Libya: Unrest and U.S. Policy
Christopher M. Blanchard
Analyst in Middle Eastern Affairs
September 9, 2011
Congressional Research Service
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CRS Report for Congress
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Libya: Unrest and U.S. Policy
Summary
Muammar al Qadhafi’s 40 years of authoritarian rule in Libya have effectively come to an end.
The armed uprising that began in February 2011 has reached a turning point, and opposition
forces now control the capital city, Tripoli, in addition to the eastern and western areas of the
country. Most observers doubt the rebel gains are reversible. However, the coastal city of Sirte
and some parts of central and southern Libya remain contested, and, isolated groups of pro-
Qadhafi forces remain capable of armed resistance. The U.S. military continues to participate in
Operation Unified Protector, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) military operation to
enforce United Nations Security Council Resolution 1973, which authorizes “all necessary
measures” to protect Libyan civilians. As of September 9, Muammar al Qadhafi had not been
located or detained, and opposition Transitional National Council (TNC) leaders are urging their
forces to exercise restraint and caution so that Qadhafi, his family members, and key regime
officials may be captured alive, formally charged, and put to trial.
The Libyan people, their interim Transitional National Council, and the international community
are shifting their attention from the immediate struggle with the remnants of Qadhafi’s regime to
the longer-term challenges of establishing and maintaining security, preventing criminality and
reprisals, restarting Libya’s economy, and beginning a political transition. The TNC has issued
orders concerning security in Tripoli and established a high security council to coordinate its
forces. A TNC stabilization team is leading efforts to deliver services, assess Libya’s
reconstruction needs, and reform Libyan ministries. TNC officials have discussed interim security
advisory missions with the United Nations Secretary General but made no firm public
commitments. The Obama Administration has reiterated that it has no intention of deploying U.S.
military forces on the ground in Libya. U.S. officials express confidence that nuclear materials
and chemical weapons components that are stored in Libya remain secure and state that remote
monitoring of relevant facilities will continue. The proliferation of military weaponry from
Libyan stockpiles, including small arms, explosives, and shoulder-fired anti-aircraft missiles,
remains a serious concern, amid continuing press reports on unsecured weapons depots.
The shift in momentum and rebel success has led to an expansion of political recognition and
offers of international financial support for the TNC. Over 70 countries now have recognized the
TNC as the legitimate representative of the Libyan people. Resolution 1973 calls for the transfer
of seized Libyan government assets for the benefit of the Libyan people “as soon as possible,”
and the U.S. government successfully secured U.N. authorization for an initial transfer of $1.5
billion to support humanitarian, fuel, and salary needs. Billions more in other asset transfers and
new pledges of financial support have come from European and Middle Eastern governments.
Members of the intergovernmental Libya Contact Group and others met in Paris, France to
discuss transition arrangements and support for the TNC on September 1, and further
consultations are expected in conjunction with the United Nations General Assembly meetings in
New York during late September.
Libya’s citizens, transitional authorities, and rebel fighters now face the task of overcoming
Libya’s history of weak government institutions, potentially divisive political dynamics, and the
effects of the fight to overthrow Qadhafi. Security challenges, significant reconstruction needs,
and political uncertainty are likely to characterize events in Libya over the coming months.
Congress may consider and debate means for assisting Libya’s transitional authorities or
supporting international security efforts.
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Libya: Unrest and U.S. Policy
Contents
Background...................................................................................................................................... 1
Status as of September 9, 2011 ........................................................................................................ 3
U.S. Military Operations and Costs .................................................................................... 4
Congressional Action and Legislation................................................................................. 4
Assessment and Key Issues ....................................................................................................... 5
Conventional Weapons and Chemical and Nuclear Materials ............................................ 7
Military Support and Disarmament..................................................................................... 8
Libyan Assets, TNC Funding, and Oil Exports................................................................... 9
Humanitarian Conditions and Relief................................................................................. 10
International Criminal Court and United Nations Human Rights
Council Investigations.................................................................................................... 10
Prospects and Challenges for U.S. Policy...................................................................................... 12
Possible Scenarios ................................................................................................................... 12
Possible Questions................................................................................................................... 13
Libyan Political Dynamics and Profiles ........................................................................................ 13
Political Dynamics................................................................................................................... 13
Interim Transitional National Council (TNC) ................................................................... 15
Prominent TNC Figures .................................................................................................... 16
Opposition Military Forces ............................................................................................... 17
Exiles and Al Sanusi Monarchy Figures ........................................................................... 19
The Muslim Brotherhood.................................................................................................. 20
Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG)/Libyan Islamic Movement for
Change (LIMC).............................................................................................................. 21
Al Qaeda in the Lands of the Islamic Maghreb (AQLIM/AQIM) .................................... 23
Figures
Figure 1. Political Map of Libya...................................................................................................... 2
Contacts
Author Contact Information........................................................................................................... 24
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Libya: Unrest and U.S. Policy
Background
For a summary of recent events and conflict assessment, see “Status as of September 9, 2011.”
Political change in neighboring Tunisia and Egypt helped bring long-simmering Libyan reform
debates to the boiling point in January and early February 2011. In recent years, leading Libyans
had staked out a broad range of positions about the necessary scope and pace of reform, while
competing for influence and opportunity under the watchful eye of hard-liners aligned with the
enigmatic leader of Libya’s 1969 revolution, Muammar al Qadhafi. Qadhafi had long insisted that
he held no formal government position, but by all accounts he maintained his 40-plus-year hold
on ultimate authority until recently as the “reference point” for Libya’s byzantine political system.
Ironically, that system cited “popular authority” as its foundational principle and organizing
concept, but it denied Libyans the most basic political rights. Tribal relations and regional
dynamics, particularly eastern regional resentments, also influence Libyan politics (see “Political
Dynamics” below).
Qadhafi government policy reversals on WMD and terrorism led to the lifting of most
international sanctions in 2003 and 2004, followed by economic liberalization, oil sales, and
international investment that brought new wealth to some in Libya. U.S. business gradually
reengaged amid continuing U.S.-Libyan tension over terrorism concerns that were finally
resolved in 2008. During this period of international reengagement, political change in Libya
remained elusive and illusory. Some observers argued that Qadhafi supporters’ suppression of
opposition had softened, as Libya’s international rehabilitation coincided with steps by some
pragmatists to maneuver within so-called “red lines.” The shifting course of those red lines had
been increasingly entangling reformers in the run-up to the outbreak of unrest in February 2011.
Government reconciliation with imprisoned Islamist militants and the return of some exiled
opposition figures were welcomed by some observers. Ultimately, inaction on the part of the
government to calls for guarantees of basic political rights and for the drafting of a constitution
suggested a lack of consensus, if not outright opposition to meaningful reform, among leaders.
The current crisis was triggered in mid-February 2011 by a chain of events in Benghazi and other
eastern cities that quickly spiraled out of Qadhafi’s control. Although Libyan opposition groups
had called for a so-called “day of rage” on February 17 to commemorate protests that had
occurred five years earlier, localized violence erupted prior to the planned national protests. On
February 15 and 16, Libyan authorities used force to contain small protests demanding that police
release a legal advocate for victims of a previous crackdown who had been arrested. Several
protestors were killed. Confrontations surrounding their funerals and other protest gatherings
escalated severely when government officers reportedly fired live ammunition. In the resulting
chaos, Libyan security forces are alleged to have opened fire with heavy weaponry on protestors,
as opposition groups confronted armed personnel and overran a number of security facilities.
Popular control over key eastern cities became apparent, and broader unrest emerged in other
regions. A number of military officers, their units, and civilian officials abandoned Qadhafi for
the cause of the then-disorganized and amorphous opposition. Qadhafi and his supporters
denounced their opponents as drug-fueled traitors, foreign agents, and Al Qaeda supporters. Until
August, Qadhafi maintained control over the capital, Tripoli, and other cities with the help of
family-led security forces and regime supporters. The cumulative effects of attrition by NATO
airstrikes against military targets and a coordinated offensive by rebels in Tripoli and from across
western Libya turned the tide, sending Qadhafi and his supporters into retreat and exile.
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Figure 1. Political Map of Libya
Sources: Congressional Cartography Program, Library of Congress, edited by CRS.
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Status as of September 9, 2011
Amid continuing NATO-led military operations to enforce U.N. Security Council Resolution
1973, Libyan rebels have succeeded in ousting Muammar al Qadhafi’s government from power
through a coordinated offensive against the capital city, Tripoli. A planned uprising within the
city, paired with the defection of prominent regime figures and a multi-front attack, succeeded in
swiftly breaking the defenses of pro-Qadhafi forces over the weekend of August 20-22.
Continued fighting between rebel forces and pro-Qadhafi elements continued in areas of the city
for days, although the capture of the Qadhafi military compound at Bab al Aziziyah in the capital
signaled the symbolic end of Qadhafi’s reign. Qadhafi’s hometown of Sirte on the central coast
and areas of southern Libya have yet to be secured by rebel forces.1 As of September 9, Qadhafi
had not been located and detained, and he has issued calls for a guerilla warfare campaign and
vowed to resist surrender indefinitely. The prospect of a prolonged irregular warfare campaign by
Qadhafi supporters exists, even as organized pro-Qadhafi forces falter and in some cases flee to
neighboring countries.
