Guam: U.S. Defense Deployments
Shirley A. Kan
Specialist in Asian Security Affairs
September 16, 2011
Congressional Research Service
7-5700
www.crs.gov
RS22570
CRS Report for Congress
Pr
epared for Members and Committees of Congress
Guam: U.S. Defense Deployments
Summary
Since 2000, the U.S. military has been building up forward-deployed forces on the westernmost
U.S. territory of Guam to increase U.S. presence, deterrence, and power projection for possible
responses to crises and disasters, counterterrorism, and contingencies in support of South Korea,
Japan, the Philippines, Taiwan, or elsewhere in Asia. Since 2006, three joint exercises based at
Guam called “Valiant Shield” have boosted U.S. military readiness in the Asian-Pacific region.
The defense buildup on Guam has been moderate. China still has concerns about Guam’s buildup,
suspecting it to be directed against China. There has been concern that China and North Korea
could target Guam with missiles. Still, Guam’s role increased in engaging China’s military.
In 2006, the United States and Japan agreed on a “Roadmap” to strengthen their alliance,
including a buildup on Guam to cost $10.3 billion, with Japan contributing 60%. Primary goals
were to start the related construction on Guam by 2010 and to complete relocation of about 8,000
marines from Okinawa to Guam by 2014. In Tokyo on February 17, 2009, the Secretary of State
signed the bilateral “Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the
Government of Japan Concerning the Implementation of the Relocation of the III Marine
Expeditionary Force Personnel and Their Dependents From Okinawa to Guam” that reaffirmed
the “Roadmap” of May 1, 2006. The two governments agreed that of the estimated $10.27 billion
cost of the facilities and infrastructure development for the relocation, Japan will provide $6.09
billion, including up to $2.8 billion in direct cash contributions (in FY2008 dollars). The United
States committed to fund $3.18 billion plus $1 billion for a road for a total of $4.18 billion.
However, completion of the marines’ relocation by 2014 would be unlikely, and the realignment
involves more than moving 8,000 marines to Guam. In September 2009, the Democratic Party of
Japan (DPJ) became the ruling party. This political change raised uncertainty as Japan sought to
re-negotiate the agreement, even while the United States sought its implementation. The dispute
over the location on Okinawa of the Futenma Replacement Facility (FRF) to replace the Marine
Corps Air Station Futenma raised implications for the relocation of marines from Okinawa to
Guam. In January 2010, Japan promised to decide by May on the location of the FRF. Then,
North Korea’s attack on South Korea’s naval ship Cheonan in March, and China’s deployment of
its Navy near Okinawa and confrontation with Japan’s forces in April, catalyzed Japan to resolve
the dispute in favor of stronger deterrence in alliance with the United States. On May 28, the
Secretaries of Defense and State and their counterparts in Japan issued a “2+2” Joint Statement,
in which they reaffirmed the 2006 Roadmap and the 2009 Agreement. In September 2010, the
Navy and Army issued a Record of Decision that deferred some decisions for Guam. Nonetheless,
despite the dispute over the FRF on Okinawa, Japan has funded in its defense budgets for direct
contributions as well as loans for the marines’ relocation to Guam.
In 2011, some Members, including Senator Jim Webb and Guam’s Delegate Madeleine Bordallo,
have urged more attention to concerns that include expanded costs and the delay in the
realignment as the U.S military presence and readiness remain critical. On May 11, 2011,
Senators Carl Levin, John McCain, and Jim Webb called for a re-examination of plans to
restructure military forces in South Korea, Japan, and Guam. Major legislation includes the
National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for FY2012, H.R. 1540 and S. 1253, which contain
provisions related to the realignment on Guam. Updated as warranted, this CRS Report discusses
major developments and policy issues related to the defense buildup. (Also see CRS Report
R41885, Military Construction: Analysis of the FY2012 Appropriation and Authorization.)
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Guam: U.S. Defense Deployments
Contents
Strategic Significance of Guam for Defense Buildup...................................................................... 1
Force Relocations and Deployments from the U.S. Mainland ........................................................ 2
U.S. Force Relocations from Japan ................................................................................................. 3
Agreement ................................................................................................................................. 3
Budgets...................................................................................................................................... 5
Concerns and Issues for Congress ................................................................................................... 6
Rationales .................................................................................................................................. 6
Concerns.................................................................................................................................... 7
Allies and Partners................................................................................................................... 13
China ....................................................................................................................................... 14
Legislation ............................................................................................................................... 16
Figures
Figure 1. Map of Guam.................................................................................................................. 18
Tables
Table 1. Illustrative Sailing Distances and Time ............................................................................. 7
Contacts
Author Contact Information........................................................................................................... 19
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Strategic Significance of Guam for Defense Buildup
Guam is a U.S. territory long valued as strategically significant to U.S. forward deployments in
the Western Pacific. In the Pacific Ocean, Hawaii is about 2,400 miles west of California, and
Guam is about 3,800 miles further west of Hawaii. Guam has two important U.S. military bases:
Apra Naval Base and Andersen Air Force Base. The island, three times the size of Washington,
DC, is home to about 183,000 residents. As the Defense Department has faced increased tension
on the Korean peninsula and requirements to fight the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, the Pacific
Command (PACOM), since 2000, has built up air and naval forces on Guam to boost U.S.
deterrence and power projection in Asia. Concerns include crisis response, counterterrorism, and
contingencies in the Pacific. The defense buildup on Guam has been moderate.
Visiting Guam in May 2008, Defense Secretary Robert Gates said that Guam’s buildup will be
“one of the largest movements of military assets in decades” and will help to “maintain a robust
military presence in a critical part of the world.”1 Under President Obama, Secretary Gates issued
the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) in February 2010, in which the United States noted the
importance of implementing the U.S.-Japan Realignment Roadmap of 2006 that will ensure the
deployment of U.S. forces in Japan and transform Guam into a regional security hub. The QDR
also announced the development of a new joint Air-Sea Battle Concept, to integrate the air, sea,
land, space, and cyberspace forces of the Air Force and Navy to counter challenges to U.S.
freedom of action, defeat adversaries with sophisticated anti-access and area-denial capabilities,
and improve power projection operations. As part of the Obama Administration’s effort to re-
engage with Asia and reassure allies and partners in the region, Gates participated at an annual
Asian-Pacific defense ministers’ meeting in June 2010 in Singapore at which he declared that the
United States is a Pacific nation and will remain a “power in the Pacific.” He highlighted that the
South China Sea became an area of “growing concern.” He also stated that the defense buildup on
Guam is part of a shift in the U.S. defense posture in Asia, a shift to be more geographically
distributed, operationally resilient, and politically sustainable.2 Deputy Defense Secretary William
Lynn III visited Guam in July and stressed Guam’s value, saying “from bases here, our forces can
ensure the security of our allies, quickly respond to disaster and humanitarian needs, safeguard
the sea lanes that are so vital to the world economy, and address any military provocation that
may occur.”3 Still, follow-up questions include how to ensure a powerful presence in the Pacific.
The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Mike Mullen, issued strategic guidance for
2011 that placed priority on U.S. security interests in the Middle East, Afghanistan, and Pakistan.
Still, he noted an increased focus on the Asian-Pacific region in balancing risks from an
aggressive North Korea and a more assertive China and in defending international freedom of
navigation. In Congress, Senator James Webb said in a speech in Tokyo in February 2011 that
Northeast Asia is the only place in the world where the interests of the United States, Russia,
China, and Japan intersect. He noted that the U.S.-Japan relationship resulted in regional stability.
Concerning China, Senator Webb said that when the Soviet Union collapsed, the United States
became “overexposed and unprepared” for the way that China has expanded. While affecting the
1 Donna Miles, “Gates Views Growth Under Way in Guam,” American Forces Press Service, May 30, 2008.
2 Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, speech at Shangri-La Hotel, Singapore, June 5, 2010.
