Central America Regional Security Initiative:
Background and Policy Issues for Congress
Peter J. Meyer
Analyst in Latin American Affairs
Clare Ribando Seelke
Specialist in Latin American Affairs
August 30, 2011
Congressional Research Service
7-5700
www.crs.gov
R41731
CRS Report for Congress
Pr
epared for Members and Committees of Congress
Central America Regional Security Initiative: Background and Policy Issues for Congress
Summary
Central America faces significant security challenges. Criminal threats, fragile political and
judicial systems, and social hardships such as poverty and unemployment contribute to
widespread insecurity in the region. Consequently, improving security conditions in these
countries is a difficult, multifaceted endeavor. Because U.S. drug demand contributes to regional
security challenges and the consequences of citizen insecurity in Central America are potentially
far-reaching, the United States is collaborating with countries in the region to implement and
refine security efforts.
Criminal Threats
Well-financed drug trafficking organizations (DTOs), along with transnational gangs and other
organized criminal groups, threaten to overwhelm Central American governments.
Counternarcotics efforts in Colombia and Mexico have put pressure on DTOs in those countries.
As a result, many DTOs have increased their operations in Central America, a region with fewer
resources and weaker institutions with which to combat drug trafficking and related criminality.
Increasing flows of narcotics through Central America are contributing to rising levels of violence
and the corruption of government officials, both of which are weakening citizens’ support for
democratic governance and the rule of law. DTOs are also increasingly becoming poly-criminal
organizations, raising millions of dollars through smuggling, extorting, and sometimes
kidnapping Central American migrants. Given the transnational character of criminal
organizations and their abilities to exploit ungoverned spaces, some analysts assert that insecurity
in Central America poses a potential threat to the United States.
Social and Political Factors
Throughout Central America, underlying social conditions and structural weaknesses in
governance inhibit efforts to improve security. Persistent poverty, inequality, and unemployment
leave large portions of the population susceptible to crime. Given the limited opportunities other
than emigration available to the expanding youth populations in Central America, young people
are particularly vulnerable. At the same time, underfunded security forces and the failure to fully
implement post-conflict institutional reforms initiated in several countries in the 1990s have left
police, prisons, and judicial systems weak and susceptible to corruption.
Approaches to Central American Security
Despite these challenges, Central American governments have attempted to improve security
conditions in a variety of ways. Governments in the “northern triangle” countries of Central
America have tended to adopt more aggressive approaches, including deploying military forces to
help police with public security functions and enacting tough anti-gang laws. Governments in
other countries have emphasized prevention activities, such as intervention programs that focus
on strengthening families of at-risk youth. Central American nations have also sought to improve
regional cooperation, given the increasingly regional nature of the threats they face.
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Central America Regional Security Initiative: Background and Policy Issues for Congress
U.S. Assistance
To address growing security concerns, the Obama Administration has sought to develop
collaborative partnerships with countries throughout the Western Hemisphere. In Central
America, this has taken the form of the Central America Regional Security Initiative (CARSI).
Originally created in FY2008 as part of the Mexico-focused counterdrug and anticrime assistance
package known as the Mérida Initiative, CARSI takes a broad approach to the issue of security,
funding various activities designed to support U.S. and Central American security objectives. In
addition to providing the seven nations of Central America with equipment, training, and
technical assistance to support immediate law enforcement and interdiction operations, CARSI
seeks to strengthen the capacities of governmental institutions to address security challenges as
well as the underlying economic and social conditions that contribute to them. Since FY2008, the
United States has provided Central America with $361.5 million through Mérida/CARSI. The
Obama Administration has requested an additional $100 million for CARSI in FY2012.
Scope of This Report
This report examines the extent of the security problems in Central America, the current efforts
being undertaken by Central American governments to address them, and U.S. support for Central
American efforts through the Central America Regional Security Initiative. It also raises potential
policy issues for congressional consideration such as funding levels, human rights concerns, and
how CARSI relates to other U.S. government policies.
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Contents
Introduction...................................................................................................................................... 1
Background: Scope of the Problem ................................................................................................. 4
Underlying Societal Conditions................................................................................................. 5
Structural Weaknesses in Governance....................................................................................... 6
Criminal Threats........................................................................................................................ 7
Drug Trafficking Organizations .......................................................................................... 7
Gangs................................................................................................................................... 9
Other Criminal Organizations ........................................................................................... 11
Efforts Within Central America ..................................................................................................... 11
Law Enforcement Approaches................................................................................................. 12
Prevention................................................................................................................................ 15
Counterdrug Efforts................................................................................................................. 15
Regional Security Efforts ........................................................................................................ 16
U.S. Policy..................................................................................................................................... 18
Background on Assistance to Central America ....................................................................... 19
Central America Regional Security Initiative.......................................................................... 20
Formulation ....................................................................................................................... 20
Funding from FY2008-FY2012 ........................................................................................ 21
Programs ........................................................................................................................... 23
Implementation.................................................................................................................. 26
Performance Measures ...................................................................................................... 27
Additional Issues for Congressional Consideration....................................................................... 27
Funding Issues ......................................................................................................................... 27
Human Rights Concerns.......................................................................................................... 29
Relation to Other U.S. Government Policies........................................................................... 30
Outlook .......................................................................................................................................... 32
Figures
Figure 1. Map of Central America ................................................................................................... 3
Figure 2. Crime Victimization Rates in Mexico and Central America ............................................ 5
Figure 3. Central American Drug Trafficking Routes...................................................................... 8
Tables
Table 1. Estimated Homicide Rates in Central America and Mexico, 2005-2010 .......................... 4
Table 2. Estimated Cocaine Seizures in 2010, by Country............................................................ 16
Table 3. Funding for the Central America Regional Security Initiative, FY2008-FY2012........... 21
Table 4. Status of Assistance Appropriated, as of March 2011...................................................... 27
Table A-1. Central America Development Indicators.................................................................... 33
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Table A-2. Central America Poverty and Inequality Indicators ..................................................... 34
Appendixes
Appendix. Central America Social Indicators ............................................................................... 33
Contacts
Author Contact Information........................................................................................................... 34
Acknowledgments ......................................................................................................................... 34
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Introduction
The security situation in Central America1 has deteriorated in recent years as gangs, drug
traffickers, and other criminal groups have expanded their activities in the region, contributing to
escalating levels of crime and violence that have alarmed citizens and threaten to overwhelm
governments. Violence is particularly intense in the “northern triangle” countries of El Salvador,
Guatemala, and Honduras, which have some of the highest homicide rates in the world. Citizens
of nearly every Central American nation now rank public insecurity as the top problem facing
their countries.2 The World Bank estimates that the overall economic costs of crime and violence
averages 7.5% of gross domestic product (GDP) in Central America.3 Moreover, some analysts
maintain that the pervasive lack of security in the region not only threatens Central American
governments and civil society, but presents a potential threat to the United States.4 Given the
proximity of Central America, instability in the region—whether in the form of declining support
for democracy as a result of corrupt governance, drug traffickers acting with impunity as a result
of weak state presence, or increased emigration as a result of economic and physical insecurity—
is likely to affect the United States.
Although some analysts assert that the current situation in Central America presents a greater
threat to regional security than the civil wars of the 1980s,5 policymakers have only recently
begun to offer increased attention and financial support to the region. During the 1980s, the
United States provided Central America with an average of nearly $1.4 billion annually in
economic and military assistance to support efforts to combat leftist political movements.6 U.S.
attention to the region declined significantly in the early 1990s, however, as the civil wars ended
and Cold War concerns faded. Prior to the introduction of the Mérida Initiative in FY2008, the
bulk of U.S. security assistance to the hemisphere was concentrated in Colombia and the other
narcotics-producing nations of the Andean region of South America. The United States provided
Central America with some assistance for narcotics interdiction and institutional capacity
building, but the funding levels were comparatively low. Central America has received higher
levels of U.S. security assistance as a result of the Mérida Initiative; however, just $361.5 million
of the $1.96 billion appropriated through Mérida and its successor programs between FY2008 and
FY2011 has been allocated to Central America, with the remainder going to Mexico.7
1 For the purposes of this report, “Central America” includes all seven countries of the isthmus: Belize, Costa Rica, El
Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Panama.
2 Corporación Latinobarómetro, Informe 2010, Santiago, Chile, December 2010.
3 This figures does not include data from Belize and Panama. See Rodrigo Serrano-Berthet and Humberto Lopez,
World Bank, Crime and Violence in Central America: A Development Challenge, Washington, D.C., 2011.
4 Bob Killebrew and Jennifer Bernal, Crime Wars: Gangs, Cartels and U.S. National Security, Center for a New
American Security, Washington, DC, September 2010.
5 Steven S. Dudley, Drug Trafficking Organizations in Central America: Transportistas, Mexican Cartels and Maras,
Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars Mexico Institute & the University of San Diego Trans-Border
Institute, Working Paper Series on U.S.-Mexico Security Collaboration, May 2010.
6 Figure is in constant, 2009 dollars. U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), U.S. Overseas Loans and
Grants: Obligations and Loan Authorizations, July 1, 1945-September 30, 2009, http://www.usaid.gov/policy/
greenbook.html.
7 For information on the Mérida Initiative in Mexico, see CRS Report R41349, U.S.-Mexican Security Cooperation:
The Mérida Initiative and Beyond , by Clare Ribando Seelke and Kristin M. Finklea.
