Palestinian Initiatives for 2011 at the United
Nations
Jim Zanotti
Analyst in Middle Eastern Affairs
Marjorie Ann Browne
Specialist in International Relations
September 23, 2011
Congressional Research Service
7-5700
www.crs.gov
R42022
CRS Report for Congress
Pr
epared for Members and Committees of Congress
Palestinian Initiatives for 2011 at the United Nations
Summary
Many Members of Congress are actively interested in the question of possible U.N. action on
Palestinian statehood. Congress could try to influence U.S. policy and the choices of other actors
through the authorization and appropriation of foreign assistance to the Palestinians, the United
Nations, and Israel and through oversight of the Obama Administration’s diplomatic efforts.
Changes to aid levels may depend on congressional views of how maintaining or changing aid
levels could affect U.S. leverage and credibility in future regional and global contexts.
Officials from the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and Palestinian Authority (PA) are
taking action in the United Nations aimed at solidifying international support for Palestinian
statehood. On September 23, 2011, at the opening of the annual session of the General Assembly,
PLO Chairman and PA President Mahmoud Abbas submitted an application for Palestinian state
membership to the U.N. Secretary-General—on the basis of the armistice lines that prevailed
before the Arab-Israeli War of 1967 (the “1967 borders”)—in order to bring about a Security
Council vote on whether to recommend membership. Abbas cites a lack of progress on the peace
process with Israel as the driving factor behind PLO consideration of alternative pathways toward
a Palestinian state. The Obama Administration has indicated that it will veto a Security Council
resolution in favor of statehood. In an alternate or parallel scenario, an existing U.N. member
state supportive of PLO plans may sponsor a resolution in the General Assembly. Such a
resolution could—with a simple majority vote—recommend the recognition of a Palestinian state
based on the 1967 borders—either as-is or subject to future Israel-PLO negotiation—and change
Palestine’s permanent observer status in the United Nations from that of an “entity” to that of a
“non-member state.” U.S., Israeli, and PLO diplomacy focused on Europe—particularly
permanent Security Council members France and the United Kingdom—has been active and
could further intensify as the time for a possible vote draws closer. Diplomacy also might
currently or in the future include negotiations regarding the venue for, and the timing and
wording of, potential resolutions or other actions on Palestinian statehood.
This report provides information on the U.N. framework and process for options being discussed,
including overviews of the following topics: the United Nations and recognition of states,
observer status in the United Nations, and the criteria and process for United Nations
membership. The report also analyzes the prospects for avoiding U.N. action by reaching an
Israel-PLO agreement to resume negotiations, as well as the possibility of a compromise U.N.
resolution that could set forth parameters for future Israeli-Palestinian negotiations but stop short
of addressing the question of Palestinian statehood beyond expressing aspirations.
It is difficult to predict the potential future implications of U.N. action on Palestinian statehood.
Some observers speculate that tightened Israeli security with respect to the West Bank and Gaza
and popular unrest or civil disobedience among Palestinians could ensue, depending on various
scenarios. Although Abbas maintains that he seeks an eventual return to U.S.-backed Israel-PLO
negotiations on a more equal basis, an upgrade of the Palestinians’ status at the U.N. also could
facilitate subsequent efforts to apply greater pressure on Israel, especially if the PLO gains greater
ability to present grievances in international courts—such as the International Court of Justice
(ICJ) or International Criminal Court (ICC). Whether U.N. action or its aftermath would make
Israel more or less willing to offer concessions in a negotiating process remains unclear,
especially in light of ongoing regional political change and the volatility and possible
deterioration of Israel’s political and military relationships with Egypt and Turkey.
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Palestinian Initiatives for 2011 at the United Nations
Contents
Overview of Palestinian Initiative and Congressional Interest........................................................ 1
United Nations Framework and Process.......................................................................................... 3
The United Nations and Recognition of States.......................................................................... 3
Observer Status in the United Nations....................................................................................... 4
United Nations Membership: Criteria and Process ................................................................... 4
Criteria................................................................................................................................. 4
Process................................................................................................................................. 6
Tactical Possibilities During the U.N. Process ................................................................................ 7
Compromise Resolution? .......................................................................................................... 8
Diplomacy Involving Europe .................................................................................................... 8
Possible Implications of U.N. Action for Future Israeli-Palestinian Developments........................ 8
On-the-Ground Consequences and Further International Action .............................................. 9
Back to Negotiations?.............................................................................................................. 10
Israel’s Reaction ...................................................................................................................... 11
Internal Palestinian Developments .......................................................................................... 11
Congressional Options on Aid ....................................................................................................... 12
Background on U.S. Aid to the Palestinians............................................................................ 12
Possible Changes to Aid to the Palestinians and to the United Nations .................................. 13
Conclusion ..................................................................................................................................... 15
Tables
Table F-1. United Nations Observer Status—The Holy See and Palestine: A Comparison
of Capacities ............................................................................................................................... 26
Appendixes
Appendix A. Timeline and Documentation for Three Recently Admitted Member States............ 17
Appendix B. The Uniting for Peace Resolution ............................................................................ 18
Appendix C. Possible Legal Implications of U.N. Action on Palestinian Statehood..................... 19
Appendix D. Congressional Action Regarding Palestinian Statehood: 1988-2000....................... 22
Appendix E. 112th Congress: Legislative Proposals ...................................................................... 23
Appendix F. United Nations Observer Status—The Holy See and Palestine: A
Comparison of Capacities........................................................................................................... 26
Contacts
Author Contact Information........................................................................................................... 29
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Palestinian Initiatives for 2011 at the United Nations
Overview of Palestinian Initiative and
Congressional Interest1
Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) Chairman and Palestinian Authority (PA) President
Mahmoud Abbas cites a lack of progress on the two-decades-old peace process with Israel as the
driving factor behind current PLO/PA2 consideration of alternative pathways toward a Palestinian
state.3 In recent months, PLO and PA officials have actively worked to obtain more widespread
international recognition of Palestinian statehood in the West Bank (including East Jerusalem)
and the Gaza Strip. Over 100 countries have recognized the state of Palestine that the PLO
declared unilaterally in 1988. No North American or Western European governments that provide
significant financial support to the PA and are influential in the Middle East have recognized the
1988 claim, and the current Palestinian initiative has raised new questions about the positions of
these third parties.4
PLO officials are pursuing action in the United Nations aimed at solidifying international support
for Palestinian statehood, and they appear to enjoy support from the Palestinian public and
several international institutions for their efforts. Proponents of these initiatives at the U.N.
support the timing of their efforts by citing both the plan of PA Prime Minister Salam Fayyad to
reach “de facto statehood” by August 20115 through strengthening PA institutions and economic
1 For additional information and analysis on this subject, including various U.N. scenarios, the possible positions of
various international actors, implications for future action in international courts and forums, examination of the
question of Palestinian statehood under international law, and prospects for the resumption of Israeli-Palestinian
negotiations, see International Crisis Group, Curb Your Enthusiasm: Israel and Palestine After the UN, Middle East
Report No. 112, September 12, 2011; David Makovsky, “The Palestinian Bid for U.N. Membership: Rationale,
Response, Repercussions,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, September 2011; Ziad J. Asali, “Train Wreck in
Turtle Bay,” foreignpolicy.com, September 8, 2011; Daniel Levy, “A Palestinian Autumn in New York—what to
expect at the U.N.” mideast.foreignpolicy.com, September 14, 2011; Arabella Thorp and Ben Smith, “Palestinian
statehood,” House of Commons Library Standard Note, August 11, 2011, available at
http://www.parliament.uk/briefing-papers/SN06051.
2 The PLO is the internationally-recognized representative of the Palestinian people. The PA was created pursuant to
various Israel-PLO agreements during the Oslo process in the 1990s as the organ of governance for limited Palestinian
self-rule in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Officially, the PLO represents the Palestinian national movement in
international bodies, including the United Nations. However, Palestinian efforts to garner international support for
statehood are referred to at this point in the report as PLO/PA efforts because Mahmoud Abbas leads both the PLO and
the PA, because some other PA officials (including Foreign Minister Riad Malki) have been publicly involved in the
efforts, and because one could argue that the territorial writ of the PA involves it in any issue pertaining to the possible
establishment of a Palestinian state within provisional or permanent borders. For the remainder of this report,
references to PLO initiatives in the U.N. regarding statehood will be construed as referring both to PLO and PA
participation, to the extent it exists.
3 Palestinian and Arab critics of U.S. policy argue that the failure of the Obama Administration to limit Israeli
settlement activity in the West Bank and some areas of Jerusalem and the U.S. veto of a draft Security Council
resolution in February 2011 that would have designated Israeli settlements as illegal are the latest manifestations of a
pattern that they perceive shows that the United States is either an ineffectual interlocutor or biased toward Israel—or
both.
4 In February 2011, the United States, casting the only vote in opposition, vetoed the U.N. Security Council draft
resolution discussed in footnote 3. Arab governments and publics criticized the U.S. veto. The United Kingdom,
France, and Germany were among the Security Council members that supported the draft resolution. Although the
February draft resolution differs substantively from the PLO’s application for U.N. membership, the debates and
positions taken by various Security Council members then might prefigure developments in the current context.
5 Palestinian National Authority, Palestine: Ending the Occupation, Establishing the State, Program of the Thirteenth
(continued...)
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development, and the goal President Obama enunciated in September 2010 for establishing a
Palestinian state by 2011 as part of a negotiated two-state solution with Israel. According to a
September 2011 poll by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research, 83% of
Palestinians in the West Bank (including East Jerusalem) and Gaza Strip support “turning to the
UN to obtain support for a Palestinian state.”6 Reports in 2011 from the World Bank, the
International Monetary Fund, and the Office of the U.N. Special Coordinator for the Middle East
Peace Process stated that the PA has made institutional progress in areas traditionally deemed
necessary for statehood,7 but noted continued impediments: an underdeveloped private sector,
constraints—mainly Israel-imposed—on movement and access respecting the West Bank and
Gaza, fiscal problems related to a dearth of international donor funding, and lack of progress in
negotiations.8
PLO Chairman/PA President Abbas has initiated action at the opening of the annual U.N. General
Assembly session that could lead to votes in both the Security Council and the General Assembly.