3 Deputy Secretary of Defense William Lynn III, Remarks at the University of Guam, July 27, 2010.
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U.S. economy, China’s rise also has incrementally affected regional stability. He urged careful
handling of the realignment of bases to avoid giving the wrong signals for strategic stability.4
Force Relocations and Deployments from the
U.S. Mainland
Guam’s strategic significance has risen steadily. In 2000, the Air Force reportedly sought to base
elements of an Air Expeditionary Force in Guam and had sent B-2 stealth bombers to Guam to
broaden the range of U.S. options for possible contingencies involving North Korea. As
PACOM’s Commander, Admiral Dennis Blair acquired approval to forward deploy air-launched
cruise missiles on Guam for the first time in August 2000. The Air Force moved precision
munitions to be stockpiled on Guam, including Joint Direct Attack Munitions and Joint Standoff
Weapons.5
In February 1997, Guam’s Delegate Robert Underwood noted in the House that an aircraft carrier
(the USS Independence, homeported in Japan) visited Guam for the first time in over 30 years.6
In early 2001, the Navy announced that it would station up to three nuclear attack submarines at
Guam, in order to shorten the transit time compared to travel from homeports in Hawaii or
California to the western Pacific and to shorten deployments for sailors. The first sub to be based
at Guam arrived in October 2002. In July 2007, the USS Buffalo joined USS Houston and USS
City of Corpus Christi as the three forward-deployed nuclear-power attack submarines (SSN)
permanently based at Guam. The three SSNs based at Guam formed part of the deployment of
about 60% of attack submarines in the Pacific by the end of 2009. The Quadrennial Defense
Review (QDR) of 2006 called for an adjustment in U.S. force posture, with a greater presence in
the Pacific than that in the Atlantic, including at least six aircraft carriers and 60% of submarines
in the Pacific. Moreover, in mid-2010, three Ohio-class guided-missile submarines (SSGN), USS
Michigan, USS Ohio, and USS Florida, showed their presence in the Pacific and used Guam to
support their operations.7 However, in 2007, the Navy decided not to homeport the aircraft carrier
USS Carl Vinson at Guam. Nonetheless, by 2008, the Navy planned for a transient berth in Apra
Harbor to support an aircraft carrier for up to three times a year, each visit for up to three weeks.8
The QDR of 2010 called for maintaining a force structure of 10-11 aircraft carriers.
In 2002, the Commander of Pacific Air Forces publicly detailed his request for basing aircraft in
Guam. In addition to munition stockpiles and jet fuel, he reportedly requested F-22 stealth
fighters, 767 tankers, C-17 transports, bombers, and Global Hawk reconnaissance drones.9 In
4 Senator James Webb, “Revitalizing Japan-U.S. Strategic Partnership for a Changing World,” keynote address, New
Shimoda Conference, Tokyo, Japan, February 22, 2011.
5 Thomas Ricks, “For Pentagon, Asia Moving to Forefront,” Washington Post, May 26, 2000; “Inside the Ring,”
Washington Times, August 25, 2000; Robert Burns, “Air Force Plan Could Place Bombers Closer to Targets,” Seattle
Times, November 30, 2000.
6 U.S. House of Representatives, “A Fair Hearing on Guam,” Congressional Record, February 25, 1997.
7 Christian Bohmfalk, “Navy Decides to Homeport Up to Three Attack Submarines in Guam,” Inside the Navy, January
29, 2001; Nathan Hodge, “Navy Basing Subs in Guam,” Defense Week, October 1, 2002; Navy Newsstand, July 12,
2007; Commander, Submarine Force, U.S. Pacific Fleet, December 4, 2009; South China Morning Post, July 4, 2010.
8 Nelson Daranciang, “Senators Hope Naval Presence Will Grow,” Honolulu Star-Bulletin, March 31, 2007; Navy
Secretary Donald Winter, Report on Department of Defense Planning Efforts for Guam, September 15, 2008.
9 Jim Wolf, “U.S. General Urges Warplanes Be Sent to Guam,” Reuters, August 23, 2002.
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March 2003, after a new Air Expeditionary Wing was activated at Guam’s Andersen Air Force
Base, B-1 and B-52 bombers deployed temporarily on a rotational basis from air bases in Texas
and Louisiana as U.S. forces prepared for war against Iraq. Beyond rotation of aircraft, the Air
Force began continuous deployment of aircraft into Guam. As part of this buildup, the first B-52
bombers (stationed out of Minot Air Force Base in North Dakota) to deploy to Andersen arrived
in February 2004. B-52 bombers can each carry 20 AGM-86C/D conventional air-launched cruise
missiles (CALCMs), and these long-range weapons have been fielded at Andersen.10 In April
2005, the Commander of Pacific Air Forces said that B-2 stealth bombers started to fly out of
Andersen. In April 2005, F-15 fighters temporarily deployed to Andersen from Idaho. An Air
Force official said in 2006 that the Air Force planned to station KC-135 tankers on Guam. In May
2007, the Air Force announced the deployment of 18 F-16 fighters to Guam for four months. In
the summer of 2008, several F-22 fighters, based in Alaska since 2007, began deployments to
Guam. Also, Andersen Air Force Base first planned to have four to six Global Hawks for an
Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) Strike Task Force by 2009, though the first
of three RQ-4 Global Hawks arrived in September 2010.11
U.S. Force Relocations from Japan
In May 2006, the United States and Japan signed a detailed “Roadmap” to broaden military
cooperation, mostly dealing with changes and additions to U.S. forces in Japan. It provided for
the relocation of the headquarters of the III Marine Expeditionary Force and 8,000 U.S. marines
from Okinawa to Guam by 2014. The cost of the relocation was estimated at $10.27 billion. Of
this amount, Japan pledged to contribute $6.09 billion, including direct financing of facilities and
infrastructure on Guam.12
Agreement
On February 5, 2009, Admiral Timothy Keating, Commander of the Pacific Command (PACOM),
told Reuters that the transfer of 8,000 marines to Guam might be delayed and cost more, but
observers questioned his authority for the statement. Indeed, PACOM clarified the next day that
the goals remained to start the related construction by 2010 and to complete relocation by 2014.
10 PACOM, “B-1Bs, B-52Hs Arrive in Guam,” March 6, 2003; Robert Burns, “Air Force Wants to Put Fighters and
Bombers Back on Guam in Pacific,” AP, January 13, 2004; Michael Sirak, “U.S. Considers Bomber Presence on
Guam,” Jane’s Defense Weekly, January 21, 2004; PACOM, “Bomber Deployment to Guam,” February 2, 2004;
“Bombers Arrive At Andersen,” AFN; Katie Worth, “B-52 Bombers Arrive,” Pacific Daily News, February 23, 2004;
U.S. Air Force, “AGM-86B/C/D Missiles.” There is also the AGM-86B version with a nuclear warhead.
11 Martin Matishak, “Hester: Air Force to Bolster Presence in Asia-Pacific Region,” Inside the Air Force, April 29,
2005; Natalie Quinata, “Fighter Squadron Arrives on Guam,” Pacific Daily News, April 30, 2005; Gregg Kakesako,
“U.S. Military to Beef Up Its Presence on Guam,” Honolulu Star-Bulletin, June 21, 2006; “United States to deploy 18
F-16s to Guam,” Reuters News, May 24, 2007; Frank Whitman, “No Big Changes at Andersen Right Away, New 36th
Wing Commander Says,” Stars and Stripes, November 18, 2006; Audrey McAvoy, “Air Force to Deploy Alaska-based
F-22 Raptors to Guam,” AP, May 21, 2008, quoting the Commander of Pacific Air Forces, General Carrol Chandler;
“Rear Admiral Addresses Business Leaders on Guam’s Military Importance,” KUAM, February 25, 2009; Travis
Tritten, “Andersen Receives Pacific’s First Global Hawk Drone,” Stars and Stripes, September 8, 2010; “USAF
Welcomes RQ-4 Global Hawk to Guam Watch,” Flight International, September 28-October 4, 2010.
12 Karl Eiselberg, “Finalized U.S.-Japan Defense Accord Masks Some Deeper Concerns in Security Alliance,” Daily
Report, May 5, 2006; Linda Sieg, “U.S.-Japan Security Overhaul Gives Tokyo Bigger Role,” Reuters, May 16, 2006.