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Recognizing that U.S.-backed efforts in Colombia and Mexico have provided incentives for
criminal groups to move into Central America and other areas where they can exploit institutional
weaknesses to continue their operations, the Obama Administration has sought to develop
collaborative security partnerships with countries throughout the hemisphere. As part of this
effort, the Administration re-launched the Central America portion of the Mérida Initiative as the
Central America Regional Security Initiative (CARSI) in FY2010. CARSI takes a broad approach
to the issue of security that goes well beyond the traditional focus on preventing narcotics from
reaching the United States. Ensuring the safety and security of all citizens is one of the four
overarching priorities of current U.S. policy toward Latin America and the Caribbean.8
Accordingly, CARSI not only provides equipment, training, and technical assistance to support
immediate law enforcement and interdiction operations, but also seeks to strengthen the
capacities of governmental institutions to address security challenges and the underlying
economic and social conditions that contribute to them. Although Central American countries
express appreciation for the funds provided, they maintain that the assistance could better respond
to host country priorities and is insufficient given the scale of the region’s security challenges.9
Congress has closely tracked the implementation of the Mérida Initiative/CARSI since its
inception. Nearly three years after Congress first appropriated funding, a number of analysts
assert that extensive long-term U.S. support will be necessary for Central America to successfully
overcome its current security challenges.10 As Congress evaluates budget priorities and debates
the form of U.S. security assistance to the region, it may examine the scope of the security
problems in Central America, the current efforts being undertaken by the governments of Central
America to address these problems, and how the United States has supported those efforts. This
report provides background information about these topics and raises potential policy issues
regarding U.S.-Central America security cooperation—such as funding levels, human rights
concerns, and how CARSI relates to other U.S. government policies—that Congress may opt to
consider.
8 The other three overarching priorities are building effective institutions of democratic governance, promoting social
and economic opportunity for everyone, and securing a clean energy future. Testimony of Arturo A. Valenzuela,
Assistant Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere Affairs, U.S. Department of State, before the Senate
Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere, Peace Corps, and Global Narcotics Affairs, February 17, 2011.
9 CRS interviews with Central American embassy officials, October 27, November 2, 3, and 9, 2010.
10 Killebrew & Bernal, September 2010, op. cit.; Diana Villiers Negroponte, “Understanding and Improving Mérida,”
Americas Quarterly, Spring 2010.
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Figure 1. Map of Central America
Source: CRS.
Notes: The “northern triangle” countries (El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras) are pictured in orange.
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Background: Scope of the Problem
As in neighboring Mexico, the countries of Central America—particularly the “northern triangle”
countries of El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras—are dealing with escalating homicides and
generalized crime committed by drug traffickers, gangs, and other criminal groups. While the
drug trafficking-related violence in Mexico11 has captured U.S. policymakers’ attention, the even
more dire security situation in many Central American countries has received considerably less
focus or financial support from the United States.12 In 2010, the homicide rate per 100,000 people
in Mexico stood at roughly 18, a rate exceeded by that of Belize (39), El Salvador (66),
Guatemala (50), Honduras (77), and Panama (21) (see Table 1). Moreover, according to recent
polling data, even Central American countries with relatively low homicide rates, such as Costa
Rica and Nicaragua, have victimization rates for common crime (a term that includes robbery and
assault) on par with Mexico (see Figure 2). As enforcement efforts in Mexico have intensified,
the security challenges facing Central America, a region with significantly fewer resources and
weaker institutions than its northern neighbor, have multiplied.13
Table 1. Estimated Homicide Rates in Central America and Mexico, 2005-2010
Homicides per 100,000 Inhabitants
Country
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Belize
28 31 30 32 32 39
Costa
Rica
8 8 8 11 12
n/a
El
Salvador
62 65 57 52 71 66
Guatemala
44 47 45 48 53 50
Honduras 37 46 50 58 67 77
Nicaragua 13 13 13 13 13 n/a
Panama 11 11 13 19 24 21
Mexico 11 11 10 12 15 18
Sources: For 2005-2008, data for Central America are drawn from U.N. Development Program, Informe Sobre
Desarrollo Humano Para América Central 2009-2010: Abrir Espacios a la Seguridad Ciudadana y el Desarrollo Humano,
October 2009. For 2009-2010, homicide rates for Belize, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Panama are
drawn from U.S. Department of State, Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, Regional
Gang Initiative: Progress Status Report – CY2010, February 8, 2011. The 2009 homicide rate for Nicaragua is from
police statistics obtained by CRS from U.S. State Department officials. The 2009 homicide rate for Costa Rica is
from Programa Estado de la Nación, Informe Estado de la Nación en Desarrollo Humano Sostenible XVI, 2010. Data
for Mexico are from Mexico’s National System of Public Security.
11 For information on drug trafficking-related violence in Mexico, see CRS Report R41576, Mexico’s Drug Trafficking
Organizations: Source and Scope of the Rising Violence, by June S. Beittel.
12Since FY2008, Congress has provided more than $1.6 billion in counterdrug and anti-crime assistance to Mexico
under the Mérida Initiative and $361.5 million to Central America through Mérida and CARSI. For historical
information, see CRS Report R40135, Mérida Initiative for Mexico and Central America: Funding and Policy Issues,
by Clare Ribando Seelke; and CRS Report R41215, Latin America and the Caribbean: Illicit Drug Trafficking and U.S.
Counterdrug Programs, coordinated by Clare Ribando Seelke.
13 Michael Shifter, “Central America’s Security Predicament,” Current History, February 1, 2011.
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Figure 2. Crime Victimization Rates in Mexico and Central America
Percentage of People Surveyed That Reported Being Victims of Crime in the Preceding 12 Months
Source: Americas Barometer survey data from 2010 by the Latin American Public Opinion Project of Vanderbilt
University.
Underlying Societal Conditions
The social fabric in many Central American countries has been tattered by persistent poverty,
inequality, and unemployment, with few opportunities available for growing youth populations
aside from emigration, often illegal.14 Except for Costa Rica and Panama, the countries of Central
America are generally low-income countries with low levels of human development (see the
Appendix). Studies have shown that high levels of income inequality are often stronger
predictors of high violent crime rates than poverty rates alone.15 For the most part, Central
American countries are not only impoverished, but highly unequal societies, with income
inequality exacerbated by the social exclusion of ethnic minorities and gender discrimination. The
linkage between inequality and high crime rates holds true in Central America except for the case
of El Salvador, a country with relatively low inequality but high crime rates.16 Poverty and
inequality have been reinforced by the lack of social mobility and persistent unemployment and
underemployment in many countries. With limited opportunities at home, roughly a quarter of
14 According to figures from the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS), El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras
follow Mexico as the primary source countries for unauthorized (illegal) immigration to the United States. Michael
Hoefer, Nancy Rytina, and Bryan C. Baker, Estimates of the Unauthorized Immigrant Population Residing in the
United States: January 2010, DHS Office of Immigration Statistics, February 2011.
15 Pablo Fajnzylber, Daniel Lederman, and Norman Loayza, “Inequality and Violent Crime,” Journal of Law and
Economics, August 2001.
16 U.N. Development Program (UNDP), Informe Sobre Desarrollo Humano Para América Central 2009-2010: Abrir
Espacios a la Seguridad Ciudadana y el Desarrollo Humano, October 2009.
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Salvadorans now live abroad, leading analysts to assert that people have become one of the
country’s primary exports.17 El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras, which have large
percentages of their populations living in the United States, have reportedly suffered more from
the negative effects of emigration (such as family disintegration and deportations) than other
countries.18
With the exceptions of Belize and Costa Rica, Central American countries have also had a long
history of armed conflicts and/or dictatorships. A legacy of conflict and authoritarian rule has
inhibited the development of democratic institutions and respect for the rule of law in many
countries. Protracted armed conflicts also resulted in the widespread proliferation of illicit
firearms in the region, as well as a cultural tendency to resort to violence as a means of settling
disputes.19 Recent research details how illicit networks that smuggled arms and other supplies to
both sides involved in the armed conflict in El Salvador have been converted into transnational
criminal networks that smuggle drugs, people, illicit proceeds, weapons, and other stolen goods.20
In addition, some former combatants in El Salvador and Guatemala have put the skills they
acquired during their countries’ armed conflicts to use in the service of criminal groups, as the
end of civil conflicts there coincided with the emergence of drug trafficking in the region.21
Structural Weaknesses in Governance
In recent years, much has been written about the governance problems that have made many
Central American countries susceptible to the influence of drug traffickers and other criminal
elements and unable to guarantee citizen security, a basic function of any government. To begin
with, many governments do not have operational control over their borders and territories. As an
example, the Mexico-Guatemalan border is 600 miles long and has only eight formal
checkpoints.22 This is partially a result of regional police and military forces being generally
undermanned and/or ill-equipped to establish an effective presence in remote regions or to
challenge well-armed criminal groups.23 Resource constraints in the security sector have persisted
over time as governments have failed to increase taxes. According to World Bank data,24 tax
revenue as a percentage of GDP averaged just 13.8% in Central America in 2009, below the
levels of many African countries. A lack of confidence in the underfunded public security forces
17 Sarah Gammage, “Exporting People and Recruiting Remittances: A Development Strategy for El Salvador?” Latin
American Perspectives , vol. 33, no. 6 (2006).
18 UNDP, October 2009, op. cit.
19 Facultad Latinoamericana de Ciencias Sociales (FLACSO), Armas Pequeñas y Livianas: Amenaza a la Seguridad
Hemisférica, 2007.
