Uzbekistan: Recent Developments and U.S.
Interests
Jim Nichol
Specialist in Russian and Eurasian Affairs
August 31, 2011
Congressional Research Service
7-5700
www.crs.gov
RS21238
CRS Report for Congress
Pr
epared for Members and Committees of Congress
Uzbekistan: Recent Developments and U.S. Interests
Summary
Uzbekistan gained independence at the end of 1991 with the breakup of the Soviet Union. The
landlocked country is a potential Central Asian regional power by virtue of its population, the
largest in the region, its substantial energy and other resources, and its location at the heart of
regional trade and transport networks. The existing president, Islam Karimov, retained his post
following the country’s independence, and was reelected in 2000 and 2007. He has pursued a
policy of cautiously opening the country to economic and political reforms, and many observers
have criticized Uzbekistan’s human rights record.
The United States pursued close ties with Uzbekistan following its independence. After the
terrorist attacks on the United States in September 2001, Uzbekistan offered over-flight and
basing rights to U.S. and coalition forces. However, U.S. basing rights at Karshi-Khanabad were
terminated in 2005 following U.S. criticism and other actions related to the Karimov
government’s allegedly violent crackdown on unrest in the southern city of Andijon. Since then,
the United States has attempted to improve relations, particularly in support of operations in
Afghanistan. In 2009, Uzbekistan began to participate in the Northern Distribution Network of
land, sea, and air transit routes from Europe through Eurasia for the supply of goods for U.S. and
NATO forces in Afghanistan.
Cumulative U.S. assistance budgeted for Uzbekistan in FY1992-FY2009 was $934.0 million (all
agencies and programs). Of this aid, $321 million (over one-third) was budgeted for combating
weapons of mass destruction (including Comprehensive Threat Reduction aid) or for Foreign
Military Financing. Food, health, and other social welfare and humanitarian aid accounted for
$220 million (nearly one-fourth), and democratization aid accounted for $168 million (nearly
one-fifth). Budgeted assistance was $12.0 million in FY2010 and an estimated $11.3 million in
FY2011, and the Administration has requested $11.8 million for FY2012 (numbers include funds
from the Assistance for Eastern Europe, Eurasia, and Central Asia Account and other “Function
150” foreign aid, and exclude Defense and Energy Department funds). The main priorities of U.S.
assistance requested for FY2012 are planned to be health, education, agriculture, and trade,
including efforts to encourage trade to support U.S. and NATO operations in Afghanistan.
These areas of assistance are permitted under provisions that otherwise limit U.S. aid to
Uzbekistan. Since FY2003 (P.L. 108-7), Congress has prohibited foreign assistance to the
government of Uzbekistan unless the Secretary of State determines and reports that Uzbekistan is
making substantial progress in meeting commitments to respect human rights; establish a
multiparty system; and ensure free and fair elections, freedom of expression, and the
independence of the media. In FY2008, Congress added a provision blocking Uzbek government
officials from entering the United States if they are deemed to have been responsible for events in
Andijon or to have violated other human rights.
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Uzbekistan: Recent Developments and U.S. Interests
Contents
Political Background ....................................................................................................................... 1
Human Rights............................................................................................................................ 3
Economic Developments ................................................................................................................. 6
Foreign Policy and Defense............................................................................................................. 7
Terrorism and Unrest ....................................................................................................................... 8
The 2005 Violence in Andijon, Uzbekistan............................................................................... 9
U.S. Relations ................................................................................................................................ 11
Contributions to Counter-Terrorism .............................................................................................. 13
Figures
Figure 1. Map of Uzbekistan ......................................................................................................... 14
Contacts
Author Contact Information........................................................................................................... 15
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Uzbekistan: Recent Developments and U.S. Interests
Political Background
Uzbekistan gained independence at the end of
Uzbekistan Basic Facts
1991 with the breakup of the Soviet Union.
Area and Population: Land area is 172,742 sq. mi.,
The landlocked country is the largest in
slightly larger than California. The population is 28.13
Central Asia in terms of population and the
mil ion (World Factbook, July 2011 est.). Administrative
third-largest in territory (behind Kazakhstan
subdivisions include the Karakalpak Republic.
and Turkmenistan; see box and Figure 1). The
Ethnicity: 80% are Uzbek, 5.5% Russian, 5% Tajik, 3%
existing president, Islam Karimov, retained his
Kazakh, 2.5% Karakalpak, 1.5% Tatar, and others (World
post following the country’s independence,
Factbook, 1996 est.). More than 1.2 million Uzbeks
and was reelected in 2000 and 2007. He has
reside in Afghanistan, 1 million in Tajikistan, and 500,000
in Kyrgyzstan.
pursued a policy of cautiously opening the
country to global economic and other
Gross Domestic Product: $85.85 billion; per capita
influences.
GDP is about $3,100 (World Factbook, 2010 est.,
purchasing power parity).
In January 2002, Karimov orchestrated a
Political Leaders: President: Islam Karimov; Prime
referendum on a new constitution that created
Minister: Shavkat Mirziyoyev; Speaker of the Legislative
Chamber: Dilorom Toshmmuhamadova; Speaker of the
a bicameral legislature. A constitutional
Senate: Ilgizar Sobirov; Foreign Minister: Elyor Ganiyev;
provision extended the presidential term to
Defense Minister: Major-General Qobil Berdiyev.
seven years. The legislature (termed the Oliy
Biography: Karimov, born in 1938, worked in Uzbek
Majlis or Supreme Assembly) consists of a
state planning and finance for much of his early career. In
120-member (later expanded, see below),
1989, he became First Secretary of the Uzbek
directly elected lower chamber, the Legislative
Communist Party. In 1990, the Uzbek Supreme Soviet
Chamber, and a 100-member upper chamber,
elected him to the newly created post of president, and
he also became a member of the Soviet Communist
the Senate. The Senate is composed of 16
Party Politburo. In December 1991, he was popularly
members appointed by the president, with the
elected president of Uzbekistan, winning 86% of the vote
rest selected by local legislatures. The
against opposition Erk Party candidate Mohammad Solikh
Legislative Chamber has formal responsibility
(Salih). In 1995, Karimov orchestrated a popular
for drafting laws. Constitutional amendments
referendum to extend his presidency until 2000, won
reelection, and in 2002 orchestrated another to extend
approved in April 2003 established that—after
his term until 2007. He was reelected in December 2007.
the presidential election at the end of 2007—
the prime minister would exercise greater power. In January 2005, Karimov explained that he
aimed to create three powerful branches of government, to correct a situation where “everything
now depends on me.”