On September 23, 2011, he submitted an application for Palestinian state9 membership—on the
basis of the armistice lines that prevailed before the Arab-Israeli War of 1967 (commonly known
as the “1967 borders”)—to the U.N. Secretary-General, who is expected to submit the matter to
the Security Council for its action on whether to recommend membership. A positive
recommendation would require 9 “yes” votes out of 15 and no vetoes by any of the five
permanent Council members. The Obama Administration has indicated that it will veto a Security
Council recommendation resolution, but in the unlikely event the Council were to make a positive
recommendation,10 a two-thirds majority vote would be required in the General Assembly to
admit a Palestinian state to the United Nations. Although the Security Council sometimes votes
on whether to recommend membership within days after the application is filed (see Appendix
A), according to the Washington Post the Security Council could take weeks to review the PLO’s
application for U.N. membership for a Palestinian state.11
(...continued)
Government, August 2009, available at http://www.mideastweb.org/palestine_state_program.htm. A key passage from
the document reads: “Out of respect for our citizens, and in recognition of their desire to live free and peaceful lives
under national independence, we must answer their demand to see the fruits of the state-building project. Against this
background, the Palestinian government is struggling determinedly against a hostile occupation regime, employing all
of its energies and available resources, most especially the capacities of our people, to complete the process of building
institutions of the independent State of Palestine in order to establish a de facto state apparatus within the next two
years. It is time now for the illegal occupation to end and for the Palestinian people to enjoy security, safety, freedom
and independence.”
6 Margin of error of 3%. See September 21, 2011 press release on poll results at
http://www.pcpsr.org/survey/polls/2011/p41ejoint.html.
7 See a discussion of these areas in the section entitled “United Nations Membership: Criteria and Process.”
8 Reports for each of these organizations to the Ad Hoc Liaison Committee for April and September of 2011 are
available at their respective websites: http://www.worldbank.org/ps, http://www.imf.org/wbg, and
http://www.unsco.org.
9 The PLO is known as “Palestine” within the U.N. system, per General Assembly Resolution 43/177, dated December
15, 1988.
10 At least one U.S. official, the Obama Administration’s nominee for Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, has
publicly stated that the United States would veto a recommendation for a putative Palestinian state’s admission as a full
U.N. member. Josh Rogin, “Wendy Sherman promises U.S. veto of Palestinian statehood at U.N.,”
thecable.foreignpolicy.com, September 7, 2011.
11 Joel Greenberg, “In Palestinian bid, new role for Abbas,” Washington Post, September 23, 2011.
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In an alternate or parallel scenario, an existing U.N. member state supportive of PLO plans may
sponsor a resolution in the General Assembly. A General Assembly resolution could recommend
the recognition of a Palestinian state based on the 1967 borders—either as-is or based
provisionally on those lines subject to future Israel-PLO negotiation—and change Palestine’s
permanent observer status in the United Nations from that of an “entity” to that of a “non-member
state” with a simple majority vote.12 Deferring the establishment of permanent borders to future
negotiations could help the Palestinians obtain more widespread support for U.N. action from
European and other countries.
Many Members of Congress are actively interested in the question of possible U.N. action on
Palestinian statehood. Congress could try to influence U.S. policy and the choices of other actors
through the authorization and appropriation of economic and security assistance and through
oversight of the Obama Administration’s diplomatic efforts. The United States may be faced with
a choice between backing its vigorous opposition to U.N. action with possible changes to U.S. aid
to the PA and the U.N., and taking more of a wait-and-see approach by reserving possible
ultimatums for what follows the U.N. outcome both diplomatically and on the ground. Both
approaches contain risks. By unsuccessfully mounting strong opposition to U.N. action, the
United States may lose credibility and leverage with key actors. A restrained response, however,
could lead these actors to perceive U.S. flexibility as weakness open to further exploitation.
Either way, the outcome and aftermath of U.N. action on Palestinian statehood could present
further challenges to U.S. efforts to pursue a negotiated two-state solution that secures U.S.
interests, is acceptable to the Palestinians, guarantees Israel’s security, and is credible to both
parties and the international community.
United Nations Framework and Process
This section provides information on the U.N. framework and process for options being
discussed, including the following topics: the United Nations and recognition of states, observer
status in the United Nations, and criteria and process for gaining United Nations membership.
The United Nations and Recognition of States
Under international practice, a state is generally understood to be “an entity that has a defined
territory and a permanent population, under the control of its own government, and that engages
in, or has the capacity to engage in, formal relations with other such entities.”13
The United Nations does not recognize states. States recognize states. The United Nations is
“neither a State nor a Government and therefore does not possess any authority to recognize
either a state or a government.”14 On the other hand, some contend that admission to membership
12 This status would be akin to that currently held by the Holy See (Vatican City), as documented in U.N. General
Assembly Resolution 58/314. See Appendix F for a comparison of the respective current capacities of Palestine and
the Holy See within the U.N. system.
13 Restatement of the Law, Third, Foreign Relations Law of the United States. Section 201. State Defined. The
American Law Institute, 1987. [The ALI is a nonprofit membership association whose members are selected on the
basis of professional standing. Its purpose, since its creation in 1923, is the “clarification and simplification of the
law.”]
14 “About UN Membership” at the United Nations website at http://www.un.org/en/members/about.shtml.
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is an acknowledgement by an organization and its members that an entity has satisfied the
requirement of statehood.15
Observer Status in the United Nations
The current relationship of Palestine and the United Nations, as defined through a series of
General Assembly resolutions, is as an “entity” having received a standing invitation to
participate as an observer in the sessions and the work of the General Assembly and maintain
permanent offices at Headquarters.16 Since 1946, non-member states of the United Nations that
were members of one or more specialized agencies have applied with the U.N. Secretary-General
for the status of Permanent Observer. This practice originated with the application of Switzerland
in 1946 for access as a Permanent Observer. It has been suggested that the General Assembly
adopt a resolution on the status of Palestine in the United Nations that would change its observer
status from “entity” to non-member state.
United Nations Membership: Criteria and Process
Criteria
Article 4 of the United Nations Charter establishes the parameters and criteria as well as the
process for acquiring membership in the organization. Paragraph 1 of the Article reads –
Membership in the United Nations is open to all other peace-loving states which accept the
obligations contained in the present Charter and, in the judgment of the Organization, are
able and willing to carry out these obligations.17
Bruno Simma, in his two-volume article-by-article commentary on the Charter,18 converts
paragraph 1, above, into “five criteria for admission.”
• “Membership...is Only Open to States”
15 Section 201. Comment “h. Determination of statehood.” in the Foreign Relations Law Restatement, Third, notes that
“Whether an entity satisfies the requirements for statehood is ordinarily determined by other states when they decide
whether to treat that entity as a state. Ordinarily, a new state is formally recognized by other states, see sec. 202, but a
decision to treat an entity as a state may be manifested in other ways. Since membership in the principal international
organizations is constitutionally open only to states, admission to membership in an international organization such as
the United Nations is an acknowledgment by the organization, and by those members who vote for admission, that the
entity has satisfied the requirements of statehood.” See Restatement of the Law, Third, Foreign Relations Law of the
United States. Section 201. State Defined. St. Paul, Minn., The American Law Institute Publishers, 1987.
16 See U.N. website under About Permanent Observers: Non-member States and Entities, at http://www.un.org/en/
members/nonmembers.shtml. The General Assembly resolutions forming the basis of Palestine’s observer status are:
A/RES/3237 (XXIX), November 22, 1974; A/RES/43/160A, December 9, 1988; and A/RES/52/250, July 7, 1998. See
Appendix F for a comparison of the respective current capacities of Palestine and the Holy See within the U.N. system.
17 Other in “All other peace-loving states” refers to those states applying for membership in addition to the 51 original
members of the Organization.
18 Simma, Bruno, ed. The Charter of the United Nations: a Commentary. 2nd edition. New York, Oxford University
Press, 2002. Bruno Simma is currently (since February 2003) a justice on the International Court of Justice, one of the
principal organs of the United Nations.
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Simma identifies the standard requirements for statehood, including recognition by other
states and the capacity to conduct diplomacy with other states.
“[A]n applicant would have to meet the formal requirements of the notion of statehood under
international law, i.e., a defined territory, a permanent population, and an independent
government.” He notes, “In order to prove that an applicant...was a State within the meaning
of Art. 4(1) reference was also occasionally made to a certain measure of diplomatic
intercourse or a certain degree of international recognition of the applicant State.”19
• “The Applicant State Must be ‘Peace-Loving’ ”
The primary purpose of the United Nations organization, as stated in Article 1 of the
Charter, is maintenance of international peace and security.
This “criterion was partly a historical criterion and partly used to qualify a candidate’s
current conduct.... The criterion...has also served as a useful instrument of individual States’
membership policies.... With regard to the admission of the large number of new States
resulting from decolonization, however, the criterion ‘peace-loving State’ was of no practical
importance at all.” 20
• “Applicant States Must Accept the Obligations Contained in the Present
Charter”
Applicant states declare that they accept the obligations set forth in the Charter, a treaty.
This would include the principles set forth in Article 2.21
• “Applicants Must, in the Opinion of the Organization, be Able and Willing
[emphasis added] to Carry out the Obligations Contained in the Charter”
While some observers might suggest that these two criteria – capacity and willingness –
have been abandoned, they are in the Charter and might be raised during consideration
for membership.
“Originally, it was intended that States should be precluded from membership of the UN if
they fell below an objective minimum standard of resource endowment necessary for
effective compliance with such obligations... In this respect, the admissions practice has
shown a high measure of flexibility. *** With the open admission to the UN in the second
phase of its development, the requirement of the ability to carry out the obligations of the
Charter has become practically irrelevant as a membership test.”