20 Douglas Farah, Organized Crime in El Salvador: the Homegrown and Transnational Dimensions, Woodrow Wilson
Center for Scholars Latin America Program, Working Paper Series on Organized Crime in Central America, February
2011.
21 Ibid.; Hal Brands, Crime, Violence, and the Crisis in Guatemala: A Case Study in the Erosion of the State, Strategic
Studies Institute, May 2010.
22 Embassy of Mexico, Toward a Secure and Prosperous Southern Border, October 2010.
23 In Guatemala, for example, former President Oscar Berger reduced the size and budget of the military by 50% more
than was required by the 1996 Peace Accords (to roughly 15,500 soldiers and 0.33% of GDP). That reform has since
been partially reversed by the Colom Administration, which aims to have some 20,000 soldiers in the Guatemalan
military. CRS interview with Guatemalan military official, January 20, 2011.
24 Data are available at http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/GC.TAX.TOTL.GD.ZS. No figures were included for
Belize or Panama.
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has led many businesses and wealthy individuals in the region to turn to private security firms.
One recent study estimated that the number of authorized private security personnel in Central
America may exceed 234,000, dwarfing the total number of police in the region.25
Resource constraints aside, there have also been serious concerns about corruption in the police,
prisons, and judicial systems in Central America.26 This corruption has occurred partially as a
result of incomplete institutional reforms implemented after armed conflicts ended in several
countries in the 1990s.27 With crime victimization rates on the rise and impunity rates averaging
roughly 90%,28 people have low levels of trust in law enforcement, which has in turn increased
support for government initiatives aimed at increasing the role of the military in public security.
Survey data have shown that those who have been victims of crime or who perceive that crime is
increasing in their countries express less support for the political system and the rule of law than
other citizens, including less support for the idea that police should always obey the law.29 In
extreme cases, people in some Central American countries have taken justice into their own hands
by carrying out vigilante killings of those suspected of committing crimes.
Criminal Threats
Drug Trafficking Organizations
Since the mid-1990s, the primary pathway for illegal drugs, including Andean cocaine, entering
the United States has been through Mexico (see Figure 3). As recently as 2007, however, only a
small amount of cocaine that passed through Mexico first transited through Central America.
Currently, 95% of all illicit drugs that enter North America from South America have transited
Central America.30 The use of Central America as a transshipment zone has continued to grow as
traffickers have used overland smuggling, littoral maritime trafficking, and short-distance aerial
trafficking rather than long-range maritime or aerial trafficking to transport cocaine from South
America to Mexico.31 A large but unknown proportion of opiates, as well as foreign-produced
marijuana and methamphetamine, some of which is now locally produced, also flows through the
same pathways. This overwhelming use of the Central America-Mexico corridor as a transit zone
25 Otto Argueta, Private Security in Guatemala: the Pathway to its Proliferation, German Institute of Global Affairs
and Area Studies, September 2010.
26 According to Transparency International’s 2010 Corruption Perception Index (CPI), the Central American countries
that are perceived to be the most corrupt are Honduras, Nicaragua, and Guatemala, while Costa Rica is viewed as least
corrupt. (Belize is not ranked.) For recent examples of corruption, see country entries in U.S. Department of State,
Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, International Narcotics Control Strategy Report
(INCSR), March 3, 2011, http://www.state.gov/p/inl/rls/nrcrpt/2011/index.htm.
27 On police reform, see Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA), Protect and Serve? The Status of Police
Reform in Central America, June 2009. On the judicial sector, see Due Process of Law Foundation, Evaluation of
Judicial Corruption in Central America and Panama and Mechanisms to Combat It, 2007.
28 UNDP, October 2009, op. cit., p. 235.
29 Mitchell A. Seligson and Amy Erica Smith, eds., The Political Culture of Democracy, 2010: Democratic
Consolidation in the Americas in Hard Times, Vanderbilt University Latin American Public Opinion Project,
December 2010.
30 Deputy Secretary of State William J. Burns, “Roundtable with Mexican Media,” Remarks at the U.S. Embassy,
Mexico City, Mexico, August 16, 2011.
31 Stephen Meiners, “Central America: An Emerging Role in the Drug Trade,” STRATFOR, March 28, 2009.
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represents a major shift in trafficking routes. In the 1980s and early 1990s, for example, drugs
primarily transited through the Caribbean into South Florida.
Figure 3. Central American Drug Trafficking Routes
Source: STRATFOR, February 25, 2011, http://www.stratfor.com.
Stepped-up enforcement efforts in Mexico and instability in certain Central American countries
have also led traffickers to use Central America, particularly Guatemala and Honduras, as
transshipment points for Andean cocaine bound for the United States. Following the June 2009
ouster of President Manuel Zelaya, for example, drug flights into Honduras reportedly
skyrocketed.32 In September 2010, President Obama identified every Central American country
except for Belize and El Salvador as a major drug transit country, with Costa Rica, Honduras, and
Nicaragua making their first appearance on the list.33
32 James Bosworth, Honduras: Organized Crime Gaining Amid Political Crisis, Woodrow Wilson Center for Scholars
Latin America Program, Working Paper Series on Organized Crime in Central America, February 2011.
33 Beginning in 1986 (P.L. 99-570), Congress introduced an annual procedure to withhold certain types of bilateral
foreign assistance, not including counternarcotics assistance, to major drug-producing and major drug transit countries
worldwide, commonly termed the “drug majors.” The President is required annually to issue a presidential
determination to identify which countries are to be included in the list of drug majors for the following fiscal year. For
FY2011, President Barack Obama identified 20 drug majors, including Costa Rica, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua,
and Panama. The drug majors are then evaluated on the basis of their effort to combat drugs and cooperate with the
U.S. government on drug policy issues. The President must accordingly “certify” to Congress that drug majors have
either “cooperated fully” or have “failed demonstrably” in U.S. and international counternarcotics efforts. President
Obama certified all five Central American countries on the list. Barack Obama, Presidential Determination No. 2009-
(continued...)
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In the past, Mexican and Colombian drug trafficking organizations (DTOs) tended to contract
local drug trafficking groups in Central America, sometimes referred to as transportistas, to
transport drugs through that region. Recently, drug transshipment activities have increasingly
been taken over, often after violent struggles, by Mexican drug traffickers from the Sinaloa DTO
and the Zetas, a rival DTO started by former Mexican military officers who, until recently, served
as the paramilitary wing of the Gulf DTO.34 Mexican DTOs have been most active in Guatemala,
where they are battling each other and family-based Guatemalan DTOs for control over lucrative
drug smuggling routes. Officials estimate that between 40% and 60% of Guatemalan territory
may now be under the effective control of drug traffickers.35 In May 2011, Guatemalan President
Alvaro Colom declared a temporary “state of siege” invoking martial law in the Petén region of
his country after the Zetas massacred 27 peasants on a farm near the Mexican border.36 Mexican
DTOs have also begun to pay transportistas and gangs who distribute drugs or serve as enforcers
(or hit men) in product, which has increased drug consumption in many countries and sparked
disputes between local groups over control of domestic drug markets.37 The DTOs, particularly
the Zetas, have also taken control of many migrant smuggling routes originating in Central
America, enacting harsh penalties on those who fail to work for them or pay them quotas.38
Gangs39
In recent years, Central American governments, the media, and some analysts have attributed,
sometimes erroneously, a significant proportion of violent crime in the region to transnational
youth gangs, or maras, many of which have ties to the United States. The major gangs operating
in Central America with ties to the United States are the “18th Street” gang (also known as M-18)
and its main rival, the Mara Salvatrucha (MS-13).40 The 18th Street gang was formed by Mexican
youth in the Rampart section of Los Angeles in the 1960s who were not accepted into existing
Hispanic gangs. MS-13 was created during the 1980s by Salvadorans in Los Angeles who had
fled the country’s civil conflict. Both gangs later expanded their operations to Central America.
This process accelerated after the United States began deporting illegal immigrants, many with
criminal convictions, back to the region after the passage of the Illegal Immigrant Reform and
Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) of 1996.41
(...continued)
30, “Memorandum to the Secretary of State: Major Drug Transit or Major Illicit Drug Producing Countries for Fiscal
Year 2011,” September 16, 2010.
34 Dudley, May 2010, op. cit.
35 The lower estimate is cited in Brands, May 2010, op. cit. The upper estimate is from “Drug Traffickers Have
Stranglehold on Guatemala Says Top Prosecutor,” El País, February 23, 2011.
36 Rory Carroll, “Guatemala's Drug War: Terror and Foreboding as Mexico's Bloody Narco Wars Spread South,”
Guardian, June 29, 2011. President Colom had previously declared a two-month “state of siege” in the Alto Verapaz
region. Nicholas Casey, “Mexican Drug War Spills to Neighbor,” Wall Street Journal, February 26, 2011.
37 Dudley, May 2010, op. cit.
38 Tim Johnson, “Violent Mexican Drug Gang, Zetas, Taking Control of Migrant Smuggling,” McClatchy Newspapers,
August 12, 2011.
39 This section is drawn from CRS Report RL34112, Gangs in Central America, by Clare Ribando Seelke.
40 For the history and evolution of these gangs, see Tom Diaz, No Boundaries: Transnational Latino Gangs and
American Law Enforcement, Ann Arbor, M.I.: University of Michigan Press, 2009.
41 IRIRA expanded the categories of illegal immigrants subject to deportation and made it more difficult for immigrants
to get relief from removal.
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Estimates of the overall number of gang members in Central America vary widely, but the U.S.
