Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance,
Security, and U.S. Policy

Kenneth Katzman
Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs
September 22, 2011
Congressional Research Service
7-5700
www.crs.gov
RL30588
CRS Report for Congress
Pr
epared for Members and Committees of Congress

Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy

Summary
Stated U.S. policy is to ensure that Afghanistan will not again become a base for terrorist attacks
against the United States. Following policy reviews in 2009, the Obama Administration asserted
that it was pursuing a well-resourced and integrated military-civilian strategy intended to pave the
way for a gradual transition to Afghan leadership from July 2011 until the end of 2014. To carry
out U.S. policy, a total of 51,000 additional U.S. forces were authorized by the two 2009 reviews,
bringing U.S. troop numbers to a high of about 99,000, with partner forces adding about 42,000.
On June 22, 2011, President Obama announced that the policy had accomplished most major U.S.
goals and that a drawdown of 33,000 U.S. troops would take place by September 2012. The first
10,000 of these are to be withdrawn by the end of 2011. The transition to Afghan leadership
began, as planned, in July 2011 in the first wave of areas, four cities and three full provinces, and
some U.S. troops have been withdrawn. Amid widespread doubts that Afghan governance and
security institutions will be strong enough to protect themselves by the end of 2014, U.S. and
Afghan officials are negotiating a “strategic partnership” that would guide the long-term
relationship, although differences over U.S. latitude to conduct operations have slowed
negotiations.
The death of Al Qaeda founder Osama bin Laden in a U.S. raid on May 1, 2011, has caused some
to argue that overarching U.S. goals will not be jeopardized by the U.S. drawdown. However, Al
Qaeda has had a minimal presence on the Afghanistan battlefield itself since 2001, and the
official U.S. military view is that security gains achieved against mostly Taliban and affiliated
Afghan insurgent groups in 2010 remain “fragile and reversible.” Some believe that a negotiated
settlement to the Afghanistan conflict has become more likely in the aftermath of bin Laden’s
death, and both Afghan and U.S. officials have begun talks with Taliban figures. There are major
concerns among Afghanistan’s minorities and among its women that reconciliation might produce
compromises that erode the freedoms enjoyed since 2001.
Others believe that the crucial variable is the quality and extent of Afghan governance. In
particular, President Hamid Karzai’s failure to forcefully confront governmental corruption has
caused a loss of Afghan support for his government. However, the Administration view is that
governance is expanding and improving slowly. U.S. officials also hope to draw on Afghanistan’s
vast mineral resources to promote long-term growth—several major mining, agricultural, and
even energy development programs, mostly funded by private investment, have begun in the past
few years, with more in various stages of consideration.
The United States is placing increased emphasis on ensuring regional support for Afghanistan’s
stability and development. U.S. officials maintain that all of Afghanistan’s neighbors, including
Pakistan and Iran, should cease using Afghanistan to promote their own interests and instead help
Afghanistan reemerge as a major regional trade route. Some strategists doubt that Afghanistan
can be rendered permanently stable unless Afghan militants are denied safe haven in Pakistan.
Much of the development to date has been accomplished with foreign, particularly U.S., help,
although donor aid is likely to decline as the transition proceeds. Through the end of FY2011, the
United States has provided over $67 billion in assistance to Afghanistan since the fall of the
Taliban, of which about $30 billion has been to equip and train Afghan forces. During FY2001-
FY2011, the Afghan intervention has cost about $443 billion, including all costs. For FY2012,
about $17 billion in aid (including train and equip) is requested, in addition to about $100 billion
for U.S. military operations there. (See CRS Report RS21922, Afghanistan: Politics, Elections,
and Government Performance
, by Kenneth Katzman.)
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Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy

Contents
Background...................................................................................................................................... 1
From Early History to the 19th Century ..................................................................................... 1
Early 20th Century and Cold War Era ........................................................................................ 1
Geneva Accords (1988) and Soviet Withdrawal........................................................................ 3
The Mujahedin Government and Rise of the Taliban................................................................ 5
Taliban Rule (September 1996-November 2001)...................................................................... 5
U.S. Efforts Against Al Qaeda During Taliban Rule........................................................... 6
The “Northern Alliance” Congeals...................................................................................... 6
Policy Pre-September 11, 2001 ................................................................................................. 7
September 11 Attacks and Operation Enduring Freedom ................................................... 8
Post-Taliban Governance-Building Efforts...................................................................................... 9
Post-Taliban Political Transition Process ................................................................................ 10
Major Governance Issues ........................................................................................................ 11
Continuing Influence of Faction Leaders or “Warlords”................................................... 11
Anti-Corruption................................................................................................................. 11
Expanding Local Governance ........................................................................................... 11
Human Rights and Democracy/Women’s Rights .............................................................. 12
Narcotics Trafficking/Insurgent Financing........................................................................ 12
Civilian Policy Structure ......................................................................................................... 13
Consulates in Mazar-e-Sharif and Herat ........................................................................... 14
Security Policy and 2011-2014 “Transition” ................................................................................. 15
Who Is “The Enemy”? Taliban, Al Qaeda, and Related Insurgents ........................................ 16
Groups: The Taliban (“Quetta Shura Taliban”) ................................................................. 16
Al Qaeda/Bin Laden.......................................................................................................... 17
Hikmatyar Faction............................................................................................................. 18
Haqqani Faction ................................................................................................................ 19
Pakistani Groups ............................................................................................................... 20
The U.S.-Led Military Effort: 2001-2008 ............................................................................... 20
Perception of “Victory” in the First Five Post-Taliban Years............................................ 21
Perception of Deterioration and Growing Force Levels in 2007 and 2008....................... 21
Obama Administration Policy: March 2009 Policy Announcement/Initial Troop
Increase/McChrystal Appointment and Assessment ............................................................ 22
Late 2009 Review: “Surge” Coupled With Transition............................................................. 23
McChrystal Replaced by Petraeus..................................................................................... 23
July 2011 “Deadline” Yields to “Transition” By the End of 2014 .................................... 24
Surge Implementation and Results .......................................................................................... 25
Significant Progress Reported in Helmand and Qandahar ................................................ 27
Initial Transition and U.S. Drawdown Announced and Begun ............................................... 28
Pace of First U.S. Drawdowns Set and Drawdown Begun ............................................... 29
Beyond 2014: Long-Term Commitment/Strategic Partnership Agreement............................. 29
No “SOFA” in Place Currently ......................................................................................... 30
Threats to Long-Term U.S. Presence: Civilian Casualties and 2011 Protests................... 31
Policy Component During Transition: Building Afghan Forces and Establishing Rule
of Law .................................................................................................................................. 32
Afghan National Army ...................................................................................................... 33
Afghan Air Force............................................................................................................... 35
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Afghan National Police (ANP) ......................................................................................... 35
Rule of Law/Criminal Justice Sector................................................................................. 36
U.S. Security Forces Funding/”CERP”............................................................................. 36
Policy Component: Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) ................................................ 37
Karzai Criticism of PRTs................................................................................................... 38
Policy Component: Cooperation With Allies and Burdensharing/Preventing Allied
“Rush for the Exits” ............................................................................................................. 38
Major Contingent Developments During the U.S. “Surge” .............................................. 40
Security/Political Innovations To Facilitate the Transition...................................................... 41
“Reintegration” and “Reconciliation” With Insurgents..................................................... 41
Local Security Experiments: Afghan Provincial Protection Program (APPP),
Afghan Local Police (ALP), and Village Stability Operations ...................................... 44
Current and Post-Transition Policy Alternatives/Support for Rapidly Reducing U.S.
Military Involvement............................................................................................................ 47
Counter-Terrorism/Counter-Terrorism “Plus” Proposals .................................................. 47
Expand Afghan Forces/Rapid Transition to Afghan Lead................................................. 47
Make Concessions to the Taliban/De-Facto Partition ....................................................... 47
Legislatively Mandated Drawdown .................................................................................. 48
Regional Dimension ...................................................................................................................... 48
Pakistan/Pakistan-Afghanistan Border .................................................................................... 51
Increased Direct U.S. Action Against Afghan Militants in Pakistan................................. 51
Pakistan’s Cooperation Against Al Qaeda......................................................................... 51
Pakistan-Afghanistan Relations ........................................................................................ 52
Iran........................................................................................................................................... 54
Iran’s Development Aid for Afghanistan........................................................................... 54
Iranian Assistance to Afghan Militants and to Pro-Iranian Groups and Regions.............. 54
Bilateral Government-to-Government Relations .............................................................. 55
India......................................................................................................................................... 56
India’s Development Activities in Afghanistan................................................................. 57
Russia, Central Asian States, and China.................................................................................. 57
Russia/Northern Distribution Network ............................................................................. 57
Central Asian States .......................................................................................................... 59
China ................................................................................................................................. 60
Persian Gulf States: Saudi Arabia and UAE............................................................................ 61
UAE Involvement ............................................................................................................. 61
Keys to Afghanistan’s Post-War Future: U.S. and International Aid and Economic
Development............................................................................................................................... 62
U.S. Assistance to Afghanistan................................................................................................ 62
Aid Oversight .................................................................................................................... 63
Aid Authorization: Afghanistan Freedom Support Act ..................................................... 63
Direct Support to the Afghan Government........................................................................ 64
International Reconstruction Pledges/National Development Strategy ............................ 66
Development in Key Sectors ................................................................................................... 67
Education........................................................................................................................... 67
Health ................................................................................................................................ 67
Roads................................................................................................................................. 68
Bridges .............................................................................................................................. 68
Railways............................................................................................................................ 68
Electricity .......................................................................................................................... 68
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Agriculture ........................................................................................................................ 70
Telecommunications.......................................................................................................... 71
Airlines.............................................................................................................................. 71
Mining and Gems .............................................................................................................. 71
Oil, Gas, and Related Pipelines......................................................................................... 72
Trade Promotion/Reconstruction Opportunity Zones.............................................................. 72
Residual Issues from Past Conflicts............................................................................................... 91
Stinger Retrieval...................................................................................................................... 91
Mine Eradication ..................................................................................................................... 91

Figures
Figure A-1. Map of Afghanistan.................................................................................................... 94
Figure A-2. Map of Afghan Ethnicities ......................................................................................... 95

Tables
Table 1. Comparative Social and Economic Statistics..................................................................... 4
Table 2. Afghanistan Political Transition Process.......................................................................... 10
Table 3. U.N. Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) ....................................................... 15
Table 4.Summary of Current U.S. Strategy and Implementation .................................................. 25
Table 5. Operation Enduring Freedom Partner Forces .................................................................. 32
Table 6. Background on NATO/ISAF Formation and U.N. Mandate............................................ 39
Table 7. Major Security-Related Indicators ................................................................................... 46
Table 8. Afghan and Regional Facilities Used for
Operations in and Supply Lines to Afghanistan ......................................................................... 50
Table 9. Major Reporting Requirements........................................................................................ 66
Table 10. Major Non-U.S. Donors to Afghanistan 2002-2011 ...................................................... 74
Table 11. U.S. Assistance to Afghanistan, FY1978-FY1998......................................................... 75
Table 12. U.S. Assistance to Afghanistan, FY1999-FY2002......................................................... 76
Table 13. U.S. Assistance to Afghanistan, FY2003 ....................................................................... 77
Table 14. U.S. Assistance to Afghanistan, FY2004 ....................................................................... 78
Table 15. U.S. Assistance to Afghanistan, FY2005 ....................................................................... 79
Table 16. U.S. Assistance to Afghanistan, FY2006 ....................................................................... 80
Table 17. U.S. Assistance to Afghanistan, FY2007 ....................................................................... 81
Table 18. U.S. Assistance to Afghanistan, FY2008 ....................................................................... 82
Table 19. U.S. Assistance to Afghanistan, FY2009 ....................................................................... 83
Table 20. FY2010 Assistance (Includes Supplemental)................................................................. 84
Table 21. FY2011........................................................................................................................... 85
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Table 22. FY2012 Request............................................................................................................. 86
Table 23. Total Obligations for Major Programs: FY2001-FY2010.............................................. 87
Table 24. NATO/ISAF Contributing Nations ................................................................................ 88
Table 25. Provincial Reconstruction Teams................................................................................... 89
Table 26. Major Factions/Leaders in Afghanistan ......................................................................... 90

Appendixes
Appendix. U.S. and International Sanctions Lifted ....................................................................... 92

Contacts
Author Contact Information........................................................................................................... 95

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Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy

Background
Afghanistan has a history of a high degree of decentralization, and resistance to foreign invasion
and occupation. Some have termed it the “graveyard of empires.”
From Early History to the 19th Century
Alexander the Great conquered what is now Afghanistan in three years (330 B.C.E. to 327
B.C.E), although at significant cost and with significant difficulty, and requiring, among other
steps, marriage to a resident of the conquered territory. From the third to the eighth century, A.D.,
Buddhism was the dominant religion in Afghanistan. At the end of the seventh century, Islam
spread in Afghanistan when Arab invaders from the Umayyad Dynasty defeated the Persian
empire of the Sassanians. In the 10th century, Muslim rulers called Samanids, from Bukhara (in
what is now Uzbekistan), extended their influence into Afghanistan, and the complete conversion
of Afghanistan to Islam occurred during the rule of the Gaznavids in the 11th century. They ruled
over the first vast Islamic empire based in what is now Ghazni province of Afghanistan.
In 1504, Babur, a descendent of the conquerors Tamarlane and Genghis Khan, took control of
Kabul and then moved on to India, establishing the Mughal Empire. (Babur is buried in the Babur
Gardens complex in Kabul, which has been refurbished with the help of the Agha Khan
Foundation.) Throughout the 16th and 17th centuries, Afghanistan was fought over by the Mughal
Empire and the Safavid Dynasty of Persia (now Iran), with the Safavids mostly controlling Herat
and western Afghanistan, and the Mughals controlling Kabul and the east. A monarchy ruled by
ethnic Pashtuns was founded in 1747 by Ahmad Shah Durrani, who was a senior officer in the
army of Nadir Shah, ruler of Persia, when Nadir Shah was assassinated and Persian control over
Afghanistan weakened.
A strong ruler, Dost Muhammad Khan, emerged in Kabul in 1826 and created concerns among
Britain that the Afghans were threatening Britain’s control of India; that fear led to a British
decision in 1838 to intervene in Afghanistan, setting off the first Anglo-Afghan War (1838-1842).
Nearly all of the 4,500-person British force was killed in that war, which ended with a final
British stand at Gandamack. The second Anglo-Afghan War took place during 1878-1880.
Early 20th Century and Cold War Era
King Amanullah Khan (1919-1929) launched attacks on British forces in Afghanistan (Third
Anglo-Afghan War) shortly after taking power and won complete independence from Britain as
recognized in the Treaty of Rawalpindi (August 8, 1919). He was considered a secular
modernizer presiding over a government in which all ethnic minorities participated. He was
succeeded by King Mohammad Nadir Shah (1929-1933), and then by King Mohammad Zahir
Shah. Zahir Shah’s reign (1933-1973) is remembered fondly by many older Afghans for
promulgating a constitution in 1964 that established a national legislature and promoting
freedoms for women, including dropping a requirement that they cover their face and hair.
However, possibly believing that he could limit Soviet support for Communist factions in
Afghanistan, Zahir Shah also entered into a significant political and arms purchase relationship
with the Soviet Union. The Soviets began to build large infrastructure projects in Afghanistan
during Zahir Shah’s time, such as the north-south Salang Pass/Tunnel and Bagram airfield. He
also accepted agricultural and other development aid from the United States, including large
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USAID-funded irrigation and hydroelectric dam projects in Helmand Province. In part, the
countryside was secured during the King’s time by local tribal militias called arbokai.
Afghanistan’s slide into instability began in the 1970s when the diametrically opposed
Communist Party and Islamic movements grew in strength. While receiving medical treatment in
Italy, Zahir Shah was overthrown by his cousin, Mohammad Daoud, a military leader who
established a dictatorship with strong state involvement in the economy. Daoud was overthrown
and killed1 in April 1978 by People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA, Communist party)
military officers under the direction of two PDPA (Khalq faction) leaders, Hafizullah Amin and
Nur Mohammad Taraki, in what is called the Saur (April) Revolution. Taraki became president,
but he was displaced in September 1979 by Amin. Both leaders drew their strength from rural
ethnic Pashtuns and tried to impose radical socialist change on a traditional society, in part by
redistributing land and bringing more women into government. The attempt at rapid
modernization sparked rebellion by Islamic parties opposed to such moves. The Soviet Union
sent troops into Afghanistan on December 27, 1979, to prevent a seizure of power by the Islamic
militias, known as the mujahedin (Islamic fighters). Upon their invasion, the Soviets replaced
Amin with another PDPA leader perceived as pliable, Babrak Karmal (Parcham faction of the
PDPA), who was part of the 1978 PDPA takeover but was exiled by Taraki and Amin.
Soviet occupation forces, which numbered about 120,000, were never able to pacify the outlying
areas of the country. The mujahedin benefited from U.S. weapons and assistance, provided
through the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in cooperation with Pakistan’s Inter-Service
Intelligence directorate (ISI). The mujahedin were also relatively well organized and coordinated
by seven major parties that in early 1989 formed a Peshawar-based “Afghan Interim
Government” (AIG). The seven party leaders were Mohammad Nabi Mohammadi; Sibghatullah
Mojaddedi; Gulbuddin Hikmatyar; Burhanuddin Rabbani; Yunus Khalis; Abd-i-Rab Rasul
Sayyaf; and Pir Gaylani. Mohammadi and Khalis have died in recent years of natural causes, and
Rabbani was killed in a September 20, 2011, assassination, but the others are still active in
Afghan politics and governance or, in the case of Hikmatyar, fighting the Afghan government.
The mujahedin weaponry included U.S.-supplied portable shoulder-fired anti-aircraft systems
called “Stingers,” which proved highly effective against Soviet aircraft. The United States
decided in 1985 to provide these weapons to the mujahedin after substantial debate within the
Reagan Administration and some in Congress over whether they could be used effectively and
whether doing so would harm broader U.S.-Soviet relations. The mujahedin also hid and stored
weaponry in a large network of natural and manmade tunnels and caves throughout Afghanistan.
Partly because of the effectiveness of the Stinger in shooting down Soviet helicopters and fixed
wing aircraft, the Soviet Union’s losses mounted—about 13,400 Soviet soldiers were killed in the
war, according to Soviet figures—turning Soviet domestic opinion against the war. In 1986, after
the reformist Mikhail Gorbachev became leader, the Soviets replaced Karmal with the director of
Afghan intelligence, Najibullah Ahmedzai (known by his first name). Najibullah was a Ghilzai
Pashtun, and was from the Parcham faction of the PDPA. Some Afghans say that some aspects of
his governing style were admirable, particularly his appointment of a prime minister (Sultan Ali
Keshtmand and others) to handle administrative duties and distribute power.

1 Daoud’s grave was discovered outside Kabul in early 2008. He was reburied in an official ceremony in Kabul in
March 2009.
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Geneva Accords (1988) and Soviet Withdrawal
On April 14, 1988, Gorbachev agreed to a U.N.-brokered accord (the Geneva Accords) requiring
it to withdraw. The withdrawal was completed by February 15, 1989, leaving in place the weak
Najibullah government. A warming of relations moved the United States and Soviet Union to try
for a political settlement to the Afghan conflict, a trend accelerated by the 1991 collapse of the
Soviet Union, which reduced Moscow’s capacity for supporting communist regimes in the Third
World. On September 13, 1991, Moscow and Washington agreed to a joint cutoff of military aid
to the Afghan combatants.
The State Department has said that a total of about $3 billion in economic and covert military
assistance was provided by the U.S. to the Afghan mujahedin from 1980 until the end of the
Soviet occupation in 1989. Press reports say the covert aid program grew from about $20 million
per year in FY1980 to about $300 million per year during FY1986-FY1990.2 The Soviet pullout
decreased the perceived strategic value of Afghanistan, causing a reduction in subsequent covert
funding. As indicated in Table 11, U.S. assistance to Afghanistan remained at relatively low
levels from the time of the Soviet withdrawal, validating the views of many that the United States
largely considered its role in Afghanistan “completed” when Soviets troops left, and there was
little support for a major U.S. effort to rebuild the country. The United States closed its embassy
in Kabul in January 1989, as the Soviet Union was completing its pullout, and it remained so until
the fall of the Taliban in 2001.
With Soviet backing withdrawn, Najibullah rallied the PDPA Army and the party-dominated
paramilitary organization called the Sarandoy, and successfully beat back the first post-Soviet
withdrawal mujahedin offensives. Although Najibullah defied expectations that his government
would immediately collapse after a Soviet withdrawal, military defections continued and his
position weakened in subsequent years. On March 18, 1992, Najibullah publicly agreed to step
down once an interim government was formed. That announcement set off a wave of rebellions
primarily by Uzbek and Tajik militia commanders in northern Afghanistan—particularly Abdul
Rashid Dostam, who joined prominent mujahedin commander Ahmad Shah Masud of the Islamic
Society, a largely Tajik party headed by Burhannudin Rabbani. Masud had earned a reputation as
a brilliant strategist by preventing the Soviets from occupying his power base in the Panjshir
Valley of northeastern Afghanistan. Najibullah fell, and the mujahedin regime began April 18,
1992.3 Each year, a public parade is held to mark that day.

2 For FY1991, Congress reportedly cut covert aid appropriations to the mujahedin from $300 million the previous year
to $250 million, with half the aid withheld until the second half of the fiscal year. See “Country Fact Sheet:
Afghanistan,” in U.S. Department of State Dispatch, vol. 5, no. 23 (June 6, 1994), p. 377.
3 After failing to flee, Najibullah, his brother, and aides remained at a U.N. facility in Kabul until the Taliban
movement seized control in 1996 and hanged them.
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Table 1. Comparative Social and Economic Statistics
Population
28 million +. Kabul population is 3 million, up from 500,000 in Taliban era.
Ethnicities/Religions
Pashtun 42%; Tajik 27%; Uzbek 9%; Hazara 9%; Aimak 4%; Turkmen 3%; Baluch 2%.
Size of Religious
Religions: Sunni (Hanafi school) 80%; Shi te (Hazaras, Qizilbash, and Isma’ilis) 19%;
Minorities
other 1%Christians-estimated 500-8,000 persons; Sikh and Hindu-3,000 persons;
Bahai’s-400 (declared blasphemous in May 2007); Jews-1 person; Buddhist- smal
numbers, mostly foreigners. No Christian or Jewish schools. One church.
Literacy Rate
28% of population over 15 years of age. 43% of males; 12.6% of females.
GDP and Growth Rates
$29.8 billion purchasing power parity (PPP). 109th in the world. Per capita: $1,000
(2010)
purchasing power parity. 212th in the world. Growth: about 9% for 2010 and expected
for 2011. GDP was about $10 billion (PPP) during last year of Taliban rule.
Unemployment Rate
40%
Children in
7.1 million, of which 40% are girls. Up from 900,000 boys in school during Taliban era.
School/Schools Built
4,000 schools built (al donors) and 140,000 teachers hired since Taliban era. 17
since 2002
universities, up from 2 in 2002. 75,000 Afghans in universities in Afghanistan (35%
female); 5,000 when Taliban was in power.
Afghans With Access to
65% with basic health services access-compared to 8% during Taliban era. Infant
Health Coverage
mortality down 22% since Taliban to 135 per 1,000 live births. 680 clinics built .
Roads Built
About 2,500 miles paved post-Taliban, including repaving of “Ring Road” (78%
complete) that circles the country. Kabul-Qandahar drive reduced to 6 hours.
Judges/Courts
Over 1,000 judges (incl. 200 women) trained since fal of Taliban.
Banks Operating
17, including branches in some rural areas, but about 90% of the population still use
hawalas (informal money transfer services). Zero banks existed during Taliban era.
Some limited credit card use. Some Afghan police now paid by cell phone (E-Paisa).
Access to Electricity
15%-20% of the population. Much of its electricity imported from neighboring states.
Government Revenues
About $1.7 billion in 2010; more than double the $720 million 2007. Total Afghan
(excl. donor funds)
budget is about $4.5 billion (including development funds)—shortfall covered by
foreign donors, including through Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund.
Financial Reserves/Debt
About $4.4 billion, up from $180 million in 2002. Includes amounts due Central Bank.
$8 billion bilateral debt, plus $500 million multilateral. U.S. forgave $108 million in
debt in 2004, and $1.6 billion forgiven by other creditors in March 2010.
Foreign/Private
About $500 million to $1 billion per year. Four Afghan airlines: Ariana (national) plus
Investment
at least two privately owned: Safi and Kam. Turkish Air and India Air fly to Kabul.
Mining/Minerals
Vast untapped minerals affirmed by U.S. experts (June 2010). Chinese firm mining
copper in Lowgar Province. December 2010: contracts let to produce oil in Sar-I-Pol
Province (north) and for private investors to mine gold in Baghlan Province.
Legal Exports/
80% of the population is involved in agriculture. Self-sufficiency in wheat production as
Agriculture
of May 2009 (first time in 30 years). Exports: $403 million (2009): fruits, raisins,
melons, pomegranate juice (Anar), nuts, carpets, lapis lazuli gems, marble tile, timber
products (Kunar, Nuristan provinces). July 2010 Afghanistan-Pakistan trade agreement.
Imports
Imports: $3.4 billion (2009): food, energy, capital goods, textiles, autos. Top five
trading partners (in descending order): Pakistan, Russia, Iran, India, United States.
Oil Proven Reserves
3.6 billion barrels of oil, 36.5 trillion cubic feet of gas. Current oil production
negligible, but USAID funding project to revive oil and gas facilities in the north.
Cellphones/Tourism
About 6.5 million cellphone subscribers, up from neglibile amounts during Taliban era.
Tourism: National park opened in Bamiyan June 2009. Increasing tourist visits.
Sources: CIA, The World Factbook; various press and U.S. government official testimony.
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The Mujahedin Government and Rise of the Taliban
The fall of Najibullah exposed the differences among the mujahedin parties. The leader of one of
the smaller parties (Afghan National Liberation Front), Islamic scholar Sibghatullah Mojadeddi,
was president during April-May 1992. Under an agreement among the major parties, Rabbani
became President in June 1992 with agreement that he would serve until December 1994. He
refused to step down at that time, saying that political authority would disintegrate without a clear
successor. Kabul was subsequently shelled by other mujahedin factions, particularly that of
nominal “Prime Minister” Gulbuddin Hikmatyar, a Pashtun, who accused Rabbani of
monopolizing power. Hikmatyar, who never formally assumed a working prime ministerial role
in Kabul because of suspicions of Rabbani, was purportedly backed by Pakistan. Hikmatyar’s
radical faction of the Islamist Hizb-e-Islami (Islamic Party) had received a large proportion of the
U.S. aid during the anti-Soviet war.
Yunus Khalis, an Islamic cleric, led a more moderate Hizb-e-Islami mujahedin party during that
war, although Khalis turned anti-U.S. in the mid-1990s. Taliban leader Mullah Umar was a fighter
in Khalis’s party during the anti-Soviet war. Khalis died in 2006.
In 1993-1994, Afghan Islamic clerics and students, mostly of rural, Pashtun origin, formed the
Taliban movement. Many were former mujahedin who had become disillusioned with conflict
among mujahedin parties and had moved into Pakistan to study in Islamic seminaries
(“madrassas”) mainly of the “Deobandi” school of Islam.4 Some say this interpretation of Islam is
similar to the “Wahhabism” that is practiced in Saudi Arabia. Taliban practices were also
consonant with conservative Pashtun tribal traditions.
The Taliban viewed the Rabbani government as corrupt and anti-Pashtun, and the four years of
civil war (1992-1996) created popular support for the Taliban as able to deliver stability. With the
help of defections, the Taliban peacefully took control of the southern city of Qandahar in
November 1994. By February 1995, it was approaching Kabul, after which an 18-month
stalemate ensued. In September 1995, the Taliban captured Herat province, bordering Iran, and
imprisoned its governor, Ismail Khan, ally of Rabbani and Masud, who later escaped and took
refuge in Iran. In September 1996, new Taliban victories near Kabul led to the withdrawal of
Rabbani and Masud to the Panjshir Valley north of Kabul with most of their heavy weapons; the
Taliban took control of Kabul on September 27, 1996. Taliban gunmen subsequently entered a
U.N. facility in Kabul to seize Najibullah, his brother, and aides, and then hanged them.
Taliban Rule (September 1996-November 2001)
The Taliban regime was led by Mullah Muhammad Umar, who lost an eye in the anti-Soviet war
while fighting as part of the Hizb-e-Islami mujahedin party of Yunis Khalis. Umar held the title of
Head of State and “Commander of the Faithful,” remaining in the Taliban power base in
Qandahar and almost never appearing in public, although he did occasionally receive high-level
foreign officials. Umar forged a political and personal bond with bin Laden and refused U.S.
demands to extradite him. Like Umar, most of the senior figures in the Taliban regime were

4 The Deobandi school began in 1867 in a seminary in Uttar Pradesh, in British-controlled India, that was set up to train
Islamic clerics and to counter the British educational model.
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Ghilzai Pashtuns, which predominate in eastern Afghanistan. They are rivals of the Durrani
Pashtuns, who are predominant in the south.
The Taliban lost international and domestic support as it imposed strict adherence to Islamic
customs in areas it controlled and employed harsh punishments, including executions. The
Taliban authorized its “Ministry for the Promotion of Virtue and the Suppression of Vice,” headed
by Maulvi Qalamuddin, to use physical punishments to enforce strict Islamic practices, including
bans on television, Western music, and dancing. It prohibited women from attending school or
working outside the home, except in health care, and it publicly executed some women for
adultery. In what many consider its most extreme action, and which some say was urged by bin
Laden, in March 2001 the Taliban blew up two large Buddha statues carved into hills above
Bamiyan city, considering them idols.
The Clinton Administration held talks with the Taliban before and after it took power, but was
unable to moderate its policies. The United States withheld recognition of Taliban as the
legitimate government of Afghanistan, formally recognizing no faction as the government. The
United Nations continued to seat representatives of the Rabbani government, not the Taliban. The
State Department ordered the Afghan embassy in Washington, DC, closed in August 1997. U.N.
Security Council Resolution 1193 (August 28, 1998) and 1214 (December 8, 1998) urged the
Taliban to end discrimination against women. Women’s rights groups urged the Clinton
Administration not to recognize the Taliban government. In May 1999, the Senate-passed S.Res.
68 called on the President not to recognize an Afghan government that oppresses women.
U.S. Efforts Against Al Qaeda During Taliban Rule
The Taliban’s hosting of Al Qaeda’s leadership gradually became the Clinton Administration’s
overriding agenda item with Afghanistan. In April 1998, then U.S. Ambassador to the United
Nations Bill Richardson (along with Assistant Secretary of State Karl Inderfurth and NSC senior
official Bruce Riedel) visited Afghanistan, but the Taliban refused to hand over bin Laden. They
did not meet Mullah Umar. After the August 7, 1998, Al Qaeda bombings of U.S. embassies in
Kenya and Tanzania, the Clinton Administration progressively pressured the Taliban, imposing
U.S. sanctions and achieving adoption of some U.N. sanctions as well. On August 20, 1998, the
United States fired cruise missiles at alleged Al Qaeda training camps in eastern Afghanistan, but
bin Laden was not hit.5 Some observers assert that the Administration missed several other
opportunities to strike him, including a purported sighting of him by an unarmed Predator drone
at the Tarnak Farm camp in Afghanistan in the fall of 2000.6 Clinton Administration officials said
that domestic and international support for ousting the Taliban militarily was lacking.
The “Northern Alliance” Congeals
The Taliban’s policies caused different Afghan factions to ally with the ousted President Rabbani
and Masud and their ally in the Herat area, Ismail Khan—the Tajik core of the anti-Taliban
opposition—into a broader “Northern Alliance.” Joining the Tajik factions in the Alliance were
Uzbek, Hazara Shiite, and even some Pashtun Islamist factions discussed in Table 6. Virtually all

5 A pharmaceutical plant in Sudan (Al Shifa) believe to be producing chemical weapons for Al Qaeda also was struck
that day, although U.S. reviews later corroborated Sudan’s assertions that the plant was strictly civilian in nature.
6 http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/4540958.
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the figures mentioned remain key players in politics in Afghanistan, sometimes allied with and at
other times adversaries of President Hamid Karzai. (For more information on many of these
figures, see CRS Report RS21922, Afghanistan: Politics, Elections, and Government
Performance
, by Kenneth Katzman.)
Uzbeks/General Dostam. One major faction was the Uzbek militia (the
Junbush-Melli, or National Islamic Movement of Afghanistan) of General Abdul
Rashid Dostam. Frequently referred to by some Afghans as one of the “warlords”
who gained power during the anti-Soviet war, Dostam first joined those seeking
to oust Rabbani during his 1992-1996 presidency, but later joined him and the
other Northern Alliance factions opposed to the Taliban.
Hazara Shiites. Members of Hazara tribes, mostly Shiite Muslims, are
prominent in Bamiyan, Dai Kundi, and Ghazni provinces (central Afghanistan)
and are always fearful of, and subject to some extent to, repression by Pashtuns
and other larger ethnic factions. The Hazaras have tended to serve in working
class and domestic household jobs, although more recently they have been
prominent in technology jobs in Kabul, raising their economic status. They are
also increasingly cohesive politically, leading to gains in the September 2010
parliamentary elections. During the various Afghan wars, the main Hazara Shiite
militia was Hizb-e-Wahdat (Unity Party, composed of eight different groups).
Hizb-e-Wahdat suffered a major setback in 1995 when the Taliban captured and
killed its leader Abdul Ali Mazari. One of Karzai’s vice president’s Karim
Khalili, is a Hazara. Another prominent Hazara faction leader, Mohammad
Mohaqeq, is a Karzi critic.
Pashtun Islamists/Sayyaf. Abd-i-Rab Rasul Sayyaf, now a leading Islamic
conservative in parliament, headed a Pashtun-dominated hardline Islamist
mujahedin faction called the Islamic Union for the Liberation of Afghanistan
(Ittihad Islami) during the anti-Soviet war. Even though he is an Islamist
conservative, Sayyaf viewed the Taliban as selling out Afghanistan to Al Qaeda
and he joined the Northern Alliance.
Policy Pre-September 11, 2001
Throughout 2001, but prior to the September 11 attacks, Bush Administration policy differed little
from Clinton Administration policy—applying economic and political pressure while retaining
dialogue with the Taliban, and refraining from militarily assisting the Northern Alliance. The
September 11 Commission report said that, in the months prior to the September 11 attacks,
Administration officials leaned toward such a step. The report added that some officials wanted,
in addition, to assist ethnic Pashtuns who were opposed to the Taliban. Other covert options were
reportedly under consideration as well.7
In a departure from Clinton Administration policy, the Bush Administration stepped up
engagement with Pakistan to try to reduce its support for the Taliban. At that time, there were
allegations that Pakistani advisers were helping the Taliban in their fight against the Northern
Alliance. In accordance with U.N. Security Council Resolution 1333, in February 2001 the State
Department ordered the Taliban representative office in New York closed, although Taliban

