softened, as Libya’s international rehabilitation coincided with
steps by some pragmatists to maneuver within so-called “red lines.” The shifting course of those
red lines had been increasingly entangling reformers in the run-up to the outbreak of unrest in
February 2011. Government rehabilitation of imprisoned Islamist militants and the return of some
exiled opposition figures were welcomed by some observers. Ultimately, inaction on the part of
the government in response to calls for guarantees of basic political rights and for the drafting of
a constitution suggested a lack of consensus, if not outright opposition to meaningful reform.
The recent conflict was triggered in mid-February 2011 by a chain of events in Benghazi and
other eastern cities that quickly spiraled out of Qadhafi’s control. Although Libyan opposition
groups had called for a so-called “day of rage” on February 17 to commemorate protests that had
occurred five years earlier, localized violence erupted prior to the planned national protests. On
February 15 and 16, Libyan authorities used force to contain small protests demanding that police
release a lawyer for victims of a previous crackdown who had been arrested. Several protestors
were killed. Funerals and other protest gatherings escalated severely when government officers
reportedly fired live ammunition. In the resulting chaos, Libyan security forces are alleged to
have opened fire with heavy weaponry on protestors, as opposition groups confronted armed
personnel and overran a number of security facilities.
The government’s loss of control over key eastern cities became apparent, and broader unrest
emerged in other regions. A number of military officers, their units, and civilian officials
abandoned Qadhafi for the cause of the then-disorganized and amorphous opposition. Qadhafi
and his supporters denounced their opponents as drug-fueled traitors, foreign agents, and Al
Qaeda supporters. Until August, Qadhafi and allied forces maintained control over the capital,
Tripoli, and other cities. The cumulative effects of attrition by NATO airstrikes against military
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targets and a coordinated offensive by rebels in Tripoli and from across western Libya turned the
tide, sending Qadhafi and his supporters into retreat and exile.
Status as of September 29, 2011
Amid continuing NATO-led military operations to enforce U.N. Security Council Resolution
1973, Libyan rebels have succeeded in ousting Muammar al Qadhafi’s government from power. A
planned uprising within the capital city, Tripoli, paired with the defection of prominent regime
figures and a multi-front attack, succeeded in swiftly breaking the defenses of pro-Qadhafi forces
over the weekend of August 20-22. Continued fighting between rebel forces and pro-Qadhafi
elements continued in areas of the city for days, although the capture of the Qadhafi military
compound at Bab al Aziziyah in the capital on August 23 signaled the symbolic end of Qadhafi’s
reign. Qadhafi’s hometown of Sirte on the central coast and isolated areas of central and southern
Libya have yet to be secured by rebel forces.1 As of September 29, Qadhafi had not been located
and detained, and he had issued calls for a guerilla warfare campaign and vowed to resist
surrender indefinitely. The risk of a prolonged irregular warfare campaign by Qadhafi supporters
exists, even as organized pro-Qadhafi forces falter and in some cases flee to neighboring
countries.



1 On September 27, NATO Spokesperson for the Operation Unified Protector Colonel Roland Lavoie stated that
“Recent developments in Sirte and Bani Walid have been our main area of attention over the last few days. Indeed, it’s
clear that remaining Gadhafi forces refuse to recognize their defeat and that the former regime has lost both legitimacy
and public support. As a last resort they are hiding in urban areas, from where they attempt to control the surrounding
population and use civilians as shields against attempts [by forces of Libya’s transitional government] to dislodge
them.” Operation Unified Protector Press Conference, September 27, 2011.
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Figure 1. Political Map of Libya

Sources: Congressional Cartography Program, Library of Congress, edited by CRS.

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The opposition Interim Transitional National Council (TNC) has asserted control over
developments in Tripoli and has begun the task of coordinating the diverse collection of armed
groups that made the rebel capture of the city possible, but which did not previously necessarily
coordinate their actions with the TNC or each other. A “high security council” serves as a
coordinating mechanism for disparate volunteer groups and regime defectors, including armed
factions from communities like Zintan and Misuratah and those led by Islamist figures, such as
former Libyan Islamic Fighting Group commander Abdelhakim Belhajj (see “Libyan Islamic
Fighting Group (LIFG)/Libyan Islamic Movement for Change (LIMC)” below).2 TNC figures
have issued repeated calls for armed groups and citizens to avoid destruction of public property,
looting, and reprisals, in a conscious effort to avoid some of the immediate security problems that
plagued Iraq in the wake of the collapse of Saddam Hussein’s government. The TNC has signaled
its intention to take a inclusive approach with regard to government personnel not known to have
been involved in severe human rights violations or public corruption. The success of the TNC
initiatives and the acceptability of this approach among Libyans remains to be seen. TNC officials
remain concerned about their ability to provide services and maintain security, although the
resumption of water service in Tripoli, deliveries of fuel, and infusions of seized assets have
improved their position.
On September 21, NATO member state officials and partner country representatives announced
the extension of military operations for an additional 90 days beyond September 30, if necessary.
Recent statements from NATO officials indicate that operations will continue consistent with the
civilian protection and other mandates established by Security Council Resolutions 1970 and
1973, subject to member state decisions on participation. NATO air operations have continued at
a rate of roughly 100 sorties per day.3 This rate may rapidly decline as remaining pro-Qadhafi
forces surrender or are disarmed. Strikes now focus on remaining pro-Qadhafi military assets in
and around Sirte and Bani Walid. NATO officials indicate that any future role for the alliance in
Libya would be contingent on authorization and a request by Libyan officials.
U.S. Military Operations and Costs
U.S. military forces continue to support all three elements of the NATO mission: maritime arms
embargo enforcement, no-fly zone patrol, and civilian protection. However, most U.S. air
operations have shifted from air strikes against Libyan ground targets toward refueling;
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR); electronic warfare; and suppression of
enemy air defenses (SEAD) for NATO aircraft performing no-fly zone patrol missions.4 Manned
U.S. aircraft carry out these missions. The United States has made armed drone aircraft available
for NATO use, and U.S. drones have carried out over 100 strike missions as part of the NATO

2 As of September 8, rebels from Zintan under the command of the Madani clan claimed to have 5,000 armed men in
Tripoli. Fighters from Misuratah reportedly shifted toward the pursuit of pro-Qadhafi forces in Sirte and Bani Walid
and their numbers in Tripoli had declined to 1,500. Belhajj claims to have taken a leading role in the Tripoli operations.
He was released from prison by the Qadhafi government in 2010 as part of a reconciliation agreement with LIFG
fighters in exchange for their renunciation of violence. See Adrien Jaulmes, “The Fragile Patchwork of the Libyan
Rebels,” Le Figaro (Paris), September 8, 2011; U.S. Open Source Center (OSC) Report GMP20110824715001, “Rebel
Commander Balhaj Urges Al-Qadhafi Brigades To ‘Abandon’ Regime,” August 20, 2011; and OSC Report
GMP20100323950045, “Three Leaders of Libyan Fighting Group Freed – Paper,” March 23, 2010.
3 As of September 26, NATO had flown over 24,040 sorties, including 8,975 strike sorties.
4 Through August 22, 2011, U.S. aircraft had flown 5,316 sorties, of which 1,210 were strike sorties. Of those strike
sorties, 262 dropped ordnance on targets. In addition, 101 Predator drone strikes had taken place. Reuters, “Factbox:
Pentagon says U.S. stepped up pace of Libya air strikes,” August 22, 2011.
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civilian protection operation. Manned U.S. aircraft also remain “on call” to potentially participate
in civilian protection strike missions. However, U.S. participation requires the prior approval of
the Secretary of Defense.
Through July 31, U.S. military operations had cost an estimated $896 million. As of June 3, over
$398 million of the U.S. costs were for munitions, many of which were used by U.S. forces
during the Operation Odyssey Dawn period prior to March 31 to dismantle Libya’s air defense
network preceding the transfer of command to NATO for Operation Unified Protector. Through
September 30, 2011, the Administration had predicted that U.S. military operations in support of
NATO in Libya, if sustained at the tempo and balance prevailing in June, would have cost up to
$1 billion, although that total may not be reached in light of recent rebel advances.
Congressional Action and Legislation
Many Members of Congress have welcomed the opposition’s success in Tripoli, while expressing
concern about security in the country, the potential proliferation of Libyan weapons, and the
prospects for a smooth political transition. The Senate version of the FY2012 State Department
and Foreign Operations appropriations bill (S. 1601) would provide $20 million in bilateral
Economic Support Fund (ESF) account assistance “to promote democracy, transparent and
accountable governance, human rights, transitional justice, and the rule of law in Libya, and for
exchange programs between Libyan and American students.” The bill prohibits non-loan-based
funding for rehabilitation or reconstruction of infrastructure in Libya. The committee report on
the bill directs the use of Nonproliferation, Antiterrorism, Demining, and Related Programs
(NADR) account funding for disarmament and securing Libyan weapons stockpiles.
The Obama Administration has begun transferring $1.5 billion in frozen Libyan assets for the
benefit of the Libyan people and the TNC. According to the State Department, the $1.5 billion
was identified in consultation with the TNC for the following purposes:5
• Transfers to international humanitarian organizations: Up to $120 million for
pending United Nations Appeal requests and up to $380 million more for any
revised U.N. Appeals for Libya and other humanitarian needs.
• Transfers to suppliers for fuel and other goods for strictly civilian purposes: Up
to $500 million to pay for fuel costs for strictly civilian needs (e.g., hospitals,
electricity, and desalinization) and for other humanitarian purchases.
• Transfers to the Temporary Financial Mechanism established by the Libya
Contact Group: Up to $400 million for providing “key social services, including
education and health” and up to $100 million for “food and other humanitarian
needs.”
Some Members of Congress have suggested that some frozen Libyan assets be directed, in
consultation with Libyan authorities, toward reimbursement of NATO countries for military
operations. Others are seeking to link the availability of assets frozen by the United States to
Libyan cooperation with investigations into Qadhafi-era terrorist attacks.