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III Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF). Soon after, on February 17, Secretary of State Hillary
Clinton visited Tokyo and signed the bilateral “Agreement Between the Government of the
United States of America and the Government of Japan Concerning the Implementation of the
Relocation of the III Marine Expeditionary Force Personnel and Their Dependents From Okinawa
to Guam” that reaffirmed the “Roadmap” of May 1, 2006. The two governments agreed that of
the estimated $10.27 billion cost of the facilities and infrastructure development for the
relocation, Japan would provide $6.09 billion, including up to $2.8 billion in direct cash
contributions (in FY2008 dollars). The United States committed to fund $3.18 billion plus about
$1 billion for a road for a total of $4.18 billion. Under the agreement, about 8,000 personnel from
the III Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) and about 9,000 of their dependents would relocate
from Okinawa to Guam by 2014.
Futenma Replacement Facility (FRF). In addition to Japan’s financial contribution, the
relocation to Guam would be dependent upon Japan’s progress toward completion of the Futenma
Replacement Facility (FRF). In the “Roadmap,” the United States and Japan agreed to replace the
Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS) Futenma with the FRF constructed using landfill and located
in another, less populated area of Okinawa (at Camp Schwab). The FRF would be part of an
interconnected package that includes relocation to the FRF, return of MCAS Futenma, transfer of
III MEF personnel to Guam, and consolidation of facilities and return of land on Okinawa.
In April 2009, the lower house of Japan’s parliament, the Diet, voted to approve the bilateral
agreement, and the Diet ratified it on May 13, 2009. The next day, the Department of State
welcomed the Diet’s ratification of the agreement and reiterated the U.S. commitment to the
completion of the relocation of 8,000 marines to Guam from Okinawa, host to about 25,000 U.S.
military personnel and their dependents.
However, on September 16, 2009, Yukio Hatoyama of the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ)
became prime minister. This political change raised uncertainty when Japan sought to re-
negotiate the agreement even as the United States sought its implementation. The DPJ had called
for the Futenma air station to be relocated outside of Okinawa, with concerns about the impact on
the local people and environment. In Tokyo on October 21, Defense Secretary Robert Gates
stressed to Japan’s Defense Minister Toshimi Kitazawa the importance of implementing the
agreement by “moving forward expeditiously on the roadmap as agreed.” Gates said at a news
conference that “without the [FRF], there will be no relocation to Guam. And without relocation
to Guam, there will be no consolidation of forces and return of land in Okinawa.” But by the time
of President Obama’s visit on November 13, 2009, the two leaders could only announce a
“working group” to discuss differences. The U.S. side agreed to discuss the agreement’s
“implementation,” but Japan sought to “review” the agreement. At a meeting in Honolulu on
January 12, 2010, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton stressed moving on the implementation of
the agreement but also acknowledged that the alliance had lots of other business to conduct. She
expressed an expectation of a decision on the FRF by May, after Foreign Minister Katsuya Okada
conveyed Hatoyama’s promise to decide by that time. Visiting Tokyo on January 15, Senator
Daniel Inouye said Hatoyama reiterated this promise to decide by May. (On details about Japan’s
dispute over Futenma, see CRS Report RL33436, Japan-U.S. Relations: Issues for Congress.)
Meanwhile, on May 20, 2010, the Republic of Korea (ROK), or South Korea, announced that an
international investigation found that an attack on March 26 by the Democratic People’s Republic
of Korea (DPRK), or North Korea, sank the ROK’s naval ship, Cheonan, and killed 46 sailors.
President Obama condemned that “act of aggression.” The crisis provoked by the DPRK
catalyzed Japan’s resolution of the dispute over the realignment. Moreover, in April, Japan said
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that China’s People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) deployed ships and submarines near Japan’s
southern islands of Okinawa and Miyakojima and dangerously confronted Japan’s surveillance
forces, including pointing guns from a PLAN destroyer at Japan’s maritime patrol plane and
flying a helicopter in close approach to Japan’s destroyer in at least two incidents. The next
month, China’s maritime survey ship approached and chased away Japan’s Coast Guard survey
ship in the East China Sea, demanding that Japan’s ship stop its surveys. While the crisis with the
DPRK involved an attack that sank the ROK’s ship and killed its sailors, the PLA’s
aggressiveness did not result in conflict at that time. Nonetheless, later in July, Assistant Secretary
of Defense for Asia and Pacific Security Affairs Wallace Gregson testified to Congress that both
the actions by North Korea and China (the PLAN’s deployment of a Surface Action Group near
Okinawa) prompted Japan’s recognition of a vital U.S. role in Japan’s deterrence.13
Joint Statements. On May 28, 2010, in Tokyo, Secretary of Defense Gates and Secretary of State
Clinton along with their counterparts in Japan issued a “2+2” Joint Statement of the U.S.-Japan
Security Consultative Committee. Thus, Japan reaffirmed its commitment to implement the 2006
Roadmap and 2009 Agreement on relocation of marines from Okinawa to Guam. The following
month, Japan’s new Prime Minister Naoto Kan affirmed the agreement.
In July 2010, the U.S. Navy expressed doubts about meeting the original goal of completing the
relocation of marines to Guam by 2014,14 supporting Admiral Keating’s assessment in 2009.
Just after retiring as an Assistant Secretary of Defense, Gregson said in April 2011 that about
10,000 marines would remain on Okinawa after the relocation of some marines from Okinawa to
Guam. Moreover, he clarified that the change would be a “realignment of the alliance to Guam.”
Not only will there be a buildup of U.S. forces at Guam, but there would be a new continuous
presence of Japan’s aviation, ground, and naval forces training at Guam.15
In the “2+2” Joint Statement of June 21, 2011, the United States and Japan reaffirmed their
commitment to implement “steadily” the realignment as agreed in 2006 and the Joint Statement
of May 2010. However, the United States and Japan also issued a document acknowledging that
the completion of the FRF and the relocation of Marines from Okinawa to Guam will not meet
the target date of 2014. After another Prime Minister, Yoshihiko Noda, took office on September
2, 2011, Japan indicated it would implement the realignment.
Budgets
Nonetheless, despite Japan’s dispute over the FRF in Okinawa, Japan has allocated funds in the
defense budgets for the marines’ relocation and buildup on Guam, including the agreed $2.8
billion in direct contributions. Japan allocated as direct contributions $336 million in the 2009
defense budget and $497 million in the 2010 budget. (Japan’s fiscal year covers April 1 to March
31.) In the 2011 defense budget, Japan funded $176 million for its direct contribution and also
$416 million for loans to be extended by the Japan Bank for International Cooperation (JBIC) to
fund the expansion of utilities (such as power, water, and wastewater) on Guam. Japan’s coping
with the earthquake, tsunami, and nuclear disaster of March 2011 delayed budgeting for 2012.
13 Before a hearing of the House Armed Services Committee, July 27, 2010.
14 Satoshi Ogawa, “U.S. Government Gives Up on Relocating Marines in Okinawa to Guam by 2014,” Yomiuri, July
23, 2010.
15 Yoichi Kato, “Japan-U.S. Alliance Will Grow Stronger From Quake,” Asahi Shimbun, April 10, 2011.
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Concerns and Issues for Congress
Rationales
One rationale for the military buildup on Guam is its status as a U.S. territory. Thus, the United
States is not required to negotiate with sovereign countries on force deployments or face the risks
of losing bases or access. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld visited Guam in November 2003
and expressed support for building up Guam as he considered a new round of base closings.16 In
contrast, the United States had to close Subic Bay Naval Base and Clark Air Force Base in the
Philippines in 1992. Foreign countries could restrict the use of U.S. forces based there. U.S.
forces based in Guam also do not have to contend with political sensitivities over nuclear
powered vessels. Moreover, some countries, including allies, have raised doubts at times about
their support for U.S. forces in a possible conflict between the United States and China.
Another rationale is the expansion of options that Guam offers to the evolving U.S. force
structure. As Commander of PACOM, Admiral William Fallon expressed his vision for Guam as
a staging area from which ships, aircraft, and troops can “surge” to the Asian theater. He stressed
“flexibility,” saying “we need to have forces ready to react,” and we must have built-in
flexibility” to meet emergencies (including disaster relief).17 In 2004, the Navy held “Summer
Pulse 04,” its first exercise to increase readiness to “surge” operations in response to a crisis. In
June 2006, PACOM held the first “Valiant Shield” exercise that brought three aircraft carriers to
waters off Guam. The third “Valiant Shield” exercise occurred in September 2010.