7 Drogin, Bob. “U.S. Had Plan for Covert Afghan Options Before 9/11.” Los Angeles Times, May 18, 2002.
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representative Abdul Hakim Mujahid continued to operate informally.8 In March 2001,
Administration officials received a Taliban envoy to discuss bilateral issues.
Even though the Northern Alliance was supplied with Iranian, Russian, and Indian financial and
military support—all of whom had different motives for that support—the Northern Alliance
nonetheless continued to lose ground to the Taliban after it lost Kabul in 1996. By the time of the
September 11 attacks, the Taliban controlled at least 75% of the country, including almost all
provincial capitals. The Alliance suffered a major setback on September 9, 2001 (two days before,
and possibly an integral part of, the September 11 attacks), when Ahmad Shah Masud was
assassinated by Al Qaeda operatives posing as journalists. He was succeeded by his intelligence
chief, Muhammad Fahim,9 a veteran figure but one who lacked Masud’s undisputed authority.
September 11 Attacks and Operation Enduring Freedom
After the September 11 attacks, the Bush Administration decided to militarily overthrow the
Taliban when it refused a final U.S. offer to extradite bin Laden in order to avoid military action.
President Bush articulated a policy that equated those who harbor terrorists to terrorists
themselves, and judged that a friendly regime in Kabul was needed to enable U.S forces to search
for Al Qaeda personnel there. The Administration sought and obtained U.N. backing: U.N.
Security Council Resolution 1368 of September 12, 2001, said that the Council
expresses its readiness to take all necessary steps to respond (implying force) to the
September 11 attacks.
This was widely interpreted as a U.N. authorization for military action in response to the attacks,
but it did not explicitly authorize Operation Enduring Freedom to oust the Taliban. Nor did the
Resolution specifically reference Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter, which allows for responses to
threats to international peace and security.
In Congress, S.J.Res. 23 (passed 98-0 in the Senate and with no objections in the House, P.L.
107-40, signed September 18, 2011), was somewhat more explicit than the U.N. Resolution,
authorizing10
all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or persons he
determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on
September 11, 2001 or harbored such organizations or persons.
Major combat in Afghanistan (Operation Enduring Freedom, OEF) began on October 7, 2001. It
consisted primarily of U.S. air-strikes on Taliban and Al Qaeda forces, facilitated by the
cooperation between small numbers (about 1,000) of U.S. special operations forces and CIA
operatives. The purpose of these operations was to help the Northern Alliance and Pashtun anti-
Taliban forces by providing information to direct U.S. air strikes against Taliban positions. In
part, the U.S. forces and operatives worked with such Northern Alliance contacts as Fahim and

8 Mujahid has reconciled with the current Afghan government, and serves as one of the deputy leaders of the 70
member High Council on political reconciliation.
9 Some Afghan sources refer to him by the name “Fahim Khan,” or “Marshal Fahim.”
10 Another law (P.L. 107-148) established a “Radio Free Afghanistan” under RFE/RL, providing $17 million in funding
for it for FY2002.
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Amrollah Saleh, who during November 2001-June 2010 served as Afghanistan’s intelligence
director, to weaken Taliban defenses on the Shomali plain north of Kabul (and just south of
Bagram Airfield. That airfield marked the forward position of the Northern Alliance during
Taliban rule). Some U.S. combat units (about 1,300 Marines) moved into Afghanistan to pressure
the Taliban around Qandahar at the height of the fighting (October-December 2001), but there
were few pitched battles between U.S. and Taliban soldiers.
The Taliban regime unraveled rapidly after it lost Mazar-e-Sharif on November 9, 2001, to forces
led by Dostam.11 Other, mainly Tajik, Northern Alliance forces—the commanders of which had
initially promised then-Secretary of State Colin Powell that they would not enter Kabul—entered
the capital on November 12, 2001, to popular jubilation. The Taliban subsequently lost the south
and east to U.S.-supported Pashtun leaders, including Hamid Karzai. The end of the Taliban
regime is generally dated as December 9, 2001, when the Taliban surrendered Qandahar and
Mullah Umar fled the city, leaving it under tribal law administered by Pashtun leaders such as the
Noorzai clan.
Subsequently, U.S. and Afghan forces conducted “Operation Anaconda” in the Shah-i-Kot Valley
south of Gardez (Paktia Province) during March 2-19, 2002, against 800 Al Qaeda and Taliban
fighters. In March 2003, about 1,000 U.S. troops raided suspected Taliban or Al Qaeda fighters in
villages around Qandahar (Operation Valiant Strike). On May 1, 2003, Secretary of Defense
Rumsfeld announced an end to “major combat.”
Post-Taliban Governance-Building Efforts12
With Afghanistan devastated after more than 20 years of warfare by the time of the 2001 fall of
the Taliban regime, there were questions about the extent of a U.S. and international commitment
to Afghanistan. Taking the view that leaving the region after the 1989 Soviet pullout allowed
Afghanistan to degenerate into chaos, the Bush Administration decided to try to build a relatively
strong Afghan central government and economy. The effort, which many outside experts
described as “nation-building,” was supported by the United Nations, international institutions,
and U.S. partners in several post-Taliban international meetings.
The Obama Administration’s strategy review in late 2009, the results of which were announced
on December 1, 2009, narrowed official U.S. goals to preventing terrorism safe haven in
Afghanistan and Pakistan. However, the elements of Obama Administration strategy during 2009-
2011 continued, or in some cases, expanded the nation-building programs put in place by the
Bush Administration.13 That task has proved slower and more difficult than anticipated because of
the devastation that years of war wrought on governing institutions, on the education system, and
on the already limited infrastructure. Some observers believe the international community had
unrealistic expectations of what could be achieved in a relatively short time frame.

11 In the process, Dostam captured Taliban fighters and imprisoned them in freight containers, causing many to
suffocate. They were buried in a mass grave at Dasht-e-Laili.
12 See also CRS Report RS21922, Afghanistan: Politics, Elections, and Government Performance, by Kenneth
Katzman, which covers the issues in this section in substantially greater depth.
13 Text of the released summary is at http://documents.nytimes.com/the-obama-administrations-overview-on-
afghanistan-and-pakistan.
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Post-Taliban Political Transition Process
Table 2 depicts, in brief, the process and events that led to the formation of the post-Taliban
government of Afghanistan. For more detail, see CRS Report RS21922, Afghanistan: Politics,
Elections, and Government Performance
.
Table 2. Afghanistan Political Transition Process
Interim
Formed by Bonn Agreement. Headed by Hamid Karzai, an ethnic Pashtun, but key security
Administration
positions dominated by mostly minority “Northern Alliance.” Karzai reaffirmed as leader
by June 2002 “emergency loya jirga.” (A jirga is a traditional Afghan assembly).
Constitution
Approved by January 2004 “Constitutional Loya Jirga” (CLJ). Set up strong presidency, a
rebuke to Northern Alliance that wanted prime ministership to balance presidential
power, but gave parliament significant powers to compensate. Gives men and women
equal rights under the law, allows for political parties as long as they are not “un-Islamic;”
al ows for court rulings according to Hanafi (Sunni) Islam (Chapter 7, Article 15). Set out
electoral roadmap for simultaneous (if possible) presidential, provincial, and district
elections by June 2004. Named ex-King Zahir Shah to non-hereditary position of “Father
of the Nation;” he died July 23, 2007.
Presidential Election
Elections for President and two vice presidents, for 5-year term, held Oct. 9, 2004.
Turnout was 80% of 10.5 million registered. Karzai and running mates (Ahmad Zia Masud,
a Tajik and brother of legendary mujahedin commander Ahmad Shah Masud, who was
assassinated by Al Qaeda two days before the Sept. 11 attacks, and Karim Khalili, a
Hazara) elected with 55% against 16 opponents. Second highest vote getter, Northern
Alliance figure (and Education Minister) Yunus Qanooni (16%). One female ran. Funded
with $90 million from donors, including $40 million from U.S. (FY2004, P.L. 108-106).
First Parliamentary
Elections held Sept. 18, 2005, on “Single Non-Transferable Vote” System; candidates
Elections
stood as individuals, not in party list. Parliament consists of a 249 elected lower house
(Wolesi Jirga, House of the People) and a selected 102 seat upper house (Meshrano Jirga,
House of Elders). 2,815 candidates for Wolesi Jirga, including 347 women. Turnout was
57% (6.8 million voters) of 12.5 million registered. Upper house is appointed by Karzai (34
seats, half of which are to be women), and by the provincial councils (68 seats). When
district councils are elected, they will appoint 34 of the seats. Funded by $160 million in
international aid, including $45 mil ion from U.S. (FY2005 supplemental, P.L. 109-13).
First Provincial
Provincial elections held Sept. 18, 2005, simultaneous with parliamentary elections. Exact
Elections/
powers vague, but now taking lead in deciding local reconstruction Provincial council sizes
District Elections
range from 9 to the 29 seats on the Kabul provincial council. Total seats are 420, of which
121 held by women. l3,185 candidates, including 279 women. District elections not held
due to complexity and potential tensions of drawing district boundaries.
Second
Presidential and provincial elections were held Aug. 20, 2009, but required a runoff
Presidential/Provincial because no candidate received over 50% in certified results issued October 20. Second
Elections
round not held because Dr. Abdullah, pulled out of runoff. Election costs: $300 million.
Parliamentary
Original y set for May 22, 2010; held September 18, 2010. Results disputed, but agreement
Elections
reached for Karzai inaugurate new lower house on January 26, 2011, six days after original
date. 70 women elected, two more than quota. Speaker selected on February 27, Abdul
Raouf Ibrahimi, an ethnic Uzbek. Special tribunal set up to investigate results and on June
23 ruled that 62 results be altered, prompting a backlash from those who might be
deprived of seats and threats of impeaching Karzai. Crisis eased on August 11, 2011, when
Karzai disbanded special tribunal and announced that only the election bodies have
standing to overturn results. Independent Election Commission announced August 21 that
nine lower house winners would be unseated for fraud. They were sworn in September 4,
but a majority of the lower house has boycotted since, rendering it non-functional. For the
upper house, 68 seats council are appointed to four-year terms by the elected provincial
councils in each of Afghanistan’s 34 provinces, and remain in office. Karzai made his 34
appointments on February 19. The speaker of that body is Muslim Yaar (a Pashtun).
Third Presidential
To be held in 2014. In August, 2011, Karzai told members of the National Assembly he
Election
will not seek to alter the constitution to allow him to run again (the constitution permits
only two consecutive terms).
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Major Governance Issues
Building the capacity of and reforming Afghan governance has been consistently and widely
judged to be key to the success of U.S. policy. This has been stated explicitly in each Obama
Administration policy review, strategy statement, and report on progress in Afghanistan. The
centrality of governance was emphasized at the two major international conferences on
Afghanistan in 2010—the January 28, 2010, “London Conference” and the July 20, 2010, “Kabul
Conference.”14 This issue is expected to be a focus of an international conference on
Afghanistan—to be chaired and organized by the Afghan government—in Bonn in December
2011, the 10th anniversary of the Bonn Agreement that began the post-Taliban political transition.
Although the issue of governance is inseparable from that of securing Afghanistan, the sections
below briefly outline Afghan-generated and international community-led efforts to build
Afghanistan’s governing capacity. The issues below are covered extensively in CRS Report
RS21922, Afghanistan: Politics, Elections, and Government Performance, by Kenneth Katzman.
Continuing Influence of Faction Leaders or “Warlords”
Governing Afghanistan is complicated by the continuing influence of local strongmen (often
referred to as “warlords”), many of whom wield personal militias or have other indirect influence.
Although U.S. policy has been to build up Afghanistan’s government as a monopoly of authority,
in some cases U.S. and Afghan government officials have worked with faction leaders to stabilize
areas of Afghanistan. Several of these figures are discussed in CRS Report RS21922,
Afghanistan: Politics, Elections, and Government Performance.
Anti-Corruption
U.S. officials believe that rife corruption at all levels of the Afghan government has undermined
U.S. domestic support for the U.S. mission in Afghanistan, and caused the Afghan population to
sour on the Karzai government. Therefore, a trend in U.S. policy—and emphasized in every
Obama Administration strategy review as well as by many in Congress—has been to press Karzai
to confront governmental corruption. One reported decision of the Administration in late 2010
was to focus on lower level corruption rather than investigations of senior Afghans or Afghans
close to President Karzai. Doing so in 2009 and early 2010 had proved counter-productive by
causing Karzai to become suspicious of U.S. intent and to ally with undemocratic elements in
Afghanistan. A major corruption-related issue that has caused tensions between the United States
and the Afghan government is the scandal surrounding concessionary lending to allies of senior
government figures by the Kabul Bank, an issue that has led to the suspension of the IMF aid
program and related withholding of some donor funds. The FY2011 appropriation (P.L. 112-10,
Section 2122) contains strict requirements for Afghanistan to take steps against corruption as a
condition of receiving U.S. aid funds.
Expanding Local Governance
In part because building the central government has gone slowly and because official corruption
is widespread, there has been a U.S. shift, predating the Obama Administration, toward promoting

14 A draft of the final communiqué of the Kabul Conference is at http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20100720.ap_on_re_as/
as_afghanistan/print.
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local governance. Some argue that, in addition to offering the advantage of bypassing an often
corrupt central government, doing so is more compatible with Afghan traditions of local
autonomy. Building local governance has suffered from a deficit of trained and respected Afghan
administrators ready or willing to serve, particularly where hostilities are ongoing. On the other
hand, the DOD report on stability in Afghanistan, covering late 2010 and early 2011, reports that
governance is emerging or taking root in large portions of districts that have been the focus of
U.S. and NATO stability operations in 2010.15 The slow progress accounts for many of the
uncertainties clouding the prospects for transition to Afghan leadership by the end of 2014.
Human Rights and Democracy/Women’s Rights
The Administration and Afghan government claim progress in building a democratic Afghanistan
that adheres to international standards of human rights practices. The State Department report on
human rights practices for 2010 (released April 8, 2011)16 presented a substantial list of human
rights deficiencies in Afghanistan, including extra-judiciary killings, torture, arbitrary arrest and
detention, restriction on freedom of the press, limits on freedom of assembly, official corruption,
violence against women, sexual abuse of children, child labor, and abuse of workers rights. Still,
the report attributes many of the shortfalls to the overall state of continued conflict and virtually
all observers agree that Afghans are freer than they were under the Taliban.
A major debate is over whether gains made by women since the fall of the Taliban can be
sustained as the U.S.-led coalition transitions to Afghan leadership and, particularly if there is an
overall political settlement between the government and insurgent leaders. Women enjoy legal
protections and play public roles unheard of during the Taliban era, although conservatives
attitudes prevail and often undermine the intentions of formal laws and regulations. These issues
are covered in substantial depth in CRS Report RS21922, Afghanistan: Politics, Elections, and
Government Performance
.
Narcotics Trafficking/Insurgent Financing17
Narcotics trafficking is regarded by some as a core impediment to the U.S. mission in
Afghanistan by undermining rule of law and providing funds to the insurgency. It is an area on
which there has been progress in recent years, although there are questions whether progress is
sustainable. The trafficking is said to generate an estimated $70 million-$100 million per year for
the Taliban. A UNODC report of September 2010, continued a relatively positive trend in
reporting on this issue, noting that all of the 20 provinces (out of 34 provinces in Afghanistan) in
the “poppy free” category remain that way. Total production in 2010 was estimated at 3,600
metric tons, a 48% decrease from 2009, although this was due to a crop disease, for the most
part.18 The UNODC winter survey, released April 19, 2011, said that the price for opium
increased dramatically in late 2010, and that there is likely to be a rise in cultivation in northern
and western Afghanistan, with several “poppy free” provinces likely to fall out of that category.

15 http://www.defense.gov/news/1230_1231Report.pdf.
16 For text, see http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2010/sca/154477.htm.
17 For a detailed discussion and U.S. funding on the issue, see CRS Report RL32686, Afghanistan: Narcotics and U.S.
Policy
, by Christopher M. Blanchard.
18 UNDOC. Opium Survey 2010. http://www.unodc.org/documents/crop-monitoring/Afghanistan/
Afg_opium_survey_2010_exsum_web.pdf
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The Obama Administration approach focuses on promoting legitimate agricultural alternatives to
poppy growing—and that sector is discussed extensively later in this paper—in line with Afghan
government preferences. In July 2009, the United States ended its prior focus on eradication of
poppy fields on the grounds that this practice was driving Afghans into the arms of the Taliban as
protectors of their ability to earn a living. The de-emphasis on eradication also put aside the long-
standing differences with Karzai over whether to conduct aerial spraying of fields. Congress
apparently has sided with Karzai’s view; the successive annual appropriations laws since FY2008
have prohibited U.S. counter-narcotics funding from being used for aerial spraying on
Afghanistan poppy fields without Afghan concurrence. Other policies, such as “good
governance” U.S.-funded bonuses, give an incentive to provinces to actively work against
cultivation.
How consistently to use U.S. and NATO forces to combat narcotics has been under almost
constant debate. Britain’s forces, for example, focus on interdicting traffickers and raiding drug
labs. The U.S. military, in support of the effort after initial reluctance, is flying Afghan and U.S.
counter-narcotics agents (Drug Enforcement Agency, DEA) on missions and identifying targets; it
also evacuates casualties from counter-drug operations and assists an Afghan helicopter squadron
to move Afghan counter-narcotics forces around the country. To help break up narcotics
trafficking networks, the DEA presence in Afghanistan is has expanded from 13 agents in 2008 to
over 80 by the start of 2011.
The Obama Administration has placed additional focus on the other sources of Taliban funding,
including continued donations from wealthy residents of the Persian Gulf. It established a
multinational task force to combat Taliban financing generally, not limited to narcotics, and U.S.
officials are emphasizing with Persian Gulf counterparts the need for cooperation.
The Bush and Obama Administrations have exercised waiver provisions to required certifications
of full Afghan cooperation needed to provide more than congressionally stipulated amounts of
U.S. economic assistance to Afghanistan. A certification requirement (to provide amounts over
$300 million) was contained in the FY2008 appropriation (P.L. 110-161); in the FY2009 regular
appropriation, P.L. 111-8 ($200 million ceiling); and the FY2010 appropriation, P.L. 111-117,
($200 million ceiling). The FY2009 supplemental (P.L. 111-32) withheld 10% of State
Department narcotics funding (International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement, INCLE)
pending a report that Afghanistan is removing officials involved in narcotics trafficking or gross
human rights violations. No specific counter-narcotics requirement was in the FY2011
appropriation (P.L. 112-10) although there are more general certification requirements that
Afghanistan is taking steps to eliminate official corruption. No funds for Afghanistan have been
held up on these grounds. Narcotics trafficking control was perhaps the one issue on which the
Taliban regime satisfied much of the international community. However, cultivation flourished in
provinces under Northern Alliance control, such as Badakhshan.
Civilian Policy Structure
Building the capacity of the Afghan government, and helping it develop economically, is
primarily, although not exclusively, the purview of U.S. and international civilian officials and
institutions. In line with the prioritization of Afghanistan policy, in February 2009, the
Administration set up the position of appointed “Special Representative for Afghanistan and
Pakistan” (SRAP), occupied first by Ambassador Richard Holbrooke, reporting to Secretary of
State Clinton. Holbrooke died on December 13, 2010, but his team at the State Department, led as
of February 2011 by Ambassador Marc Grossman, remains largely intact, consisting mainly of
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members detailed from several different agencies; several, such as deputy SRAP Vikram Singh,
have long-term experience on Afghanistan and Pakistan affairs.
At the U.S. Embassy in Kabul, Ambassador Ryan Crocker replaced Karl Eikenberry on July 25,
2011. Crocker is expected to improve the embassy’s relations with President Karzai—relations
that suffered partly because of Ambassador Eikenberry’s blunt criticisms of the Karzai
government’s shortcomings. There is a “deputy Ambassador” (currently State Department official
David Pearce) and separate Ambassador rank officials to manage U.S. economic assistance issues
and to oversee Embassy operations. Another official of Ambassador rank, Hans Klemm, (as of
June 2010) coordinates U.S. rule of law programs. Ambassador Timothy Carney oversaw U.S.
policy for the 2009 elections.
The U.S. Embassy has progressively expanded its personnel and facilities to accommodate the
additional civilian hires and Foreign Service officers who have been posted to Afghanistan since
2009 as mentors and advisers to the Afghan government. U.S. officials say there are more than
1,130 U.S. civilian officials in Afghanistan, as of September 2011, up from only about 400 in
early 2009. Of these at least 400 serve outside Kabul as part of initiatives such as the 32 “District
Support Teams” and the “District Working Groups.” That is up from 67 outside Kabul in 2009.
On February 7, 2010, in an effort to improve civilian coordination between the United States, its
foreign partners, and the Afghan government, a NATO “Senior Civilian Representative” in
Afghanistan, UK Ambassador Mark Sedwill, took office. This official works not only with U.S.
military officials but with representatives of the embassies of partner countries and with a special
U.N. Assistance Mission–Afghanistan (UNAMA, see Table 3). In April 2011, Sedwill was
replaced by the former British Ambassador to Iran, Sir Simon Gass. The contribution of the
United Nations to enhancing governance and coordinating donors is discussed below.
Afghan Ambassador to the United States, Sayed Tayib Jawad, served as Ambassador from 2004
until his recall in August 2010. He was recalled because of complaints in Kabul about Western-
style parties that were being held at the Afghan embassy in the United States. Then deputy
Foreign Minister Eklil Hakimi replaced him in February 23, 2011.
Consulates in Mazar-e-Sharif and Herat
The tables at the end of this report include U.S. funding for State Department and USAID
operations, including Embassy construction and running the “Embassy air wing,” a fleet of twin-
engine turboprops that ferry U.S. officials and contractors around Afghanistan. In a significant
development attempting to signal normalization of certain areas of Afghanistan, in early 2010 the
United States formally inaugurated U.S. consulates in Herat and Mazar-e-Sharif. In November
2010 contracts were announced for expansion of the U.S. Embassy ($511 million) and to
construct the two consulates ($20 million for each facility). As discussed below, both cities were
in the first tranche of areas to be transitioned to Afghan control.
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Table 3. U.N. Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA)
The United Nations is extensively involved in Afghan governance and national building, primarily in factional conflict
resolution and coordination of development assistance. The coordinator of U.N. efforts is the U.N. Assistance
Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA), headed as of March 22, 2010, by Swedish diplomat Staffan de-Mistura, replacing
Norwegian diplomat Kai Eide. Mistura formerly played a similar role in Iraq. U.N. Security Council Resolution 1806 of
March 20, 2008, expanded UNAMA’s authority to coordinating the work of international donors and strengthening
cooperation between the international peacekeeping force (ISAF, see below) and the Afghan government. In concert
with the Obama Administration’s emphasis on Afghan policy, UNAMA is to open offices in as many of Afghanistan’s
34 provinces as financial y and logistical y permissible. The mandate of UNAMA, was renewed for another year on
March 22, 2011, by Resolution 1974. As did Resolution 1917 the previous year, Resolution 1974 largely restated
UNAMA’s coordinating role with other high-level representatives in Afghanistan and election support role, while
referring to UNAMA’s role in facilitating the coming transition to Afghan leadership. As part of the expansion of its
mandate, UNAMA is playing a role in reintegration of surrendering insurgent fighters that is receiving increased
emphasis. It is doing so through a “Salaam (Peace) Support Group,” working with Afghanistan’s High Peace Council
that is promoting reconciliation and reintegration. UNAMA has always been involved in local dispute resolution,
disarmament of local militias, and donor coordination. Under a March 2010 compromise with Karzai, it nominates
two international members of the five person Electoral Complaints Commission (ECC), one fewer than the three it
selected under the prior election law.
UNAMA is also playing a growing role in engaging regional actors in Afghan stability. It was a co-convener of the
January 28, 2010, and July 20, 2010, London and Kabul Conferences, respectively. Along with Turkey, UNAMA chairs
a “Regional Working Group” to enlist regional support for Afghan integration.
On donor coordination, UNAMA is co-chair of the joint Afghan-international community coordination body cal ed
the Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board (JCMB), and is helping implement the five-year development strategy
outlined in a “London Compact,” (now called the Afghanistan Compact) adopted at the January 31-February 1, 2006,
London conference on Afghanistan. The priorities developed in that document comport with Afghanistan’s own
“National Strategy for Development,” presented on June 12, 2008, in Paris.
The difficulties in coordinating U.N. with U.S. and NATO efforts were evident in a 2007 proposal to create a new
position of “super envoy” that would represent the United Nations, the European Union, and NATO in Afghanistan.
The concept advanced and in January 2008, with U.S. support, U.N. Secretary General Ban Ki Moon tentatively
appointed British diplomat Paddy Ashdown as the “super envoy.” However, Karzai rejected the appointment
reportedly over concerns about the scope of authority of such an envoy. Ashdown withdrew his name on January 28,
2008 and further discussion has withered. The NATO senior civilian representative. post, discussed above, appears to
represent a step in the direction of improved donor coordination in Afghanistan and streamlining of the foreign
representative structure there.
For more information on UNAMA, see CRS Report R40747, United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan:
Background and Policy Issues
, by Rhoda Margesson.

Security Policy and 2011-2014 “Transition”19
Although the formal Obama Administration policy goal is to prevent Afghanistan from again
becoming a safe haven for global terrorism, since 2002 the U.S. criteria for judging achievement
of that goal have been the degrees to which the Afghan government and security force can defend
itself, govern effectively, and develop economically. The President’s June 22, 2011, speech on
Afghanistan announcing a U.S. troop drawdown outlined that the Afghan government is to
increasingly assume the lead on security as the United States reduces its level of military effort
over the next several years. Until the transition is complete, the basic pillars of U.S. and NATO
security strategy that have been in place since 2001 will largely continue. Aside from the civilian

19 Some of the information in this section is taken from Department of Defense. “Report on Progress Toward Security
and Stability in Afghanistan.” April 2011.
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advice and aid discussed above and later in this paper, U.S.-led activities have included (1)
combat operations by U.S. forces and a NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF)
to “provide space” for the expansion of Afghan governance, security leadership, and economic
development; (2) U.S. and NATO operation of “provincial reconstruction teams” (PRTs) to serve
as enclaves to facilitate the strategy; and (3) the equipping, training, and expansion of
Afghanistan National Security Forces (ANSF).
Who Is “The Enemy”? Taliban, Al Qaeda, and Related Insurgents
As noted in Defense Department and other U.S. government reports on Afghanistan stability,
security is being challenged by a confluence of related and, to varying degrees, cooperating
armed groups whose tactics continue to evolve based on experiences from previous fighting.20 Of
these groups, Al Qaeda is the least materially significant to the insurgency in Afghanistan,
although it may pose the greatest transnational threat to the United States and its allies. There has
not been agreement about the relative strength of insurgents in all of the areas where they operate.
U.S. assessments are that there up to 25,000 total Afghan insurgents operating in Afghanistan.
As far as tactics, U.S. commanders have, prior to mid-2011, worried most about insurgent use of
improvised explosive devices (IEDs), including roadside bombs. IED’s are the leading cause of
U.S. combat deaths, although the Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization, a part
of DOD, reported in February 2011 substantial progress finding IED’s before they explode. In
January 2010, President Karzai issued a decree banning importation of fertilizer chemicals
(ammonium nitrate) commonly used for the roadside bombs, but there reportedly is informal
circumvention of the ban for certain civilian uses, and the material reportedly still comes into
Afghanistan from at least two major production plants in Pakistan. U.S. commanders have said
they have verified some use of surface-to-air missiles,21 although it does not appear that
sophisticated missiles were involved in the apparent shootdown of a U.S. Chinook helicopter in
which about 30 U.S. soldiers (mostly special forces) were killed on August 6, 2011. Throughout
2011, insurgents appear to have made increasing use of infiltrators within the Afghan security
forces, persons impersonating Afghan security personnel, or recruits to their ranks from among
aides trusted by Afghan leaders. Afghan officials have tried to increase monitoring over the sale
of military-style clothing that might be used for such attacks. Other insurgents, particularly in
southern Afghanistan, appear to be making increasing use of bombs hidden in turbans, which are
generally not searched out of respect for Afghan religious traditions. Such a bomb killed former
President Rabbani on September 20, 2011, as noted above.
Groups: The Taliban (“Quetta Shura Taliban”)
The core of the insurgency remains the Taliban movement loyal, to varying degrees, to Mullah
Umar, who led the Taliban regime during 1996-2001. He and many of his top advisers reportedly
have relative safe haven in Pakistan, reportedly the city of Quetta, thus accounting for the term
usually applied to Umar and his aides: “Quetta Shura Taliban” (QST). Some, such as Mullah
Dadullah, his son Mansoor, and Mullah Usmani have been killed or captured. Others, such as
Mullah Hassan Rahmani, former Taliban governor of Qandahar, are said to have come under
some Pakistani pressure to refrain from militant activities.