Southern Command has placed that figure at around 70,000, a figure also cited by the United
Nations. The gang problem is most severe in Honduras, Guatemala, and El Salvador. Estimates of
Central American gang membership by country also vary considerably, but the U.N. Office on
Drugs and Crime (UNODC) has cited country membership totals of some 36,000 in Honduras,
14,000 in Guatemala, and 10,500 in El Salvador. These figures are compared to 4,500 in
Nicaragua, 2,660 in Costa Rica, and 1,385 in Panama.42 Nicaragua has a significant number of
local gangs, often referred to as pandillas, but does not have large numbers of MS-13 or M-18
members.
MS-13 and M-18 began as loosely structured street gangs, but there is evidence that both gangs
have expanded geographically, become more organized, and expanded the range of their criminal
activities. As happened in the United States, gang leaders in Central America have used prisons to
recruit new members and to increase the discipline and cohesion among their existing ranks. By
2008, Salvadoran police had found evidence suggesting that some MS-13 leaders jailed in El
Salvador were ordering retaliatory assassinations of individuals in Northern Virginia, as well as
designing plans to unify their clicas (cliques) with those in the United States.43 Central American
officials have blamed gangs for a large percentage of homicides committed in recent years,
particularly in El Salvador and Honduras, but some analysts assert that those claims may be
exaggerated.44 The actual percentage of homicides that can be attributed to gangs in Central
America remains controversial, but analysts agree that the gangs have increasingly become
involved in extortion, kidnapping, human trafficking, and drug, auto, and weapons smuggling.
Gangs have extorted millions of dollars from residents, bus drivers, and businesses in cities
throughout the region. Failure to pay often results in harassment or violence by gang members,
with at least 170 Guatemalan bus drivers and fare collectors killed by gangs in 2010 alone.45 The
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) has also documented increasing numbers of cases of
extortion schemes carried out by gangs in El Salvador against Salvadorans in the United States.46
Some studies maintain that ties between Central American gangs and organized criminal groups
have increased, while others downplay the connection. Regional and U.S. authorities have
confirmed increasing gang involvement in drug trafficking, although mostly on a local level. MS-
13 members are reportedly being contracted on an ad hoc basis by Mexico’s warring DTOs to
carry out revenge killings. Some analysts assert that the relationship between DTOs and gangs
appears to be most developed in El Salvador and, to a lesser extent, in Honduras, with few DTO-
gang connections in Costa Rica, Guatemala, Nicaragua, or Panama.47
42 Testimony of General Bantz J. Craddock, Commander, U.S. Southern Command, before the Senate Armed Services
Committee, March 15, 2005; United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), Crime and Development in
Central America: Caught in the Crossfire, May 2007. These estimates are still widely cited.
43 U.S. Department of State, Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, Regional Gang Initiative:
Assessments and Plan of Action, July 1, 2008.
44 UNODC, May 2007, op. cit.
45 “Guatemala: Desde las Cárceles los Pandilleros Continúan Sembrando el Terror,” Agence France Presse, January 6,
2011.
46 U.S. Department of State, Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, Regional Gang Initiative:
Progress Status Report – CY2010, Feb. 8, 2010.
47 Dudley, May 2010, op. cit.
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Other Criminal Organizations
Much less information is publicly available about what analysts have termed “other criminal
organizations” than about drug trafficking organizations or gangs operating in the region.
Criminal organizations included in this catchall category may be involved in a wide variety of
illicit activities, including, but not limited to, arms trafficking, alien smuggling, human
trafficking, and money laundering. Some organizations specialize in one type of crime, such as
human trafficking, while other enterprises engage in a range of criminal activities. Although most
of the income-generating activities of these criminal organizations are illicit, some groups receive
revenue through ties to legitimate businesses as well.
Some criminal enterprises active in Central America focus only on a certain neighborhood, city,
or perhaps region in one country, while others, often referred to as “organized crime,”48 possess
the capital, manpower, and networks required to run sophisticated enterprises and to penetrate
state institutions at high levels. The more organized criminal groups in Central America include
both domestically based and transnational groups. In Guatemala, for example, much has been
written on the ongoing influence and illicit activities of domestic criminal organizations, often
referred to as “hidden powers,” whose membership includes members of the country’s elite,
including current and former politicians and military officials.49 While the dominant transnational
criminal organization may vary from country to country, certain transnational criminal groups
appear to be active throughout the region.
Efforts Within Central America
Confronting the increasing threat posed by both transnational and domestic criminal
organizations has become a central concern of governments throughout Central America. Until
recently, governments in the “northern triangle” countries of Central America have tended to
adopt more aggressive law enforcement approaches than the other Central American countries.
These policies have included deploying military forces to help police perform public security
functions and enacting tough anti-gang laws (in El Salvador and Honduras), which have led to
large roundups of suspected gang members. In general, such policies have failed to stave off
rising crime rates in the region and have had several negative unintended consequences, including
severe prison overcrowding. As a result, many experts have urged governments to move away
from “enforcement-only” strategies toward more holistic approaches to addressing crime and
violence.50 Just as broad-based anti-crime efforts in particular countries need to be intensified, so
48 The definition of what constitutes “organized criminal organizations” varies significantly from country to country.
For example, the Mexican government refers to DTOs as organized crime, whereas the U.S. government has
historically considered drug trafficking and organized crime as distinct for programmatic purposes. Similarly, the
Salvadoran government considers gangs as transnational organized crime, while the Nicaraguan government seems to
view gangs as a local problem to be addressed primarily by youth crime prevention programs. For a discussion of the
various definitions of organized crime in the United States, see CRS Report R41547, Organized Crime: An Evolving
Challenge for U.S. Law Enforcement, by Jerome P. Bjelopera and Kristin M. Finklea; and CRS Report R40525,
Organized Crime in the United States: Trends and Issues for Congress, by Kristin M. Finklea.
49 See, for example, Susan C. Peacock and Adrana Beltrán, Hidden Powers in Post-Conflict Guatemala, WOLA,
September 2003; Brands, May 2010, op. cit.
50 Holistic approaches to addressing gang-related violence may include prevention programs for at-risk youth,
interventions to encourage youth to leave gangs, and the creation of municipal alliances against crime and violence.
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too do regional security efforts coordinated by the Central American Integration System (SICA).51
SICA revised its proposal for a regional security plan for Central America and presented it to the
United States and other international donors at a conference held in Guatemala in June 2011(see
“Regional Security Efforts” below).
Law Enforcement Approaches
Following the end of armed conflicts and dictatorships in Central America in the 1990s, most
countries made significant progress in subordinating military forces to civilian control and in
reducing the size of military budgets and personnel. They made less progress, however, in
defining proper military-police roles and relationships, particularly as they relate to dealing with
threats to public security.52 Despite, or perhaps because of, that lack of definition, El Salvador,
Guatemala, and Honduras have deployed thousands of troops to help their often underpaid and
poorly equipped police forces carry out public security functions, without clearly defining when
those deployments might end. Salvadoran military officials estimate that approximately 8,000
troops are involved in border security efforts, joint patrols with police in high-crime areas, and
patrolling the country’s prisons. Guatemalan military officials maintain that fewer than 10% of
the country’s 9,000 soldiers currently perform traditional military functions.53 The Honduran
government has recently sent troops to help patrol its major urban centers. This trend has led
many human rights groups to raise concerns about the “re-militarization” of some Central
American countries and to predict an increase in human rights abuses committed by military
personnel in the region who are ill-trained to perform police work (as has occurred in Mexico).54
Evidence also indicates that military involvement in public security functions has not reduced
crime rates significantly.
In the early 2000s, governments in the northern triangle countries also adopted mano dura
(strong-handed) anti-gang policies in response to popular demands and media pressure for them
to “do something” about an escalation in gang-related crime. Mano dura approaches typically
involve incarcerating large numbers of youth (often those with visible tattoos) for illicit
association, and increasing sentences for gang membership and gang-related crimes. Early public
reactions to the tough anti-gang reforms enacted in El Salvador and Honduras were extremely
positive, supported by media coverage demonizing the activities of tattooed youth gang members,
but the long-term effects of the policies on gangs and crime have been largely disappointing.
Most youth arrested under mano dura provisions were subsequently released for lack of evidence
that they committed any crime. Some youth who were wrongly arrested for gang involvement
were recruited into the gang life while in prison. Finally, in response to mano dura policies, gangs
have changed their behavior to avoid detection.
51 The Central American Integration System (SICA), a regional organization with a Secretariat in El Salvador, is
composed of the governments of Belize, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Panama. The Security
Commission was created in 1995 to develop and carry out regional security efforts.
52 Richard L. Millett and Orlando J. Perez, “New Threats and Old Dilemmas: Central America’s Armed Forces in the
21st Century,” Journal of Political and Military Sociology, vol. 33, no. 1 (Summer 2005).
53 CRS interview with Salvadoran military official, January 17, 2011; CRS interview with Guatemalan military official,
January 20, 2011. See also “Military Given Indefinite Role in Combating Organized Crime,” Latin American Regional
Report: Caribbean & Central America, February 2011.
54 See, for example, relevant sections of George Withers, Lucila Santos, and Adam Isaacson, Preach What you
Practice: the Separation of Military and Police Roles in the Americas, WOLA, November 2010.
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Aggressive roundups of criminal suspects have overwhelmed prisons in Central America, which
are in desperate need of reform. Prison conditions in the region are generally harsh, with severe
overcrowding, inadequate sanitation, and staffing shortages. In recent years, facilities that were
already teeming with inmates have been filled beyond their capacities with thousands of
suspected gang members, many of whom have yet to be convicted of any crimes.
