



China's Holdings of U.S. Securities: Implications for the U.S. Economy

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Summary

Given its relatively low savings rate, the U.S. economy depends heavily on foreign capital inflows from countries with high savings rates (such as China) to meet its domestic investment needs and to fund the federal budget deficit. The willingness of foreigners to invest in the U.S. economy and purchase U.S. public debt have helped keep U.S. real interest rates relatively low, which, until recently, contributed to rapid U.S. economic growth. However, many economists contend that U.S. dependency on foreign savings was a contributing factor to the U.S. housing bubble and subsequent global financial crisis.

China's policy of intervening in currency markets to limit the appreciation of its currency against the dollar (and other currencies) has made it the world's largest and fastest growing holder of foreign exchange reserves, which totaled \$3.2 trillion as of June 2011. China has invested a large share of these reserves in U.S. private and public securities, which include long-term (LT) Treasury debt, LT U.S. agency debt, LT U.S. corporate debt, LT U.S. equities, and short-term debt. As of June 2010, China was the largest holder of U.S. securities, which totaled \$1.6 trillion. China's holdings of U.S. Treasury securities, which are used to help finance the federal budget deficit, totaled \$1.17 trillion as of June 2011, which were 25.9% of total foreign holdings.

The U.S. public debt has risen sharply over the past decade, reaching \$14.3 trillion as of March 2011. Of this amount, 41.8% was held by U.S. government trust funds and 58.2% was privately held. Foreign investors held 53.8% of privately-held U.S. public debt, up from 35.0% in March 2001. The large and growing U.S. public debt has raised concerns over the willingness of foreigners, including China, to continue to invest in U.S. public debt securities. For example, in 2009, Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao stated that he was "a little worried" about the safety of China's holdings of U.S. debt. The recent debate in Congress over raising the public debt ceiling and the downgrade of the U.S. long-term sovereign credit from AAA to AA+ by Standard and Poor's in August 2011 have renewed Chinese concerns. Editorials in China's state-run media have sharply criticized U.S. fiscal and monetary policies. Some Chinese analysts have urged the government to diversify its reserves away from U.S. dollar assets, while others have called for more rapid appreciation of China's currency, which could lessen the need to hold U.S. assets.

Some U.S. policymakers have expressed concern over the size of China's large holdings of U.S. government debt. For example, some contend that China might decide to sell a large share of its U.S. securities holdings. This could induce other foreign investors to sell off their U.S. holdings as well, which could destabilize the U.S. economy. Others argue that China could use its large holdings of U.S. debt as a bargaining chip in its dealing with the United States on economic and noneconomic issues. In the 112th Congress, H.R. 2166 and S. 1028 would seek to increase the transparency of foreign ownership of U.S. debt instruments, especially China's, in order to assess if such holdings posed potential risks for the United States. H.R. 1540 would require the Secretary of Defense to conduct a national security risk assessment of U.S. federal debt held by China. Many analysts argue that China's holdings of U.S. debt give it little leverage over the United States, arguing that as long as China continues to peg its currency mostly to the U.S. dollar, it will have few options other than to keep investing in U.S. dollar assets. Any attempt by China to sell a large portion of its dollar holdings could reduce the value of its remaining dollar holdings, and any subsequent negative shocks to the U.S. (and global) economy could dampen U.S. demand for Chinese exports. They contend that the main issue for U.S. policymakers is not China's large holdings of U.S. securities per se, but rather the high U.S. reliance on foreign capital in general, including in the public debt, and whether that reliance is sustainable.

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Because of its low savings rate, the United States borrows to finance the federal budget deficit and its private capital needs. It therefore depends on countries with high savings rates, such as China, to invest some of its capital in the United States. Such investments help to keep U.S. interest rates relatively low and enable the United States to consume more than it produces. According to the International Monetary Fund (IMF), in 2009, the United States was the world's largest importer of foreign capital (at 38.2% of global total), while China was the largest exporter of capital (at 24.2%).¹ From FY2001 to FY2010, the amount of U.S. public debt that is privately held grew from \$3.3 trillion to \$9.0 trillion; as a share of GDP, this level rose from 32.5% to 62.9%.² Of the U.S. public debt that is privately held, more than half is held by foreigners. Many analysts argue that heavy U.S. reliance on foreign savings is not sustainable and may undermine U.S. economic interests over time.

China's central bank is a major purchaser of U.S. financial assets, largely because of its exchange rate policy.³ In order to limit the appreciation of China's currency, the renminbi (RMB), against the dollar, China must purchase U.S. dollars. This has led China to amass a huge level of foreign exchange (FX) reserves, which totaled \$3.2 trillion as of June 2011. Rather than hold dollars (and other foreign currencies), which earn no interest, the Chinese central government has converted some level of its foreign exchange reserve holdings into U.S. financial securities, including U.S. Treasury securities, U.S. agency debt, U.S. corporate debt, and U.S. equities.

U.S. Treasury securities, which are used to finance the federal budget deficit, constitute the largest category of U.S. securities held by China. As of June 2011, these totaled \$1.17 trillion and accounted for 25.9% of total foreign holdings of U.S. Treasury securities. Some U.S. policymakers have expressed concern that China's large holdings of U.S. securities could pose a risk to the U.S. economy if China stops purchasing those securities or attempts to divest itself of a large share of its holdings. Others argue that China's large and growing holdings of U.S. securities give it leverage over the United States on economic and noneconomic issues. On the other hand, many analysts contend that, given the current state of the global economy, China has few options for investing its FX holdings, other than to buy U.S. securities. They further argue that any attempt by China to sell off a large share of its current holdings would diminish the value of its remaining holdings and could further destabilize the global economy, which would likely negatively impact China's economy. Hence, it is argued, the U.S. and Chinese economies are mutually dependent on each other, which, they contend, gives China very little leverage over U.S. policy.

This report examines the importance to the U.S. economy of China's investment in U.S. securities, as well as the policy implications of its holdings for both the United States and China.⁴ For the United States, the issue of China's large holdings of U.S. securities is part of a broader question that has been raised by many economists: what are the implications of the heavy U.S.

¹ IMF, *Global Financial Stability Report*, October 2010, Statistical Appendix, p.3

² Source: Economist Intelligence Unit database. Privately-held debt is defined as all debt not held by the federal government or Federal Reserve; it includes debt held by local or foreign governments.

³ China contends that its currency policy is intended to promote financial stability in China, while critics contend the main purpose is to keep the value of its currency low in order to benefit Chinese exporters. See, CRS Report RS21625, *China's Currency: An Analysis of the Economic Issues*, by Wayne M. Morrison and Marc Labonte.