5 State Department, Office of the Spokesperson, Unfreezing Assets to Meet the Critical Humanitarian Needs of the
Libyan People, Washington, DC, August 25, 2011.
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H.Con.Res. 75 would state the sense of Congress that:
the funds of the regime of Muammar Qaddafi that have been frozen by the United States
should be returned to the people of Libya for their benefit, including humanitarian and
reconstruction assistance, and the President should explore the possibility with the
Transitional National Council of using some of such funds to reimburse NATO countries for
expenses incurred in Operation Odyssey Dawn and Operation Unified Protector.
S. 1520 would restrict the transfer of blocked Libyan assets to Libyan authorities for other than
humanitarian purposes until the President certifies to Congress “that the Transitional National
Council or successor government is fully cooperating with requests for information and ongoing
investigations related to the bombing of Pan Am flight 103 and any other terrorist attacks
attributable to the government of Muammar Qaddafi against United States citizens.” The bill
would provide national security waiver authority to the President and require reporting on U.S.
efforts to obtain information regarding terrorist attacks along with Libyan cooperation.
Debate between Congress and the Obama Administration about congressional authorization and
the cost of U.S. military operations in Libya has diminished, as the prospect of a sustained
military campaign requiring extended U.S. investment and force deployments now appears less
likely. Some Members of Congress have sought a clearer definition of U.S. objectives, costs, and
operations, and, in June and July, some Members of Congress became increasingly assertive in
their efforts to force President Barack Obama to seek congressional authorization for continued
U.S. military involvement. A number of proposed resolutions and amendments to appropriations
and authorization bills sought to require reporting on U.S. strategy and operations or to proscribe
limits on the authorization or funding for continued U.S. military operations in Libya. Others
have sought to authorize the continued use of U.S. Armed Forces in support of NATO operations,
short of the use of ground troops.
On June 3, the House adopted H.Res. 292 (Roll no. 411), which directed the Administration to
provide documents on consultation with Congress and a report “describing in detail United States
security interests and objectives, and the activities of United States Armed Forces, in Libya since
March 19, 2011.” The Administration submitted the report on June 15, 2011.6 The House of
Representatives rejected a series of other resolutions seeking to authorize or de-authorize
continuing U.S. participation in Operation Unified Protector.
Assessment and Key Issues
The Obama Administration’s stated policy objectives in Libya have been to protect civilians and
to secure a democratic political transition, including the departure of Muammar al Qadhafi from
power and the selection of a new government by the Libyan people. In pursuit of U.S. objectives,
the Administration is supporting military, financial, and diplomatic efforts to enforce United
Nations Security Council Resolutions 1970 and 1973, both of which stopped short of calling for
Qadhafi’s removal. The Administration argued that sustained U.S. and international military and
financial pressure would resolve core differences between U.S. and U.N.-endorsed goals by
convincing remaining loyalists to withdraw their support for Qadhafi and opening the way for his
departure and a settlement of the conflict. Qadhafi’s intransigence notwithstanding, the
combination of the opposition’s military operations and international military and financial

6 Overview of United States Activities in Libya, June 15, 2011. Available from CRS.
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pressure appears to have succeeded in convincing many prominent regime figures to defect and
ultimately in toppling the Qadhafi regime. The implications of this regime change for Libya, the
region, and the United States remain to be seen.
The post-conflict Libyan political order will be complicated by the immediate consequences of
the current fighting, the legacies of decades of Qadhafi’s patronage- and fear-based rule, and the
chronic economic and political challenges that have fueled popular discontent in recent years.
Security is the immediate priority, and questions remain about the ability of the TNC to assert
control. Prior to the capture of Tripoli, reports from eastern Libya suggested that limited financial
resources and latent political rivalries were creating parallel challenges for the TNC as it sought
to solidify its base of support among the disparate groups that have risen against Qadhafi. The
July 2011 assassination of rebel military commander and prominent regime defector Abdelfattah
Younis al Ubaydi, reportedly by rival rebel forces, cast serious doubt on the unity of TNC-
affiliated military forces and led to the resignation of several TNC leadership figures. Various
rebel groups have stated their recognition of the TNC’s authority as a means of securing the
country in the immediate aftermath of Qadhafi’s fall. Press reports and interviews suggest that
these groups remain wary of each other in some cases, and some calls for changes to the
leadership of the TNC have emerged from former rebel groups. TNC officials indicate that some
leadership changes are forthcoming, and U.S. officials have not yet indicated they regard the
debates and delays as threats to Libya’s transition.7
Paying salaries, purchasing imports, maintaining public utility services, and meeting
administrative and military needs reportedly tested the limited financial resources and expertise
available to the TNC, although some reports suggest that recent infusions of previously frozen
assets have reduced some of the financial pressure.8 Both financial and administrative challenges
have increased now that the TNC is seeking to pay salaries and assert control over Libya’s major
population center in Tripoli and manage government entities in the rest of the country. Some TNC
leaders continue to cite financial constraints in public statements and urge foreign governments to
fully release frozen Libyan assets. Some reports from visiting nongovernmental experts and State
Department officials suggest that while a lively political atmosphere has emerged in opposition-
controlled areas, political support for the TNC among the broader population may be contingent
on the council’s ability to provide basic services and financial support via salaries and subsidies.9
Organized armed groups or ad hoc citizen coalitions may choose to challenge the TNC if public
hardships increase or if TNC political decisions prove controversial. Taken together, these factors
suggest that securing U.S. interests in Libya will require sustained attention and resources beyond
the scope of the current fighting and emergent transition period.
United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) and Other Stabilization
Efforts
The Administration has not publicly disclosed plans for U.S. participation in multilateral post-
conflict security, stability, or reconstruction operations in Libya or highlighted requests for new

7 Remarks by TNC Minister for Reconstruction Ahmed Jehani and U.S. Ambassador to Libya Gene Cretz.
8 CRS cannot independently verify the state of the opposition’s finances, but one opposition source indicated that, as of
May, costs had reached $100 million per day, with gasoline and other fuel imports constituting a particularly critical
need. Richard Spencer and Ruth Sherlock, “Libya’s Rebels To Run Out of Money ‘in Three Weeks,’” Telegraph (UK),
May 3, 2011; VOA News, “Libya’s Rebel Envoy Seeks Frozen Assets,” August 25, 2011.
9 CRS review of unpublished NGO and unclassified State Department reporting, May 2011.
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funding to support such efforts by third-parties, including the new United Nations Support
Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) established by Resolution 2009.10 U.N. Secretary General Ban Ki-
moon has named UK-born Ian Martin as the director for UNSMIL. Martin is continuing the work
he began in mid-2011 as the Secretary General’s special adviser for post-conflict and transition
issues in Libya. A sector-by-sector post-conflict needs assessment is planned under the auspices
of the TNC, the United Nations, the European Union, the World Bank, and the International
Monetary Fund (IMF).
Conventional Weapons and Chemical and Nuclear Materials
The apparent proliferation of small arms, man-portable air defense missile systems (MANPADS),
and some heavy weaponry among fighters on both sides of the recent conflict has led some
counterterrorism and arms trafficking experts, as well as officials in neighboring countries, to
express concern about the conflict’s longer-term implications for regional security.11 Most
security experts expect that unexploded ordnance, explosive remnants, and looted weaponry will
present a challenge inside Libya for an extended period of time. On May 9, the Administration
notified Congress that it had waived normal congressional notification requirements to
immediately obligate $1.5 million in Nonproliferation, Antiterrorism, Demining and Related
Programs (NADR) account funding for “urgently needed assistance to collect, destroy, and re-
establish control of Libyan munitions and small arms and light weapons” in response to “a
substantial risk to human health or welfare.”12 The funding was provided to non-governmental
organizations specializing in international demining and ordnance disposal. Those organizations
and others are working with the United Nations as part of a Joint Mine Action Coordination Team
that issues regular reports on the status of efforts to remove ordnance threats across Libya and
related funding needs.13
Israeli officials have stated that “weapons are available in Libya as a result of the unstable
situation there, and Hamas has exploited it to buy weapons from Libyan smugglers.”14 According
to unnamed Israeli officials, “thousands” of weapons have entered Gaza from Libya, including