“Regarding the subjective criterion of willingness to carry out the obligations of the Charter,
the GA suggested the following indicators: maintenance of friendly relations with other
States; fulfilment of international obligations; and the reputation of States concerned for
being prepared to utilize procedures of peaceful dispute settlement (GA Res. 506A (VI), Feb.
1, 1952).”22
19 Simma, vol. 1, pp. 180-181.
20 Simma, p. 182.
21 Article 2 includes the obligation to settle international disputes by peaceful means and to refrain from the threat or
use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state.
22 Simma, pp. 183-184.
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Process
The Security Council
Both the U.N. Security Council and General Assembly are involved in the process for
consideration of applications for U.N. membership. According to paragraph 2 of Article 4 of the
U.N. Charter,
The admission of any such state to membership in the United Nations will be effected by a
decision of the General Assembly upon the recommendation of the Security Council.
The details of the process are set forth in the rules of procedure of the Security Council and the
General Assembly. Applications for membership are submitted by the requesting state to the U.N.
Secretary-General who forwards them to both the Assembly and the Council. In accordance with
Rules 58 through 60 of the Provisional Rules of Procedure of the Security Council, the applicant
state includes a declaration that “it accepts the obligations contained in the Charter.” After receipt
of the application, the Council President usually refers the application to the Council Committee
on the Admission of New Members for its consideration.23 After the Council Committee
completes its review of the application, it submits a report, with recommended resolution
language back to the Council, which takes up the matter in a formal meeting. Decisions on
membership applications are subject to veto by any of the five permanent members of the
Council. If the Council decides to recommend the state for admission, it adopts a resolution of
recommendation that is forwarded in a report to the General Assembly, with a complete record of
the discussion.24 The Council, in recent years, has also issued a presidential statement on its
action. If the Council decides not to recommend the state for admission to U.N. membership, it
shall, in accordance with Rule 60, submit a special report to the General Assembly with a
complete record of the discussion.
The General Assembly
Rule 136 of the Rules of Procedure of the General Assembly states that if the Security Council
recommends the applicant State for membership, the General Assembly shall consider whether
the applicant is “a peace-loving State” and is “able and willing” to carry out the obligations
contained in the Charter. The Assembly decides, by a two-thirds majority of the members present
and voting, on the state’s application for membership. Membership becomes effective on the date
on which the General Assembly adopts the resolution on admission.25
If the Security Council has not recommended the applicant state for membership or postpones its
consideration of the application, then Assembly Rule 137 provides that the General Assembly
may, after full consideration of the special report of the Security Council, send the application
23 In accordance with Rule 59, “Unless the Security Council decides otherwise, the application shall be referred by the
President to a committee of the Security Council upon which each member of the Security Council shall be
represented. The committee shall examine any application referred to it and report its conclusions thereon to the
Council not less than thirty-five days in advance of a regular session of the General Assembly or, if a special session of
the General Assembly is called, not less than fourteen days in advance of such session.” Note: a special session of the
Assembly is different from an emergency special session of the Assembly.
24 Rule 60 of the Provisional Rules of Procedure of the Security Council.
25 Rule 138 of the Rules of Procedure of the General Assembly.
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back to the Council, along with a full record of the discussion in the Assembly, for further
consideration and recommendation or report.
Appendix A provides information on the process for three recently admitted states.26 It includes
document numbers so that a reader might examine them.
Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice (ICJ)
Can the General Assembly admit a state to membership in the United Nations without a prior
Security Council resolution recommending admission? That, in essence, was the question placed
before the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in 1949, in response to the persistent inability of
the Security Council, between 1946 and 1949, to recommend admission of a number of states.
During this time, the USSR exercised its veto in 23 votes on membership applications involving
at least nine states.
In November 1949, the General Assembly, in an effort to determine if an alternative approach was
possible, requested the ICJ, or World Court, to provide an advisory opinion on the following
question:
Can the admission of a State to membership in the United Nations, pursuant to Article 4,
paragraph 2, of the Charter, be effected by a decision of the General Assembly, when the
Security Council has made no recommendation for admission by reason of the candidate
failing to obtain the requisite majority or of the negative vote of a permanent Member upon a
resolution so to recommend?
On March 3, 1950, the World Court, in its advisory opinion to the Assembly, answered the
question in the negative, by 12 votes to two.27
Some have argued that Security Council failure to recommend Palestine for U.N. membership
could be circumvented by taking the issue to the General Assembly, under the Uniting for Peace
Resolution (General Assembly Resolution 377 A (V)). The aforementioned World Court advisory
opinion appears to refute use of that approach, which was intended to be applied in instances
involving maintenance of international peace and security. See Appendix B for further
discussion.28
Tactical Possibilities During the U.N. Process
The following discussion sets forth various possibilities regarding the nature of potential U.N.
action or alternatives to such action. Even after a Security Council or General Assembly process
has begun, continuing diplomacy might lead to deferral, withdrawal, or modification of a
potential resolution. Several actors—including the United States, the PLO, Israel, the European
Union, Arab states, and Turkey—could influence developments.
26 Appendix A. Timeline and Documentation for Three Recently Admitted Member States.
27 International Court of Justice, Advisory Opinion, Competence of the General Assembly for the Admission of a State
to the United Nations (1950). Year Book of the United Nations, 1950, pp. 409-413. See International Court of Justice
website at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/index.php?p1=3&p2=4&code=gaun&case=9&k=31.
28 Appendix B. The Uniting for Peace Resolution.
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The two main decisions for the PLO will be:
• In which U.N. venue(s) (the Security Council, the General Assembly, or both)
will it pursue its efforts?
• What will be the substance and wording of its request(s)?
Compromise Resolution?
The United States, Israel, and other actors may seek to influence Palestinian decision-making on
both questions. A compromise U.N. resolution might set forth parameters for future Israeli-
Palestinian negotiations but stop short of addressing the question of Palestinian statehood beyond
expressing aspirations. Such a compromise could prevent the United States from feeling
compelled to veto a Security Council vote and risking a significant loss of goodwill among the
Palestinian people and wider Arab world. On the other hand, a compromise approach, if
perceived by Palestinians as U.S.- or Israeli-engineered coercion of PLO leadership, could lead to
an even more negative Palestinian popular reaction—possibly stoked by Hamas or other parties
opposed to peace with Israel that have criticized the PLO’s resort to the United Nations as
futile—than U.S. opposition to U.N. action on statehood.29
Diplomacy Involving Europe
It is unclear what leverage U.S. economic and security assistance might have on Palestinian
decision-making (see “Congressional Options on Aid” below), but any such leverage is likely to
be lessened in the event the Palestinians secure significant Western European, Gulf Arab, or other
support or assurances of continued assistance. Thus U.S., Israeli, and PLO diplomacy focused on
Europe—particularly permanent Security Council members France30 and the United Kingdom—
could intensify as the time for a possible vote draws closer. Such diplomacy also could become
intertwined with negotiations regarding the venue for, and the timing and wording of, potential
resolutions or other actions.
Possible Implications of U.N. Action for Future
Israeli-Palestinian Developments
The following discussion sets forth possible implications stemming from the process, outcome, or
aftermath of U.N. action on Palestinian statehood. Such implications could include consequences
for day-to-day interactions between Israelis and Palestinians, precedents that could lead to further
29 U.S. and Israeli pressure on Mahmoud Abbas led him to delay consideration of the so-called “Goldstone Report”
regarding the 2008-2009 Gaza conflict (commonly known by its Israeli code name, “Operation Cast Lead”) at the U.N.
Human Rights Council, for which he suffered heated criticism in domestic circles. Abbas is reportedly determined to
avoid any incident related to the U.N. process pertaining to Palestinian statehood that could lead to similar damage to
his domestic standing. International Crisis Group, op. cit.; Makovsky, op. cit.
30 In a General Assembly speech on September 21, 2011, French President Nicolas Sarkozy expressed support for the
idea of a General Assembly resolution designating Palestine as a “United Nations [non-member] observer state,” and
for resuming Israeli-PLO negotiations within one month, with specific timelines for agreement on borders and security
(six months), and all outstanding issues (one year). Sarkozy also said, “[W]ho doubts that a veto at the Security Council
will engender a cycle of violence in the Middle East? Who doubts that?”
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international action on behalf of the Palestinians, and ramifications for possible future
negotiations and internal Israeli and Palestinian political developments.
On-the-Ground Consequences and Further International Action
Many proponents of emphasizing Palestinian claims to statehood acknowledge that greater
international support through the United Nations or elsewhere will not resolve disputes between
Israelis and Palestinians on core issues—borders, security, settlements, refugees, Jerusalem, water
rights. Some observers express skepticism that international or unilateral action on the statehood
question can transcend symbolism to significantly contribute to Palestinian independence. An
upgrade in status would not confer characteristics of sovereignty that might strengthen the
Palestinians’ position in a negotiating context—such as an independent military capacity and
control over territory and borders. Israel would probably retain control over East Jerusalem and
overall control—despite the PA’s limited self-rule—in the West Bank, while the Sunni Islamist
group Hamas (a U.S.-designated Foreign Terrorist Organization) would probably continue its de
facto rule over the Gaza Strip.
If Israel continues to control developments on the ground in the West Bank and East Jerusalem,
along with access to Gaza, the PLO might face questions about next steps from its own people.
PLO officials have portrayed the possibility of U.N. action as consequential, if not ultimately
decisive, on the statehood issue. However, reduced levels of financial and political support from
international patrons stemming from U.N. action could hinder possible subsequent efforts by
Palestinian leaders to follow up such action with measures seeking to change Israel’s posture in
the West Bank and Gaza, and to rally popular and international support for these possible follow-
up measures.