⁴ China's investment in U.S. securities far exceed its foreign direct investment (FDI) flows to the United States. FDI data reflect ownership or investment in U.S. businesses (and are not covered by this report). For additional detail on China's FDI flows to the United States, see CRS Report RL33536, *China-U.S. Trade Issues*, by Wayne M. Morrison, p.14.

reliance on foreign investment in U.S. securities to maintain healthy economic growth and to finance the budget deficit?⁵ Since 2008, private savings in the United States has risen but public savings has declined (i.e., the budget deficit has grown). Borrowing from abroad fell by half in dollar terms between 2007 and 2009. (It has since risen, but remains below its previous peak.) Thus, economic imbalances in the United States have become less of an issue of inadequate private saving and more of an issue of high government borrowing since the financial crisis began. It remains to be seen whether the rise in private savings was a permanent shift or a temporary response to the recession, however.

The broader issue for China is whether its current unbalanced economic policies, especially those that have contributed to its large savings rate, over-reliance on exports for its economic growth, and accumulation of huge FX reserves, are sustainable in the long-run, especially given economic slowdowns in Europe and the United States. Some have argued that these factors may induce China to accelerate efforts to boost consumer demand and improve domestic living standards, which could include further appreciation of the RMB against the dollar. Such policies could lessen China's need to buy U.S. securities.

China's Foreign Exchange Reserves

China's economic policies, including those that induce high levels of domestic savings and promote export-related activities as the main engine of China's economic growth, have contributed to a surge in China's FX reserves over the past decade, as indicated in **Table 1**. China's exchange rate policies attempt to slow (and sometimes halt) the appreciation of the RMB against the dollar. This makes Chinese exports less expensive, and foreign imports into China more expensive, than would occur if China maintained a floating currency. The main purpose of this policy is to promote China's export industries and encourage foreign investment. To that end, the Chinese central bank must intervene heavily in currency markets by buying up as many dollars as necessary to meet the government's targeted RMB-dollar exchange rate.⁶ Chinese policies that induce high savings rates dampen domestic consumption and demand for imports, while shifting financial resources (i.e., low-cost bank credit) largely to export-oriented industries. As a result, China consumes much less than it produces. Such policies have contributed to China's large annual trade surpluses. The combination of China's large trade surpluses (\$185 billion in 2010), inflows of foreign direct investment into China (\$106 billion in 2010), and inflows of "hot money" into China have been the main components of China's accumulation of FX reserves.⁷

According to Chinese government figures, its FX reserves rose from \$216 billion in 2001 to \$3.2 trillion as of June 2011, an increase of nearly \$3 trillion or 1,383%.⁸ China's FX reserves in June

⁵ For a discussion of the implications of a possible global sell-off of U.S. securities, see CRS Report RL34319, *Foreign Ownership of U.S. Financial Assets: Implications of a Withdrawal*, by James K. Jackson.

⁶ China states that it maintains a managed peg with a number of major currencies, but U.S. officials contend that, in fact, the RMB is pegged largely to the dollar.

⁷ "Hot money" are inflows of capital from overseas investors who attempt to bypass Chinese government capital restrictions. Some attempt to purchase Chinese currency in the belief that the Chinese government will continue to appreciate the RMB in the near future, while others are seeking to invest in certain "high growth" sectors, such as real estate. The inflows of hot money force the government to intervene to buy the inflows of foreign currency, such as the dollar, to maintain its exchange rate targets.

⁸ Some analysts contend that China's actual FX reserves are much higher than official Chinese data. For example, Brad (continued...)

2011 were up \$350.2 billion over December 2010 levels. China's reserves as a percent of nominal GDP grew from 15.3% in 2001 to 48.4% in 2010—an unusually high level for a large economy. A listing of the world's top holders of FX reserves as of June 2011 is shown in **Figure 1**. Not only was China by far the world's largest holder of FX reserves, its reserves were greater than the combined reserves of Japan, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Taiwan, Brazil, and South Korea. (Besides Japan, these countries had much smaller economies than China.)

Table 1. China's Foreign Exchange Reserves: Totals and as a Percent of GDP, 2001-2010 and as of June 2011

Year	Billions of U.S. Dollars	As a % of Chinese GDP
2001	215.6	16.3
2002	291.1	20.0
2003	403.3	24.6
2004	609.9	31.6
2005	818.9	36.5
2006	1,068.5	40.2
2007	1,528.2	45.2
2008	1,946.0	45.0
2009	2,399.2	48.1
2010	2,847.3	48.4
June 2011	3,197.5	NA


Source: Global Insight and Chinese State Administration of Foreign Exchange.

Note: Year-end or end of month values.

(...continued)

Setser and Arpana Pandey contend that China's official data on FX reserves do not include holdings and assets held by China's main sovereign wealth fund, China Investment Corporation (CIC), and those held by state banks. They estimated that China's actual FX holdings were 18% higher than its official estimates. See Council on Foreign Relations, *China's \$1.7 Trillion Bet: China's External Portfolio and Dollar Reserves*, by Brad Setser and Arpana Pandey, January 2009.

Figure I. Major Holders of Foreign Exchange Reserves as of June 2011
(\$ billions)



Sources: IMF International Financial Statistics, and Central Bank of the Republic of China (Taiwan).

Notes: Ranked according to total holdings as of June 2011. Data for Saudi Arabia are through December 2010.

China's Holdings of U.S. Securities⁹

Although the Chinese government does not make public the dollar composition of its FX holdings, many analysts estimate this level to be around 70%.¹⁰ U.S. assets have generally been favored by China for its investment needs for a number of reasons. First, in order to maintain the exchange rate effects that lay behind the acquisition of U.S. dollars, those dollars must be invested in dollar-denominated securities. Second, the United States is the world's largest economy and has the biggest capital market. In 2009, the combined value of U.S. private and public debt securities was \$31.7 trillion (compared with \$11.9 trillion for Japan and \$5.7 trillion for Germany) and accounted for 34.4% of global debt securities. Many analysts contend that the U.S. debt securities market is the only global market that is big enough to absorb a big part of China's large and growing FX holdings. U.S. securities have also been favored by China because, historically, they have been considered to be safe and liquid (i.e., easily sold) relative to other types of investments.¹¹ Finally, U.S. Treasury securities are backed by the full faith and credit of

⁹ For additional information on foreign ownership of U.S. securities, see CRS Report RL32462, *Foreign Investment in U.S. Securities*, by James K. Jackson.