20 http://www.defense.gov/news/1230_1231Report.pdf.
21 Major General John Campbell, commander of RC-E, July 28, 2010, press briefing.
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For now still committed to insurgent action, Umar has been making appointments to replenish the
QST leadership ranks. When his top deputy, Mullah Bradar, was arrested in Pakistan in February
2011, Umar replaced him with younger and reputedly hardline, anti-compromise leaders Mullah
Abdul Qayyum Zakir, a U.S. detainee in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba until 2007; and Akhtar
Mohammad Mansoor, a logistics expert.22 The Taliban has several official spokespersons still at
large, including Qari Yusuf Ahmadi and Zabiullah Mujahid, and it operates a clandestine radio
station, “Voice of Shariat” and publishes videos.
Some believe that Umar and his inner circle blame their past association with Al Qaeda for their
loss of power and want to distance themselves from Al Qaeda. Other experts see continuing close
association that is likely to continue were the Taliban movement to return to power. It is unclear
how this internal Taliban debate might be affected by the death of Al Qaeda founder Osama bin
Laden on May 1, 2011. Some within the movement might argue that his removal from the
regional picture might lessen international military pressure on the Taliban. Others might argue
that his death will lead to a weakening of Al Qaeda in the immediate region and association with
Al Qaeda has little value to the Taliban effort. Even before the death of bin Laden, U.S. officials
argued that the successes produced by the U.S. “surge” in Afghanistan were causing some Taliban
leaders to mull the concept of a political settlement, and Mullah Umar released a statement on the
tenth anniversary of the September 11 attacks on the United States acknowledging there have
been some talks, although only over prisoner exchanges, according to his statement.
Reconciliation talks are discussed in the section on that issue later in this paper.
Al Qaeda/Bin Laden
U.S. officials have long considered Al Qaeda to have been largely expelled from Afghanistan
itself. This view was enhanced by the May 1, 2011, death of bin Laden. U.S. commanders have,
for several years, characterized any Al Qaeda militants in Afghanistan as facilitators of militant
incursions into Afghanistan rather than active fighters in the Afghan insurgency. Then-Director of
Central Intelligence (now Defense Secretary) Leon Panetta said on June 27, 2010, that Al Qaeda
fighters in Afghanistan itself might number 50-100.23 Contradicting those comments to some
extent, NATO/ISAF officials said in October 2010, that Al Qaeda cells may be moving back into
remote areas of Kunar and Nuristan provinces,24 particularly in areas vacated by U.S.-led forces.
Press reports in April 2011 added that some Al Qaeda training camps may have been established
inside Afghanistan, but then top U.S. and NATO commander in Afghanistan General Petraeus
tried to refute these stories on April 10, 2011, by saying that the Al Qaeda presence in
Afghanistan remains small at “less than 100 or so.” Some of the Al Qaeda fighters are believed to
belong to Al Qaeda affiliates such as the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU).
Until the May 1, 2011, death of bin Laden, there had been frustration within the U.S. government
that Al Qaeda’s top leadership had eluded U.S. efforts to capture them. In December 2001, in the
course of the post-September 11 major combat effort, U.S. Special Operations Forces and CIA
operatives reportedly narrowed Osama bin Laden’s location to the Tora Bora mountains in
Nangarhar Province (30 miles west of the Khyber Pass), but the Afghan militia fighters who were
the bulk of the fighting force did not prevent his escape. Some U.S. military and intelligence

22 Ibid.; Moreau, Ron. “New Leaders for the Taliban.” Newsweek, January 24, 2011.
23 Text of the Panetta interview with ABC News is at http://abcnews.go.com/print?id=11025299.
24 Dreazen, Yochi. “Al Qaida Returning to Afghanistan for New Attacks.” Nationaljournal.com. October 18, 2010.
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officers (such as Gary Berntsen and Dalton Fury, who have written books on the battle) have
questioned the U.S. decision to rely mainly on Afghan forces in this engagement.
U.S. efforts to find Al Qaeda leaders are expected to now focus on his close ally Ayman al-
Zawahiri, who is also presumed to be on the Pakistani side of the border and who was named new
leader of Al Qaeda in June 2011. CNN reported October 18, 2010, that assessments from the
U.S.-led coalition said Zawahiri (and bin Laden) was likely in a settled area near the border with
Afghanistan, and not living in a very remote uninhabited area. A U.S. strike reportedly missed
Zawahiri by a few hours in the village of Damadola, Pakistan, in January 2006, suggesting that
there was intelligence on his movements.25 Many observers say that Zawahiri is not well liked
within Al Qaeda and may have trouble holding the leading figures of the group together.
Other senior Al Qaeda leaders are either in or are allowed to transit or reside in Iran. Among them
are Al Qaeda’s former spokesman, Kuwait-born Sulayman Abu Ghaith, as well as Sayf al Adl.
The United States has no diplomatic relations with Iran and therefore has no known anti-terrorism
operations in Iran, but instead has called on Iran to arrest and submit any Al Qaeda operatives to
international authorities for trial.
U.S. efforts in the region have killed numerous senior operatives other than bin Laden. A January
2008 strike near Damadola killed Abu Laith al-Libi, who purportedly masterminded, among other
operations, the bombing at Bagram Air Base in February 2007 when Vice President Cheney was
visiting. In August 2008, an airstrike was confirmed to have killed Al Qaeda chemical weapons
expert Abu Khabab al-Masri, and two senior operatives allegedly involved in the 1998 embassy
bombings in Africa reportedly were killed by an unmanned aerial vehicle (Predator) strike in
January 2009. Following the killing of bin Laden, another top Al Qaeda leader, Ilyas Kashmiri,
was reportedly killed by an armed drone strike in June 2011. Such aerial-based strikes have
become more frequent under President Obama, indicating that the Administration sees the tactic
as effective in preventing attacks.
Hikmatyar Faction
Another “high value target” identified by U.S. commanders is the faction of former mujahedin
party leader Gulbuddin Hikmatyar (Hizb-e-Islami Gulbuddin, HIG) allied with Al Qaeda and
Taliban insurgents. As noted above, Hikmatyar was one of the main U.S.-backed mujahedin
leaders during the Soviet occupation era. Hikmatyar’s faction received extensive U.S. support
against the Soviet Union, but is now active against U.S. and Afghan forces in Kunar, Nuristan,
Kapisa, and Nangarhar provinces, north and east of Kabul. On February 19, 2003, the U.S.
government formally designated Hikmatyar as a “Specially Designated Global Terrorist,” under
the authority of Executive Order 13224, subjecting it to financial and other U.S. sanctions. It is
not designated as a “Foreign Terrorist Organization” (FTO).
Hikmatyar has expressed a willingness to discuss a cease-fire with the Karzai government since
2007, and several of Karzai’s key allies in the National Assembly are members of a moderate
wing of Hikmatyar’s party. While U.S. commanders continue to battle Hikmatyar’s militia, on
March 22, 2010, both the Afghan government and Hikmatyar representatives confirmed talks in
Kabul, including meetings with Karzai. The speaker of the lower house, Abdul Raouf Ibrahimi, is

25 Gall, Carlotta and Ismail Khan. “U.S. Drone Attack Missed Zawahiri by Hours.” New York Times, November 10,
2006.
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said to be a member of this group. In January 2010, Hikmatyar outlined specific conditions for a
possible reconciliation with Karzai, including elections under a neutral caretaker government
following a U.S. withdrawal. Some close to Hikmatyar apparently attended the consultative peace
loya jirga on June 2-4, 2010, which discussed the reconciliation issue, as analyzed further below.
Haqqani Faction26
Another militant faction, cited repeatedly as a major threat to stabilization efforts in Afghanistan,
is the “Haqqani Network” led by Jalaludin Haqqani. As a mujahedin commander during the U.S.-
backed war against the Soviet Union, he was a U.S. ally. He subsequently joined the Taliban
regime (1996-2011) and served as Minister of Tribal Affairs in that government. Since the ousting
of the Taliban regime in 2001, he has been a staunch opponent of the Karzai government and his
faction is believed closer to Al Qaeda than to the ousted Taliban leadership in part because one of
his wives is purportedly Arab. Press reports indicate that the few Al Qaeda fighters that are in
Afghanistan are mostly embedded with Haqqani fighters. Now led mostly by his sons, Siraj (or
Sirajjudin) and Badruddin, the faction is most active around its key objective, Khost city, capital
of Khost Province. Another Haqqani brother, Mohammad, was reportedly killed by a U.S.
unmanned vehicle strike in late February 2010, although Mohammad was not thought to be a key
militant commander. On August 16, 2011, the Obama Administration designated a Haqqani
member, Mullah Sangeen Zadran, “shadow governor” of Paktika Province, as a Specially
Designated Global Terrorist (SDGT). It is estimated that there may be as many as 3,000 Haqqani
fighters.
Suggesting it may act as a tool of Pakistani interests, the Haqqani network has primarily targeted
Indian interests. It claimed responsibility for two attacks on India’s embassy in Kabul (July 2008
and October 2009), and reportedly was involved, possibly with other groups, on the December
2009 attack on a CIA base in Khost that killed seven CIA officers. U.S. officials attribute the June
28, 2011, attack on the Intercontinental Hotel in Kabul and a September 10, 2011, truck bombing
in Wardak Province to the group. U.S. officials say the attacks on the U.S. Embassy and ISAF
headquarters in Kabul on September 13, 2011, were the work of the faction as well. Some believe
the group may have also been responsible for the September 20 killing of Professor Rabbani. That
the faction has a degree of protection in the North Waziristan area of Pakistan and alleged ties to
Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate (ISI) were causes of sharp U.S. criticism of
Pakistan - in particular by Secretary of Defense Panetta and Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman
Mullen - following the September 2011 attacks on the U.S. Embassy. Admiral Mullen testified
before the Senate Armed Services Committee on September 22, 2011, that the Haqqani network
acts “as a veritable arm” of the ISI. The ISI is believed to see the Haqqanis as a potential ally in
any new Afghan political structure that might be produced by a political settlement in
Afghanistan.
In addition to pressing Pakistan to deny the group safehaven, U.S. officials say they are
continuing to pressure the Haqqani network with military action in Afghanistan and air strikes on
the Pakistani side of the border, as well as with direct ground action, such as a raid in late July
2011 that reportedly killed over 80 Haqqani network militants. During a visit to Afghanistan on
July 31, 2011, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Mullen said that recent U.S. efforts to prevent
the movement of Haqqani fighters from Pakistan into Afghanistan were yielding successes.

26 A profile of the faction and its activities is provided in: Joshua Partlow. “In Afghan War, Haqqani Group Is
‘Resilient’ Foe.” Washington Post, May 30, 2011.
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Pakistan reportedly arrested a minor family member (Nasruddin Haqqani) in December 2010—a
possible indication that Pakistan senses U.S. pressure for increased action against the network.
However, the faction is viewed as resilient and able to tap a seemingly infinite pool of recruits.
The faction has generally been considered least amenable to a political settlement with the
Afghan government, but it is possible that the May 1, 2011, raid that killed Osama bin Laden will
reinforce those within the faction who might want to reassess that stance. To facilitate such a
reassessment by the faction, in July 2010, General Petraeus advocated that the Haqqani network
be named as an FTO under the Immigration and Naturalization Act. Such a move would be
intended to signal to Pakistan that it should not continue to support the Haqqani network.27 In
May 2011, there were reports that ISI is pushing the Haqqani network to join nascent settlement
talks under way between the Afghan government and other insurgent factions. Siraj Haqqani said
after the September 13, 2011, attacks on the U.S. Embassy that the faction might, at some point,
participate in settlement talks, although many doubt that intent in light of the recent high profile
attacks by the group.
Pakistani Groups
The Taliban of Afghanistan are increasingly linked politically and operationally to Pakistani
Taliban militants. The Pakistani groups might see a Taliban recapture of Afghanistan’s
government as helpful to the prospects for these groups inside Pakistan or in their Kashmir
struggle. A major Pakistani group, the Pakistani Taliban (Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan, TTP), is
primarily seeking to challenge the government of Pakistan, but they facilitate the transiting into
Afghanistan of Afghan Taliban and support the Afghan Taliban goals of recapturing Afghanistan.
The TTP may also be seeking to target the United States, an assessment based on a failed
bombing in New York City in May 2010. The State Department designated the TTP as a Foreign
Terrorist Organization (FTO) under the Immigration and Naturalization Act on September 2,
2010, allegedly for having close connections to Al Qaeda. Its current leader, Hakimullah Mehsud,
was named as terrorism supporting entities that day. (He succeeded Baitullah Mehsud, who was
killed in a U.S. drone strike in August 2009.)
Another Pakistani group said to be increasingly active inside Afghanistan is Laskhar-e-Tayyiba
(LET, or Army of the Righteous). LET is an Islamist militant group that has previously been
focused on operations against Indian control of Kashmir.
The U.S.-Led Military Effort: 2001-2008
To combat the insurgency, in partnership with 49 other countries and the Afghan government and
security forces (see Table 24), there were about 99,000 U.S. troops in Afghanistan as of the
beginning of July 2011—the height of the U.S. presence. The vast majority operate under
NATO/ISAF command, but about 9,000 are part of the post-September 11 anti-terrorism mission
Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF). On April 28, 2011, President Obama nominated the top U.S.
and NATO commander in Afghanistan, General David Petraeus, to become CIA Director, and
Lieutenant General John Allen took over the command in Afghanistan on July 18, 2011. Serving
under the top U.S. and NATO/ISAF commander is an “Intermediate Joint Command” focused

27 Jane Perlez, Eric Schmitt, and Carlotta Gall, “Pakistan Is Said to Pursue Foothold in Afghanistan,” New York Times,
June 24, 2010.
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primarily on day-to-day operations; it is headed since July 2011 by Lieutenant General Curtis
Scaparrotti, who succeded Major General David Rodriguez.
Prior to the U.S. surge in 2009, most U.S. forces were in eastern Afghanistan and lead Regional
Command East (RC-E) of the NATO/ISAF operation. The most restive provinces in RC-E are
Paktia, Paktika, Khost, Kunar, and Nuristan. Helmand, Qandahar, Uruzgan, Zabol, Nimruz, and
Dai Kundi provinces constituted a “Regional Command South (RC-S),” a command formally
transferred to NATO/ISAF responsibility on July 31, 2006. The growing U.S. troop strength in
RC-S in 2009 and 2010—a product of the fact that most of the 2009-2010 U.S. “surge” was
focused on the south—prompted a May 2010 NATO decision to bifurcate RC-S, with the United
States leading at first leading a “southwest” subdivision for Helmand and Nimruz. U.S.
commanders now lead both RC-S and RC-SW. About 4,000 U.S. forces are under German
command in RC-North, headquartered in Konduz.
Perception of “Victory” in the First Five Post-Taliban Years
During 2001 to mid-2006, U.S. forces and Afghan troops fought relatively low levels of insurgent
violence with focused combat operations against Taliban concentrations in the south and east. For
example, the United States and partner forces conducted “Operation Mountain Viper” (August
2003); “Operation Avalanche” (December 2003); “Operation Mountain Storm” (March-July
2004); “Operation Lightning Freedom” (December 2004-February 2005); and “Operation Pil”
(Elephant, October 2005). By late 2005, U.S. and partner commanders appeared to believe that
the combat, coupled with overall political and economic reconstruction, had virtually ended any
insurgency. Anticipating further stabilization, NATO/ISAF assumed lead responsibility for
security in all of Afghanistan during 2005-2006.
Contrary to U.S. expectations, violence increased significantly in mid-2006, particularly in the
east and the south, where ethnic Pashtuns predominate. Reasons for the deterioration include:
Afghan government corruption; the absence of governance or security forces in many rural areas;
the safe haven enjoyed by militants in Pakistan; the reticence of some NATO contributors to
actively combat insurgents; a popular backlash against civilian casualties caused by NATO and
U.S. military operations; and the slow pace of economic development. Many Afghans are said to
have turned to the Taliban as a source of impartial and rapid justice, in contrast to the slow and
corrupt processes instituted by the central government.
Perception of Deterioration and Growing Force Levels in 2007 and 2008
Since 2006, and particularly during 2010, the key theater of implementation of U.S. strategy has
been eastern and southern Afghanistan, especially Helmand and Qandahar provinces. NATO
counter-offensives during 2006-2008—such as Operation Mountain Lion, Operation Mountain
Thrust, and Operation Medusa (August-September 2006, in Panjwai district of Qandahar
Province)—cleared key districts but did not prevent subsequent reinfiltration because Afghan
governance was not established in cleared areas.
As a further response, NATO and OEF forces tried to apply a more integrated strategy involving
preemptive combat and increased development work. Major combat operations in 2007 included
U.S. and NATO attempted preemption of an anticipated Taliban “spring offensive” (“Operation
Achilles,” March 2007) in the Sangin district of Helmand Province, around the Kajaki dam, and
Operation Silicon (May 2007), also in Helmand. (In September 2010, Britain turned over security
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leadership in Sangin to U.S. forces. That district produced half of Britain’s casualties in
Afghanistan to date.)
Despite the additional resources put into Afghanistan, throughout 2008, growing concern took
hold within the Bush Administration. Pessimism was reflected in such statements as a September
2008 comment by Joint Chiefs of Staff chairman Admiral Mike Mullen that “I’m not sure we’re
winning” in Afghanistan. Several major incidents supported that assessment, including (1)
expanding Taliban operations in provinces where it had not previously been active, particularly
Lowgar, Wardak, and Kapisa, close to Kabul; (2) high-profile attacks in Kabul, such as the
January 14, 2008, attack on the Serena Hotel in Kabul and the July 7, 2008, suicide bombing at
the Indian Embassy in Kabul, killing more than 50; (3) the April 27, 2008, assassination attempt
on Karzai during a military parade celebrating the ouster of the Soviet Union; and (4) a June 12,
2008, Sarposa prison break in Qandahar, in which several hundred Taliban captives were freed.
To try to arrest deterioration, the United States and its partners decided to increase force levels by
partly fulfilling a mid-2008 request by General McKiernan for 30,000 additional U.S. troops. The
decision whether to fulfill the entire request was deferred to the next Administration. U.S. troop
levels started 2006 at 30,000; climbed slightly to 32,000 by December 2008; and reached 39,000
by April 2009 (shortly after President Obama took office). Partner forces were increased
significantly as well, by about 6,000 during this time, to a total of 39,000 at the end of 2009
(rough parity between U.S. and non-U.S. forces). Many of the U.S. forces deployed in 2008 and
2009 were Marines that deployed to Helmand, large parts of which had fallen out of
coalition/Afghan control.
In September 2008, the U.S. military and NATO each began strategy reviews. The primary U.S.
review was headed by Lieutenant General Douglas Lute, the Bush Administration’s senior adviser
on Iraq and Afghanistan (who is in the Obama NSC with responsibility for Afghanistan). These
reviews were briefed to the incoming Obama Administration.
Obama Administration Policy: March 2009 Policy
Announcement/Initial Troop Increase/McChrystal Appointment
and Assessment

The Obama Administration maintained that Afghanistan needed to be given a higher priority than
it was during the Bush Administration, but also that the U.S. mission in Afghanistan not be
indefinite. The new Administration integrated the reviews under way at the end of the Bush
Administration’s into an overarching 60-day inter-agency “strategy review.” It was chaired by
South Asia expert Bruce Riedel and co-chaired by Ambassador Holbrooke and Under Secretary
of Defense for Policy Michele Flournoy.
Following its initial review, President Obama announced a “comprehensive” strategy on March
27, 2009.28 In conjunction, he announced the deployment of an additional 21,000 U.S. forces, of
which about 4,000 would be trainers. Shortly after the announcement, the Administration decided
that U.S. military leadership in Afghanistan was insufficiently innovative. On May 11, 2009, then
Secretary of Defense Gates announced that General McKiernan would be replaced by General

28 “White Paper”: http://www.whitehouse.gov/assets/documents/Afghanistan-Pakistan_White_Paper.pdf.
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Stanley McChrystal, considered an innovative commander as head of U.S. Special Operations
forces from 2003 to 2008. He assumed command in Afghanistan on June 15, 2009.
General McChrystal, after assuming command, assessed the security situation and suggested a
strategy in a report of August 30, 2009, and presented to NATO on August 31, 2009,29 as follows:
• That the goal of the U.S. military should be to protect the population—and to
help the Afghan government take steps to earn the trust of the population—rather
than to focus on searching out and combatting Taliban concentrations. Indicators
of success such as ease of road travel, participation in local shuras, and normal
life for families are more significant than counts of enemy fighters killed.
• That there is potential for “mission failure” unless a fully resourced,
comprehensive counter-insurgency strategy is pursued and reverses Taliban
momentum within 12-18 months. About 44,000 additional U.S. combat troops
(beyond those approved by the Obama Administration strategy review in March
2009) would be needed to have the greatest chance for his strategy’s success.
Late 2009 Review: “Surge” Coupled With Transition
The McChrystal assessment set off debate within the Administration and another policy review,
taking into account the McChrystal recommendations and the marred August 20, 2009, Afghan
presidential election. Some senior U.S. officials, such as then Secretary of Defense Gates, were
concerned that adding many more U.S. forces could create among the Afghan people a sense of
“occupation” that could prove counter-productive. The high-level review included at least nine
high-level meetings, chaired by President Obama, and reportedly concluded on November 19,
2009. The President announced the following decisions in a speech at West Point military
academy on December 1, 2009:30
• That 30,000 additional U.S. forces (a “surge”) would be sent (bringing U.S.
levels close to 100,000) to “reverse the Taliban’s momentum” and strengthen the
capacity of Afghanistan’s security forces and government.
• That there would be a transition, beginning in July 2011, to Afghan leadership of
the stabilization effort and a corresponding beginning of a drawdown of U.S.
force levels. The July 2011 “deadline” caused significant controversy, as
discussed below.
McChrystal Replaced by Petraeus
On June 23, 2010, President Obama accepted the resignation of General McChrystal after
summoning him to Washington, DC, to discuss the comments by him and his staff to a reporter
for Rolling Stone magazine that disparaged several civilian figures involved in Afghanistan
policy. He named General Petraeus as General McChrystal’s successor. In a June 23, 2010,

29 Commander NATO International Security Assistance Force, Afghanistan, and U.S. Forces, Afghanistan.
“Commander’s Initial Assessment.” August 30, 2009, available at http://media.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/politics/
documents/Assessment_Redacted_092109.pdf?.
30 President Obama speech, op. cit. Testimony of Secretary Gates, Secretary Clinton, and Admiral Mullen before the
Senate Armed Services Committee and the House Foreign Affairs Committee. December 2, 2009.
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statement, President Obama attributed the change purely to the Rolling Stone comments, and
stated that Afghanistan policy would not change. General Petraeus was confirmed by the Senate
on June 30, 2010, and assumed command on July 4, 2010.
July 2011 “Deadline” Yields to “Transition” By the End of 2014
The Obama Administration emphasis on transition to Afghan security leadership beginning in
July 2011 was perhaps the most widely debated aspect of policy. Debate over whether to
announce such a timeframe is described in the 2010 book by Bob Woodward called Obama’s
Wars
. The Administration explained the time frame as a means of demonstrating to a war-weary
public that U.S. military involvement in Afghanistan is not open-ended, and to compel the Afghan
government to assume greater ownership and responsibility for the mission. However, the 2011
“deadline” was interpreted by some Administration critics—and by some Afghan and regional
leaders—as laying the groundwork for winding down U.S. involvement in coming years.31
Perhaps to address perceived criticism of such a deadline in the upper ranks of the U.S. military,
in an August 31, 2010, statement, the President asserted that the pace and scope of any drawdown
would be subject to conditions on the ground.
The debate over the July 2011 drawdown abated substantially with an agreement between the
United States and NATO partner forces to focus on allowing a longer time frame for transition to
Afghan leadership. At the November 19-20, 2010, NATO summit in Lisbon, it was agreed that
the transition to Afghan leadership would begin in 2011 and would be completed by the end of
2014. The 2014 date is one that Karzai articulated in 2009 as a time when Afghan forces would
be able to secure Afghanistan.

31 Commander NATO International Security Assistance Force, Afghanistan, and U.S. Forces, Afghanistan.
“Commander’s Initial Assessment.” August 30, 2009, available at http://media.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/politics/
documents/Assessment_Redacted_092109.pdf. White House. Remarks by the President In Address to the Nation on the
Way Forward in Afghanistan and Pakistan. December 1, 2009; Chandrasekaran, Rajiv. “Differing Views of New
Afghanistan Strategy.” Washington Post, December 26, 2009.
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Table 4.Summary of Current U.S. Strategy and Implementation
The major outlines of Obama Administration strategy have taken shape as outlined below.
Goals: (1) to disrupt terrorist networks in Afghanistan and Pakistan to degrade their ability to launch international
terrorist attacks; (2) promote a more capable, accountable, and effective government in Afghanistan; (3) develop self-
reliant Afghan security forces; and (4) involve the international community to achieve these objectives.
Strategy Definition: to employ the U.S. and NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) to protect the
population and build Afghan institutions and prepare them for a transition to full responsibility for securing and
developing Afghanistan by the end of 2014. A U.S. drawdown began in July 2011 in concert with the start of a
transition to Afghan security leadership in seven areas specified by President Karzai in March 2011 (four cities and
three provinces). The United States and Afghanistan are negotiating a long-term security partnership agreement that
will outline the continuing U.S. commitment to Afghan stability subsequent to 2014.
Surge and then Drawdown: with the buildup of troops (surge) announced in December 2009, U.S. commanders
asserted that resource “inputs” were, as of October 2010, aligned with mission requirements. U.S. force levels
reached a high of 99,000. A U.S. drawdown of 33,000 is to be completed by September 2012, with the remaining
drawdown plan until 2014 to be determined at a NATO meeting in Chicago in May 2012.
Afghan Governance: to develop Afghan institutions, particularly at the provincial and local levels. The Administration
asserts that the Karzai government is being held to account for its performance, although no specific penalties have
been imposed on the Afghan government for shortfalls.
Reintegration and Reconciliation: to support Afghan efforts to reach a settlement with insurgent leaders and provide
financial and social incentives to persuade insurgents to lay down their arms.
Pakistan: to engage Pakistan and enlisting its increased cooperation against militant groups, such as the Haqqani
network, that have a measure of safehaven in Pakistan. See also: CRS Report RL33498, Pakistan-U.S. Relations, by K.
Alan Kronstadt.
International Dimension: to integrate Afghanistan into existing and new international diplomatic and economic
structures, and to better coordinate all “stakeholders” in the Afghanistan issue (NATO, Afghanistan’s neighbors,
other countries in Afghanistan’s region, the United Nations, and other donors). A major conference is to be held in
Bonn in December 2011, the tenth anniversary of the original Bonn Conference on Afghanistan.
Partner Contributions: to encourage partner forces to remain in Afghanistan at least until the completion of the
transition.
Metrics: to measure progress along clear metrics. P.L. 111-32 (FY2009 supplemental appropriation) requires that the
President submit to Congress, 90 days after enactment (by September 23, 2009), metrics by which to assess progress,
and a report on that progress every 180 days thereafter. The Administration’s approximately 50 metrics32 and
reports are submitted regularly, the latest of which was issued in April 2011. In its September 22, 2009, report on the
situation in Afghanistan (A/64/364-S/2009/475), the United Nations developed its own “benchmarks” for progress.

Surge Implementation and Results
The pace and scope of the transition to Afghan security leadership was intended to depend on
assessments of how well U.S. policy is working. Prior to the surge, the Karzai government was
estimated by to control about 30% of the country, while insurgents controlled 4% (13 out of 364
districts). Insurgents “influenced” or “operated in” another 30% (Afghan Interior Ministry
estimates in August 2009). Tribes and local groups with varying degrees of loyalty to the central
government control the remainder. Some outside groups report higher percentages of insurgent
control or influence.33 The Taliban had named “shadow governors” in 33 out of 34 of

32 http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2009/09/16/evaluating_progress_in_afghanistan_pakistan.
33 http://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/12/world/asia/12afghan.html?_r=1.
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Afghanistan’s provinces, although many provinces in northern Afghanistan were assessed as
having minimal Taliban presence.
General Petraeus stated in his March 15 and 16, 2011, testimony before the two armed services
committees of Congress that U.S. strategy is showing results, particularly in the provinces of
focus (Helmand, Qandahar) although such gains are “fragile and reversible.” That same
assessment was reflected in a White House report to Congress submitted in March 2011 and
covering July 2010-March 2011,34 and in the DOD “1230 Report” of April 2011, covering the six
months prior to April 1, 2011. In his June 22, 2011, speech, President Obama stated that the
United States had achieved its core objectives, articulated in the December 2009 speech, of
pressuring Al Qaeda, reversing Taliban momentum, and building capable Afghan security forces.
Some specifics include:
• Opening of a contiguous secure corridor for commerce between Helmand and
Qandahar, and markets, and other signs of normal life proliferating in Helmand
and Qandahar. Less progress has been achieved in RC-East, where a relatively
small proportion of the U.S. surge forces were deployed. However, as noted
above, U.S. and partner forces are increasing defenses along the border with
Pakistan to prevent the movement of Haqqani and other militants into
Afghanistan.
• U.S. commanders receiving overtures from local insurgent leaders who have lost
morale and seek to discuss possible terms for their reintegration. Commanders
also say they have obtained internal insurgent communications indicating low
morale and reluctance to obey orders on the part of insurgent fighters.
• The Afghan forces are becoming increasingly large, adding 70,000 personnel
since mid-2009, and are increasingly in the lead on operations.
Still, many commanders attributed the signs of progress not only to the increase in numbers of
U.S. forces, but to General Petraeus’ tactics, including nearly tripling Special Operations Force
operations in Afghanistan since 2009 (nearly 2,000 such missions during January-August 2011)
and greatly increased UAV (unmanned aerial vehicle) strikes on concentrations across the border
in Pakistan to try to drive insurgents to reconcile with the Karzai government and cease fighting.
In November 2010, General Petraeus approved the deployment of about 17 M1A1 tanks for use
by the Marines in southern Afghanistan in order to put further pressure on militants.
Less optimistic assessments of the surge are based on observations that the insurgents continue to
be able to operate in normally quiet provinces, including cities in the first group to be
transitioned, such as Herat. Others say the insurgents are making successful use of bombings
against key officials, such as a bombing that killed a top Afghan security official Daoud Daoud in
Takhar Province on May 28, 2011 (in which the top German commander in Afghanistan was
slightly wounded). There was a multiple suicide bomber attack on August 13, 2011, on the
governor’s compound in normally quiet Parwan province, which killed 22 (but not governor
Abdul Basir Salangi). Moreover, observers note an apparent increase in major attacks in Kabul,
which is generally considered secure: on June 28, insurgents stormed the historic Intercontinental
Hotel in Kabul, prompting a several hour gun battle with Afghan authorities backed by NATO-led
forces. On August 19, 2011, insurgents attacked the compound of the British Council in Kabul, on

34 White House. “Report on Afghanistan and Pakistan, March 2011.” Released April 5, 2011, at http://abcnews.go.com/
images/Politics/UNCLASS%20Report%20on%20Afghanistan%20and%20Pakistan.pdf.
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the anniversary of Afghanistan’s formal independence from Britain in 1919. The September 13,
2011, rocket and gunfire attack on the U.S. Embassy in Kabul and ISAF headquarters prompted
even more significant questions about U.S. and Afghan successes, although some U.S. officials
used the attack as an indication that insurgent groups are altering their tactics in response to being
largely defeated in their strongholds in eastern and southern Afghanistan (discussed below).
U.S. casualties also increased during the surge. There were about 310 U.S. soldiers killed in 2009,
nearly double the previous year, and U.S. deaths in 2010 reached a new high for the Afghan
conflict of just over 500. There were about 210 soldiers from partner countries killed during
2010. According to a UNAMA report issued in December 2010, covering the fall of 2010, there
was a 66% increase in security incidents as compared to the same period in 2009. A subsequent
UNAMA report, released on July 15, 2011, said that civilian deaths increased in the January-June
2011 period 15% over the same time period in 2010. Over 80% of the civilian deaths are
purportedly caused by insurgent attacks, causing U.N. Secretary General Ban Ki Moon to call the
Taliban “totally irresponsible” for causing civilian deaths. Still others say that Afghan governance
is lagging to the point where the Afghans will not be able to hold U.S./NATO gains on their own
and insurgents will be able to regroup as soon as international forces thin out.
Significant Progress Reported in Helmand and Qandahar
U.S. policymaker hopes that the surge would yield clear results in the most restive provinces of
Helmand and Qandahar appear to have been realized. The reports of progress in Helmand,
particularly the settled areas along the Helmand River, include gains from “Operation Moshtarek”
(Operation Together) in Marjah. That consisted of about 15,000 U.S., foreign partner, and Afghan
forces (about 8,000 of the total) that, beginning on February 13, 2010, sought to clear Taliban
militants from Marjah city (85,000 population) in Helmand. An Afghan governing structure was
identified in advance, the population had substantial warning, and there were meetings with
regional elders just before the offensive began—all of which were an apparent effort to cause
militants to flee and to limit civilian losses.35 The city, for the most part, was declared cleared of
militants as of February 26, 2010, but some militants continued to fight in and on the outskirts of
Marjah and to assassinate and intimidate Afghans cooperating with U.S. and Afghan forces. That
activity reportedly began to diminish in January 2011 and has quieted further since.
Qandahar
There are perceptions of major progress in Qandahar Province. In early 2010, U.S. commanders
had emphasized that the Qandahar effort would focus less on combat and more on conducting
consultations and shuras with tribal leaders and other notables to enlist their cooperation against
insurgents. Some U.S. commanders described the operation as more of a “process”: a slow push
into restive districts by setting up Afghan checkpoints to secure the city and districts around it
(particularly Arghandab, Zhari, and Panjwai) and not a classic military offensive. Qandahar’s
population is far larger (about 2 million in the province), and Qandahar province and city have
functioning governments, which Marjah did not. The city hosts numerous businesses and has
always remained vibrant, despite some Taliban clandestine activity. Separately, DOD and USAID
are also working to expand electricity availability in and around Qandahar by refurbishing

35 Holbrooke interview on CNN, March 14, 2010, op. cit.
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substations, a large effort that prompted a request for the “Afghanistan Infrastructure Fund”
mechanism discussed later.
After arriving in Afghanistan in July 2010, General Petraeus also increased operations by U.S.
Special Operations Forces against key militants near the city36 and subsequently expanded the
U.S. force presence in partnership with Afghan forces. The strategy ended Taliban control of
many neighborhoods and Afghan checkpoints have been established. Further shuras have been
held to promote Afghan governance. On the other hand, the escape of 450 prisoners, mostly
insurgents, through a tunnel dug from Sarposa prison in Qandahar, contradicted assessments of
progress, to some extent, as did insurgent attacks in the city during May 7-8, 2011. In the latter
incidents, about 25 militants disrupted the city by attacking government locations, including the
governor’s compound, and sparking a two-day gun battle.
The Qandahar effort suffered a significant setback on July 12, 2011, when a trusted aide killed
President Karzai’s half-brother, Ahmad Wali Karzai, chair of the provincial council.37 The death
shook confidence in the U.S.-led effort and could still provoke a power struggle with rivals to
Karzai’s Popolzai tribe. Karzai has named another brother, Shah Wali Karzai, as head of the
Popolzai subsequently, although Shah Wali is said to lack the dynamism and effect of Ahmad
Wali. Unconfirmed reports suggest Karzai might appoint a replacement to Governor Tooryalai
Wesa, a low key technocrat who has tried to balance the flow of U.S. and international funds to
the various tribes and clans in the province but who lacked Ahmad Wali Karzai’s influence in the
province. On the other hand, some say that Shah Wali and other alternative leadership in the
province could help alleviate some of the grudges and jealousies of Ahmad Wali’s often arbitrary
exercise of influence and result in a net increase in stability. Karzai’s influence in Qandahar was
further weakened on July 27, 2011, when the mayor of Qandahar city, Ghulam Haider Hamidi,
was killed.
Initial Transition and U.S. Drawdown Announced and Begun
Despite doubts about the durability of progress to date, the transition to Afghan leadership began
in July 2011. It began in the areas that Karzai announced on March 22, 2011, would the first set
of areas to be transitioned during June 22-July 22, 2011. They are:
• Three provinces: Kabul (except Sarobi district, which is still restive), Panjshir,
and Bamiyan. The latter two are considered highly stable. In Kabul, Afghan
forces have already been in the lead for at least one year.
• Four cities: Herat, Mazar-e-Sharif, Lashkar Gah, and Mehtarlam. The former two
cities are widely considered stable. The latter two are in restive areas, Helmand
and Laghman provinces, respectively, and the announcement of transition in
these cities surprised many observers.
In each area of transition, the process of completing the transition to Afghan responsibility is to
take about 12-18 months, according to U.S. commanders. As the transition process proceeds, U.S.
forces are being withdrawn or thinned out; some forces may be “reinvested” (redeployed) to areas