A third rationale is the need to counter what commanders call the “tyranny of distance.” PACOM,
headquartered in Honolulu, has an area of responsibility that encompasses almost 60% of the
world’s population, over 50% of the earth’s surface, the Pacific and Indian Oceans, 16 time zones,
and five of seven U.S. defense treaties. U.S. forces on Guam are much closer to East Asia, where
the United States has five alliances with Australia, Japan, South Korea, Thailand, and the
Philippines. The United States also has concerns about tension and instability in the East China
Sea, South China Sea, and Yellow Sea; terrorism in Southeast and South Asia; humanitarian
crises; and sea lines of communication (SLOCs), particularly through the Straits of Malacca.
Combat aircraft on Guam can reach Taiwan, Japan, Philippines, or the Korean peninsula in two to
five hours.18 Moreover, Table 1 presents the shorter sailing distance and time from Guam to
Manila in East Asia, as an example, compared to that from Honolulu, Seattle, and San Diego.
16 James Brooke, “Looking for Friendly Overseas Base, Pentagon Finds it Already Has One,” New York Times, April 7,
2004.
17 Richard Halloran, “Guam Seen as Pivotal U.S. Base,” Washington Times, March 11, 2006.
18 Donna Miles, “Gates Views Massive Growth Under Way in Guam,” AFPS, May 30, 2008.
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Table 1. Illustrative Sailing Distances and Time
To Manila, from:
Statute miles
Days at 20 knots
Days at 30 knots
Guam 1,724
3.1
2.1
Honolulu 5,482
9.9
6.6
Seattle 6,853
12.4
8.3
San Diego
7,595
13.8
9.2
Notes: Sailing distances in statute miles were calculated using nautical miles reported by “Distances Between
Ports,” 2001, published by the National Imagery and Mapping Agency. Also, 1 nautical mile equals 1.15 statute
miles, and 1 knot equals 1.15 mph.
Relatedly, under President Obama, the United States has paid greater attention to Southeast Asia.
There is concern about potential instability over disputed islands and China’s assertiveness in the
South China Sea. In February 2011, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Mike
Mullen, issued a National Military Strategy, declaring that the U.S. military also must invest new
attention and resources in Southeast and South Asia, in addition to the long-standing presence in
Northeast Asia. PACOM’s Commander, Admiral Robert Willard, testified to the House Armed
Services Committee in April 2011, elaborating that it has become increasingly important for U.S.
forces to attain more access to and support from allies and partners in South and Southeast Asia.
Concerns
Infrastructure. As U.S. forces relocate to Guam, the state of its infrastructure has been of
concern to some policymakers. Also, Guam’s political leaders have expressed concerns about the
impact of additional deployments on its civilian infrastructure, including utilities, roads, and
water supplies. Guam’s location in the Western Pacific also requires construction of protection for
U.S. forces and assets against typhoons. In the fall of 2006, PACOM officials briefed Guam on
some aspects of an undisclosed draft plan for military expansion, the Integrated Military
Development Plan, with possible military projects worth a total of about $15 billion.19 In addition,
Guam’s size, remoteness, and conditions raised more questions about hosting and educating
military dependents; training on Guam and with other units in Asia, Hawaii, or the west coast;
and costs and time for extended logistical support and travel. Addressing another concern, a
former commander of Marine Forces Pacific urged in 2007 that Guam’s buildup include more
than infrastructure to develop also human capital, communities, and the environment.20 From
2009 to 2011, Wallace Gregson was the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asian and Pacific
Security Affairs.
Strategic Target. A concern is that Guam’s higher military profile could increase its potential as a
strategic target for terrorists and adversaries during a conflict. For example, potential PRC and
DPRK missile attacks could raise Guam’s need for missile defense. Still, when he worked in
Guam in 1974, Senator James Webb wrote that “as long as the U.S. maintains and communicates
a credible military presence and capability, Guam is under no greater threat, in reality, than any
other part of the U.S.”21 China is believed to have deployed ballistic missiles that could target
Guam, considered by China as part of the “Second Island Chain” from which it needs to break out
19 KUAM News, September 12, 2006; Pacific Daily News, September 13, 2006; Stars and Stripes, September 17, 2006.
20 W. C. “Chip” Gregson, “New Thinking Needed on Pacific Frontier,” Honolulu Advertiser, December 7, 2007.
21 James Webb, “The Future Land Needs of the U.S. Military on Guam,” Guam Bureau of Planning, July 24, 1974.
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of perceived U.S.-led “containment.” China’s missiles that could target forces based at Guam
include the DF-3A (CSS-2) medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM). China also has developed
an extended-range DH-10 ground-launched land-attack cruise missile (LACM) and the world’s
first anti-ship ballistic missile (ASBM), the DF-21D ASBM, to target aircraft carriers and other
ships. While the DF-21D’s initial range could be 1,500-2,000 km (930-1240 mi), a more
advanced variant could extend the range to 3,000 km and reach Guam.22 In addition, the DPRK
has developed an intermediate range ballistic missile (IRBM) with a range over 2,000 miles.
There has been a question about whether North Korea deployed this IRBM. In 2008, South
Korea’s Defense White Paper stated that North Korea started to deploy its IRBM (Taepodong-X)
with a range that could reach Guam. At a high-profile military parade in October 2010, North
Korea showed a new IRBM (a missile some called Musudan), apparently deployed without flight
testing in North Korea. It was unclear whether it was the same IRBM reported by South Korea,
with a different designation. The U.S. National Intelligence Council (NIC) reported to Congress
in early 2011 that North Korea in 2010 continued to develop a mobile IRBM and did not report
that it was deployed. Still, the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), Lieutenant
General Ronald Burgess, Jr., testified to the Senate Armed Services Committee on March 10,
2011, that North Korea has tried to upgrade already deployed missiles that included IRBMs.23
Allies and Partners. Moreover, some said that Guam is still too distant from flash points in the
Asia and advocated closer cooperation with allies and partners such as Singapore, Australia, the
Philippines, and Japan.24 Building up the U.S. presence in those countries could enhance alliances
or partnerships, increase interoperability, and reduce costs for the United States. In 2010, Defense
Secretary Gates wrote an article, calling for “building partner capacity” to help other countries to
defend themselves, or if necessary, to fight alongside U.S. forces by providing them with
equipment, training, and other security assistance. The stress would be on helping other countries
provide for their own security.25 Later in 2010, Australia proposed that the U.S. military increase
use of this ally’s existing bases.26 In April 2011, PACOM’s Commander, Admiral Willard,
testified to the House Armed Services Committee that the U.S. military has increased attention to
Southeast and South Asia. He acknowledged that the U.S. force posture in Southeast Asia has
involved mostly deployed U.S. forces, making it costly and inefficient. He sought to expand the
U.S. presence in Southeast Asia beyond only Singapore. Willard also confirmed that Australia
might further support the U.S. posture. In testimony the same month to the Senate Armed
Services Committee, Willard stated that Marine Corps forces could rotate into northern Australia
and other locations closer to Southeast Asia, in addition to marines in Japan, Guam, and Hawaii.
Environmental Impact Statement (EIS). In July 2010, the U.S. Navy’s Joint Guam Program
Office issued the Final Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) on implications of the buildup on
22 Mark Stokes, “China’s Evolving Conventional Strategic Strike Capability,” Project 2049, September 14, 2009;
Secretary of Defense, “Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s
Republic of China 2010,” August 16, 2010.