¹⁰ See testimony of Brad Setser, Senior Economist, Roubini Global Economics and Research Associate, Global Economic Governance Programme, University College, Oxford, before the House Budget Committee, *Foreign Holdings of U.S. Debt: Is our Economy Vulnerable?*, June 26, 2007, p. 11. In addition, the *People's Daily Online* (August 28, 2006) estimated China's dollar holdings to total FX reserves at 70%.

¹¹ See CRS Report RL34582, *The Depreciating Dollar: Economic Effects and Policy Response*, by Craig K. Elwell.

the U.S. government, which guarantees that interest and principal payments will be paid on time. The global economic slowdown and the European sovereign debt crisis may have also boosted the attractiveness of U.S. securities for China.¹² According to China's State Administration of Foreign Exchange (SAFE), its main principles for administering China's FX reserves are "security, liquidity, and increases in value, among which security is the primary principle."¹³

U.S. financial securities consist of a mix of securities issued by the U.S. government and private sector entities and include long-term (LT) U.S. Treasury securities (which are discussed in more detail in the next section), LT U.S. government agency securities,¹⁴ LT corporate securities (some of which are asset-backed), equities (such as stocks), and short-term debt.¹ LT securities are those with no stated maturity date (such as equities) or with an original term to maturity date of more than one year. Short-term debt includes U.S. Treasury securities, agency securities, and corporate securities with a maturity date of less than one year.¹⁵ The Department of the Treasury issues an annual survey of foreign portfolio holdings of U.S. securities by country and reports data for the previous year as of the end of June.¹⁶

The latest Treasury survey of portfolio holdings of U.S. securities was issued on April 29, 2011.¹⁷ The report indicates that China's total holdings of U.S. securities as of June 2010 were \$1.6 trillion. Treasury data indicated that China's holdings of U.S. securities have increased much faster than those of any other country. From 2006-2010, China's holding increased by \$912 billion (or 130.4%).¹⁸ China overtook Japan as the largest holder of U.S. securities in 2009, and, as June 2010, its holdings were 15.6% higher than that those of Japan. As indicated in **Figure 2**, as China's FX reserves have risen rapidly, so has its holdings of U.S. securities.

¹² The global financial crisis, global economic slowdown, and public debt crisis in many countries have induced capital to flow to the United States, often referred to as a "flight to quality." This has pushed yields on U.S. Treasury securities to record lows. For the month of July 2011, the average yields on one-year, five-year, and ten-year Treasury nominal constant maturities were 0.32%, 1.54%, and 3.0%, respectively.

¹³ See China's State Administration of Foreign Exchange (SAFE), *FAQs on Foreign Exchange Reserves*, July 20, 2010.

¹⁴ Agency securities include both federal agencies and government-sponsored enterprises created by Congress (e.g., Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac) to provide credit to key sectors of the economy. Some of these securities are backed by assets (such as home mortgages).


¹⁵ As of June 2010, 77% of U.S. short-term debt consisted on U.S. Treasury securities, followed by corporate debt (15.9%) and U.S. agency debt (6.4%).

¹⁶ The report is prepared jointly by the Department of the Treasury, the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, and the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.

¹⁷ Department of the Treasury, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, and Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, *Report on Foreign Portfolio Holdings of U.S. Securities as of June 30, 2010, April 2011*, available at <http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/data-chart-center/tic/Documents/shla2010r.pdf>.

¹⁸ Data on China's holdings of U.S. securities exclude holdings by Hong Kong and Macao. These entities, though part of China, are reported separately by Treasury.

Figure 2. China's Holdings of Foreign Exchange Reserves and U.S. Securities: 2002-2010
(\$ billions)



Sources: U.S. Treasury Department, *Report on Foreign Portfolio Holdings of U.S. Securities as of June 30, 2010*, April 2011, and Global Insight Database.

Note: Data on foreign exchange reserves are end of year values while data on holdings of U.S. securities are through the end of June.

Table 2 lists the top three holders of U.S. securities as of June 2010, broken down by the type of securities held and **Figure 3** provides a breakdown of China's holdings of U.S. securities by category. These data indicate that as of June 2010:

- China accounted for 15.1% of total foreign-held U.S. securities (compared with 4.1% in 2002).
- LT Treasury securities constituted the bulk of China's holdings of U.S. securities (at 68.8% of total), followed by long-term agency debt (22.3%) and U.S. equities (7.9%).¹⁹

¹⁹ In June 2008, China's holdings of LT U.S. Agency debt constituted 43.7% of its holding of U.S. securities, which were greater than its holdings of LT U.S. Treasury securities (43.3%). However, the bursting of the U.S. housing bubble and the subsequent federal takeover of Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae in 2008 led China to significantly reduce its holdings of U.S. Agency debt, while increasing its holdings of other securities, especially Treasury securities. However, as of June 2010, China remained the largest foreign holder of U.S. Agency debt.

- China was the largest foreign holder of LT Treasury debt (33.1% of the foreign total) and U.S. agency debt (33.2%).
- China was the 8th largest holder of U.S. equities at \$127 billion, which was 4.5% of total foreign holdings.

Table 2. Top Three Foreign Holders of U.S. Securities and China's Share of These Holdings by Category as of June 2010


(\$ billions)

Type of Security	Total	LT Treasury	LT Agency	LT Corporate	Equities	Short Term
China	1,611	1,108	360	11	127	5
Japan	1,393	737	234	130	224	69
United Kingdom	798	72	10	369	324	22
Foreign Total	10,691	3,343	1,085	2,492	2,814	956
China's June 2010 Holdings as a Percent of Total Foreign Holdings	15.1%	33.1%	33.2%	0.4%	4.5%	0.5%

Source: U.S. Department of the Treasury, *Report on Foreign Portfolio Holdings of U.S. Securities as of June 30, 2010*, April 2011.

Note: LT securities are those with no stated maturity date (such as equities) or with an original term to maturity date of more than one year. Short term securities have a maturity period of less than one year. Data on China exclude Hong Kong and Macau.

Figure 3. China's Holdings of U.S. Securities by Major Category as a Percent of Total Holdings as of June 2010



Source: U.S. Department of the Treasury, Report on Foreign Portfolio Holdings of U.S. Securities as of June 30, 2010, April 2011.