10 The United Nations Department of Political Affairs is responsible for UNSMIL and is funded through assessed
contributions of U.N. member states, including the United States.
11 For example, these concerns were raised in C. J. Chivers, “Experts Fear Looted Libyan Arms May Find Way to
Terrorists,” New York Times, March 3, 2011. African Union communiqués have expressed concern about regional
stability, and some Sahel region governments have specifically warned about Al Qaeda supporters seizing control of
specific types of weapons and exploiting the weakness of government forces in Libya to expand their areas of operation
and sanctuary. Algerian authorities have reportedly expanded the presence of security forces along their border with
Libya and have announced operations to eliminate weapons smugglers and seize smuggled weaponry and explosives.
12 The notification requirements were waived pursuant to Section 634a of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 and
Sections 7015(f) and 7015 (e) of the Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations
Act (SFOAA), 2010 (Div. F, P.L. 111-117), as amended and carried forward by the Full-Year Continuing
Appropriations Act, 2011 (Div. B, P.L. 112-10). The notification states, “The fighting in Libya and NATO air strikes
have left many ammunition storage areas totally unsecured and open to looting.… There is little or no perimeter
security at the storage sites, and munitions and small arms and light weapons, including thousands of MANPADS, have
been looted for weeks. It is critically important not only to the Libyan population, but to counter the threat of
proliferation into neighboring regions that work begin immediately to collect, control, and destroy conventional
weapons and munitions, and reestablish security at these storage sites. Terrorist groups are exploiting this opportunity
and the situation grows more dangerous with each passing day, a situation that directly impacts U.S. national security.”
13 For more information see the United Nations Mine Action Service website at http://www.mineaction.org/
overview.asp?o=3994.
14 Reuters, “Israel sees Libya as New Source of Arms for Gaza,” July 21, 2011.
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“SA-7 anti-aircraft missiles and rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs),” but the weaponry is “not a
major qualitative enhancement” for Gaza-based armed groups.15 CRS cannot independently
verify these statements, and the Obama Administration has not commented on the record
regarding reports of arms shipments from Libya to Gaza. There is no indication that members of
the TNC have been involved with reported shipments of weapons and material from Libya to
Gaza since the uprising began.
The security of Libya’s stockpiles of declared chemical weapons material and its remaining
nuclear materials also has been the subject of scrutiny.16 NATO officials report that anti- Qadhafi
forces now control the sites where key materials of concerns are stored. Libya destroyed the
munitions it possessed for dispersing mustard agent in 2004, and since March 2011, U.S. officials
have repeatedly stated publicly that they believe the remaining sulfur mustard agent and precursor
stockpiles are secure.17 The now non-weaponized nature of the sulfur mustard agent and precursor
materials suggests that they pose a smaller threat than otherwise may have been the case.18 In late
2010, Libya had restarted the long-delayed destruction of its mustard agent and precursor
stockpiles, although technical problems and the outbreak of the conflict resulted in Libya missing
its May 2011 deadline for the destruction of its mustard agent. In August 2011, the State
Department reported that prior to the conflict, Libya had destroyed over 50% of its mustard agent
stocks and over 40% of its liquid chemical weapons precursors. The transitional authorities are
expected to reengage with the multilateral Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons
to set a new destruction timetable.
Libya’s nuclear materials also have been subject to international and U.S. oversight and joint
operations that removed highly enriched uranium and other proliferation-sensitive items. Libya’s
research reactor east of Tripoli at Tajura was converted with U.S. assistance in 2006 to operate
using low-enriched uranium. Libya also possesses a stored stockpile of at least several hundred
tons of uranium oxide yellowcake, reportedly stored near the southern contested city of Sebha.
Programs to engage Libyan nuclear scientists reportedly have been disrupted by the recent
conflict, but may be restarted as the transition unfolds.
Military Support and Disarmament
Throughout the uprising, the United States and its allies debated means for improving the military
capabilities and effectiveness of opposition forces while expressing some concern about the
identity and intentions of opposition fighters and the proliferation of small arms and heavy
weaponry inside Libya and beyond its borders. Some press reports suggest that Qatar provided

15 Reuters, “Israel Says Gaza Gets Anti-Plane Arms from Libya,” August 29, 2011.
16 For an overview of Libya’s declared chemical weapons and nuclear materials see U.S. State Department, Condition
(10) (C) Report - Compliance with the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and
Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction, August 2011; and, International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
Board of Governors, Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Socialist People’s Libyan Arab
Jamahiriya, GOV/2008/39, September 12, 2008.
17 The chemical materials are stored at Rabta, southwest of Tripoli and Ruwagha, near the Al Jufrah Air Force Base in
central Libya. According to the U.S. State Department, identified mustard and nerve agent precursors present in Libya
included pinacolyl alcohol, isopropanol, phosphorus trichloride, 2-chloroethanol, tributylamine, and thionyl chloride.
See State Department, Office of the Spokesperson, “Libya: Securing Stockpiles Promotes Security,” August 26, 2011.
18 “We believe that it’s secure,” said Colonel David Lapan, a Pentagon spokesman. “Even if not weaponized, there’s
still a threat, but it’s a smaller threat than if it is weaponized.” Agence France Presse, “Libya Has Mustard Gas, Lacks
Delivery Systems: Monitor,” March 10, 2011.
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weaponry to TNC-affiliated forces and that Qatari, British, French, and Jordanian special forces
operatives provided military advice to opposition forces, including during the final campaign to
seize Tripoli. CRS cannot confirm these reports. The United Kingdom, Italy, and France
acknowledged that they had sent military advisers to Benghazi to work to improve opposition
command and control arrangements and communications, outside of their governments’ support
for NATO operations.
U.S. officials have argued that the rebels’ most pressing needs are command and control,
communications, training, organization, and logistics support. These needs are expected to last
beyond the current fighting in addition to emerging needs associated with reconstituting a
national military for Libya, incorporating opposition fighters and former regime personnel into
security forces, demobilizing civilian volunteers, and destroying excess weaponry and
unexploded ordnance. The Administration notified Congress of plan to offer up to $25 million in
nonlethal material support to groups in Libya, including the TNC.19 Deliveries had begun, with
roughly half of the authorized amount delivered as of early August 2011.
Libyan Assets, TNC Funding, and Oil Exports
The United States and others froze tens of billions of dollars in Libyan state assets, and the
Obama Administration placed targeted sanctions on Libyan oil companies and other entities in
support of Executive Order 13566 and the U.N. Security Council resolutions 1970 and 1973. The
TNC has identified up to $170 billion in Libyan assets around the world to which it is now
seeking access. TNC officials indicate that they plan to prioritize a public financial management
assessment in order to give third parties confidence in their ability to responsibly manage blocked
assets. U.N. Security Council Resolution 2009 reflects this plan and identifies the World
Bank and IMF as partners in conducting the assessment. The intergovernmental Libya Contact
Group created a “temporary financial mechanism” to support the TNC,20 and several governments
have pledged hundreds of millions of dollars in aid via this channel.
U.N. Security Council Resolution 2009 reiterated the Security Council's intent to ensure that
frozen assets are made available as soon as possible to and for the benefit of the Libyan people:
• The resolution modifies the existing asset freeze requirements related to certain
Libyan entities, lifting entirely the measures applicable to the Libyan National
Oil Corporation and setting conditions for the release of some frozen assets
belonging to the Central Bank of Libya, the Libya Investment Authority, and
other prominent national financial entities.
• Under the changes, U.N. member states, after consulting with Libyan authorities,
may notify the sanctions committee on Libya of their "intent to authorize access

19 Items have been drawn from Defense Department stocks and may include medical first aid kits, stretchers, bandages
& dressing, surgical tape, blankets, meals ready to eat, tents, sleeping bags, canteens, uniforms, boots, tactical load-
bearing vests, bullet-proof vests, military helmets, maps, binoculars, infrared markers, panel marker, infrared (glint)
tape, HESCOS (or sandbags), hand shovels, and 9 volt batteries. CRS communication with State Department, April 29,
2011.
20 Over 20 Contact Group members attended the meeting in Rome including and officials from the Arab League, the
African Union, the World Bank, NATO, the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), the Organization of the Islamic
Conference (OIC), the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Australia, Bahrain, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Jordan,
Morocco, Netherland, Poland, Romania, Malta, Canada, Tunisia, Spain, Turkey, the United Kingdom, the United
States, Sudan and the Holy See. Portugal observed the meeting.
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to funds, other financial assets, or economic resources," for five purposes:
"humanitarian needs; fuel, electricity and water for strictly civilian uses;
resuming Libyan production and sale of hydrocarbons; establishing, operating, or
strengthening institutions of civilian government and civilian public
infrastructure; or facilitating the resumption of banking sector operations,
including to support or facilitate international trade with Libya."
• The Libyan authorities or the U.N. sanctions committee (acting on a consensus
basis) may block asset transfer proposals within five days. U.N. asset freezes
affecting named individuals remain in place.
The U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) has issued
general licenses, effective September 19, that authorize new transactions with Libyan state
entities and maintain the asset freeze established under Executive Order 13566 on named
individuals and state entities, with the exception of the National Oil Corporation and other oil
sector firms. On September 22, the European Union announced that previously frozen funds
belonging to the Central Bank of Libya, the Libyan Investment Authority, the Libyan Foreign
Bank, and the Libya Africa Investment Portfolio were authorized to be released “for humanitarian
and civilian needs, to support renewed activity in the Libyan oil and banking sectors and to assist
with building a civilian government.”21 Resolution 2009 calls on governments to submit
individual notifications of intent to the Libyan authorities and the U.N. sanctions committee as
part of the process for releasing funds.
Two factors may influence the decisions of U.S. policymakers, their international counterparts,
and Libyan authorities about the relative urgency and desirability of releasing frozen funds. First,
the TNC’s present need for immediate access to blocked assets may be less severe than it
appeared in August, given aid and asset transfers to the TNC worth several billion dollars that
have taken place since the fall of Tripoli and the changes outlined in Resolution 2009 that
facilitate the future sale of oil and the unblocking of some frozen assets. Open-source estimates
suggest that more than $15 billion in blocked Libyan assets have been identified by various
governments for transfer to the TNC, and press reports suggest that the TNC has located over $23
billion in previously unknown domestic assets that are contributing to its ability to spend on
salaries and services.
Second, countries holding blocked assets, including the United States, may remain wary about the
immediate transfer of large sums to the control of the TNC, given emerging political uncertainty
about the make-up and priorities of the TNC and its executive authority. Some political groups
and local councils are seeking changes to the makeup of the TNC leadership and TNC officials
indicate that changes are forthcoming. While recent United Nations resolutions on Libya clearly
underscore that blocked assets remain the property of the Libyan people, Resolution 2009
reiterates that, pending transfer for authorized purposes, assets shall remain blocked. It also
creates a joint consultation mechanism among Libyan leaders, the sanctions committee, and those
governments holding blocked funds.
Libya’s oil production and export infrastructure appears to have survived the civil conflict
relatively unscathed, although some facility damage, the departure of large numbers of laborers
and skilled technicians, and the lack of maintenance during the conflict may limit the speed with