23 Sam Kim, “N. Korea Deploys Medium-Range Missiles, Bolsters Special Forces,” Yonhap, Seoul, February 23, 2009;
National Air and Space Intelligence Center, “Ballistic and Cruise Missile Threat,” April 2009; Joshua Pollack, “North
Korea Debuts an IRBM,” Arms Control Wonk blog, October 10, 2010; NIC, “Unclassified Report to Congress on the
Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions, Covering
1 January to 31 December 2010.”
24 For example: Thomas Donnelly, “Rebasing, Revisited,” American Enterprise Institute, December 2004.
25 Robert Gates, “Helping Others Defend Themselves,” Foreign Affairs, May/June 2010.
26 Phil Stewart, “U.S. Military Moves in Asia Not Aimed At China: Gates,” Reuters, November 7, 2010.
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Guam.27 The detailed study estimated a higher population increase than the move of 8,000
marines to Guam. As noted above, the U.S.-Japan agreement of 2009 provided for 8,000 marines
and 9,000 of their dependents to relocate from Okinawa to Guam. However, the EIS of 2010
estimated that a total of 8,552 Marines plus 630 Army soldiers would form the 9,182 permanent
military personnel to relocate to Guam. The total military population on Guam would increase by
30,190 (including 9,182 permanent military personnel, 9,950 dependents, 9,222 transient military
personnel, and 1,836 civilian workers). In addition, construction workers and others could mean a
total increase in population of about 79,000 at the peak in 2014, in this initial assumption.
Tinian. The study also found that Guam cannot accommodate all training for the relocated
marines, and the nearby island of Tinian (100 miles away) could help to provide land for their
training. There would be a challenge for sustaining operational readiness in training while
limiting the time and expense to travel to train. The study found that “the training ranges
currently planned for Guam and Tinian only replicate existing individual-skills training
capabilities on Okinawa and do not provide for all requisite collective, combined arms, live and
maneuver training the Marine Corps forces must meet to sustain core competencies. As with
Marine Corps forces currently in Okinawa who must now travel to mainland Japan, other partner
nations, and the U.S. to accomplish this requisite core competency training, the Marine Corps
forces relocating from Okinawa to Guam would also have to use alternate locations to accomplish
requisite core competency training.” After a visit to Guam, Tinian, and Saipan in February 2010,
Senator James Webb expressed concern about placing live-fire ranges on Guam for the Marine
Corps and urged greater use of Tinian.28 Also, Guam’s Delegate Madeleine Bordallo expressed
concern about a proposed firing range on Guam and urged the Pentagon to consider an alternative
for a range on Tinian, at a hearing on March 15, 2011, of the House Armed Services
Subcommittee on Readiness. Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Energy, Installations, and
Environment Jackalyne Pfannenstiel testified that certain training for the marines needs to be on
the island of Guam.
In addition, the Navy would need a new deep-draft wharf at Apra Harbor to support a transient
aircraft carrier. Third, the Army would relocate about 600 military personnel to establish and
operate an Air and Missile Defense Task Force (AMDTF).
Record of Decision. However, as stated in the Record of Decision on the Final EIS issued two
months later in September 2010, the Navy and Army deferred decisions on a site for the marines’
live-fire training range on Guam, a site for the transient aircraft carrier berth within Apra Harbor,
and construction of an AMDTF on Guam. Also, the Record of Decision used an assumption that
construction to support the marines’ relocation would start in 2014 and not be completed until
2016. Moreover, the Record of Decision projected that instead of a peak of an increase of 79,178
people (including military personnel, dependents, and workers) in Guam in 2014, a “more
realistic” projection would see a peak of 59,173 growth in population in 2015. The peak of
10,552 more marines on Guam would be reached in 2017 instead of 2014.29
27 Joint Guam Program Office, “Final Environmental Impact Statement: Guam and CNMI Military Relocation,” public
release on July 29, 2010. This followed the Draft Environment Impact Statement issued in November 2009.
28 Senator James Webb, “Proper Reengagement in Asia Requires a Strong Alliance with Japan, a Strong Relationship
with the People of Guam,” press release, February 19, 2010.
29 “Record of Decision for Guam/Commonwealth of Northern Mariana Islands Military Relocation,” September 2010.
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Expanding Costs. However, there would not be only 10,552 marines. There has been greater
congressional concern about expanding costs involved with moving more marines (estimated at
10,552) with additional army soldiers (estimated at 630) and civilian military workers (estimated
at 1,836). That could be an increase of 13,018 military and civilian personnel working for the
Defense Department. Also, there could be expanded costs (for schools, health care, housing,
transportation, etc.), if the option is used for personnel to be accompanied by dependents. The
estimate of additional dependents increased from 9,000 under the U.S.-Japan agreement to 11,695
(9,000 Marine Corps dependents, 950 Army dependents, plus 1,745 civilian military dependents).
Total personnel and dependent growth could be 24,713 from 2017 on, after completion of
construction. At a hearing of the Senate Armed Services Committee on April 12, 2011, the
Chairman, Senator Carl Levin, expressed concern that the delays in the realignment might
significantly increase costs. The Ranking Member, Senator John McCain, said that total
investments by the United States and Japan for new bases for U.S. forces on both Okinawa and
Guam could reach at least $30 billion. PACOM’s Commander, Admiral Robert Willard, conceded
that the delays and new requirements on Guam have raised uncertainty about the cost, which
could be higher than $10.3 billion. Senator James Webb urged for greater clarity about the
realignment and attention by the Senate. In his study in 1974 for Guam, Webb had called for a
broader look at the total cost of the U.S. force structure in the Pacific that took into account any
savings in consolidation of bases, more joint service uses, and the fact that bases in Guam are
permanent bases on U.S. soil.30 Then on May 26, 2011, Senators Levin, McCain, and Webb cited
as support for their proposal to reexamine the plans for realignment (see below) a GAO report
that estimated costs of over $27 billion to realign bases on Okinawa and Guam.31
Naval Assets. As another concern, the marines on Guam would need naval assets for
transportation for both deployments and exercises. Options include basing in Guam another
Amphibious Ready Group (ARG) with amphibious ships of the Navy to transport a Marine
Expeditionary Unit (MEU). Another consideration would homeport in Guam the new non-
combatant sealift Joint High Speed Vessel (JHSV). Since 2001, the III MEF in Okinawa already
has experience with using a leased theater support ship called “Westpac Express.” The marines
used this fast, roll-on/roll-off ship to deploy with helicopters to reinforce Guam’s defense after
the 9/11 terrorist attacks in 2001.32
Outside Workers. Some have noted a concern about the potential introduction of temporary
outside workers to Guam during construction for the defense buildup. In 2009, Representative
Neil Abercrombie of Hawaii urged a preference for American workers.33 Regarding defense
policy, some have raised security considerations of the country of origin of any foreign workers,
including China. For example, in 2009, Guam’s Governor Felix Camacho said that it was likely
that foreign workers could come from skilled labor in the Philippines, if local labor is insufficient.
He said that China’s workers would not be hired “because of security concerns related to work on
military bases.”34 Workers outside of Guam could be hired from Hawaii, the U.S. mainland,
American Samoa, Northern Mariana Islands, Freely Associated States, or other places.
30 James Webb, “The Future Land Needs of the U.S. Military on Guam,” Guam Bureau of Planning, July 24, 1974.
31 Senator Carl Levin, “GAO Report Validates Recommendations for Bases in East Asia; Action Needed to Re-
examine DoD Planning”; Senator Jim Webb, “GAO Findings a Call to Action on Realignment of Military Bases in
East Asia,” May 26, 2011.
32 Consultations with PACOM in Honolulu in November 2010 and Pentagon in Washington in December 2010.
33 Neil Abercrombie, “Why Construction on Guam is Right for Americans,” letter to Washington Post, July 13, 2009.
34 “Guam Governor Expects Filipinos to Fill Jobs,” The Star, July 1, 2009.
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Military Readiness. At a hearing of the House Armed Services Subcommittee on Readiness on
March 15, 2011, Representative Randy Forbes and Guam’s Delegate Bordallo focused on the
issue of whether U.S. forces in the Pacific have sufficient military readiness, including in the
realignment on Guam. Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Energy, Installations, and Environment
Jackalyne Pfannenstiel testified that the first focus would be on assuring adequate land to be able
to train the marines as they arrive in Guam. Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asian and
Pacific Security Affairs Michael Schiffer added later that there would need to be parallel progress
between the United States and Japan, so that the Futenma Air Station relocates to the Futenma
Replacement Facility, and marines relocate from Okinawa to Guam. He said that preparation on
Guam needs to begin well in advance of actual construction on the ground for the replacement
facility at Camp Schwab and that relocation of the marines from Okinawa will be phased with
completion of suitable infrastructure on Guam, with sequencing to maintain unit cohesion and
operational readiness. In answer to Mr. Forbes’ question of whether the Air-Sea Battle Concept
was ready, Schiffer testified that the concept was still an evolving operational concept. Major
General (USMC) Randolph Alles, PACOM’s Director of Strategic Planning and Policy (J-5),
stated that the concept addresses anti-access/area-denial but would be broader than just China,
cover situations around the world, and take several years to implement. Also, Alles acknowledged
concern about the vulnerability of above-ground stored fuel on Guam.