China's Ownership of U.S. Treasury Securities²⁰

U.S. Treasury securities are the largest category of U.S. securities and are main vehicle the U.S. government uses to finance the federal debt, which totaled \$14.3 trillion at the end of March 2011.²¹ As indicated in **Table 3**, China's holdings have increased rapidly from 2002 to 2010, both in dollar terms and as a percent of total foreign holdings. In September 2008, China overtook Japan to become the largest foreign holder of U.S. Treasury securities (it was 7th largest in 1997). From 2002 to 2010, China's holdings increased by over \$1 trillion, which were by far the largest dollar increase in holdings of any country, and accounted for 33% of net new foreign holdings of U.S. Treasury securities over this time. As indicated in **Figure 4**, China's purchases of new Treasury securities over the past three years have been significant, averaging about \$224.2 billion per year, compared to an average annual increase of \$61.5 billion from 2002 to 2007. China's share of foreign holdings of U.S. Treasury securities rose from 9.6% in 2002 to 26.1% in 2010.

²⁰ For a general discussion of foreign ownership of U.S. debt, see CRS Report RS22331, *Foreign Holdings of Federal Debt*, by Justin Murray and Marc Labonte. For a discussion on Treasury's debt management practices, see CRS Report R40767, *How Treasury Issues Debt*, by Mindy R. Levit.

²¹ It was at \$14.6 trillion as of August 8, 2011. See the Department of the Treasury, *The Debt to the Penny and Who Holds It*, available at <http://www.treasurydirect.gov/NP/BPDLLogin?application=np>.

A listing of the top 10 foreign holders of U.S. Treasury securities as of June 2011 is shown in **Table 4**. China's holdings were reported at nearly \$1.17 trillion, or 25.9% of total foreign holdings. China was the largest holder of U.S. Treasury securities, followed by Japan, the United Kingdom, major oil exporters,²² and Brazil. The data in **Table 4** likely understate the actual level of China's holdings (see text box, below).

Monthly Data on China's Holdings of U.S. Treasury Securities

The Department of the Treasury reports foreign holdings of U.S. Treasury securities on a monthly basis. These monthly data generally reflect the country of origin of the buyer. However, Treasury securities are often purchased through a third party, such as a broker in London; this initially would be counted as a purchase by a UK investor. Treasury makes revisions to its monthly data at least once a year, based on a department survey which attempts to better determine the country of origin of the purchase, rather than where it was purchased from. Treasury's revisions usually show a significant increase in the estimated level of China's Treasury holdings for that year. For example, on February 15, 2011, Treasury reported that China's holdings of U.S. Treasury securities totaled about \$892 billion at the end of 2010, which were \$3.2 billion less than its holdings in 2009. This led some to speculate that China was no longer purchasing Treasury securities. However, on February 23, 2011, Treasury revised its estimates of foreign holdings of U.S. Treasury securities, which raised China's holdings at the end of 2010 upward by 30% (to \$1,160 billion) over its previous estimate. Treasury's revision also reduced the estimated holdings of the United Kingdom by 49.7% (from \$541 billion to \$272 billion). The revisions may indicate that China purchases some U.S. Treasury securities through financial centers outside of China. However, as one analyst noted, "the involvement of chains of intermediaries in the custody or management of securities frequently makes accurate identification of the actual owners of U.S. securities impossible."²³ China has never disclosed the value of its holdings of U.S. securities. These factors indicate that (1) Treasury's 2011 monthly data on foreign holdings of U.S. Treasury securities, as shown in **Table 4**, will likely be sharply increased when Treasury does its final revisions of the 2011 data (probably in early 2012), and (2) even Treasury's final revisions may undercount China's actual holdings of U.S. Treasury securities because the amount of purchases China makes through third parties may not be fully accounted for.

Table 3. China's Year-End Holdings of U.S. Treasury Securities: 2002-2010

(\$ billions and as a percent of total foreign holdings)


	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
China's Holdings (\$billions)	118.4	159.0	222.9	310.0	396.9	477.6	727.4	894.8	1,160.1
Holdings as a % of Total Foreign Holdings	9.6%	10.4%	12.1%	15.2%	18.9%	20.3%	23.6%	24.2%	26.1%

Source: Department of Treasury, Major Foreign Holders of Treasury Securities Holdings, July 18, 2011.

²² Oil exporters include Ecuador, Venezuela, Indonesia, Bahrain, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Algeria, Gabon, Libya, and Nigeria.

²³ Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve, Federal Reserve Bulletin, *Understanding U.S. Cross-Border Securities Data*, 2006, p. A63.

Figure 4. Annual Change in China's Holdings of U.S. Treasury Securities: 2002-2010
(\$ billions)



Source: U.S. Department of the Treasury.

Table 4. Top 10 Foreign Holders of U.S. Treasury Securities as of June 2011

	Total Foreign Holdings (\$ billions)	Country Holdings as a Share of Total Foreign Holdings (%)
China	1,165.5	25.9
Japan	911.0	20.2
United Kingdom	349.5	7.8
Oil Exporters	229.6	5.1
Brazil	207.1	4.6
Taiwan	153.4	3.4
Caribbean Banking Centers	140.5	3.1
Hong Kong	118.4	2.6
Russia	109.8	2.4
Switzerland	108.2	2.4
Total Foreign Holdings	4,499.2	100.0

Source: Department of Treasury, *Major Foreign Holders of Treasury Securities Holdings*, August 15, 2011.

Note: Treasury's monthly data generally reflect its initial assessment of the country of origin of the purchaser. Treasury later makes revisions to these data at least once a year in an effort to factor in purchases of securities made through intermediaries in other countries. Revisions in the past have raised the estimate of China's holdings of U.S. Treasury securities.

Concerns over China's Large Holdings of U.S. Securities

The growing U.S. dependency on China to purchase U.S. Treasury securities to help fund the U.S. budget deficit has become a major concern to many U.S. policymakers. Some have raised concerns that China's large holdings may give it leverage over the United States on economic as well as noneconomic issues. Others have expressed concern that China might lose faith in the ability of the United States to meet its debt obligations, and, thus, might seek to liquidate such assets or significantly cut back on purchases of new securities, a move some contend could damage the U.S. economy. Still others contend that China's purchases of U.S. securities was a major contributing factor to the U.S. sub-prime mortgage crisis and subsequent global economic slowdown because such purchases helped to keep real U.S. interest rates very low and increased global imbalances.²⁴ Some warn that similar bubbles could occur in the future if imbalances between the United States and China are not addressed.²⁵ Chinese officials, on the other hand, have expressed concerns over the safety of their large holdings of U.S. debt, and some have argued that China should either diversify away from U.S. Treasury securities or implement policies that slow the accumulation of FX reserves, which would lessen the need to buy U.S. assets.