Only government-controlled parties operate legally: the Popular Democratic Party (PDP),
formerly the communist party headed by Karimov; the Adolat (Justice) Social Democratic Party;
the Liberal-Democratic Party (LDP), consisting of government-connected businessmen; and the
Milliy Tiklanish (National Revival) Party, consisting of state-supported intellectuals. Opposition
parties such as Birdamlik, Birlik, Erk, Free Farmers, and the Sunshine Coalition are illegal. The
former Fidokorlar (Self-Sacrifice) National Democracy Party, created by Karimov as a youth
party, merged with the National Revival Party in June 2008, and the enlarged party joined the
“Democratic Bloc” of Legislative Chamber factions (including Adolat and the Liberal
Democratic Party) in August 2008. A constitutional law on parties and democratization came into
effect in 2008 that permits “opposition” party deputies in the Legislative Chamber to offer
alternative bills and take part in debates. The law also calls for the president to “consult” with
Legislative Chamber factions before nominating a candidate for prime minister.
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In December 2008, President Karimov signed electoral legislation that eliminated the nomination
of candidates for legislative and presidential elections by independent initiative groups, leaving
only parties as eligible to nominate candidates.1 The law also expanded the size of the Legislative
Chamber from 120 to 150. Fifteen of the members of the Chamber are to be elected by delegates
to a conference of the Environmental Movement of Uzbekistan (EMU), registered as a political
party in September 2008. The EMU proclaims that it is not like green parties in other countries,
so that it can focus on environmental issues rather than grasping for political power.
The Uzbek Central Election Commission (CEC) in mid-November 2007 approved four
candidates to run in the prospective December 23, 2007, presidential election. Incumbent
President Karimov was nominated by the LDP. The party which Karimov once headed, the PDP,
nominated its current head, Asliddin Rustamov. The Adolat Social Democratic Party nominated
its head, Dilorom Toshmuhammadova. A citizen’s initiative committee nominated Akmal Saidov.
The CEC disqualified the candidates nominated by the Milliy Taklanish and Fidokorlar parties at
their conventions (the latter party had sponsored Karimov during his 2000 election), saying they
had not gathered enough signatures. Although the Uzbek constitution bars a president from more
than two terms, the CEC argued that since the most recent constitution was approved in 2002,
Karimov’s “first term” followed his election in January 2000, and that he was eligible to run for a
“second term” in December 2007.
According to the report of a small election observation mission sponsored by the OSCE’s Office
of Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), the Uzbek CEC and local electoral
commissions controlled public appearances and spending by the candidates. There were no
campaign debates and media coverage was minimal, according to ODIHR. Each presidential
candidate used similar language to laud economic development and democratization under the
incumbent president. State-owned media urged the electorate to vote for Karimov. According to
the CEC, Karimov received 88% of 14.8 million votes with a 90.6% turnout. Each of the
remaining three candidates received about 3% of the vote. The OHIDR election mission issued a
press statement assessing the election as “generally fail[ing] to meet many OSCE commitments
for democratic elections.” Besides the problems noted above, others included lax rules regarding
early voting, frequent voting by one member of a household for all members, and an observed
low turnout. In his inaugural address in January 2008, Karimov thanked the citizenry “who gave
me a massive vote of confidence by freely expressing their will [in an] election which was held in
full compliance with ... universally recognized democratic standards.”2
Elections to the Legislative Chamber were held on December 27, 2009. Over 500 candidates from
the four approved parties ran for 135 seats, and an additional 15 seats were filled by voting at a
conference of the Environmental Movement. Turnout reportedly was almost 88% of 17.2 million
registered voters. The Central Electoral Commission reported that in 39 districts no candidate had
received over 50% of the vote, so that run-offs would be held on January 10, 2010. Following
these run-offs, the Liberal Democratic Party had won 53 seats, the People’s Democratic Party had
won 32 seats, the Milliy Tiklanish Democratic Party had won 31 seats, and the Adolat Social
1 The chairman of the Legislative Chamber’s Committee on Legislation, Nurdinjon Ismoilov hailed the elimination of
this nomination process as “primarily aimed at preventing various troublemakers from getting into parliament,
including members of organized crime groups, and their acquiring deputy immunity. This measure also prevents a
parliament post from being used to pursue clannishness and promote parochial and corporate interests.” National Word,
6 December, 2008, quoted in Sukhrobjon Ismoilov and Sanzhar Saidov, “On the Results of the Parliamentary Elections
in Uzbekistan,” Central Asia and the Caucasus, Vol. 11, Issue 1, 2010.
2 Open Source Center, Central Eurasia: Daily Report (hereafter CEDR), January 16, 2008, Doc. No. CEP-950404.
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Democratic Party had won 19 seats. The OSCE declined to send observers, stating that the
electoral environment did not permit a free and fair contest. Some U.S. embassy personnel
observed some of the voting, and the embassy stated afterward that the election campaign failed
to reflect diverse viewpoints, since candidates from only pro-Karimov parties were permitted to
run.3 Indirect elections to the Senate were held on January 20-22, 2010. The president’s 16
appointees to the Senate included deputy prime ministers, the chairman of the Supreme Court,
and the foreign minister, making the Senate an amalgam of the three branches of government.
Perhaps to create the appearance of diversity, the Liberal Democratic Party, the Milliy Tiklanish
Democratic Party, and the Adolat Social Democratic Party have declared that they form a
“majority democratic bloc” in the Legislative Chamber. The People’s Democratic Party has
declared that it is the “minority opposition” party. Opening a joint session of the newly elected
legislature in late January 2010, President Karimov called for studying the activities of the U.S.