In addition to prison reform, large-scale institutional reforms to improve the investigative
capacity of police and the conviction rates secured by public prosecutors’ offices are still needed
in many Central American countries; however, such reforms have generally not been undertaken
because of limited funding and political will to do so. The U.S. government has urged
governments to employ “intelligence-led policing” and urged legislatures in the region to give
police and prosecutors new tools to help them build successful cases, including the ability to use
wiretaps to gather evidence. In 2010, the Guatemalan government had some success in using
wiretaps to arrest and prosecute gangs involved in extorting and murdering public transit
workers.55 Some countries are also in the process of implementing laws that would enable assets
seized from criminal organizations to fund law enforcement entities. Improving trust,
information-sharing, and coordination between police and prosecutors is another important
component of the reform process. Building that trust will require proper recruiting, vetting, and
training of police and prosecutors, as well as robust systems of internal and external controls in
both institutions to detect and punish corruption.56
The International Commission against Impunity in Guatemala (CICIG) is a new approach to law
enforcement in the region. Recognizing that its judicial system was too weak and corrupt to
handle criminal prosecutions on its own, Guatemala agreed to the creation of an international
entity capable of supporting investigative and prosecutorial efforts within the country. Other
Central American nations are now considering the model as a result of its considerable success
(see the text box below, “The International Commission Against Impunity in Guatemala: A
Regional Model?”).
55 INCSR, March 2011, op. cit.; U.S. Department of State, Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement
Affairs, Regional Gang Initiative: Progress Status Report – CY2010, February 8, 2010. El Salvador, Guatemala,
Panama, and Nicaragua have wiretapping laws in place.
56 For detailed information on the status of police reform in Central America and additional reforms that need to be
undertaken in the region, see WOLA, Protect and Serve? The Status of Police Reform in Central America, June 2009,
http://www.wola.org/publications/protect_and_serve_the_status_of_police_reform_in_central_america.
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The International Commission Against Impunity in Guatemala:
A Regional Model?
In August 2007, the Guatemalan Congress ratified an agreement with the United Nations to establish a commission to
support Guatemalan institutions in the identification, investigation, and prosecution of illegal security groups and
clandestine organizations, some of which have been tied, directly or indirectly, to the Guatemalan state. Inaugurated
in January 2008, the International Commission against Impunity in Guatemala (CICIG) is a unique hybrid body that
operates completely within the Guatemalan legal system, includes both international and local staff, and has a $20
mil ion annual budget funded entirely through international donations. In addition to assisting in investigative and
prosecutorial actions, CICIG undertakes efforts to build capacity within justice sector institutions and recommends
public policies and institutional reforms. CICIG’s mandate, which was originally for two years, has been extended
twice and is now scheduled to end in September 2013.57
In its first three years, CICIG has produced considerable results. Commission-supported investigations into
corruption and the infiltration of organized crime in state institutions have contributed to the dismissal of some 1,700
police officers and several senior prosecutors. Likewise, a number of former high-level officials have been charged
with corruption and are facing trials.58 CICIG has also helped prevent a number of individuals with significant ties to
corruption and/or organized crime from being appointed to senior positions in the Guatemalan state, including the
attorney general’s office and three seats on the supreme court. Moreover, the Guatemalan government has approved
CICIG-recommended legislative reforms, such as changes to an arms and munitions law, an organized crime law, and
the code of criminal procedure.59 Proponents of CICIG argue that perhaps its greatest achievement has been to
demonstrate to the public that Guatemala’s high impunity rates are not inevitable, and the criminal justice system can
be made to work, even against powerful individuals who have long been considered “untouchable.”60 Nevertheless,
many analysts maintain that recent events, such as the controversial May 2011 acquittal of former President Alfonso
Portillo on charges of embezzling $15 million, have demonstrated that the Guatemalan justice system remains weak
and in need of reform, and that CICIG’s work is far from over.61
Given the success of CICIG, the presidents of El Salvador and Honduras have indicated interest in setting up similar
commissions in their countries or a regional commission to combat organized crime in the entire northern triangle.
Although most analysts agree that both countries would benefit from technical assistance in conducting investigations
and prosecutions, there is disagreement concerning what form of assistance would be most beneficial. Some have
suggested that a regional commission would be best, given the regional nature of organized crime. 62 Others argue
that separate commissions may be more useful since security conditions and institutional capacity vary between the
countries.63 It may be difficult to establish any form of commission, however, as countries would need to look to
international donors for funding, and many citizens and legislators are opposed to the idea of ceding sovereignty to an
international body.
57 Julia Shünemann, ‘Looking the Monster in the Face’: The International Commission against Impunity in Guatemala
and the ‘Rule of Law-builders Contract,’ Initiative for Peacebuilding (IFP) and Fundación para las Relaciones
Internacionales y el Diálogo Exterior (FRIDE), October 2010; Frank Bajak and Juan Carlos Llorca, “U.N.-backed
Investigators Shake up Guatemala,” Associated Press, November 14, 2010; CRS interview with CICIG official,
January 20, 2011.
58 Bajak and Llorca, November 2010, op. cit.
59 Comisión Internacional Contra la Impunidad en Guatemala (CICIG), Tercer Año de Labores, September 2010.
60 Morris Panner and Adriana Beltrán, “Battling Organized Crime in Guatemala,” Americas Quarterly, Fall 2010.
61 Geoffrey Ramsey, “After Portillo’s Acquittal, a Challenge for Judicial Reform in Guatemala,” InSight: Organized
Crime in the Americas, May 13, 2011; Danilo Valladares, “Guatemala: Efforts to Uproot Impunity Receive New
Setback,” Inter Press Service, May 25, 2011; “Impunity in Guatemala: Two Steps Forward, One Step Back,”
Economist, June 8, 2011.
62 CRS interview with analysts at the Fundación Salvadoreña para el Desarrollo Económico y Social (FUSADES),
January 18, 2010.
63 CRS interview with CICIG official, January 20, 2011.
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Prevention
In the past few years, Central American leaders, including those from the northern triangle
countries, appear to have moved, at least on a rhetorical level, toward more comprehensive
approaches to dealing with gangs and crime. In mid-December 2007, then-Salvadoran President
Tony Saca opened a summit of the Central America Integration System (SICA) by stating that the
gang problem had shown the importance of coordinated anti-crime efforts, with the most
important element of those efforts being prevention. All of the Central American countries have
created institutional bodies to design and coordinate crime prevention strategies and have units
within their national police forces engaged in prevention efforts. Some governments, with support
from the U.N. Development Program (UNDP) and other donors, have also begun to encourage
municipalities to develop crime prevention plans. In general, however, government-sponsored
prevention programs have tended, with some exceptions (such as Nicaragua’s national youth
crime prevention strategy), to be small-scale, ad hoc, and underfunded. Governments have been
even less involved in sponsoring rehabilitation programs for individuals seeking to leave gangs,
with most reintegration programs funded by church groups or nongovernmental organizations
(NGOs).
Central American government officials have generally cited budgetary limitations and competing
concerns as major factors limiting their ability to implement more extensive prevention and
rehabilitation programs. This may be changing, however, as the government of Mauricio Funes in
El Salvador has increased funding for prevention programs to roughly 14% of the Ministry of
Security’s budget (from a historic average of just over 1%).64 Experts have long argued that it is
important for governments to offer educational and job opportunities to youth who are willing to
leave gangs before they are tempted to join more sophisticated criminal organizations. It is also
critical, they argue, for intervention efforts to focus on strengthening families of at-risk youth.65
Counterdrug Efforts
Despite having limited technology and relatively small interdiction budgets, many countries have
markedly increased their seizures of drugs and illicit funds over the past few years, with
Nicaragua showing especially high seizure rates. In 2010, Panama, Nicaragua, and Costa Rica
seized more cocaine than Mexico (see Table 2). Although large quantities of cocaine do not tend
to flow through El Salvador, and the country has registered only small cocaine seizures in recent
years, Salvadoran police officials seized some $20 million worth of illicit currency in 2010.66
Even with these increasing seizure rates, however, obstacles to more effective counterdrug efforts
are numerous and have not changed significantly over time.67 Some of those obstacles include a
64 CRS interview with officials from El Salvador’s National Civilian Police, December 7, 2010.
65 Bernardo Kliksberg, Mitos y Realidades Sobre la Criminalidad en America Latina (Guatemala City: F & G Editores,
2007).
66 INCSR, March 2011, op. cit.
67 A 1994 report by what was then known as the U.S. General Accounting Office found that “although all of the Central
American countries have drug control efforts underway, no country possesses the technical, financial or human
resources necessary to run an efficient drug interdiction program ... [and that] corruption also limits the effectiveness of
Central American governments’ narcotics control efforts.” U.S. General Accounting Office, Interdiction Efforts in
Central America Have Had Little Impact on the Flow of Drugs, GAO/NSIAD- 94-233, August 1994,
http://www.fas.org/irp/gao/nsi94233.htm.
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lack of funding and equipment for security forces engaged in interdiction efforts, an inability to
sustain programs started with U.S. assistance, limited political support in some countries, and
corruption.68 For example, Costa Rica, which has no military, has only three boats with no
nighttime navigation capacity to patrol its coastline, and no helicopters, radars, or planes for
police engaged in interdiction efforts.69 In Guatemala, high-level official corruption has
exacerbated the country’s resource constraints and limited political will. Two former heads of the
country’s national police are currently facing drug trafficking and conspiracy charges.70
Table 2. Estimated Cocaine Seizures in 2010, by Country
(in metric tons)
Costa
El
Belize
Rica
Salvador
Guatemala Honduras Nicaragua Panama
Mexico
2.6
14.8 0.1 1.4 9.0 17.5
49.5 9.4
Source: U.S. Department of State, Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, International
Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR), March 3, 2011.