Growing Bilateral Tensions over the U.S. Public Debt

Since the beginning of the global financial crisis in 2008, U.S. government officials have increasingly sought to offer assurances to Chinese officials regarding the safety of China's holdings of U.S. government debt securities and to encourage China to continue to purchase U.S. securities. For example, during her first visit to China on February 21, 2009, Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton was quoted as saying that she appreciated "greatly the Chinese government's continuing confidence in the United States Treasuries," and she urged the government to continue to buy U.S. debt.²⁶ However on March 13, 2009, Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao at a news conference stated: "We've lent a huge amount of capital to the United States, and of course we're concerned about the security of our assets. And to speak truthfully, I am a little bit worried. I would like to call on the United States to honor its words, stay a credible nation and ensure the safety of Chinese assets."²⁷ On March 24, 2009, the governor of the People's Bank of China, Zhou Xiaochuan, published a paper calling for replacing the U.S. dollar as the international reserve currency with a new global system controlled by the IMF.²⁸

The recent contentious U.S. debate over raising the debt ceiling and over how to address long-term U.S. debt issues, along with the downgrade of the long-term sovereign credit rating of the United States from AAA to AA + by Standard and Poor's in August 2011, appear to have

²⁴ See CRS Report RL34742, *The Global Financial Crisis: Analysis and Policy Implications*, coordinated by Dick K. Nanto.

²⁵ Low U.S. interest rates sharply contributed to U.S. demand for housing. Homeowners viewed growing home values as a source of income to draw from through home equities, which were used to buy consumer goods. The rise in U.S. domestic consumption boosted foreign imports, such as from China, which sharply increased the U.S. trade deficit.

²⁶ ABC News International, *Clinton Seeks to Reassure China on T-Bills*, February 21, 2009.

²⁷ China Daily, March 14, 2009, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2009-03/14/content_7578931.htm.

²⁸ Financial Times, *China Calls for New Reserve Currency*, March 24, 2009.

intensified China's concerns over its U.S. debt holdings.²⁹ Several government-controlled Chinese newspapers issued sharp criticism of U.S. economic policies (as well as the U.S. political system). For example:

- A July 28, 2011, Xinhua News Agency (Xinhua) editorial stated: "With its debt approximating its annual economic output, it is time for Washington to revisit the time-tested common sense that one should live within one's means."
- An August 3, 2011, a Xinhua editorial stated: "Should Washington continue turning a blind eye to its runaway debt addiction, its already tarnished credibility will lose more luster, which might eventually detonate the debt bomb and jeopardize the well-being of hundreds of millions of families within and beyond the U.S. borders."
- A Xinhua August 6, 2011, editorial said: "The U.S. government has to come to terms with the painful fact that the good old days when it could just borrow its way out of messes of its own making are finally gone. International supervision over the issue of U.S. dollars should be introduced and a new, stable and secured global reserve currency may also be an option to avert a catastrophe caused by any single country."
- A Xinhua editorial on August 8, 2011, stated: "The days when the debt-ridden Uncle Sam could leisurely squander unlimited overseas borrowing appeared to be numbered as its triple A-credit rating was slashed by Standard & Poor's (S&P) for the first time on Friday. China, the largest creditor of the world's sole superpower, has every right now to demand the United States to address its structural debt problems and ensure the safety of China's dollar assets."

The U.S. debt issue was a major topic during Vice President Joe Biden's trip to China in August 2011. At a meeting with Chinese Premier Wen Jiabo on August 19, 2011, Vice President Biden stated that "we appreciate and welcome your concluding that the United States is such a safe haven because we appreciate your investment in U.S. treasuries. And very sincerely, I want to make clear that you have nothing to worry about in terms of their -- their viability."³⁰ In a speech at Sichuan University, he stated that "the concern that we will not make good on the investments that people have made -- in your case up to \$1.7 trillion total out of a very large economy is not to worry about. We could not afford -- we could not afford not to make good on that requirement."³¹

Some analysts contend that China's main concern is not a possible U.S. default on its debt, but rather U.S. monetary policies that have been utilized by the Federal Reserve in recent years to stimulate the economy, namely the purchases of U.S. Treasury securities, agency debt, and agency mortgage-backed securities. Such measures, often referred to as "quantitative easing" (QE), have led the Federal Reserve to purchase over \$2 trillion in U.S. securities since March 2009 in an effort to lower long-term interest rates.³² An August 25, 2011, editorial in *China Daily*

²⁹ Failure to extend the debt ceiling could have put the U.S. government in default of its debt obligations.

³⁰ The White House, Office of the Vice President, *Remarks by Vice President Biden at a Meeting with Chinese Premier Wen*, August 19, 2011, available at <http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/08/19/remarks-vice-president-biden-meeting-chinese-premier-wen>.

³¹ The White House, Office of the Vice President, *Remarks by Vice President Biden, on U.S.-China Relations followed by Q&A with Students, Sichuan University, Chengdu, China, August 21, 2011*.

³² CRS Report R41540, *Quantitative Easing and the Growth in the Federal Reserve's Balance Sheet*, by Marc Labonte.

stated that “China is not worried that Standard & Poor's has downgraded the U.S. credit rating from AAA to AA+. Rather it is concerned about the Fed announcing QE3. If the U.S. administration chooses to make the irresponsible choice of devaluating the dollar further, China would not only stop buying U.S. debt, but also gradually decrease its holdings, which would certainly not be in the interests of the U.S. or in accordance with Biden's wishes.”³³ Chinese officials have expressed concerns that actions by the Federal Reserve to boost the U.S. money supply will undermine the value of China's holdings of U.S. dollar assets, either by causing the dollar to depreciate against other major currencies or by significantly increasing U.S. inflation. To date, quantitative easing has not led to a noticeable increase in U.S. inflation, and the Federal Reserve has argued that it has sufficient tools to maintain low inflation in the future.

Does China's Holdings of U.S. Debt Give it Leverage?

It is difficult to determine whether China's holdings of U.S. securities give it any leverage over U.S. policies.³⁴ The importance of China's debt holdings to the U.S. economy can be measured in a number of different ways (see text box below). During his confirmation hearing to become U.S. Ambassador to China before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in May 2011, Gary Locke, in response to a question on this issue, stated that China's holdings of U.S. Treasury securities did not “in any way influence U.S. foreign policy.”³⁵

Indicators of the Size of China's Ownership of U.S. Public Debt

China's ownership of U.S. Treasury securities, or U.S. federal debt, is significant, but the relative importance of those

³³ China Daily, Dilemma of Yuan revaluation, August 25, 2011, available at http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/opinion/2011-08/25/content_13185617.htm.

³⁴ China has attempted to use the U.S. debt crisis to criticize U.S. economic policies and its political system, implying that Chinese economic and political policies are more stable.