21 European Council, EU implements latest U.N. decisions in support of Libya, September 22, 2011.
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which production and exports can be restarted.22 Prior to the conflict, Libya was exporting 1.3
million barrels of oil per day; current production is roughly 60,000 barrels per day. Experts differ
in their projections about how soon production and exports could return to pre-conflict levels,
with optimistic and pessimistic assumptions differing over expected security conditions, changes
to sanctions, and the return of foreign laborers. The importance of oil exports for Libya cannot be
overstated, as the IMF reported in February 2011 that over 90% of state revenue came from the
hydrocarbon sector in 2010. On September 6, new National Oil Company chairman Nuri
Berruien gave an “optimistic forecast” that in 15 months, production would resume at the pre-war
level of 1.6 million barrels per day.
Prior to the rebel victory, the U.S. Treasury Department had issued a Statement of Licensing
Policy allowing U.S. persons to request from OFAC “specific authorization to trade in
hydrocarbon fuel (i.e., oil, gas, and petroleum products) ... to the extent that such hydrocarbon
fuel is exported under the auspices of the Transitional National Council of Libya.”23 The license
further allowed U.S. persons to request permission “to engage in transactions related to the
production of oil, gas, and petroleum products in areas controlled by the Transitional National
Council of Libya.” More recently released general licenses removed restrictions on transactions
with Libyan oil firms.
Humanitarian Conditions and Relief
The gradual establishment of security and transitional authority control across the country should
facilitate greater international humanitarian access to internally displaced Libyans and other
communities with humanitarian needs. Those needs are not fully known, but recent assessment
visits indicate that the conflict has disrupted the supply of food, medicine, fuel, and other
commodities on a nationwide basis. Some current reports suggest that remaining pro-Qadhafi
fighters in Sirte and Bani Walid are preventing the flow of relief supplies to civilian populations
in those areas as a means of maintaining leverage and preventing opposition infiltration. The
conditional authorization of transfers of assets to and transactions with Libyan government
entities could mitigate some concerns about the supply of goods and services to the Libyan
population.24 The TNC, the United Nations, and third parties are expected to discuss needs
assessment and resource requirements in more detail over the coming weeks. According to TNC
Minister for Reconstruction Jehani, health sector improvements are among the TNC’s top
priorities because health facilities and personnel have been severely strained and disrupted during
the conflict.25
According to the International Organization for Migration (IOM), as of June 14, over 679,000
people had fled the country since the fighting began.26 These include Libyans as well as sizable
numbers of third country nationals, notably from Sub-Saharan Africa. Throughout the conflict,

22 The oil terminal at Brega reportedly suffered the most damage, along with support infrastructure elsewhere.
23 Office of Foreign Assets Control, Statement of Licensing Policy on the Trade in Oil, Gas, and Petroleum Products
Exported Under the Auspices of the Transitional National Council of Libya,” (Updated April 26, 2011), available at
http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/Programs/Documents/libya_oil_gas.pdf.
24 In May, U.N. Under-Secretary-General and Emergency Relief Coordinator Valerie Amos reported that “The manner
in which the sanctions are implemented and monitored is causing serious delays in the arrival of commercial goods.”
U.N. Document S/PV.6530, Provisional Record of the 6530th meeting of the Security Council, May 9, 2011.
25 Jehani remarks at United States Institute of Peace, September 23, 2011.
26 Response to the Libyan Crisis, External Situation Report, September 7, 2011.
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the U.S. government and its allies have worked to respond to the repatriation and humanitarian
needs of third country nationals who remain in temporary Tunisian and Egyptian border transit
camps. According to U.N. Under-Secretary-General and Emergency Relief Coordinator Valerie
Amos and the IOM, more recent fighting in western Libya displaced over 50,000 Libyan
civilians, many of whom fled into Tunisia and some of whom have begun to return. Italy and the
European Union have expressed concern about the movements of migrants from Libya by sea, in
some cases on ships in unsafe conditions. If security and economic conditions improve in Libya,
flows of migrants to Europe could slow.
International Criminal Court and United Nations Human Rights
Council Investigations27
On June 27, 2011, Pre-Trial Chamber I of the International Criminal Court (ICC) issued arrest
warrants for three individuals: Muammar al Qadhafi, his son Sayf al Islam al Qadhafi, and
intelligence chief Abdullah al Senussi, for “crimes against humanity committed against civilians”
not including “war crimes committed during the armed conflict that started at the end of
February.”28 ICC Prosecutor Luis Moreno-Ocampo requested the warrants on May 16. On May 4,
Moreno-Ocampo reported to the Security Council pursuant to the referral of the situation in Libya
since February 15, 2011, to the ICC by Resolution 1970, and stated that the preliminary
investigation conducted by the ICC prosecutor’s office “establishes reasonable grounds to believe
that widespread and systematic attacks against the civilian population, including murder and
persecution as crimes against humanity, have been and continue to be committed in Libya,” in
addition to “war crimes” during the ongoing armed conflict.29 Some observers have argued that
the prospect of an ICC trial made it less likely that Qadhafi would have agreed to relinquish
power or will now surrender to the opposition.30 Interpol has issued arrest warrants for all three
individuals.
The TNC has been supportive of the ICC efforts to investigate crimes in Libya, but its future
plans with regard to the ICC arrest warrants are as yet unclear. TNC officials have pledged to
pursue justice for Libyan victims of the recent fighting as well as victims from the Qadhafi era.
However, the transfer of individuals to foreign courts could remain politically sensitive for the
TNC or its successor. In August, TNC officials informed the ICC of reports that Sayf al Islam al
Qadhafi had been detained, although those reports subsequently proved false. TNC officials have
ordered rebel fighters to avoid reprisals, but some reports suggest that both pro- and anti-Qadhafi
forces may have engaged in summary executions during recent fighting in Tripoli.
On June 1, 2011, the U.N. Human Rights Council’s Commission of Inquiry issued a report
characterizing the Libyan conflict as “a civil war” and concluded that “international crimes, and

27 For more information on the ICC and Africa, see CRS Report R41116, The International Criminal Court (ICC):
Jurisdiction, Extradition, and U.S. Policy, by Emily C. Barbour and Matthew C. Weed and CRS Report RL34665,
International Criminal Court Cases in Africa: Status and Policy Issues, coordinated by Alexis Arieff.
28 ICC Prosecutor’s Office, Public Redacted Version of Prosecutor’s Application Pursuant to Article 58 as to Muammar
Mohammed Abu Minyar Gaddafi, Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi, and Abdullah Al Senussi,” May 16, 2011.
29 U.N. Document S/PV.6528, Provisional Record of the 6528th meeting of the Security Council, May 4, 2011.
30 For example, see International Crisis Group, “Popular Protest in North Africa and the Middle East (V): Making
Sense of Libya,” Middle East/North Africa Report No. 107, June 6, 2011.
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specifically crimes against humanity and war crimes, have been committed.”31 With regard to
government forces, it stated,
The commission has found that there have been acts constituting murder, imprisonment,
other forms of severe deprivation of physical liberty in violation of fundamental rules of
international law, torture, persecution, enforced disappearance and sexual abuse that were
committed by Government forces as part of a widespread or systematic attack against a
civilian population with knowledge of the attack.… The consistent pattern of violations
identified creates an inference that they were carried out as a result of policy decisions by
Colonel Qadhafi and members of his inner circle. Further investigation is required in relation
to making definitive findings with regard to the identity of those responsible for the crimes
committed.
With regard to opposition forces, the commission “established that some acts of torture and cruel
treatment and some outrages upon personal dignity in particular humiliating and degrading
treatment have been committed by opposition armed forces, in particular against persons in
detention, migrant workers and those believed to be mercenaries.” These acts could constitute
war crimes. The commission “is not of the view that the violations committed by the opposition
armed forces were part of any ‘widespread or systematic attack’ against a civilian population such
as to amount to crimes against humanity.” The commission considered its findings in light of the
future transitional justice needs of the Libyan people and recommended that the U.N. Human
Rights Council establish a mechanism to continue the monitoring and investigation of human
rights abuses in Libya for a period of one year.
Prospects and Challenges for U.S. Policy
Events in Libya remain fluid and fast-moving. After the swell of confidence and international
recognition following the capture of Tripoli, Libya’s revolutionaries and the TNC now must
embark on an uncharted path of political transition and economic recovery. A large number of
armed groups are now active and their continued unity of purpose and endorsement of proposed
TNC transition plans (see “Interim Transitional National Council (TNC)” below) cannot be taken
for granted. Since the uprising began, U.S. officials have argued that U.S. policy must remain
flexible in order to effectively shape and respond to changing developments. Given these
circumstances, Administration officials and Members of Congress may seek to define U.S.
interests; better understand the range of possible outcomes and discuss their potential
implications; and define the authorities for and costs of potential U.S. responses in advance.
Some expert observers of Libya’s domestic politics have emphasized the general weakness and
fractured condition of Libya’s political landscape after 40 years of idiosyncratic abuse by Qadhafi
and his supporters. Competition among tribal, regional, or political groups that are not now
apparent could emerge during any post-conflict negotiations. The political ascendance of
nonviolent Islamist opposition forces or the potential intransigence of any of the armed organized
factions now active, including armed Islamists, also may create unique challenges. Opposition
ranks might split in the short term over differences in opinion about security arrangements or in
the long term over the goals and shape of the post-Qadhafi political system. The United States