Congress in order to boost the role of budgeting and oversight in the Uzbek legislature.4
In a speech in November 2010, President Karimov called for various constitutional changes
which were approved by the legislature in March 2001 and signed into law by the president in
April 2011. One of the changes provides for the political party that controls a majority of seats in
the lower legislative chamber to have the right to nominate a candidate for prime minister (all
existing political parties are pro-Karimov). Procedures also are outlined for the legislature to hold
a vote of no confidence in the prime minister. The prime minister is given responsibility for
appointing regional administrators, a power formerly lodged with the president. Another
amendment specifies that in the event the president is incapacitated, the chairman of the Senate
will serve as the interim head of state pending the holding of a presidential election within three
months. Some skeptics have linked the constitutional changes to government concerns that civil
discontent could become manifest as it did in several Middle Eastern countries in early 2011.
Others suggest that since some of the ostensible reform efforts predate the “Arab Spring,” they
are linked to infighting within the elite. Perhaps supporting the latter view, in mid-July 2011 the
legislature passed a joint resolution criticizing an economic report delivered by the prime
minister.5
Human Rights
Assessing human rights developments in 2010, Human Rights Watch, a non-government
organization (NGO), has reported that “Uzbekistan’s human rights record remains abysmal….
Authorities continue to crack down on civil society activists, opposition members, and
independent journalists, and to persecute religious believers who worship outside strict state
controls. Freedom of expression remains severely limited.”6 However, Assistant Secretary of
3 OSCE. ODIHR. Republic of Uzbekistan Parliamentary Elections 27 December 2009: OSCE/ODIHR Needs
Assessment Mission Report, October 21-22, 2009; Deirdre Tynan, “Uzbekistan: Tashkent Holds Parliamentary
Elections,” Eurasia Insight, December 28, 2009. Uzbek analysts Sukhrobjon Ismoilov and Sanzhar Saidov claim that
turnout was actually around 50% or less and that candidates were pre-designated to win seats. They argue that even
though “the political parties of Uzbekistan are incapable of rallying people around them and governing the state,” the
parties are gaining experience and eventually may be permitted to freely and effectively aggregate interests. “On the
Results of the Parliamentary Elections in Uzbekistan,” Central Asia and the Caucasus, Vol. 11, Issue 1, 2010.
4 CEDR, January 28, 2010, Doc. No. CEP-950069.
5 CEDR, July 22, 2011, Doc. No. CEP-950121.
6 World Report 2011: Events of 2010, Human Rights Watch, January 24, 2011.
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State Michael Posner stated during a visit to Uzbekistan in June 2010 that “there are a number of
[human rights] fields that the government here has made progress in,” such as permitting the
International Committee of the Red Cross to visit prisons, submitting a human rights report to the
U.N. under the Universal Periodic Review, increasing the power of the legislature, and carrying
out parliamentary exchanges with the U.S. Congress.7 The U.S. government also praised
Uzbekistan’s efforts to temporarily shelter displaced persons fleeing ethnic violence in
Kyrgyzstan in June 2010.
According to the State Department’s Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2010,
police routinely beat and otherwise mistreated detainees to obtain confessions. Sources reported
that torture and abuse were common in prisons and pretrial facilities. A few criminal cases were
opened against police charged with torture or other brutal treatment of prisoners or detainees.
Corruption among law enforcement personnel remained a problem. Police routinely and
arbitrarily detained citizens to extort bribes. There were at least 11 publicized prosecutions of law
enforcement officials on corruption-related charges. Authorities continued to arrest persons
arbitrarily on charges of extremism, including association with banned religious groups. Human
rights activists and journalists who criticized the government were subject to physical attack,
harassment, arbitrary arrest, and politically motivated prosecution and detention. The judicial
branch often took direction from the executive branch. Observers estimated that authorities held
13 to 25 individuals on political grounds. There were reports that security forces entered the
homes of human rights activists and members of some religious groups without a warrant.
The Uzbek government tightly controlled broadcast and print media, according to the State
Department. Police and security services increasingly subjected print and broadcast journalists to
harassment and arrest. Journalists reported that there were officials whose responsibilities
included censorship. The Uzbekistan National News Agency cooperated closely with presidential
staff to prepare and distribute all officially sanctioned news and information. The government
reported that there were 1,172 registered newspapers, magazines, news agencies, electronic media
outlets, and Web sites. Three of the country's most influential national daily newspapers were
government owned, as well as several other daily and weekly publications. The government
allowed publication of a few private newspapers. Four state-run channels dominated television
broadcasting. Numerous privately owned regional television stations and privately owned radio
stations were influential among local audiences. The government continued to refuse Radio Free
Europe/Radio Liberty, Voice of America, and BBC World Service permission to broadcast from
within the country.
The Uzbek government continued to restrict freedom of assembly and association, according to
the State Department. The government often did not grant the required permits for demonstrations
and dispersed and sometimes detained those involved in peaceful protests. The government
compelled most local NGOs to join a government-controlled NGO association that allowed the
government some control over their funding and activities. Penalties were imposed against
international NGOs for engaging in political activities, activities inconsistent with their charters,
or activities the government did not approve in advance. The government required NGOs to
submit detailed reports every six months on any grant funding received, events conducted, and
planned events for the next period. The government suppressed political opposition. The law
made it extremely difficult for genuinely independent political parties to organize, nominate
7 U.S. Embassy in Tashkent, Uzbekistan, Press Conference with Assistant Secretary of State for Democracy, Human
Rights, and Labor Michael Posner, June 18, 2010.
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candidates, and campaign. The government also exercised control over established parties by
controlling their financing and media exposure.8
Since November 2006, the State Department has designated Uzbekistan a “country of particular
concern” (CPC), for severe religious and other human rights violations that could lead to U.S.
sanctions. In its most recent report in May 2011, the U.S. Commission on International Religious
Freedom reported that “the Uzbek government ... harshly penalizes individuals for independent
religious activity, regardless of their religious affiliation. A restrictive religion law severely limits
the rights of all religious communities and facilitates the Uzbek government‘s control over them,
particularly the majority Muslim community.... The State Department should again designate
Uzbekistan as a CPC.” In June 2011, the State Department reported that Uzbekistan is a source
country for human trafficking for forces labor and sex, and that the government demonstrated
negligible progress in ceasing forced labor, including forced child labor, in the annual cotton
harvest. The State Department also stated that Uzbekistan did not make efforts to investigate or
prosecute government officials suspected to be complicit in forced labor, so would remain on the
“Tier 2 Watch List” of countries that do not fully comply with the minimum standards for the
elimination of trafficking.9
In 2009, the U.S. Department of Labor listed all the Central Asian states as countries that use
child labor to pick cotton. This list was meant to inform the choices made by the buying public. In
addition, on July 20, 2010, cotton from Tajikistan and Uzbekistan was added to a list that requires
U.S. government contractors to certify that they have made a good faith effort to determine
whether forced or indentured child labor was used to produce the cotton.10 In June 2011, the
Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations of the U.N.’s
International Labor Organization (ILO) discussed the issue of child labor in Uzbekistan, with the
U.S. representative raising concerns. The committee concluded that despite denials by the Uzbek
government, “there was broad consensus among the United Nations bodies, the representative
organizations of workers and employers and NGOs, regarding the ... systemic and persistent
recourse to forced child labor in cotton production, involving an estimated 1 million children....