The opposition Interim Transitional National Council (TNC) has asserted control over
developments in Tripoli and has begun the task of coordinating the diverse collection of armed
groups that made the rebel capture of the city possible. A “high security council” serves as a
coordinating mechanism for disparate rebel groups and former regime security force personnel,
including armed rebel factions from communities like Zintan and Misuratah and those led by
Islamist figures, such as former Libyan Islamic Fighting Group commander Abdelhakim Belhajj
(see “Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG)/Libyan Islamic Movement for Change (LIMC)”
below).2 TNC figures have issued repeated calls for armed groups and citizens to avoid
destruction of public property, looting, and reprisals, in a conscious effort to avoid some of the
immediate security problems that plagued Iraq in the wake of the collapse of Saddam Hussein’s
government. The TNC has signaled its intention to take a inclusive approach with regard to
government personnel not known to have been involved in severe human rights violations or
public corruption. The success of the TNC initiatives and the acceptability of this approach
among Libyans remains to be seen. TNC officials remain concerned about their ability to provide
services and maintain security, although the resumption of water service in Tripoli, deliveries of
fuel, and infusions of seized assets have improved their position.
1 On September 6, NATO Spokesperson for the Operation Unified Protector Colonel Roland Lavoie stated that “a
significantly improved security situation is gradually allowing Libyans to start rebuilding their country.” He also
warned that “pro-Qadhafi forces are still present in varying degrees in the areas of Bani Walid, Sirte, near the Al Jufrah
oasis and surrounding communities and the region of Sebha. Of course, Qadhafi forces cannot reverse the momentum.
Their capabilities are degraded, mercenaries are fleeing and many former regime leaders and military commanders are
abandoning their followers. Yet, Qadhafi is still issuing threats, calling for acts of aggression and commanding
remaining military assets in a senseless attempt to maintain control over populated areas.” Operation Unified Protector
Press Conference, September 6, 2011.
2 As of September 8, rebels from Zintan under the command of the Madani clan claimed to have 5,000 armed men in
Tripoli. Fighters from Misuratah reportedly shifted toward the pursuit of pro-Qadhafi forces in Sirte and Bani Walid
and their numbers in Tripoli had declined to 1,500. Belhajj claims to have taken a leading role in the Tripoli operations.
He was released from prison by the Qadhafi government in 2010 as part of a reconciliation agreement with LIFG
fighters in exchange for their renunciation of violence. See Adrien Jaulmes, “The Fragile Patchwork of the Libyan
Rebels,” Le Figaro (Paris), September 8, 2011, and U.S. Open Source Center (OSC) Report GMP20110824715001,
“Rebel Commander Balhaj Urges Al-Qadhafi Brigades To ‘Abandon’ Regime,” August 20, 2011; and OSC Report
GMP20100323950045, “Three leaders of Libyan Fighting Group freed – paper,” March 23, 2010.
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NATO member state officials and partner country representatives had previously agreed to extend
military operations through September 30, and recent statements from NATO officials indicate
that operations will continue consistent with the civilian protection and other mandates
established by Security Council Resolutions 1970 and 1973. NATO air operations and strike
sorties have continued during the recent opposition offensive at a slightly higher rate.3 This rate
may rapidly decline as remaining pro-Qadhafi forces surrender or are disarmed. Strikes now
focus on remaining pro-Qadhafi military assets in and around Sirte, Bani Walid, Hun, Al Jufrah,
and Sebha. NATO officials indicate that any future role for the alliance in Libya would be
contingent on authorization and a request by Libyan officials.
U.S. Military Operations and Costs
U.S. military forces continue to support all three elements of the NATO mission: maritime arms
embargo enforcement, no-fly zone patrol, and civilian protection. However, the bulk of U.S. air
operations has shifted from air strikes against Libyan ground targets toward refueling;
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR); electronic warfare; and suppression of
enemy air defenses (SEAD) for NATO aircraft performing no-fly zone patrol missions.4 Manned
U.S. aircraft carry out these missions. The United States has made armed drone aircraft available
for NATO use, and U.S. drones have carried out over 100 strike missions as part of the NATO
civilian protection operation. Manned U.S. aircraft also remain “on call” to potentially participate
in civilian protection strike missions. However, U.S. participation requires the prior approval of
the Secretary of Defense.
Through July 31, U.S. military operations had cost an estimated $896 million. As of June 3, over
$398 million of the U.S. costs were for munitions, many of which were used by U.S. forces
during the Operation Odyssey Dawn period to dismantle Libya’s air defense network preceding
the transfer of command to NATO for Operation Unified Protector. Through September 30, 2011,
the Administration had predicted that U.S. military operations in support of NATO in Libya, if
sustained at the tempo and balance prevailing in June, would have cost up to $1 billion, although
that total may not be reached in light of recent events.
Congressional Action and Legislation
Many Members of Congress have welcomed the opposition’s success in Tripoli, while expressing
concern about security in the country, the potential proliferation of Libyan weapons, and the
prospects for a smooth political transition. The Obama Administration has not immediately
signaled its intention to seek additional assistance funding for Libya, but has begun transferring
$1.5 billion in frozen Libyan assets for the benefit of the Libyan people and the TNC. According
to the State Department, the $1.5 billion was identified in consultation with the TNC for the
following purposes:5
3 As of August 24, NATO had flown over 20,262 sorties, including 7,635 strike sorties.
4 Through August 22, 2011, U.S. aircraft had flown 5,316 sorties, of which 1,210 were strike sorties. Of those strike
sorties, 262 dropped ordnance on targets. In addition, 101 Predator drone strikes had taken place. Reuters, “Factbox:
Pentagon says U.S. stepped up pace of Libya air strikes,” August 22, 2011.
5 State Department, Office of the Spokesperson, Unfreezing Assets to Meet the Critical Humanitarian Needs of the
Libyan People, Washington, DC, August 25, 2011.
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• Transfers to International Humanitarian Organizations - up to $120 million for
pending United Nations Appeal requests and up to $380 million more for any
revised UN Appeals for Libya and other humanitarian needs.
• Transfers to suppliers for fuel and other goods for strictly civilian purposes: Up
to $500 million to pay for fuel costs for strictly civilian needs (e.g., hospitals,
electricity and desalinization) and for other humanitarian purchases.
• Transfers to the Temporary Financial Mechanism established by the Libya
Contact Group: Up to $400 million for providing “key social services, including
education and health” and up to $100 million for “food and other humanitarian
needs.”
U.S. military operations to prevent remaining pro-Qadhafi forces from targeting civilians may
continue, although the prospect of a sustained military campaign requiring extended U.S.
investment and force deployments now appears less likely. As such, debate between Congress and
the Obama Administration about the authorization and cost of U.S. military operations in Libya
may diminish. Some Members of Congress have sought a clearer definition of U.S. objectives,
costs, and operations, and, in June and July, some Members of Congress became increasingly
assertive in their efforts to force President Barack Obama to seek congressional authorization for
continued U.S. military involvement. A number of proposed resolutions and amendments to
appropriations and authorization bills sought to require reporting on U.S. strategy and operations
or to proscribe limits on the authorization or funding for continued U.S. military operations in
Libya. Others have sought to authorize the continued use of U.S. Armed Forces in support of
NATO operations, short of the use of ground troops.
On June 3, the House adopted H.Res. 292 (Roll no. 411), which directed the Administration to
provide documents on consultation with Congress and a report “describing in detail United States
security interests and objectives, and the activities of United States Armed Forces, in Libya since
March 19, 2011.” The Administration submitted the report on June 15, 2011.6 The House of
Representatives rejected a series of other resolutions seeking to authorize or de-authorize
continuing U.S. participation in Operation Unified Protector. H.Con.Res. 75 would state the sense
of Congress that:
“the funds of the regime of Muammar Qaddafi that have been frozen by the United States
should be returned to the people of Libya for their benefit, including humanitarian and
reconstruction assistance, and the President should explore the possibility with the
Transitional National Council of using some of such funds to reimburse NATO countries for
expenses incurred in Operation Odyssey Dawn and Operation Unified Protector.”
Assessment and Key Issues
The Obama Administration’s stated policy objectives in Libya have been to protect civilians and
to secure a democratic political transition, including the departure of Muammar al Qadhafi from
power and the selection of a new government by the Libyan people. In pursuit of U.S. objectives,
the Administration is supporting military, financial, and diplomatic efforts to enforce United
Nations Security Council Resolutions 1970 and 1973, both of which stop short of calling for
Qadhafi’s removal. The Administration argued that sustained U.S. and international military and
6 Overview of United States Activities in Libya, June 15, 2011. Available from CRS.
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financial pressure would resolve core differences between U.S. and U.N.-endorsed goals by
convincing remaining loyalists to withdraw their support for Qadhafi and opening the way for his
departure and a settlement of the conflict. Qadhafi’s intransigence notwithstanding, the
combination of the opposition’s military operations and international military and financial
pressure appears to have succeeded in convincing many prominent regime figures to defect and
ultimately in toppling the Qadhafi regime. The implications of this regime change for Libya, the
region, and the United States remain to be seen.
The post-conflict Libyan political order will be complicated by the immediate consequences of
the current fighting, the legacies of decades of Qadhafi’s patronage- and fear-based rule, and the
chronic economic and political challenges that have fueled popular discontent in recent years.
Security is the immediate priority, and questions remain about the ability of the TNC to assert
control. Prior to the capture of Tripoli, reports from eastern Libya suggested that limited financial
resources and latent political rivalries were creating parallel challenges for the TNC as it sought
to solidify its base of support among the disparate groups that have risen against Qadhafi. The
July 2011 assassination of rebel military commander and prominent regime defector Abdelfattah
Younis al Ubaydi cast serious doubt on the unity of TNC-affiliated military forces and led to the
resignation of several TNC leadership figures. Various rebel groups have stated their recognition
of the TNC’s authority as a means of securing the country in the immediate aftermath of
Qadhafi’s fall. Press reports and interviews suggest that these groups remain wary of each other in
some cases.