36 “U.S. Elite Units Step Up Effort in Afghan City.” New York Times, April 26, 2010.
37 Partlow, Joshua. “U.S. Seeks to Bolster Kandahar Governor, Upend Power Balance.” Washington Post, April 29,
2010.
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where extra combat force is required. All seven areas began the transition process in July 2011,
beginning with Bamiyan on July 17.
Pace of First U.S. Drawdowns Set and Drawdown Begun
General Petraeus’ recommendations about the size of the initial drawdown were submitted in
mid-June 2011. According to his testimony during his confirmation hearings to be CIA Director,
and that of Admiral Mullen on June 23, 2011, the U.S. military recommended a gradual
drawdown in which the overwhelming majority of the 30,000 “surge” forces would be in combat
through the end of 2012. They also had wanted to redeploy some troops to RC-E, where there had
not been as intensive an effort since 2010 as in RC-S or RC-SW. President Obama, asserting that
key goals of the surge had been accomplished, announced his decision on June 22, 2011, as
• the drawdown of 10,000 U.S. forces by the end of 2011.
• the removal of another 23,000 forces (the remainder of the surge forces) by
September 2012. The United States will have about 66,000-68,000 after this
drawdown is completed. The first 800 U.S. forces left Afghanistan on July 14,
and the exact drawdown schedule for all 33,000 surge forces to be removed is to
be developed by the Defense Department by October 2011.
• a decision on a drawdown plan for the remaining forces, from 2012 until the
2014 transition completion, to be decided at a NATO meeting in Chicago in May
2012. Many experts say that, even after the 2014 transition, the United States will
likely keep about 25,000 troops in Afghanistan for overwatch and training the
ANSF for at least several years thereafter.
Press reports say the President’s decision was colored by the perception that the killing of Osama
bin Laden represented a key accomplishment of the core U.S. mission, and because of the
financial needs to reduce the size of the U.S. budget deficit.
The President did not announce a scaled-back strategy to a “counter-terrorism” or “counter-
terrorism plus” mission (discussed below). General Petraeus and Admiral Mullen, in their
testimonies the following day, acknowledged that the President’s decision represented an
“aggressive” drawdown but both said that they could still carry out U.S. policy with it. In a press
interview, then Secretary Gates indicated that U.S. strategy would progressively evolve to more
of “overwatch” and counter-terrorism but that, for the near term, the current counter-insurgency
approach could still be pursued in some areas of Afghanistan. President Karzai backed the
drawdown as well.
Beyond 2014: Long-Term Commitment/Strategic Partnership
Agreement

As noted, President Obama and other senior U.S. officials say that 2014 is not a date certain for a
complete U.S. pullout, but rather for a transition to Afghan leadership, with some international
forces remaining after 2014 to train and mentor the Afghans. During a visit to Afghanistan, Vice
President Biden reiterated on January 10, 2011, that U.S. forces would likely be required to help
secure Afghanistan after 2014.
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In addition to these statements of reassurance, President Obama, at a May 12, 2010, press
conference with visiting President Karzai, stated that the United States and Afghanistan would
renew and expand a five-year-old strategic partnership. A strategic partnership agreement might
be modeled along that of a “Security Agreement” agreed with Iraq in 2008, although likely
without an end date for U.S. military involvement in Afghanistan, as there was in the Iraq
agreement. Unlike Iraq, no major Afghan figures are calling for an end to U.S. military
involvement in Afghanistan.
Negotiations on a long-term strategic partnership began with the February 24-28, 2011, visit to
Washington, DC, of Afghan Defense Minister Wardak and Interior Minister Khan; the talks
continued with the March 2011 visit to Afghanistan of a U.S. negotiating team, as stated by
Secretary Gates on March 7, 2011. The Administration intent was to finalize the new strategic
partnership to coincide with the beginning of the U.S. drawdown in July 2011, although that goal
was not met. Press reports indicate that negotiations have bogged down over Afghan insistence on
firm deadlines for Afghan institutions to assume control over detention centers and decisions on
nighttime and other U.S.-led raids on insurgents. The Afghan side is also said to have overly
ambitious plans to buy major U.S. combat systems, such as F-16s, that the Afghans cannot sustain
without significant longterm assistance. The pact reportedly will not provide for “permanent”
U.S. bases or for the use of Afghan facilities for use against neighboring countries, but would
apparently allow longterm U.S. use of the facilities. On September 10, 2011, Karzai’s National
Security Adviser Rangin Spanta said the gaps were narrowing and the pact would likely be agreed
soon. President Karzai has indicated he would put the accord to a special loya jirga for
ratification
The strategic partnership was first established on May 23, 2005, when Karzai and President Bush
issued a “joint declaration”38 providing for U.S. forces to have access to Afghan military
facilities, in order to prosecute “the war against international terror and the struggle against
violent extremism.” The joint statement did not give Karzai enhanced control over facilities used
by U.S. forces, over U.S. operations, or over prisoners taken during operations. Some of the
bases, both in and near Afghanistan, that support combat in Afghanistan, include those in Table 8.
Karzai’s signing of the partnership had been blessed by 1,000 Afghan representatives on May 8,
2005, at a consultative jirga in Kabul. That jirga supported an indefinite presence of international
forces to maintain security but urged Karzai to delay a firm decision to request such a presence.
Karzai stated on March 22, 2011, that he would likely call another loya jirga to evaluate the
renewed and expanded partnership, if it is agreed with the United States. A FY2009 supplemental
appropriation (P.L. 111-32) and the FY2010 and FY2011 National Defense Authorization Acts
(P.L. 111-84 and H.R. 6523, respectively) prohibit the U.S. establishment of permanent bases in
Afghanistan.
No “SOFA” in Place Currently
U.S. forces currently operate in Afghanistan under relatively vague “diplomatic notes” between
the United States and the interim government of Afghanistan—primarily one that was exchanged
in November 2002. That agreed note gives the United States legal jurisdiction over U.S.
personnel serving in Afghanistan and states the Afghan government’s acknowledgment that U.S.-
led military operations were “ongoing.” A draft SOFA—or technical agreement clarifying

38 See http://merln.ndu.edu/archivepdf/afghanistan/WH/20050523-2.pdf.
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U.S./coalition authorities in Afghanistan—reportedly has been under discussion between the
United States and Afghanistan since 2007.
Threats to Long-Term U.S. Presence: Civilian Casualties and 2011 Protests
As noted above, Afghan officials seek in any long term pact to limit the U.S. ability to cause
civilian casualties and to conduct certain operations that cause political backlash against the
United States and the Afghan government. U.S. commanders agree, to a large extent, with the
Afghan concerns, but seek to balance civilian casualties against the need to accomplish
operational objectives. The Afghan position is a result of several major incidents. One major such
incident occurred near Herat on August 22, 2008, in which a NATO bomb killed up to 90
civilians, as well as the incident in September 2009 in Konduz in which Germany’s contingent
called in an airstrike on Taliban fighters who captured two fuel trucks; killing several civilians as
well as Taliban fighters. However, ISAF-caused civilian casualties continue and usually lead to
recriminations from President Karzai, including a veiled threat from Karzai in May 2011 that
continued civilian casualties would cause Afghans to view international forces as occupiers, and
Karzai instructions to Afghan military leaders to play in approving NATO operations. He made
similar comments in June 2011, causing outgoing Ambassador Eikenberry to rebuke him
indirectly but publicly.
If there is a decision to retain international forces in Afghanistan beyond 2014, the attitudes of the
Afghan population might become a factor. The insurgent forces had always used the presence of
foreign forces on Afghan soil as a rallying and recruiting point, but the vast bulk of Afghans have,
in surveys, generally appreciated the need for foreign forces to secure Afghanistan. There were
signs in April 2011 that the public welcome of foreign forces might be eroding. On April 1, 2011,
crowds of Afghans in the northern city of Mazar-e-Sharif demonstrated against the March 2011
burning of a Quran by a Florida pastor. The demonstration turned violent, with protesters
storming the U.N. compound in the city and killing 12, including 7 U.N. staff. Demonstrations in
other Afghan cities followed, including anti-U.S. slogans and posters echoing the Taliban’s anti-
U.S., anti-Western rhetoric. The demonstrations raised questions as to whether the Afghan public
has begun to see international forces as occupiers, and appeared to illustrate that a long-term
presence of large numbers of international forces might be opposed broadly within Afghanistan.
Additionally, a riot erupted on May 19, 2011, in normally quiet Takhar Province to protest a
NATO night raid there that allegedly killed four civilians.
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Table 5. Operation Enduring Freedom Partner Forces
Operation Enduring Freedom continues as a separate combat track, led by the United States but joined by at least
twelve partners. The caveat issue is less of a factor with OEF, since OEF is known as a combat-intensive mission
conducted in large part by special forces contingents of contributing nations. The overwhelming majority of non-U.S.
forces are under the NATO/ISAF mission. Prior to NATO assumption of command in October 2006, 19 coalition
countries—primarily Britain, France, Canada, and Italy contributing approximately 4,000 combat troops to OEF-
Afghanistan. Now, that figure is lower as most have been rebadged to ISAF. However, several foreign contingents,
composed mainly of special operations forces, including a 200 person unit from the UAE, are still part of OEF-
Afghanistan. This includes about 500 British special forces, some German special forces, and other special forces units.
In early 2010, U.S. Special Forces operating in Afghanistan were brought under direct command of the top U.S.
command in Afghanistan, now General Petraeus.
Under OEF, Japan provided naval refueling capabilities in the Arabian sea, but the mission was suspended in October
2007 fol owing a parliamentary change of majority there in July 2007. The mission was revived in January 2008 when
the new government forced through parliament a bill to allow the mission to resume. It was renewed again, over
substantial parliamentary opposition, in December 2008, but the opposition party won September 2009 elections in
Japan and reportedly has decided on an alternative to continuing the refueling mission—by increasing its financial
contributions to economic development in Afghanistan. That led to an October 2009 pledge by Japan—already the
third largest individual country donor to Afghanistan, providing about $1.9 billion in civilian reconstruction aid since
the fall of the Taliban—to provide another $5 billion over five years. It has been requested to be a major financial
donor of an Afghan army expansion, and, in March 2009, it pledged to pay the costs of the Afghan National Police for
six months.
As part of OEF outside Afghanistan, the United States leads a multi-national naval anti-terrorist, anti-smuggling, anti-
proliferation interdiction mission in the Persian Gulf/Arabian Sea, headquartered in Bahrain. That mission was
expanded after the fall of Saddam Hussein to include protecting Iraqi oil platforms in the Gulf.

Policy Component During Transition: Building Afghan Forces
and Establishing Rule of Law

Since the Taliban were ousted from power, a key tenet of U.S. and NATO policy—and the key to
their “exit strategy” from Afghanistan—has been to build capable Afghan National Security
Forces (ANSF), consisting primarily of the Afghan National Army (ANA) and Afghan National
Police (ANP). This policy is being emphasized to an even greater degree as the transition to
Afghan lead proceeds.
Although the ANSF has expanded considerably since 2002, it has been considered a struggle to
bring these forces to a level of capability that would allow for a transition from international
forces in securing Afghanistan. Obama Administration strategy emphasizes expanding the ANSF
and improving it through partnering and more intense mentoring and training—about 70% of
Afghan units are now partnered with international forces. The Department of Defense “1230
Report” for late 2010 and early 2011, cited earlier, provides a detailed assessment of what it says
is “significant progress” of the ANSF, as well as continued deficiencies. That assessment was
repeated by the commander in charge of training the ANSF, General William Caldwell,
mentioned below, in early June 2011 and again in September 2011.
On January 21, 2010, the joint U.N.-Afghan “Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board” (JCMB)
agreed that, by October 2011, the ANA would expand to 171,600 and the ANP to about 134,000,
for a total ANSF of 305,600. Both forces are, as of September 2011, roughly at that level. Both
forces reached a lower interim size of 134,000 and 109,000 respectively in August 2010, two
months earlier than planned. Based on U.S. commander recommendations, in August 2011 a new,
larger target level for the ANSF was set: 352,000 by November 2012. That is allocated as:
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195,000 ANA and 157,000 ANP. This new target level is slightly smaller than a Gen. Petraeus
recommendation of a 378,000 target level, which was not adopted because of the concerns about
the Afghan ability to sustain so large a force. About 1% of the ANSF is female. General Caldwell
stated in June 2011 that the United States is also helping the ANSF build up an indigenous
weapons production capability.
U.S. forces, along with partner countries and contractors, train the ANSF. In February 2010, the
U.S.-run “Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan” (CSTC-A) that ran the training
was subordinated to the broader NATO Training Mission—Afghanistan (NTM-A). NTM-A is
commanded by U.S. Major General William Caldwell. CSTC-A’s mission was reoriented to
building the capacity of the Afghan Defense and Interior Ministries, and to provide resources to
the ANSF. The total number of required trainers (U.S. and partner) for these institutions is 4,750.
The unfilled gap of trainers totaling about 750 is discussed in the section on Alliances below, and
particular attention has been called to the need for 290 police trainers to staff five new police
training centers scheduled to open in 2011.39
A separate France-led 300-person European Gendarmerie Force (EGF) has been established to
train Afghan forces out in the provinces. The European Union is providing a 190-member
“EUPOL” training effort, and 60 other experts to help train the ANP. These efforts are subsumed
under NTM-A.
A core element of NATO’s training efforts are its mentoring teams—known as Operational
Mentoring Liaison Teams (OMLTs) and Police Operational Mentoring and Liaison Teams
(POMLTs). While NTM-A focuses on building institutional capacity in the ANSF and on training
initial recruits, OMLTs and POMLTs are responsible for training and mentoring deployed ANSF
units. OMLTs, which operate with the Afghan National Army (ANA), consist of 11-28 personnel
from one or several countries. POMLTs, which teach and mentor the Afghan National Police
(ANP), are composed of 15-20 personnel each. In addition to the training, Obama Administration
strategy emphasizes improving it through partnering—about 70% of Afghan units are now
partnered with international forces.
According to General Caldwell, much of the deficiency throughout the ANSF is due to illiteracy,
which is estimated at about 90%. That has prompted NTM-A to increasingly focus on providing
literacy training, which is also seen as a large driver of recruits who want the literacy education.
The April 2011 DOD report says there were 60,000 Afghan soldiers and police undergoing
literacy training as of March 2011.
Afghan National Army
The Afghan National Army has been built “from scratch” since 2002—it is not a direct
continuation of the national army that existed from the 1880s until the Taliban era. That national
army all but disintegrated during the 1992-1996 mujahedin civil war and the 1996-2001 Taliban
period. However, some Afghan officers who served prior to the Taliban have joined the ANA.
U.S. and allied officers say that the ANA is becoming a major force in stabilizing the country and
a national symbol. It now has at least some presence in most of Afghanistan’s 34 provinces,
working with the PRTs, and it deployed outside Afghanistan to assist relief efforts for victims of

39 Deb Riechmann, “NATO:740 Trainers still needed for Afghan forces,” Associated Press, February 13, 2010.
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the October 2005 Pakistan earthquake. ANA battalions, or “Kandaks,” are the main unit of the
Afghan force.
The ANA is able to lead a growing percentage of all combat operations, but there is substantial
skepticism within the U.S. defense establishment that it can assume full security responsibility by
2014, which is the target time frame announced by Karzai. Among examples of the ANA taking
overall responsibility, in August 2008, the ANA took over security of Kabul city from Italy, and it
took formal control of Kabul Province in early 2009. The commando forces of the ANA, trained
by U.S. Special Operations Forces, and numbering about 5,300, are considered well-trained and
are taking the lead in some operations against high-value targets.
However, some U.S. military assessments say the force remains poorly led. It still suffers from at
least a 20% desertion rate. Some accounts say that a typical ANA unit is only at about 50% of its
authorized strength at any given time, and there are significant shortages in about 40% of
equipment items. The high desertion rate complicates U.S.-led efforts to steadily grow the force.
Some recruits take long trips to their home towns to remit funds to their families, and often then
return to the ANA after a long absence. Others, according to U.S. observers, often refuse to serve
far from their home towns. The FY2005 foreign aid appropriation (P.L. 108-447) required that
ANA recruits be vetted for terrorism, human rights violations, and drug trafficking.
The United States has built five ANA bases: Herat (Corps 207), Gardez (Corps 203), Qandahar
(Corps 205), Mazar-e-Sharif (Corps 209), and Kabul (Division HQ, Corps 201, Air Corps).
Coalition officers conduct heavy weapons training for a heavy brigade as part of the “Kabul
Corps,” based in Pol-e-Charki, east of Kabul.
Ethnic and Factional Considerations/Defense Minister Wardak
At the time the United States first began establishing the ANA, Northern Alliance figures who
were then in key security positions weighted recruitment for the national army toward its Tajik
ethnic base. Many Pashtuns, in reaction, refused recruitment or left the ANA program. The
naming of a Pashtun, Abdul Rahim Wardak, as Defense Minister in December 2004 reduced
desertions among Pashtuns (he remains in that position). U.S. officials in Afghanistan say this
problem was further alleviated with better pay and more close involvement by U.S. forces, and
that the force is ethnically integrated in each unit and representative. With about 41% Pashtuns,
34% Tajiks, 12% Hazaras, and 8% Uzbeks, the force is roughly in line with the broad
demographics of the country, according to the April 2010 DOD report. However, U.S.
commanders say that those Pashtuns who are in the force are disproportionately eastern Pashtuns
(from the Ghilzai tribal confederations) rather than southern Pashtuns (mostly Durrani tribal
confederations). Defense Minister Wardak said in February 2011 that a greater proportion of
southern Pashtuns are being recruited to redress that imbalance somewhat. The chief of staff was
General Bismillah Khan, a Tajik who was a Northern Alliance commander, although as of June
2010 he is Interior Minister.
There were press reports in April 2011 that Karzai might be planning to replace Wardak (as well
as Finance Minister Omar Zakhiwal) partly because he perceives them as working too closely
with their U.S. counterparts. A name that has surfaced to potentially replace Wardak is General
Abdul Rauf Begi, an ethnic Uzbek who is close to Abdul Rashid Dostam; his appointment would
represent a Karzai move to further consolidate support from the Uzbek community, but could
alienate the Pashtuns in the military.
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Afghan Air Force
Equipment, maintenance, and logistical difficulties continue to plague the Afghan Air Force, and
it remains mostly a support force for ground operations rather than a combat-oriented force.
However, the Afghan Air Force has been able to make ANA units nearly self-sufficient in airlift.
The force is a carryover from the Afghan Air Force that existed prior to the Soviet invasion, and
is expanding gradually after its equipment was virtually eliminated in the 2001-2002 U.S. combat
against the Taliban regime. It now has about over 3,000 personnel, including 400 pilots, as well as
a total of about 46 aircraft (of a planned fleet of 146 aircraft). Afghan pilots are based at Bagram
air base. There are some female Afghan Air Force personnel; four arrived in the United States in
July 2011 for training as military helicopter pilots.
Afghanistan is seeking the return of 26 aircraft, including some MiG-2s that were flown to safety
in Pakistan and Uzbekistan during the past conflicts in Afghanistan. U.S. plans do not include
supply of fixed-wing combat aircraft such as F-16s, which Afghanistan wants, according to U.S.
military officials. There is a concern that Afghanistan does not have the capability, to date, to
sustain operations of an aircraft as sophisticated as the F-16. In 2010, Russia and Germany
supplied MI-8 helicopters to the Afghan Air Force.
Afghan National Police (ANP)
U.S. and Afghan officials believe that building up a credible and capable national police force is
at least as important to combating the insurgency as building the ANA. The April 2011 DOD
report on Afghanistan, cited earlier, contains substantial detail on U.S.-led efforts to continue
what it says are “significant strides [that] have been made in professionalizing the ANP.” Outside
assessments are widely disparaging, asserting that there is rampant corruption to the point where
citizens mistrust and fear the ANP. Among other criticisms are a desertion rate far higher than that
of the ANA; substantial illiteracy; involvement in local factional or ethnic disputes because the
ANP works in the communities its personnel come from; and widespread use of drugs. It is this
view that has led to consideration of stepped up efforts to promote local security solutions such as
those discussed above.
Bismillah Khan, the Interior Minister, was highly respected as ANA chief of staff and has taken
new steps to try to improve the police force, including through unannounced visits to ANP bases
and stations around the country. He has also instituted salary increases and objective standards for
promotions and assignments. Still, some Pashtuns might resent his Tajik ethnicity, and some
criticized him for direct involvement in combating the September 13, 2011, attack on the U.S.
Embassy in Kabul and confusing the lines of authority and reducing the effect of the Afghan
counterattack. His reform efforts build on those taken in March 2010, by then-Interior Minister
Atmar when he signed a “strategic guidance” document for the ANP, which prioritizes
eliminating corruption within the ANP and winning public confidence. About 1,000 ANP are
women, demonstrating some commitment to gender integration of the force.
Other U.S. commanders credit a November 2009 raise in police salaries (nearly doubled to about
$240 per month for service in high combat areas)—and the streamlining and improvement of the
payments system for the ANP—with reducing the solicitation of bribes by the ANP. The raise also
stimulated an eightfold increase in the number of Afghans seeking to be recruited. Others note the
success, thus far, of efforts to pay police directly (and avoid skimming by commanders) through
cell phone-based banking relationships (E-Paisa, run by Roshan cell network).
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The United States has worked to correct longstanding equipment deficiencies. According to
General Caldwell in June 2011, the ANP is increasingly being provided with heavy weapons and
now have about 5,000 armored vehicles countrywide. Still, most police units lack adequate
ammunition and vehicles. In some cases, equipment requisitioned by their commanders is being
sold and the funds pocketed by the police officers. These activities contributed to the failure of a
2006 “auxiliary police” effort that attempted to rapidly field large numbers of new ANP officers.
The U.S. police training effort was first led by State Department/INL, but the Defense
Department took over the lead in police training in April 2005. Some U.S. officials believe that
the United States and its partners still have not centered on a clearly effective police training
strategy. A training reorganization implemented since 2007, called “focused district
development,
” received little discussion in the April 2011 DOD report on Afghanistan stability. In
that program, a district police force was taken out and retrained, its duties temporarily performed
by more highly trained police (Afghan National Civil Order Police, or ANCOP, which number
about 9,400 nationwide), and then reinserted after the training is complete. However, the ANCOP
officers are currently being used mostly to staff new checkpoints that are better securing the
restive districts in southern and eastern Afghanistan.
Police training now includes instruction in human rights principles and democratic policing
concepts, and the State Department human rights report on Afghanistan, referenced above, says
the government and outside observers are increasingly monitoring the police force to prevent
abuses.
Rule of Law/Criminal Justice Sector
Many experts believe that an effective justice sector is vital to Afghan governance. Some of the
criticisms and allegations of corruption at all levels of the Afghan bureaucracy have been
discussed throughout this report. U.S. justice sector programs generally focus on promoting rule
of law and building capacity of the judicial system, including police training and court
construction. The rule of law issue is covered in detail in CRS Report R41484, Afghanistan: U.S.
Rule of Law and Justice Sector Assistance
, by Liana Sun Wyler and Kenneth Katzman.
U.S. Security Forces Funding/”CERP”
Because the Afghan government has so few resources, the Afghan security sector is funded
almost entirely through international donations. In 2011, NTM-A has a budget of $10 billion,
almost all of which is U.S. funded, including: $3 billion for infrastructure; $3 billion for
equipment; $1 billion for training; and $3 billion for “sustainment” (food and salaries for the
Afghan forces, and related costs).
Most estimates say that, beyond the 2014 transition completion, the ANSF will require $6 billion
- $ 8 billion per year. The United States, as noted below, expects to spend $12.8 billion on the
ANSF in FY2012, but press reports in September 2011 say the Administration plan is to reduce
U.S. contributions to about $6 billion in FY2014. It is possible that the United States will seek
matching partner contributions to provide for the ANSF after 2014, in order to allow the U.S.
contribution to be reduced to about $4 billion per year after 2014, according to press reports in
September 2014.
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The time frame for Afghan self-reliance for its security is far in the future. As noted elsewhere,
the Afghan government will take in less than $2 billion in total revenue in 2011. In December
2009, Karzai asserted that the Afghan government could not likely fund its own security forces
until 2024.
Recent appropriations for the ANA and ANP are contained in the tables at the end of this report,
which also contain breakdowns for Commanders Emergency Response Program funds, or CERP,
which is used for projects that build goodwill and presumably reduce the threat to use forces.
CERP has also been used for projects that are traditionally considered suitable for management
by USAID, a point of contention among some observers. The tables at the end also list
breakdowns for ANSF funding, which has consumed more than half of all U.S. aid to Afghanistan
since 2002. As noted in the tables, as of FY2005, the security forces funding has been DOD
funds, not State Department funds (Foreign Military Financing, FMF).
NATO Trust Fund for the ANA
In 2007, ISAF set up a trust fund for donor contributions to fund the transportation of equipment
donated to and the training of the ANA; the mandate was expanded in 2009 to include
sustainment costs. U.S. funding for the ANSF is provided separately, not through this fund. The
fund is estimated to require $2 billion per year. NATO allies in Europe have contributed about
$375 million to the fund.
Law and Order Trust Fund for the ANP
There is also a separate “Law and Order Trust Fund” (LOTF) for Afghanistan, run by the U.N.
Development Program, which is used to pay the salaries of the ANP and other police-related
functions. From 2002-2010, donors contributed $1.74 billion to the Fund, of which the United
States contributed about $620 million, according to the April 2011 DOD report (p. 41). Japan’s
2009 pledge to pay the expenses of the Afghan police for at least six months (about $125 million
for each six month period) is implemented through the LOTF.
Policy Component: Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs)
U.S. and partner officials have generally praised the effectiveness of “Provincial Reconstruction
Teams” (PRTs)—enclaves of U.S. or partner forces and civilian officials that provide safe havens
for international aid workers to help with reconstruction and to extend the writ of the Kabul
government—in accelerating reconstruction and assisting stabilization efforts. The PRTs, the
concept for which was announced in December 2002, perform activities ranging from resolving
local disputes to coordinating local reconstruction projects, although most U.S.-run PRTs and
most PRTs in combat-heavy areas focus on counter-insurgency. Many of the additional U.S.
civilian officials deployed to Afghanistan during 2009 and 2010 are based at PRTs, which have
facilities, vehicles, and security. Some aid agencies say they have felt more secure since the PRT
program began,40 but several relief groups do not want to associate with military forces because
doing so might taint their perceived neutrality. Others, such as Oxfam International, argue that the
PRTs are delaying the time when the Afghan government has the skills and resources to secure

40 Kraul, Chris. “U.S. Aid Effort Wins Over Skeptics in Afghanistan.” Los Angeles Times, April 11, 2003.
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and develop Afghanistan on its own. It is likely that the PRTs in Afghanistan will either be phased
out or transitioned to purely civilian leadership and roles as the transition unfolds.
The list of PRTs in operation, including lead country, is shown in Table 25. Virtually all the PRTs
are now under the ISAF mission. Each PRT operated by the United States has U.S. forces;
Defense Department civil affairs officers; representatives of USAID, State Department, and other
agencies; and Afghan government (Interior Ministry) personnel. Most PRTs, including those run
by partner forces, have personnel to train Afghan security forces. USAID officers assigned to the
PRTs administer PRT reconstruction projects.
Karzai Criticism of PRTs
As far as use of PRTs to jump-start development, USAID observers say there is little Afghan
input, either into development project decision making or as contractors for facility and other
construction. That lack of input has fed criticism by Karzai, most recently at his February 6, 2011,
speech at a security conference in Munich, that the PRTs should be abolished and all aid funds
channeled through the Afghan government. USAID spending on PRT projects is in the table on
USAID spending in Afghanistan at the end of this report, and there is a database on development
projects sponsored by each PRT available to CRS, which can be provided on request.
To address criticism from Karzai as well as from aid organizations, some donor countries—as
well as the United States—are trying to enhance the civilian component of the PRTs and change
their image from military institutions. There has been long been consideration to turn over the
lead in the U.S.-run PRTs to civilians rather than military personnel, presumably State
Department or USAID officials. That was first attempted in 2006 with the establishment of a
civilian-led U.S.-run PRT in the Panjshir Valley. As noted, in March 2009, the Netherlands
converted its PRT to civilian lead, although that alteration ceased after the assumption of U.S. and
Australian PRT command in July 2010. As of November 2009, the “civilianization” of the PRT
concept has evolved further with the decision to refer to PRTs as Interagency Provincial Affairs
(IPA) offices or branches. In this new concept—a local parallel to the Senior Civilian
Representatives now assigned to each regional command—State Department officers enjoy
enhanced decision-making status at each PRT.
Policy Component: Cooperation With Allies and
Burdensharing/Preventing Allied “Rush for the Exits”

Since the fall of the Taliban, the U.S.-led mission in Afghanistan has been in cooperation with
partners. Since 2006, the vast bulk of all U.S. troops in Afghanistan have served under the
umbrella of the NATO-led “International Security Assistance Force” (ISAF). ISAF consists of all
26 NATO members states plus partner countries—a total of 50 countries including the United
States. President Obama’s December 1, 2009, policy speech on Afghanistan was explicit in
seeking new partner troop commitments, and pledges met or exceeded what some U.S. officials
expected. However, as the transition to Afghan leadership began in July 2011, U.S. officials are
attempting to prevent a “rush to the exits” in which partner forces pull out before their areas of
responsibility are ready for transition. Rather, U.S. officials want partner drawdowns to occur at
roughly the same rate and proportion as the U.S. drawdown occurs, which thus far has been
achieved.
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Even before President Obama’s June 22, 2011, speech, virtually all the European governments
were under pressure from their publics and parliaments to end or reduce their military
involvement in Afghanistan. Before the speech, several key contingents (1) already ended their
combat missions (the Netherlands), (2) announced firm ends to those missions (Canada ended its
combat mission in late July 2011, but will furnish 950 trainers for the ANSF), or (3) set notional
times to depart before the 2014 completion of the transition. Partner forces that continue to bear
the brunt of combat in Afghanistan include Britain, Canada, Poland, France, Denmark, Romania,
and Australia.
Other partner countries announced their own drawdowns immediately after President Obama’s
June 22, 2011, speech:
• France announced it would cut about 10% of its force (about 400 troops) by
September 2011.
• Britain announced it would withdraw about 800 of its force by the end of 2011.
• Italy, Poland, and Germany have also indicated an intent to try to wind down
their involvement in Afghanistan before the end of 2014.
• Germany’s parliament in January 2011 renewed the German participation for one
year, although that might be reviewed in late 2011.
Table 6. Background on NATO/ISAF Formation and U.N. Mandate
The International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) was created by the Bonn Agreement and U.N. Security Council
Resolution 1386 (December 20, 2001, a Chapter 7 resolution),41 initially limited to Kabul. In October 2003, after
Germany agreed to contribute 450 military personnel to expand ISAF into the city of Konduz, ISAF contributors
endorsed expanding its presence to several other cities, contingent on formal U.N. approval—which came on
October 14, 2003, in U.N. Security Council Resolution 1510. In August 2003, NATO took over command of ISAF—
previously the ISAF command rotated among donor forces including Turkey and Britain.
NATO/ISAF’s responsibilities broadened significantly in 2004 with NATO/ISAF’s assumption of security responsibility
for northern and western Afghanistan (Stage 1, Regional Command North, in 2004 and Stage 2, Regional Command
West, in 2005, respectively). The transition process continued on July 31, 2006, with the formal handover of the
security mission in southern Afghanistan to NATO/ISAF control. As part of this “Stage 3,” a British/Canadian/Dutch-
led “Regional Command South” (RC-S) was formed. Britain is the lead force in Helmand; Canada is lead in Qandahar,
and the Netherlands was lead in Uruzgan until its departure in July 2010; the three rotated the command of RC-S.
“Stage 4,” the assumption of NATO/ISAF command of peacekeeping in 14 provinces of eastern Afghanistan (and thus
all of Afghanistan), was completed on October 5, 2006. As part of the completion of the NATO/ISAF takeover, the
United States put about half the U.S. troops then operating in Afghanistan under NATO/ISAF in “Regional Command
East” (RC-E).
The ISAF mission was renewed (until October 13, 2011) by U.N. Security Council Resolution 1943 (October 13,
2010), which reiterated previous resolutions’ support for the Operation Enduring Freedom mission. Tables at the end
of this report list contributing forces, areas of operations, and their Provincial Reconstruction Teams.


41 Its mandate was extended until October 13, 2006, by U.N. Security Council Resolution 1623 (September 13, 2005);
and until October 13, 2007, by Resolution 1707 (September 12, 2006).
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Major Contingent Developments During the U.S. “Surge”
In indicating a propensity to draw down their forces, U.S. partners note that they have repeatedly
answered the U.S. call to support the mission. Following the Obama Administration’s March 27,
2009, policy announcement, some additional pledges came through at the April 3-4, 2009, NATO
summit, and other force pledges were announced in conjunction with the January 28, 2010,
conference on Afghanistan in London. Among major pledges (troops and major aid funds) that
were intended to show support for the U.S. surge:
• November 10, 2009: Ahead of President Obama’s visit to Asia, Japan announced
a pledge of $5 billion over the next five years for Afghanistan civilian
development, although it suspended its naval refueling mission. Japan has been
covering about half of the $250 million yearly salary costs of the ANP.
• July 2009: South Korea announced it would increase its aid contribution to
Afghanistan by about $20 million, in part to expand the hospital capabilities at
Bagram Air Base. In November 2009, it announced a return of about 150
engineers to Afghanistan for development missions, protected by 300 South
Korean forces. The forces deployed to Parwan Province in July 2010.42
• December 2009-January 2010 (London conference): A total of about 9,000 forces
were pledged (including retaining 2,000 sent for the August 2009 election who
were due to rotate out). Several countries pledged police trainers.
• July 2010: Malaysia became a new contributor to the Afghanistan effort,
furnishing 40 military medics.
• March 2011: Germany said it would add 300 forces to operate surveillance
systems, although this decision was related to its refusal to participate in military
action against Libya rather than to an Afghanistan-specific requirement.
• May 2011: Kazakhstan became the first Central Asian state to announce a troop
contribution, pledging four non-combat troops to the mission.
National “Caveats” on Combat Operations
One of the most thorny issues has been the U.S. effort to persuade other NATO countries to adopt
flexible rules of engagement that allow all contributing forces to perform combat missions.
NATO and other partner forces have not, as they pledged at the NATO summit in April 2008,
removed the so-called “national caveats” on their troops’ operations that Lieutenant General
McChrystal says limits operational flexibility. For example, some nations refuse to conduct night-
time combat. Others have refused to carry Afghan personnel on their helicopters. Others do not
fight after snowfall. These caveats were troubling to NATO members with forces in heavy combat
zones; such countries feel they are bearing the brunt of the fighting.