A resolution upgrading the permanent observer status of Palestine in the United Nations to a non-
member state may also set in motion developments that eventually change how Israelis and
Palestinians address their ongoing, fundamental disputes. If Palestinians and other international
actors perceive that Palestinian political or legal claims have more basis for redress, altered
expectations and calculations could lead to a new dynamic in how Palestinian and third parties
relate to Israel with regard to core issues of the dispute. Possible developments—many of which
Israel decries as connoting or possibly leading to its “delegitimization”—include greater levels of
Palestinian civil disobedience or unrest; international boycott, divestment, and sanctions (BDS)
movements; and an increase in grievances filed concerning Israeli actions in international
courts—such as the International Court of Justice (ICJ)31 and the International Criminal Court
(ICC)—and other forums. A General Assembly resolution purporting to recognize Palestinian
statehood could strengthen the Palestinian case for membership in or greater access to some of
31 Only states may bring contentious cases to the ICJ. Under Article 93 of the U.N. Charter, all U.N. members are ipso
facto parties of the Statute of the International Court of Justice. However, states that are not U.N. members may only
become parties upon recommendation by the U.N. Security Council. Accordingly, unless granted U.N. membership, it
does not appear that the Palestinians could become a non-member party to the ICJ statute absent Security Council
approval, even presuming that the Palestinians were deemed to satisfy the conditions for recognition as a state. See
U.N. Charter, art. 93(2) (“A state which is not a Member of the United Nations may become a party to the Statute of
the International Court of Justice on conditions to be determined in each case by the General Assembly upon the
recommendation of the Security Council.”).
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these international courts and forums, but would not automatically confer such privileges or rights
upon the Palestinians.32
Some PLO leaders have stated that following acknowledgment of even limited Palestinian
sovereignty, aspects of Israeli control over the West Bank and Gaza would constitute a “state
occupying another state.” This argument is presumably advanced in order to increase
international pressure on Israel to reduce its presence and military control over the territories. Yet,
several international actors might reject this argument, particularly if the state’s borders have not
been definitively established in the Security Council. Israel is likely to reject it under any
circumstances.
Back to Negotiations?
Abbas maintains that he still favors a U.S.-led negotiating process under the right conditions, and
that U.N. action supporting Palestinian statehood could help bring Israel and the Palestinians to
the bargaining table on a more equal footing.33 Yet, pursuit of U.N. action on Palestinian
statehood outside of negotiations could be interpreted as a lack of faith by the Palestinians in the
ability and/or willingness of the United States to be an “honest broker” and guarantor of the peace
process. Additionally, some analysts argue that the PLO’s pursuit of U.N. action on Palestinian
statehood undermines prospects for resuming negotiations because it violates previous Israeli-
PLO agreements that form the foundation for a peace process. See Appendix C for further
analysis of this question. Still other analysts warn that nominal Palestinian sovereignty gained
through unilateral or international means might serve possible Israeli interests in avoiding serious
negotiations toward a two-state solution by relieving the sense of international urgency for action
on the issue.34
Until late September, when Palestinian resolve to submit an application for U.N. membership
became clearer, the most credible alternative to a U.N. vote appeared to be the possibility of a
last-minute agreement by the international Quartet (United States, European Union, United
Nations Secretariat, Russia) on parameters for a resumption of Israel-PLO final-status
negotiations—drawing from the guidelines President Barack Obama offered for future
negotiations in speeches he gave on May 19 and May 22, 2011. President Obama called for
basing the borders of Israel and a future Palestinian state on the 1967 lines with mutually agreed
swaps to establish secure and recognized borders for both states under the principle of “two states
for two peoples.” However, future resumption of negotiations may be unlikely unless Israel drops
its insistence on Palestinian recognition of Israel as a “Jewish state”35 and the PLO drops its
32 A September 2011 International Crisis Group report provided details on possible routes open to the Palestinians for
availing itself of the ICC’s jurisdiction and that of other international bodies. The report also stated: “[T]he ICC looms
largest, for Palestinians, for Israel and for the U.S. That is because it affirms criminal responsibility of individuals
[emphasis original] and because Rome Statute parties are legally obliged to enforce [the ICC’s] rulings – both of
which, together, lead Israeli officials to fear the repercussions of a hypothetical future adverse finding.” International
Crisis Group, op. cit. See also Makovsky, op. cit.
33 See Mahmoud Abbas, “The Long-Overdue Palestinian State,” New York Times, May 16, 2011. See also Yossi
Alpher, “An opportunity for Israel,” bitterlemons.org, January 10, 2011.
34 Hussein Agha and Robert Malley, “Who’s Afraid of the Palestinians?”, New York Review of Books, February 10,
2011.
35 Palestinians would generally view such recognition as foreclosing discussion on the status of Palestinian refugees
who claim a “right of return” to their original or ancestral homes in present-day Israel. Most Western and Israeli
discussions of the issue anticipate that, under a final-status Israeli-Palestinian peace agreement, a symbolic number of
(continued...)
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insistence on a halt to Israeli settlement building. Moreover, even if negotiations resume, their
prospects remain uncertain, if not dim. The unwillingness of Hamas to recognize Israel’s right to
exist and renounce violence further complicates matters. Israel remains unwilling to negotiate
directly with Hamas, and Israelis and Palestinians appear unwilling to compromise conflicting
positions concerning the claims of Palestinian refugees and the status of Jerusalem.
Israel’s Reaction
Broad international support for Palestinian statehood could amplify Israelis’ concerns about their
own security, particularly in view of ongoing political change in the surrounding Arab world and
the volatility and possible deterioration of Israel’s political and military relationships with Egypt
and Turkey. Israeli threat perceptions could lead to greater flexibility on its positions on some of
the core issues expected to be resolved in a final-status Israel-PLO peace agreement, although the
political climate in Israel makes this unlikely. The rationale, espoused by commentators and some
former Israeli leaders commonly identified with the left and center of the political spectrum,
would be that time for reaching a deal with the Palestinians is running out, as changes in the
region lead Palestinian leaders and Arab state governments to show greater responsiveness to
popular anti-Israel sentiment, and that negotiating peace is Israel’s best chance to ensure its long-
term security.36
Israeli leaders might, instead, be more likely to become less flexible in negotiations due to
calculations that Israeli concessions are likely to embolden—not assuage—Palestinians and other
Arabs, encouraging them to seek greater gains at Israel’s expense. Many Israelis see the wave of
change in the Arab world, and especially in Egypt, as a repudiation of the logic of trading land for
peace, and as contributing to an unpredictable environment that merits caution, not concessions.
If these views prevail, Israel might conclude that its best options lie in using its military and other
strategic assets to shape desired outcomes either unilaterally or in concert with regional and
international allies and supporters. Possible specific Israeli responses may include, among others:
• withholding transfer revenue (taxes and customs Israel collects on behalf of the
PA) that constitutes nearly two thirds of the PA’s budget;
• increasing construction and approval of Israeli settlements and infrastructure in
the West Bank and East Jerusalem; and
• tightening security in and around the West Bank and Gaza.37
Internal Palestinian Developments
Although the PLO is internationally recognized as the sole representative of the Palestinian
people, the nature, outcome, and aftermath of U.N. action aimed at advancing the cause of
Palestinian statehood could have a significant effect on internal Palestinian developments, which
(...continued)
refugees might return to their earlier homes, but the vast majority would instead receive compensation and resettlement
rights in a Palestinian state.
36 See, e.g., Ehud Olmert, “Peace Now, or Never,” New York Times, September 21, 2011.
37 Makovsky, op. cit.
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would in turn affect the Palestinians’ dealings with Israel and the international community. The
following questions could become pertinent:
• Will Mahmoud Abbas and his PLO/PA/Fatah colleagues and possible successors
be willing and able to drive the Palestinian agenda toward a negotiated peace
with Israel, or will past experience, regional trends, and popular sentiment
compel them to pursue alternatives?
• Will efforts by Fatah and Hamas to form a consensus PA government and reunite
the West Bank and Gaza under limited self-rule resume in light of their May 2011
agreement? What form might these efforts take?
• Could the outcome of international or unilateral action contribute to internal
challenges to Fatah-led PA leadership in the West Bank and/or Hamas rule in
Gaza? What are the relative risks of uprisings fed by changed popular
expectations or the actions of organized militant groups?
• If a Palestinian entity claims or receives greater international recognition of its
sovereignty over the West Bank, Gaza, and East Jerusalem on the basis of the
1967 lines, how might the rights and privileges of Palestinian refugees and other
diaspora members living outside the 1967 borders be affected?38
Congressional Options on Aid
Background on U.S. Aid to the Palestinians
Many observers point to signs of progress with PA security capacities and West Bank economic
development, along with greater Israeli cooperation, as indications that U.S. aid is serving its
purpose. It is less clear whether the progress they cite can be made self-sustaining and will be
useful in promoting a broader political solution, and whether the level of Israeli cooperation is
sufficient in forwarding both these goals. For a description of U.S. aid programs, see CRS Report
RS22967, U.S. Foreign Aid to the Palestinians, by Jim Zanotti.
Ultimately, the ability of U.S. aid to influence Palestinian political decisions depends on some
level of Palestinian popular recognition that U.S. policies and assistance promote Palestinians’
long-term interests. PA willingness to support U.S.-sponsored efforts to counter Hamas and to
reform internal Palestinian political and economic structures could recede as well unless
Palestinians believe that the U.S. is both willing and able to support their quest for self-
determination. Continued active U.S. opposition to U.N. action on Palestinian statehood—
particularly a possible U.S. veto in the U.N. Security Council—could cast further doubt among
Palestinians (possibly along with other international actors) that the United States is an effective
partner, and thus may undermine any potential leverage provided by U.S. aid programs. Bottom-
up political pressure, along with frustration at the lack of progress over the past several years,
38 Guy Goodwin-Gill, Opinion Re The Palestine Liberation Organization, the future State of Palestine, and the
question of popular representation, August 2011, available at http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/238962/final-
pdf-plo-statehood-opinionr-arb.pdf. Goodwin-Gill is a British barrister and a senior research fellow at All Souls
College, Oxford University.