Paying salaries, purchasing imports, maintaining public utility services, and meeting
administrative and military needs reportedly tested the limited financial resources and expertise
available to the TNC, although some reports suggest that recent infusions of previously frozen
assets have reduced some of the financial pressure.7 Both financial and administrative challenges
have increased now that the TNC is seeking to pay salaries and assert control over Libya’s major
population center in Tripoli and manage government entities in the rest of the country. Some TNC
leaders continue to cite financial constraints in public statements and urge foreign governments to
fully release frozen Libyan assets. Some reports from visiting nongovernmental experts and State
Department officials suggest that while a lively political atmosphere has emerged in opposition-
controlled areas, political support for the TNC among the broader population may be contingent
on the council’s ability to provide basic services and financial support via salaries and subsidies.8
Organized armed groups or ad hoc citizen coalitions may choose to challenge the TNC if public
hardships increase or if TNC political decisions prove controversial.
Taken together, these factors suggest that securing U.S. interests in Libya will require sustained
attention and resources beyond the scope of the current fighting and emergent transition period.
The Administration has not publicly disclosed any plans for U.S. participation in post-conflict
security, stability, or reconstruction operations in Libya or planned requests for new funding to
support such efforts by third-parties, such as the United Nations, NATO, the European Union, or
the African Union. United Nations Secretary General Ban Ki-moon and his special envoy,
Jordanian former foreign minister Abdel Ilah Khatib, are shifting from their pursuit of a cease-fire
7 CRS cannot independently verify the state of the opposition’s finances, but one opposition source indicated that, as of
May, costs had reached $100 million per day, with gasoline and other fuel imports constituting a particularly critical
need.Richard Spencer and Ruth Sherlock, “Libya’s Rebels To Run Out of Money ‘in Three Weeks,” Telegraph (UK),
May 3, 2011; VOA News, Libya’s Rebel Envoy Seeks Frozen Assets, August 25, 2011.
8 CRS review of unpublished NGO and unclassified State Department reporting, May 2011.
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agreement to discussions with Libyan parties about security monitoring, humanitarian assistance,
and the transition. The Secretary General has named UK-born Ian Martin his special adviser for
post-conflict and transition issues in Libya. A sector-by-sector post-conflict needs assessment is
planned under the auspices of the TNC, the United Nations, the European Union, and the World
Bank.
Conventional Weapons and Chemical and Nuclear Materials
The apparent proliferation of small arms, man-portable air defense missile systems (MANPADS),
and some heavy weaponry among fighters on both sides of the recent conflict has led some
outside counterterrorism and arms trafficking experts to express concern about the conflict’s
longer-term implications for regional security.9 Most security experts expect that unexploded
ordnance, explosive remnants, and looted weaponry will present a challenge inside Libya for an
extended period of time. On May 9, the Administration notified Congress that it had waived
normal congressional notification requirements to immediately obligate $1.5 million in
Nonproliferation, Antiterrorism, Demining and Related Programs (NADR) account funding for
“urgently needed assistance to collect, destroy, and re-establish control of Libyan munitions and
small arms and light weapons” in response to “a substantial risk to human health or welfare.”10
The funding was provided to non-governmental organizations specializing in international
demining and ordnance disposal. Those organizations and others are working with the United
Nations as part of a Joint Mine Action Coordination Team that issues regular reports on the status
of efforts to remove ordnance threats across Libya and related funding needs.11
The security of Libya’s stockpiles of declared chemical weapons material and its remaining
nuclear materials also has been the subject of scrutiny.12 Libya destroyed the munitions it
possessed for dispersing mustard agent in 2004, and since March 2011, U.S. officials have been
stating publicly that they believe the remaining sulfur mustard agent and precursor stockpiles are
9 For example, these concerns were raised in C. J. Chivers, “Experts Fear Looted Libyan Arms May Find Way to
Terrorists,” New York Times, March 3, 2011. African Union communiqués have expressed concern about regional
stability, and some Sahel region governments have specifically warned about Al Qaeda supporters seizing control of
specific types of weapons and exploiting the weakness of government forces in Libya to expand their areas of operation
and sanctuary. Algerian authorities have reportedly expanded the presence of security forces along their border with
Libya and have announced operations to eliminate weapons smugglers and seize smuggled weaponry and explosives.
10 The notification requirements were waived pursuant to Section 634a of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 and
Sections 7015(f) and 7015 (e) of the Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations
Act (SFOAA), 2010 (Div. F, P.L. 111-117), as carried forward by the Full-Year Continuing Appropriations Act, 2011
(Div. B, P.L. 112-10). The notification states, “The fighting in Libya and NATO air strikes have left many ammunition
storage areas totally unsecured and open to looting.… There is little or no perimeter security at the storage sites, and
munitions and small arms and light weapons, including thousands of MANPADS, have been looted for weeks. It is
critically important not only to the Libyan population, but to counter the threat of proliferation into neighboring regions
that work begin immediately to collect, control, and destroy conventional weapons and munitions, and reestablish
security at these storage sites. Terrorist groups are exploiting this opportunity and the situation grows more dangerous
with each passing day, a situation that directly impacts U.S. national security.”
11 For more information see the United Nations Mine Action Service website at http://www.mineaction.org/
overview.asp?o=3994.
12 For an overview of Libya’s declared chemical weapons and nuclear materials see U.S. State Department, Condition
(10) (C) Report - Compliance with the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and
Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction, August 2011; and, International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
Board of Governors, Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Socialist People’s Libyan Arab
Jamahiriya, GOV/2008/39, September 12, 2008.
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secure.13 The now non-weaponized nature of the sulfur mustard agent and precursor materials
suggests that they pose a smaller threat than otherwise may have been the case.14 In late 2010,
Libya had restarted the long-delayed destruction of its mustard agent and precursor stockpiles,
although technical problems and the outbreak of the conflict resulted in Libya missing its May
2011 deadline for the destruction of its mustard agent. In August 2011, the State Department
reported that prior to the conflict, Libya had destroyed over 50% of its mustard agent stocks and
over 40% of its liquid chemical weapons precursors. The transitional authorities are expected to
reengage with the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons to set a new destruction
timetable.
Libya’s nuclear materials also have been subject to international and U.S. oversight and joint
operations that removed highly enriched uranium and other proliferation-sensitive items. Libya’s
research reactor east of Tripoli at Tajura was converted with U.S. assistance in 2006 to operate
using low-enriched uranium. Libya also possesses a stored stockpile of at least several hundred
tons of uranium oxide yellowcake, reportedly stored near the southern contested city of Sebha.
Programs to engage Libyan nuclear scientists reportedly have been disrupted by the recent
conflict, but may be restarted as the transition unfolds.
Military Support and Disarmament
Throughout the uprising, the United States and its allies debated means for improving the military
capabilities and effectiveness of opposition forces while expressing some concern about the
identity and intentions of opposition fighters and the proliferation of small arms and heavy
weaponry inside Libya and beyond its borders. Some press reports suggest that Qatar provided
weaponry to TNC-affiliated forces and that Qatari, British, French, and Jordanian special forces
operatives provided military advice to opposition forces and support for NATO airstrikes,
including during the final campaign to seize Tripoli. CRS cannot confirm these reports. The
United Kingdom, Italy, and France acknowledged that they had sent military advisers to Benghazi
to work to improve opposition command and control arrangements and communications, outside
of their governments’ support for NATO operations.
U.S. officials have argued that the rebels’ most pressing needs are command and control,
communications, training, organization, and logistics support. These needs are expected to last
beyond the current fighting in addition to emerging needs associated with reconstituting a
national military for Libya, incorporating opposition fighters and former regime personnel into
security forces, demobilizing civilian volunteers, and destroying excess weaponry and
unexploded ordnance. The Administration notified Congress of plan to offer up to $25 million in
nonlethal material support to groups in Libya, including the TNC.15 Deliveries had begun, with
roughly half of the authorized amount delivered as of early August 2011.
13 The chemical materials are stored at Rabta, southwest of Tripoli and Ruwagha, near the Al Jufrah Air Force Base in
central Libya. According to the U.S. State Department, identified mustard and nerve agent precursors present in Libya
included pinacolyl alcohol, isopropanol, phosphorus trichloride, 2-chloroethanol, tributylamine, and thionyl chloride.
See State Department, Office of the Spokesperson, Libya: Securing Stockpiles Promotes Security, Washington, DC,
August 26, 2011.
14 “We believe that it’s secure,” said Colonel David Lapan, a Pentagon spokesman. “Even if not weaponized, there’s
still a threat, but it’s a smaller threat than if it is weaponized.” Agence France Presse, “Libya has mustard gas, lacks
delivery systems: monitor,” March 10, 2011.
15 Items have been drawn from Defense Department stocks and may include medical first aid kits, stretchers, bandages
(continued...)
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Libyan Assets, TNC Funding, and Oil Exports
The United States and others have frozen tens of billions of dollars in Libyan state assets, and the
Obama Administration has placed targeted sanctions on Libyan oil companies and other entities
in support of Executive Order 13566 and the recent U.N. Security Council resolutions on Libya.
The TNC has identified up to $170 billion in Libyan assets around the world to which it is
seeking access. The intergovernmental Libya Contact Group created a “temporary financial
mechanism” to support the TNC,16 and several governments have pledged hundreds of millions of
dollars via this channel. In the wake of the capture of Tripoli, Germany, Turkey, and Italy each
announced new plans to provide financial assistance to the TNC worth several hundred million
dollars, amid warnings from TNC officials that their ability to pay salaries and purchase needed
supplies will determine the stability of the country in the immediate transition period. Following
the “Friends of Libya” meeting in Paris on September 1, French officials indicated that up to $15
billion in previously frozen assets had been made available to the TNC and for the benefit of the
Libyan people. CRS could not confirm this aggregate.