42 Until December 2007, 200 South Korean forces at Bagram Air Base, mainly combat engineers, were part of
Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF); they left in December 2007 in fulfillment of a decision by the South Korean
government the previous year. However, many observers believe South Korea did not further extend its mission beyond
that, possibly as part of an agreement in August 2007 under which Taliban militants released 21 kidnapped South
Korean church group visitors. Two were killed during their captivity. The Taliban kidnappers did not get the demanded
release of 23 Taliban prisoners held by the Afghan government.
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Security/Political Innovations To Facilitate the Transition
Despite the assessments of progress, the U.S. military view is that ending the conflict on
favorable terms requires new approaches that convince insurgent leaders that further conflict is
futile and that a negotiated settlement should be pursued. Some of the more recent strategy and
policy innovations designed to shape an “end game” in Afghanistan are discussed below.
“Reintegration” and “Reconciliation” With Insurgents
The issue of reintegrating insurgent fighters into society, and reconciling with insurgent leaders, is
receiving increasing high level attention, to the point where SRAP Grossman is said to focus
primarily on this issue. Both are Afghan-led processes but they have concerned some in the
international community and Afghanistan because of the potential for compromises with
insurgents that may produce backsliding on human rights. Most insurgents are highly
conservative Islamists who agreed with the limitations in women’s rights that characterized
Taliban rule. Many leaders of ethnic minorities are also skeptical of the effort because they fear
that it might further Pashtun political strength within Afghanistan, and enhance the influence of
Pakistan in Afghan politics. Even before his term as top commander in Afghanistan, General
Petraeus had said that the way conflicts like the one in Afghanistan end is through a political
settlement. The United States and the Karzai government agree that any settlement requires that
fighters and insurgent leaders agree, as an outcome,43 to (1) cease fighting, (2) accept the Afghan
constitution, and (3) sever any ties to Al Qaeda or other terrorist groups.
Reintegration/”Peace Jirga”
Before the more recent emphasis on reconciliation, the concept of providing incentives to
persuade insurgents to surrender and reenter their communities received most of the U.S.
attention. The elements included in a reintegration plan drafted by the Afghan government and
adopted by a “peace loya jirga” during June 2-4, 201044 included providing surrendering fighters
with jobs, amnesty, protection, and an opportunity to be part of the security architecture for their
communities. In its final declaration, the peace jirga backed the plan, but also called for the
release of some detained insurgents where allegations against them are weak. The day after the
jirga concluded, Karzai sought to implement that recommendation by calling for a review of the
cases of all insurgent detentions. In late June 2010, President Karzai issued a decree to implement
the plan, which involves outreach by Afghan local leaders to tribes and others who can convince
insurgents to lay down their arms. The Afghan plan received formal international backing at the
July 20, 2010, Kabul Conference. Britain, Japan, and several other countries, including the United
States, have announced a total of about $235 million in donations to a new fund to support the
reintegration process, of which $134 million has been received.45 The U.S contribution is to be
about $100 million (CERP funds), of which $50 million was formally pledged in April 2011.46

43 The concept that this stipulations could be an “outcome” of negotiations was advanced by Secretary of State Clinton
at the first annual Richard C. Holbrooke Memorial Address. February 18, 2011.
44 Afghanistan National Security Council. “Afghanistan Peace and Reintegration Program.” April 2010.
45 United Nations. Report of the Secretary General: “The Situation in Afghanistan and Its Implications for International
Peace and Security.” March 9, 2011.
46 The National Defense Authorization Act for FY2010 (P.L. 111-84) authorized the use of CERP funds to win local
support, to “reintegrate” Taliban fighters.
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Despite the international funding for the effort, the Afghan-led reintegration process has moved
forward slowly. As of September 2011, about 2,400 fighters have reintegrated, but they are
mostly from the north and west and not the more violent south and east. However, another 1,000-
2,000, including a higher percentage of those from the south, are expected to begin the process in
the near future. Some accounts attribute the slow progress to delays by Afghan officials who say
they are not ready to provide the promised protection and job training services to reintegrating
fighters. In addition, short of formal reintegration, U.S. military meetings with tribal elders have,
in some cases, persuaded Taliban and other insurgents in their areas to stop fighting. On the other
hand, some observers say there have been cases in which reintegrated fighters have committed
Taliban-style human rights abuses against women and others, suggesting that the reintegration
process might have unintended consequences.
To help the process along from the international perspective, in November 2009, ISAF set up a
“force reintegration cell” to develop additional programs and policies to accelerate the effort to
cause insurgents to change sides. These strategies are similar to what was employed successfully
in Anbar Province in Iraq in 2006 and 2007.
Previous efforts similarly met mixed success. A “Program for Strengthening Peace and
Reconciliation” (referred to in Afghanistan by its Pashto acronym “PTS”) operated during 2003-
2008, headed by then Meshrano Jirga speaker Sibghatullah Mojadeddi and Vice President Karim
Khalili, and overseen by Karzai’s National Security Council. The program persuaded 9,000
Taliban figures and commanders to renounce violence and join the political process.
Reconciliation With Taliban Figures/Rabbani Assassination Setback
The separate but related Afghan-led initiative is to conduct negotiations with senior insurgent
leaders. Many in the international community, including within the Obama Administration,
initially withheld endorsement of reconciliation, fearing it might result in the incorporation into
the Afghan political system of insurgent leaders who retain ties to Al Qaeda and commit severe
human rights abuses. Representing a U.S. and international shift on the issue, the July 20, 2010,
Kabul Conference endorsed establishment of an Afghan High Peace Council to build Afghan
consensus on the issue. That Council was established on September 5, 2010, and its 70 members
met for the first time under the leadership of Tajik leader Rabbani on October 10, 2010. Rabbani
was appointed because of Karzai’s perception that he could bring along skeptical Northern
Alliance/Tajik/other minority figures to support reconciliation – a replacement of Rabbani’s
stature in this role will be difficult to identify.
Rabbani earned substantial respect among all factions for his diligent work in this role. He led
High Peace Council visits to Pakistan and other regional countries, and established provincial
representative offices of the Council in at least 27 provinces. On the other hand, some of the nine
women on the Council say their views are largely dismissed. Rabbani’s assassination at his home
by a turban-bomb wielding insurgent on September 20, 2011, is considered a setback to the
reconciliation process. Rabbani reportedly was lured to take the meeting when the assassin
pretended to be delivering a key new message from Taliban leaders based in Pakistan.
The Northern Alliance reacted to the assassination by asserting that this action affirms its
assertions that the Taliban does not want reconciliation and that counting on its prospects is naïve.
Any settlement would require the Taliban to drop at least some of its demands that (1) ll foreign
troops leave Afghanistan; (2) a new “Islamic” constitution be adopted; and (3) Islamic law is
imposed. However, those are viewed as opening positions; the Afghan government, for its part,
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may have softened its position on changes to the Afghan constitution as part of a settlement.
Secretary Clinton said in India on July 20, 2011, that any settlement must not result in and
undoing of “the progress that has been made [by women and ethnic minorities] in the past
decade.”
Prior to the Rabbani killing, senior U.S. officials had grown more optimistic about reconciliation
as contacts between Taliban representatives and the Karzai government have continued and
proliferated. On April 7, 2011, the Afghan head of the reintegration process, Mohammad
Stanekzai (who is also the secretary of the High Peace Council and who was seriously wounded
in the Rabbani attack) said that the Afghan government was in talks with Taliban representatives.
The issue garnered further attention in May 2011 amid reports that U.S. officials had met at least
three times in 2011 with Tayeb Agha, a figure believed close to Mullah Umar. In late June 2011,
those meetings were confirmed both by Karzai and then Defense Secretary Gates, who said the
talks have been led by the State Department (deputy SRAP Frank Ruggiero, but not current SRAP
Marc Grossman), and have been facilitated by Germany and Qatar. Secretary of State Clinton, in
testimony on June 23, 2011, said that negotiations with the Taliban are a necessary if unpleasant
requirement for settling the Afghan conflict. In early September 2011, press reports stated that
U.S. officials had accepted, in principle, the opening of a Taliban political office in Qatar to
facilitate talks.
Prior to the 2011 talks, hopes were dashed when it was revealed that one of the purported senior
Taliban interlocutors was an imposter. Still, Mullah Bradar, who is close to Mullah Umar, was
said by the Afghan side to have been engaged in talks with the Afghan government prior to his
arrest by Pakistan in February 2010. Karzai reportedly believes that Pakistan arrested Bradar in
order to be able to influence the course of any Afghan government-Taliban settlement. The
Taliban as a movement was not invited to the June 2-4, 2010, consultative peace jirga, but some
Taliban sympathizers reportedly were there.
Other talks have taken place over the past few years, although with less apparent momentum than
is the case in 2010. Press reports said that Afghan officials (led by Karzai’s brother Qayyum) and
Taliban members had met each other in Ramadan-related gatherings in Saudi Arabia in
September 2008. Another round of talks was held in January 2009 in Saudi Arabia, and there
were reports of ongoing contacts in Dubai, UAE. Some of these talks apparently involved Arsala
Rahmani, a former Taliban official now in parliament, and the former Taliban Ambassador to
Pakistan, Abdul Salam Zaeef, who purportedly is in touch with Umar’s inner circle. These same
Taliban representatives may be involved in the ongoing talks referred to by Stanekzai, above.
Separately, as discussed above, in advance of the peace jirga, the Karzai government and
representatives of Hikmatyar confirmed peace talks on March 21, 2010, in which Karzai and
several Northern Alliance figures met with the Hikmatyar representatives.
Removing Taliban Figures From U.N. Sanctions Lists. The consultative peace jirga, in its final
declaration, supported Karzai’s call for the removal of the names of some Taliban figures from
U.N. lists of terrorists, lists established pursuant to Resolution 1267 and Resolution 1333
(October 15, 1999, and December 19, 2000, both pre-September 11 sanctions against the Taliban
and Al Qaeda) and Resolution 1390 (January 16, 2002). Press reports before the July 20, 2010,
Kabul Conference said the Afghan government has submitted a list of 50 Taliban figures it wants
taken off this list (which includes about 140 Taliban-related persons or entities) as a confidence-
building measure. The Conference called on Afghanistan to engage with the U.N. Security
Council to provide evidence to justify such de-listings, and U.N., U.S., and other international
officials said they would support considering de-listings on a case-by-case basis. On January 26,
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2010, Russia, previously a hold-out against such a process, dropped opposition to removing five
Taliban-era figures from these sanctions lists, including Taliban-era foreign minister Wakil
Mutawwakil, who ran in 2005 parliamentary elections. Also removed was Abdul Hakim Monib,
who has served Karzai as governor of Uruzgan, Abdul Hakim Mujahid, who was Taliban
representative in the United States, and three others. Mujahid now is one of three deputy chairs of
the High Peace Council. “Mullah Rocketi,” not on the sanctions list, is a former Taliban
commander who ran for president in the August 2009 elections.
On June 17, 2011, in concert with U.S. confirmations of talks with Taliban figures, the U.N.
Security Council adopted Resolution 1988 and 1989. The resolutions drew a separation between
the Taliban and Al Qaeda with regard to the sanctions. However, a decision on whether to remove
the 50 Taliban figures from the list, as suggested by Afghanistan, was deferred. On July 21, 2011,
14 Taliban figures were removed from the “1267” sanctions list; among them were four members
of the High Peace Council (including Arsala Rahmani, mentioned above).
Local Security Experiments: Afghan Provincial Protection Program (APPP),
Afghan Local Police (ALP), and Village Stability Operations

Until mid-2008, U.S. military commanders opposed assisting local militias anywhere in
Afghanistan for fear of creating rivals to the central government. The urgent security needs in
Afghanistan caused reconsideration and, during his command, General Petraeus expanded local
security experiments, based on successful experiences in Iraq and after designing mechanisms to
reassure Karzai that any local security organs would be firmly under Afghan government control.
Afghan Local Police
One major initiative is the “Afghan Local Police” (ALP), a program in which local security
organs are formed from local recruits who want to defend their communities. The local units are
under the control of district police chiefs and each fighter is vetted by a local shura as well as
Afghan intelligence (Petraeus testimony, March 15 and 16, 2011). As of August 2011, the
initiative has recruited a total of about 6,000 ALP from 40 different districts in several different
provinces. There are three ALP centers in Helmand province. According to August 2011 press
reports, 100 districts have been approved for the program, each with about 300 fighters, which
would bring the target size of the program to about 30,000. The Defense Department notified
Congress in September 2010 that it will reprogram about $35 million in Afghan security forces
funding to support the initiative.
Afghan Provincial Protection Program
The ALP initiative builds on another program begun in 2008, termed the “Afghan Provincial
Protection Program” (APPP, commonly called “AP3”) and is funded with DOD (CERP) funds.
The APPP got under way in Wardak Province (Jalrez district) in early 2009 and 100 local security
personnel “graduated” in May 2009. It has been expanded to 1,200 personnel, in a province with
a population of about 500,000. U.S. commanders say that no U.S. weapons are supplied to the
militias, but this is an Afghan-led program and the Afghan government is providing weapons
(Kalashnikov rifles) to the local groups, possibly using U.S. funds. Participants in the program are
given $200 per month. General Petraeus showcased Wardak in August 2010 as an example of the
success of the APPP and similar efforts. The National Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 111-84)
called for a report on the program within 120 days of the October 28, 2009, enactment.
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Village Stability Operations
A separate program, the Local Defense Initiative, began in February 2010 in Arghandab district of
Qandahar Province. U.S. Special Forces organized about 25 villagers into a neighborhood watch
group, which is armed. The program has been credited by U.S. commanders as bringing normal
life back to the district. A different militia was allowed to operate in Konduz to help secure the
northern approaches to that city. Problems arose when the militia began arbitrarily administering
justice, fueling the concerns discussed above these local security approaches. This program
apparently has evolved into a joint Afghan-ISAF program called “Village Stability Operations,”
in which personnel from these forces live in remote communities to help improve governance,
security and development. The program is discussed in the April 2011 DOD “1230 report.”
The local security experiments to date are not arbokai, which are private tribal militias. Still,
some believe that the arbokai concept should be revived as a means of securing Afghanistan, as
the arbokai did during the reign of Zahir Shah and in prior pre-Communist eras. Reports persist
that some tribal groupings have formed arbokai without specific authorization.
Reversal of Previous Efforts: DDR and DIAG programs
As noted, the local security programs appear to reverse the 2002-2007 efforts to disarm local
sources of armed force.
DDR: The main program, run by UNAMA, was called the “DDR” program—Disarmament,
Demobilization, and Reintegration—and it formally concluded on June 30, 2006. The program
got off to a slow start because the Afghan Defense Ministry did not reduce the percentage of
Tajiks in senior positions by a July 1, 2003, target date, dampening Pashtun recruitment. In
September 2003, Karzai replaced 22 senior Tajiks in the Defense Ministry officials with Pashtuns,
Uzbeks, and Hazaras, enabling DDR to proceed. The major donor for the program was Japan,
which contributed about $140 million. Figures for collected weapons are in and U.S. spending on
the programs are in the U.S. aid tables later in the report.
The DDR program was initially expected to demobilize 100,000 fighters, although that figure was
later reduced. (Figures for accomplishment of the DDR and DIAG programs are contained in
Table 7.) Of those demobilized, 55,800 former fighters have exercised reintegration options
provided by the program: starting small businesses, farming, and other options. U.N. officials say
at least 25% of these found long-term, sustainable jobs. Some studies criticized the DDR program
for failing to prevent a certain amount of rearmament of militiamen or stockpiling of weapons
and for the rehiring of some militiamen.47 Part of the DDR program was the collection and
cantonment of militia weapons, but generally only poor-quality weapons were collected. As one
example, Fahim, still the main military leader of the Northern Alliance faction, continues to turn
heavy weapons over to U.N. and Afghan forces (including four Scud missiles), although the U.N.
Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) says that large quantities of weapons remain in the
Panjshir Valley.
Despite the earlier demobilization, which affected many of the northern minorities, there are
indications that some faction leaders may be seeking to revive disbanded militias. The minorities

47 For an analysis of the DDR program, see Christian Dennys. Disarmament, Demobilization and Rearmament?, June
6, 2005, http://www.jca.apc.org/~jann/Documents/Disarmament%20demobilization%20rearmament.pdf.
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may fear increased Taliban influence as a result of the Karzai reconciliation efforts, and the
minorities want to be sure they could combat any Taliban abuses that might result if the Taliban
achieves a share of power.
DIAG: Since June 11, 2005, the disarmament effort has emphasized another program called
“DIAG”—Disbandment of Illegal Armed Groups. It is run by the Afghan Disarmament and
Reintegration Commission, headed by Vice President Khalili. Under the DIAG, no payments are
available to fighters, and the program depends on persuasion rather than use of force against the
illegal groups. DIAG has not been as well funded as was DDR: it has received $11 million in
operating funds. As an incentive for compliance, Japan and other donors have made available
$35 million for development projects where illegal groups have disbanded. These incentives were
intended to accomplish the disarmament of a pool of as many as 150,000 members of 1,800
different “illegal armed groups”: militiamen that were not part of recognized local forces (Afghan
Military Forces, AMF) and were never on the rolls of the Defense Ministry. These goals were not
met by the December 2007 target date in part because armed groups in the south say they need to
remain armed against the Taliban, but UNAMA reports that 100 out of 140 districts planned for
DIAG are now considered “DIAG compliant.” (U.N. Secretary General Report, March 9, 2011).
Table 7. Major Security-Related Indicators
Force Current
Level
Total Foreign Forces in
About 141.000: About 98,000 U.S. and 40,500 non-U.S. partner forces. (U.S. total
Afghanistan
was: 25,000 in 2005; 16,000 in 2003; 5,000 in 2002. ISAF totals were: 12,000 in 2005;
and 6,000 in 2003.) US. forces deployed at 88 bases in Afghanistan, and include 1 air
wing (40 aircraft) and 1 combat aviation brigade (100 aircraft).
U.S. Casualties in Afghanistan
1,666 killed, of which 1,394 by hostile action. Additional 99 U.S. deaths in other OEF
theaters, including the Philippines and parts of Africa. 150 U.S. killed from October
2001-January 2003. 315 killed in 2009, and about 500 killed in 2010. Over 300 UK
forces killed in Afghanistan to date.
NATO Sectors (Regional
RC-S: 35,000 (U.K. lead). RC-Southwest: 27,000 (U.S. lead); RC-E: 32,000 (U.S.
Commands-South, east,
lead); RC-N: 11,000 (German lead); RC-W: 6,000 (Italy lead) RC-Kabul: 5,000
north, west, and
(Turkey, Afghan lead).
central/Kabul)
Afghan National Army (ANA) Close to the current interim goal of 171,600 by Oct. 2011. About 2,000 trained per
month. 5,300 are commando forces, trained by U.S. Special Forces. ANA private
paid about $200 per month; generals receive about $750 per month.
Afghan National Police (ANP) Close to current interim goal of 134,000 by Oct. 2011. 20,000 are Border Police;
3,800+ counter-narcotics police; 9,400 Civil Order Police (ANCOP). 1,000+ are
female.
ANSF Salaries
About $800 million per year, paid by donor countries bilaterally or via trust funds
U.S. and Partner Trainers
About 4,000, with target of 4,750. Pledges to fill the 750 person gap still required
Armed Fighters disarmed by
63,380 demobilized by DDR—all of the pool identified for the program. 100 out of
DDR or DIAG
140 districts identified for DIAG deemed “DIAG compliant” as of March 2010.
Number of Al Qaeda
“Less than 100 or so”, according to General Petraeus in April 2011. Also, small
numbers of Lashkar-e-Tayyiba, Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, Pakistan Taliban.
Number of Taliban fighters
Up to 25,000 (U.S. military and Afghan estimates). Some estimates higher. Plus about
3,000 Haqqani faction and 1,000 Hikmatyar (HIG).
Insurgents Reintegrated
About 2,400 since 2010 with at about another 2,000 awaiting processing
Attacks per day (average)
1,500+ per month in 2010; compared to 800 per month in 2007; 400 in 2005.
Afghan casualties
See CRS Report R41084, Afghanistan Casualties: Military Forces and Civilians, by Susan
G. Chesser.
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Sources: CRS; testimony and public statements by DOD officials.
Current and Post-Transition Policy Alternatives/Support for
Rapidly Reducing U.S. Military Involvement

As the transition proceeds in July 2011, there is growing discussion of alternative strategies and
policies. Some of these proposals may have been mooted by the President’s June 22, 2011,
speech, but some experts believe that alternatives need to stay under active consideration,
depending on how well the mission proceeds as U.S. forces are reduced.
Counter-Terrorism/Counter-Terrorism “Plus” Proposals
During the late 2009 strategy review, some, purportedly including Vice President Joseph Biden,
favored a more limited mission for Afghanistan designed solely to disrupt Al Qaeda in
Afghanistan and Pakistan. Some believed that the President might adopt this strategy when he
made his June 22 drawdown announcement. However, he appears to have leaned toward a
modified version of this strategy called “counter-terrorism plus,” in which combat is conducted
by Special Operations forces against high value targets but some regular U.S. forces remain to
protect some key population centers. Still, some believe the President might adopt a counter-
terrorism strategy as long-term U.S. policy in Afghanistan beyond 2014.
As noted, a counter-terrorism strategy was not adopted in 2009. However, U.S. commanders say
that some of the most effective current U.S. operations consist of Special Operations forces
tracking and killing selected key mid-level insurgent commanders, even though such operations
were not intended to be the centerpiece of current U.S. strategy. Some of these operations
reportedly involve Afghan commandos trained by U.S. Special Forces.
Critics of the limited counter-terrorism strategy express the view that the Afghan government
might collapse and Al Qaeda would have safe haven again in Afghanistan if there are insufficient
numbers of U.S. forces there.48 Others say that it would be difficult to identify targets to strike
with aircraft or aerial vehicles unless there were sufficient forces on the ground to identify targets.
Expand Afghan Forces/Rapid Transition to Afghan Lead
Some have long advocated a rapid build-up of Afghan security forces as an alternative to large
numbers of U.S. troops. During the Administration debate over strategy in late 2009, some
Members of Congress, including Senate Armed Services Committee Chairman Carl Levin, took
this position. Still, the focus on building up Afghan forces as a central feature of the President’s
June 22 drawdown announcement indicates that this option has been adopted to a large extent.
Make Concessions to the Taliban/De-Facto Partition
Some experts, such as former U.S. Ambassador to India Robert Blackwill and members of a
working group sponsored by the Century Foundation (including former negotiator Lakhdar
Brahimi and former high-ranking State Department official Thomas Pickering), believe that a

48 Ibid.
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preferable strategy would be to work with Pakistan and other neighboring states to reach a
political settlement that might be favorable to the Taliban. These plans might involve allowing the
Taliban to control large parts of the south and east, where the insurgency is most active, and to
work with the Northern Alliance to keep other parts of Afghanistan relatively peaceful. These
plans are referred to by experts as partition or de-facto partition plans, although those terms are
usually used by experts who believe these plans amount to a managed U.S. defeat.
Legislatively Mandated Drawdown
In Congress, some have expressed support for efforts or plans to wind down the U.S. involvement
in Afghanistan far more rapidly than those outlined by the Administration. That effort appears to
have gained momentum in the aftermath of the death of Osama bin Laden on May 1, 2011. In the
111th Congress, H.Con.Res. 248, a resolution introduced by Representative Kucinich to require
removal of U.S. forces from Afghanistan not later than December 31, 2010, was defeated in the
House by a vote of 65 to 356 on March 10, 2010. Other legislation, requiring the Administration
to develop (by January 1, 2011) plans to wind down the U.S. military presence in Afghanistan
failed 18-80, May 27, 2010) in a Senate vote during consideration of a FY2010 supplemental
appropriation (H.R. 4899). On July 1, 2010, the House voted 162-260 to reject a plan in that bill
to require the Administration to submit, by April 4, 2011, a plan and timetable to redeploy from
Afghanistan. Earlier, in House consideration of a FY2010 National Defense Authorization Act
(H.R. 2647), a similar provision failed on June 25, 2009, by a vote of 138-278.
However, in the 112th Congress, on May 26, 2011, an amendment to the defense authorization bill
(H.R. 1540) that would have required a plan to accelerate the transition to Afghan-lead security
failed narrowly by a vote of 204-215. The amendment contained the main elements of the
“Afghanistan Exit and Accountability Act” (H.R. 1735), which was introduced after the death of
bin Laden. A day earlier (May 25), an amendment that would require U.S. troops to withdraw and
leave in place only U.S. counter-terrorism operations failed 123-294. Among other bills, H.R. 651
requires an agreement with Afghanistan under which U.S. forces redeploy from Afghanistan
within one year of entry into that agreement, and H.Con.Res. 28, H.R. 780, and H.Con.Res. 248
require a withdrawal. The latter bill failed by a vote of 356 to 65 on March 10, 2011. The fate of
such legislation is uncertain given that the President has now announced a way forward for
winding down the U.S. military involvement in Afghanistan.
Regional Dimension
Most of Afghanistan’s neighbors believed that the fall of the Taliban in Afghanistan would
stabilize the region, but Islamist militants have continued to challenge the Afghan government
and have battled the government of Pakistan and conducted acts of terrorism in India and
elsewhere in the region. The Obama Administration’s 2009 announcement of the transition to
Afghan leadership beginning in July 2011 led some regional powers to plan for what they believe
might be a post-U.S. presence scramble for influence in Afghanistan—or at least for the ability to
deny their rivals influence there. Iran, which shares with India a fear of any return of radical
Taliban (Sunni Muslim) extremism in Afghanistan, has begun over the past year to engage more
substantively on the future of Afghanistan with other regional countries. These maneuverings, to
some extent, cast doubt on the commitment of Afghanistan’s six neighbors to a non-interference
pledges they have made, including: The Kabul Declaration (December 23, 2002) and the “Heart
of Asia Declaration” (Istanbul, January 26, 2010). State Department officials say that one of the
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goals of the December 2011 Bonn Conference on Afghanistan will be for regional countries to
publicly recommit to these pledges. That meeting purportedly is to be attended by high level
representatives from 90 countries.
At the same time, Afghanistan has been re-integrating into regional security and economic
organizations that reflect an effort to conduct relatively normal commerce and diplomatic
relationships. This integration could make Afghanistan the Central Asia-South Asia trading hub
that is an increasing focus of Administration policy. In November 2005, Afghanistan joined the
South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), and Afghanistan has observer
status in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, a security coordination body that includes
Russia, China, and several Central Asian states. U.S. officials have sought to enlist both regional
and greater international support for Afghanistan through the still-expanding 44-nation
“International Contact Group,” which held its latest meeting in Jeddah on March 3, 2011.
Several regional summit meeting series have been established involving Afghanistan, including:
• Summit meetings between Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Turkey; and between Iran,
Afghanistan, and Pakistan. The latest Iran-Afghanistan-Pakistan meeting took
place in Tehran on June 25, 2011. The fifth of the Turkey-led meetings occurred
on December 24, 2010, and resulted in a decision for joint military exercises in
March 2011 between Turkey, Afghanistan, and Pakistan.
• Turkey and UNAMA co-chair a “Regional Working Group” initiative, which is to
culminate in a major meeting on Afghanistan in Istanbul in November 2011 -
immediately preceding the Bonn Conference the following month.
• UNAMA also leads a “Kabul Silk Road” initiative, to promote regional
cooperation on Afghanistan.
• Russia has put together two “quadrilateral summits,” the latest of which was on
August 18, 2010, among Pakistan, Russia, Afghanistan, and Tajikistan, and
focused on counter-narcotics and anti-smuggling.
• Another regional collaborative effort is the Regional Economic Cooperation
Conference on Afghanistan, which was launched in 2005.
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Table 8. Afghan and Regional Facilities Used for
Operations in and Supply Lines to Afghanistan
Facility
Use
Bagram Air
50 miles north of Kabul, the operational hub of U.S. forces in Afghanistan, and base for CJTF-
Base
82. At least 2000 U.S. military personnel are based there. Handles many of the 150+ U.S.
aircraft (including helicopters) in country. Hospital constructed, one of the first permanent
structures there. FY2005 supplemental (P.L. 109-13) provided about $52 million for various
projects to upgrade facilities at Bagram, including a control tower and an operations center, and
the FY2006 supplemental appropriation (P.L. 109-234) provided $20 million for military
construction there. NATO also using the base and sharing operational costs. Bagram can be
accessed directly by U.S. military flights following April 2010 agreement by Kazakhstan to allow
overflights of U.S. lethal equipment.
Qandahar Air
Just outside Qandahar, the hub of military operations in the south. Turned over from U.S. to
Field
NATO/ISAF control in late 2006 in conjunction with NATO assumption of peacekeeping
responsibilities. Enhanced (along with other facilities in the south) at cost of $1.3 billion to
accommodate influx of U.S combat forces in the south.
Shindand Air
In Farah province, about 20 miles from Iran border. Used by U.S. forces and combat aircraft
Base
since October 2004, after the dismissal of Herat governor Ismail Khan, who controlled it.
Peter Ganci
Used by 1,200 U.S. military personnel as wel as refueling and cargo aircraft for shipments into
Base: Manas,
Afghanistan. Leadership of Kyrgyzstan changed in April 2005 in an uprising against President
Kyrgyzstan
Askar Akayev and again in April 2010 against Kurmanbek Bakiyev. Previous Kyrgyz governments
demanded the U.S. vacate the base but in both cases, (July 2006 and July 2009) agreement to
use the base was extended in exchange for large increase in U.S. payments for its use (to $60
million per year in the latter case). Interim government formed in April 2010 first threatened
then retracted eviction of U.S. from the base, but the issue remains subject to decision making
by a new government elected in Kyrgyzstan on October 11, 2010. Some questions have arisen
in Congress over alleged corruption involving fuel suppliers of U.S. aircraft at the base.
Incirlik Air
About 2,100 U.S. military personnel there; U.S. aircraft supply U.S. forces in Iraq and
Base, Turkey
Afghanistan. U.S. use repeatedly extended for one year intervals by Turkey.
Al Dhafra, UAE Air base used by about 1,800 U.S. military personnel, to supply U.S. forces and related
transport into Iraq and Afghanistan. Could see increasing use if Manas closes.
Al Udeid Air
Largest air facility used by U.S. in region. About 5,000 U.S. personnel in Qatar. Houses central
Base, Qatar
air operations coordination center for U.S. missions in Iraq and Afghanistan; also houses
CENTCOM forward headquarters. Could see increased use if Manas closes.
Naval Support
U.S. naval command headquarters for OEF anti-smuggling, anti-terrorism, and anti-proliferation
Facility, Bahrain
naval search missions, and Iraq-related naval operations (oil platform protection) in the Persian
Gulf and Arabian Sea. About 5,100 U.S. military personnel there.
Karsi-Khanabad Not used by U.S. since September 2005 fol owing U.S.-Uzbek dispute over May 2005 Uzbek
Air Base,
crackdown on unrest in Andijon. Once housed about 1,750 U.S. military personnel (900 Air
Uzbekistan
Force, 400 Army, and 450 civilian) supplying Afghanistan. Uzbekistan allowed German use of
the base temporarily in March 2008, indicating possible healing of the rift. U.S. relations with
Uzbekistan improved in 2009, but U.S. officials said in 2010 that the use of the air base is still
not under active discussion. Some shipments beginning in February 2009 through Navoi airfield
in central Uzbekistan, and U.S. signed agreement with Uzbekistan on April 4, 2009, allowing
nonlethal supplies for the Afghanistan war. Goods are shipped to Latvia and Georgia, some
transits Russia by rail, then to Uzbekistan.
Tajikistan
Some use of air bases and other facilities by coalition partners, including France, and emergency
use by U.S. India also uses bases under separate agreement. New supply lines to Afghanistan
established in February 2009 (“northern route”) make some use of Tajikistan.
Pakistan
As discussed below, most U.S. supplies flow through Pakistan. Heavy equipment docks in
Karachi and is escorted by security contractors to the Khyber Pass crossing.
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Pakistan/Pakistan-Afghanistan Border49
Pakistan’s determination to retain influence over Afghanistan is heavily colored by fears of
historic rival India. Pakistan appears insistent that Afghanistan, at the very least, not align with
rival India, and, at best, provide Pakistan strategic depth against India. Pakistan says India is
using its Embassy and four consulates in Afghanistan (Pakistan says India has nine such
consulates) to train and recruit anti-Pakistan insurgents, and is using its reconstruction funds to
build influence there.
The Obama Administration policy reviews in 2009 and 2010 all emphasized the linkage between
militant safehaven in Pakistan and the difficulty stabilizing Afghanistan. The December 2010
U.S. policy review said that greater cooperation with Pakistan is necessary to address militant
safehavens there, but that denial of safehavens also requires effective development strategies
inside Pakistan. The Administration report on progress in Afghanistan, released April 5, 2011,
cited earlier, noted that Pakistan has, in some ways, been deficient in pursuing militants and
eliminating safehavens on its side of the border. Questions about Pakistan’s commitment to the
overall effort against militants increased substantially after the May 1, 2011, U.S. raid on bin
Laden’s compound in Abbotabad, a compound which he apparently inhabited for more than five
years without being discovered by Pakistani intelligence. That event has led to some public
recriminations by Pakistan about U.S. interference, but continuing on-the-ground cooperation
between the two countries, by most accounts.
U.S. concerns heightened in September 2011, and led to strong and direct U.S. criticism of
Pakistan, in the wake of the September 13, 2011, attack on U.S. Embassy Kabul. U.S. officials
directly accused Pakistan’s Inter Services Intelligence Directorate (ISI) of protecting the alleged
perpetrator of the attacks – the Haqqani network. Pakistan appears to see the Haqqani network as
a Pakistan ally in a post-settlement Afghanistan.
Increased Direct U.S. Action Against Afghan Militants in Pakistan50
Aside from the raid on bin Laden’s compound, the Obama Administration has generally tried to
combat Afghanistan-focused militants in Pakistan without directly violating Pakistan’s
restrictions on the U.S. ability to operate “on the ground” in Pakistan. The Obama Administration
has significantly increased the use of Predator and Reaper unmanned aircraft to strike militant
targets in Pakistan as compared to the Bush Administration. Pakistani militant group Tehrik-e-
Taliban (TTP, Pakistan Taliban) leader Baitullah Mehsud was killed in such a U.S. strike in
August 2009. Some militant websites say the strikes are taking a major toll on their operations
and networks.
Pakistan’s Cooperation Against Al Qaeda
For the first several years after the September 11, 2001, attacks, Pakistani cooperation against Al
Qaeda had been considered by U.S. officials to be relatively consistent and effective. During