The Committee expressed its serious concern at the insufficient political will and the lack of
transparency of the [Uzbek] Government to address the issue.”11
At his confirmation hearing on May 15, 2011, Ambassador-designate to Uzbekistan George Krol
reportedly stated that the United States will “relentlessly raise individual cases of [human rights]
repression both privately and publicly at all levels of the Uzbekistani government and will seek to
identify opportunities to support and expand space for civil society and human rights activists.”
8 U.S. Department of State. Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2010, April 8, 2011.
9 U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom, Annual Report, May 1, 2009, Annual Report, May 1, 2010, and
Annual Report, May 1, 2011; U.S. Department of State, Trafficking in Persons Report, June 27, 2011.
10 U.S. Department of Labor. Bureau of International Labor Affairs. Office of Child Labor, Forced Labor, and Human
Trafficking. The Department of Labor’s List of Goods Produced by Child Labor or Forced Labor, September 3, 2009;
Executive Order 13126, Prohibition of Acquisition of Products Produced by Forced or Indentured Child Labor, at
http://www.dol.gov/ILAB/regs/eo13126/main.htm.
11 U.N. International Labor Organization, Conference, 100th Session, Provisional Record, No. 18, Part 2, Third Item on
the Agenda: Information and Reports on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations, Report of the
Committee on the Application of Standards, Observations And Information Concerning Particular Countries, June 16,
2011, p. 114.
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He also pledged that the United States would continue to support “embattled civil society and
independent media.”12
Increased government concerns related to the “Arab Spring” have contributed to an Uzbek
crackdown on social media on the Internet and cell phones. In September 2011, a Facebook-like
social networking website is being launched by an Uzbek firm that some observers suggest may
be easily monitored.
Economic Developments
After economic dislocations associated with the breakup of the Soviet Union, the Uzbek economy
ceased to decline and began to turn around in 1996. In 2003, Uzbekistan announced that it would
permit full currency convertibility, but vitiated the reform by reducing money in circulation,
closing borders, and placing punitive tariffs on imports. These restrictions helped fuel organized
crime, corruption, and consumer shortages. Uzbekistan is the world’s fifth-largest cotton producer
and second-largest exporter. About one-fifth of the country’s economic activity is based on
agriculture (which employs 44% of the workforce). The largest portion of foreign currency
earnings is based on cotton exports, followed by exports of gold and natural gas. The government
closely controls export earning sectors. Over one-quarter of the population remains below the
poverty level, and a large portion of the working-age population has migrated abroad for work.
Some commercial firms have boycotted purchases of Uzbek cotton and finished goods on the
grounds that forced child labor is used to pick the cotton.
In response to the global economic downturn in 2008, the Uzbek government launched an anti-
crisis program to increase budgetary expenditures on infrastructure modernization, extend credit
to export industries, restructure bank debts, boost investment in small-sized businesses, and
augment public-sector wages and social welfare. Transfers from the Fund for Reconstruction and
Development, a pool of export and portfolio earnings launched in 2006, are being used for some
of these expenditures, although the Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU) business firm alleges that
mainly state-owned companies receive the funds. President Karimov reported that the fund held
$3.7 billion at the end of 2009.
The Uzbek government reported that GDP increased by 8.5% in 2010. The EIU states that the
Uzbek government’s economic data are untrustworthy, but that the Uzbek economy may have
improved somewhat during the year, bolstered by rising revenues from natural gas exports and
increased remittances from migrant workers. The government also reduced personal income and
profit taxes and increased public-sector wages and benefits in 2010 to bolster growth. The
government reports that GDP has grown 8% during the first half of 2011, led by increasing gold,
automobile, and cotton exports and a robust grain harvest. The EIU has estimated that consumer
inflation, which averaged 15% in 2010, may increase slightly to 16% in 2011, due to continuing
high food prices early in the year and rises in wages and benefits. According to EIU, currency
controls and high tariffs on imports continue to discourage some Western investors.13 Some
foreign media have reported that Uzbek authorities in recent months have stepped up raids against
dozens of domestic and foreign businesses, accusing them of tax and other violations, and have
12 Catherine Fitzpatrick, “Uzbekistan Weekly Roundup,” Eurasianet, June 3, 2011; U.S. Senate, Committee on Foreign
Relations, Nomination Hearing, Statement by George Krol, Nominee for Ambassador to Uzbekistan, May 17, 2011.
13 Uzbekistan: Country Report, Economist Intelligence Unit, August 2011.
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forced them to close.14 Other transnational corporations and governments continue to invest in
Uzbekistan. In June 2011, a flat tax for small and medium-sized businesses with less than 100
employees went into effect. That tax, along with new excise taxes on imported goods, threatens to
put many small firms out of business, according to some observers. The government states that
these firms contribute over 50% of GDP.
The International Crisis Group, an NGO, claimed in early 2011 that Uzbekistan has experienced
massive declines in the quality of healthcare, education, transportation, and other infrastructure
that threaten its future. The NGO also warns that “systematic change is impossible [in
Uzbekistan] because of overwhelming state control, ideological constraints and a fear of genuine
innovation.”15
Russia is the largest importer of Uzbek natural gas, up to 547 billion cubic feet in 2010.
Uzbekistan’s domestic gas pipeline system was connected to the Central Asia-China gas pipeline
at the end of 2010, and Uzbekistan plans to export up to 353 billion cubic feet of gas in 2011 to
China. Uzbekistan has supplied some petroleum products and electricity to Afghanistan, but
Uzbek oil production has been declining, leading to petrol shortages within Uzbekistan.
