Libya: Unrest and U.S. Policy
Christopher M. Blanchard
Analyst in Middle Eastern Affairs
September 29, 2011
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Libya: Unrest and U.S. Policy
Summary
After more than 40 years of authoritarian repression and over seven months of armed conflict,
fundamental political change has come to Libya. The Libyan people, their interim Transitional
National Council (TNC), and the international community are now shifting their attention from
their struggle with the remnants of Muammar al Qadhafi’s defeated regime to longer-term
challenges posed by a planned transition to democratic governance. The rebel military victory
over pro-Qadhafi forces signals the beginning of a period that may prove more complex and
challenging for Libyans and their international supporters alike. Immediate tasks include
establishing and maintaining security, preventing criminality and reprisals, restarting Libya’s
economy, and taking the first steps toward defining a new political system. In the coming weeks
and months, Libyans will face key questions about basic terms for transitional justice, a new
constitutional order, political participation, and Libyan foreign policy. Security challenges,
significant investment needs, and vigorous political debates are likely to emerge.
As of September 29, increasingly isolated areas in central and southern Libya remain contested.
Muammar al Qadhafi has not been located or detained, and small groups of pro-Qadhafi forces
are capable of armed resistance. The U.S. military continues to participate in Operation Unified
Protector, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) military operation to enforce United
Nations (U.N.) Security Council Resolution 1973, which authorizes “all necessary measures” to
protect Libyan civilians. On September 21, NATO extended the military operation for a further 90
days, if necessary. U.S. officials express confidence that nuclear materials and chemical weapons
components that are stored in Libya remain secure and state that remote monitoring will continue.
The proliferation of military weaponry from unsecured Libyan stockpiles—including small arms,
explosives, and shoulder-fired anti-aircraft missiles—remains a serious concern. The Obama
Administration has reiterated that it has no intention of deploying U.S. military forces on the
ground in Libya. The U.S. Embassy in Tripoli has reopened with a limited staff. Congress may
consider proposals for assisting Libya’s transitional authorities or supporting security efforts.
The U.N. General Assembly has recognized the TNC as Libya’s U.N. representative, and the
Security Council has adopted Resolution 2009, creating a three-month mandate for a U.N.
Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) to assist Libyans with public security and transition
arrangements. The resolution also sets conditions for the sale of arms and training to the Libyan
state and partially lifts the asset freeze for certain purposes. The TNC continues to call for the
release of Libyan assets seized pursuant to Resolutions 1970 and 1973. Transfers have begun
from multiple governments, including $1.5 billion in previously blocked assets that the U.S.
government has arranged to support Libyan humanitarian, fuel, and salary needs. U.S. Treasury
Department licenses now authorize the release of assets belonging to some Libyan entities and
allow some transactions with Libyan financial institutions.
A TNC stabilization team is leading Libyan efforts to deliver services; assess reconstruction
needs; and begin to reform ministries, public utilities, and security forces. The TNC has issued
orders concerning security and established a high security council to coordinate volunteer forces.
Initial reports from Libya suggest that local militias and some emergent political groups may
oppose certain TNC policies and may seek to replace certain TNC personalities. Overall, TNC
officials continue to express confidence in Libyan unity and plan changes to the membership of
the interim government. As Libyans work to shape their future, Congress and the Administration
will have the first opportunity to fully redefine U.S.-Libyan relations since the 1960s.
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Libya: Unrest and U.S. Policy
Contents
Background...................................................................................................................................... 1
Status as of September 29, 2011 ...................................................................................................... 2
U.S. Military Operations and Costs .................................................................................... 4
Congressional Action and Legislation................................................................................. 5
Assessment and Key Issues ....................................................................................................... 6
United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) and Other Stabilization
Efforts............................................................................................................................... 7
Conventional Weapons and Chemical and Nuclear Materials ............................................ 8
Military Support and Disarmament..................................................................................... 9
Libyan Assets, TNC Funding, and Oil Exports................................................................. 10
Humanitarian Conditions and Relief................................................................................. 12
International Criminal Court and United Nations Human Rights
Council Investigations.................................................................................................... 13
Prospects and Challenges for U.S. Policy...................................................................................... 14
Possible Questions................................................................................................................... 15
Libyan Political Dynamics and Profiles ........................................................................................ 16
Political Dynamics................................................................................................................... 16
Interim Transitional National Council (TNC) ................................................................... 17
Prominent TNC Figures .................................................................................................... 18
Armed Opposition Forces ................................................................................................. 19
Exiles and Al Sanusi Monarchy Figures ........................................................................... 21
Libyan Islamists and the TNC ................................................................................................. 22
The Muslim Brotherhood.................................................................................................. 22
Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG)/Libyan Islamic Movement for
Change (LIMC).............................................................................................................. 23
Al Qaeda in the Lands of the Islamic Maghreb (AQLIM/AQIM) .................................... 25
Transitional National Council Positions and Statements .................................................. 26
Figures
Figure 1. Political Map of Libya...................................................................................................... 3
Contacts
Author Contact Information........................................................................................................... 27
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Libya: Unrest and U.S. Policy
Background
For a summary of recent events and conflict assessment, see “Status as of September 29, 2011.”