31 The commission members are Cherif Bassiouni of Egypt, Asma Khader of Jordan, and Philippe Kirsch of Canada.
See U.N. Document A/HRC/17/44, “Report of the International Commission of Inquiry to investigate all alleged
violations of international human rights law in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya,” June 1, 2011.
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and Europe have expressed concern about violent Islamist groups in Libya and were pursuing
counterterrorism cooperation with the Qadhafi government prior to the unrest.
Possible Questions
Possible questions that Members of Congress may wish to consider when assessing the recent
developments in Libya and proposals regarding continued U.S. military operations, foreign
assistance, or political engagement in Libya include the following:
• In the wake of Qadhafi’s downfall, what are the goals of U.S. policy in Libya?
What U.S. national interests are at stake? What options exist for securing them?
How might continued U.S. or multilateral military interventions to protect
civilians contribute to or detract from those goals? What advisory support and
assistance should be provided to interim authorities via military and civilian
means?
• How are events in Libya likely to shape developments in the broader Middle East
and North Africa? What unintended consequences may result from regime
change in Libya? What opportunities does regime change present? What
precedents have U.S. or multilateral military intervention in the Libyan conflict
set and how might those precedents affect the context in which U.S. decision
makers respond to other regional crises and events?
• When and on what terms should remaining U.N. or U.S. sanctions on Libyan
entities be removed? When should the United States transfer Libyan assets to a
new Libyan governing authority and for what purposes? Should the United States
seek reimbursement from Libya for the cost of military operations or
humanitarian assistance?
• In addition to UNSMIL, which actors are providing assistance and advice to
Libyans on security, stabilization, and reconstruction in the wake of the conflict?
Under what authority and on what terms? What role, if any, will the United States
play in a post-conflict setting? What appropriations or authorizations might be
required to support such a role?
• Which individuals and groups are emerging as key political, economic, and
security actors in Libya? What should be the key components of a future U.S.-
Libyan bilateral relationship? What limits to engagement, if any, should the
United States impose on its dealings with different Libyan groups? What type of
security relationship, if any, should the United States pursue with a new Libyan
government?
• What steps, if any, should the United States take to assist Libyan authorities in
securing chemical weapons stockpiles and nuclear materials? What can and
should be done to limit the proliferation of conventional weaponry within and
beyond Libya?
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Libyan Political Dynamics and Profiles
Political Dynamics
Prior to the recent conflict, Libya’s political dynamics were characterized by competition among
interest groups seeking to influence policy within the confines of the country’s authoritarian
political system and amid Libya’s emergence from international isolation. Economic reformers
embraced changes to Libya’s former socialist model to meet current needs, even as political
reforms languished amid disputes between hard-line political forces and reform advocates. In
general, the legacies of Italian colonial occupation and Libya’s struggle for independence in the
early-to-mid-20th century continue to influence Libyan politics. This is reflected in the celebration
of the legacy of the anti-colonial figure Omar al Mukhtar during the current uprising. Prior to the
recent unrest, rhetorical references to preserving sovereignty and resistance to foreign domination
were common in political statements from all parties. Wariness of ground-based foreign
intervention and the slogan “Libyans can do it on their own” common among Libyans reflect that
sentiment and are likely to persist in a post-Qadhafi environment. Most Libyans accept a
prominent role for Islamic tradition in public life, but differ in their personal preferences and
interpretations of their faith. Islam is the official religion and the Quran is the nominal basis for
the country’s law and its social code.
Tribal relationships have remained socially important, particularly in non-urban settings, and had
some political role under Qadhafi with regard to the distribution of leadership positions in
government ministries, in some economic relationships between some social groups and families,
and in political-military relations. Tribal loyalties reportedly remain strong within and between
branches of the armed services, and members of Qadhafi’s tribe, the Qadhafa, have held many
high-ranking government positions. Some members of larger tribes, such as the Magariha,
Misurata, and the Warfalla, sought to advance their broad interests under Qadhafi through control
of official positions of influence, although some of their members opposed the regime on grounds
of tribal discrimination.
Competition for influence among Libya’s regions characterized the pre-Qadhafi period, and some
saw the 1969 Qadhafi-led revolution as having been partly facilitated by western and southern
Libyan resentments of the Al Sanusi monarchy based in the eastern Libyan region of Cyrenaica.
More recent Libyan politics have not been dominated by overt inter-regional tension, although
pro-Qadhafi forces accused the organizers and leaders of the revolt as having, inter alia, an
eastern regional separatist agenda. The TNC denied these accusations and has quickly moved
representatives westward to Tripoli, while proposing changes to the structure and membership of
the TNC to improve national representation. Some reports suggest that federalism is one model
being explored by some groups, although the TNC has not endorsed federalism to date.
Political parties and all opposition groups were banned under Qadhafi. Formal political pluralism
was frowned upon by many members of the ruling elite, even as, in the period preceding the
unrest, some regime figures advocated for greater popular participation in existing government
institutions. The general lack of widespread experience in formal political organization,
competition, and administration is likely to remain a challenge in the immediate post-Qadhafi era.
Independent NGO reports suggest ad hoc political organization is ongoing across opposition-held
areas and much of it reflects a desire for institution-based, democratic governance rooted in the
rule of law. Some nascent political and social groups have sought external training and support to
overcome the legacy of decades of restrictions. The continued openness of newly liberated
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Libyans to outside examples and assistance remains to be determined, and different groups are
likely to take different approaches.
Prior to the 2011 uprising, Libya’s opposition movements were often categorized broadly as
Islamist, royalist, or secular nationalist in orientation. Their activities and effectiveness had been
largely limited by government repression and infiltration, disorganization, rivalry, and ideological
differences. New efforts to coordinate opposition activities had begun in response to Libya’s
reintegration to the international community and the emergence of a broader political reform
debate in the Arab world, and gained momentum with the outbreak of region-wide protests and
political change in late 2010 and early 2011. The infusion of popular support and regime
defectors to the broadly defined opposition cause inside Libya was welcomed by many
established opposition groups, even if the specific political demands of newly active opposition
supporters and their compatibility with the agendas of the established groups remain unclear.
The emergence of real political competition during Libya’s post-conflict and post-authoritarian
transition creates unique challenges for U.S. policymakers, among which are identifying new
leaders and groups; determining their relative intentions, goals, and legitimacy; and assessing the
capabilities and intent of armed elements.
Interim Transitional National Council (TNC)
Early in the uprising against Qadhafi, opposition leaders formed a 45-member Interim
Transitional National Council (TNC) in the eastern city of Benghazi to coordinate resistance
efforts and to serve as an international representative for the Libyan people. Endorsements from
self-organized local councils established some basic political legitimacy and authority for the
TNC, and its leaders addressed their plans and appeals to all Libyans regardless of region or
political orientation in the hopes of maintaining unity. The TNC took on some of the functions of
government in liberated areas of the east, although all accounts suggest that Libyan citizens’
volunteer efforts and restraint were mainly responsible for the maintenance of order. The TNC’s
authority over volunteer fighters appeared tenuous at best during much of the conflict. As of late
September, the TNC had assumed responsibility for transition efforts nationwide, working
through the local councils that established its legitimacy. Leading TNC figures have relocated to
Tripoli to direct efforts from the capital. Many world governments have recognized the TNC as
“the legitimate representative of the Libyan people,” and the U.N. General Assembly voted to
grant the TNC Libya’s seat at the United Nations. The United States government refers to the
TNC as “the legitimate interlocutor for the Libyan people during this interim period.”
Throughout the conflict, limited information has been available about the TNC’s relationships
with many emergent opposition leaders, particularly in western Libya, whose identities TNC
leaders claimed needed to remain secret for their protection. The prominent role played by
western activists and armed elements in capturing Tripoli and the criticism that some groups have
made of TNC leaders and decisions in the wake of the capture of Tripoli illustrates the challenges
facing the TNC. Some opposition supporters, including the Libyan Muslim Brotherhood and local
leaders from Misuratah, have indicated they will not support the participation of some former
government officials in any future transitional political arrangement. These concerns have led to
delays in announcing a reorganization of the TNC executive authority, even as critical groups and
figures have endorsed the TNC’s transition roadmap in general terms.
The TNC has laid out key aspects of its political platform and proposed roadmap for the transition
in a bid to communicate clearly with domestic supporters and the international community. The
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TNC also has taken steps to clarify the legislative role of the Council and the role of its
“executive authority” and “stabilization team.”
• According to TNC officials and a draft interim national charter, current plans call
for local councils to select representatives to a reconstituted National Transitional
Council, which will remain “the supreme authority” in Libya, deriving its
legitimacy from “the Revolution of February 17.”32 A declaration of liberation
will start a proposed sequence for the transition, with key milestones expected
over a period of 20 months.
• After naming an interim government—within 30 days of a declaration of
liberation—the TNC is to choose members by secret ballot for a Constitutional
Authority to draft a constitution that would then be subject to a popular
referendum. Within 60 days of the approval of a constitution, the TNC will
provide electoral laws for U.N.-supervised national elections to be held within
six months for a legislature and president.
• The executive authority, led by Prime Minister Mahmoud Jibril and deputy
chairman Ali Tarhouni, plays a cabinet function. Individuals are responsible for
discrete portfolios including internal security, foreign relations, social affairs,
reconstruction and Islamic endowments, among others.
• The stabilization team, led by Minister for Reconstruction Ahmed Jehani, is
responsible for overseeing transition efforts across all sectors. The team
developed detailed plans in consultation with Libyans and external parties in
preparation for the end of the conflict. Minister Jehani is now coordinating TNC
interaction with external parties on implementing those plans in key sectors such
as public finance, public security, health, education, and civil service reform.
Transition plans include a series of restrictions on the ability of TNC and executive authority
members from holding dual office, benefitting from transactions involving state property, and
standing for some future elected positions. The draft charter states that “Islam is the religion of
the state and the principal source of legislation is Islamic jurisprudence (sharia).... The State shall
guarantee for non-Moslems the freedom of practicing religious rights and shall guarantee respect
for their systems of personal status.”
Prominent TNC Figures
• Mustafa Abdeljalil. (aka Mustafa Abdeljalil Fadl) Serves as chairman of the
Interim Transitional National Council. He served as Libya’s justice minister from
2007 through the onset of the uprising. He is known for having been supportive
of some reform initiatives advanced by Sayf al Islam al Qadhafi and for
challenging Muammar al Qadhafi and his supporters regarding due process and
incarceration of prisoners in some prominent legal cases during 2009 and 2010.
He attempted to resign from his position in early 2010.33 He is a native of Bayda,