Foreign Policy and Defense
Home to more than half of the population of Central Asia, Uzbekistan seeks to play a leading role
in regional affairs. From the late 1990s until mid-2005, Karimov’s priority was to seek closer ties
with the United States, the European Union, and NATO while maintaining working relations with
Russia and China. However, after the mid-2005 events in Andijon (see below), he shifted to
closer ties with the latter two states. In 2001, Uzbekistan joined the Shanghai Cooperation
Organization and in 2003 insisted on hosting its Regional Anti-Terrorism Center. Uzbekistan has
ongoing tensions with other Central Asian states over its mining of borders, water-sharing, border
delineation, and other issues. In July 2008, the head of the Tajik Supreme Court asserted that
Uzbek security forces had bombed the Supreme Court building the previous summer as part of
efforts to topple the government. In 2002, the Turkmen government accused Uzbek officials of
conspiring to overthrow it. The Kyrgyz premier rejected claims by Karimov in 2005 that
Kyrgyzstan had provided training facilities and other support for the Andijon militants. Karimov
again accused Kyrgyzstan in late May 2009 of harboring terrorists that had attacked across the
border.
After the April 2010 coup in Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan tightened border controls with this country,
greatly harming its economy. Conflict between ethnic Uzbeks and ethnic Kyrgyz in southern
Kyrgystan in June 2010 further strained relations between the two countries. Up to 100,000 ethnic
Uzbeks fled fighting in southern Kyrgyzstan to refugee camps in Uzbekistan. Although critical of
the Kyrgyz government, Uzbekistan did not intervene militarily or permit its citizens to enter
Kyrgyzstan to join in the fighting. According to Assistant Secretary of State Eric Schwartz, “the
Government of Uzbekistan acted quickly and constructively in response to the humanitarian
14 Catherine Fitzpatrick, “Uzbekistan: Weekly Roundup,” Eurasianet, August 19, 2011.
15 Central Asia: Decay and Decline, International Crisis Group, February 3, 2011.
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crisis, [and] cooperated closely with U.N. agencies, the International Committee of the Red Cross
and non-governmental organizations. These efforts helped many people in a time of dire need.”16
Tajikistan has alleged that Uzbekistan delays rail freight shipments, purportedly to pressure
Tajikistan to halt construction of the Rogun hydro-electric power dam on the Vakhsh River, which
Uzbekistan fears could limit the flow of water into the country.
Uzbekistan has developed some ties with post-Taliban Afghanistan. In August 2011, Uzbekistan
completed a 50-mile railroad linking its border town of Hairatan with the city of Mazar-e-Sharif
in Afghanistan. The railway is part of the Northern Distribution Network (NDN) of U.S. and
NATO-developed land, air, and sea routes from Europe through Eurasia to Afghanistan. Since
2002, Uzbekistan has provided some electricity to northern Afghanistan. Since early 2008,
President Karimov has advocated the opening of U.N.-sponsored “6+3” Afghan peace talks
(participants would include regional powers Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Pakistan,
China, and Iran and outside powers NATO, the United States, and Russia), similar to the “6+2”
Afghan peace talks he had helped originate and which were held from 1999 to 2001 (NATO was
not included at that time). The United States has stressed an Afghan-led reconciliation process
(see also below, “Contributions to Counter-Terrorism”).
The Uzbek military is the most advanced among those of the Central Asian states. The armed
forces consist of about 50,000 ground force troops and 17,000 air force troops. There are also up
to 19,000 internal security (police) troops and 1,000 national guard troops.17 Uzbekistan’s military
doctrine proclaims that it makes no territorial claims on other states and adheres to nuclear non-
proliferation. Military cooperation between Russia and Uzbekistan is ensured through a 1992
Friendship Treaty, a 1994 military treaty, a 1999 accord on combating terrorism and Islamic
extremism, and a November 2005 Treaty of Alliance. The latter accord calls for mutual
consultations in case of a security threat to either party. After withdrawing in 1999, Uzbekistan
rejoined the Collective Security Treaty Organization in December 2006 (CSTO; members now
include Russia, Belarus, Armenia, and the Central Asian states except Turkmenistan). Uzbekistan
has appeared wary of Russian intentions regarding the CSTO, including by insisting that it will
not participate in rapid reaction forces established in June 2009 unless they pledge to not become
involved in disputes within the Commonwealth of Independent States.
Terrorism and Unrest
On February 16, 1999, six bomb blasts in Tashkent’s governmental area by various reports killed
16-28 and wounded 100-351. Karimov termed the bombing an assassination attempt. He alleged
that exiled Erk Party leader Mohammad Solikh (Salih) led the plot, assisted by Afghanistan’s
Taliban and IMU co-leader Tahir Yuldashev. Solikh denied any role in the bombings. In
November 2000, Yuldashev and Namanganiy received death sentences and Solikh 15.5 years in
prison. Another defendant, Najmiddin Jalolov (see below), received 18 years (all in absentia).
Other security threats included the invasion of neighboring Kyrgyzstan in July-August 1999 by
several hundred IMU and other guerrillas. They were rumored to be aiming to create an Islamic
state in south Kyrgyzstan as a springboard for a jihad in Uzbekistan. By mid-October 1999, they
16 U.S. Department of State. Opening Statement of Assistant Secretary Schwartz, June 29, 2010. See also “Tashkent’s
Response to Kyrgyz Crisis Boosts Karimov’s Image,” Eurasianet, July 15, 2010.
17 International Institute of Strategic Studies. The Military Balance, March 7, 2011.
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had been forced out of Kyrgyzstan with Uzbek aid. In August 2000, dozens of IMU and other
guerrillas again invaded Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, but were expelled by late October. In
September 2000, the State Department designated the IMU as a Foreign Terrorist Organization,
and stressed that the “United States supports the right of Uzbekistan to defend [itself against] the
violent actions of the IMU.”