Libya’s oil production and export infrastructure appears to have survived the civil conflict
relatively unscathed, although some facility damage, the departure of large numbers of laborers
and skilled technicians, and the lack of maintenance during the conflict may limit the speed with
which production and exports can be restarted.17 Prior to the conflict, Libya was exporting 1.3
million barrels of oil per day; current production is roughly 60,000 barrels per day. Experts differ
in their projections about how soon production and exports will return to pre-conflict levels, with
optimistic and pessimistic assumptions differing over expected security conditions, changes to
sanctions, and the return of foreign laborers. The importance of oil exports for Libya cannot be
overstated, as the IMF reported in February 2011 that over 90% of state revenue came from the
hydrocarbon sector in 2010. On September 6, new National Oil Company chairman Nuri
Berruien gave an “optimistic forecast” that in 15 months, production would resume at the pre-war
level of 1.6 million barrels per day.
The U.S. Treasury Department has issued a Statement of Licensing Policy allowing U.S. persons
to request from the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) “specific authorization to trade in
hydrocarbon fuel (i.e., oil, gas, and petroleum products) ... to the extent that such hydrocarbon
fuel is exported under the auspices of the Transitional National Council of Libya.”18 The license
further allows U.S. persons to request permission “to engage in transactions related to the
(...continued)
& dressing, surgical tape, blankets, meals ready to eat, tents, sleeping bags, canteens, uniforms, boots, tactical load-
bearing vests, bullet-proof vests, military helmets, maps, binoculars, infrared markers, panel marker, infrared (glint)
tape, HESCOS (or sandbags), hand shovels, and 9 volt batteries. CRS communication with State Department, April 29,
2011.
16 Over 20 Contact Group members attended the meeting in Rome including and officials from the Arab League, the
African Union, the World Bank, NATO, the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), the Organization of the Islamic
Conference (OIC), the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Australia, Bahrain, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Jordan,
Morocco, Netherland, Poland, Romania, Malta, Canada, Tunisia, Spain, Turkey, the United Kingdom, the United
States, Sudan and the Holy See. Portugal observed the meeting.
17 The oil terminal at Brega reportedly suffered the most damage, along with support infrastructure elsewhere.
18 Office of Foreign Assets Control, Statement of Licensing Policy on the Trade in Oil, Gas, and Petroleum Products
Exported Under the Auspices of the Transitional National Council of Libya,” (Updated April 26, 2011), available at
http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/Programs/Documents/libya_oil_gas.pdf.
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production of oil, gas, and petroleum products in areas controlled by the Transitional National
Council of Libya.” That license may change as the transition unfolds.
Humanitarian Conditions and Relief
The capture of Tripoli by opposition forces and the gradual establishment of security and
transitional authority control in other areas of the country should facilitate greater international
humanitarian access to internally displaced Libyans and communities with humanitarian needs.
Those needs are not fully known, but recent assessment visits indicate that the conflict has
disrupted the supply of food, medicine, fuel, and other commodities on a nationwide basis.
Potential changes to international sanctions on Libya also could mitigate some concerns about the
supply of goods and services to the Libyan population.19 The TNC, the United Nations, and third
parties are expected to discuss needs assessment and resource requirements in more detail over
the coming weeks.
According to the International Organization for Migration (IOM), as of June 14, over 679,000
people had fled the country since the fighting began.20 Throughout the conflict, the U.S.
government and its allies have worked to respond to the repatriation and humanitarian needs of
third country nationals who have fled Libya and remain in temporary Tunisian and Egyptian
border transit camps. According to U.N. Under-Secretary-General and Emergency Relief
Coordinator Valerie Amos and the International Organization for Migration (IOM), fighting in
western Libya displaced over 50,000 Libyan civilians, many of whom fled into Tunisia and some
of whom have begun to return in recent weeks. Italy and the European Union have expressed
concern about the movements of migrants from Libya by sea, in some cases on ships in unsafe
conditions that have been lost at sea. If security and economic conditions improve in Libya, flows
of migrants to Europe could slow.
International Criminal Court and United Nations Human Rights
Council Investigations
On June 27, 2011, Pre-Trial Chamber I of the International Criminal Court (ICC) issued arrest
warrants for three individuals: Muammar al Qadhafi, his son Sayf al Islam al Qadhafi, and
intelligence chief Abdullah al Senussi, for “crimes against humanity committed against civilians”
not including “war crimes committed during the armed conflict that started at the end of
February.”21 ICC Prosecutor Luis Moreno-Ocampo requested the warrants on May 16. On May 4,
Moreno-Ocampo reported to the Security Council pursuant to the referral of the situation in Libya
to the ICC by Resolution 1970,22 and stated that the preliminary investigation conducted by the
ICC prosecutor’s office “establishes reasonable grounds to believe that widespread and
systematic attacks against the civilian population, including murder and persecution as crimes
against humanity, have been and continue to be committed in Libya,” in addition to “war crimes”
19 In May, U.N. Under-Secretary-General and Emergency Relief Coordinator Valerie Amos reported that “The manner
in which the sanctions are implemented and monitored is causing serious delays in the arrival of commercial goods.”
U.N. Document S/PV.6530, Provisional Record of the 6530th meeting of the Security Council, May 9, 2011.
20 Response to the Libyan Crisis, External Situation Report, September 7, 2011.
21 ICC Prosecutor’s Office, Public Redacted Version of Prosecutor’s Application Pursuant to Article 58 as to Muammar
Mohammed Abu Minyar Gaddafi, Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi, and Abdullah Al Senussi,” May 16, 2011.
22 U.N. Document S/PV.6528, Provisional Record of the 6528th meeting of the Security Council, May 4, 2011.
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during the ongoing armed conflict. Some observers have argued that the prospect of an ICC trial
made it less likely that Qadhafi would have agreed to relinquish power or will now surrender to
the opposition.23 Interpol has issued arrest warrants for all three individuals.
The TNC has been supportive of the ICC efforts to investigate crimes in Libya, but its future
plans with regard to the ICC arrest warrants are as yet unclear. TNC officials have pledged to
pursue justice for Libyan victims of the recent fighting as well as victims from the Qadhafi era.
However, the transfer of individuals to foreign courts could remain politically sensitive for the
TNC or its successor. TNC officials informed the ICC of reports that Sayf al Islam al Qadhafi had
been detained, although those reports subsequently proved false. TNC officials have issued orders
for rebel fighters to avoid reprisals, although some reports suggest that both pro- and anti-Qadhafi
forces may have engaged in summary executions during recent fighting in Tripoli.
The U.N. Human Rights Council Commission of Inquiry also has completed a series of
interviews and site visits in western and eastern Libya and issued a report on its findings on June
1, 2011.24 The report characterizes the Libyan conflict as “a civil war” and concludes that
“international crimes, and specifically crimes against humanity and war crimes, have been
committed in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya.” With regard to government forces,
The commission has found that there have been acts constituting murder, imprisonment,
other forms of severe deprivation of physical liberty in violation of fundamental rules of
international law, torture, persecution, enforced disappearance and sexual abuse that were
committed by Government forces as part of a widespread or systematic attack against a
civilian population with knowledge of the attack.… The consistent pattern of violations
identified creates an inference that they were carried out as a result of policy decisions by
Colonel Qadhafi and members of his inner circle. Further investigation is required in relation
to making definitive findings with regard to the identity of those responsible for the crimes
committed.
With regard to opposition forces, the commission “established that some acts of torture and cruel
treatment and some outrages upon personal dignity in particular humiliating and degrading
treatment have been committed by opposition armed forces, in particular against persons in
detention, migrant workers and those believed to be mercenaries.” These acts constitute war
crimes. The commission “is not of the view that the violations committed by the opposition
armed forces were part of any ‘widespread or systematic attack’ against a civilian population such
as to amount to crimes against humanity.” The commission considers its findings in light of the
future transitional justice needs of the Libyan people and recommends that the Human Rights
Council establish a mechanism to continue the monitoring and investigation of human rights
abuses in Libya for a period of one year.
23 For example, see International Crisis Group, “Popular Protest in North Africa and the Middle East (V): Making
Sense of Libya,” Middle East/North Africa Report No. 107, June 6, 2011.
24 The commission members are Cherif Bassiouni of Egypt, Asma Khader of Jordan, and Philippe Kirsch of Canada.
See U.N. Document A/HRC/17/44, “Report of the International Commission of Inquiry to investigate all alleged
violations of international human rights law in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya,” June 1, 2011.
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Prospects and Challenges for U.S. Policy
In the wake of the rebel capture of Tripoli, events in Libya remain fluid and fast-moving.
Qadhafi’s disappearance and increased international recognition of the TNC as Libya’s governing
authority suggest that the Obama Administration’s goal of regime change is secured, in spite of
continued sporadic fighting between opposition and pro-regime forces. Yet even as Qadhafi’s
fortunes appear to whither, rapid consolidation of TNC control over Libya is not guaranteed. A
large number of armed groups are now active and their continued unity of purpose and
endorsement of proposed TNC transition plans (see “Interim Transitional National Council
(TNC)” below) cannot be taken for granted. Since the uprising began, U.S. officials have argued
that U.S. policy must remain flexible in order to effectively shape and respond to changing
developments. Given these circumstances, Administration officials and Members of Congress
may seek to better understand the range of possible outcomes and discuss their potential
implications and the authorization for and costs of potential U.S. responses in advance.