Political change in neighboring Tunisia and Egypt helped bring long-simmering Libyan reform
debates to the boiling point in January and early February 2011. In recent years, leading Libyans
had staked out a broad range of positions about the necessary scope and pace of reform, while
competing for influence and opportunity under the watchful eye of hard-liners aligned with the
enigmatic leader of Libya’s September 1969 revolution, Muammar al Qadhafi. Qadhafi had long
insisted that he held no formal government position, but by all accounts he maintained his 40-
plus-year hold on ultimate authority, until recently, as the “reference point” for Libya’s byzantine
political system. Ironically, that system cited “popular authority” as its foundational principle and
organizing concept, but it denied Libyans the most basic political rights. Tribal relations and
regional dynamics, particularly long-held resentments among residents in the east, also influence
Libyan politics (see “Political Dynamics” below).
Qadhafi government policy reversals on weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and terrorism led
to the lifting of most international sanctions in 2003 and 2004, followed by economic
liberalization, oil sales, and foreign investment that brought new wealth to some in Libya. U.S.
business gradually reengaged amid continuing U.S.-Libyan tension over terrorism concerns that
were finally resolved in 2008. During this period of international reengagement, political change
in Libya remained elusive and illusory. Some observers argued that Qadhafi supporters’
suppression of opposition had softened, as Libya’s international rehabilitation coincided with
steps by some pragmatists to maneuver within so-called “red lines.” The shifting course of those
red lines had been increasingly entangling reformers in the run-up to the outbreak of unrest in
February 2011. Government rehabilitation of imprisoned Islamist militants and the return of some
exiled opposition figures were welcomed by some observers. Ultimately, inaction on the part of
the government in response to calls for guarantees of basic political rights and for the drafting of
a constitution suggested a lack of consensus, if not outright opposition to meaningful reform.
The recent conflict was triggered in mid-February 2011 by a chain of events in Benghazi and
other eastern cities that quickly spiraled out of Qadhafi’s control. Although Libyan opposition
groups had called for a so-called “day of rage” on February 17 to commemorate protests that had
occurred five years earlier, localized violence erupted prior to the planned national protests. On
February 15 and 16, Libyan authorities used force to contain small protests demanding that police
release a lawyer for victims of a previous crackdown who had been arrested. Several protestors
were killed. Funerals and other protest gatherings escalated severely when government officers
reportedly fired live ammunition. In the resulting chaos, Libyan security forces are alleged to
have opened fire with heavy weaponry on protestors, as opposition groups confronted armed
personnel and overran a number of security facilities.
The government’s loss of control over key eastern cities became apparent, and broader unrest
emerged in other regions. A number of military officers, their units, and civilian officials
abandoned Qadhafi for the cause of the then-disorganized and amorphous opposition. Qadhafi
and his supporters denounced their opponents as drug-fueled traitors, foreign agents, and Al
Qaeda supporters. Until August, Qadhafi and allied forces maintained control over the capital,
Tripoli, and other cities. The cumulative effects of attrition by NATO airstrikes against military
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Libya: Unrest and U.S. Policy
targets and a coordinated offensive by rebels in Tripoli and from across western Libya turned the
tide, sending Qadhafi and his supporters into retreat and exile.
Status as of September 29, 2011
Amid continuing NATO-led military operations to enforce U.N. Security Council Resolution
1973, Libyan rebels have succeeded in ousting Muammar al Qadhafi’s government from power. A
planned uprising within the capital city, Tripoli, paired with the defection of prominent regime
figures and a multi-front attack, succeeded in swiftly breaking the defenses of pro-Qadhafi forces
over the weekend of August 20-22. Continued fighting between rebel forces and pro-Qadhafi
elements continued in areas of the city for days, although the capture of the Qadhafi military
compound at Bab al Aziziyah in the capital on August 23 signaled the symbolic end of Qadhafi’s
reign. Qadhafi’s hometown of Sirte on the central coast and isolated areas of central and southern
Libya have yet to be secured by rebel forces.1 As of September 29, Qadhafi had not been located
and detained, and he had issued calls for a guerilla warfare campaign and vowed to resist
surrender indefinitely. The risk of a prolonged irregular warfare campaign by Qadhafi supporters
exists, even as organized pro-Qadhafi forces falter and in some cases flee to neighboring
countries.
1 On September 27, NATO Spokesperson for the Operation Unified Protector Colonel Roland Lavoie stated that
“Recent developments in Sirte and Bani Walid have been our main area of attention over the last few days. Indeed, it’s
clear that remaining Gadhafi forces refuse to recognize their defeat and that the former regime has lost both legitimacy
and public support. As a last resort they are hiding in urban areas, from where they attempt to control the surrounding
population and use civilians as shields against attempts [by forces of Libya’s transitional government] to dislodge
them.” Operation Unified Protector Press Conference, September 27, 2011.
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