49 For extensive analysis of U.S. policy toward Pakistan, and U.S. assistance to Pakistan in conjunction with its
activities against Al Qaeda and the Taliban, see CRS Report RL33498, Pakistan-U.S. Relations, by K. Alan Kronstadt.
50 CRS Report RL34763, Islamist Militancy in the Pakistan-Afghanistan Border Region and U.S. Policy, by K. Alan
Kronstadt and Kenneth Katzman.
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2001-2006, the Bush Administration praised then President Pervez Musharraf for Pakistani
accomplishments against Al Qaeda, including the arrest of over 700 Al Qaeda figures since the
September 11 attacks.51 After the attacks, Pakistan provided the United States with access to
Pakistani airspace, some ports, and some airfields for OEF. Others say Musharraf acted against Al
Qaeda only when it threatened him directly; for example, after the December 2003 assassination
attempts against him.
U.S. criticism of Pakistan’s commitment increased following a New York Times report (February
19, 2007) that Al Qaeda had reestablished some small terrorist training camps in Pakistan, near
the Afghan border. As noted above, Pakistan’s commitment has come under major question as a
result of the discovery of the Abbotabad compound of Osama bin Laden, although no evidence
has come to light suggesting that senior Pakistani officials knew he was there.
Pakistan-Afghanistan Relations
The U.S. mission in Afghanistan also depends on healthy, consistent, and operationally significant
cooperation between Pakistan and Afghanistan. However, Afghanistan-Pakistan relations have
tended to fluctuate. Many Afghans fondly remember Pakistan’s role as the hub for U.S. backing
of the mujahedin that forced the Soviet withdrawal in 1988-1989, but, later, most Afghan leaders
came to resent Pakistan as the most public defender of the Taliban movement when it was in
power. (Pakistan was one of only three countries to formally recognize it as the legitimate
government; Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates are the others.)
Since 2008, the end of the Musharraf era, there has been a significant improvement in
Afghanistan-Pakistan relations. Karzai attended the September 9, 2008, inauguration of Zardari.
A “peace jirga” process—a series of meetings of notables on each side of the border—was
launched at a September 28, 2006, dinner hosted by President Bush for Karzai and Musharraf,
and meetings of 700 Pakistani and Afghan tribal elders were held in August 2007 and again in
October, 2008. Zardari visited Kabul on January 9, 2009, where he and Karzai signed a joint
declaration against terrorism that affects both countries. (A September 2010 meeting between
them appeared to be a rededication of this declaration.) Afghan and Pakistani ministers jointly
visited Washington, DC, during February 23-27, 2009, to participate in the first Obama
Administration strategic review. As noted above, Karzai and Zardari conducted a joint visit to
Washington, DC, in May 2009.
The relationship was again placed under strain following the killing of bin Laden, with many
Afghan figures, including President Karzai, using the discovery of bin Laden’s hiding place to
portray Pakistan as insincere and as a harborer of regional militant figures. Still, Karzai had what
were widely described as productive meetings in Islamabad during June 10-11, 2011, including
the announcement of implementation of the new transit trade agreement discussed below. The
summit paved the way for a U.S.-Pakistan-Afghanistan meeting on June 28, 2011, attended by
SRAP Grossman, the purpose of which was to discuss possible pathways to reconciliation in the
Afghan conflict. However, the tripartite meeting was clouded somewhat by Afghan allegations
that several hundred rockets had been fired into Afghanistan from Pakistan in prior days—
allegations that have continued since. The attacks on the U.S. Embassy and the killing of

51 Among those captured by Pakistan are top bin Laden aide Abu Zubaydah (captured April 2002); alleged September
11 plotter Ramzi bin Al Shibh (September 11, 2002); top Al Qaeda planner Khalid Shaikh Mohammed (March 2003);
and a top planner, Abu Faraj al-Libbi (May 2005).
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Professor Rabbani in September 2011, however, are likely to lead to increasing domestic criticism
of Karzai’s attempts to engage Pakistan for the purpose of a settlement in Afghanistan.
In April 2008, in an extension of the Tripartite Commission’s work, the three countries agreed to
set up five “border coordination centers” (BCCs) which include networks of radar nodes to give
liaison officers a common view of the border area. These centers build on an agreement in May
2007 to share intelligence on extremists’ movements. Four have been established to date,
including one near the Torkham Gate at the Khyber Pass, but all four are on the Afghan side of
the border. The White House report released April 5, 2011, said that Pakistan had not fulfilled its
pledge (May 2009) to establish one on the Pakistani side of the border. In June 2008, Pakistan
ended a six-month suspension in attendance at meetings of the Tripartite Commission under
which NATO, Afghan, and Pakistani military leaders meet regularly on both sides of the border.
Regarding the long-term relationship, Pakistan wants the government of Afghanistan to pledge to
abide by the “Durand Line,” a border agreement reached between Britain (signed by Sir Henry
Mortimer Durand) and then Afghan leader Amir Abdul Rahman Khan in 1893, separating
Afghanistan from what was then British-controlled India (later Pakistan after the 1947 partition).
The border is recognized by the United Nations, but Afghanistan continues to indicate that the
border was drawn unfairly to separate Pashtun tribes and should be renegotiated. As of October
2002, about 1.75 million Afghan refugees have returned from Pakistan since the Taliban fell, but
as many as 3 million might still remain in Pakistan, and Pakistan says it plans to expel them back
into Afghanistan in the near future.
Afghanistan-Pakistan Transit Trade Agreement (APTTA)
Pakistan has also sought to control Afghanistan’s trade, particularly with India, leading to U.S.
efforts to persuade Pakistan to forge a “transit trade” agreement with Afghanistan. That effort
bore success with the signature of a trade agreement between the two on July 18, 2010, allowing
for an easier flow of Afghan products, which are mostly agricultural products that depend on
rapid transit. On June 12, 2011, in the context of a Karzai visit to Islamabad, both countries began
full implementation of the agreement. It is expected to greatly expand the $2 billion in trade per
year the two countries were doing prior to the agreement. The agreement represented a success
for the Canada-sponsored “Dubai Process” of talks between Afghanistan and Pakistan on
modernizing border crossings, new roads, and a comprehensive border management strategy to
meet IMF benchmarks. A drawback to the agreement is that Afghan trucks, under the agreement,
are not permitted to take back cargo from India after dropping off goods there.
The Afghanistan-Pakistan trade agreement came after earlier signs of growing cooperation,
including Afghan agreement to send more Afghan graduate students to study in Pakistan, and a
June 2010 Afghan agreement to send small numbers of ANA officers to undergo training in
Pakistan.52 In early January 2011, Secretary of Homeland Security Janet Napolitano visited
Afghanistan and announced a future tripling (from 25 to 77) of the number of U.S. customs
agents that will train Afghan border and customs officers.

52 Partlow, Joshua. “Afghans Build Up Ties With Pakistan.” Washington Post, July 21, 2010.
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Iran
Iran perceives its key national interests in Afghanistan as denying the United States a base from
which to pressure or attack Iran. Secondarily, Iran seeks to exert its traditional influence over
western Afghanistan, which Iran borders and was once part of the Persian empire, to protect
Afghanistan’s Shiite and other Persian-speaking minorities. There are mixed views on how
influential Iran is in Afghanistan; most experts appear to see Iran as relatively marginal player,
particularly compared to Pakistan.
The Obama Administration initially saw Iran as potentially helpful to its strategy for Afghanistan;
the late SRAP Holbrooke was an advocate of cooperation with Iran on Afghanistan issues. Early
in the Administration, Secretary of State Clinton made a point of announcing that Iran would be
invited to the U.N.-led meeting on Afghanistan at the Hague on March 31, 2009. At the meeting,
the late SRAP Holbrooke briefly met the Iranian leader of his delegation to the meeting, and
handed him a letter on several outstanding human rights cases involving Iranian-Americans. At
the meeting, Iran pledged cooperation on combating Afghan narcotics and in helping economic
development in Afghanistan—both policies Iran is pursuing to a large degree.
Still, suggesting that the concept of cooperation with Iran on Afghanistan still resonates with
some U.S. officials and outside experts, Iran’s attendance of the October 18, 2010, International
Contact Group” meeting in Rome, including a briefing by General Petraeus. Earlier, the United
States and Iran took similar positions at a U.N. meeting in Geneva in February 2010 that
discussed drug trafficking across the Afghan border. Iran did not attend the January 28, 2010,
international meeting in London, but it did attend the July 28, 2010, international meeting in
Kabul (both discussed above). As a member of the OIC, an Iranian representative attended the
March 3, 2011, Contact Group meeting at OIC headquarters in Jeddah.
Iran’s Development Aid for Afghanistan
Iran has pledged at least $400 million in aid to Afghanistan, according to the Afghan government,
much of which has been used to build roads and bridges in western Afghanistan. In cooperation
with India, Iran has been building roads that would connect western Afghanistan to Iran’s port of
Chahbahar, and provide Afghan and other goods an easier outlet to the Persian Gulf. Iran also has
provided credits to the Afghan private sector and helped develop power transmission lines in the
provinces bordering Iran.
Iranian Assistance to Afghan Militants and to Pro-Iranian Groups and Regions
A sustained U.S.-Iran dialogue on Afghanistan, were it to be established, would presumably be
intended to address the U.S. concerns about Iran’s support for groups that operate against U.S.
forces. Iran may be arming groups in Afghanistan to try to pressure U.S. forces that use
Afghanistan’s Shindand air base,53 which Iran fears the United States might use to attack or
conduct surveillance against Iran. Or, Iran’s policy might be to gain broader leverage against the
United States by demonstrating that Iran is in position to cause U.S. combat deaths in
Afghanistan.

53 Rashid, Ahmed. “Afghan Neighbors Show Signs of Aiding in Nation’s Stability.” Wall Street Journal, October 18,
2004.
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The State Department report on international terrorism for 2010, released August 18, 2011, said
the Qods Force of the Revolutionary Guard of Iran continues to provide training to the Taliban on
small unit tactics, small arms, explosives, and indirect weapons fire, and that it ships arms to
militants in Qandahar. This phrasing implies that Iran is arming Pashtun Taliban militants in the
core of the combat zone in Afghanistan. Weapons provided, according to the State Department
report, include mortars, 107mm rockets, rocket-propelled grenades, and plastic explosives. On
March 9, 2011, NATO said it had seized 48 Iranian-made rockets in Nimruz Province, bound for
Afghan militants; the 122mm rockets, have a range (13 miles) greater than those previously
provided by Iran. On August 3, 2010, the Treasury Department, acting under Executive Order
13224, named two Qods Force officers as terrorism supporting entities (freezing assets in the
United States, if any). They are Hossein Musavi, Commander of the Qods Force Ansar Corps,
which is the key Qods unit involved in Afghanistan; and Hasan Mortezavi, who is a Qods officer
responsible for providing funds and materiel to the Taliban, according to the Treasury
Department.54
Assistance to Ethnic and Religious Factions in Afghanistan
Others are puzzled by Iran’s support of Taliban fighters who are Pashtun, because Iran has
traditionally supported Persian-speaking non-Pashtun factions in Afghanistan, many of whom
have been oppressed by the Pashtuns. Some of Iran’s funding has been intended to support pro-
Iranian groups in the west as well as Hazara Shiites in Kabul and in the Hazara heartland of
Bamiyan, Ghazni, and Dai Kundi, in part by providing scholarships and funding for technical
institutes. Iran has used some of its funds to construct mosques in Herat, pro-Iranian theological
seminaries in Shiite districts of Kabul, and Shiite institutions in Hazara-dominated areas. Iran also
offers scholarships to Afghans to study in Iranian universities, and there are consistent allegations
that Iran has funded Afghan provincial council and parliamentary candidates who are perceived
as pro-Tehran.55 These efforts have helped Iran retain close ties with Afghanistan’s leading Shiite
cleric, Ayatollah Mohammad Mohseni.
Bilateral Government-to-Government Relations
Iran’s interest in a broad relationship with Karzai has not, to date, been affected by Iran’s
continued support for Taliban and other militants in Afghanistan. Karzai has, at times, called Iran
a “friend” of Afghanistan; in March 2010 he met with Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad
on two occasions, possibly to signal to the United States that he might realign with regional actors
if the United States continues to criticize his leadership. One of the meetings was just after the
departure of visiting Defense Secretary Gates. Previously, Karzai received Ahmadinejad in Kabul
in August 2007, and he visited Tehran at the end of May 2009 as part of the tripartite diplomatic
process between Iran, Pakistan, and Afghanistan. During a visit to the United States in May 2009,
Karzai said he had told both the United States and Iran that Afghanistan must not become an
arena for the broader competition and disputes between the United States and Iran.56 The latest
Afghanistan-Pakistan-Iran summit meeting was held in Tehran during June 24-25, 2011. It came a
few days after a visit to Afghanistan by Iran’s Defense Minister, Ahmad Vahidi, to sign a bilateral
border security agreement.

54 Treasury Department. Fact Sheet: U.S. Treasury Department Targets Iran’s Support for Terrorism. August 3, 2010.
55 King, Laura. “In Western Afghan City, Iran Makes Itself Felt.” Los Angeles Times, November 14, 2010.
56 Comments by President Karzai at the Brookings Institution. May 5, 2009.
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A controversy arose in late October 2010 when Karzai acknowledged accepting about $2 million
per year in cash payments from Iran, via his chief of Staff Mohammad Daudzai. On the other
hand, in December 2010, Iran suddenly ceased shipping fuel into Afghanistan, causing some spot
dislocations in Afghanistan, including in Kabul. The move could have been related to reported
shortages of gasoline inside Iran, which are a result of U.S. sanctions imposed on sales of
gasoline to Iran in July 2010.
Many Afghans look fondly on Iran for helping them try to oust the Taliban regime when it was in
power. Iran saw the Taliban regime, which ruled during 1996-2001, as a threat to its interests in
Afghanistan, especially after Taliban forces captured Herat in September 1995. Iran subsequently
drew even closer to the ethnic minority-dominated Northern Alliance than previously, providing
its groups with fuel, funds, and ammunition.57 In September 1998, Iranian and Taliban forces
nearly came into direct conflict when Iran discovered that nine of its diplomats were killed in the
course of the Taliban’s offensive in northern Afghanistan. Iran massed forces at the border and
threatened military action, but the crisis cooled without a major clash, possibly out of fear that
Pakistan would intervene on behalf of the Taliban. Iran offered search and rescue assistance in
Afghanistan during the U.S.-led war to topple the Taliban, and it also allowed U.S. humanitarian
aid to the Afghan people to transit Iran. Iran helped construct Afghanistan’s first post-Taliban
government, in cooperation with the United States—at the December 2001 “Bonn Conference.”
In February 2002, Iran expelled Karzai-opponent Gulbuddin Hikmatyar, but it did not arrest him.
At other times, Afghanistan and Iran have had disputes over Iran’s efforts to expel Afghan
refugees. About 1.2 million remain, mostly integrated into Iranian society, and a crisis erupted in
May 2007 when Iran expelled about 50,000 into Afghanistan. About 300,000 Afghan refugees
have returned from Iran since the Taliban fell.
India
The interests and activities of India in Afghanistan are almost the exact reverse of those of
Pakistan. India’s goal is to deny Pakistan “strategic depth” in Afghanistan, and to deny Pakistan
the ability to block India from trade and other connections to Central Asia and beyond. India saw
the AfghanTaliban’s hosting of Al Qaeda during 1996-2001 as a major threat to India itself
because of Al Qaeda’s association with radical Islamic organizations in Pakistan, such as LET
(Laskhar-e-Tayyiba, or Army of the Righteous), one of the groups that was formed in Pakistan to
challenge India’s control of part of the disputed territories of Jammu and Kashmir. Some
observers believe Pakistan wants to retain the ability to stoke these militants against India, even
though these militants may be aiding Islamist groups challenging Pakistan’s stability. Some of
these groups have committed major acts of terrorism in India, and there might be connections to
the militants who carried out the terrorist attacks in Mumbai in November 2008, as well as
another attack in that city in July 2011. Pakistan accuses India of using its four consulates in
Afghanistan (Pakistan says there are nine such consulates) to spread Indian influence in
Afghanistan.
Some believe India has been concerned that any negotiated settlement of the Afghanistan conflict
will give Pakistan preponderant influence in Afghanistan, and India, which supported the
Northern Alliance against the Taliban in the mid-1990s, has stepping up its contacts with those
factions to discuss possible contingencies in the event of an Afghan settlement deal. Still, possibly

57 Steele, Jonathon. “America Includes Iran in Talks on Ending War in Afghanistan.” Washington Times, December 15,
1997.
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at U.S. urging, in May 2011, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, during a visit to Afghanistan,
publicly expressed India’s support for the reconciliation process. He also announced during that
visit a new India – Afghanistan “Strategic Partnership,” which demonstrated India’s support for
U.S. efforts to better integrate Afghanistan into regional political, economic, and security
structures.
Despite Pakistan’s efforts, it is unlikely Afghanistan will distance itself from India. Many of the
families of Afghan leaders have lived in India at one time or another and, as noted above, Karzai
studied there. Many U.S. observers believe India’s role in Afghanistan is constructive, and some
would support an Indian decision to deploy more security forces in Afghanistan to protect its
construction workers, diplomats, and installations. India reportedly decided in August 2008 to
improve security for its officials and workers in Afghanistan, but not to send actual troops there.
Yet, Tajikistan, which also supported the mostly Tajik Northern Alliance against the Taliban when
it was in power, allows India to use one of its air bases.
India’s Development Activities in Afghanistan
India is the fifth-largest single country donor to Afghan reconstruction, funding projects worth
over $1.5 billion, with an additional $500 million announced during the Singh visit to Kabul in
May 2011. Indian officials assert that all their projects are focused on civilian, not military,
development and are in line with the development priorities set by the Afghan government. India,
along with the Asian Development Bank, financed a $300 million project, mentioned above, to
bring electricity from Central Asia to Afghanistan. It has also renovated the well-known Habibia
High School in Kabul and committed to a $67 million renovation of Darulaman Palace as the
permanent house for Afghanistan’s parliament. At a cost of about $85 million, India financed the
construction of a road to the Iranian border in remote Nimruz province, linking landlocked
Afghanistan to Iran’s Chahbahar port on the Arabian Sea. India currently constructing the 42
megawatt hydroelectric Selwa Dam in Herat Province at a cost of about $77 million. This will
increase electricity availability in the province.
India is also helping the IDLG with its efforts to build local governance organizations, and it
provides 1,000 scholarships per year for Afghans to undergo higher education in India. Some
Afghans want to enlist even more Indian assistance in training Afghan bureaucrats in accounting,
forensic accounting, oversight, and other disciplines that will promote transparency in Afghan
governance.
Russia, Central Asian States, and China
Some neighboring and nearby states take an active interest not only in Afghan stability, but in the
U.S. military posture that supports U.S. operations in Afghanistan. The region to the north of
Afghanistan is a growing factor in U.S. efforts to rely less on supply routes through Pakistan.
Russia/Northern Distribution Network
Russia wants to reemerge as a great power and to contain U.S. power in Central Asia, including
Afghanistan. At the same time, by supporting the “Northern Distribution Network” supply route
for NATO forces in Afghanistan, Russia supports U.S. and NATO efforts to combat militants in
the region who have sometimes posed a threat to Russia itself. Its hosting of the “quadrilateral
summits” mentioned above, could represent stepped up efforts by Russia to exert influence on the
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Afghanistan issue. President Medvedev is expected to visit Afghanistan later in 2011, a high
profile visit given the sensitivities Afghans have about Russia’s past involvement in Afghanistan.
Previously, Russia had kept a low profile in the country because it still feels humiliated by its
withdrawal in 1989 and senses some Afghan resentment of the Soviet occupation.
In June 2010, Russia said more economic and social assistance is needed for Afghanistan. Russia
reportedly is considering investing $1 billion in Afghanistan to develop its electricity capacity and
build out other infrastructure. Included in those investments are implementation of an agreement,
reached during a Karzai visit to Moscow on January 22, 2011, for Russia to resume long dormant
Soviet occupation-era projects such as expanding the Salang Tunnel connecting the Panjshir
Valley to Kabul, hydroelectric facilities in Kabul and Baghlan provinces, a customs terminal, and
a university in Kabul. Since 2002, Russia has been providing some humanitarian aid to
Afghanistan.
During the 1990s, after its 1989 withdrawal and the breakup of the Soviet Union, Russia
supported the Northern Alliance against the Taliban with some military equipment and technical
assistance in order to blunt Islamic militancy emanating from Afghanistan.58 Although Russia
supported the U.S. effort against the Taliban and Al Qaeda in Afghanistan out of fear of Islamic
(mainly Chechen) radicals, Russia continues to seek to reduce the U.S. military presence in
Central Asia. Russian fears of Islamic activism emanating from Afghanistan may have ebbed
since 2002 when Russia killed a Chechen of Arab origin known as “Hattab” (full name is Ibn al-
Khattab), who led a militant pro-Al Qaeda Chechen faction. The Taliban government was the
only one in the world to recognize Chechnya’s independence, and some Chechen fighters fighting
alongside Taliban/Al Qaeda forces have been captured or killed.
Northern Distribution Network and Other Aid to Afghan Security
Russian cooperation is crucial to the U.S. effort in Afghanistan. In February 2009, Russia paved
the way for the expansion of the Northern Distribution Network by allowing the resumption of
shipment of non-lethal equipment into Afghanistan through Russia (following a suspension in
2008 caused by differences over the Russia-Georgia conflict). There are discussions with Russia
over possibly allowing some lethal equipment to transit as well. About half of all ground cargo
for U.S. forces in Afghanistan now flow through the Northern Distribution Network.
Russia has also responded to NATO requests to provide helicopters and spare parts to the Afghan
forces (which still make heavy use of Russian-made Hind helicopters) as well as fuel. In April
2011, there was agreement to establish a “Helicopter Maintenance Trust Fund.” Russia has also
delivered 24 helicopters to Afghan forces, financed by the United States. Russia reportedly has
pledged to train Afghan security forces.
In November 2010, in its most significant intervention in Afghanistan since its occupation,
Russian officers reportedly joined U.S. and Afghan forces attempting to interdict narcotics
trafficking in Afghanistan. However, the move prompted a complaint by President Karzai because
he was not consulted about the inclusion of the Russians.

58 Risen, James. “Russians Are Back in Afghanistan, Aiding Rebels.” New York Times, July 27, 1998.
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Central Asian States
These states are crucial to U.S. strategy in Afghanistan. As shown in the table, Uzbekistan,
Turkmenistan, Tajikistan and Kazakhstan are pivotal actors in U.S. efforts to expand the Northern
Distribution Network supply route as an alternative to reliance on routes through Pakistan. These
states are also becoming crucial to Afghanistan’s strategy to attempt to emerge as a trade
crossroads between South and Central Asia—a strategy that could net Kabul substantial customs
duties and other economic benefits. The possible revival of a long-standing plan to establish
Afghanistan as a transit hub for Central Asian natural gas (TAPI pipeline) is discussed later in this
paper under long-term economic development opportunities. Turkmenistan is key to this natural
gas project but, perhaps to avoid offending Pakistan or other actors, it takes a position of “positive
neutrality” on Afghanistan and does not allow its territory to be part of the Northern Distribution
Network. No U.S. forces have been based in Turkmenistan.
On security cooperation, Tajikistan allows access primarily to French combat aircraft, and
Kazakhstan has allowed use of facilities in case of emergency. In May 2011, Kazakhstan became
the first Central Asian state to pledge forces to Afghanistan (four non-combat troops). In April
2010, Kazakhstan agreed to allow U.S. overflights of lethal military equipment to Afghanistan,
allowing the United States to use polar routes to fly materiel directly from the United States to
Bagram Airfield.
In 1996, several of the Central Asian states banded together with Russia and China into a regional
grouping called the Shanghai Cooperation Organization to discuss the Taliban threat. It includes
China, Russia, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan. Reflecting Russian and
Chinese efforts to limit U.S. influence in the region, the group has issued statements, most
recently in August 2007, that security should be handled by the countries in the Central Asia
region. A meeting of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization to discuss Afghanistan was held in
Moscow on March 25, 2009, and was observed by a U.S. official, as well as by Iran.
Uzbekistan, a sponsor of Afghan faction leader Abdul Rashid Dostam, an ethnic Uzbek, allowed
use of Karshi-Khanabad air base by OEF forces from October 2001 until a rift emerged in May
2005 over Uzbekistan’s crackdown against riots in Andijon, and U.S.-Uzbek relations remained
largely frozen. Uzbekistan’s March 2008 agreement with Germany for it to use Karshi-Khanabad
air base temporarily, for the first time since the rift in U.S.-Uzbek relations developed in 2005,
suggests that U.S.-Uzbek cooperation on Afghanistan and other issues might be rebuilt. Renewed
U.S. discussions with Uzbekistan apparently bore some fruit with the Uzbek decision in February
2009 to allow the use of Navoi airfield for shipment of U.S./NATO goods into Afghanistan. The
late Ambassador Holbrooke visited in February 2010, indicating further warming.
An increasing amount of trade is flowing from Afghanistan to and through the Central Asian
states. As noted below, railway lines are being build to Uzbekistan. The Panj bridge, built largely
with U.S. funds, has become a major thoroughfare for goods to move between Afghanistan and
Tajikistan. Kazakhstan is funding a $50 million program to develop Afghan professionals.
Central Asian Activities During Taliban Rule
During Taliban rule, Russian and Central Asian leaders grew increasingly alarmed that radical
Islamic movements were receiving safe haven in Afghanistan. Uzbekistan, in particular, has long
asserted that the group Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), allegedly responsible for four
simultaneous February 1999 bombings in Tashkent that nearly killed President Islam Karimov, is
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linked to Al Qaeda.59 One of its leaders, Juma Namangani, reportedly was killed while
commanding Taliban/Al Qaeda forces in Konduz in November 2001. Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan
do not directly border Afghanistan, but IMU guerrillas transited Kyrgyzstan during incursions
into Uzbekistan in the late 1990s.
Of the Central Asian states that border Afghanistan, only Turkmenistan chose to seek close
relations with the Taliban leadership when it was in power, possibly viewing engagement as a
more effective means of preventing spillover of radical Islamic activity from Afghanistan. It saw
Taliban control as facilitating construction of the natural gas pipeline, discussed above, that was
under consideration during Taliban rule. The September 11 events stoked Turkmenistan’s fears of
the Taliban and its Al Qaeda guests and the country publicly supported the U.S.-led war.
China60
China’s involvement in Afghanistan policy appears to be growing, perhaps to secure access to
Afghan minerals and resources, and perhaps also to help its ally, Pakistan, avoid encirclement by
India. Like Pakistan, China has been a rival of India. China also is concerned about the potential
for Islamic militancy in Afghanistan to inflame Islamist sentiment among China’s Uighur
community in China. A major organizer of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, China has a
small border with a sparsely inhabited sliver of Afghanistan known as the “Wakhan Corridor,”
and it is building border access routes and supply depots to facilitate China’s access to
Afghanistan through the corridor. Chinese delegations continue to assess the potential for new
investments in such sectors as mining and energy,61 and the cornerstone is the development of the
Aynak copper mine south of Kabul. For more information, see the sections below on the Afghan
economy: mining sector. In late 2009, China allocated an additional $75 million in economic aid
to Afghanistan, adding to the $130 million its has provided during 2002-2009. On March 20,
2010, ahead of a visit to China by Karzai, China called for more international support for
Afghanistan. During the visit, China stressed that its investments in Afghanistan would continue.
China has not taken any direct role in securing Afghanistan. Having established significant
strategic and economic interests in post-Taliban Afghanistan, there were indications in 2009 that
China was considering contributing some People’s Liberation Army (PLA) forces, possibly in a
non-combat role, to help secure Afghanistan. A communiqué from the Obama visit to China in
November 2009 implied a possible larger role for China to help stabilize Afghanistan. However,
no such Chinese mission has been announced.
In December 2000, sensing China’s increasing concern about Taliban policies, a Chinese official
delegation met with Mullah Umar. However, China did not enthusiastically support U.S. military
action against the Taliban, possibly because China was wary of a U.S. military buildup nearby.