A series of bombings and armed attacks took place in Uzbekistan in late March-early April 2004,
reportedly killing 47 individuals. President Karimov asserted that the attacks were aimed to
“cause panic among our people, [and] to make them lose their trust” in the government. The then-
Combined Forces Commander for Afghanistan, Lieutenant General David Barno, visited
Uzbekistan in April 2004 and stressed that “we stand with Uzbekistan in facing down this
terrorist menace.” The obscure Islamic Jihad Union of Uzbekistan (IJU; reportedly a breakaway
faction of the IMU) claimed responsibility. Suspected terrorists testified at a trial in mid-2004 that
Jalolov was the leader of IJU, that they were trained by Arabs and others at camps in Kazakhstan
and Pakistan, and that the IJU was linked to Hizb ut-Tahrir, the Taliban, Uighur extremists, and Al
Qaeda. During this trial, explosions occurred on July 30, 2004, at the U.S. and Israeli embassies
and the Uzbek Prosecutor-General’s Office in Tashkent. The IMU and IJU claimed responsibility.
On May 25-26, 2009, a police checkpoint was attacked on the Kyrgyz-Uzbek border, attacks took
place in the border town of Khanabad, and four bombings occurred in Andijon in the commercial
district, including at least one by suicide bombers. Several deaths and injuries were alleged,
although reporting was suppressed. Uzbek officials blamed the IMU, although the IJU allegedly
claimed responsibility. President Karimov flew to Andijon on May 31. In late August 2009,
shootings took place in Tashkent that resulted in the deaths of three alleged IMU members and
the apprehension of other group members. The Uzbek government alleged that the group had
been involved in the 1999 explosions and in recent assassinations in Tashkent.
In May 2005, the State Department designated the IJG/IJU as a Foreign Terrorist Organization
and Specially Designated Global Terrorist, and in June, the U.N. Security Council added the
IJG/IJU to its terrorism list.18 In June 2008, Jalolov and his associate Suhayl Fatilloevich Buranov
were added to the U.N. 1267 Sanctions Committee’s Consolidated List of individuals and entities
associated with Osama bin Laden, al Qaeda, and the Taliban. Also, the U.S. Treasury Department
ordered that any of their assets under U.S. jurisdiction be frozen and prohibited U.S. citizens from
financial dealings with the terrorists.19
The 2005 Violence in Andijon, Uzbekistan
Dozens or perhaps hundreds of civilians were killed or wounded on May 13, 2005, after Uzbek
troops fired on demonstrators in the eastern town of Andijon. The protestors had gathered to
demand the end of a trial of local businessmen charged with belonging to an Islamic terrorist
group. The night before, a group stormed a prison where those on trial were held and released
18 U.S. Department of State. Press Statement: U.S. Department of State Designates the Islamic Jihad Group Under
Executive Order 13224, May 26, 2005; U.N. Security Council. The Al-Qaida and Taliban Sanctions Committee. Press
Release: Security Council Committee Adds One Entity to Al-Qaida Section of Consolidated List, SC/8405, June 3,
2005.
19 U.S. Department of the Treasury. Press Release: Treasury Designates Leadership of the IJU Terrorist Group, June
18, 2008.
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hundreds of inmates.20 Many freed inmates then joined others in storming government buildings.
President Karimov flew to the city to direct operations, and reportedly had restored order by late
on May 13.21 On July 29, 439 people who had fled from Uzbekistan to Kyrgyzstan were airlifted
to Romania for resettlement processing, after the United States and others raised concerns that
they might be tortured if returned to Uzbekistan.22
The United States and others in the international community repeatedly called for an international
inquiry into events in Andijon, which the Uzbek government rejected as violating its sovereignty.
In November 2005, the EU Council approved a visa ban on 12 Uzbek officials it stated were
“directly responsible for the indiscriminate and disproportionate use of force in Andijon and for
the obstruction of an independent inquiry.” The Council also embargoed exports of “arms,
military equipment, and other equipment that might be used for internal repression.”23 In October
2007 and April 2008, the EU Council suspended the visa ban for six months but left the arms
embargo in place. In October 2008, the EU Council praised what it viewed as some positive
trends in human rights in Uzbekistan and lifted the visa ban, although it left the arms embargo in
place.24 In October 2009, it lifted the arms embargo.
At the first major trial of 15 alleged perpetrators of the Andijon unrest in late 2005, the accused
all confessed and asked for death penalties. They testified that they were members of Akramiya, a
branch of HT launched in 1994 by Akram Yuldashev that allegedly aimed to use force to create a
caliphate in the area of the Fergana Valley located in Uzbekistan. Besides receiving assistance
from HT, Akramiya was alleged to receive financial aid and arms training from the IMU. The
defendants also claimed that the U.S. and Kyrgyz governments helped finance and support their
effort to overthrow the government, and that international media colluded with local human rights
groups and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in this effort. The U.S. and Kyrgyz
governments denied involvement, and many observers criticized the trial as appearing stage-
managed. Reportedly, 100 or more individuals were arrested and sentenced, including some
Uzbek opposition party members and media and NGO representatives.25 Partly in response, the
U.S. Congress tightened conditions on aid to Uzbekistan (see below).
20 There is a great deal of controversy about whether this group contained foreign-trained terrorists or was composed
mainly of the friends and families of the accused. See U.S. Congress. Commission on Security and Cooperation In
Europe. Briefing: The Uzbekistan Crisis. Testimony of Galima Bukharbayeva, Correspondent. Institute for War and
Peace Reporting, June 29, 2005. For a contrasting assessment, see Shirin Akiner, Violence in Andijon, 13 May 2005:
An Independent Assessment, Central Asia-Caucasus Institute, July 2005; and AbduMannob Polat, Reassessing Andijan:
The Road to Restoring U.S.-Uzbek Relations, Jamestown Foundation, June 2007.
21 Analyst Adeeb Khalid draws a parallel between the Uzbek government’s actions at Andijon and at a large student
demonstration in Tashkent in January 1992. In the latter case, Karimov allegedly ordered troops to fire on the marchers,
resulting in up to six deaths and two dozen or more injuries. Islam After Communism (Berkeley, CA: University of
California Press, 2007), p. 155. See also Reuters, January 17, 1992.
22 See also CRS Report RS22161, Unrest in Andijon, Uzbekistan: Context and Implications, by Jim Nichol.
23 Council of the European Union, Uzbekistan: Council Adopts Restrictive Measures, Press Release 14392/05,
November 14, 2005. U.S. officials argued that the United States already had been limiting military assistance—at
congressional request—because of human rights abuses.