³⁵ Congressional Quarterly, Congressional Transcripts, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, *Hearing on the Nomination of Secretary of Commerce Gary Locke to Be Ambassador to People's Republic of China*, May 26, 2011.

holdings to the overall U.S. federal debt can be measured in different ways. The U.S. public debt totaled \$14.3 trillion as of March 2011. Of this amount, 41.8% was held by U.S. government trust funds and 58.2% was privately held. Of the total level of privately-held U.S. Treasury securities (\$8.3 trillion), foreigners owned 53.8% of the total (\$4.5 trillion).³⁶ China's holdings of U.S. Treasury securities as of March 2011 were \$1.1 trillion. The importance of China's holdings of U.S. debt securities (as of March 2011) can be measured as follows. They constituted: 25.6% of total foreign holdings of U.S. Treasury securities, 13.8% of U.S. privately-held Treasury securities, and 8.0% of the total level of U.S. federal debt (privately held and intergovernmental).

The amount of interest payments the U.S. government makes to China each year is not precisely known since a breakdown of the types of Treasury securities, their maturity dates, and their yields, is not published.³⁷ A rough estimate can be made by taking the Treasury Department's data on interest paid on the debt held by foreigners in 2010 (\$136 billion) and multiplying it by China's holdings of U.S. federal debt as percent of the total foreign debt (26%). Based on these data, it is estimated that U.S. interest rate payments to China on its holdings of U.S. Treasury securities were \$36.0 billion for 2010, or about \$100 million per day³⁸

China's \$1.16 trillion holdings of U.S. Treasury debt at the end of 2010 was equal to \$3,740 for every American and \$884 for every Chinese. According to one observer: "Never before has a country as poor as China provided so much financing to a country as rich as the United States."³⁹

Some Chinese officials in the past have suggested that its holdings of U.S. debt could be used in regard to economic and political disputes with the United States. To illustrate, an August 7, 2007, article in the *Telegraph* (an online British newspaper) cited interviews with officials from two leading Chinese government think tanks who reportedly stated that China had the power to make the dollar collapse (if it chose to do so) by liquidating large portions of its U.S. Treasury securities holdings if the United States imposed trade sanctions to force an appreciation of the RMB, and that the threat to do so could be used as a "bargaining chip." Ding Gang, a senior editor with China's *People's Daily* wrote in an editorial in August 2011 that China should directly link the amount of U.S. Treasury holdings with U.S. arms sales to Taiwan, stating that "now is the time for China to use its 'financial weapon' to teach the United States a lesson if it moves forward with a plan to sale arms to Taiwan. In fact, China has never wanted to use its holdings of U.S. debt as a weapon. It is the United States that is forcing it to do so...to defend itself when facing threats to China's sovereignty."⁴⁰

The likelihood that China would suddenly reduce its holdings of U.S. securities is questionable because doing so could have a significant negative impact on the Chinese economy. First, a large sell-off of China's U.S. holdings could diminish the value of these securities in international markets, which would lead to large losses on the sale, and would, in turn, decrease the value of China's remaining dollar-denominated assets.⁴¹ This would also occur if the value of the dollar were greatly diminished in international currency markets due to China's sell-off.⁴² Second, such

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³⁶ U.S. Treasury Department, Financial Management Service, *Ownership of Federal Securities*, available at <http://www.fms.treas.gov/bulletin/index.html>.

³⁷ For example, Treasury securities maturity dates range from one month to 30 years. Yields change on a daily basis.

³⁸ For an overview of the types of securities issue by Treasury and its management of U.S. debt, see CRS Report R40767, *How Treasury Issues Debt*, by Mindy R. Levit.

³⁹ Council on Foreign Relations, *China's \$1.7 Trillion Bet: China's External Portfolio and Dollar Reserves*, by Brad Setser and Arpana Pandey, January 2009.

⁴⁰ *People's Daily*, *China must punish US for Taiwan arm sales with 'financial weapon'*, August 8, 2011, at <http://english.people.com.cn/90780/91342/7562776.html>.

⁴¹ Since there are many other holders of U.S. assets, it is possible that if China believed a decline in asset values was imminent, it could minimize its losses by dumping its U.S. assets first.

⁴² Selling off U.S. dollar assets could cause the RMB to appreciate against the dollar, which would lower the value of (continued...)

a move would diminish U.S. demand for Chinese imports, either through a rise in the value of the RMB against the dollar or a reduction in U.S. economic growth (especially if other foreign investors sold their U.S. asset holdings, and the United States was forced to raise interest rates in response).⁴³ It is estimated that nearly one quarter of Chinese exports went to the United States in 2010. A sharp reduction of U.S. imports from China could have a significant impact on China's economy, which heavily depends on exports for its economic growth (and is viewed by the government as a vital source of political stability).⁴⁴ Any major action by the Chinese government that destabilized (or further destabilized) the U.S. economy (whether deliberate or not) could provoke "protectionist" sentiment in the United States against China. One analyst described the financial interdependency between the United States and China as "a kind of balance of financial terror." According to Derek Scissors, a Research Fellow with the Heritage Foundation:

One area of concern in the U.S. is Chinese financial influence. As noted, Chinese investment is largely involuntary, a function of having a great deal of money and no place else to put it. This refines the usual analogy of banker and customer to one where the banker has a choice of "lending" to one particular customer for the better part of her business, or crafting an exceptionally large mattress. The influence is mutual." Who needs the other more varies with American and international financial conditions. The more money the U.S. borrows, the more the American economy needs the PRC. The more desirable Treasury bonds are, the more China needs us. The U.S. is planning to run a federal deficit of over \$1 trillion but there has been a flight to quality and American Treasury bonds are highly desired. There is balance on this score. The PRC can exercise little or no leverage over American policy by virtue of its purchase of our bonds.

However, Scissors goes on to state:

There is future danger in the possibility that we will run sustained, gigantic deficits. The longer these last, the more likely it is that U.S. treasuries will become relatively less attractive, thereby tipping the balance of influence toward China. The U.S. could come to need Chinese purchases more than the PRC needs American bonds, yet another argument to control the federal budget.⁴⁵

Many analysts contend that the U.S. debt securities market is the only global market that is big enough to absorb a big part of China's large and growing FX holdings. Economic problems in Japan and Europe do not leave China with many alternatives for investing its massive FX reserves. According to Andrew Peale, a writer for the Wall Street Journal: "Some say China could switch holdings into gold -- but that market's highly volatile, and not large enough to absorb more than a small proportion of China's reserves. It's not clear, meanwhile, that euro, or

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remaining U.S. assets since the assets are dollar-denominated.