Regional Security Efforts
Some analysts maintain that the increasing threat posed by transnational organized crime has led
to greater security cooperation among Central American countries; others disagree, maintaining
that many obstacles to regional efforts remain.71 While most governments appear to agree on a
theoretical level that they need to work together on security issues and to approach donors jointly,
they continue to differ among themselves as to the biggest threats facing the region and the best
ways to combat those threats. The need to cooperate on shared security challenges has also
sometimes been overshadowed by unrelated disputes among the countries, including the recent
Costa Rica-Nicaragua border dispute. Even when the will to collaborate as a region has existed,
political instability in particular countries, such as the June 2009 ouster of the president of
Honduras, has inhibited regional efforts.
Central American governments have demonstrated differing levels of political will to address
crime and tackle corruption, and varying degrees of willingness to collaborate with the United
States, a major donor in the region. For example, according to a recent UNDP report, the Central
American governments together spent a total of almost $4 billion on security and justice in 2010,
a 60% increase in total spending since 2006.72 That aggregate figure masks significant variance
among the countries in terms of the amount of funding budgeted for criminal justice and law
enforcement ministries. While funds dedicated to police and public security have increased
significantly in Costa Rica, Honduras, and Panama, the other countries have posted more
68 U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO), Cooperation with Many Major Drug Transit Countries Has
Improved, but Better Performance Reporting and Sustainability Plans Are Needed, GAO-08-784, July 2008,
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d08784.pdf.
69 CRS correspondence with Embassy of Costa Rica official, March 3, 2011.
70 INCSR, March 2011, op. cit.
71 “Central America: Prospects for a new U.S.-Backed Regional Scheme,” Latin American Security and Strategic
Review, February 2011.
72 UNDP, Información Sobre el Gasto Público de Seguridad y Justicia en Centroamérica 2006-2010, Versión
Preliminar, June 2011, http://www.pnud.org.gt/data/publicacion/informe_gastopublico.pdf.
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moderate increases in security spending. Varying degrees of cooperation exist between Central
American governments and the U.S. government. For example, although cooperation continues
between the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) and the Nicaraguan Navy on interdiction,
the Nicaraguan government has disbanded the vetted anti-drug police unit trained by DEA and
refused to sign bilateral counternarcotics agreements with the United States in fiscal years 2009
and 2010.73
Central American leaders and officials have regularly met over the past few years, often
accompanied by their U.S. and Mexican counterparts, to discuss ways to better coordinate
security efforts and information sharing on gang members and other criminal groups. Most of the
regional security meetings have been organized by the Security Commission of SICA. The
leaders of the SICA member states and the president-elect of Mexico began developing a regional
security strategy in October 2006, which was subsequently adopted at a summit held in August
2007.74 The strategy identified eight threats to regional security, including organized crime, drug
trafficking, deportees with criminal records, gangs, homicide, small arms trafficking, terrorism,
and corruption. In 2008, SICA estimated that the costs to implement its regional security plan
could exceed $953 million.75
Until recently, most regional security cooperation has occurred on a declarative, rather than an
operational, level. International donors (including the United States) have formed a Group of
Friends of Central America76 that has worked with the Central American governments and SICA
to revise and implement the aforementioned security plan. The scope of SICA’s proposed plan
was modified to focus only on efforts in Central America (not Mexico), to prioritize fewer
initiatives, and to address new security threats that have emerged in the last few years. SICA
convened a donors’ conference in Guatemala City on June 22-23, 2011 at which donors pledged
roughly $1.1 billion in new funding for regional security efforts and ongoing support for the
regional security strategy.77 The new aid pledged at the donor’s conference is in addition to
roughly $1.7 billion in committed or dispersed funds that donors have provided since January
2009.78 The extent to which the United States and other bilateral and multilateral donors will now
refocus their existing efforts to align better with Central America’s top priorities still remains to
be seen. Some observers question whether SICA has the institutional capacity to manage projects
across the Central American region79 and to oversee implementation of the new strategy.80
73 INCSR, March 2011, op. cit.
74 A copy of that version of the strategy is available at http://www.state.gov/p/wha/rls/93586.htm.
75 SICA General Secretariat, Fifth Meeting of the Working Group for Drafting Proposals to Finance Central American
Security, May 13-14, 2008.
76 The Group of Friends of Central America originally included: Canada, Spain, the United States, the European
Commission, the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), the Organization of American States (OAS), the United
Nations, and the World Bank.
77 In addition to the aforementioned donors, Colombia, Finland, Germany, Israel, Italy, Japan, South Korea, Mexico,
and Norway signed on to a joint statement in support of the new Central American security strategy. See U.S.
Department of State, “Joint Press Statement of Support for the Central American Security Strategy,” press release, June
21, 2011 and “Central America Gets More Than Expected to Spend on its Public Security Strategy,” Latin American
Security and Strategic Review, June 2011.
78 Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) and Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA), Mapeo de las
Intervenciones de Seguridad Ciudadana en Centroamérica Financiadas por la Cooperación Internacional, June 2011.
79 Villiers Negroponte, Spring 2010, op. cit.
80 “Central America: Region Hails ‘Historic’ Security Summit; Doubts Persist,” Latin American Weekly Report, June
30, 2011.
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U.S. Policy
U.S. security policy in the Western Hemisphere has changed considerably in recent years. In the
aftermath of the Cold War, preventing narcotics from reaching the United States became the
primary focus of U.S. security efforts in the hemisphere. In an attempt to reduce the supply of
illicit drugs, the bulk of U.S. security assistance was concentrated in Colombia and the other
cocaine-producing nations of the Andean region of South America. The United States provided
some support for counternarcotics and other security efforts elsewhere in the hemisphere—
including a major interdiction effort in Central America in the early 1990s—but the funding
levels were comparatively low. Although U.S.-led efforts have contributed to temporary successes
in particular countries or sub-regions, they have done little to change the overall availability of
illicit drugs in the United States, as traffickers have altered their cultivation patterns, production
techniques, and trafficking routes and methods in order to avoid detection. These mixed results,
along with rising levels of crime and violence throughout the hemisphere, have led policymakers
to move toward a more comprehensive approach to security issues.81
While largely maintaining previous narcotics supply reduction efforts, U.S. policy now places
increased emphasis on coordinating efforts throughout the hemisphere and strengthening the
capacities of partner governments. The Obama Administration, which has made ensuring the
safety and security of all citizens one of the four overarching priorities of U.S. policy in Latin
America, has sought to develop collaborative partnerships with countries throughout the
hemisphere.82 These partnerships have taken the form of bilateral security cooperation with
countries like Colombia and Mexico, as well as regional programs such as the Caribbean Basin
Security Initiative (CBSI) and the Central America Regional Security Initiative (CARSI).
According to the State Department, activities supported through these partnerships are designed
to be complementary and are developed in coordination with one another, drawing on lessons
learned from past U.S. initiatives. In addition to providing equipment, training, and technical
assistance to support immediate law enforcement and interdiction operations, these partnerships
seek to strengthen the capacities of governmental institutions to address security challenges and
the underlying economic and social conditions that contribute to them.83
Despite these changes in emphasis, a commission of prominent world leaders—including former
presidents of Brazil, Colombia, and Mexico—recently concluded that U.S. counternarcotics
policies “have clearly failed to effectively curtail supply or consumption.” The commission
suggests that supply reduction and incarceration strategies are futile and that government
resources would be better spent on demand and harm reduction efforts.84
81 For more information on the evolution of U.S. policies, see CRS Report R41215, Latin America and the Caribbean:
Illicit Drug Trafficking and U.S. Counterdrug Programs, coordinated by Clare Ribando Seelke. For information on
interdiction efforts in Central America in the early 1990s, see GAO, August 1994, op. cit.
82 Valenzuela testimony, February 2011, op. cit.
83 U.S. Department of State, “Hemispheric Security—An Integrated U.S. Government Approach,” January 25, 2011.
84 Global Commission on Drug Policy, War on Drugs: Report of the Global Commission on Drug Policy, June 2011,
http://www.globalcommissionondrugs.org/Report.