32 CRS obtained a draft interim national charter from an independent source as well as from a translated version
available from the U.S. Open Source Center. Pending the availability of a final official version, this analysis is subject
to change.
33 OSC Report GMP20100128950040, “Libyan Minister of Justice Resigns Over ‘Harsh’ Criticism in People’s
Congress,” January 28, 2010.
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where he once served as chief judge. He is 59 years old. In February, Abdeljalil
claimed to have evidence that Qadhafi ordered the terrorist attack on Pan Am
Flight 103.
• Mahmoud Jibril. (aka Mahmoud Jibril Ibrahim Al Warfali) Mahmoud Jibril
serves as the interim prime minister and the foreign affairs representative for the
executive bureau of the TNC. He is a graduate of the University of Pittsburgh,
where he earned a masters degree in political science and a Ph.D. in planning in
the early 1980s. He is 58 years old, and is described by personal acquaintances
and professional contacts as being intelligent, moderate, analytical, detail-
oriented, and an articulate English speaker. He worked as an independent
consultant prior to serving as the secretary of the Libyan National Planning
Council and director-general of the National Economic Development Board
(NEDB) from 2007 onward. The NEDB was a government entity affiliated with
Muammar al Qadhafi’s relatively reform-oriented son Sayf al Islam that was
tasked with proposing institutional reform and attracting foreign investment and
educational exchange opportunities to Libya. He visited Washington, DC, during
the week of May 9 and met with Members of Congress, Senators, and
Administration officials.
• Ali Tarhouni. Serves as the vice chairman of the TNC executive authority.
Returned to Libya from the United States where he has lived since the early
1970s and worked as an economics professor at the University of Washington.
• Abdel Hafez Ghoga. Serves as vice-chairman and spokesman for the TNC. He is
described in the Libyan press as a “human rights lawyer and community
organizer.” Reports suggest that Ghoga had been working to organize a national
transitional council at the same time as Mustafa Abdeljalil and others were
working to form the TNC. The two figures reportedly agreed to cooperate.
• Ahmed Jehani. Serves as minister of infrastructure and reconstruction and
chairman of the TNC “stabilization team.” Jehani is a former World Bank adviser
and country director. He served with Mahmoud Jibril as the associate director
general of the National Economic Development Board (NEDB). In the 1970s he
served as general counsel for the Libyan National Oil Company. He holds legal
degrees from Harvard and the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy.
Armed Opposition Forces
A military council was established in parallel to the TNC to coordinate the efforts of volunteers
and defectors, and a Tripoli-based higher security council seeks to coordinate the efforts of
volunteer militia groups and former regime security officials. TNC representatives have sought to
manage rivalries among leading defectors, former exiles, and volunteers, while remaining vague
about the role of former regime military forces who defected. Rebel operations do not appear to
have featured regular military units. Opposition-affiliated forces include the “17 February
Forces,” the “Army of Free Libya,” and groups made up of various volunteers, including
secularists and Islamists. City-based militias remain active and have demonstrated a willingness
and ability to work independently of their counterparts and the TNC.
Consistent coordination among the different volunteer armed elements is not apparent, and key
figures Abdelfattah Younis al Ubaydi and Khalifah Belqasim Haftar reportedly competed for
leadership of the opposition’s overall efforts prior to Younis’s assassination in July by an
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unidentified faction.34 During the conflict, much of the reporting from combat areas regularly
described the opposition as mostly untrained, poorly equipped, uncoordinated, and without
professional logistics or communications support.35 The coordinated assault on Tripoli, including
the reported intervention by Misuratah-based fighters, appeared to belie those descriptions, even
as subsequent urban fighting in Tripoli and in pro-Qadhafi strongholds in Sirte, Bani Walid, and
Sebha has been chaotic.
Prominent opposition military and security figures include
• Omar al Hariri. Serves as the military affairs representative (or “defense
minister”) on the TNC. Hariri participated in 1969 anti-monarchy coup alongside
Qadhafi, but later was imprisoned and sentenced to death on suspicion of plotting
an uprising in 1975. He was moved to Tobruk and placed under house arrest in
1990. He is 67 years old. He has been quoted as calling for “a multi-party
system” for Libya.
• Abdelfattah Younis al Ubaydi. Assassinated in July 2011. Participated in the
1969 anti-monarchy coup alongside Qadhafi. Prior to the conflict, he served as
minister for public security and a special forces commander, which put him in
charge of some internal security forces through the start of the uprising. His
resignation and defection came just hours after Muammar al Qadhafi specifically
named him as one of his key supporters in a February 22 speech. Human rights
concerns prior to and potentially during the beginning of the unrest could have
involved forces under his command. He was the TNC-appointed leader of
military operations and remained an outspoken advocate for the opposition cause
until his death. Subsequent reports suggested that allegations that he misled the
opposition about his activities and forces may have contributed to suspicions that
he remained a clandestine Qadhafi supporter.
• Colonel Khalifah Belqasim Haftar. A veteran of the ill-fated Libyan invasion of
Chad during the 1980s, he turned against Qadhafi. Colonel Haftar returned to
Libya from exile in the United States after the uprising began.36 In the past,
Haftar has been mentioned as a leader of the Libyan Movement for Change and
Reform and the Libyan National Army, an armed opposition group reported to
have received support from foreign intelligence agencies and alleged to have

34 Kareem Fahim, “Rebel Leadership Shows Signs of Strain in Libya,” New York Times, April 4, 2011; Kim Sengupta,
“Divided and Disorganised, Libyan Rebel Military Turn on NATO Allies,” The Independent (UK), April 7, 2011; and,
Rod Nordland, “As British Help Libyan Rebels, Aid Goes to a Divided Force,” New York Times, April 19, 2011.
35 One early April account described the opposition forces as follows: “The hard core of the fighters has been the
shabaab—the young people whose protests in mid-February sparked the uprising. They range from street toughs to
university students (many in computer science, engineering, or medicine), and have been joined by unemployed
hipsters and middle-aged mechanics, merchants, and storekeepers. There is a contingent of workers for foreign
companies: oil and maritime engineers, construction supervisors, translators. There are former soldiers, their gunstocks
painted red, green, and black—the suddenly ubiquitous colors of the pre-Qaddafi Libyan flag. And there are a few
bearded religious men, more disciplined than the others, who appear intent on fighting at the dangerous tip of the
advancing lines.… With professional training and leadership (presumably from abroad), the rebels may eventually turn
into something like a proper army. But, for now, they have perhaps only a thousand trained fighters, and are woefully
outgunned.” Jon Lee Anderson, “Who are the Rebels?” The New Yorker, April 4, 2011.
36 Chris Adams, “Libyan rebel leader spent much of past 20 years in suburban Virginia,” McClatchy Newspapers,
March 26, 2011.
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been involved in past attempts to overthrow Qadhafi.37 Press reports suggest
Haftar is contributing to training and command efforts and either took or was
granted the rank/title of general. Reports also suggest that the TNC may have
sought to remove him from a command role, and that Haftar has resisted those
efforts.
• Major Abdelmoneim Al Huni. An original member of the Revolution
Command Council, Al Huni had been serving as Libya’s representative to the
Arab League and resigned in protest of the use of force against protestors.
Regional press accounts from the 1990s describe Al Huni as having coordinated
with the opposition efforts of Colonel Haftar and others, before Al Huni
reconciled with Qadhafi in 2000.
• Abdelhakim Belhajj. Reported to be the commander of a significant contingent
of opposition forces involved in the capture of Tripoli, Belhajj is otherwise
known as the former commander of the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group, a U.S.-
designated Foreign Terrorist Organization. Belhajj, a veteran of the anti-Soviet
period in Afghanistan, fled Afghanistan via Iran and Thailand in the wake of the
U.S. invasion in 2001 and was detained and transferred to Libyan detention. He
remained imprisoned until 2010, when he was released as part of a reconciliation
agreement between the Qadhafi government and the LIFG.38
Exiles and Al Sanusi Monarchy Figures
Complex relationships among former regime figures, competing heirs to the former monarchy
(1951-1969), and long-standing opposition leaders may evolve as specific arrangements are made
for reconciliation and a new government.
Opposition groups in exile have included the National Alliance, the Libyan National Movement
(LNM), the Libyan Movement for Change and Reform, the Islamist Rally, the National Libyan
Salvation Front (NLSF), and the Republican Rally for Democracy and Justice. These groups and
others held an opposition conference—known as the National Conference for the Libyan
Opposition (NCLO)—in July 2005 in London and issued a “national accord,” calling for the
removal of Qadhafi from power and the establishment of a transitional government.39 A follow-up
meeting was held in March 2008.40 The NCLO reportedly helped lead the call for the February
17, 2011, “day of rage” that helped catalyze protests into a full-blown uprising against Qadhafi.
A royalist contingent based on the widely recognized claim to the leadership of the royal family
by Mohammed al Rida al Sanusi, the son of the former Libyan crown prince, has been based in
London.41 His claim is disputed by a distant relative, whose family members also have given

37 OSC Report FTS19960821000373, “U.S.-Based Oppositionist Has ‘Secret Meetings’ Near Tripoli,” August 21,
1996.
38 Rod Nordland, “As British Help Libyan Rebels, Aid Goes to a Divided Force,” New York Times, April 19, 2011.
39 May Youssef, “Anti-Gaddafists Rally in London,” Al Ahram Weekly (Cairo), No. 749, June 30 - July 6, 2005; Al
Jazeera (Doha), “Opposition Plans to Oust Al Qadhafi,” June 25, 2005; Middle East Mirror, “Libya’s Fractured
Opposition,” July 29, 2005.
40 “Libyan Opposition Groups Meet in London To Reiterate Commitment To Save Libya,” OSC Report
GMP20080329825012, March 29, 2008.
41 His family name also is transliterated as Al Senussi. Immediately prior to his departure for medical treatment in
August 1969, the late King Idris signaled his intent to abdicate and pass authority to his crown prince and nephew,
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interviews to international media outlets. On April 20, Mohammed al Sanusi met with members
of the European Parliament and said, “it is up to the Libyan people to decide whether they go
down the road of a constitutional monarchy or that of a republic.” He recently repeated similar
sentiments and called on Libyans “to lay the foundations for a democratic state.” The Libyan
constitutional monarchy system was overturned by Qadhafi in 1969, and Al Sanusi believes the
old constitution, if “suitably updated,” could “form the basis of a new Libya.” He also has
pledged to “assist in creating a democratic state for Libyans based on a representative parliament
chosen by free and fair elections.”
Libyan Islamists and the TNC
Like citizens in other Middle Eastern societies, Libyans have grappled with questions posed by
Islamist activism, state repression of Islamist groups, and violent Islamist extremism over a
period of decades. As the transition period unfolds, Libyans will be debating the role of Islamist
groups in political life, the role of Islam in society, and the nature and proper responses to threats
posed by armed extremist groups. These debates may have implications for U.S. policy toward
Libya and the region.
The Muslim Brotherhood
A statement attributed to the Libyan Muslim Brotherhood in late February 2011 welcomed the
formation of the TNC but called for a future, non-tribal government to “be formed by those who
actually led the revolution on the ground” and to exclude supporters of the original Qadhafi coup
or officials involved in human rights violations.42 This would seem to implicate some original
Qadhafi allies and security officials who have defected to the opposition cause. An individual
with reported links to the Muslim Brotherhood, Dr. Ali al Salabi, has criticized the TNC
leadership on these grounds in the wake of the capture of Tripoli.43 In the past, the controller
general of the Libyan Muslim Brotherhood, Suleiman Abdel Qadir, has described the
Brotherhood’s objectives as peaceful and policy-focused, and has long called for the cancellation
of laws restricting political rights.44