Possible Scenarios
Consolidation of Opposition Military Successes. During the conflict, various opposition forces
have had difficulty consolidating territorial gains and preventing the emergence of stalemate
conditions. However, the opposition’s recent sweep into Tripoli, the capture of the important
Qadhafi compound at Bab al Aziziyah, and the outpouring of celebration among Libyans suggest
that politically, if not militarily, Libya’s rebel cause has turned the corner in its struggle to
overthrow Qadhafi. Reports suggest that military operations in and around Sirte and Al Jufrah, in
southern areas near Sebha, and in western border areas may continue even as security control is
consolidated in Tripoli and other urban coastal areas. Continued NATO strikes against military
support targets may be necessary to prevent pro-Qadhafi elements from reemerging as an
organized national force. In the short term, TNC efforts are expected to focus on coordinating
disparate opposition forces, providing for basic security in newly liberated areas, and preventing
looting and reprisals. Over the medium term, the TNC or its successor may seek to set more
specific terms for the incorporation of rebel factions into national security forces, the
disarmament of volunteers, and the elimination of excess small arms and light weapons. In
addition to seeking access to frozen Libyan state assets to meet immediate needs, the TNC and its
allies may seek international financial and material support for security and reconstruction efforts,
including from the United States.
Competition or Collapse among Opposition Forces. Some expert observers of Libya’s
domestic politics have emphasized the general weakness and fractured condition of Libya’s
political landscape after 40 years of idiosyncratic abuse by Qadhafi and his supporters.
Competition among tribal, regional, or political groups that are not now apparent could emerge
during any post-conflict negotiations. The political ascendance of nonviolent Islamist opposition
forces or the potential intransigence of any of the armed organized factions now active, including
armed Islamists, also may create unique challenges. Opposition ranks might split in the short term
over differences in opinion about security arrangements or in the long term over the goals and
shape of the post-Qadhafi political system. The United States and Europe have expressed concern
about violent Islamist groups in Libya and were pursuing counterterrorism cooperation with the
Qadhafi government prior to the unrest.
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Possible Questions
Possible questions that Members of Congress may wish to consider when assessing the recent
developments in Libya and proposals regarding continued U.S. military operations, foreign
assistance, or political engagement in Libya include the following:
• Now that Qadhafi’s downfall appears certain, what are the goals of U.S. policy in
Libya? What U.S. national interests are at stake? What options exist for securing
them? How might continued U.S. or multilateral military interventions to protect
civilians contribute to or detract from those goals? What regional or international
political support and authorization exists for military and civilian operations in
Libya?
• How are events in Libya likely to shape developments in the broader Middle East
and North Africa? What unintended consequences may result from regime
change in Libya? What opportunities does regime change present? What
precedents have U.S. or multilateral military intervention in the Libyan conflict
set and how might those precedents affect the context in which U.S. decision
makers must respond to other regional crises and events?
• When and on what terms should U.N. or U.S. sanctions on Libyan entities be
removed? When should the United States transfer Libyan assets to a new Libyan
governing authority and for what purposes? Should the United States seek
reimbursement for the cost of military operations or humanitarian assistance?
• Who will assume responsibility for assisting Libyans with security, stabilization,
and reconstruction in the wake of the conflict? Under what authority and on what
terms? What role, if any, will the United States play in a post-conflict setting?
What appropriations or authorizations might be required to support such a role?
• Who are likely to be the key political, economic, and security actors in Libya
after the fall of Qadhafi’s government? What should a future U.S.-Libyan
bilateral relationship entail? What limits to engagement, if any, should the United
States impose on its dealings with Libyan entities? What type of security
relationship, if any, should the United States pursue with a new Libyan
government? When should the United States reestablish a regular diplomatic
presence?
• How secure are Libyan chemical weapons stockpiles and nuclear materials?
What can and should be done to limit the proliferation of conventional weaponry
within and beyond Libya?
Libyan Political Dynamics and Profiles
Political Dynamics
Prior to the recent conflict, Libya’s political dynamics were characterized by competition among
interest groups seeking to influence policy within the confines of the country’s authoritarian
political system and amid Libya’s emergence from international isolation. Economic reforms
embraced changes to Libya’s former socialist model to meet current needs, even as political
reforms languished amid disputes between hard-line political forces and reform advocates. In
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general, the legacies of Italian colonial occupation and Libya’s struggle for independence in the
early-to-mid-20th century continue to influence Libyan politics. This is reflected in the celebration
of the legacy of the anti-colonial figure Omar al Mukhtar during the current uprising. Prior to the
recent unrest, rhetorical references to preserving sovereignty and resistance to foreign domination
were common in political statements from all parties. Wariness of ground-based foreign
intervention and the slogan “Libyans can do it on their own” common among Libyans reflect that
sentiment and are likely to persist in a post-Qadhafi environment. Most Libyans accept a
prominent role for Islamic tradition in public life, but differ in their personal preferences and
interpretations of their faith. Islam is the official religion and the Quran is the nominal basis for
the country’s law and its “social code.”
Tribal relationships have remained socially important, particularly in non-urban settings, and had
some political role under Qadhafi with regard to the distribution of leadership positions in
government ministries, in some economic relationships between some social groups and families,
and in political-military relations. Tribal loyalties reportedly remain strong within and between
branches of the armed services, and members of Qadhafi’s tribe, the Qadhafa, have held many
high-ranking government positions. Some members of larger tribes, such as the Magariha,
Misurata, and the Warfalla, sought to advance their broad interests under Qadhafi through control
of official positions of influence, although some of their members have opposed the regime on
grounds of tribal discrimination.
Competition for influence among Libya’s regions characterized the pre-Qadhafi period, and some
saw the 1969 Qadhafi-led revolution as having been partly facilitated by western and southern
Libyan resentments of the Al Sanusi monarchy based in the eastern Libyan region of Cyrenaica.
Contemporary Libyan politics have not been dominated by overt inter-regional tension, although
pro-Qadhafi forces accused the organizers and leaders of the current opposition as having, inter
alia, an eastern regional separatist agenda. The opposition TNC has denied these accusations and
is moving quickly to move its representatives and leaders westward to Tripoli. Some reports
suggest that federalism is one model being explored by some opposition supporters, although the
TNC has not endorsed federalism to date.
Political parties and all opposition groups were banned under Qadhafi. Formal political pluralism
was frowned upon by many members of the ruling elite, even as in the period preceding the
unrest some regime figures advocated for greater popular participation in existing government
institutions. The general lack of widespread experience in formal political organization,
competition, and administration is likely to remain a challenge in the immediate post-Qadhafi era.
Independent NGO reports suggest ad hoc political organization is ongoing across opposition-held
areas and much of it reflects a desire for institution-based, democratic governance rooted in the
rule of law. Some nascent political and social groups in liberated areas have sought external
training and support to overcome the legacy of decades of restrictions. The continued openness of
newly liberated Libyans to outside examples and assistance remains to be determined.
Prior to the 2011 uprising, Libya’s opposition movements were often categorized broadly as
Islamist, royalist, or secular nationalist in orientation. Their activities and effectiveness had been
largely limited by disorganization, rivalry, and ideological differences. New efforts to coordinate
opposition activities had begun in response to Libya’s reintegration to the international
community and the emergence of a broader political reform debate in the Arab world, and gained
momentum with the outbreak of region-wide protests and political change in late 2010 and early
2011. The infusion of popular support and regime defectors to the general opposition cause inside
Libya was welcomed by many established opposition groups, even if the specific political
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demands of newly active opposition supporters and their compatibility with the agendas of the
established groups remain unclear.
U.S. policymakers continue to seek more information on the identities and backgrounds of
various opposition leaders and groups; the capabilities of armed opposition supporters; and the
relative intentions, goals, and legitimacy of opposition elements. Qadhafi and his supporters have
accused his opponents, including the TNC, of having an eastern regional separatist agenda and of
serving as a front for Al Qaeda. The TNC has denied these accusations, stressing its broad
nationalist orientation and denying formal connections to religious militants, while
acknowledging that some Islamists, including former Libyan Islamic Fighting Group members,
are involved in military operations against pro-Qadhafi forces.
Interim Transitional National Council (TNC)
Opposition groups have formed a 45-member Interim Transitional National Council (TNC) that
has worked to gain international recognition as the representative of the Libyan people from its
original base in the eastern city of Benghazi. The group has demonstrated some domestic political
legitimacy and authority, and its stated aspirations and appeals are addressed to all Libyans. Its
claims also have been endorsed by some Libyans abroad, including some Libyan expatriate
groups in Europe and the United States. The TNC states that local and regional citizen councils
that formed across Libya in the wake of the uprising have endorsed the Council and its agenda.
To date, over 40 governments have recognized the TNC as “the legitimate representative of the
Libyan people.” The United States government refers to the TNC as “the legitimate interlocutor
for the Libyan people during this interim period.”
Limited information is available about the TNC’s relationships with many emergent opposition
leaders, particularly in western Libya, whose identities TNC leaders had long claimed needed to
remain secret for their protection. The prominent role played by western activists and armed
elements in capturing Tripoli creates new urgency for understanding these relationships. In June,
the Administration reported to Congress that “The TNC has emphasized the importance of
representing all regions and people in Libya and even includes members from regime-controlled
areas such as Tripoli and Sebha.” The TNC’s approach to pro-Qadhafi groups in western Libya
could prove decisive in negotiating a political solution to any continued fighting. According to the
Obama Administration’s reporting to Congress, “the TNC has shown a willingness to work with
technocrats from the regime, provided they have not participated in human rights violations.”
Some opposition supporters, including the Libyan Muslim Brotherhood, have indicated they will
not support the participation of former government officials in any future transitional political
arrangement, although their positions may change.
The TNC has laid out key aspects of its political platform and approach to the conflict in a bid to
communicate clearly with domestic supporters and potential international sponsors and donors.
The TNC also has taken steps to clarify the legislative role of the Council and the role of its
“executive authority” and “stabilization team.” The executive authority plays a cabinet function
with individuals responsible for discrete portfolios including internal security, foreign relations,
social affairs, and Islamic endowments.