⁴³ In addition, if a "dollar collapse" occurred, U.S. imports from other major trade partners would decline, which could slow their economies. This in turn could weaken their demand for Chinese products.

⁴⁴ Although a falling dollar may harm China's short-term growth via reduced Chinese exports (and export sector-related employment), it would also improve China's terms of trade with the United States, raising China's overall consumption since it could now spend less to acquire the same amount of American goods (which would also create jobs in other sectors of the economy because of increased consumer purchasing power).

⁴⁵ The Heritage Foundation, Testimony before the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission on China's Role in the Origins of and Responses to the Global Recession, by Derek Scissors, Ph.D., March 3, 2009, available at <http://www.heritage.org/Research/Testimony/Testimony-before-the-US-China-Economic-and-Security-Review-Commission-on-Chinas-Role-in-the-Origins-of-and-Responses-to-the-Global-Recession>.

yen-denominated debt is any safer, more liquid, or profitable than U.S. debt -- key criteria for China's leadership."⁴⁶

Legislation has been introduced in the 112th Congress that would seek to assess the implications for the United States of China's ownership of U.S. debt.

- H.R. 2166 (Sam Johnson) and S. 1028 (Cornyn), both titled "Foreign-Held Debt Transparency and Threat Assessment Act," would seek to increase the transparency of foreign ownership of U.S. debt instruments, especially in regard to China, in order to better assess the potential risks such holdings could pose for the United States. The bills state, for example, that under certain circumstances, China's holdings of U.S. debt could give it a tool with which it can try to manipulate U.S. domestic and foreign policymaking, including the U.S. relationship with Taiwan; and that China could attempt to destabilize the U.S. economy by rapidly divesting large portions of its holdings of U.S. debt instruments. The bills would require the President to issue a quarterly report on foreign holders of U.S. debt instruments, which would include a breakdown of foreign ownership by country of domicile and by the type of creditor (i.e., public, quasi-public, private); an analysis of the country's purpose and long-term intentions in regard to its U.S. debt holdings; an analysis of the current and foreseeable risks to U.S. national security and economic stability of each nation's U.S. debt holdings; and a determination whether such risks are "acceptable or unacceptable." If the President determined that a foreign country's holdings of U.S. debt instruments was an unacceptable risk, he would be required to formulate an action plan to reduce that risk.
- H.R. 1540 (McKeon), would, among other things, require the Secretary of Defense to conduct a national security risk assessment of U.S. federal debt held by China.⁴⁷ In addition, the Director of the Congressional Budget Office would be required to determine, and make publicly available, the amount of accrued interest on U.S. federal debt paid to China during the past five years.

What If China Reduces its Holdings of U.S. Securities?⁴⁸

As the previous data illustrate, China has accumulated large holdings of U.S. assets in recent years. These accumulations are the result of U.S. borrowing to finance its large trade deficit with China (the gap between U.S. exports and Chinese imports). All else equal, Chinese government purchases of U.S. assets increases the demand for U.S. assets, which reduces U.S. interest rates.

⁴⁶ Wall Street Journal, *China's Limited Options on Treasuries*, March 16, 2009, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB123694305633018403.html?mod=googlenews_wsj.

⁴⁷ The bill, titled the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012, was passed by the House on May 26, 2011.

⁴⁸ From the perspective of the macroeconomic effects on U.S. investment, interest rates, and so on, it does not matter what type of U.S. security is purchased when foreign capital flows to the United States. Thus, Chinese purchases of all types of U.S. securities (not just Treasury securities) should be considered when attempting to understand the impact China's investment decisions have on the U.S. economy.

What might happen if China no longer purchased U.S. securities and/or tried to sell a significant share of its dollar holdings?

If China stopped buying U.S. securities, the United States would need other investors (foreign and domestic) to fill in the gap. Such investors would presumably require higher interest rates than those prevailing today to be enticed to buy them. One economist in 2007 estimated that a Chinese move away from long-term U.S. securities could raise U.S. interest rates by as much as 50 basis points.⁴⁹ Higher interest rates would cause a decline in investment spending and other interest-sensitive spending. All else equal, the reduction in Chinese Treasury holdings would cause the overall foreign demand for U.S. assets to fall, and this would cause the dollar to depreciate. If the value of the dollar depreciated, the trade deficit would decline, as the price of U.S. exports fell abroad and the price of imports rose in the United States.⁵⁰ The magnitude of these effects would depend on how many U.S. securities China sold; modest reductions would have negligible effects on the economy given the large size of U.S. financial markets.

Since China held \$1.6 trillion of U.S. securities (largely U.S. Treasury securities) as of June 2010, any reduction in its U.S. holdings could potentially be large. If there were a large reduction in its holdings, the effect on the U.S. economy would still depend on whether the reduction were gradual or sudden. It should be emphasized that economic theory suggests that a *slow decline* in the trade deficit and dollar would not be troublesome for the overall economy. In fact, a slow decline could even have an expansionary effect on the economy, if the decrease in the trade deficit had a more stimulative effect on aggregate demand in the short run than the decrease in investment and other interest-sensitive spending resulting from higher interest rates. Historical experience seems to bear this out—the dollar declined by about 40% in real terms and the trade deficit declined continually in the late 1980s, from 2.8% of GDP in 1986 to nearly zero during the early 1990s. Yet economic growth was strong throughout the late 1980s.

A potentially serious short-term problem would emerge if China decided to *suddenly* reduce their liquid U.S. financial assets significantly. The effect could be compounded if this action triggered a more general financial reaction (or panic), in which all foreigners responded by reducing their holdings of U.S. assets. The initial effect could be a sudden and large depreciation in the value of the dollar, as the supply of dollars on the foreign exchange market increased, and a sudden and large increase in U.S. interest rates, as an important funding source for investment and the budget deficit was withdrawn from the financial markets. The dollar depreciation by itself would not cause a recession since it would ultimately lead to a trade surplus (or smaller deficit), which expands aggregate demand.⁵¹ (Empirical evidence suggests that the full effects of a change in the exchange rate on traded goods takes time, so the dollar may have to “overshoot” its eventual depreciation level in order to achieve a significant adjustment in trade flows in the short run.)⁵²

⁴⁹ Testimony of Brad Setser before the House Budget Committee, *Foreign Holdings of U.S. Debt: Is our Economy Vulnerable?*, June 26, 2007. Brad Setser is Senior Economist, Roubini Global Economics, and Research Associate, Global Economic Governance Programme, University College, Oxford. Setser does not detail how much U.S. debt he assumes China would sell to reach his estimate.