59 The IMU was named a foreign terrorist organization by the State Department in September 2000.
60 For more information, see CRS Report RL33001, U.S.-China Counterterrorism Cooperation: Issues for U.S. Policy,
by Shirley A. Kan.
61 CRS conversations with Chinese officials in Beijing. August 2007.
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Persian Gulf States: Saudi Arabia and UAE
The Gulf states are considered a key part of the effort to stabilize Afghanistan. As noted, the late
Ambassador Holbrooke focused substantial U.S. attention—and formed a multilateral task
force—to try to curb continuing Gulf resident donations to the Taliban in Afghanistan. He
maintained that these donations are a larger source of Taliban funding than is the narcotics trade.
The Gulf states have also been a source of development funds and for influence with some
Afghan clerics and factions.
Saudi Arabia has a role to play in Afghanistan in part because, during the Soviet occupation,
Saudi Arabia channeled hundreds of millions of dollars to the Afghan resistance, primarily
Hikmatyar and Sayyaf. Drawing on its reputed intelligence ties to Afghanistan during that era,
Saudi Arabia worked with Taliban leaders to persuade them to suppress anti-Saudi activities by Al
Qaeda. Some press reports indicate that, in late 1998, Saudi and Taliban leaders discussed, but did
not agree on, a plan for a panel of Saudi and Afghan Islamic scholars to decide bin Laden’s fate.
A majority of Saudi citizens practice the strict Wahhabi brand of Islam similar to that of the
Taliban, and Saudi Arabia was one of three countries to formally recognize the Taliban
government. The Taliban initially served Saudi Arabia as a potential counter to Iran, but Iranian-
Saudi relations improved after 1997 and balancing Iranian power ebbed as a factor in Saudi
policy toward Afghanistan.
Saudi Arabia has played a role as a go-between for negotiations between the Karzai government
and “moderate” Taliban figures. This role was recognized at the London conference on January
28, 2010, in which President Karzai stated in his opening speech that he sees a role for Saudi
Arabia in helping stabilize Afghanistan. As noted, some reports say that a political settlement
might involve Mullah Umar going into exile in Saudi Arabia.
According to U.S. officials, Saudi Arabia cooperated extensively, if not publicly, with OEF. It
broke diplomatic relations with the Taliban in late September 2001 and quietly permitted the
United States to use a Saudi base for command of U.S. air operations over Afghanistan, but it did
not permit U.S. airstrikes from it.
UAE Involvement
The United Arab Emirates, the third country that recognized the Taliban regime, is emerging as
another major donor to Afghanistan. Its contribution of about 250 troops mostly to OEF was
discussed above (35 of them are assigned to ISAG). The UAE has donated at least $135 million
to Afghanistan since 2002, according to the Afghan Finance Ministry. Projects funded include
housing in Qandahar, roads in Kabul, a hospital in Zabol province, and a university in Khost. At
the same time, the UAE property market has been an outlet for investment by Afghan leaders who
may have acquired their funds through soft loans from the scandal-plagued Kabul Bank or
through corruption connected to donor contracts or other businesses.
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Keys to Afghanistan’s Post-War Future: U.S. and
International Aid and Economic Development

Some experts have long believed that accelerating economic development would do more to
improve the security situation than combat operations, and that economic development is widely
considered pivotal to Afghanistan’s ability to shape its future after the bulk of international forces
depart. This belief appears to constitute a major element of Obama Administration policy,
although some believe the link between economic development and security is unproved. The
United States and partner countries provide large amounts of assistance, but many economic
sectors are have been developed with private investment, including by wealthy or well-connected
Afghans who have founded companies. The multiple overlapping funding streams complicate
efforts to determine the effects on Afghanistan’s economy of aid, as compared to the effects of
investment, trade, and other variables. At the same time, there is substantial concern about the
effects on the Afghan economy of the transition to Afghan lead, which will likely see donor funds
reduced substantially. In July 2011, Secretary of State Clinton and other U.S. officials began to
articulate a post-transition vision of greater Afghan economic integration in the region and its role
in a “New Silk Road” trading system.
Hindering that vision is that Afghanistan’s economy and society are still fragile after decades of
warfare that left about 2 million dead, 700,000 widows and orphans, and about 1 million Afghan
children who were born and raised in refugee camps outside Afghanistan. More than 3.5 million
Afghan refugees have since returned, although a comparable number remain outside Afghanistan.
The U.N. High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) supervises Afghan repatriation and Afghan
refugee camps in Pakistan. As discussed, the literacy rate is very low and Afghanistan has a small,
although growing, pool of skilled labor, middle managers, accountants, and information
professionals.
There are debates over virtually all aspects of international aid to Afghanistan, including amounts,
mechanisms for providing it, coordination among donors, and how aid is distributed within
Afghanistan. For example, some of the more stable provinces, such as Bamiyan and Balkh, are
complaining that U.S. and international aid is flowing mostly to the restive provinces in an effort
to quiet them, and ignoring the needs of poor Afghans in peaceful areas. Later in this report are
tables showing U.S. appropriations of assistance to Afghanistan, and Table 23 lists U.S. spending
on all sectors for FY2001-FY2010.
U.S. Assistance to Afghanistan
During the 1990s, the United States became the largest single provider of assistance to the Afghan
people. During Taliban rule, no U.S. aid went directly to that government; monies were provided
through relief organizations. Between 1985 and 1994, the United States had a cross-border aid
program for Afghanistan, implemented by USAID personnel based in Pakistan. Citing the
difficulty of administering this program, there was no USAID mission for Afghanistan from the
end of FY1994 until the reopening of the U.S. Embassy in Afghanistan in late 2001.
For all of FY2002-FY2011, the United States has provided about $67.4 billion in assistance,
including military “train and equip” for the ANA and ANP (which is about $39.5 billion of these
funds). The figures in the tables do not include costs for U.S. combat operations. Including those
costs, the United States spent about $105 billion for FY2010 and expects to spend about $120
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billion for FY2011. A total of $118 billion in DOD funds is requested for FY2012 for both
Afghanistan and Iraq. For further information on combat costs, see CRS Report RL33110, The
Cost of Iraq, Afghanistan, and Other Global War on Terror Operations Since 9/11
, by Amy
Belasco.
Aid Oversight
Still heavily dependent on donors, Karzai has sought to reassure the international donor
community by establishing a transparent budget and planning process. Some in Congress want to
increase independent oversight of U.S. aid to Afghanistan; the conference report on the FY2008
defense authorization bill (P.L. 110-181) established a “special inspector general” for Afghanistan
reconstruction, (SIGAR) modeled on a similar outside auditor for Iraq (“Special Inspector
General for Iraq Reconstruction,” SIGIR). Funds provided for the SIGAR are in the tables below.
On May 30, 2008, Major General Arnold Fields (Marine, ret.) was named to the position. His
office has filed several reports on Afghan reconstruction, which include discussions of SIGAR
staffing levels and activities, as well as several specific project audits. However, he acknowledged
that criticisms in a July 2010 “peer review” of SIGAR operations by the Inspectors General of
several U.S. agencies were valid, attributing many of the shortcomings to slow pace of fully
funding his office.62 One recent SIGAR report noted deficiencies in the ability of the Afghan
government’s Central Audits Office to monitor how funds are used. Another (January 2011)
assesses the degree of coordination in U.S. programs to help women and girls. Some Members of
Congress criticized the SIGAR for ineffective oversight and called for his replacement; General
Fields (ret) announced his resignation in January 2011. His deputy, Herb Richardson, replaced
him on an acting basis as of February 2011, but in August 2011, Richardson announced his
departure, leaving the permanent top position at SIGAR again in transition. The acting deputy,
Steve Trent, reportedly will be acting SIGAR as of September 2011.
Aid Authorization: Afghanistan Freedom Support Act
A key post-Taliban aid authorization bill, S. 2712, the Afghanistan Freedom Support Act (AFSA)
of 2002 (P.L. 107-327, December 4, 2002), as amended, authorized about $3.7 billion in U.S.
civilian aid for FY2003-FY2006. The law, whose authority has now expired, was intended to
create a central source for allocating funds; that aid strategy was not implemented. However,
some of the humanitarian, counter-narcotics, and governance assistance targets authorized by the
act were met or exceeded by appropriations. No Enterprise Funds authorized by the act have been
appropriated. The act authorized the following:
• $60 million in total counter-narcotics assistance ($15 million per year for
FY2003-FY2006);
• $30 million in assistance for political development, including national, regional,
and local elections ($10 million per year for FY2003-FY2005);
• $80 million total to benefit women and for Afghan human rights oversight ($15
million per year for FY2003-FY2006 for the Afghan Ministry of Women’s

62 http://www.sigar.mil/pdf/peer_review/Section5.pdf.
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Affairs, and $5 million per year for FY2003-FY2006 to the Human Rights
Commission of Afghanistan);
• $1.7 billion in humanitarian and development aid ($425 million per year for
FY2003-FY2006);
• $300 million for an Enterprise Fund;
• $550 million in drawdowns of defense articles and services for Afghanistan and
regional militaries. (The original law provided for $300 million in drawdowns.
That was increased by subsequent appropriations laws.)
A subsequent law (P.L. 108-458, December 17, 2004), implementing the recommendations of the
9/11 Commission, contained “The Afghanistan Freedom Support Act Amendments of 2004.” The
subtitle mandated the appointment of a U.S. coordinator of policy on Afghanistan and requires
additional Administration reports to Congress.
Afghan Freedom Support Act Reauthorization
In the 110th Congress, H.R. 2446, passed by the House on June 6, 2007 (406-10), would have
reauthorized AFSA through FY2010. A version (S. 3531), with fewer provisions than the House
bill. It was not taken up by the full Senate, possibly over concerns that it might limit
Administration flexibility in allocating aid. H.R. 2446 would have authorized about $1.7 billion
in U.S. economic aid and $320 in military aid (including drawdowns of equipment) per fiscal
year. It also would have authorized a pilot program of crop substitution to encourage legitimate
alternatives to poppy cultivation; and a cut off of U.S. aid to any Afghan province in which the
Administration reports that the leadership of the province is complicit in narcotics trafficking.
AFSA reauthorization was not reintroduced in the 111th Congress.
Direct Support to the Afghan Government
Although the Afghan government has been increasing its revenue (about $1.5 billion for 2010), its
revenues cover only about one-third of its overall budget of about $4.5 billion (including donated
development funds). USAID and other donors provide funding to help the Afghan government
meet gaps in its operating budget. As shown in the tables below, some U.S. funds are provided
both directly and through a U.N.-run multi-donor Afghan Reconstruction Trust Fund (ARTF)
account, run by the World Bank. As of February 2011, 31 donors have contributed $4.1 billion to
the ARTF, with $2.1 billion for Afghan salaries and over $1.2 billion for priority investments.
(DOD “1230 report,” April 2011, p. 86.)
Currently, the United States disburses more than 40% of its donated aid funds through the Afghan
government. The Kabul Conference (July 20, 2010) communiqué endorsed a goal of increasing
that to about 50% and for 80% of all funds to align with Afghan government priorities. Karzai has
long complained about the high percentage of donor aid not channeled through the Afghan
government and this criticism of what he calls a “parallel government” was emphasized in his
February 6, 2011, speech at a Munich security conference.63

63 http://www.afghanistan-un.org/2011/02/statement-by-his-excellency-hamid-karzai-president-of-the-islamic-republic-
of-afghanistan-at-the-47th-munich-security-conference-msc/.
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National Solidarity Program
Through the ARTF, the United States supports an Afghan government program that promotes
local decision making on development—the “National Solidarity Program” (NSP). The program
provides block grants of about $60,000 per project to local councils to implement their priority
projects, most of which are water projects. The Afghan implementer is the Ministry of Rural
Rehabilitation and Development. As discussed in a SIGAR report of March 2011, it is widely
hailed as a highly successful, Afghan-run program, although the report says its contributions to
improving local governance are unclear. Still, it is being implemented in almost every district of
Afghanistan, and it employs over 800 Afghans. Donors have provided the program with $600
million through March 2011, of which U.S. funding (through October 2010) has been $528
million (DOD “1230 report,” April 2011. p. 86).
U.S. funds for the program are drawn from a broad category of ESF for “good governance.” P.L.
111-32, the FY2009 supplemental discussed above, earmarks $70 million to defray a large part of
a shortfall in that program. The FY2010 consolidated appropriation (P.L. 111-117) earmarked
another $175 million in ESF for the program. A total of almost $800 million in good governance
funds are requested for FY2012, meaning that the NSP funding provided by the U.S. will likely
meet prior years’ levels, if the funds are appropriated. The FY2010 National Defense
Authorization Act (P.L. 111-84) authorizes the use of some CERP funds, controlled by the U.S.
military, to supplement the funding for the NSP. However, this authorization, if implemented,
incurred opposition from some international NGOs who are opposed to combining military action
with development work.
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Table 9. Major Reporting Requirements
Several provisions require Administration reports on numerous aspects of U.S. strategy, assistance, and related issues.

P.L. 108-458, The Afghanistan Freedom Support Act Amendments required, through the end of FY2010, an
overarching annual report on U.S. strategy in Afghanistan. Other reporting requirements expired, including
required reports: (1) on long-term U.S. strategy and progress of reconstruction; (2) on how U.S. assistance is
being used; (3) on U.S. efforts to persuade other countries to participate in Afghan peacekeeping; and (4) a joint
State and Defense Department report on U.S. counter-narcotics efforts in Afghanistan.

P.L. 110-181 (Section 1230), FY2008 Defense Authorization Act requires a quarterly DOD report on the
security situation in Afghanistan; the first was submitted in June 2008. It is required by that law through FY2011.
Section 1231 requires a report on the Afghan National Security Forces through the end of FY2010.

Section 1229 of the same law requires the quarterly report of the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan
Reconstruction (SIGAR).

P.L. 111-8 (Omnibus Appropriation, explanatory statement) required a State Department report on the use of
funds to address the needs of Afghan women and girls (submitted by September 30, 2009).

P.L. 111-32, FY2009 Supplemental Appropriation (Section 1116), required a White House report, by the time of
the FY2011 budget submission, on whether Afghanistan and Pakistan are cooperating with U.S. policy sufficiently
to warrant a continuation of Administration policy toward both countries, as wel as efforts by these
governments to curb corruption, their efforts to develop a counter-insurgency strategy, the level of political
consensus in the two countries to confront security chal enges, and U.S. government efforts to achieve these
objectives. The report was released with a date of September 30, 2010.

The same law (Section 1117) required a report, by September 23, 2009, on metrics to be used to assess
progress on Afghanistan and Pakistan strategy. A progress report measured against those metrics is to be
submitted by March 30, 2010, and every six months thereafter, until the end of FY2011.

Section 1228 of the FY2010 National Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 111-84) required a report, within 120
days, on the Afghan Provincial Protection Program and other local security initiatives. Section 1235 authorized a
DOD-funded study of U.S. force levels needed for eastern and southern Afghanistan, and Section 1226 required
a Comptrol er General report on the U.S. “campaign plan” for the Afghanistan (and Iraq) effort.

The FY2011 National Defense Authorization Act (H.R. 6523, P.L. 111-383) provides for (Section 1231) a one
year extension—through FY2012—on the security situation in Afghanistan that was begun in P.L. 110-181: a two
year extension (Section 1232) in the reporting requirement—through FY 2012—on the Afghan National Security
Forces; (Section 1535) a report within six months of enactment on U.S. economic strategy for Afghanistan and a
plan, to be submitted concurrent with the FY2012 budget submission, to transition the duties of the Task Force
for Business and Stability Operations in Afghanistan to the Department of State; and a report by State, DOD,
and USAID on the use of contractors in Afghanistan.
International Reconstruction Pledges/National Development Strategy
As shown in Table 10, non-U.S. donors, including such institutions as the EU and the Asian
Development Bank, have provided over $29 billion in assistance to Afghanistan since the fall of
the Taliban. When combined with U.S. aid, this by far exceeds the $27.5 billion for reconstruction
identified by the IMF as required for 2002-2010. Major pledges have been made primarily at
donor conferences such as Tokyo (2002), Berlin (April 2004), Kabul (April 2005), London
(February 2006), Paris (June 2008), and London (January 2010). The December 2011 is not,
according to U.S. officials, intended as a “pledging conference,” although it is likely some donor
pledges will be announced in connection with that meeting.
Among multilateral lending institutions, in May 2002, the World Bank reopened its office in
Afghanistan after 20 years. Its projects have been concentrated in the telecommunications and
road and sewage sectors. The Asian Development Bank (ADB) has also been playing a major role
in Afghanistan, including in financing railway construction. Another of its projects in Afghanistan
was funding the paving of a road from Qandahar to the border with Pakistan, and as noted above,
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it is contributing to a project to bring electricity from Central Asia to Afghanistan. On the eve of
the London conference on January 28, 2010, the IMF and World Bank announced $1.6 billion in
Afghanistan debt relief. As noted in CRS Report RS21922, Afghanistan: Politics, Elections, and
Government Performance
, however, the IMF credit program has been in suspension since late
2010 because of the Kabul Bank scandal. As a condition of resuming the program, the IMF
demands that those responsible be held accountable and that efforts be made to recoup the
estimated $900 million in Kabul Bank losses.
Development in Key Sectors
Efforts to build the legitimate economy are showing some results, by accounts of senior U.S.
officials. Some sectors, discussed below, are being developed primarily (although not
exclusively) with private investment funding. There has been substantial new construction,
particularly in Kabul, such as the Serena luxury hotel (opened in November 2005); a $25 million
Coca Cola bottling factory (opened in September 2006); and numerous apartment complexes,
marriage halls, office buildings, and other structures. The bottling factory is located near the
Bagrami office park (another private initiative), which includes several other factories. The
Serena was built by the Agha Khan foundation, a major investor in Afghanistan.
An arm of the Defense Department, called the Task Force for Business and Stability Operations,
headed by deputy undersecretary Paul Brinkley, is attempting to facilitate the investment. On the
other hand, that Task Force reportedly has seen many of its personnel depart because of a
provision of the FY2011 Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 111-383) that the Task Force be folded
into State/USAID-led assistance structures by the end of FY2011. Others say that private
investment could be healthier if not for the influence exercised over it by various faction leaders
and Karzai relatives.
The following are some key sectors and what has been accomplished with U.S. and international
donor funds, as well as with private investment.
Education
Despite the success in enrolling Afghan children in school since the Taliban era (see statistics
above), setbacks have occurred because of Taliban attacks on schools, causing some to close. In
addition, Afghanistan’s university system is said to be woefully underfunded, in part because
Afghans are entitled to free higher education (to the B.A. level) by the Constitution which means
that demand for the higher education far outstrips Afghan resources. The shortfall is impeding the
development of a large enough pool of skilled workers for the Afghan government. Afghanistan
requires about $35 million to operate its universities and institutes for one year; USAID has
requested $20 million to help fund those activities for FY2012.64
Health
The health care sector, as noted by Afghan observers, has made considerable gains in reducing
infant mortality and giving about 65% of the population at least some access to health

64 Boak, Josh. “Afghan Universities Struggling for Funding.” Washington Post, February 13, 2011.
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professionals. In addition to U.S. assistance to develop the health sector’s capacity, Egypt
operates a 65-person field hospital at Bagram Air Base that instructs Afghan physicians. Jordan
operates a similar facility in Mazar-e-Sharif.
Roads
Road building is considered a U.S. priority and has been USAID’s largest project category there,
taking up about 25% of USAID spending since the fall of the Taliban. Roads are considered key
to enabling Afghan farmers to bring legitimate produce to market in a timely fashion, and former
commander of U.S. forces in Afghanistan General Eikenberry (later Ambassador) said “where the
roads end, the Taliban begin.” The major road, the Ring Road, is nearly all repaved, and the 150
miles in the northwest remaining to be repaved is being funded by a $350 million Asian
Development Bank donation. Among other major projects completed are a road from Qandahar to
Tarin Kowt, (Uruzgan province) built by U.S. military personnel, inaugurated in 2005; and a road
linking the Panjshir Valley to Kabul. In several of the most restive provinces, U.S. funds
(sometimes CERP funds) are being used to build roads that link up farming communities to the
market for their products. Other key priorities are completing a Khost-Gardez road, under way
currently, but slowed by security concerns, and a Salang Bypass Road through Bamiyan province.
Bridges
Afghan officials are said to be optimistic about increased trade with Central Asia now that a new
bridge has opened (October 2007) over the Panj River, connecting Afghanistan and Tajikistan.
The bridge was built with $33 million in (FY2005) U.S. assistance. The bridge is helping what
press reports say is robust reconstruction and economic development in the relatively peaceful
and ethnically homogenous province of Panjshir, the political base of the Northern Alliance.
Railways
Afghanistan does not currently have any functioning railway. However, three railway projects are
under way. One, from Mazar-i-Sharif to Hairaton, on the border with Uzbekistan, was completed
in March 2011 with $165 million from the Asian Development Bank. It is to become operational
in summer 2011. With funding from Japan and China, other rail lines will extend from Iran to
Herat Province, and from the Tajikistan border down to Konduz. The various segments are
eventually to link up and parallel the Ring Road that circles Afghanistan. The railway will
integrate Afghanistan to the former Soviet railway system in Central Asia, increasing
Afghanistan’s economic integration in the region.
Electricity
At least 10% of USAID funds for Afghanistan have been spent on power projects, although that
percentage is rising in 2010 and 2011. The Afghanistan Compact states that the goal is for
electricity to reach 65% of households in urban areas and 25% in rural areas by 2010, a goal that
has not been met. However, severe power shortages in Kabul, caused in part by the swelling of
Kabul’s population to about 3 million, up from half a million when the Taliban was in power, are
fewer now than two years ago. Power to the capital has grown due to the Afghan government’s
agreements with several Central Asian neighbors to import electricity, as well as construction of
new substations. Many shops in Kabul are now lit up at night, as observed by numerous visitors
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over the past few years, including CRS. On the other hand, there has been some criticism of a 105
Megawatt power generating plants built by USAID at Tarakhil, in north Kabul at a cost of about
$300 million because of the high costs of fuel, the questionable need for the plant given
alternative plants built recently, and the possible inability of the Afghan authorities to maintain
them. As noted above, in January 2011, Russia pledged to resume work on some long dormant
hydroelectric projects in Afghanistan that were suspended when Soviet troops withdrew in 1989.
Kajaki Dam and Qandahar Power Initiative
A major USAID and DOD focus is on power projects in southern Afghanistan. The key longterm
project is to expand the capacity of the Kajaki Dam, located in Helmand Province. USAID has
allocated about $500 million to restore and expand the capacity of the dam. As of October 2009,
two turbines were operating—one was always working, and the second was repaired by USAID
contractors. This has doubled electricity production in the south and caused small factories and
other businesses to come to flourish. USAID plans to further expand capacity of the dam by
installing a third turbine (which there is a berth for but which never had a turbine installed.) In an
operation involving 4,000 NATO troops (Operation Ogap Tsuka), components of the third turbine
were successfully delivered to the dam in September 2008. It was expected to be operational in
mid-late 2009 but technical and security problems, such as inability to secure and build roads
leading to the dam, have delayed the project, and there is no public estimate as to when the third
turbine will be completed.
In the interim, and to the consternation of some who want longterm, sustainable solutions for
Afghanistan rather than short-term palliatives, the U.S. military and USAID began in February
2011 to implement a plan (“Qandahar Power Initiative”) to focus on smaller substations and
generator projects that can bring more electricity to Qandahar and other places in the south
quickly. The initiative has been pursued in order to facilitate the U.S.-military led counter-
insurgency strategy in Qandahar, even though the initiative may not produce sustainable gains
over the longer term. Some of the power provided by additional diesel generators is being used to
supply the Qandahar Industrial Park. For this and other power projects, the Administration
requested legislative authority for an “Infrastructure Fund” to be funded by DOD ($500 million is
requested for FY2012) but controlled jointly by DOD and USAID. That authority is provided in
the FY2011 DOD authorization bill (P.L. 111-383), and is funded in P.L. 112-10. President Karzai
said in a CNN interview on June 26, 2011, that the Afghan government favored emphasizing the
longer-term Kajaki Dam project rather than the interim generator project.
Solar Power
There is also an apparent increasing emphasis on providing electricity to individual homes and
villages through small solar power installations. A contractor to USAID, IRG, is providing small
solar powered-electricity generators to homes in several districts of Afghanistan, alleviating the
need to connect such homes to the national power grid. However, there are technical drawbacks,
including weather-related inconsistency of power supply and the difficulty of powering
appliances that require substantial power. The U.S. broadcasting service to Afghanistan, Radio
Azadi, run by Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, has given out 20,000 solar-powered radios
throughout Afghanistan, according to RFE/RL in December 2010.
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Agriculture
With about 80% of Afghans living in rural areas, the agriculture sector has always been key to
Afghanistan’s economy and stability. The late Ambassador Holbrooke, including in his January
2010 strategy document, outlined U.S. policy to boost Afghanistan’s agriculture sector not only to
reduce drug production but also as an engine of economic growth. Prior to the turmoil that
engulfed Afghanistan in the late 1970s, Afghanistan was a major exporter of agricultural
products.
USAID has spent about 15% of its Afghanistan funds on agriculture (and “alternative
livelihoods” to poppy cultivation), and this has helped Afghanistan double its legitimate
agricultural output over the past five years. One emerging “success story” is growing Afghan
exports of high-quality pomegranate juice called Anar. Other countries are promoting not only
pomegranates but also saffron rice and other crops that draw buyers outside Afghanistan. Another
emerging success story is Afghanistan’s November 2010 start of exports of raisins to Britain.65
Wheat production was robust in 2009 because of healthy prices for that crop, and Afghanistan is
again self-sufficient in wheat production. According to April 2011 DOD report, the U.S.
Department of Agriculture has about 110 personnel in Afghanistan on long-term and priority
projects; there are also at least 25 agriculture experts from USAID in Afghanistan. Their efforts
include providing new funds to buy seeds and agricultural equipment, and to encourage agri-
business. In addition, the National Guard from several states is deploying nine (as of March 2011)
“Agribusiness Development Teams” in several provinces to help Afghan farmers with water
management, soil enhancement, crop cultivation, and improving the development and marketing
of their goods.
U.S. strategy has addressed not only crop choice but also trying to construct the entirety of the
infrastructure needed for a healthy legitimate agriculture sector, including road building, security
of the routes to agriculture markets, refrigeration, storage, transit through Pakistan and other
transportation of produce, building legitimate sources of financing, and other aspects of the
industry. U.S. officials in Kabul say that Pakistan’s restrictions on trade between Afghanistan and
India had prevented a rapid expansion of Afghan pomegranate exports to that market, but the
transit trade agreement between Afghanistan and Pakistan, discussed above, is expected to
alleviate some of these bottlenecks. Dubai is another customer for Afghan pomegranate exports.
There is a vibrant timber industry in the northeast provinces. However, the exports are illegal. De-
forestation has been outlawed because of the potential for soil erosion and other economic and
environmental effects.
In terms of specific programming, USAID has a $150 million program for the relatively safe
areas of Afghanistan to continue to develop licit crops. The Incentives Driving Economic
Alternatives for the North, East, and West (IDEA-NEW) program is planned to run through
FY2014. In southern and eastern areas of the country where counterinsurgency operations are
ongoing, USAID’s $474 million Afghanistan Vouchers for Increased Production in Agriculture
(AVIPA-Plus) program is scheduled to run through FY2011 and includes initiatives coordinated
with U.S. counterinsurgency operations in Helmand and Qandahar provinces. The program
provides vouchers for wheat seed, fertilizer, and tools, in addition to supporting cash for work
programs and small grants to local cooperatives.

65 Lemmon, Gayle Tzemach. “New Hope for Afghan Raisin Farmers.” New York Times, October 9, 2010.
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Telecommunications
Several Afghan telecommunications firms have been formed. With startup funds from the Agha
Khan Foundation (the Agha Khan is leader of the Isma’ili community, which is prevalent in
northern Afghanistan), the highly successful Roshan cellphone company was founded. Another
Afghan cellphone firm is Afghan Wireless. The most significant post-Taliban media network is
Tolo Television, owned by Moby Media. U.S. funds are being used to supplement the private
investment; a $4 million U.S. grant, in partnership with the Asia Consultancy Group, is being
used to construct communication towers in Bamiyan and Ghor provinces. The Afghan
government says it plans to link all major cities by fiber optic cable by the end of 2011.
Airlines
The 52-year-old national airline, Ariana, is said to be in significant financial trouble due to
corruption that has affected its safety ratings and left it unable to service a heavy debt load.
However, there are new privately run airlines, such as Safi Air (run by the Safi Group, which has
built a modern mall in Kabul), and Kam Air. Another, Pamir, was ordered closed in 2010 due to
safety concerns.
Mining and Gems
Afghanistan’s mining sector has been largely dormant since the Soviet invasion. Some Afghan
leaders complain that not enough has been done to revive such potentially lucrative industries as
minerals mining, such as of copper and lapis lazuli (a stone used in jewelry). The issue became
more urgent in June 2010 when a Defense Department development team announced, based on
surveys, that Afghanistan may have untapped minerals worth over $1 trillion.66 General Petraeus,
in an interview with NBC News on August 15, 2010, said the amount could be in the “trillions.
Although copper and iron are the largest categories by value, there are believed to also be
significant reserves of such minerals as lithium in western Afghanistan—lithium is crucial to the
new batteries being used to power electric automobiles.
As noted above, a major project, signed in November 2007, is with China Metallurgical Group
for the company to invest $3.0 billion to develop Afghanistan’s Aynak copper field in Lowgar
Province. The agreement, viewed as generous to the point where it might not be commercially
profitable for China Metallurgical Group, includes construction of two coal-fired electric power
plant (one of which will supply more electricity to Kabul city); a segment of railway (discussed
above); and a road from the project to Kabul. Work on the mine reportedly has been slowed by
various factors, including the need to clear mines in the area and to excavate ancient artifacts that
the Afghan government seeks to preserve. Actual digging at the mine is expected to begin in mid-
2012. U.S. forces do not directly protect the project, but U.S. forces have set up small bases on
some of the roads leading to the mine project to provide general stability there.
On December 14, 2010, with involvement of the DOD Task Force for Business and Stability
Operations, 10 outside investors announced $50 million in investment in a gold mine in Baghlan
Province. There is another gold mine operating in neighboring Takhar Province. Bids are being
accepted for another large mining project, the Haji Gak iron ore mine (which may contain 60

66 Risen, James. “U.S. Identifies Mineral Riches in Afghanistan.” New York Times, June 14, 2010.
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billion tons of iron ore) near Kabul. China Metallurgy, as well as companies from India, are said
to be finalists for the project.
Oil, Gas, and Related Pipelines
Afghanistan has no hydrocarbons energy export industry and a small refining sector that provides
some of Afghanistan’s needs for gasoline or other fuels. Almost all of Afghanistan’s fuel comes
from neighboring states. As noted, Afghanistan has had virtually no operational hydrocarbon
energy sector. However, Afghanistan’s prospects in this sector appeared to brighten by the
announcement in March 2006 of an estimated 3.6 billion barrels of oil and 36.5 trillion cubic feet
of gas reserves. Experts believe these amounts, if proved, could make Afghanistan relatively self-
sufficient in energy and able to export energy to its neighbors. In a major development, on
December 15, 2010, the Afghan government let a six-month contract to a local firm, Ghazanfar
Neft Gas, to collect and market crude oil from the Angot field in northern Afghanistan (part of a
field that may contain 80 million barrels of oil), initially producing at the low rate of 800 barrels
per day. However, the sector is expected to expand to more fields in the Amu Darya basin
(northern Afghanistan), and a tender will be offered to develop a larger oil field in Balkh Province
(Kasha Kari bloc), estimated to hold 1.8 billion barrels of oil. Separately, USAID is funding a test
project to develop gas resources in northern Afghanistan.
TAPI (Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India) Gas Pipeline Project. Another major energy
project remains under consideration. During 1996-1998, the Clinton Administration supported
proposed natural gas and oil pipelines through western Afghanistan as an incentive for the
warring factions to cooperate. A consortium led by Los Angeles-based Unocal Corporation
proposed a $7.5 billion Central Asia Gas Pipeline that would originate in southern Turkmenistan
and pass through Afghanistan to Pakistan, with possible extensions into India.67 The deterioration
in U.S.-Taliban relations after 1998 suspended hopes for the pipeline projects, but prospects for
the project improved in the post-Taliban period. In a summit meeting in late May 2002 between
the leaders of Turkmenistan, Afghanistan, and Pakistan, the three countries agreed to revive the
project. Sponsors held an inaugural meeting on July 9, 2002, in Turkmenistan, signing a series of
preliminary agreements. On December 12, 2010, in the Turkmenistan capital Ashkabad, the
relevant leaders reaffirmed their intent to complete the project Disagreements remain over the
proportion of gas supplied to the line by individual countries, and over pricing, but Afghan
officials say the Asian Development Bank has agreed to finance the project, removing what had
been a major hurdle. U.S. officials view this project as a superior alternative to a proposed gas
pipeline from Iran to India, transiting Pakistan.
Trade Promotion/Reconstruction Opportunity Zones
As noted above, the United States is trying to build on Afghanistan’s post-war economic
rebound—and ensure continued economic progress during and after the security transition—with
trade promotion initiatives. The United States is doing so by promoting regional economic
integration, discussed above, as well as through bilateral economic agreements with Afghanistan.

67 Other participants in the Unocal consortium include Delta of Saudi Arabia, Hyundai of South Korea, Crescent Steel
of Pakistan, Itochu Corporation and INPEX of Japan, and the government of Turkmenistan. Some accounts say
Russia’s Gazprom would probably receive a stake in the project. Nezavisimaya Gazeta (Moscow), October 30, 1997,
p. 3.
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In September 2004, the United States and Afghanistan signed a bilateral trade and investment
framework agreement (TIFA). These agreements are generally seen as a prelude to a broader and
more complex bilateral free trade agreement, but negotiations on an FTA have not yet begun. On
December 13, 2004, the 148 countries of the World Trade Organization voted to start membership
talks with Afghanistan.
USAID is funding a five year project ($63 million total during 2010-2014) to simplify the
customs clearance process. This includes new import procedures that have reduced the time
needed for imports to clear customs by 45%.
Another initiative supported by the United States is the establishment of joint Afghan-Pakistani
“Reconstruction Opportunity Zones” (ROZ’s) which would be modeled after “Qualified
Industrial Zones” run by Israel and Jordan in which goods produced in the zones receive duty free
treatment for import into the United States. For FY2008, $5 million in supplemental funding was
requested to support the zones, but P.L. 110-252 did not specifically mention the zones.
Bills in the 110th Congress, S. 2776 and H.R. 6387, would have authorized the President to
proclaim duty-free treatment for imports from ROZ’s to be designated by the President. In the
111th Congress, a version of these bills was introduced (S. 496 and H.R. 1318). President Obama
specifically endorsed passage of these bills in his March 2009 strategy announcement. H.R. 1318
was incorporated into H.R. 1886, a Pakistan aid appropriation that is a component of the new
U.S. strategy for the region, and the bill was passed by the House on June 11, 2009, and then
appended to H.R. 2410. However, another version of the Pakistan aid bill, S. 1707, did not
authorize ROZ’s; it was passed and became law (P.L. 111-73).
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Table 10. Major Non-U.S. Donors to Afghanistan 2002-2011
(in $ millions)
Japan
3,150
European Union
2,880
Asian Development Bank
2,270
Britain 2,220
World Bank
2,140
Germany 2,130
India 1,515
Canada 1,255
Netherlands
775
Norway 745
Australia 645
Italy 645
Sweden 635
United Nations
445
Denmark 435
Iran 400
France 320
Spain 220
Turkey 210
Finland 160
Russia 150
Saudi Arabia
140
China 140
UAE 135
Switzerland 120
South Korea
115
Czech Republic
105
Total
$24,900
(includes donors of under
(of which $19,700 disbursed
$100 million, not listed)
– about 80%)
Notes and Source: Afghanistan Ministry of Finance: Development Cooperation Report, 2010. Released July
2011. Table includes donors of over $100 million only.