24 Council of the European Union, 2824th General Affairs Council Meeting, Press Release, October 15-16, 2007; 2864th
and 2865th General Affairs and External Relations Council Meetings, Press Release, April 29, 2008; 2897th General
Affairs and External Relations Council Meeting, Press Release, October 13, 2008. Some international human rights
groups protested against a visit by the head of the Uzbek state security service—who had been subject to the visa ban
lifted by the COE—to Germany in late October 2008. He reportedly advised German officials on IJU activities in
Central Asia.
25 OSCE, Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), Report from the OSCE/ODIHR Trial
(continued...)
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U.S. Relations
According to testimony to Congress by Assistant Secretary of State Robert Blake, “Uzbekistan
remains a valued partner for its participation in the Northern Distribution Network [various U.S.
military and NATO land, sea, and air supply routes transiting Central Asia to Afghanistan] and its
role in Afghanistan reconstruction. A few years ago Uzbekistan began a new effort to export
reasonably-priced electricity to Afghanistan.... Uzbekistan has facilitated transit for essential
supplies to coalition forces in Afghanistan.” He also stated that the Obama Administration in late
2009 began annual bilateral consultations with Uzbekistan to elevate dialogue, make contacts
regular, and achieve greater cooperation on trade, the human dimension, and energy issues.26
During President Karimov’s March 2002 U.S. visit, former Uzbek Foreign Minister Abdulaziz
Komilov and former Secretary of State Colin Powell signed a Declaration on Strategic
Partnership and Cooperation that set forth broad-scale goals for political, economic, security, and
humanitarian cooperation. The accord pledged the United States to “urgent consultations” in the
case of external security threats to Uzbekistan and pledged Uzbekistan “to further intensify the
democratic transformation of society in the political, economic and spiritual areas,” and to
“ensure the effective exercise and protection of human rights.”27 U.S. relations with Uzbekistan
were set back in 2005 after the United States joined others in the international community to
criticize an Uzbek government crackdown in the town of Andijon (see above). The criticism
contributed to Uzbekistan’s closure of over a dozen U.S.-based or U.S.-supported non-
governmental organizations (NGOs), the termination of U.S. basing rights at Karshi-Khanabad
(see below), a fall-off in official and diplomatic contacts, and the strengthening of U.S.
congressional restrictions on aid to the Uzbek government (see directly below).
U.S.-Uzbek relations recently have improved, according to the Administration. Assistant
Secretary of State Robert Blake visited Uzbekistan in November 2009 and stated that his
meetings there were “a reflection of the determination of President Obama and Secretary Clinton
to strengthen ties between the United States and Uzbekistan.” He proposed that the two countries
set up high-level annual consultations to “build our partnership across a wide range of areas.
These include trade and development, border security, cooperation on narcotics, the development
of civil society, and individual rights.”28 The first Bilateral Consultation meeting took place in late
December 2009 with a U.S. visit by an Uzbek delegation led by Foreign Minister Vladimir
Norov. The two sides drew up a plan for cooperation for 2010 that involved diplomatic visits,
increased military-to-military contacts, and investment and trade overtures.29
(...continued)
Monitoring in Uzbekistan, April 21, 2006; Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Uzbekistan, Comments on the
Report Prepared by the OSCE ODIHR, April 19, 2006.
26 U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on Europe and Eurasia, Hearing on
U.S. Relations with Europe and Eurasia, Testimony by Robert O. Blake, Jr., Assistant Secretary, Bureau of South and
Central Asian Affairs, March 10, 2011.
27 U.S. Embassy in Tashkent, Uzbekistan, Press Release: United States-Uzbekistan Declaration on the Strategic
Partnership and Cooperation Framework, March 12, 2002, at http://uzbekistan.usembassy.gov/pr031203.html.
28 U.S. Embassy in Tashkent, Uzbekistan. Press Conference of Assistant Secretary for South and Central Asian Affairs
Robert Blake, October 14, 2009.
29 CEDR, January 29, 2010, Doc. No. CEP-4019.
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During her December 2010 visit to Uzbekistan, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton stated that an
improved bilateral relationship was “crucial” to U.S. interests. She reportedly thanked President
Islam Karimov for Uzbekistan’s support for the Northern Distribution Network (transport routes
supporting military operations in Afghanistan) and for other assistance to Afghanistan. She stated
that issues of human rights also had been discussed. She hailed the signing of a bilateral science
and technology cooperation agreement as an effort “to try to find other ways to connect with and
promote positive cooperation between our two countries.”30 After Secretary Clinton’s visit, a
small pro-democracy rally in Tashkent, the capital, was broken up. In November 2010, Assistant
Secretary of State Robert Blake testified to Congress that “the Obama Administration has
increased its engagement with Uzbekistan on a full agenda of security, economic and human
rights issues. In the regional security field, Uzbekistan has become a key partner for the United
States' effort in Afghanistan…. It has facilitated transit for essential supplies to Coalition forces
and constructed an important railroad line inside of Afghanistan. Through this increased
engagement, we have seen an improved relationship with Uzbekistan, but many challenges
remain. We continue to encourage the Uzbek authorities to address significant human rights
concerns.”31
The second U.S.-Uzbek Bilateral Consultation meeting took place in February 2011 with a visit
to Uzbekistan led by Assistant Secretary Blake. The talks reportedly included security
cooperation, trade and development, science and technology, counter-narcotics, civil society
development, and human rights. A U.S. business delegation discussed means to increase trade
ties. Blake reported that the United States had purchased $23 million in Uzbek goods for transit to
Afghanistan in FY2010 (see below).
Cumulative U.S. assistance budgeted for Uzbekistan in FY1992-FY2009 was $934.0 million (all
agencies and programs). Of this aid, $321 million (over one-third) was budgeted for combating
weapons of mass destruction (including Comprehensive Threat Reduction aid) or for Foreign
Military Financing. Food, health, and other social welfare and humanitarian aid accounted for
$220 million (nearly one-fourth), and democratization aid accounted for $168 million (nearly
one-fifth). Budgeted assistance was $12.0 million in FY2010 and an estimated $11.3 million in
FY2011, and the Administration has requested $11.8 million for FY2012 (numbers include funds
from the Assistance for Eastern Europe, Eurasia, and Central Asia Account and other “Function
150” foreign aid, and exclude Defense and Energy Department funds). The main priorities of U.S.
assistance requested for FY2012 are planned to be health, education, agriculture, and trade,
including efforts to encourage trade to support U.S. and NATO operations in Afghanistan.