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might influence some leaders who once supported U.S. priorities to change course. Close Abbas
advisor Yasser Abed Rabbo, anticipating U.S. opposition to U.N. action, said in September 2011:
This shows not only disdain for the Palestinian position, but also scorn for what is happening
in the Arab world: a revival seeking justice for the Arab peoples and the region as whole.39
The prospect of a peace process with no end in sight could intensify the jockeying between and
among Israelis and Palestinians for alternatives to a two-state solution, perhaps leading ultimately
to greater conflict. Also, the attention and resources devoted to reform and to strengthening anti-
Hamas groups in the West Bank could widen divisions between the two Palestinian territories,
given perceptions that residents of the Gaza Strip—almost totally dependent on external
assistance and illicit economic activity—are being neglected, left behind, or perhaps even
targeted. This could lead to heightened Palestinian resentment of all parties promoting the peace
process.
Possible Changes to Aid to the Palestinians and to the United
Nations
Some Members of Congress are questioning the continuation of U.S. budgetary, security, and/or
developmental assistance to the Palestinians due to uncertainty over possible contingencies. Both
the House of Representatives (H.Res. 268) and Senate (S.Res. 185) passed resolutions in the
summer of 2011 questioning the continuation of U.S. aid to the PA or to Palestinians in general in
the event the PLO appeals to the United Nations, other international bodies or forums, and/or
foreign governments for recognition of statehood or similar diplomatic support.40 Draft legislation
for FY2012 appropriations approved by the House Appropriations Subcommittee for State,
Foreign Operations and Related Programs in July 2011 would condition any direct assistance to
the Palestinian Authority on the Secretary of State’s certification that the PA is “not attempting to
establish or seek recognition at the United Nations of a Palestinian state outside of an agreement
negotiated between Israel and the Palestinians.”41 Senate Report 112-85 dated September 22,
2011, says that the Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs
Appropriations Bill, 2012 (S. 1602) draft appropriations legislation for FY2012 approved in
September 2011 by the Senate Appropriations Committee may apply similar conditions, but “with
waiver authority, if Palestine becomes a member or non-member state of the United Nations
outside of a negotiated agreement with Israel.” Reports also indicate that S. 1602 may require the
Secretary of State to report on whether Palestinian U.N. initiatives warrant the closure of the
PLO’s office in Washington, DC.42
39 Joel Greenberg, “Israel warns Palestinians on U.N. statehood bid,” Washington Post, September 15, 2011.
40 H.Res. 268 passed on July 7, 2011 by a vote of 407-6, and S.Res. 185 passed on June 28, 2011, by unanimous
consent. The eighth “resolved” clause in H.Res. 268 “affirms that Palestinian efforts to circumvent direct negotiations
and pursue recognition of statehood prior to agreement with Israel will harm United States-Palestinian relations and
will have serious implications for the United States assistance programs for the Palestinians and the Palestinians [sic]
Authority.” The eighth “resolved” clause in S.Res. 185 reads that the Senate would “consider restrictions on aid to the
Palestinian Authority should it persist in efforts to circumvent direct negotiations by turning to the United Nations or
other international bodies.”
41 Draft legislation at subheading “Economic Support Funds,” fifth proviso, available at
http://appropriations.house.gov/UploadedFiles/FY12-SFOPS-07-25_xml.pdf.
42 Joanna Anderson, “Senators Add Language on PLO to Spending Bill,” CQ Today, September 22, 2011.
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In August 2011, the Obama Administration provided congressional notification of its intent to
obligate the remaining $242 million of the approximately $400 million in FY2011 Economic
Support Fund assistance Congress appropriated for the Palestinians—including the final $50
million of the total authorized amount of $200 million in direct budgetary assistance for the PA.43
The New York Times has reported that Israeli Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu “urged dozens
of members of Congress visiting Israel [in August] not to object to the aid,” at the
Administration’s request.44
If the PLO is even partly successful in its ongoing effort to gain U.N. and other international
support for Palestinian statehood, one might conclude that it would be encouraged to continue
with this approach and either discard or call into question the traditional “Oslo peace process”
approach involving U.S.-supported negotiations with Israel. In that event, Congress would likely
face a dilemma. If Congress continues to appropriate U.S. aid to the Palestinians as-is, the PLO
might not have sufficient incentive to consider modifying its new approach to the peace process.
The PLO might perceive that it has enhanced its leverage with both the United States and Israel
and thus become emboldened to act with less regard for U.S. positions. Alternatively, if Congress
elects to reduce or discontinue assistance, U.S. influence over future Palestinian policies and
internal developments may decline. Such an approach may also increase PA reliance on aid either
from European or from Gulf Arab sources, and might amplify Iran’s influence by weakening the
PA relative to Hamas.45 The underlying political agendas of these sources could significantly
diverge from U.S. interests with regard to issues such as maintaining Israel’s security and
promoting democratic values and civil liberties. Moreover, if possible cuts in U.S. aid contribute
to an environment in which Israel-PA security cooperation erodes, the result could be an increased
level of Israeli-Palestinian or regional violence and the further degradation of prospects for a
negotiated two-state solution.
Witnesses from a September 14, 2011 hearing before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs,
including Elliott Abrams (of the Council on Foreign Relations), who handled Israeli-Palestinian
issues on the George W. Bush National Security Council, cautioned that an automatic and across-
the-board cutoff of aid to the PA in the event of U.N. action might not serve U.S. interests—
depending on the venue and substance of the possible action:
Some of the programs that are up for cutting are actually in our interest and the interest of
Israel, such as the security programs….
The entire Palestinian Authority is not to blame for what the PLO-Fatah crew is planning in
New York. I think the collapse of the P.A. would not be in our interest, or for that matter,
Israel’s or Jordan’s. It might actually benefit Hamas and other terrorist groups….
[W]ait and see what President Abbas in his capacity as chairman of the PLO does. Does he
go to the Security Council to force an American veto? That is very harmful for the United
States.
43 U.S. Agency for International Development Congressional Notification #133, August 18, 2011; Presidential
Determination 2011-14, August 30, 2011, http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/08/30/presidential-
memorandum-waiver-restriction-providing-funds-palestinian-a
44 Jennifer Steinhauer and Steven Lee Myers, “House Republicans Discover a Growing Bond with Netanyahu,” New
York Times, September 21, 2011.
45 Testimony of Jonathan Schanzer (of the Foundation for Defense of Democracies), September 14, 2011 House
Foreign Affairs Committee hearing on U.S. aid to Palestinians.
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What language does he put forth in his resolution? How bad is it, exactly? Does he try to get
the General Assembly to pronounce on Jerusalem; on refugees, on borders? Does he go
forward the next day to say, “I'm for negotiations,” or is he to go forward the next day in the
International Criminal Court? So you should keep some powder dry, I think.46
Some Members of Congress have proposed reducing or ceasing U.S. contributions to the United
Nations or any U.N. agency that recognizes Palestinian statehood or accepts a putative Palestinian
state as a member.47 As possible precedent, Representative Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, Chairwoman of
the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, has cited threats to U.N. funding from the George H.W.
Bush Administration that may have discouraged the General Assembly and U.N. agencies from
recognizing the 1988 declaration of Palestinian statehood.48 See Appendix D for information on
congressional action from past instances since 1988 relating to unilateral or international efforts
to advance the cause of Palestinian statehood, and Appendix E for information on legislative
proposals pertinent to these issues that have been introduced during the 112th Congress.
Conclusion
PLO diplomatic efforts in 2011 are unlikely to lead to U.N. membership for a putative Palestinian
state because of a near certainty that the United States would veto a Security Council membership
recommendation vote. However, most observers believe that the PLO has majority support for a
possible General Assembly resolution that would upgrade Palestine’s permanent observer status
in the U.N. to that of a “non-member state.” Having apparently failed to come up with a
compromise for a resumption of negotiations that would have headed off the U.N. effort, the
United States, Israel, and European countries are likely to focus on influencing Palestinian
decisions on the venue of U.N. action and/or the substance and wording of a possible
resolution—with special attention to the question of statehood and to the permanence or
provisionality of borders along the 1967 lines.
The future implications of U.N. action on Palestinian statehood—beyond its potential symbolic
value—are unclear. Although such action is unlikely to immediately resolve any of the core issues
of the Israeli-Palestinian dispute, it may affect developments on the ground. For example,
tightened Israeli security measures with respect to the West Bank and Gaza and popular unrest or
civil disobedience among Palestinians could ensue. Although PLO Chairman/PA President
Mahmoud Abbas maintains that he seeks an eventual return to U.S.-backed Israel-PLO
negotiations, an upgrade to Palestinian statehood status at the U.N. could lead to subsequent
efforts to apply greater political, and international legal pressure on Israel to change its posture on
the ground, especially if the PLO gains greater access to international courts—such as the ICJ or
46 Testimony of Elliott Abrams, September 14, 2011 House Foreign Affairs Committee hearing on U.S. aid to
Palestinians.
47 H.R. 2457 (Palestinian Accountability Act); H.R. 2261 (To withhold United States contributions to the United
Nations or a United Nations agency if the United Nations or such agency supports the recognition of an independent
Palestinian state, and for other purposes); H.Res. 297 (Expressing the sense of the House of Representatives that the
Secretary of State should withhold United States contributions to the regularly assessed biennial budget of the United
Nations for purposes of the General Assembly of the United Nations if the General Assembly adopts a resolution in
favor of recognizing a state of Palestine outside of or prior to a final status agreement negotiated between, and
acceptable to, the State of Israel and the Palestinians).
48 Remarks by Chairwoman Ileana Ros-Lehtinen from September 14, 2011 House Foreign Affairs Committee hearing
on U.S. aid to Palestinians.
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ICC—or other forums in order to bring action against Israel. Such legal action could focus on
Israeli military and security practices and Israeli settlements and infrastructure in the West Bank
and East Jerusalem. Israel has expressed concern that additional Palestinian access to such
institutions will further expose Israeli military leaders to the types of war crimes charges that
have become more common following Israel’s military actions of the past decade—possibly
affecting the military’s morale and operational freedom.