The TNC also has spelled out ambitious plans with regard to a potential transition. According to
TNC officials and a draft interim national charter, current plans call for local councils to select
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representatives to a reconstituted National Transitional Council, which will remain “the supreme
authority” in Libya, deriving its legitimacy from “the Revolution of February 17.”25 After moving
to Tripoli and naming an interim government—within 30 days of liberation—the NTC is to
choose members by secret ballot for a Constitutional Authority to draft a constitution that would
then be subject to a popular referendum. Within 60 days of the approval of a constitution, the
TNC will provide electoral laws for U.N.-supervised national elections to be held within six
months for a legislature and president. Transitional plans include a series of restrictions on the
ability of TNC and executive authority members from holding dual office, benefitting from
transactions involving state property, and standing for some future elected positions. The charter
states that “Islam is the religion of the state and the principal source of legislation is Islamic
jurisprudence (sharia).... The State shall guarantee for non-Moslems the freedom of practicing
religious rights and shall guarantee respect for their systems of personal status.”
The tone and guarantees in the draft interim national charter reflect prior TNC statements of
intent. On March 22, a Council statement said,
The Interim National Council is committed to the ultimate goal of the revolution; namely to
build a constitutional democratic civil state based on the rule of law, respect for human rights
and the guarantee of equal rights and opportunities for all its citizens including full political
participations by all citizens and equal opportunities between men and women and the
promotion of women empowerment. Libya will become a state which respects universal core
values that are embedded in the rich cultural diversities around the globe which includes
justice, freedom, human rights, and non-violence.
On March 29, the Council released a statement on “a vision of a democratic Libya,” which states
the Council’s view of its “obligation” to “draft a national constitution” with separation of
“legislative, executive and judicial powers” and measures to protect free association, political
participation, voting rights, and “freedom of expression through media, peaceful protests,
demonstrations and sit-ins and other means of communication, in accordance with the
constitution and its laws in a way that protects public security and social peace.”
A March 30 statement on counterterrorism affirmed the Council’s support for United Nations
Security Council resolutions on Al Qaeda and the Taliban and U.N. conventions on terrorism. The
statement “affirms the Islamic identity of the Libyan People, its commitment to the moderate
Islamic values, its full rejection to the extremist ideas and its commitment to combating them in
all circumstances, and refuses the allegations aiming to associate al-Qaeda with the revolutionists
in Libya.” This built on the Council’s March 29 statement, which said, “The state to which we
aspire will denounce violence, terrorism, intolerance and cultural isolation; while respecting
human rights, rules and principles of citizenship and the rights of minorities and those most
vulnerable.”
Prominent TNC Figures
• Mustafa Abdeljalil. (aka Mustafa Abdeljalil Fadl) Serves as chairman of the
Interim Transitional National Council. He served as Libya’s justice minister from
2007 through the onset of the uprising. He is known for having been supportive
25 CRS obtained a draft interim national charter from an independent source as well as from a translated version
available from the U.S. Open Source Center. Pending the availability of a final official version, this analysis is subject
to change.
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of some reform initiatives advanced by Sayf al Islam al Qadhafi and for
challenging Muammar al Qadhafi and his supporters regarding due process and
incarceration of prisoners in some prominent legal cases during 2009 and 2010.
He attempted to resign from his position in early 2010.26 He is a native of Bayda,
where he once served as chief judge. He is 59 years old. In February, Abdeljalil
claimed to have evidence that Qadhafi ordered the terrorist attack on Pan Am
Flight 103.
• Mahmoud Jibril. (aka Mahmoud Jibril Ibrahim Al Warfali) Mahmoud Jibril
serves as the interim Prime Minister and the foreign affairs representative for the
executive bureau of the TNC. He is a graduate of the University of Pittsburgh,
where he earned a masters degree in political science and a Ph.D. in planning in
the early 1980s. He is 58 years old, and is described by personal acquaintances
and professional contacts as being intelligent, moderate, analytical, detail-
oriented, and an articulate English speaker. He worked as an independent
consultant prior to serving as the secretary of the Libyan National Planning
Council and director-general of the National Economic Development Board
(NEDB) from 2007 onward. The NEDB was a government entity affiliated with
Muammar al Qadhafi’s relatively reform-oriented son Sayf al Islam that was
tasked with proposing institutional reform and attracting foreign investment and
educational exchange opportunities to Libya. He visited Washington, DC, during
the week of May 9 and met with Members of Congress, Senators, and
Administration officials.
• Ali Tarhouni – Serves as the vice chairman of the TNC executive authority.
Returned to Libya from the United States where he has lived since the early
1970s and worked as an economics professor at the University of Washington.
• Abdel Hafez Ghoga. Serves as vice-chairman and spokesman for the Council.
He is described in the Libyan press as a “human rights lawyer and community
organizer.” Reports suggest that Ghoga had been working to organize a national
transitional council at the same time as Mustafa Abdeljalil and others were
working to form the TNC. The two figures reportedly agreed to cooperate.
Opposition Military Forces
A military council was established in parallel to the TNC to coordinate the efforts of volunteers
and defectors, and that body may now be superseded by a Tripoli-based higher security council to
coordinate eastern and western rebel groups and former regime security officials. TNC
representatives have sought to manage rivalries among leading defectors, former exiles, and
volunteers, while remaining vague about the role of military forces who defected in the
opposition’s efforts to date. Rebel operations do not appear to have featured regular military units,
and regular units have not been prominent in international media coverage of opposition forces’
activities. Opposition-affiliated forces include the “17 February Forces,” the “Army of Free
Libya,” and groups made up of various secular and Islamist volunteers. Consistent coordination
among these different elements is not apparent, and key figures Abdelfattah Younis al Ubaydi and
Khalifah Belqasim Haftar reportedly competed for leadership of the opposition’s overall efforts
26 OSC Report GMP20100128950040, “Libyan Minister of Justice Resigns Over ‘Harsh’ Criticism in People’s
Congress,” January 28, 2010.
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prior to Younis’s assassination by an unidentified faction.27 During the conflict, much of the
reporting from combat areas regularly described the opposition as mostly untrained, poorly
equipped, uncoordinated, and without professional logistics or communications support.28 The
coordinated assault on Tripoli, including the reported intervention by Misuratah-based fighters
appeared to belie those descriptions, even as subsequent urban fighting has been chaotic.
Prominent opposition military and security figures include
• Omar al Hariri. Serves as the military affairs representative (or “defense
minister”) on the TNC. Hariri participated in 1969 anti-monarchy coup alongside
Qadhafi, but later was imprisoned and sentenced to death on suspicion of plotting
an uprising in 1975. He was moved to Tobruk and placed under house arrest in
1990. He is 67 years old. He has been quoted as calling for “a multi-party
system” in the event that Qadhafi is deposed.
• Abdelfattah Younis al Ubaydi. Assassinated in July 2011. Participated in the
1969 anti-monarchy coup alongside Qadhafi. Prior to the conflict, he served as
minister for public security and a special forces commander, which put him in
charge of some internal security forces through the start of the uprising. His
resignation and defection came just hours after Muammar al Qadhafi specifically
named him as one of his key supporters in a February 22 speech. Human rights
concerns prior to and potentially during the beginning of the unrest could have
involved forces under his command. He was the TNC-appointed leader of
military operations and remained an outspoken advocate for the opposition cause
until his death. Subsequent reports suggested that allegations that he misled the
opposition about his activities and forces may have contributed to suspicions that
he remained a clandestine Qadhafi supporter.
• Colonel Khalifah Belqasim Haftar. A veteran of the ill-fated Libyan invasion of
Chad during the 1980s, he turned against Qadhafi. Colonel Haftar returned to
Libya from exile in the United States after the uprising began.29 In the past,
Haftar has been mentioned as a leader of the Libyan Movement for Change and
Reform and the Libyan National Army, an armed opposition group reported to
have received support from foreign intelligence agencies and alleged to have
been involved in past attempts to overthrow Qadhafi.30 Press reports suggest
27 Kareem Fahim, “Rebel leadership shows signs of strain in Libya,” New York Times, April 4, 2011; Kim Sengupta,
“Divided and disorganised, Libyan rebel military turn on NATO allies,” The Independent (UK), April 7, 2011; and,
Rod Nordland, “As British Help Libyan Rebels, Aid Goes to a Divided Force,” New York Times, April 19, 2011.
28 One early April account described the opposition forces as follows: “The hard core of the fighters has been the
shabaab—the young people whose protests in mid-February sparked the uprising. They range from street toughs to
university students (many in computer science, engineering, or medicine), and have been joined by unemployed
hipsters and middle-aged mechanics, merchants, and storekeepers. There is a contingent of workers for foreign
companies: oil and maritime engineers, construction supervisors, translators. There are former soldiers, their gunstocks
painted red, green, and black—the suddenly ubiquitous colors of the pre-Qaddafi Libyan flag. And there are a few
bearded religious men, more disciplined than the others, who appear intent on fighting at the dangerous tip of the
advancing lines.… With professional training and leadership (presumably from abroad), the rebels may eventually turn
into something like a proper army. But, for now, they have perhaps only a thousand trained fighters, and are woefully
outgunned.” Jon Lee Anderson, “Who are the Rebels?” The New Yorker, April 4, 2011.
29 Chris Adams, “Libyan rebel leader spent much of past 20 years in suburban Virginia,” McClatchy Newspapers,
March 26, 2011.
30 OSC Report FTS19960821000373, “U.S.-Based Oppositionist Has ‘Secret Meetings’ Near Tripoli,” August 21,
(continued...)
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Haftar is now contributing to opposition training and command efforts and has
either taken or been granted the rank/title of General. Reports also suggest that
the TNC may have sought to remove him from a command role, and that Haftar
has resisted those efforts.
• Major Abdelmoneim Al Huni. An original member of the Revolution
Command Council, Al Huni had been serving as Libya’s representative to the
Arab League and resigned in protest of the use of force against protestors.