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Background on Assistance to Central America
Given the proximity of Central America, the United States has long been concerned about
potential security threats from the region and has provided Central American nations with
assistance to counter those threats. During the Cold War, the United States viewed links between
the Soviet Union and political movements in Central America as a potential threat to U.S.
strategic interests. To prevent Soviet allies from establishing political or military footholds in the
region, the United States heavily supported anti-communist forces, including the Salvadoran
government in its battle against the leftist insurgency of the Farabundo Martí National Liberation
Front (FMLN), and the contra forces seeking to overthrow the leftist government of the
Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN) in Nicaragua.85 Between 1979, when the Sandinistas
seized power in Nicaragua, and 1992, when peace accords were signed to end the civil war in El
Salvador, U.S. economic and military assistance to Central America averaged $1.3 billion
annually.86
Following the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the end of the civil wars in the region, U.S.
assistance to Central American nations declined substantially. Between FY1993 and FY2007,
total U.S. assistance to Central America averaged $413 million annually, roughly a third of what
had been provided in the previous 15 years.87 Likewise, the majority of the assistance provided
was directed toward economic and political development, as the United States sought to
encourage the spread of free-market economic policies and the consolidation of democratic
governance. Of the security-related assistance that the United States has provided to the region
since the end of the Cold War, a substantial portion has been dedicated to U.S. Agency for
International Development (USAID) rule of law programs, which have provided support for
justice sector reforms in several Central American nations since the 1980s.88 In El Salvador—
where institutional reforms have been the most extensive—USAID has supported the
establishment of informal justice centers that provide community-level mediation and dispute
resolution, and the transformation of the judicial process from a written, inquisitorial system to an
oral, accusatorial system, among other efforts. Although reforms such as these have strengthened
the rule of law in El Salvador and other Central American nations, progress has been uneven and
many justice sector institutions remain relatively weak, as noted above.89
85 U.S. Congress, Joint Economic Committee, The Caribbean Basin: Economic and Security Issues, committee print,
Central America: Continuing U.S. Concerns, study paper prepared by Nina M. Serafino of the Congressional Research
Service, 102nd Cong., 2nd sess., January 1993, S.Prt. 102-110 (Washington: GPO, 1993), pp. 173-178.
86 Assistance peaked in 1985 at nearly $2.4 billion. Figures are in constant, 2009 dollars. U.S. Overseas Loans and
Grants, op. cit.
87 Ibid.
88 USAID initiated rule of law programs in El Salvador in 1984, in Costa Rica and Honduras in 1985, in Guatemala in
1986, and Panama in 1992. U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), Bureau for Democracy, Conflict,
and Humanitarian Assistance, Office of Democracy and Governance, Achievements in Building and Maintaining the
Rule of Law, Occasional Papers Series, November 2002.
89 Ibid.
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Central America Regional Security Initiative
Formulation
The impetus for increased U.S.-Central American cooperation on security issues stemmed from a
trip by then-President George W. Bush to Central America and Mexico in March 2007. Concerns
over an increase in narcotics flows and the rapid escalation of crime and violence in the region
reportedly dominated the President’s conversations with his counterparts, as well as follow-on
consultations between U.S., Central American, and Mexican officials. To capitalize on the
emergence of a cohesive security dialogue among the seven nations of Central America and the
Mexican government’s willingness to address the issues of drug trafficking and organized crime,
the Bush Administration began to develop the framework for a new regional security partnership.
In October 2007, the Bush Administration requested funding for a security assistance package
designed to support Mexico and the countries of Central America in their fight against organized
crime, to improve communication among the various law enforcement agencies, and to support
the institutional reforms necessary to ensure the long-term enforcement of the rule of law and
protection of civil and human rights.90 This security assistance package was originally known as
the Mérida Initiative, named after the location in Mexico where President Bush had met with
President Calderón. The Central America portion of Mérida was split into a separate Central
America Regional Security Initiative (CARSI) in FY2010. Officials from nearly every Central
American nation maintain that the region was not sufficiently involved in the formulation of
Mérida/CARSI, and that the initiative could be more responsive to host government priorities.91
As currently formulated, CARSI provides equipment, training, and technical assistance to build
the capacity of Central American institutions to counter criminal threats. In addition, CARSI
supports community-based programs designed to address underlying economic and social
conditions that leave communities vulnerable to those threats. The five primary goals of CARSI
are to:
1. create safe streets for the citizens of the region;
2. disrupt the movement of criminals and contraband within and among the nations
of Central America;
3. support the development of strong, capable, and accountable Central American
governments;
4. establish effective state presence and security in communities at risk; and
5. foster enhanced levels of security and rule of law coordination and cooperation
among the nations of the region.92
90 Testimony of Thomas A. Shannon Jr., Assistant Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere Affairs, and David T.
Johnson, Assistant Secretary of State for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, U.S. Department of
State, before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, November 14, 2007.
91 CRS interviews with Central American embassy officials, October 27, November 2, 3, and 9, 2010.
92 U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, “The Central America Regional Security Initiative: Citizen-
Safety—A Shared Partnership,” Fact Sheet, January 26, 2011.
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Funding from FY2008-FY201293
Since FY2008, $361.5 million has been appropriated for the countries of Central America under
what was formerly known as the Mérida Initiative-Central America and is now known as CARSI.
This includes $101.5 million in assistance that has been allocated to the region for the current
fiscal year (FY2011). The Obama Administration has requested $100 million in additional
funding for CARSI for FY2012 (see Table 3).
The funds provided through CARSI comprise only a portion of total U.S. security assistance to
the region. During a March 2011 visit to El Salvador, President Obama announced a “Central
America Citizen Security Partnership,” under which the United States would review its security
efforts in the region and potentially refocus funding to adapt to changing conditions. 94 At the June
2011 SICA conference, Secretary of State Clinton announced that U.S. funding for the Central
America Citizen Security Partnership would exceed $290 million in FY2011.95 The $290 million
pledge includes the $101.5 million being provided through CARSI as well as all other bilateral
and regional U.S. assistance being provided to support security efforts in the region in FY2011.96
Table 3. Funding for the Central America Regional Security Initiative,
FY2008-FY2012
($ in thousands)
FY2008
FY2009
FY2010
FY2011
FY2012
Account
(Actual)
(Actual)
(Actual)a
(Estimate)
(Request)
ESF
25,000 18,000 23,000 30,000 45,000
INCLE 24,800 70,000 65,000 71,500 55,000
NADR
6,200 — — — —
FMF 4,000
17,000
7,000 — —
Total
60,000 105,000 95,000 101,500 100,000
Sources: U.S. Department of State, Congressional Budget Justification for Foreign Operations, Fiscal Year 2012,
March, 2011; U.S. Department of State, FY 2010 Spending Plan for the Central America Regional Security Initiative,
July 29, 2010. FY2011 653(a) al ocation data provided by the U.S. Department of State, August 2011.
Notes: ESF = Economic Support Fund; INCLE = International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement; NADR
= Nonproliferation, Anti-Terrorism, De-mining and Related Programs; and FMF = Foreign Military Financing.
a. In the 2010 Consolidated Appropriations Act (P.L. 111-117), Congress appropriated “up to” $83 mil ion for
the countries of Central America “only to combat drug trafficking and related violence and organized crime,
and for judicial reform, institution building, anti-corruption, rule of law activities, and maritime security.”
After consultations with Congress, the Department of State allocated an additional $12 million in ESF from
funds appropriated to its Western Hemisphere Regional account to crime and violence prevention
programs administered by USAID, bringing total FY2010 CARSI funding to $95 million.
93 This section partially draws from CRS Report R40135, Mérida Initiative for Mexico and Central America: Funding
and Policy Issues, by Clare Ribando Seelke.
94 White House, “The Central America Citizen Security Partnership,” Fact Sheet, March 21, 2011.
95 U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, “Remarks at the Central American Security Conference (SICA),” U.S.
Department of State, June 22, 2011.
96 CRS discussions with State Department officials, June 2011.
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FY2008 Appropriations
When announcing the Mérida Initiative, the Bush Administration originally requested $50 million
for the countries of Central America. All of the funds were requested in the International
Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE) account, and were designated to be used for
public security and law enforcement programs. Members of Congress, some of whom expressed
considerable disappointment that they were not consulted as the plan was being formulated,97
dedicated additional funds to Central America and broadened the focus of the initiative.
Through the FY2008 Supplemental Appropriations Act (P.L. 110-252), Congress appropriated
$60 million for Central America and divided the funds among the following accounts: INCLE;
Economic Support Fund (ESF); Nonproliferation, Anti-Terrorism, De-mining and Related
Programs (NADR); and Foreign Military Financing (FMF). Congress allotted $25 million in ESF
funds for the creation of an Economic and Social Development Fund for Central America, $20
million of which was to be administered by USAID and $5 million of which was to be
administered by the State Department to support educational and cultural exchange programs.
Congress also allotted $1 million to support the International Commission against Impunity in
Guatemala (CICIG).98 The act required the State Department to withhold 15% of the INCLE and
FMF assistance appropriated for the countries of Central America until the Secretary of State
could report that the Central American governments were taking steps to improve respect for
human rights, such as creating police complaints commissions, reforming their judiciaries, and
investigating and prosecuting military and police forces that had been credibly alleged to have
committed human rights violations.
FY2009 Appropriations
In the FY2009 Omnibus Appropriations Act (P.L. 111-8), Congress provided $105 million in
funding for Central America. It required that at least $35 million of the funds appropriated for the
region be used to support judicial reform, institution building, anti-corruption, and rule of law
activities. The explanatory statement to the act directed that $70 million of the funds for the
region be provided through the INCLE account, that $15 million of the FMF funds support
maritime security programs, and that $12 million in ESF support USAID’s Economic and Social
Development Fund for Central America. The FY2009 funds were subject to the same human
rights conditions as the funds provided through the FY2008 supplemental.
FY2010 Appropriations
In the FY2010 Consolidated Appropriations Act (P.L. 111-117), Congress appropriated “up to”
$83 million for the countries of Central America “to combat drug trafficking and related violence
and organized crime, and for judicial reform, institution building, anti-corruption, rule of law
activities, and maritime security.” After consultations with Congress, the Department of State
allocated an additional $12 million in ESF from funds appropriated to its Western Hemisphere
Regional account to crime and violence prevention programs administered by USAID, bringing
97 U.S. Congress, House Committee on Foreign Affairs, The Merida Initiative: Assessing Plans to Step Up Our
Security Cooperation with Mexico and Central America, 110th Cong., 1st sess., November 14, 2007, Serial No. 110-135
(Washington: GPO, 2008).