⁵⁰ The extent that the dollar declined and U.S. interest rates rose would depend on how willing other foreigners were to supplant China's reduction in capital inflows. A greater willingness would lead to less dollar depreciation and less of an increase in interest rates, and vice versa.

⁵¹ A sharp decline in the value of the dollar would also reduce living standards, all else equal, because it would raise the price of imports to households. This effect, which is referred to as a decline in the terms of trade, would not be recorded directly in GDP, however.

⁵² Since the decline in the dollar would raise import prices, this could temporarily increase inflationary pressures. The effect would likely be modest, however, since imports are small as a share of GDP and import prices would only (continued...)

However, a sudden increase in interest rates could swamp the trade effects and cause (or worsen) a recession. Large increases in interest rates could cause problems for the U.S. economy, as these increases reduce the market value of debt securities, cause prices on the stock market to fall, undermine efficient financial intermediation, and jeopardize the solvency of various debtors and creditors. Resources may not be able to shift quickly enough from interest-sensitive sectors to export sectors to make this transition fluid. The Federal Reserve could mitigate the interest rate spike by reducing short-term interest rates, although this reduction would influence long-term rates only indirectly, and could worsen the dollar depreciation and increase inflation. In March 2007, Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke reportedly stated in a letter to Senator Shelby that “because foreign holdings of U.S. Treasury securities represent only a small part of total U.S. credit market debt outstanding, U.S. credit markets should be able to absorb without great difficulty any shift of foreign allocations.”⁵³

U.S. financial markets experienced exceptional turmoil beginning in August 2007. Over the following year, the dollar declined by almost 8% in inflation-adjusted terms—a decline that was not, in itself, disruptive. But as the turmoil deepened and spread to the rest of the world in 2008, the value of the dollar began rising. Interest rates on U.S. Treasuries fell close to zero, implying excessive investor demand. Other interest rates also remained low, although access to credit was limited for some. Although comprehensive data will not be available for some time, a “sudden stop” in capital inflows does not appear to have been a feature of the downturn. Problems experienced in U.S. financial markets over the past few years have been widely viewed as “once in a lifetime” events. If these events failed to cause a sudden flight from U.S. assets and an unwinding of the current account deficit by China or other countries, it is hard to imagine what would.

Concluding Observations

Many economists argue that concerns over China’s holdings of U.S. securities represent part of a broader problem for the U.S. economy, namely its dependence on foreign saving to finance its investment needs and federal budget deficits. The large U.S. current account deficit (the manifestation of the high U.S. saving/investment gap) cannot be sustained indefinitely because the U.S. net foreign debt cannot rise faster than GDP indefinitely.⁵⁴ Some economists argue that at some point foreign investors may view the growing level of U.S. foreign debt as unsustainable or more risky, or they may no longer view U.S. securities as offering the best return on their investment, and shift investment funds away from U.S. assets, thus forcing U.S. interest rates to rise to attract needed foreign capital. This would result in higher interest rates and lower investment rates, all else equal, which would reduce long-term growth.⁵⁵ A reliance on foreign governments such as China to finance the U.S. current account deficit (which includes the U.S. merchandise trade deficit) by increasing their foreign exchange reserves may prolong the necessary adjustment process. Thus, it is argued, the United States must boost its level of savings

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gradually rise in response to the fall in the dollar.

⁵³ Reuters, *Bernanke-China Holdings of US Debt Not Problematic*, March 26, 2007.

⁵⁴ The U.S. current account deficit as a percent of GDP fell from a peak of 6.0% in 2006 to 2.7% in 2009; it rose to 3.0% in 2010. The IMF projects that this figure will fall to 1.7% by 2013, but then rise to 2.7% by 2016. (Source: IMF, *World Economic Database*, September 2011 edition.)

⁵⁵ See CRS Report RL33186, *Is the U.S. Current Account Deficit Sustainable?*, by Marc Labonte.

in the long run in order to reduce its vulnerability to a potential shift away from U.S. assets by foreign investors. It remains to be seen whether this adjustment process began in the United States in 2008, or whether the rise in private saving and decline in the current account deficit was only a temporary response to the recession. Some economists contend that, although the low U.S. savings rate is a problem, the U.S. current account deficit and high levels of foreign capital flows to the United States are also reflections of the strength of the U.S. economy and its attractiveness as a destination for foreign investment, and therefore discount the likelihood that foreign investors will suddenly shift their capital elsewhere.⁵⁶

Some economists view China's purchases of U.S. securities as a type of subsidy that is transferred from Chinese savers to U.S. consumers in the form of lower-cost Chinese products and lower U.S. interest rates. That subsidy helps to boost U.S. consumption of Chinese products, which supports China's export industries. However, the subsidy is at the expense of Chinese consumers and nonexport industries, largely because China's undervalued RMB makes imports more expensive than they would be if the RMB was a floating currency. The lack of a social safety net forces Chinese workers to save a significant part of their income. That savings is used to finance the Chinese government's purchases of U.S. securities.

Chinese purchases and holdings of U.S. securities have reportedly been controversial in China according to some media reports, many of which cite complaints among some Chinese Internet bloggers over low return on Chinese investment of its FX reserves. Many analysts (including some in China) have questioned the wisdom of China's policy of investing a large level of FX reserves in U.S. government securities, which offer a relatively low rate of return, when China has such huge development needs at home. One Chinese blogger reportedly wrote: "Chinese people are working so hard, day in and day out, the economic environment is so good, but people's livelihoods are not so great — turns out it is because the government is tightening people's waist belts to lend money to the United States."⁵⁷ Some Chinese analysts have argued that the debt problems in Europe and the United States will decrease their demand for Chinese products, and that a depreciating dollar will lower the value of Chinese dollar assets. Thus, they argue, China will need to accelerate its economic reforms in order to boost domestic consumption (including increased imports), lower its dependency on exporting for economic growth, and slow or reduce China's FX reserves and holdings of U.S. securities. If China consumed more and saved less, it would have less capital to invest overseas, including in the United States. Thus, if the United States did not reduce its dependence on foreign savings for its investment needs, and China reduced its U.S. investments, the United States would need to obtain investment from other countries, and the overall U.S. current account balance would likely remain relatively unchanged but U.S. interest rates would be expected to rise.

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⁵⁶ See Council of Economic Advisors, Economic Report of the President, *The U.S. Capital Surplus*, February 2006, p. 144.

⁵⁷ NYTimes, *Chinese Fault Beijing Over Foreign Reserves*, August, 9, 2011, available at <http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/09/business/global/chinese-fault-beijings-moves-on-foreign-reserves.html>