Regional press accounts from the 1990s describe Al Huni as having coordinated
with the opposition efforts of Colonel Haftar and others, before Al Huni
reconciled with Qadhafi in 2000.
• Abdelhakim Belhajj. Reported to be the commander of a significant contingent
of opposition forces involved in the capture of Tripoli, Belhajj is otherwise
known as the former commander of the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group, a U.S.-
designated Foreign Terrorist Organization. Belhajj, a veteran of the anti-Soviet
period in Afghanistan, fled Afghanistan via Iran and Thailand in the wake of the
U.S. invasion in 2001 and was detained and transferred to Libyan detention. He
remained imprisoned until 2010, when he was released as part of a reconciliation
agreement between the Qadhafi government and the LIFG.31
Exiles and Al Sanusi Monarchy Figures
Complex relationships among former regime figures, competing heirs to the former monarchy,
and long-standing opposition leaders may evolve as specific arrangements are made for
reconciliation and a new government.
Opposition groups in exile have included the National Alliance, the Libyan National Movement
(LNM), the Libyan Movement for Change and Reform, the Islamist Rally, the National Libyan
Salvation Front (NLSF), and the Republican Rally for Democracy and Justice. These groups and
others held an opposition conference—known as the National Conference for the Libyan
Opposition (NCLO)—in July 2005 in London and issued a “national accord,” calling for the
removal of Qadhafi from power and the establishment of a transitional government.32 A follow-up
meeting was held in March 2008.33 The NCLO reportedly helped lead the call for the February
17, 2011, “day of rage” that helped catalyze protests into a full-blown uprising against the
Qadhafi regime.
A royalist contingent based on the widely recognized claim to the leadership of the royal family
by Mohammed al Rida al Sanusi, the son of the former crown prince, has been based in London.34
(...continued)
1996.
31 Rod Nordland, “As British Help Libyan Rebels, Aid Goes to a Divided Force,” New York Times, April 19, 2011.
32 May Youssef, “Anti-Gaddafists Rally in London,” Al Ahram Weekly (Cairo), No. 749, June 30 - July 6, 2005; Al
Jazeera (Doha), “Opposition Plans to Oust Al Qadhafi,” June 25, 2005; Middle East Mirror, “Libya’s Fractured
Opposition,” July 29, 2005.
33 “Libyan Opposition Groups Meet in London To Reiterate Commitment To Save Libya,” OSC Report
GMP20080329825012, March 29, 2008.
34 His family name also is transliterated as Al Senussi. Immediately prior to his departure for medical treatment in
August 1969, the late King Idris signaled his intent to abdicate and pass authority to his crown prince and nephew,
Hasan al Rida al Mahdi al Sanusi. Crown Prince Hasan was serving as regent during the Qadhafi coup, and he and his
(continued...)
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His claim is disputed by a distant relative, whose family members also have given interviews to
international media outlets. On April 20, Mohammed al Sanusi met with members of the
European Parliament and said, “it is up to the Libyan people to decide whether they go down the
road of a constitutional monarchy or that of a republic.” He recently repeated similar sentiments
and called on Libyans “to lay the foundations for a democratic state.” The Libyan constitutional
monarchy system was overturned by Qadhafi in 1969, and Al Sanusi believes the old constitution,
if “suitably updated,” could “form the basis of a new Libya.” He also has pledged to “assist in
creating a democratic state for Libyans based on a representative parliament chosen by free and
fair elections.”
The Muslim Brotherhood
A statement attributed to the Libyan Muslim Brotherhood in late February 2011 welcomed the
formation of the TNC but called for a future, non-tribal government to “be formed by those who
actually led the revolution on the ground” and to exclude supporters of the original Qadhafi coup
or officials involved in human rights violations.35 This would seem to implicate some original
Qadhafi allies and security officials who have defected to the opposition cause. In the past, the
controller general of the Libyan Muslim Brotherhood, Suleiman Abdel Qadir, has described the
Brotherhood’s objectives as peaceful and policy-focused, and has long called for the cancellation
of laws restricting political rights.36 An individual with unconfirmed Muslim Brotherhood ties,
Dr. Ali al Salabi, has been the subject of opposition speculation and controversy regarding
negotiations he allegedly carried out with the Qadhafi government during the uprising. In the
past, Al Salabi participated in the government’s dialogue with imprisoned Islamists.
Like other political organizations and opposition groups, the Muslim Brotherhood was banned in
Libya under Qadhafi. Since the late 1940s, when members of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood
first entered Libya following a crackdown on their activities, the Libyan Muslim Brotherhood has
existed as a semi-official organization. Hundreds of Brotherhood members and activists were
jailed in 1973, although the Brotherhood eventually reemerged and operated as a clandestine
organization for much of the following two decades. In 1998, a second round of mass arrests took
place, and 152 Brotherhood leaders and members were arrested. Several reportedly died in
custody, and, following trials in 2001 and 2002, two prominent Brotherhood leaders were
sentenced to death and over 70 were sentenced to life in prison.37 The government announced a
(...continued)
family were imprisoned and placed under house arrest until being allowed to leave Libya in the late 1980s. Each of
King Idris’s potential direct heirs died as children. Upon Prince Hasan’s death in 1992, he passed the title of head of the
Al Sanusi royal house to his son, Prince Mohammed al Rida al Sanusi.
35 OSC Report GMP20110228405001, “Libyan Muslim Brotherhood Group Supports ‘Glorious Revolution,’” February
28, 2011.
36 In 2007, Abdel Qadir responded to political reform statements by Sayf al Islam al Qadhafi with calls for more
inclusive, consultative decision making. In a November 2008 interview, Abdel Qadir noted that reform outreach was
taking place under the auspices of the Qadhafi Foundation and not through official state organs, which in his view
undermined the significance of the outreach. He also repeated calls for reform and reconciliation aimed at creating a
constitution and protecting civil rights for Libyans. See OSC Report GMP20050803550006, “Al Jazirah TV Interviews
Libyan Muslim Brotherhood Leader on Current Situation,” August 3, 2005; OSC Report GMP20070830282001,
“Libyan MB Concerned Over Sayf al-Islam’s Statements Regarding New Constitution,” August 30, 2007; and, OSC
Report GMP20081111635001, “Libyan Muslim Brotherhood Official on Libya’s Foreign, Domestic Politics,”
November 10, 2008.
37 The two were group leaders Dr. Abdullah Ahmed Izzadin and Dr. Salem Mohammed Abu Hanek.
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retrial for the imprisoned Brotherhood activists in October 2005, and in March 2006, the group’s
84 remaining imprisoned members were released.38
Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG)/Libyan Islamic Movement for
Change (LIMC)
Prior to the 2011 uprising that began in eastern Libya, some reports examined whether the region
was a stronghold for Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG) members and other extremist groups
that might pose a threat to Libya’s security and potentially to regional security.39 Some Members
of Congress have expressed concern that violent Islamists may seek to exploit the conflict in
Libya or any post-conflict transition. On March 29, NATO Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
U.S. Admiral James Stavridis said in Senate testimony that he did not have “detail sufficient to
say that there’s a significant Al Qaida presence or any other terrorist presence in and among” the
Libyan opposition.40 The full effect of the ongoing unrest on the views, positions, and activities of
former-LIFG personnel and other potentially armed Islamist groups has not yet been determined,
although some former LIFG members appear to be providing security in opposition held areas
and engaging in fighting against pro-Qadhafi forces. Libyan government officials claim that some
LIFG members previously released as part of the government-approved reconciliation process
participated in violence at the beginning of the recent uprising and the government has accused
some individuals of seeking to establish “Islamic emirates” in eastern Libya.41 Some opposition
figures have decried the government accusations as scare tactics, although released figures such
as Abdelhakim Belhajj clearly have played a leadership role in some operations.
The LIFG is an Islamist movement that used violence in the past as a means to overthrow the
Qadhafi government.42 In recent years, its then-imprisoned leaders engaged in a dialogue and
reconciliation process with the Qadhafi Foundation, and over 200 LIFG members were released,
including senior leaders and former commanders (see below).43 Some Libya-based members of
the LIFG responded to the release of leading figures on February 16 by announcing the
reorganization of the group as the Libyan Islamic Movement for Change (LIMC). The LIMC
demands political change and an end to corruption, and has underscored its decision to “enter a
38 Afaf El Geblawi, “Libya Frees All Jailed Muslim Brotherhood Members,” Agence France Presse, March 3, 2006.
39 Peraino, “Destination Martyrdom,” Newsweek, April 19, 2008. For more information on AQIM see CRS Report
RS21532, Algeria: Current Issues, by Alexis Arieff, and CRS Report R41070, Al Qaeda and Affiliates: Historical
Perspective, Global Presence, and Implications for U.S. Policy, coordinated by John Rollins.
40 Testimony of Admiral James Stavridis before the Senate Armed Services Committee, March 29, 2011.
41 Libyan authorities specifically named Abdelkarim Ahsadi [a likely misspelling of Abdelhakim Al Hasadi],
Khayrallah Barasi, Mohamed Darnawi, and Abou Sofian Ben Guemou, a former U.S. detainee at Guantanamo Bay,
Cuba, who Libyan officials released in September 2010. Libyan government claims have not been independently
verified. OSC Report GMP20110223950040, “Senior Libyan Security Official Gives Details on Unrest in Benghazi
Tripoli,” February 22, 2011.
42 According to the State Department, the LIFG has attempted to assassinate Qadhafi four times, but “has been largely
inactive operationally in Libya since the late 1990s.” The August 2011 State Department report on terrorism noted the
reconciliation announcements in Libya and stated that, “To date, the November 3, 2007 merger with AQ, which many
LIFG members in Europe and Libya did not recognize, has not resulted in a significant increase in LIFG activities
within Libya.” See U.S. Department of State, “Terrorist Organizations: LIFG,” Country Reports on Terrorism 2010,
August 2011.