Force Structure. There could be attention to how Guam fits in more broadly to the U.S. force
structure in the Pacific. Senator James Webb called for more attention to “all the players out there
in the region” regarding the realignment in Guam, at a hearing on April 12, 2011, of the Senate
Armed Services Committee. Webb had started in the 1970s to look strategically at Guam’s place
in the U.S. defense posture in the Pacific, writing in 1974 that “it is quite conceivable that in ten
to twenty years the entire U.S. Pacific presence will be centered on a Guam-Tinian axis.” He
proposed back then a shift of the Marine Corps from Okinawa to Tinian. He lamented that “Guam
has been a loyal, though often unrecognized and ignored, segment of the American system.”35
As Senator Levin said at the Senate Armed Services Committee’s hearing in April, “the details of
the plans for Okinawa are many and complex, as are the details of the associated military buildup
on Guam. That said, because these actions will affect the U.S. military’s strategic positioning well
into the future, it is important that these issues be discussed and resolved.” Senator Webb said, “I
have a concern that we are at this point allowing the process to be determined in many ways
simply by the momentum of defense planners at a time when a lot of these pieces are in question.
So I hope we can have a hearing. I’m going to be traveling to Korea and then into Guam again
and Okinawa in the coming weeks, and Chairman Levin is going to accompany me to Guam and
Okinawa. I think it will be a very important set of visits and perhaps we can try to find ways to at
least clarify this matter and move forward.”
Subsequently, trying to move forward, Senators Levin, McCain, and Webb called in May 2011 for
a re-examination of plans to restructure military forces in South Korea, Japan, and Guam. They
critiqued the planned realignment as “unrealistic, unworkable, and unaffordable.” As another
objective, the Senators sought to reassure “Japan, Korea, and other countries that the United
States strongly supports a continuous and vigorous U.S. presence in the region” as well as “strong
bilateral alliances.”36 They also noted consideration of Japan’s enormous financial burden that
35 James Webb, Jr., Micronesia and U.S. Pacific Strategy: A Blueprint for the 1980s, Praeger Publishers, 1974.
36 Senate Armed Services Committee, “Senators Levin, McCain, Webb Call for Re-examination of Military Basing
Plans in East Asia,” May 11, 2011.
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resulted from the earthquake, tsunami, and nuclear disaster in March 2011. Contrary to much
press reporting that stressed the proposal as criticizing plans and trying to “freeze” or to “put on
hold” the plans, a goal of the Senators’ proposal to review basing plans was to address concerns,
cut costs, and make progress at a time when the realignment to Guam faced an impasse and a
strong U.S. military presence remained critical in the Asian-Pacific region. For Guam, the
Senators proposed to base a permanently assigned headquarters (with family accompaniment) for
a “stripped-down” presence of the Marine Corps, but bolstered by deployments of rotating
combat troops that would be home-based elsewhere. They noted that rotating units into and out of
Guam from a home base such as in Hawaii or California (and thus leaving families at those bases)
“would make a strong difference in terms of infrastructure costs for schools, medical, recreational
facilities, and housing.” The Senators also recommended that the Defense Department examine
the feasibility of moving Marine Corps assets at Futenma into Kadena Air Force Base while
dispersing some Air Force assets now at Kadena to other areas in the Pacific region, including
Andersen Air Force Base in Guam. They further noted that Kadena’s 6,000-acre ammunition
storage site could be downsized by making use of two ammunition storage areas already located
in Guam, including at Andersen.
Guam’s Delegate Madeleine Bordallo promptly issued a press release on the same day. She
focused on the Senators’ “re-examination” of the plans for bases in Guam and elsewhere. She also
focused on the Senators’ appraisal of Guam’s “strategic importance.” She saw their
recommendation as another opportunity for the Defense Department to further clarify plans and
rationale concerning the bases. However, she seemed to raise concerns that consolidating Marine
Corps assets from Futenma to Kadena Air Base needs to be addressed directly between the U.S.
Government and Japan’s Government, because it would require “serious changes” to the Defense
Posture Review Initiative (DPRI). She also raised concern that moving air assets from Kadena Air
Force Base to Andersen Air Force Base would require “careful attention to the balance among
forces on Guam so that additional air assets and associated personnel do not overload and unduly
strain [Guam’s] infrastructure.” Further, she raised concern that a “transient presence” of Marines
on Guam would reduce family housing but also reduce funds that would come from permanently
stationed forces. In addition, she expressed concern about reducing military families and their ties
to Guam. At the same time, Delegate Bordallo cited a mention in the proposal about an issue
related to firing ranges and reiterated her call for the Defense Department to certify a national
security requirement for such ranges. She also highlighted the Senators’ reference to Guam’s
“clear message” about its need for federal funds to build up its infrastructure outside of the bases.
According to her, when the time comes for the conference on the National Defense Authorization
Act, the Senators “will now better see” the need for her proposal to give the Defense Department
the authority to transfer funds to support local infrastructure. Finally, she assured her constituents
that the Senators did not propose to stop Guam’s buildup and that she took their view to be in line
with her’s and others in the House, namely, that the buildup should be “done right.”37
However, Assistant Secretary of State Kurt Campbell visited Tokyo and said on May 22, 2011,
that both the United States and Japan intended to go ahead with the current plans, based on the
Joint Declaration of 2006 and the Joint Statement of May 28, 2010. Also visiting Tokyo at the end
of May, Senator Daniel Inouye expressed support for the decision made in 2006.
37 Madeleine Bordallo, “Reaction to Senators’ Call for Re-examination of Military Basing Plans in East Asia,” May 11,
2011.
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Local Concerns. Related, there has been an issue of whether policymakers have addressed
Guam’s concerns about the scope and pace of the construction, as expressed by the local people
or their elected officials. For example, at a hearing of the House Armed Services Committee on
February 3, 2010, Guam’s Delegate Madeleine Bordallo urged Secretary Gates to take into
account the concerns of the local community that the buildup would be “done right,” including in
the impact on the environment. Senator Webb visited Tokyo, Okinawa, and Guam in February
2010, in part to listen to various people about the U.S. realignment in the region. He also urged a
more open discussion about the realistic timeline for the realignment and buildup on Guam by
2014. He urged sensitivity to the stress of the people and limitations of space on Guam, including
over the issue of whether the military should have more land beyond the current one-third of the
island.38 On April 25-26, 2011, Senators James Webb and Carl Levin visited Guam and met with
local officials, who assured them that Guam’s people support the defense buildup but with local
gains and improved communication of information from the Defense Department.39
Allies and Partners
For combined training and engagement with allies and partners, Guam has provided valuable and
less constrained airspace and bombing ranges for the air forces of Japan, Thailand, Singapore,
South Korea, and Australia. Also, Taiwan has asked to fly to Guam for training. Taiwan’s F-16
fighter pilots train at Luke Air Force Base in Arizona. Taiwan has other options for both training
and operations (such as humanitarian missions) to fly to Pacific nations like Palau and the
Solomon Islands that keep diplomatic ties with Taipei. Taiwan could assist such nations to
improve and extend their runways if needed. Taiwan could contribute more to regional security.
South Korea. The Guam Integrated Military Development Plan, parts of which were reported in
October 2006, indicated that U.S. Army units withdrawn from South Korea were not likely to be
stationed on Guam.40 The Pentagon’s restructuring plan reportedly intended to maintain U.S. air
power in South Korea, particularly the three squadrons of F-16 fighters based at Osan Air Base.
An emphasis on U.S. offshore forces in South Korean security could affect decisions regarding
the mix of U.S. forces based on Guam and rotated into Guam from other bases. This might
especially be true of heavy bombers, which the Air Force rotates into Guam from bases in the
United States. Concerns about maintaining deterrence after U.S. reductions of ground forces
might lead PACOM to increase exercises of heavy bombers and/or aircraft carrier strike groups
near Korea.41
In September 2008, Secretary of the Navy Donald Winter submitted a report that envisioned a
consolidation of the expeditionary training centers of the U.S. Pacific Air Forces (PACAF) from
South Korea to Guam.42 The Record of Decision for Guam of 2010 did not mention South Korea.