U.N. action on Palestinian statehood or its aftermath may affect the willingness of Israel to offer
concessions in a negotiating process, especially in light of ongoing, widespread change in the
Arab world and the volatility and possible deterioration of Israel’s political and military
relationships with Egypt and Turkey. Nominal Palestinian sovereignty gained through U.N. action
might serve Israeli interests by relieving the sense of international urgency for further action on
the issue. If the U.N. outcome does not meet the expectations of the Palestinian people, the PLO
could face internal challenges—from popular movements, Hamas, or other organized militant
groups—to its continued control of the West Bank and status as the international representative of
the Palestinian people.
Congressional decision-making on future budgetary assistance to the PA and other forms of aid
could be tied to PLO efforts to pursue U.N. action, to the outcome of Security Council and/or
General Assembly votes, to what follows the U.N. outcome both diplomatically and on the
ground, some combination of these, or none of these. Resolution of these questions could depend
on congressional views of how maintaining or changing aid levels could affect U.S. leverage and
credibility in future regional and global contexts.
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Appendix A. Timeline and Documentation for
Three Recently Admitted Member States
Democratic Republic of
East Timor (Timor-
Applicant State:
Switzerland
Leste)
Republic of Montenegro
Application Submission:
Letter dated June 20, 2002;
Letter dated May 20, 2002;
Letter dated June 5, 2006;
A/56/1009 – S/2002/801,
A/56/953 – S/2002/558,
A/60/890-S/2006/409,
dated July 24, 2002
dated May 20, 2002
dated June 16, 2006
Security Council
Referred, considered, and
Referred to Committee,
Referred to Committee,
Committee Referral and
reported, July 24, 2002;
May 22, 2002; considered
June 21, 2006 (S/PV.5471);
Action: *
S/2002/825, recommended
by Committee May 23,
considered by Committee,
unanimously
2002. Reported, May 23,
June 21, 2006. Reported,
2002, with unanimous
June 21, 2006, with
recommendation
unanimous
(S/2002/566)
recommendation
(S/2006/425).
Security Council
Considered and
Considered and
Considered and
Consideration and
recommended, without a
recommended, without a
recommended, without a
Action:
vote, July 24, 2002 (S/PV.
vote, May 23, 2002 (S/PV.
vote, June 22, 2006
4585); S/RES/1426 (2002).
4542); S/RES/1414 (2002).
(S/PV.5473); S/RES/1691
Also S/PRST/2002/23.
Also S/PRST/2002/15.
(2006). Also
S/PRST/2006/27.
General Assembly
Reported to the Assembly,
Reported to the Assembly,
Reported to the Assembly,
Consideration and
July 24, 2002 (A/57/259).
May 23, 2002 (A/57/258,
June 22, 2006 (A/60/902,
Action:
Considered by Assembly
dated July 25, 2002).
dated June 23, 2006).
September 10, 2002
Considered by Assembly
Considered by Assembly
(A/57/PV. 1), A/RES/57/1,
September 27, 2002
June 28, 2006 (A/60/PV.91),
adopted by acclamation.
(A/57/PV. 20), A/RES/57/3,
A/RES/60/264, adopted by
adopted by acclamation.
acclamation.
Source: CRS, from underlying United Nations sources; this table was prepared before the United Nations
admitted South Sudan to membership on July 14, 2011.
Notes: * The Council refers the application to its Committee on New Members; this Committee is composed
of a representative from each of the 15 members of the Council. For the texts of the documents cited in this
Table, see the United Nations website at http://documents.un.org/default.asp; click on Welcome; then click on
Simple Search.
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Appendix B. The Uniting for Peace Resolution
Some observers have expressed the opinion that in the absence of positive Security Council
action relating to an independent Palestine, such as a Council recommendation to the General
Assembly on an application for U.N. membership by Palestine, the issue might be referred to the
Assembly for approval of a membership application. This section briefly discusses the Uniting for
Peace Resolution process and application, in light of the U.N. Charter’s express requirement that
Assembly consideration of an application for U.N. membership is predicated on prior favorable
Council recommendation.
The General Assembly adopted Resolution 377 A (V) on November 3, 1950, as an option in the
event that the Security Council was unable to act on a matter dealing with the maintenance of
international peace and security. After military forces from North Korea invaded the Republic of
Korea in June 1950, the Council recommended that U.N. member states “furnish such
assistance...as may be necessary to repel the armed attack and to restore international peace and
security in the area.” Adoption of S/RES/83 (1950) was possible because the USSR had
boycotted meetings of the Council. However, from August on, a Soviet delegation was present at
Council meetings and cast a negative vote on a U.S. draft resolution condemning the action by the
North Korean authorities.49
In the resolution, the General Assembly
1. Resolves that if the Security Council, because of lack of unanimity of the permanent
members, fails to exercise its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international
peace and security in any case where there appears to be a threat to the peace, breach of the
peace, or act of aggression, the General Assembly shall consider the matter immediately with
a view to making appropriate recommendations to Members for collective measures,
including in the case of a breach of the peace or act of aggression the use of armed force
when necessary, to maintain or restore international pace and security. If not in session at the
time, the General Assembly may meet in emergency special session within twenty-four
hours of the request therefor. Such emergency special session shall be called if requested by
the Security Council the vote of any seven members, or by a majority of the Members of the
United Nations;50
The aforementioned World Court advisory opinion (see “United Nations Membership: Criteria
and Process” in the main body of the report) appears to refute use of the Uniting for Peace
Resolution approach in connection with the possible admission of states to U.N. membership. The
resolution was intended to be applied in instances involving maintenance of international peace
and security.51
49 For further discussion, see Uniting for Peace, by Christian Tomuschat, at the United Nations Audiovisual Library of
International Law at http://www.un.org/law/avl. The Year Book of the United Nations, 1950, at
http://unyearbook.un.org/; Select 1950 and see Chapter III. Political and Security Questions. This source also provides
a detailed treatment of Council and Assembly action.
50 A/RES/377 A (V) had parts A through E and an Annex amending the rule of procedure of the Assembly. Resolution
377 itself also had a part B and part C, in addition to part A. Operative paragraph 1, of Resolution 377 A is a primary
element for Uniting for Peace. See list of Emergency Special Sessions of the General Assembly, with dates, how
convened, and links to Resolutions adopted and Records of the Meetings, at
http://www.un.org/en/ga/sessions/emergency.shtml.
51 The process governing U.N. membership is set forth in Chapter II of the U.N. Charter, while the process set forth in
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Appendix C. Possible Legal Implications of U.N.
Action on Palestinian Statehood
For Previous Israeli-PLO Agreements
Some Israeli analysts believe that PLO pursuit of a U.N. Security Council or General Assembly
vote on Palestinian statehood violates or contradicts previous Israeli-PLO agreements. A May
2011 Jerusalem Report article stated that a former legal advisor to the Israeli Foreign Ministry is
contending that “the Palestinians are in serious breach of the 1995 Oslo Interim Agreement,
which set up the Palestinian Authority [PA], the presidency and the parliament, on the
understanding that all remaining differences would be resolved through negotiations.”52 As
discussed below, Palestinian claims that Israel has breached the “Oslo agreements” also are
possible.
The Interim Agreement and the 1993 Declaration of Principles,53 two of the main Oslo
agreements, both contemplated that Israel and the PLO would negotiate a “permanent settlement
based on Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338,” both of which support the principle of Israel
withdrawing from territories that its military occupied during the June 1967 war in exchange for
“just and lasting peace” with its Arab adversaries. Article XXXI, Clause 7 of the Interim
Agreement reads:
Neither side shall initiate or take any step that will change the status of the West Bank and
the Gaza Strip pending the outcome of the permanent status negotiations.
PLO pursuit or acceptance of a U.N. vote on Palestinian statehood for the West Bank and Gaza
outside of an Israel-PLO negotiating context could be interpreted as contradicting the above
clause. Israeli sources have argued that, by allowing the U.N. to vote on the issue rather than
issuing its own unilateral declaration of statehood,54 the PLO might seek to receive sovereignty
for “Palestine” while maintaining that it is not taking active steps that constitute a breach of
Article XXXI, Clause 7.55
(...continued)
the Uniting for Peace Resolution was prescribed in a U.N. General Assembly, governed by the function laid out in
Chapter IV of the U.N. Charter.
52 Leslie Susser, “Countdown to a State,” Jerusalem Report, May 23, 2011.
53 The text of the Declaration of Principles is available at http://www.bitterlemons.net/docs/dop.html, and the text of the
Interim Agreement is available at
http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Peace+Process/Guide+to+the+Peace+Process/THE+ISRAELI-
PALESTINIAN+INTERIM+AGREEMENT.htm.
54 The PLO did unilaterally declare Palestinian statehood in 1988, 5 years prior to the initial Oslo agreement. The
declaration, however, did not identify the borders of the state with any degree of specificity.
55 Dore Gold, “Countdown to September: Israel, the Palestinians, and the UN General Assembly,” Jerusalem Center for
Public Affairs, May-June 2011, available at
http://www.jcpa.org/JCPA/Templates/ShowPage.asp?DRIT=2&DBID=1&LNGID=1&TMID=111&FID=443&PID=0
&IID=6969&TTL=Countdown_to_September:_Israel,_the_Palestinians,_and_the_UN_General_Assembly.
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Whether the PLO has an ongoing requirement to abide by the above clause and the rest of the
Oslo agreements may be subject to debate. The PLO could argue that any requirement pertaining
to negotiations that might have existed under the Oslo agreements no longer applies because the
Oslo agreements contemplated that the transitional period under which negotiations would
proceed and the PA would govern specified areas of the West Bank and Gaza Strip would “not
exceed 5 years.” The continuing applicability of the agreements beyond the initial 5-year period
is unclear; one could argue that the agreements remain in force unless explicitly terminated, or
one could argue that they are no longer binding. Israel might argue that by continuing the PA’s
administrative duties in the West Bank and Gaza beyond the initial 5-year-period, the PLO has
implicitly accepted the continuing applicability of the Oslo agreements in their entirety. This,
however, also could lead to Palestinian claims—likely to be disputed by Israel—that Israel has
breached obligations under the agreements. For example, Palestinians could allege that Israel
sought to change the status of Gaza when it withdrew its military forces and settlers in 2005, that
it failed to treat the West Bank and Gaza as a single territorial unit, or that continued building of
settlements and infrastructure in the West Bank and East Jerusalem is tantamount to a change in
status.