43 Prominent prisoners released under the auspices of the reconciliation program include former LIFG leader
Abdelhakim al Khuwaylidi Belhajj, former military director Khaled Sharif, and leading LIFG ideologue Sami Sa’idi.
OSC Report GMP20100323950045, “Three leaders of Libyan Fighting Group freed – paper,” March 23, 2010.
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new stage of struggle in which we do not adopt an armed program but a belief in the Libyan
people’s ability to bring about the change to which we are aspiring.”44 Muammar al Qadhafi has
both blamed Al Qaeda and violent Islamists for instigating the uprising, and, on March 15, he
threatened to join them if the United States or European countries intervened militarily in the
conflict.45
Al Qaeda Affiliation and Recantations
The United States froze the LIFG’s U.S. assets under Executive Order 13224 in September 2001,
and formally designated the LIFG as a Foreign Terrorist Organization in December 2004. In
February 2006, the U.S. Department of the Treasury designated five individuals and four entities
in the United Kingdom as Specially Designated Global Terrorists for their role in supporting the
LIFG.46 On October 30, 2008, Treasury designated three more LIFG financiers.47 Some observers
characterized the designations as a U.S. gesture of solidarity with the Libyan government and
argued that the ability and willingness of the LIFG to mount terror attacks in Libya may have
been limited. Others claimed that some LIFG fighters were allied with other violent Islamist
groups operating in the trans-Sahara region, and cited evidence of Libyan fighters joining the
Iraqi insurgency as an indication of ongoing Islamist militancy in Libya and a harbinger of a
possible increase in violence associated with fighters returning from Iraq.48
In November 2007, Al Qaeda figures Ayman al Zawahiri and Abu Layth al Libi announced the
merger of the LIFG with Al Qaeda, which many terrorism analysts viewed at the time as having
political rather than operational relevance.49 Abu Layth Al Libi was killed in an air strike in
Pakistan in February 2008. The group’s reported ties with Al Qaeda came under scrutiny in July
2009 after group members based in Britain reportedly renounced the group’s affiliation with Al
Qaeda, and contrasted the LIFG with others who use indiscriminate bombing and target
civilians.50 The statement warned that the group would “preserve [its] lawful and natural right to
oppose the regime if it does not turn its back on its previous policy that has led to tension and
deadlock.”
The Libyan government and the LIFG reached an agreement in which LIFG leaders renounced
violence against the Libyan state, and, later in 2009, the dialogue resulted in the issuance of
44 OSC Report GMP20110217825017, “Libya: IFG Elements Establish New Group Aiming for Peaceful Regime
Change,” February 17, 2011.
45 OSC Report EUP20110315058001, “'Exclusive’ Interview With Al-Qadhafi on Insurgency, Western Ties, US, Al-
Qa'ida,” March 15, 2011.
46 U.S. Department of the Treasury, “Treasury Designates UK-Based Individuals, Entities Financing Al Qaida-
Affiliated LIFG,” JS-4016, February 8, 2006.
47 U.S. Department of the Treasury, “Three LIFG Members Designation for Terrorism,” HP-1244, October 30, 2008.
48 Alison Pargeter, “Militant Groups Pose Security Challenge for Libyan Regime,” Janes Intelligence Review, Vol. 17,
No. 8, August 2005, pp. 16-19.
49 OSC Report FEA20071104393586, “Al-Zawahiri, Al-Libi: Libyan Islamic Fighting Group Joins Al-Qa’ida,”
November 3, 2007.
50 In a July 2009 statement, LIFG members in Britain characterized the November 2007 Al Qaeda affiliation
announcement from the late Abu Layth Al Libi as “a personal decision that is at variance with the basic status of the
group,” and sought to “clearly emphasize that the group is not, has never been, and will never be, linked to the Al
Qaeda organization.” OSC Report GMP20090703825003, “Libyan Islamic Fighting Group Abroad Issues Statement
Supporting Regime Dialogue,” July 3, 2009.
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written “recantations” of the LIFG’s former views on religion and violence.51 In October 2009,
over 40 LIFG prisoners were released, alongside other Islamists. However, Libyan and U.S.
concerns about LIFG’s domestic and international activities persisted. Qadhafi announced the
release of the final 110 “reconciled” LIFG members at the outset of the 2011 uprising, reportedly
including Abdelwahhab Muhammad Qayid, who has been identified in some sources as the
brother of prominent Al Qaeda ideologue Abu Yahya al Libi. In March 2011, Abu Yahya Al Libi
released a video condemning Qadhafi and calling on Libyans to use arms against Qadhafi
supporters, but to refrain from violence or criminality against each other.52
Al Qaeda in the Lands of the Islamic Maghreb (AQLIM/AQIM)
U.S. government officials and their regional counterparts remain focused on the potential for the
unrest in Libya to provide opportunities to Al Qaeda’s regional affiliate, Al Qaeda in the Lands of
the Islamic Maghreb (AQLIM/AQIM). Some press reports suggest that AQIM personnel have
obtained weaponry from looted Libyan military stockpiles, including surface-to-air missiles. The
Algerian and Chadian governments continue to express concern about the potential for instability
in Libya to weaken security along Libya’s long borders, which could allow AQIM operatives and
criminal networks that provide services to AQIM to move more freely.
While the imprisoned, Libya-based leaders of the LIFG participated in reconciliation with
Qadhafi’s government and renounced violence as a domestic political tool, the participation of
some of their supporters in efforts to send Libyans abroad to participate in insurgencies and
terrorism has raised concerns about the potential for cooperation between AQIM and some
Libyan Islamists. Former Guantanamo Bay detainee Abu Sufian Hamuda Bin Qumu has attracted
some media attention, and one figure, Abdelhakim Al Hasadi, is leading ad hoc security
arrangements in the eastern city of Darnah, which was home to several dozen Libyan recruits who
travelled to Iraq to fight U.S. and coalition forces.53 TNC oversight of his operations is not
apparent, although he has indicated his support for the Council’s role. As noted above, the group’s
former commander, Abdelhakim Belhajj, is playing a leadership role in some military operations
in and around Tripoli. Some Libyan observers have been critical of international media coverage
of these individuals and argue they represent an exception and have been given too much
attention.
On April 16, London-based pan-Arab newspaper Al Hayat published an email interview with a
reported spokesman for AQIM named Salah Abu Muhammad, who confirmed reports that AQIM
had obtained weaponry from Libyan military stockpiles and claimed that AQIM had cooperative
51 “Report on ‘Seething Anger’ in Libya Over Dismantling Al Qa’ida-Linked Cells,” OSC Report
GMP20080630825001 June 30, 2008; “Libya: Jailed Islamic Group Leaders ‘Preparing’ To Renounce Armed
Violence,” OSC Report GMP20080706837002, July 6, 2008; “Libyan Islamic Fighting Group Source Announces
Ideology Revision Nearly Complete,” OSC Report GMP20090615825012, June 15, 2009; and OSC Reports,
GMP20090911452001, GMP20090911452002, GMP2009091145200, GMP20090910488004, GMP20090911452004,
GMP20090915452001, “Libyan Newspaper Publishes Libyan Fighting Group Retractions,” September 2009.
52 OSC Report GMP20110313479001, “New Abu-Yahya al-Libi Video: ‘To Our People in Libya,’” March 12, 2011.
53 Kevin Peraino, “Destination Martyrdom,” Newsweek, April 19, 2008. Al Hasadi claims to have recruited Libyans to
fight in Iraq, but has publicly denied accusations he is affiliated with Al Qaeda or is seeking to establish Islamist rule in
Darnah or on a national basis. Al Hasadi appeared on Al Jazeera and read a statement denying the Libyan government’s
accusations. See OSC Report GMP20110225648002, “Libya: Former LIFG Leader Denies Plan To Establish ‘Islamic
Emirate’ in Darnah,” February 25, 2011; and, OSC Report EUP20110322025008, “Libya: Rebel Leader in Derna
Denies Local Presence of Extremists, Al-Qa'ida,” March 22, 2011.
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relationships with Al Hasadi and so-called “emirates” in several eastern Libyan cities. A
subsequent statement from another reported AQIM source accused Algerian intelligence services
of fabricating the Abu Muhammad interview.54 Neither source could be independently verified.
A March 17 statement attributed to AQIM leader Abdelmalik Droukdel (aka Abu Mus’ab al
Wudud) addressed Libyan rebels and sought to associate the Libyan uprising with Al Qaeda’s
campaign against Arab and Western governments.55 The statement advised Libyans to avoid
cooperation with the United States and “to rally around the revolutionary leaders who are holding
fast to their Islamic faith and whose readiness to make sacrifices has been proven on the
battlefield.” Other AQIM figures have sought to explain that their organization is not seeking to
direct or claim credit for the Libyan uprising, but that AQIM is supportive of the campaign
against Qadhafi. As noted above, U.S. and regional observers continue to monitor statements
from and actions by AQIM and Libyan Islamists closely.
Author Contact Information
Christopher M. Blanchard
Analyst in Middle Eastern Affairs
cblanchard@crs.loc.gov, 7-0428
54 See OSC Report GMP20110416825001, “Al-Qa’ida in Islamic Maghreb Spokesman Says There Are Islamic
Amirates in Libya,” April 16, 2011; and, OSC Report AFP20110418950070, “AQIM accuses Al-Hayat newspaper of
falsifying interview with spokesman,” April 18, 2011.
55 Droukdel said “the battle you are fighting now with the tyrant ... It is itself the battle we fought yesterday and are
fighting today.” See OSC Report GMP20110318405002, “AQIM Amir’s Audio Message to Libya, ‘The Descendants
of Umar al-Mukhtar,’” March 17, 2011.
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