In testimony to the House Armed Services Committee on April 6, 2011, PACOM’s Commander,
Admiral Willard, testified that PACAF has planned to use Guam as the “hub” for air force assets
38 Senator James Webb, “Proper Reengagement in Asia Requires a Strong Alliance with Japan, a Strong Relationship
with the People of Guam,” press release, February 19, 2010.
39 “U.S. Senators Webb, Levin Hear Guam Concerns,” Guam Pacific Daily News, April 27, 2011; “Senator Jim
Webb’s East Asia Trip: Record of Activities and Achievements, April 16-29, 2011,” press release, April 29, 2011.
40 Murayama Kohei, “U.S. to Triple Troops in Guam, but No Earlier Than 2010 for Marines,” Kyodo, October 3, 2006.
41 Bill Gertz, “More Muscle, With Eye on China,” Washington Times, April 20, 2006; Robert Burns, “U.S. Air Power
in East Asia Has Grown,” Associated Press, October 11, 2006.
42 Donald Winter, “Report on Department of Defense Planning Efforts for Guam,” September 15, 2008.
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in strike and refueling missions in the Asian-Pacific region. Also, PACAF has been building some
projects to set up the Pacific Regional Training Center at Guam.
There could be an option for South Korea to contribute to the cost of the defense buildup on
Guam. Some officials have tied the buildup to North Korea’s threat. Deputy Assistant Secretary
of Defense for East Asia Michael Schiffer testified to Congress in March 2010 that the
implementation of the 2006 Realignment Roadmap would help meet shared security challenges,
including the threat posed by North Korea. Just after North Korea launched artillery attacks on
South Korea’s Yeonpyeong Island in November 2010, Guam’s Delegate Madeleine Bordallo
issued a statement that she received a briefing on the situation in South Korea from the Defense
Department. She also asserted that “this attack by North Korea is a reminder of the importance of
the United States remaining a vigilant and visible power in the Asia-Pacific region. Further it
highlights the importance of realigning our military forces in this region to be better postured to
address destabilizing events.” Senator Jim Webb delivered a speech in Tokyo in February 2011 in
which he noted that, given regional tension in the Koreas and elsewhere in Asia, “it is extremely
important for Japan and the United States to work to maintain a strategic stability in this region
and also for us to take advantage of the willingness of South Korea to join in this effort.”43
Japan. Under the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty, U.S. concerns involved possible conflict between
China and Japan over their competing claims to the Senkaku islands (called Diaoyu islands by
China) in the East China Sea. (Taiwan as the Republic of China also claims the islands as
Tiaoyutai.) The United States administered the islands after World War II and turned them over to
Japanese administration in 1972. Clinton and Bush Administration officials stated that the
Senkakus fall under the scope of the U.S.-Japan alliance. In September 2005, the PLA Navy
deployed five naval ships to the disputed area in the East China Sea with competing territorial and
oil claims. Under President Obama, after China escalated tension with Japan in wake of a PRC
fishing boat’s collision with Japan’s patrol boats in September 2010, Secretary of State Hillary
Clinton and Defense Secretary Gates explicitly assured Japan of the U.S. position that the
Senkakus are covered by the defense treaty. National Security Council (NSC) Senior Director for
Asian Affairs Jeff Bader also stated that while the United States takes no position on the
sovereign claim over the islands, the U.S.-Japan treaty covers areas administered by Japan,
including the Senkakus since 1972. The next month in Honolulu, Clinton publicly declared that
“the Senkakus fall within the scope of Article 5 of the 1960 U.S.-Japan Treaty of Mutual
Cooperation and Security.”44
China
China’s civilian and military commentators commonly have suspected that the U.S. defense
buildup on Guam partly has been aimed at China, which has threatened to use the People’s
Liberation Army (PLA) against Taiwan. U.S. policy on helping Taiwan’s self-defense is governed
43 Michael Schiffer’s testimony before the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Asia, the Pacific, and the Global
Environment, March 17, 2010; Guam Delegate Madeleine Bordallo’s press release, November 23, 2010; Senator Jim
Webb, keynote address, New Shimoda Conference, Tokyo, Japan, February 22, 2011.
44 CRS Report 96-798, Senkaku (Diaoyu) Islands Dispute: The U.S. Legal Relationship and Obligations, by Larry A.
Niksch; “U.S.-Japan Treaty Covers Disputed Isles,” Reuters, November 28, 1996; Yoichi Funabashi, “Maintain the
Armitage Doctrine Quietly,” Asahi Shimbun, February 2, 2004; “Clinton Tells Maehara Senkakus Subject to Japan-
U.S. Security Pact,” Kyodo, September 23, 2010; Defense Department, news briefing with Secretary Gates and
Admiral Mullen, September 23, 2010; White House, press briefing, New York, September 23, 2010; State Department,
Joint Press Availability with Japanese Foreign Minister Seiji Maehara, Honolulu, October 27, 2010.
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not by a defense treaty but by the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA), P.L. 96-8. Some concerns about
the PLA’s accelerated modernization since the Taiwan Strait Crisis of 1995-1996 also have
expanded beyond a focus on Taiwan to include PLA preparations for possible conflicts with the
United States, Japan, and others. In Southeast Asia, China claims much of the South China Sea as
well as the disputed Spratly and Paracel Islands in that sea as its “sovereign territory.” The PLA
has increased attention to Guam and has been building up its submarine force (both nuclear-
powered and diesel-electric). In November 2004, the PLA Navy sent a Han-class nuclear attack
submarine to waters off Guam before intruding into Japan’s territorial water.45 In 2007, PACOM
Commander Admiral Timothy Keating visited Guam and acknowledged that its defense buildup
was partly due to concerns about tension over Taiwan and deterrence of North Korea. At the same
time, he stressed U.S. transparency, saying the buildup was not “under the cover of darkness.”46
Later, in 2008, Deputy PACOM Commander, Lt. Gen. Dan Leaf (USAF), addressed the question
of whether China posed a threat and if China could see Guam as a threat, and he said that while
the United States had concerns about China’s military buildup, “that’s not why we’re basing
forces in Guam.” He noted that the forces were already based and standing ready in the Pacific,
with new adjustments in U.S. posture.47 While in Australia in late 2010 to discuss the alliance,
Defense Secretary Gates stated that moves to strengthen the U.S. military presence in the region
have been more about relationships with the rest of Asia than about China.48
Air-Sea Battle Concept. Under President Obama, the Pentagon issued a QDR in February 2010
that announced the development of a new joint Air-Sea Battle Concept, as noted above. The
QDR’s discussion of that concept did not name China. Nevertheless, some analysts discussed the
Air-Sea Battle Concept as a way to counter the PLA’s rising capabilities in anti-access and area-
denial (to prevent U.S. forces from entering into a theater of operations and to prevent U.S.
freedom of action in an area under an adversary’s control). A year later in February 2011,
PACOM’s Commander, Admiral Robert Willard, said that the Defense Department added the
Marine Corps into the study of the new doctrine. In March, Secretary Gates said that China,
North Korea, and Iran are countries that pose emerging asymmetric threats by developing
capabilities that appear designed to neutralize the advantages of the U.S. military in unfettered
freedom of movement and projection of power to any region. Gates said that with the new
concept, the Air Force and Navy would leverage each other’s capabilities to overcome future anti-
access and area-denial threats.49 At a hearing of the House Armed Services Subcommittee on
Readiness on March 15, 2011, Major General (USMC) Randolph Alles, PACOM’s Director of
Strategic Planning and Policy (J-5), explicitly testified that the new concept addresses anti-
access/area-denial but is broader in scope than attention to China. The concept would address
security situations around the world.