These areas of assistance are permitted under provisions that otherwise limit U.S. aid to
Uzbekistan. Since FY2003 (P.L. 108-7), Congress has prohibited foreign assistance to the
government of Uzbekistan unless the Secretary of State determines and reports that Uzbekistan is
making substantial progress in meeting commitments to respect human rights; establish a
multiparty system; and ensure free and fair elections, freedom of expression, and the
independence of the media. Congress received a determination of progress in FY2003. In FY2004
and thereafter, however, some aid to Uzbekistan has been withheld because of lack of progress on
democratic reforms. In FY2008, Congress added a provision blocking Uzbek government
30 U.S. Department of State, Meeting With Staff and Their Families of Embassy Tashkent, December 2, 2010.
31 U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on Asia, the Pacific, and the Global
Environment, Hearing on the Emerging Importance of the U.S.-Central Asia Partnership, Testimony of Robert O.
Blake, Jr., Assistant Secretary, Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs, November 17, 2010.
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officials from entering the United States if they are deemed to have been responsible for events in
Andijon or to have violated other human rights.
In late 2009, Congress permitted (P.L. 111-84, §801)—for the first time since restrictions were
put in place—the provision of some assistance on national security grounds to facilitate the
acquisition of supplies for U.S. and NATO operations in Afghanistan from countries along the
Northern Distribution Network. In 2012, $100,000 is requested under the Foreign Military
Financing program to provide non-lethal equipment to facilitate Uzbekistan’s protection of the
Northern Distribution Network. In 2010, Congress permitted (P.L. 111-117)—for the first time
since the restrictions were put in place—an expanded IMET program for training Uzbek military
officers on human rights, civilian control of the military, and other democracy topics. For 2012,
$300,000 is requested for expanded IMET.32
Contributions to Counter-Terrorism
An agreement on the U.S. use of the Khanabad airbase, near the town of Karshi (termed the K2
base) for Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) in Afghanistan was signed in October 2001, and a
joint statement pledged the two sides to consult in the event of a threat to Uzbekistan’s security
and territorial integrity. This non-specific security pledge was reiterated in the March 2002
“Strategic Partnership” accord (mentioned above). In addition to security assurances and
increased military and other aid, U.S. forces in Afghanistan killed many terrorists belonging to
the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU; dedicated to the forceful establishment of Islamic
rule in Uzbekistan). Following U.S. criticism of Uzbek government actions in Andijon, the
government demanded at the end of July 2005 that the United States vacate K2 within six
months. On November 21, 2005, the United States officially ceased operations at K2. The Uzbek
government has permitted Germany to maintain a small airbase at Termez with about 163 troops.
According to some German reports, the country has paid an average of 11 million euros since
2002 for basing privileges.33
Among possible signs of improving U.S.-Uzbek relations, in early 2008 Uzbekistan reportedly
permitted U.S. military personnel under NATO command, on a case-by-case basis, to transit
through an airbase near the town of Termez that it has permitted Germany to operate.34 President
Karimov attended the NATO Summit in Bucharest, Romania, in early April 2008 and stated that
Uzbekistan was ready to discuss the transit of non-lethal goods and equipment by NATO through
Uzbekistan to Afghanistan. This issue was part of the agenda during then-Assistant Secretary of
State Richard Boucher’s May 30-June 3, 2008, visit to Uzbekistan. After the Commander of the
U.S. Central Command, General David Petraeus, visited Uzbekistan in January 2009, the country
reportedly began facilitating the transit of U.S. non-lethal supplies to Afghanistan. A first rail
shipment of U.S. non-lethal supplies departed from Latvia and entered Afghanistan in late March
2009 after transiting Russia, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan. President Karimov announced in May
2009 that the United States and NATO had been permitted to use the Navoi airport (located
32 U.S. Department of State. Congressional Budget Justification for Foreign Operations, Annex: Regional Perspectives,
FY2012, April 8, 2011.
33 International Institute of Strategic Studies. The Military Balance, March 7, 2011; Deirdre Tynan, “Uzbekistan:
Tashkent Tries to Stuff Termez Genie Back in the Bottle,” Eurasianet, August 4, 2011.
34 “U.S. Military Returns to Ex-Soviet Uzbekistan,” Agence France Presse, March 6, 2008; “Only Germany Can Use
Uzbek Bases Now,” United Press International, December 13, 2005.
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between Samarkand and Bukhara in east-central Uzbekistan) to receive non-lethal supplies,
which could then be transported by air, rail, and ground to Afghanistan. In August 2009, General
Petraeus visited and signed an accord on boosting military educational exchanges and training.
Reportedly, these visits also resulted in permission by Uzbekistan for military overflights carrying
weapons to Afghanistan. President Karimov hailed the visit by General Petraeus as a sign that
“relations between our states are developing further. In the fact that we are meeting with you
again I see a big element of the fact that both sides are interested in boosting and developing
relations.”35
Among other security-related visits, in November 2010, U.S. Central Command Commander
James Mattis visited Uzbekistan, where he signed a military cooperation accord with General-
Major Kabul Berdiyev, the Uzbek Minister of Defense, on engagements and training between
USCENTCOM and the Ministry of Defense to be held in 2011, a follow-on to the accord signed
in August 2009. In early May 2011, the State Department’s U.S. Negotiator for Nuclear Security
and Dismantlement, Michael Stafford, visited the Uzbek foreign ministry to discuss joint non-
proliferation efforts. In late May 2011, Deputy National Security Advisor Denis McDonough met
with President Karimov to discuss Uzbekistan’s assistance to Afghanistan. In early July 2011,
Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, Kurt Amend
visited Uzbekistan. His specialties include defense cooperation and status of forces negotiations.
Figure 1. Map of Uzbekistan
Source: CRS
35 Open Source Center. Central Eurasia: Daily Report (hereafter CEDR), August 18, 2009, Doc. No CEP950264; July
14, 2009, Doc. No. CEP-950075.
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Author Contact Information
Jim Nichol
Specialist in Russian and Eurasian Affairs
jnichol@crs.loc.gov, 7-2289
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