(...continued)
Hasan al Rida al Mahdi al Sanusi. Crown Prince Hasan was serving as regent during the Qadhafi coup, and he and his
family were imprisoned and placed under house arrest until being allowed to leave Libya in the late 1980s. Each of
King Idris’s potential direct heirs died as children. Upon Prince Hasan’s death in 1992, he passed the title of head of the
Al Sanusi royal house to his son, Prince Mohammed al Rida al Sanusi.
42 OSC Report GMP20110228405001, “Libyan Muslim Brotherhood Group Supports ‘Glorious Revolution,’” February
28, 2011.
43 Al Salabi is referred to in regional press outlets as a prominent Muslim Brotherhood supporter. In the past, Al Salabi
facilitated the government’s dialogue with imprisoned Islamists.
44 In 2007, Abdel Qadir responded to political reform statements by Sayf al Islam al Qadhafi with calls for more
inclusive, consultative decision making. In a November 2008 interview, Abdel Qadir noted that reform outreach was
taking place under the auspices of the Qadhafi Foundation and not through official state organs, which in his view
undermined the significance of the outreach. He also repeated calls for reform and reconciliation aimed at creating a
constitution and protecting civil rights for Libyans. See OSC Report GMP20050803550006, “Al Jazirah TV Interviews
Libyan Muslim Brotherhood Leader on Current Situation,” August 3, 2005; OSC Report GMP20070830282001,
“Libyan MB Concerned Over Sayf al-Islam’s Statements Regarding New Constitution,” August 30, 2007; and, OSC
Report GMP20081111635001, “Libyan Muslim Brotherhood Official on Libya’s Foreign, Domestic Politics,”
November 10, 2008.
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Like other political organizations and opposition groups, the Muslim Brotherhood was banned in
Libya under Qadhafi. Since the late 1940s, when members of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood
first entered Libya following a crackdown on their activities, the Libyan Muslim Brotherhood has
existed as a semi-official organization. Hundreds of Brotherhood members and activists were
jailed in 1973, although the Brotherhood eventually reemerged and operated as a clandestine
organization for much of the following two decades. In 1998, a second round of mass arrests took
place, and 152 Brotherhood leaders and members were arrested. Several reportedly died in
custody, and, following trials in 2001 and 2002, two prominent Brotherhood leaders were
sentenced to death and over 70 were sentenced to life in prison.45 The government announced a
retrial for the imprisoned Brotherhood activists in October 2005, and in March 2006, the group’s
84 remaining imprisoned members were released.46
Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG)/Libyan Islamic Movement for
Change (LIMC)
The LIFG is a U.S.-designated Foreign Terrorist Organization and Islamist movement that used
violence in past attempts to overthrow Muammar al Qadhafi and his government.47 Over the last
20-plus years, members of the LIFG are reported to have fought in various conflicts around the
world involving Muslims, including in Afghanistan during the 1980s, the Balkans during the
1990s, and Iraq after 2003. According to the U.S. State Department, members of the group at
times have demonstrated distinct and competing priorities: “some members maintained a strictly
anti-Qadhafi focus … others … aligned with Osama bin Laden, and are believed to be part of the
Al Qaeda leadership structure or active in international terrorism.”48 According to the 2010 State
Department report on terrorism released in August 2011, many LIFG members in Europe and
Libya rejected a 2007 statement by Ayman al Zawahiri and the late Abu Layth Al Libi
announcing the merger of the LIFG with Al Qaeda.49 In a July 2009 statement, LIFG members in
Britain characterized the November 2007 Al Qaeda affiliation announcement as “a personal
decision that is at variance with the basic status of the group,” and sought to “clearly emphasize
that the group is not, has never been, and will never be, linked to the Al Qaeda organization.”50
While publicly rejecting Al Qaeda affiliation, the 2009 LIFG statement warned the Qadhafi
government that the group would “preserve [its] lawful and natural right to oppose the regime if it
does not turn its back on its previous policy that has led to tension and deadlock.” The
participation of LIFG figures in recent military operations against pro-Qadhafi forces illustrated
this commitment. However, prior to the recent unrest, many leading LIFG figures had been
imprisoned and released after renouncing the use of violence as part of a dialogue and
reconciliation process with the Qadhafi government.51 Some figures affiliated with the LIFG, such

45 The two were group leaders Dr. Abdullah Ahmed Izzadin and Dr. Salem Mohammed Abu Hanek.
46 Afaf El Geblawi, “Libya Frees All Jailed Muslim Brotherhood Members,” Agence France Presse, March 3, 2006.
47 The United States froze the LIFG’s U.S. assets under Executive Order 13224 in September 2001, and formally
designated the LIFG as a Foreign Terrorist Organization in December 2004.
48 See U.S. Department of State, “Terrorist Organizations: LIFG,” Country Reports on Terrorism 2010, August 2011.
49 OSC Report FEA20071104393586, “Al-Zawahiri, Al-Libi: Libyan Islamic Fighting Group Joins Al-Qa’ida,”
November 3, 2007.
50 OSC Report GMP20090703825003, “Libyan Islamic Fighting Group Abroad Issues Statement Supporting Regime
Dialogue,” July 3, 2009.
51 Through this process, over 200 LIFG members were released from jail, including senior leaders and former
commanders who have been active during the recent unrest. Prominent prisoners released under the auspices of the
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as current Tripoli-based militia commander Abdelhakim Belhajj, participated in this
reconciliation process and have reiterated their rejection of Al Qaeda and its ideology in public
interviews in recent weeks (see below).
Some Libya-based members of the LIFG responded to the release of leading figures on February
16 by announcing the reorganization of the group as the Libyan Islamic Movement for Change
(LIMC). The LIMC demands political change and an end to corruption, and has underscored its
decision to “enter a new stage of struggle in which we do not adopt an armed program but a belief
in the Libyan people’s ability to bring about the change to which we are aspiring.”52
Al Qaeda Affiliation and Recantations
The United States froze the LIFG’s U.S. assets under Executive Order 13224 in September 2001,
and formally designated the LIFG as a Foreign Terrorist Organization in December 2004. In
February 2006, the U.S. Department of the Treasury designated five individuals and four entities
in the United Kingdom as Specially Designated Global Terrorists for their role in supporting the
LIFG.53 On October 30, 2008, Treasury designated three more LIFG financiers.54 Some observers
characterized the designations as a U.S. gesture of solidarity with the Qadhafi government and
argued that the ability and willingness of the LIFG to mount terror attacks in Libya may have
been limited. Others claimed that some LIFG fighters were allied with other violent Islamist
groups operating in the trans-Sahara region, and cited evidence of Libyan fighters joining the
Iraqi insurgency as an indication of ongoing Islamist militancy in Libya and a harbinger of a
possible increase in violence associated with fighters returning from Iraq.55
In November 2007, Al Qaeda figures Ayman al Zawahiri and Abu Layth al Libi announced the
merger of the LIFG with Al Qaeda, which many terrorism analysts viewed at the time as having
political rather than operational relevance.56 Abu Layth Al Libi was killed in an air strike in
Pakistan in February 2008. The group’s reported ties with Al Qaeda came under scrutiny in July
2009 after group members based in Britain reportedly renounced the group’s affiliation with Al
Qaeda, and contrasted the LIFG with others who use indiscriminate bombing and target
civilians.57 The statement warned that the group would “preserve [its] lawful and natural right to