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Table 11. U.S. Assistance to Afghanistan, FY1978-FY1998
($ in millions)
Fiscal
Devel.
Econ. Supp.
P.L. 480 (Title I
Other (Incl. Regional
Year
Assist.
(ESF)
and II)
Military
Refugee Aid)
Total
1978 4.989 —
5.742 0.269
0.789 11.789
1979 3.074 —
7.195 —
0.347 10.616
1980

(Soviet invasion-December 1979)


1981 — —
— —


1982 — —
— —


1983 — —
— —


1984 — —
— —


1985 3.369 —



3.369
1986 — —
8.9 —

8.9
1987
17.8
12.1 2.6 —
— 32.5
1988 22.5 22.5 29.9 —

74.9
1989 22.5 22.5 32.6 —

77.6
1990 35.0 35.0 18.1 —

88.1
1991 30.0 30.0 20.1 —

80.1
1992 25.0 25.0 31.4 —

81.4
1993 10.0 10.0 18.0 —
30.2 68.2
1994 3.4 2.0
9.0 —
27.9 42.3
1995 1.8 —
12.4 —
31.6 45.8
1996 — — 16.1 —
26.4 42.5
1997 — — 18.0 —
31.9a 49.9
1998 — —
3.6 —
49.14b 52.74
Source: Department of State.
a. Includes $3 million for demining and $1.2 million for counternarcotics.
b. Includes $3.3 million in projects targeted for Afghan women and girls, $7 million in earthquake relief aid,
100,000 tons of 416B wheat worth about $15 million, $2 million for demining, and $1.54 for
counternarcotics.
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Table 12. U.S. Assistance to Afghanistan, FY1999-FY2002
($ in millions)

FY1999 FY2000 FY2001
FY2002
(Final)
U.S. Department of
42.0 worth of
68.875 for 165,000
131.1 (300,000
198.12 (for food
Agriculture (DOA) and
wheat (100,000
metric tons.
metric tons under
commodities)
USAID Food For Peace
metric tons under
(60,000 tons for
P.L. 480, Title II,
(FFP), via World Food
“416(b)” program.)
May 2000 drought
and 416(b))
Program(WFP)
relief)
State/Bureau of
16.95 for Afghan
14.03 for the same
22.03 for similar
136.54 (to U.N.
Population, Refugees and
refugees in Pakistan
purposes
purposes
agencies)
Migration (PRM) via
and Iran, and to
UNHCR and ICRC
assist their
repatriation
State Department/
7.0 to various
6.68 for drought
18.934 for similar
113.36 (to various
Office of Foreign
NGOs to aid
relief and health,
programs
U.N. agencies and
Disaster Assistance
Afghans inside
water, and
NGOs)
(OFDA)
Afghanistan sanitation programs
State Department/HDP
2.615
3.0
2.8
7.0 to Halo
(Humanitarian Demining
Trust/other demining
Program)
Aid to Afghan Refugees
5.44 (2.789 for
6.169, of which
5.31 for similar

in Pakistan (through
health, training—
$3.82 went to
purposes
various NGOs)
Afghan females in
similar purposes
Pakistan)
Counter-Narcotics

1.50
63.0
USAID/Office of

0.45
(Afghan
24.35 for
Transition Initiatives
women in
broadcasting/media
Pakistan)
Department of Defense



50.9 ( 2.4 million
rations)
Foreign Military



57.0 (for Afghan
Financing
national army)
Anti-Terrorism



36.4
Economic Support Funds


105.2
(E.S.F)
Peacekeeping


24.0
Totals
76.6
113.2
182.6
815.9
Source: CRS.
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Table 13. U.S. Assistance to Afghanistan, FY2003
($ in millions; same acronyms as Table 12)
FY2003 Foreign Aid Appropriations (P.L. 108-7)
Development/Health 90
P.L. 480 Title II (Food Aid)
47
Peacekeeping 10
Disaster Relief
94
ESF
50
Non-Proliferation, De-mining, Anti-Terrorism (NADR)
5
Refugee Relief
55
Afghan National Army (ANA) train and equip (FMF)
21
Total from this law
372
FY2003 Supplemental (P.L. 108-11)
Road Construction (ESF, Kabul-Qandahar road)
100
Provincial Reconstruction Teams (ESF)
10
Afghan government support (ESF)
57
ANA train and equip (FMF)
170
Anti-terrorism/de-mining
28
(NADR, some for Karzai protection)
Total from this law
365
Total for FY2003
737
Source: CRS.
Note: Earmarks for programs benefitting women and girls totaled $65 million. Of that amount, $60 million was
earmarked in the supplemental and $5 million in the regular appropriation.
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Table 14. U.S. Assistance to Afghanistan, FY2004
($ in millions, same acronyms as previous tables)
Afghan National Police (FMF)
160
Counter-Narcotics
125.52
Afghan National Army (FMF)
719.38
Presidential Protection (NADR)
52.14
DDR Program (disarming militias)
15.42
MANPAD destruction
1.5
Terrorist Interdiction Program
0.41
Border Control (WMD)
0.23
Good Governance Program
113.57
Political Competition, Consensus Building
24.41
(Elections)
Rule of Law and Human Rights
29.4
Roads
348.68
Education/Schools 104.11
Health/Clinics 76.85
Power
85.13
PRTs
57.4
CERP (DOD funds to build good will)
39.71
Private Sector Development/Economic Growth
63.46
Water Projects
28.9
Agriculture 50.5
Refugee/IDPs 82.6
Food Assistance
88.25
De-mining 12.61
State/USAID Program Support
203.02
Total Aid for FY2004
2,483.2
Laws Derived: FY2004 supplemental (P.L. 108-106); FY2004 regular appropriation (P.L. 108-
199). Regular appropriation earmarked $5 million for programs benefitting women and girls.
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Table 15. U.S. Assistance to Afghanistan, FY2005
($ in millions)
Afghan National Police (State Department funds, FMF, and DOD funds,
624.46
transition to DOD funds to Afghan security forces
Counter-Narcotics 775.31
Afghan National Army (State Department funds, FMF, and DOD funds)
1,633.24
Presidential (Karzai) Protection (NADR funds)
23.10
DDR
5.0
Detainee Operations
16.9
MANPAD Destruction
0.75
Smal Arms Control
3.0
Terrorist Interdiction Program
0.1
Border Control (WMD)
0.85
Good Governance
137.49
Political Competition/Consensus-Building/Election Support
15.75
Rule of Law and Human Rights
20.98
Roads
334.1
Afghan-Tajik (Nizhny Panj) Bridge
33.1
Education/Schools 89.63
Health/Clinics 107.4
Power
222.5
PRTs
97.0
CERP
136.0
Civil Aviation (Kabul International Airport)
25.0
Private Sector Development/Economic Growth
77.43
Water Projects
43.2
Agriculture 74.49
Refugee/IDP Assistance
54.6
Food Assistance (P.L. 480, Title II)
108.6
Demining
23.7
State/USAID Program Support
142.84
Total Aid for FY2005
4,826.52
Laws Derived: FY2005 Regular Appropriations (P.L. 108-447); Second FY2005 Supplemental
(P.L. 109-13). The regular appropriation earmarked $50 million to be used for programs to
benefit women and girls.
Source: CRS.
Note: In FY2005, funds to equip and train the Afghan national security forces was altered from State
Department funds (Foreign Military Financing, FMF) to DOD funds.
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Table 16. U.S. Assistance to Afghanistan, FY2006
($ in millions)
Afghan National Police (DOD funds)
1,217.5
Counter-narcotics
419.26
Afghan National Army (DOD funds)
735.98
Presidential (Karzai) protection (NADR funds)
18.17
Detainee Operations
14.13
Smal Arms Control
2.84
Terrorist Interdiction
.10
Counter-terrorism Finance
.28
Border Control (WMD)
.40
Bilateral Debt Relief
11.0
Budgetary Support to the Government of Afghanistan
1.69
Good Governance
10.55
Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund
47.5
Political Competition/Consensus Building/Elections
1.35
Civil Society
7.77
Rule of Law and Human Rights
29.95
Roads
235.95
Education/Schools 49.48
Health/Clinics 51.46
Power
61.14
PRTs
20.0
CERP Funds (DOD)
215.0
Private Sector Development/Economic Growth
45.51
Water Projects
.89
Agriculture 26.92
Food Assistance
109.6
De-mining 14.32
Refugee/IDP aid
36.0
State/USAID program support
142.42
Total 3,527.16
Laws Derived: FY2006 Regular Foreign Aid Appropriations (P.L. 109-102); FY06 supplemental
(P.L. 109-234). The regular appropriation earmarked $50 million for programs to benefit
women and girls.
Source: CRS.
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Table 17. U.S. Assistance to Afghanistan, FY2007
($ in millions)
Afghan National Police (DOD funds)
2,523.30
Afghan National Army (DOD funds)
4,871.59
Counter-Narcotics
737.15
Presidential (Karzai) Protection (NADR)
19.9
Detainee Operations
12.7
Smal Arms Control
1.75
Terrorist Interdiction Program
0.5
Counter-Terrorism Finance
0.4
Border Control (WMD)
0.5
Budget Support to Afghan Government
31.24
Good Governance
107.25
Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund (incl. National
63
Solidarity Program)
Political Competition/Election support (ESF)
29.9
Civil Society (ESF)
8.1
Rule of Law/Human Rights (ESF)
65.05
Roads (ESF)
303.1
Education/Schools (ESF)
62.75
Health/Clinics 112.77
Power (ESF)
194.8
PRTs (ESF)
126.1
CERP (DOD funds)
206
Private Sector Development/Economic Growth
70.56
Water Projects (ESF)
2.3
Agriculture (ESF)
67.03
Refugee/IDP Assistance
72.61
Food Assistance
150.9
Demining 27.82
State/USAID Program Support
88.7
Total 9,984.98
Laws Derived: Regular Appropriation P.L. 110-5; DOD Appropriation P.L. 109-289; and
FY2007 Supplemental Appropriation P.L. 110-28. The regular appropriation earmarked $50
million for programs to benefit women/ girls. Providing ESF in excess of $300 million subject
to certification of Afghan cooperation on counter-narcotics.
Sources: CRS; Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, October 2008 report.
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Table 18. U.S. Assistance to Afghanistan, FY2008
(appropriated; $ in millions)
Afghan National Army (DOD funds)
1,724.68
Afghan National Police (DOD funds)
1,017.38
Counter-Narcotics (INCLE and DOD funds)
619.47
NADR (Karzai protection)
6.29
Radio Free Afghanistan
3.98
Detainee operations
9.6
Smal Arms Control
3.0
Terrorist Interdiction Program
.99
Counter-Terrorism Finance
.60
Border Control (WMD)
.75
Commanders Emergency Response Program (CERP, DOD
269.4
funds)
Direct Support to Afghan Government
49.61
Good Governance
245.08
Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund (incl. National
45.0
Solidarity program)
Election Support
90.0
Civil Society Building
4.01
Rule of Law and Human Rights
125.28
Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction
2.0
(SIGAR)
Roads
324.18
Education/Schools 99.09
Health/Clinics 114.04
Power (incl. Kajaki Dam rehabilitation work)
236.81
PRT programs
75.06
Economic Growth/Private Sector Development
63.06
Water Projects
16.4q
Agriculture 34.44
Refugee/IDP Assistance
42.1
Food Aid
101.83
De-Mining 15.0
State/USAID Program Support
317.4
Total 5,656.53
Appropriations Laws Derived: Regular FY2008 (P.L. 110-161); FY2008 Supplemental (P.L.
110-252). The regular appropriation earmarked $75 million for programs to benefit woman
and girls. ESF over $300 million subject to narcotics cooperation certification.
Sources: Special Inspector General Afghanistan Reconstruction, October 2008 report; CRS.
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Table 19. U.S. Assistance to Afghanistan, FY2009
($ in millions)
Regular
Bridge
FY2009
Appropriation
Supplemental
Supplemental

(P.L. 111-8)
(P.L. 110-252)
(P.L. 111-32)
Total
ANSF
Funding
2,000 3,607
5,607
CERP (DOD funds)

683

683
Detainee ops (DOD)

4

4
Counternarcotics (C-N) (DOD)
24
150
57
232
C-N
(DEA)
19
19
C-N—Alternative. Livelihoods (INCLE)
100
70
87
257
C-N—Eradication, Interdiction (INCLE)
178
14
17
209
IMET
1.4
1.4
ARTF (Incl. National Solidarity Program)
45
20
85
150
Governance building
100
68
115
283
Civil Society promotion
8
4

12
Election
Support
93 56 25
174
Strategic Program Development


50
50
Rule of Law Programs (USAID)
8
15
20
43
Rule of Law (INCLE)
34
55
80
169
Roads (ESF)
74
65

139
Power (ESF)
73
61

134
Agriculture (ESF and DA)
25

85
110
PRTs/Local Governance (ESF)
74
55
159
288
Education 88
6

94
Health 61
27

88
Econ Growth/”Cash for Work”
49
37
220
306
Water, Environment, Victims Comp.
31
3

34
Karzai Protection (NADR)
32

12
44
Food Aid (P.L. 480, Food for Peace)
14
44

58
Migration, Refugee Aid

50
7
57
State Ops/Embassy Construction
308
131
450
889
USAID Programs and Ops
18
2
165
185
State/USAID IG/SIGAR
3
11
7
20
Cultural Exchanges, International Orgs
6
10

16
Totals
1,463 3,640 5,248
10,352
Notes: P.L. 111-32 (FY2009 supplemental): provides requested funds, earmarks $70 million for National
Solidarity Program; $150 million for women and girls (all of FY2009); ESF over $200 million subject to narcotics
certification; 10% of supplemental INCLE subject to certification of Afghan government moves to curb human
rights abuses, drug involvement.
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Table 20. FY2010 Assistance (Includes Supplemental)
($ in millions)
Afghan Security Forces Funding (DOD funds)
9,162 (6,563 appropriated plus 2,600
supplemental request)
CERP (DOD funds)
1,000
Counternarcotics (DOD)
361
INCLE: all functions: interdiction, rule of law,
620 (420 regular approp. plus 200
alternative livelihoods
supplemental request)
IMET
1.5
Global Health/Child Survival
92.3
Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund (Incl.
200
National Solidarity Program) (ESF)
Governance building (ESF)
191
Civil Society promotion (ESF)
10
Election Support (ESF)
90
Strategic Program Development (ESF)
100
USAID Rule of Law Programs (ESF)
50
Roads (ESF)
230
Power (ESF)
230
Agriculture (ESF)
230
PRT programs/Local governance (ESF)
251
Education (ESF)
95
Health (ESF)
102
Econ Growth/”Cash for Work” (ESF)
274
Water, Environment, Victim Comp. (ESF)
15
Karzai Protection (NADR)
58
Food Aid (P.L. 480, Food for Peace)
16
Refugees and Migration
11
State Ops/Embassy Construction
697 (486 regular plus 211 supplemental)
Cultural Exchanges
6
SIGAR
37 (23 regular plus 14 supp request)
FY2010 supplemental ESF request (for ESF
1,576
programs above)
Total Appropriated (Incl. Supplemental)
15,700
Laws derived: FY2010 foreign aid appropriation in Consolidated Appropriation (P.L. 111-117),
which earmarks: $175 million (ESF and INCLE) for programs for women and girls, and $175
mil ion (ESF) for the National Solidarity Program. The FY2010 Defense Appropriation (P.L.
111-118), which cut $900 million from the requested amount for the ANSF (regular defense
appropriation). FY2010 supplemental funds appropriated by H.R. 4899 (P.L. 111-212)
Source: CRS.
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Table 21. FY2011
($ in millions)
Request/Enacted in April
Program/Area
2011 Budget Agreement
Afghan National Security Forces (DOD funds)
11,620
(enacted, as requested)
CERP
400
Afghanistan Infrastructure Fund (DoD funds)
400
Business Stability Task Force (DoD funds)
150
DoD Counternarcotics
333
Economic Support Funds (ESF)
1,967
(of 3,316 requested)
Refugee Accounts
65
Food Aid
15
Global Health/ Child Survival
70
International Disaster Assistance
30
INCLE
400
Karzai Protection (NADR funds)
69.3
IMET
1.5
State Department Operations (not incl. security)
754
SIGAR
24
Total Request
16,303
Budget agreement is H.R. 1473. The Administration requested to authorize an “Afghanistan
Infrastructure Fund,” to contain mostly DOD funds, beginning with $400 million in FY2011,
was authorized in H.R. 6523, the National Defense Authorization Act for FY2011, P.L. 111-
383). Funds were appropriated. The fund will be used mostly for electricity projects, including
an ongoing major electricity project for Qandahar, but could be used for other infrastructure
projects later on, such as roads.

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Table 22. FY2012 Request
($ in millions)
Program/Area Request
ANSF Funding
12,800
Economic Support Funds
2,804
(incl.: $227 m for health, $115 m for education, $790 m
(of which 1,216 is Overseas
for “good governance,”$185 m for agriculture, $66 m for
Contingency Operations
“private sector competitiveness”)
funding)
Health and Child Survival (State)
0.5
Health and Child Survival (USAID)
0.5
Food For Peace Title II
15.5
INCLE (counter-narcotics, rule of law)
324
NADR funds (Karzai protection, explosives removal,
66.2
counter-terrorism)
IMET
2.4
Diplomatic and Consular (embassy construction,
758
personnel)
Diplomatic and Consular (security)
190
SIGAR
44
CERP (regular)
400
CERP (contribution to Afghan Infrastructure Fund)
500
CERP (Taskforce for Business)
150
Total
18,050
Figures do not include about $100 billion in U.S. military operations costs

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Table 23. Total Obligations for Major Programs: FY2001-FY2010
($ in millions. Source: USAID and CRS calculations)
Security Related Programs (mostly DOD funds)
Afghan National Security Forces (incl. FMF, and DoD ANSFF)
40506
Commander Emergency Response Program (CERP)
3039
Karzai Protection (NADR funds)
440
Counter-Narcotics (INCLE, DOD, DEA)
5227
Other, incl de-mining operations (Halo Trust, other contractors)
146
International Military Education and Training Funds (IMET)
9.8
Other DoD: AFSA defense article drawdown (540), Infrastructure Fund (400),
1547
Business Task Force (150)
Humanitarian-Related Programs
Food Aid (USDA and USAID: P.L. 480 Title 1 and II; Food for Progress, 416(b),
994
Food for Education)
Migration and Refugee aid (including emergency)
690
Debt Relief for Afghan government
11
Disaster Relief (IDA)
406
USAID Development Funding: Economic Support Funds (ESF) and
Total: 15,900+
Development Assistance (DA)
Afghan government budget support
423
Democracy (Including election support)
1775
Afghan Reconstruction Trust Fund (for National Solidarity Program, etc)
1909
(about 500 for NSP)
Rule of Law and Human Rights (incl. some INCLE funds)
935
Roads
2280
Power/Electricity
1453
Education
782
Health Sector
932
Water
88
Agriculture
1192
PRT projects (development and local governance)
1692
Private Sector Development/Econ. Growth (incl cash-for-work)
1406
Alternative Development/Livelihoods
1186
Embassy Operations, Construction, Aid Oversight
3,721
Other Aid:

Child Survival and Health
556
Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC)
26
Treasury Technical Assistance
3.5
USAID (other)
31
Total (including minor amounts not included in table)
73,255
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Table 24. NATO/ISAF Contributing Nations
(as of September 9, 2011)
NATO Countries
Non-NATO Partners
Belgium 521
Albania 286
Bulgaria 602
Armenia 126
Canada 520*
Austria 3
Czech Republic
622
Australia
1550
Denmark 750
Azerbaijan 94
Estonia 159
Bosnia-Herzegovina
55
France 3935
Croatia 317
Germany 4998
Finland
156
Greece 158
Georgia 937
Hungary 433
Ireland
7
Iceland 4
Jordan 0
Italy 3918
Macedonia
163
Latvia 173
Malaysia 46
Lithuania 235
Mongolia 114
Luxemburg 10
Montenegro 36
Netherlands 183
New
Zealand 188
Norway 428
Singapore 38
Poland
2580
South Korea
350
Portugal 140
Sweden 500
Romania 1948
Ukraine
23
Slovakia
309
United Arab Emirates
35
Slovenia 78
Tonga 55
Spain 1523


Turkey 1840


United Kingdom
9500


United States
90000


Total Listed ISAF: 130,670

Source: http://www.isaf.nato.int/images/stories/File/Placemats/16%20August%202011%20Placemat.pdf
Note: As noted elsewhere in this report, U.S. force totals in Afghanistan (including those not under
NATO/ISAF) are approximately 98,000. In addition, the NATO/ISAF site states that troop numbers in this table
are based on broad contribution and do not necessarily reflect the exact numbers on the ground at any one
time. Kazakhstan announced in May 2011that it would send 4 non-combat officers to join ISAF. *ISAF figures
now reflect Canada combat troop pullout in July-August 2011; numbers listed are to train the ANSF. Numbers in
the table for the United States may not reflect the start of a U.S. drawdown in July 2011.

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Table 25. Provincial Reconstruction Teams
Location (City)
Province/Command
U.S.-Lead (all under ISAF banner)
1. Gardez
Paktia Province (RC-East, E)
2. Ghazni
Ghazni (RC-E). with Poland.
3. Jalalabad
Nangarhar (RC-E)
4. Khost
Khost (RC-E)
5. Qalat
Zabol (RC-South, S). with Romania.
6. Asadabad
Kunar (RC-E)
7. Sharana
Paktika (RC-E). with Poland.
8. Mehtarlam
Laghman (RC-E)
9. Jabal o-Saraj
Panjshir Province (RC-E), State Department lead
10. Qala Gush
Nuristan (RC-E)
11. Farah
Farah (RC-SW)
Partner Lead (most under ISAF banner)
PRT Location
Province
Lead Force/Other forces
12. Qandahar
Qandahar (RC-S)
Canada (seat of RC-S)
13. Lashkar Gah
Helmand (RC-S)
Britain. with Denmark and Estonia
14. Tarin Kowt
Uruzgan (RC-S)
Australia (and U.S.) (Replaced Netherlands in August 2010)
15. Herat
Herat (RC-W)
Italy (seat of RC-W)
16. Qalah-ye Now
Badghis (RC-W)
Spain
17. Mazar-e-Sharif
Balkh (RC-N)
Sweden
18. Konduz
Konduz (RC-N)
Germany (seat of RC-N)
29. Faizabad
Badakhshan (RC-N)
Germany. with Denmark, Czech Rep.
20. Meymaneh
Faryab (RC-N)
Norway. with Sweden.
21. Chaghcharan
Ghowr (RC-W)
Lithuania. with Denmark, U.S., Iceland
22. Pol-e-Khomri
Baghlan (RC-N)
Hungary
23. Bamiyan
Bamiyan (RC-E)
New Zealand (not NATO/ISAF).
24. Maidan Shahr
Wardak (RC-C)
Turkey
25. Pul-i-Alam
Lowgar (RC-E)
Czech Republic
26. Shebergan
Jowzjan (RC-N)
Turkey
27. Charikar
Parwan (RC-E)
South Korea (Bagram, in Parwan Province, is the base of RC-E)
Note: RC = Regional Command.

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Table 26. Major Factions/Leaders in Afghanistan
Party/
Ideology/

Leader Leader
Ethnicity Regional
Base
Taliban
Mullah (Islamic cleric) Muhammad Umar (still at large
Ultra-
Insurgent
possibly in Afghanistan. Umar, born in Tarin Kowt, Uruzgan
orthodox
groups, mostly
province, is about 65 years old.
Islamic,
in the south and
Pashtun
east.
Haqqani
Jalaludin Haqqani. Allied with Taliban and Al Qaeda. Said to
Same
as
Paktia, Paktika,
Network
be heavily influenced by elements within Pakistani military
above
Khost, Kabul
intelligence.
Islamic Society Burhannudin Rabbani/ Yunus Qanooni (speaker of lower
Moderate Much of
(leader of
house)/Muhammad Fahim/Dr. Abdul ah Abdul ah (Foreign
Islamic,
northern and
“Northern
Minister 2001-2006). Ismail Khan, a so-called “warlord,”
mostly Tajik western
Alliance”)
heads faction of the grouping in Herat area. Khan, now
Afghanistan,
Minister of Energy and Water, visited United States in March
including Kabul
2008 to sign USAID grant for energy projects.
National
Abdul Rashid Dostam. During OEF, impressed U.S.
Secular,
Jowzjan, Balkh,
Islamic
commanders with horse-mounted assaults on Taliban
Uzbek
Faryab, Sar-i-Pol,
Movement of
positions at Shulgara Dam, south of Mazar-e-Sharif, leading
and Samangan
Afghanistan
to the fall of that city and the Taliban’s subsequent collapse.
provinces.
Was Karzai rival in October 2004 presidential election, then
his top “security adviser.”
Hizb-e-
Composed of Shiite Hazara tribes from central Afghanistan.
Shiite,
Bamiyan, Ghazni,
Wahdat
Karim Khalili is Vice President, but Mohammad Mohaqiq is
Hazara
Dai Kundi
Karzai rival in 2004 presidential election and parliament.
tribes
province
General y pro-Iranian. Was part of Rabbani 1992-1996
government, and fought unsuccessfully with Taliban over
Bamiyan city. Still revered by Hazara Shiites is the former
leader of the group, Abdul Ali Mazari, who was captured and
killed by the Taliban in March 1995.
Pashtun
Various regional governors and local leaders in the east and
Moderate Dominant in the
Leaders
south; central government led by Hamid Karzai.
Islamic,
south and east
Pashtun
Hizb-e-Islam
Mujahedin party leader Gulbuddin Hikmatyar. Was part of
Orthodox Small groups in
Gulbuddin
Soviet-era U.S.-backed “Afghan Interim Government” based
Islamic,
Nangarhar,
(HIG)
in Peshawar, Pakistan. Was nominal “prime minister” in
Pashtun
Nuristan, and
1992-1996 mujahedin government but never actual y took
Kunar provinces
office. Lost power base around Jalalabad to the Taliban in
1994, and fled to Iran before being expelled in 2002. Still
allied with Taliban and Al Qaeda in operations east of Kabul,
but open to ending militant activity. Leader of a rival Hizb-e-
Islam faction, Yunus Khalis, the mentor of Mul ah Umar, died
July 2006.
Islamic Union
Abd-I-Rab Rasul Sayyaf. Islamic conservative, leads a pro-
orthodox Paghman
Karzai faction in parliament. Lived many years in and
Islamic,
(west of Kabul)
politically close to Saudi Arabia, which shares his “Wahhabi”
Pashtun
ideology. During anti-Soviet war, Sayyaf’s faction, with
Hikmatyar, was a principal recipient of U.S. weaponry.
Criticized the U.S.-led war against Saddam Hussein after
Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait.
Source: CRS.
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Residual Issues from Past Conflicts
A few issues remain unresolved from Afghanistan’s many years of conflict, such as Stinger
retrieval and mine eradication.
Stinger Retrieval
Beginning in late 1985 following internal debate, the Reagan Administration provided about
2,000 man-portable “Stinger” anti-aircraft missiles to the mujahedin for use against Soviet
aircraft. Prior to the ouster of the Taliban, common estimates suggested that 200-300 Stingers
remained at large, although more recent estimates put the number below 100.68 The Stinger issue
resurfaced in conjunction with 2001 U.S. war effort, when U.S. pilots reported that the Taliban
fired some Stingers at U.S. aircraft. No hits were reported. The danger of these weapons has
become apparent on several past occasions. Iran bought 16 of the missiles in 1987 and fired one
against U.S. helicopters in the Persian Gulf. India claimed that it was a Stinger supplied to
Islamic rebels in Kashmir by sympathizers in Afghanistan, that shot down an Indian helicopter
over Kashmir in May 1999.69 Soviet-made SA-7 “Strella” man-portable launchers, which
allegedly have been used in the past by Al Qaeda, including against an Israeli passenger jet in
Kenya on November 30, 2002, were discovered in Afghanistan by U.S. forces in December 2002.
In 1992, after the fall of the Russian-backed government of Najibullah, the United States
reportedly spent about $10 million to buy the Stingers back, at a premium, from individual
mujahedin commanders. The New York Times reported on July 24, 1993, that the buy back effort
failed because the United States was competing with other buyers, including Iran and North
Korea, and that the CIA would spend about $55 million in FY1994 in a renewed effort. On March
7, 1994, the Washington Post reported that the CIA had recovered only about 50 or 100 at-large
Stingers. In February 2002, the Afghan government found and turned over to the United States
“dozens” of Stingers.70 In January 2005, Afghan intelligence began buying Stingers back, at a
reported cost of $150,000 each.71 Any Stingers that remain in Afghanistan likely pose little threat,
in part because of deteriorating components. No recent uses are reported.
Mine Eradication
Land mines laid during the Soviet occupation constitute one of the principal dangers to the
Afghan people. The United Nations estimates that 5 million to 7 million mines remain scattered
throughout the country, although some estimates are lower. U.N. teams have destroyed one
million mines and are now focusing on de-mining priority-use, residential and commercial
property, including lands around Kabul. Amounts contributed by the United States to the de-
mining effort are shown in the tables above. Most of the funds have gone to HALO Trust, a
British organization, and the U.N. Mine Action Program for Afghanistan. The Afghanistan
Compact adopted in London in February 2006 states that by 2010, the goal should be to reduce
the land area of Afghanistan contaminated by mines by 70%.

68 Saleem, Farrukh. “Where Are the Missing Stinger Missiles? Pakistan,” Friday Times. August 17-23, 2001.
69 “U.S.-Made Stinger Missiles—Mobile and Lethal.” Reuters, May 28, 1999.
70 Fullerton, John. “Afghan Authorities Hand in Stinger Missiles to U.S.” Reuters, February 4, 2002.
71 “Afghanistan Report,” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty. February 4, 2005.
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Appendix. U.S. and International Sanctions Lifted
Virtually all U.S. and international sanctions on Afghanistan, some imposed during the Soviet
occupation era and others on the Taliban regime, have now been lifted.
• P.L. 108-458(December 17, 2004, referencing the 9/11 Commission
recommendations) repealed bans on aid to Afghanistan outright. On October 7,
1992, President George H.W. Bush had issued Presidential Determination 93-3
that Afghanistan is no longer a Marxist-Leninist country, but the determination
was not implemented before he left office. Had it been implemented, the
prohibition on Afghanistan’s receiving Export-Import Bank guarantees,
insurance, or credits for purchases under Section 8 of the 1986 Export-Import
Bank Act, would have been lifted. In addition, Afghanistan would have been able
to receive U.S. assistance because the requirement would have been waived that
Afghanistan apologize for the 1979 killing in Kabul of U.S. Ambassador to
Afghanistan Adolph “Spike” Dubs. (Dubs was kidnapped in Kabul in 1979 and
killed when Afghan police stormed the hideout where he was held.)
• U.N. sanctions on the Taliban imposed by Resolution 1267 (October 15, 1999),
Resolution 1333 (December 19, 2000), and Resolution 1363 (July 30, 2001) have
now been narrowed to penalize only Al Qaeda (by Resolution 1390, January 17,
2002). Resolution 1267 banned flights outside Afghanistan by Ariana, and
directed U.N. member states to freeze Taliban assets. Resolution 1333 prohibited
the provision of arms or military advice to the Taliban (directed against
Pakistan); ordered a reduction of Taliban diplomatic representation abroad; and
banned foreign travel by senior Taliban officials. Resolution 1363 provided for
monitors in Pakistan to ensure that no weapons or military advice was provided
to the Taliban.
• On January 10, 2003, President Bush signed a proclamation making Afghanistan
a beneficiary of the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP), eliminating U.S.
tariffs on 5,700 Afghan products. Afghanistan had been denied GSP on May 2,
1980, under Executive Order 12204 (45 F.R. 20740).
• On April 24, 1981, controls on U.S. exports to Afghanistan of agricultural
products and phosphates were terminated. Such controls were imposed on June 3,
1980, as part of the sanctions against the Soviet Union for the invasion of
Afghanistan, under the authority of Sections 5 and 6 of the Export Administration
Act of 1979 [P.L. 96-72; 50 U.S.C. app. 2404, app. 2405].
• In mid-1992, the George H.W. Bush Administration determined that Afghanistan
no longer had a “Soviet-controlled government.” This opened Afghanistan to the
use of U.S. funds made available for the U.S. share of U.N. organizations that
provide assistance to Afghanistan.
• On March 31, 1993, after the fall of Najibullah in 1992, President Clinton, on
national interest grounds, waived restrictions provided for in Section 481 (h) of
the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 mandating sanctions on Afghanistan,
including bilateral aid cuts and suspensions, including denial of Ex-Im Bank
credits; the casting of negative U.S. votes for multilateral development bank
loans; and a non-allocation of a U.S. sugar quota. Discretionary sanctions
included denial of GSP; additional duties on exports to the United States; and
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curtailment of air transportation with the United States. Waivers were also
granted in 1994 and, after the fall of the Taliban, by President Bush.
• On May 3, 2002, President Bush restored normal trade treatment to the products
of Afghanistan, reversing the February 18, 1986, proclamation by President
Reagan (Presidential Proclamation 5437) that suspended most-favored nation
(MFN) tariff status for Afghanistan (51 F.R. 4287). The Foreign Assistance
Appropriations for FY1986 [Section 552, P.L. 99-190] had authorized the denial
of U.S. credits or most-favored-nation (MFN) status for Afghanistan.
• On July 2, 2002, the State Department amended U.S. regulations (22 C.F.R. Part
126) to allow arms sales to the new Afghan government, reversing the June 14,
1996, addition of Afghanistan to the list of countries prohibited from importing
U.S. defense articles and services. Arms sales to Afghanistan had also been
prohibited during 1997-2002 because Afghanistan had been designated under the
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (P.L. 104-132) as a state
that is not cooperating with U.S. anti-terrorism efforts.
• On July 2, 2002, President Bush formally revoked the July 4, 1999, declaration
by President Clinton of a national emergency with respect to Taliban because of
its hosting of bin Laden. The Clinton determination and related Executive Order
13129 had blocked Taliban assets and property in the United States, banned U.S.
trade with Taliban-controlled areas of Afghanistan, and applied these sanctions to
Ariana Afghan Airlines, triggering a blocking of Ariana assets (about $500,000)
in the United States and a ban on U.S. citizens’ flying on the airline. (The ban on
trade with Taliban-controlled territory had essentially ended on January 29, 2002,
when the State Department determination that the Taliban controls no territory
within Afghanistan.)

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Figure A-1. Map of Afghanistan

Source: Map Resources. Adapted by CRS.

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Figure A-2. Map of Afghan Ethnicities

Source: 2003 National Geographic Society. http://www.afghan-network.net/maps/Afghanistan-Map.pdf. Adapted
by Amber Wilhelm, CRS Graphics.
Notes: This map is intended to be illustrative of the approximate demographic distribution by region of
Afghanistan. CRS has no way to confirm exact population distributions.

Author Contact Information

Kenneth Katzman

Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs
kkatzman@crs.loc.gov, 7-7612


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