For Previous U.N. Resolutions
A potential U.N. General Assembly resolution on Palestinian statehood could be seen as contrary
to the letter or spirit of U.N. Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338 because these two
resolutions are commonly seen as the foundational international legal basis for a negotiated
“land-for-peace” peace process contemplated under the Oslo agreements (as discussed above).
Recognizing Palestinian sovereignty within the 1967 borders in connection with a General
Assembly resolution could be interpreted as satisfying the Palestinians’ claims to land without
requiring them to make commitments for peace with Israel or otherwise address security
considerations, and therefore as undermining UNSCRs 242 and 338. Because General Assembly
resolutions, however, are generally seen as non-binding as a matter of international law, or at least
less binding than Security Council resolutions, such a General Assembly resolution on Palestinian
statehood might not legally conflict with the two UNSCRs in question.56
The PLO and other actors supportive of a General Assembly resolution could argue that pursuing
Palestinian statehood does not conflict with “land-for-peace” principles because nominal
sovereignty alone would not alter Israel’s control over lands beyond the 1967 borders. Mahmoud
Abbas asserted in a May 2011 New York Times column that a sovereign Palestinian entity could
actually be better-positioned than the non-sovereign PA to negotiate a final land-for-peace
compromise with Israel.57 Analyzing the matter similarly, though from a different viewpoint, one
prominent Israeli analyst stated that “Abbas’ move is aimed at shaping the political context of the
diplomatic struggle between Israel and the Palestinians in the future in the Palestinians’ favor….
56 Additionally, some analysts might cite parallels between a potential U.N. General Assembly resolution on Palestinian
statehood and General Assembly Resolution 181 from 1947, which proposed the partition of historic Palestine into a
Jewish state and an Arab state and thus provided some basis for the establishment of the state of Israel in 1948.
However, Resolution 181 was passed at a time when there were no Security Council resolutions pertaining to the
establishment of internationally-recognized borders in historic Palestine. Also, Resolution 181 did not itself purport to
establish sovereignty for the states it proposed forming, but rather left the question for the stakeholders in historic
Palestine and the international community to resolve.
57 Mahmoud Abbas, “The Long-Overdue Palestinian State,” New York Times, May 16, 2011.
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This is as much a struggle about political consciousness as it is about international law.”58
Another prominent Israeli analyst has related the idea of potential international recognition of
Palestinian statehood to the concept of an “independent Palestinian state with provisional borders
and attributes of sovereignty” proposed by the United States and the other members of the Middle
East Quartet (United Nations, European Union, Russia) in 2002-2003 in Phase II of the
Performance-Based Road Map to a Permanent Two-State Solution to the Israeli-Palestinian
Conflict (“Roadmap”).59
58 Gold, op. cit.
59 Yossi Alpher, “Obama is deep into phase II,” bitterlemons.org, August 19, 2009, stating “While [the PLO] would
seek international recognition of that state within the 1967 borders, in practical terms its borders would at least
temporarily be defined by Oslo areas A and B and be provisional.”
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Appendix D. Congressional Action Regarding
Palestinian Statehood: 1988-2000
Following the PLO’s declaration of statehood in 1988, Congress included a section (Section 414)
in the Foreign Relations Authorization Act for FY1990 and FY1991 (P.L. 101-246) that
prohibited U.S. funding for the United Nations or any U.N. agency to the extent those forums
accorded the PLO “the same standing as member states.”
In the context of Yasser Arafat’s threat to declare a state in May 1999 at the expiration of the
initial five-year interim period of the Oslo Accords—which Arafat did not ultimately carry out—
the House of Representatives (in March 1999) and Senate (in April 1999) passed H.Con.Res. 24,
which contained the following three resolutions:
• The final political status of the territory controlled by the Palestinian Authority
can only be determined through negotiations and agreement between Israel and
the Palestinian Authority;
• Any attempt to establish Palestinian statehood outside the negotiating process
will invoke the strongest congressional opposition; and
• The President should unequivocally assert United States opposition to the
unilateral declaration of a Palestinian state, making clear that such a declaration
would be a grievous violation of the Oslo accords and that a declared state would
not be recognized by the United States.
In September 2000, in the context of another Arafat threat—also not carried out—to declare a
state following the breakdown of U.S.-brokered Israel-PLO negotiations, and just prior to the
outbreak of the second intifada, the House passed the Peace Through Negotiations Act of 2000
(H.R. 5272), which, if enacted as law, would have established the following provisions in the
event of a subsequent PLO unilateral declaration of statehood:
• Downgrade to the status of the PLO’s office in the United States;
• Prohibition on U.S. aid to a unilaterally-declared Palestinian state, the Palestinian
Authority, or any successor or related entity;
• Prohibition on U.S. program or project aid (except humanitarian aid) in the West
Bank and Gaza Strip;
• Authorization of the President to reduce contributions to international
organizations that recognize a unilaterally-declared Palestinian state; and
• Prohibition on use of funds to extend U.S. recognition to a unilaterally-declared
Palestinian state.
H.R. 5272 also sought to require the United States to oppose membership by a unilaterally-
declared Palestinian state in any international financial institution and to oppose any such
institution’s extension of loans or other financial or technical assistance to such a state.
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Appendix E. 112th Congress: Legislative Proposals
H.R. 2261, introduced June 21, 2011:
To withhold United States contributions to the United Nations or a United Nations agency if the
United Nations or such agency supports the recognition of an independent Palestinian state, and
for other purposes.
H.R. 2457 [Palestinian Accountability Act], introduced July 7, 2011:
Section 4. Prohibits funds from being obligated or expended for U.S. contributions to the United
Nations if the United Nations or any U.N. entity declares or recognizes statehood for the
Palestinian territories unless the Secretary of State certifies to Congress that the Palestinian
Authority, at a minimum, meets specified requirements.
H.R. 2829 [United Nations Transparency, Accountability, and Reform Act of 2011], introduced
August 30, 2011:
Title IV. Status of Palestinian Entities at the United Nations.
States the policy of the United States to oppose recognition of a Palestinian state by any United
Nations entity or any upgrade in the status of the Palestinian observer mission at the United
Nations...prior to the achievement of a final peace agreement negotiated between and agreed to
by Israel and the Palestinians.
Directs the Secretary of State to withhold U.S. contributions from any U.N. entity that recognizes
a Palestinian state or upgrades in any way the status of the Palestinian observer mission...at that
United Nations entity prior to achievement of a peace agreement.
H.R. --- [Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs for FY2012] House
Appropriations Subcommittee on State Department, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs
Mark Up, July 27, 2011, pending full committee markup. Title I, Economic Support Funds: Fifth
Proviso: “That none of the funds appropriated under this heading may be made available for the
Palestinian Authority unless the Secretary of State certifies to the Committees on Appropriations
that the Palestinian Authority is not attempting to establish or seek recognition at the United
Nations of a Palestinian state outside of an agreement negotiated between Israel and the
Palestinians.”
H.R. 2893 [To prohibit Foreign Military Financing program assistance to countries that vote in
the United Nations General Assembly in favor of recognizing a Palestinian state in the absence of
a negotiated border agreement between the Government of Israel and the Palestinian Authority.],
introduced September 12, 2011.
H.Res. 268, introduced May 13, 2011; passed/agreed to in House, July 7, 2011:
Reaffirms support for a negotiated solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict resulting in two
states, a democratic, Jewish state of Israel and a democratic Palestinian state living in peace and
mutual recognition.
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States that any Palestinian unity government must forswear terrorism, accept Israel’s right to
exist, and reaffirm previous agreements made with Israel.
Opposes any attempt to establish or seek recognition of a Palestinian state outside of an
agreement negotiated between Israel and the Palestinians.
Urges Palestinian leaders to cease efforts at circumventing the negotiation process, including
through a unilateral declaration of statehood or by seeking recognition of a Palestinian state from
other nations or the United Nations (U.N.).
Supports the Administration’s opposition to a unilateral declaration of a Palestinian state.
Affirms that Palestinian efforts to circumvent direct negotiations will harm U.S.-Palestinian
relations and will have implications for U.S. assistance programs for the Palestinians and the
Palestinian Authority (PA).
Reaffirms the U.S. statutory requirement precluding assistance to a PA that includes Hamas
unless that PA and all its ministers accept Israel’s right to exist and all prior agreements and
understandings with the United States and Israel.
H.Res. 297, introduced June 3, 2011:
Expresses the sense of the House of Representatives that the Secretary of State should withhold
U.S. contributions to the regularly assessed biennial budget of the United Nations (U.N.) for the
U.N. General Assembly if the General Assembly adopts a resolution in favor of recognizing a
Palestinian state outside of or prior to a final status agreement negotiated between Israel and the
Palestinians.
H.Res. 314, introduced June 16, 2011:
Declaring that it is the policy of the United States to support its ally Israel in seeking peace with
its neighbors, particularly toward a two-state solution that results in a free, nonmilitarized
Palestinian state living side-by-side in peace and security with the Jewish State of Israel, the
home of the Jewish people.
S.Res. 185, introduced May 16, 2011; passed/agreed to in Senate, June 28, 2011:
Reaffirms support for a negotiated solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict resulting in two
states, a democratic, Jewish state of Israel and a democratic Palestinian state living in peace and
mutual recognition.
States that any Palestinian unity government must forswear terrorism, accept Israel’s right to
exist, and reaffirm previous agreements made with Israel.