(...continued)
reconciliation program include former LIFG leader Abdelhakim Belhajj, former military director Khaled Sharif, and
leading LIFG ideologue Sami Sa’idi. OSC Report GMP20100323950045, “Three leaders of Libyan Fighting Group
freed – paper,” March 23, 2010.
52 OSC Report GMP20110217825017, “Libya: IFG Elements Establish New Group Aiming for Peaceful Regime
Change,” February 17, 2011.
53 U.S. Department of the Treasury, “Treasury Designates UK-Based Individuals, Entities Financing Al Qaida-
Affiliated LIFG,” JS-4016, February 8, 2006.
54 U.S. Department of the Treasury, “Three LIFG Members Designation for Terrorism,” HP-1244, October 30, 2008.
55 Alison Pargeter, “Militant Groups Pose Security Challenge for Libyan Regime,” Janes Intelligence Review, Vol. 17,
No. 8, August 2005, pp. 16-19.
56 OSC Report FEA20071104393586, “Al-Zawahiri, Al-Libi: Libyan Islamic Fighting Group Joins Al-Qa’ida,”
November 3, 2007.
57 In a July 2009 statement, LIFG members in Britain characterized the November 2007 Al Qaeda affiliation
announcement from the late Abu Layth Al Libi as “a personal decision that is at variance with the basic status of the
group,” and sought to “clearly emphasize that the group is not, has never been, and will never be, linked to the Al
Qaeda organization.” OSC Report GMP20090703825003, “Libyan Islamic Fighting Group Abroad Issues Statement
Supporting Regime Dialogue,” July 3, 2009.
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oppose the regime if it does not turn its back on its previous policy that has led to tension and
deadlock.”
The Libyan government and the LIFG reached an agreement in which LIFG leaders renounced
violence against the Libyan state, and, later in 2009, the dialogue resulted in the issuance of
written “recantations” of the LIFG’s former views on religion and violence.58 In October 2009,
over 40 LIFG prisoners were released, alongside other Islamists. However, Libyan and U.S.
concerns about LIFG’s domestic and international activities persisted. Qadhafi announced the
release of the final 110 “reconciled” LIFG members at the outset of the 2011 uprising, reportedly
including Abdelwahhab Muhammad Qayid, who has been identified in some sources as the
brother of prominent Al Qaeda ideologue Abu Yahya al Libi. In March 2011, Abu Yahya Al Libi
released a video condemning Qadhafi and calling on Libyans to use arms against Qadhafi
supporters, but to refrain from violence or criminality against each other.59
Al Qaeda in the Lands of the Islamic Maghreb (AQLIM/AQIM)60
U.S. government officials and their regional counterparts remain focused on the potential for the
unrest in Libya to provide opportunities to Al Qaeda’s regional affiliate, Al Qaeda in the Lands of
the Islamic Maghreb (AQLIM/AQIM). Some press reports suggest that AQIM personnel have
obtained weaponry from looted Libyan military stockpiles, including surface-to-air missiles. The
Algerian, Malian, and Chadian governments continue to express concern about the potential for
instability in Libya to weaken security along Libya’s long borders, which could allow AQIM
operatives and criminal networks that provide services to AQIM to move more freely.
While the imprisoned, Libya-based leaders of the LIFG participated in reconciliation with
Qadhafi’s government and renounced violence as a domestic political tool, the participation of
some of their supporters in efforts to send Libyans abroad to participate in insurgencies and
terrorism has raised concerns about the potential for cooperation between AQIM and some
Libyan Islamists. Former Guantanamo Bay detainee Abu Sufian Hamuda Bin Qumu has attracted
some media attention, and one figure, Abdelhakim Al Hasadi, is leading ad hoc security
arrangements in the eastern city of Darnah, which was home to several dozen Libyan recruits who
travelled to Iraq to fight U.S. and coalition forces.61 TNC oversight of his operations is not
apparent, although he has indicated his support for the Council’s role. As noted above, the group’s
former commander, Abdelhakim Belhajj, is playing a leadership role in some military operations

58 “Report on ‘Seething Anger’ in Libya Over Dismantling Al Qa’ida-Linked Cells,” OSC Report
GMP20080630825001 June 30, 2008; “Libya: Jailed Islamic Group Leaders ‘Preparing’ To Renounce Armed
Violence,” OSC Report GMP20080706837002, July 6, 2008; “Libyan Islamic Fighting Group Source Announces
Ideology Revision Nearly Complete,” OSC Report GMP20090615825012, June 15, 2009; and OSC Reports,
GMP20090911452001, GMP20090911452002, GMP2009091145200, GMP20090910488004, GMP20090911452004,
GMP20090915452001, “Libyan Newspaper Publishes Libyan Fighting Group Retractions,” September 2009.
59 OSC Report GMP20110313479001, “New Abu-Yahya al-Libi Video: ‘To Our People in Libya,’” March 12, 2011.
60 For more information on AQIM and its relationship to Al Qaeda, see CRS Report R41070, Al Qaeda and Affiliates:
Historical Perspective, Global Presence, and Implications for U.S. Policy, coordinated by John Rollins.
61 Kevin Peraino, “Destination Martyrdom,” Newsweek, April 19, 2008. Al Hasadi claims to have recruited Libyans to
fight in Iraq, but has publicly denied accusations he is affiliated with Al Qaeda or is seeking to establish Islamist rule in
Darnah or on a national basis. Al Hasadi appeared on Al Jazeera and read a statement denying the Libyan government’s
accusations. See OSC Report GMP20110225648002, “Libya: Former LIFG Leader Denies Plan To Establish ‘Islamic
Emirate’ in Darnah,” February 25, 2011; and, OSC Report EUP20110322025008, “Libya: Rebel Leader in Derna
Denies Local Presence of Extremists, Al-Qa'ida,” March 22, 2011.
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in and around Tripoli. Some Libyan observers have been critical of international media coverage
of these individuals and argue they represent an exception and have been given too much
attention.
On April 16, London-based pan-Arab newspaper Al Hayat published an email interview with a
reported spokesman for AQIM named Salah Abu Muhammad, who stated that AQIM had
obtained weaponry from Libyan military stockpiles and claimed that AQIM had cooperative
relationships with Al Hasadi and so-called “emirates” in several eastern Libyan cities. A
subsequent statement from another reported AQIM source accused Algerian intelligence services
of fabricating the Abu Muhammad interview.62 Neither source could be independently verified.
A March 17 statement attributed to AQIM leader Abdelmalik Droukdel (aka Abu Mus’ab al
Wudud) addressed Libyan rebels and sought to associate the Libyan uprising with Al Qaeda’s
campaign against Arab and Western governments.63 The statement advised Libyans to avoid
cooperation with the United States and “to rally around the revolutionary leaders who are holding
fast to their Islamic faith and whose readiness to make sacrifices has been proven on the
battlefield.” Other AQIM figures have sought to explain that their organization is not seeking to
direct or claim credit for the Libyan uprising, but that AQIM is supportive of the campaign
against Qadhafi.
Transitional National Council Positions and Statements
To date, the leadership of the TNC has not demonstrated rhetorical or material support for Al
Qaeda, the Muslim Brotherhood, or Hamas. TNC officials repeatedly emphasize their concerns
about the proliferation of small arms and light weapons within and potentially beyond Libya. The
TNC has not taken public positions on a number of foreign policy matters—including the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict—in line with its commitment to leave the definition of Libyan foreign policy
to a future elected government. On March 30, the TNC released a statement affirming its support
for U.N. Security Council resolutions on Al Qaeda and the Taliban and U.N. conventions on
terrorism. The statement “affirms the Islamic identity of the Libyan People, its commitment to the
moderate Islamic values, its full rejection to the extremist ideas and its commitment to combating
them in all circumstances, and refuses the allegations aiming to associate al-Qaeda with the
revolutionists in Libya.”
Since the capture of Tripoli, TNC leaders have reemphasized their rejection of ideological
extremism among Libyans and are seeking to unite different interest groups for the transition
period. As noted above, the TNC’s draft interim constitutional charter, released in August, states
in Article One that: “Libya is an independent Democratic State wherein the people are the source
of authorities.… Islam is the Religion of the State and the principal source of legislation is
Islamic Jurisprudence (sharia).… The State shall guarantee for non-Muslims the freedom of
practicing religious rights and shall guarantee respect for their systems of personal status.” On
September 12, TNC Chairman Mustafa Abdeljalil said in a public address in Tripoli that the TNC

62 See OSC Report GMP20110416825001, “Al-Qa’ida in Islamic Maghreb Spokesman Says There Are Islamic
Amirates in Libya,” April 16, 2011; and, OSC Report AFP20110418950070, “AQIM accuses Al-Hayat newspaper of
falsifying interview with spokesman,” April 18, 2011.
63 Droukdel said “the battle you are fighting now with the tyrant ... It is itself the battle we fought yesterday and are
fighting today.” See OSC Report GMP20110318405002, “AQIM Amir’s Audio Message to Libya, ‘The Descendants
of Umar al-Mukhtar,’” March 17, 2011.
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is “seeking to establish the rule of law, a welfare state, and a state in which Islamic sharia will be
the main source of legislation.… we will not allow any extremist ideology, whether on the left or
on the right. We are a Muslim people, our Islam is moderate, and we will preserve that.”64
TNC officials have continuously denied that their ranks or those of their military supporters
include Al Qaeda operatives, although some TNC officials have made statements expressing
concern that extremist groups are active in Libya and may seek to exploit the recent fighting and
transition. For example:
• On August 22, Chairman Abdeljalil told an Al Jazeera interviewer that he “was
planning to resign from the council the day Abd-al-Fattah Yunus [former
commander of Libyan rebels] was killed as long as the rebels think in such a
manner. It does not honor me to work for a council that oversees rebels with such
mentality. We have some extremist Islamists.… I tell you candidly that there are
extremist Islamist groups that seek to have revenge and to create turbulence in
the Libyan society. I will not be honored to be the head of a National Transitional
Council with such rebels working for it.”65 Subsequent reports suggest that TNC
officials have identified and detained the individuals suspected of involvement in
the murder of Yunus. TNC officials have not confirmed the ideological affiliation
of those individuals, and a trial is expected.
• On August 28, TNC military commander Khalifah Heftar said in an Al Arabiya
television interview: “I was asked before whether Al Qaeda elements have joined
us. I answered this question by saying that had there been Al Qaeda groups here
in Libya, I would not have been in this position. However, I knew that there are
extremist groups in Libya, and this extremism does not lie in the interest of the
Libyan people, and I do not think the Libyan people accept this extremism.”66
U.S. and regional observers continue to closely monitor statements from and actions by AQIM,
Libyan Islamists, and the TNC.

Author Contact Information

Christopher M. Blanchard

Analyst in Middle Eastern Affairs
cblanchard@crs.loc.gov, 7-0428



64 OSC Report FEA20110913021928, “Libya: TNC Chairman Says Sharia'h Law To Be Main Source of Legislation -
Libya TV,” September 12, 2011.
65 OSC Report GMP20110822676001, “Libya's Abd-al-Jalil Warns of 'Extremist Islamists,' Threatens To Resign,”
August 22, 2011.
66 OSC Report GMP20110828648003, “Libya: Rebel Military Commander Says No Al-Qa'ida Groups in Libya,”
August 28, 2011.
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