45 Kyodo World Service, November 16, 2004.
46 Audrey McAvoy, “U.S. Pacific Commander Says Taiwan is Factor in Guam Buildup,” AP, April 15, 2007.
47 Interview with Lt. Gen. Dan Leaf, Asia-Pacific Defense Forum, 1st Quarter 2008.
48 Phil Stewart, “U.S. Military Moves in Asia Not Aimed At China: Gates,” Reuters, November 7, 2010.
49 Michael McDevitt, “The 2010 QDR and Asia: Messages for the Region,” Asia Pacific Bulletin, East-West Center,
March 11, 2010; Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, “AirSea Battle: A Point-of-Departure Operational
Concept,” May 18, 2010; Bruce Rolfsen, “Air Force-Navy Team May Counter China Threat,” Navy Times, May 23,
2010; Bill Gertz, “Military to Bolster Its Forces in the Pacific,” Washington Times, February 18, 2011; Robert Gates,
speech at the Air Force Academy, Colorado Springs, March 4, 2011; “Team Links AirSea Battle to China,” Inside the
Pentagon, June 9, 2011; Dave Majumdar, “U.S. Air Force’s Bomber Will be One Aircraft, Not Many,” Defense News,
July 18, 2011; Tony Capaccio, “Panetta Reviewing Air-Sea Battle Plan Summary, Greenert Says,” Bloomberg, July 26,
2011. For a critical view: Thomas Barnett, “Big-War Thinking in a Small-War Era,” China Security, November 2010.
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Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for East Asia Michael Schiffer testified to Congress in
March 2010 that the implementation of the 2006 Realignment Roadmap would help meet shared
security challenges, including the threat posed by North Korea as well as uncertainty posed by the
PLA’s “rapid” modernization. In the same month in answer to Senator Daniel Akaka, PACOM’s
Commander, Admiral Willard, cited the PLA Air Force’s fighters and air defense systems for U.S.
deployment of F-22 fighters in the Pacific, including at Guam’s Andersen Air Force Base.50
Still, a policy challenge has been to avoid conflict with China and deter aggression by China as
well as to assure it that the U.S. goal is expanded cooperation with this rising power as a
responsible, peaceful, and rules-based country. Indeed, China has benefitted from U.S.
preservation of peace, stability, and prosperity in the region. The Commander of Pacific Air
Forces said in May 2005 that the PLA’s modernization gave him “pause for interest” but did not
make a difference in significant force redeployment.51 Also, in 2006, Guam became a focal point
for improving the military-to-military relationship with China. To blunt charges that Guam’s
buildup targeted China, PACOM’s Commander, Admiral Fallon, invited PLA observers to the
U.S. “Valiant Shield” exercise that brought three aircraft carriers to waters off Guam in June
2006. The PLA Navy sent a Deputy Chief of Staff and specialist in submarine operations to lead
the observers, who also boarded an aircraft carrier and visited Guam’s air and naval bases. In May
2008, two C-17 transport aircraft flew supplies from Guam to China for earthquake relief.
Legislation
This section covers major legislation related to the defense buildup on Guam. In July 2006, the
Senate Appropriations Committee issued a report (S.Rept. 109-286) on the Military Construction
and Veteran Affairs Appropriations Act, which expressed concerns about a construction program
on Guam estimated to cost $10.3 billion (with Japan paying 60%) and expectations of a master
plan for Guam from the Defense Secretary by December 29, 2006. In the Consolidated
Appropriations Act for FY2008 (that became P.L. 110-161 on December 26, 2007), the
appropriations committees decided against a Senate provision that would have required the
Defense Secretary to submit the master plan by December 29, 2007, and provided more time for a
report by September 15, 2008. In response, the Navy Secretary reported on planning for Guam,
with initiatives for the Air Force, Army, Navy, and Marine Corps. Also, he reported that the
Pentagon was developing the Guam Joint Military Master Plan.52
The National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for FY2009 (that became P.L. 110-417 on
October 14, 2008), inter alia, authorized a total of about $180 million for Guam’s military
construction projects, established a Treasury account for all contributions for military realignment
and relocations, and required the Defense Secretary to report on military construction projects by
February 15 of each year.
On May 7, 2009, days before Japan’s Diet ratified the relocation agreement with the United
States, Defense Secretary Gates submitted the proposed defense budget for FY2010. As part of
the realignment of the Global Defense Posture, he requested $378 million to start construction in
50 Testimonies before the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Asia, the Pacific, and the Global Environment,
March 17, 2010; and Senate Armed Services Committee, March 26, 2010.
51 General Paul Hester, interview with Inside the Air Force, May 6, 2005.
52 Donald Winter, “Department of Defense Planning Efforts for Guam,” September 15, 2008.
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Guam to support the relocation of 8,000 marines from Japan in order to strengthen the U.S.-Japan
alliance. This amount would contribute to the total U.S. cost of $4.18 billion for the relocation.
The NDAA for FY2010 (enacted as P.L. 111-84 on October 28, 2009) authorized the first
substantial incremental funding for the relocation of marines from Okinawa to Guam, but
conditioned upon the Defense Department’s submission to Congress of a Guam Master Plan.
Among a number of provisions related to Guam in the legislation and conference report,
Congress designated the Deputy Secretary of Defense to lead a Guam Executive Council and
coordinate interagency efforts related to Guam. Congress also required a report on training,
readiness, and movement requirements for Marine Forces Pacific, with a sense of Congress that
expansion of Marine Corps training should not impact the implementation of the U.S.-Japan
agreement on relocation from Okinawa to Guam. Congress authorized a total amount (including
for Defense-wide, Army, Navy, and Air Force) of almost $733 million.
The NDAA for FY2011 (enacted as P.L. 111-383 on January 7, 2011) changed the name of the
Guam Executive Council to Guam Oversight Council. Among the provisions related to defense
realignment on Guam, Congress required a report from the Defense Secretary on an assessment
of the natural and manmade threats to realigned forces on Guam, the facilities needed to support
those forces, and required costs. The House and Senate Armed Services Committees stated
concern on December 22, 2010, that the Defense Department failed to report to Congress the
detailed plan for projects for the realignment and that the Navy’s Record of Decision of
September 2010 deferred key decisions, including on training ranges and amphibious landings for
the Marine Corps. The committees recommended that Congress defer authorizations for
construction for the relocation on Guam pending additional information that includes an updated
master plan from the Defense Department. The committees reduced $320 million in the requested
authorization of appropriations (for three construction projects involving aircraft parking, site
preparation, and utilities). The NDAA for FY2011 authorized $176 million for projects on Guam.
On May 26, 2011, the House passed H.R. 1540, the NDAA for FY2012, which would authorize a
total of $303,521,000 for Marine Corps and Air Force projects in Guam in FY2012, after a
reduction of $64 million. Also, among a number of stipulations in Subtitle D for the realignment
in Guam, the legislation would prohibit the establishment of a firing range until the Defense
Secretary certifies a national security need related to readiness. After Senators Levin, McCain,
and Webb called for a re-examination of the realignment of forces, on June 17, the Senate Armed
Services Committee completed markup of the NDAA. According to the committee, it cut about
$156 million for two projects for the realignment of Marine Corps forces from Okinawa to Guam
because they would not be necessary in FY2012 and the Defense Secretary failed to provide a
master plan; and it cut $33 million for grants to purchase items related to the relocation to Guam
because the funds would be ahead of need. At the same time, the committee stated that the
relocation of marines to Guam remained an important aspect of the U.S.-Japan alliance. The
committee reported its NDAA for FY2012 as S. 1253 on June 22. Section 2208 on Guam
stipulated that none of the funds authorized to be appropriated or amounts provided by Japan for
projects on land under the Defense Department’s jurisdiction may be obligated or expended to
implement the realignment of Marine Corps forces to Guam until certain conditions are met,
including that the Marine Corps Commandant provides a force lay-down and the Defense
Secretary submits a master plan on costs and construction. The committee also directed the
Secretary to study the feasibility of moving Air Force assets from Kadena to Andersen and to
commission an independent assessment of the U.S. military posture in the Asian-Pacific region,
including the realignment of marines and buildup on Guam. (Also see CRS Report R41885,
Military Construction: Analysis of the FY2012 Appropriation and Authorization.)
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Figure 1. Map of Guam
Source: Guam-OnLine, http://www.guam-online.com/maps/maps.htm.
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Author Contact Information
Shirley A. Kan
Specialist in Asian Security Affairs
skan@crs.loc.gov, 7-7606
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