Opposes any attempt to establish or seek recognition of a Palestinian state outside of an
agreement negotiated between leaders in Israel and the Palestinians.
Urges Palestinian leaders to cease efforts at circumventing the negotiation process, including
through a unilateral declaration of statehood or by seeking recognition of a Palestinian state from
other nations or the United Nations (U.N.).
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Supports the President’s opposition to a unilateral declaration of a Palestinian state.
States that the Senate will consider restrictions on aid to the Palestinian Authority (PA) should the
PA persist in efforts to circumvent direct negotiations.
Reaffirms the requirement under U.S. law precluding assistance to a PA that includes Hamas
unless that PA and all its ministers accept Israel’s right to exist and all prior agreements and
understandings with the governments of the United States and Israel.
H.Res. 394 [Supporting Israel's right to annex Judea and Samaria in the event that the Palestinian
Authority continues to press for unilateral recognition of Palestinian statehood at the United
Nations.], introduced September 8, 2011.
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Appendix F. United Nations Observer Status—The
Holy See and Palestine: A Comparison of Capacities
The following table is intended to provide information on the capacities of observer status in the
United Nations (U.N.) for the Holy See (sometimes referred to as the Vatican), which has non-
member state observer status, and for Palestine, which is an entity with observer status.
Originally, the Holy See gained permanent observer status in the U.N. General Assembly in 1964
when it established a permanent observer mission and requested access to the General Assembly
from the U.N. Secretary-General. That status was and is listed in the Blue Book, the Permanent
Missions to the United Nations publication.60 The Palestine Liberation Organization, later
designated by the General Assembly as Palestine within the U.N. system, was given observer
status in 1974 and received enhanced capacities in successive Assembly resolutions. In 2004, the
Assembly adopted a resolution on the Status of the Holy See in the United Nations, that gave the
Holy See enhanced capacities that are nearly-identical to those Palestine has received.61
Table F-1. United Nations Observer Status—The Holy See and Palestine:
A Comparison of Capacities
The Palestine Liberation
The Holy See: non-member
Topics
Organization/Palestine: entity
State
Regular observer status
1964: permanent observer status, per
request to the Secretary-General
Original designation as
General Assembly Resolution 3237 (XXIX),
observer
November 22, 1974:
Op Para 1. Invites the PLO to participate in
the sessions and the work of the General
Assembly in the capacity of observer;
Op Para 2. Invites the PLO to participate in
the sessions and the work of all international
conferences convened under the auspices of
the General Assembly in the capacity of
observer;
Op Para 3. Considers that the PLO is entitled
to participate as an observer in the sessions
and the work of all international conferences
convened under the auspices of other organs
of the United Nations;
60 See http://www.un.int/protocol/bluebook.html; click on Blue Book, see Sections II and III.
61 One difference between the capacities of Palestine and the Holy See is the seating privileges accorded to each of
them. See the next-to-last row in Table F-1 with the Topics heading of “Priority seating before other observers”.
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General Assembly Resolution 43/160 A,
A/RES/58/250, ANNEX
December 9, 1988
Op Para 1. Decides that the PLO...are
5. The right to have its
Communications relating
entitled to have their communications relating communications relating to the
to work of the General
to the sessions and work of the General
sessions and work of the General
Assembly issued as official
Assembly issued and circulated directly, and
Assembly issued and circulated
documents
without intermediary, as official documents of directly, and without intermediary, as
the Assembly;
official documents of the Assembly;
Op Para 2. Decides also that the PLO...are
entitled to have their communications relating
Communications relating
to the sessions and work of all international
6. The right to have its
to work of all international conferences convened under the auspices of
communications relating to the
conferences under
the General Assembly of the United Nations
sessions and work of all international
Assembly auspices issued
issued and circulated directly, and without
conferences convened under the
as official documents
intermediary, as official documents of these
auspices of the General Assembly
conferences;
issued and circulated directly, and
without intermediary, as official
Op Para 3. Authorizes the Secretariat to
documents of these conferences;
issue and circulate as official documents of
the United Nations under the appropriate
symbol of other organs or conferences of the
United Nations, communications submitted
directly, without intermediary, by the PLO...,
on matters relative to the work of these
organs and conferences;
General Assembly Resolution 43/160 B,
December 9, 1988
Privileges and Immunities
Op Para 2. Calls once more upon the States
concerned to accord to the delegations of the
national liberation movements recognized by
the Organization of African Unity and/or by
the League of Arab States and accorded
observer status by international organizations
[PLO], the facilities, privileges and immunities
necessary for the performance of their
functions in accordance with the provisions of
the Vienna Convention on the
Representation of States in Their Relations
with International Organizations of a
Universal Character;
General Assembly Resolution 43/177,
December 15, 1988
PLO designation as
Op Para 1. Decides that, effective as of 15
“Palestine”
December 1988, the designation “Palestine”
should be used in place of the designation
“Palestine Liberation Organization” in the
United Nations system, without prejudice to
the observer status and functions of the
Palestine Liberation Organization within the
United Nations system, in conformity with
relevant United Nations resolutions and
practice;
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General Assembly Resolution 52/250, July 7,
General Assembly Resolution 58/314,
1998
July 1, 2004
Additional rights and
privileges --- introductory
Op Para 1. Decides to confer upon Palestine,
Op Para 1. Acknowledges that the
paragraph
in its capacity as observer, and as contained in Holy See, in its capacity as an
the annex to the present resolution,
Observer State, shall be accorded the
additional rights and privileges of participation rights and privileges of participation in
in the sessions and work of the General
the sessions and work of the General
Assembly and the international conferences
Assembly and the international
convened under the auspices of the Assembly
conferences convened under the
or other organs of the United Nations, as
auspices of the Assembly or other
well as in United Nations conferences;
organs of the United Nations, as well
as in United nations conferences as
set out in the annex to the present
resolution;
A/RES/52/250, ANNEX
A/RES/58/314, ANNEX
Participation in general
1. The right to participate in the general
1. The right to participate in the
debate
debate of the General Assembly.
general debate of the General
Assembly;
A/RES/52/250, ANNEX
A/RES/58/314, ANNEX
Inscription on list of
2. Without prejudice to the priority of
2. Without prejudice to the priority of
speakers at any plenary
Member States, Palestine shall have the right
Member States, the Holy See shall
Assembly meeting, after
of inscription on the list of speakers under
have the right of inscription on the list
last member state speaker
agenda items other than Palestinian and
of speakers under agenda items at any
at the meeting
Middle East issues at any plenary meeting of
plenary meeting of the General
the General Assembly, after the last Member
Assembly, after the last Member State
State inscribed on the list of that meeting.
inscribed on the list;
A/RES/52/250, ANNEX
A/RES/58/314, ANNEX
Right of reply*
3. The right of reply.
4. The right of reply;
A/RES/52/250, ANNEX
A./RES/58/314, ANNEX
Points of order related to
4. The right to raise points of order related
7. The right to raise points of order
specific topic, but not to
to the proceedings on Palestinian and Middle
related to any proceedings involving
challenge a decision of the
East-issues, provided that the right to raise
the Holy See, provided that the right
presiding officer
such a point of order shall not include the
to raise such a point of order shall not
right to challenge the decision of the
include the right to challenge the
presiding officer.
decision of the presiding officer;
A/RES/52/250, ANNEX
A/RES/58/314, ANNEX
Co-sponsor draft
5. The right to co-sponsor draft resolutions
8. The right to co-sponsor draft
resolutions on specific
and decisions on Palestinian and Middle East
resolutions and decisions that make
topics, but not to cal for a
issues. Such draft resolutions and decisions
reference to the Holy See; such draft
vote on such
shall be put to a vote only upon request from
resolutions and decisions shall be put
resolutions/decisions
a Member State.
to a vote only upon request from a
Member State.
A/RES/52/250, ANNEX
A/RES/58/314, ANNEX
Right to make
6. The right to make interventions, with a
3. The right to make interventions,
interventions during an
precursory explanation or the recal of
with a precursory explanation or the
Assembly session after
relevant General Assembly resolutions being
recall of relevant General Assembly
only an initial (one-time)
made only once by the President of the
resolutions being made only once by
explanation or recal of
General Assembly at the start of each session
the President of the General
relevant resolutions by the of the Assembly.
Assembly at the start of each session
President of the Assembly
of the Assembly.
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A/RES/52/250, ANNEX
A/RES/58/314, ANNEX
Priority seating before
7. Seating for Palestine shall be arranged
9. Seating for the Holy See shall be
other observers
immediately after non-member States and arranged immediately after member
before the other observers; and with the
States and before the other
NOTE Distinction in
allocation of six seats in the General
observers when it participates as a
BOLD [emphasis
Assembly Hall.
non-member State observer, with the
added]
allocation of six seats in the General
Assembly Hall.
A/RES/52/250, ANNEX
A/RES/58/314, ANNEX
Capacities denied
8. Palestine shall not have the right to vote or 10. The Holy See shal not have the
to put forward candidates.
right to vote or to put forward
candidates in the General Assembly.
Source: CRS, from United Nations General Assembly resolutions.
Notes: “Regular observer status” enjoyed by the Holy See from 1964 to 2004 has been described in Article 7 of
the Convention on the Representative of States in their Relations with International Organizations of a Universal
Character, done March 14, 1975 and not yet in force (nor signed by the United States). Article 7 provides “The
functions of the permanent observer mission consist inter alia in: (a) ensuring the representation of the sending
State and safeguarding its interests in relation to the Organization and maintaining liaison with it; (b) ascertaining
activities in the Organization and reporting thereon to the Government of the sending State; (c) promoting co-
operation with the Organization and negotiating with it.”
* Right of reply is a right to speak in reply to a previous speaker’s comment.
Author Contact Information
Jim Zanotti
Marjorie Ann Browne
Analyst in Middle Eastern Affairs
Specialist in International Relations
jzanotti@crs.loc.gov, 7-1441
mbrowne@crs.loc.gov, 7-7695
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