98 For more information on CICIG, see the text box titled “The International Commission Against Impunity in
Guatemala: A Regional Model?” in the “Law Enforcement Approaches” section above.
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total FY2010 CARSI funding to $95 million. The conference report to the act (H.Rept. 111-366)
split Central America funding from the Mérida Initiative and placed it under a new Central
America Regional Security Initiative (CARSI). The Obama Administration embraced the change
as a way to focus more attention on the situation in Central America and U.S. efforts in the
region. In addition to subjecting CARSI funds to the same human rights conditions as previous
years, the conference report to the act directed the Secretary of State to submit a report within 90
days of enactment detailing regional threats or problems to be addressed in the region, as well as
realistic goals for U.S. efforts and actions planned to achieve them.
FY2011 Appropriations
After a series of continuing resolutions, the FY2011 Department of Defense and Full-Year
Continuing Appropriations Act (P.L. 112-10) was signed into law on April 15, 2011. The
legislation had no accompanying report and did not designate a funding level for CARSI. It did,
however, direct the Obama Administration to report back to Congress within 30 days on its
proposed allocations of the appropriated funds. After consultations with Congress, the
Department of State allocated $101.5 million for CARSI in FY2011.99 The funds are subject to
the same human rights conditions as previous years.
Programs
Through CARSI, the United States funds a variety of activities designed to support U.S. and
Central American security objectives. U.S. agencies provide partner nations with equipment,
technical assistance, and training to improve narcotics interdiction and disrupt criminal networks
that operate in the region, as well as in the United States. CARSI-funded activities also provide
support for Central American law enforcement and justice sector institutions, identifying
deficiencies and building their capacities to ensure the safety and security of the citizens of the
region. In addition, CARSI supports prevention efforts that seek to reduce drug demand and
provide at-risk youth with educational, vocational, and recreational opportunities. Many of the
activities funded by CARSI build on previous security efforts in the region. U.S. officials assert
that although CARSI allows the United States to set up pilot programs that demonstrate
potentially successful approaches to improving security conditions, it is up to Central American
nations themselves to sustain successful programs and apply the lessons learned nationwide.100
A number of U.S. and partner nation agencies are involved in developing and supporting CARSI
activities. The U.S. agencies involved include the Departments of State, Defense, and Treasury;
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE); Customs and Border Patrol (CBP); the U.S. Coast
Guard; the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI); the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA);
the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF); the Office of Overseas
Prosecutorial Development, Assistance and Training (OPDAT); and the U.S. Agency for
International Development (USAID).101 CARSI working groups within U.S. embassies include
representatives of the relevant agencies present at each post and serve as the formal mechanism
for interagency coordination in the field.102
99 FY2011 653(a) allocation data provided to CRS by the U.S. Department of State, August 2011.
100 CRS interview with State Department official at the U.S. Embassy in Guatemala, January 19, 2011.
101 U.S. Department of State, “The Central America Regional Security Initiative,” January 25, 2011.
102 U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO), Mérida Initiative: The United States Has Provided
(continued...)
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The U.S.-SICA dialogue serves as the forum for regional coordination, while bilateral
coordination varies by country. Coordination is particularly close in Honduras, where a bilateral
CARSI task force, co-chaired by the U.S. Ambassador and President Lobo, convenes quarterly.
The task force has established eight working groups, which undertake joint planning related to the
security issues prioritized by the Honduran government.103 Coordination with some of the other
Central American nations, however, is less robust. Although the United States has good relations
with many parts of the Salvadoran government, it reportedly refuses to work with the Minister of
Public Security.104 In Nicaragua, the United States has limited contact with many sectors of the
government but works closely with the Nicaraguan Navy.105
Narcotics Interdiction and Law Enforcement Support
The bulk of U.S. assistance provided through CARSI provides Central American nations with
equipment and related maintenance, technical support, and training to support narcotics
interdiction and other law enforcement operations. In addition to the provision and refurbishment
of aircraft, boats, and other vehicles, CARSI provides communications, border inspection, and
security force equipment such as radios, computers, X-ray cargo scanners, narcotics identification
kits, weapons, ballistic vests, and night-vision goggles. Although the types of equipment and
training vary according to the capabilities and needs of each Central American nation, in general,
the assistance is designed to extend the reach of the region’s security forces and enable countries
to better control their national territories. For example, an aviation support program is providing
Guatemala with helicopters that enable security forces to rapidly reach areas of the country that
would otherwise be too difficult or dangerous to access, thereby limiting sanctuaries for DTOs.
The program was launched in FY2009 and is expected to last four years, at which point the
Guatemalan government would become responsible for sustaining it.106
U.S. assistance provided through CARSI also supports specialized law enforcement units that are
vetted by, and work with, U.S. personnel to investigate and disrupt the operations of transnational
gangs and trafficking networks. FBI-led Transnational Anti-Gang (TAG) units, which were first
created in El Salvador in 2007, are now expanding to Guatemala and Honduras with CARSI
support. According to the FBI, intelligence collected by the Salvadoran TAG unit has been used
to convict criminals in both El Salvador and the United States.107 DEA, ICE, and the Department
of State’s Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) also have vetted
unit programs throughout Central America. Among other activities, they conduct complex
investigations into money laundering, bulk cash smuggling, and the trafficking of narcotics,
(...continued)
Counternarcotics and Anticrime Support but Needs Better Performance Measures, GAO-10-837, July 2010,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-837.
103 INCSR, March 2011, op. cit.
104 The Minister of Public Security—who like many members of the current FMLN Administration in El Salvador
fought against the U.S.-backed government during the country’s civil war—is alleged to have played a role in the 1985
killing of four U.S. marines. Tim Johnson, “El Salvador’s long-ago civil war still colors U.S. relations,” Miami Herald,
March 17, 2011.
105 INCSR, March 2011, op. cit.
106 U.S. Department of State, FY 2010 Spending Plan for the Central America Regional Security Initiative (CARSI),
July 29, 2010.
107 CRS interview with FBI attaché at the U.S. embassy in El Salvador, January 18, 2011.
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firearms, and persons.108 Although these units have produced some notable successes, they are
small and difficult to maintain, given the broader context of corruption within many Central
American law enforcement institutions. In El Salvador, for example, the DEA-vetted unit was
reduced from 22 members to eight after polygraph tests demonstrated that nearly two-thirds of the
officers were no longer suitable for the unit.109
Institutional Capacity Building
In addition to immediate support for law enforcement efforts, CARSI provides funding to identify
deficiencies and build long-term capacity within law enforcement and justice sector institutions.
INL and USAID community-policing programs are designed to build local confidence in police
forces by converting them into more community-based, service-oriented organizations.110 One
such program, the Villa Nueva model precinct in Guatemala, is being replicated with CARSI
funding as a result of its success in establishing popular trust and reducing violence.111 To
improve the investigative capacity of Central American nations, CARSI has supported
assessments of forensic laboratories, the implementation of ATF’s Electronic Trace Submission
(eTrace) System to track firearms, and the expansion of the FBI’s Central America Fingerprint
Exchange (CAFE), which assists partner nations in developing fingerprint and biometric
capabilities. CARSI also seeks to reduce impunity by improving the efficiency and effectiveness
of Central American judicial systems. U.S. agencies provide training and technical assistance
designed to enhance prosecutorial capabilities, improve the management of courts, and facilitate
coordination between justice sector entities. Moreover, they provide training and technical
assistance to improve prison management, which repeatedly has been identified as a major
weakness throughout the region.112
Prevention
Beyond providing support for law enforcement and institutional capacity-building efforts, CARSI
funds a variety of prevention programs designed to address underlying economic and social
conditions that leave communities vulnerable to crime and violence. USAID asserts that Central
American youth often see few alternatives to gangs and other criminal organizations as a result of
the social and economic exclusion that stems from dysfunctional families, high levels of
unemployment, minimal access to basic services, ineffective government institutions, and
insufficient access to educational and economic opportunities. Through its management of
CARSI funds allocated to the congressionally created Economic and Social Development Fund
for Central America, USAID supports prevention programs designed to address these issues by
providing educational, recreational, and vocational opportunities for at-risk youth.113
Although projects vary by country, nearly all are community-based and municipally led as a
result of lessons learned through previous efforts in the region.114 In El Salvador, for example,
108 FY 2010 Spending Plan for CARSI, July 2010, op. cit.
109 CRS interview with DEA attaché at the U.S. embassy in El Salvador, January 18, 2011.
110 CRS interview with USAID officials in El Salvador, January 18, 2011.
111 CRS interviews with Villa Nueva model precinct officers, January 19, 2011.
112 FY 2010 Spending Plan for CARSI, July 2010, op. cit.
113 Ibid.
114 CRS interview with USAID officials in El Salvador, January 18, 2011.
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USAID’s Community-Based Crime and Violence Prevention Project works in 12 municipalities
to strengthen the capacities of local governments, civil society organizations, community leaders,
and youth to address the problems of crime and violence. Prevention councils in each
municipality analyze problems within the community and develop prevention plans to address
those problems through activities ranging from vocational training to social entrepreneurship
projects.115 USAID has expanded the reach of its CARSI efforts in many countries by
supplementing the funds provided through the initiative with funds appropriated for bilateral
assistance.116
Implementation
Some Members of Congress and Central American officials have expressed frustration over the
relatively slow pace of implementation of CARSI.117 As of March 2010, only 25% of the funds
appropriated for Mérida/CARSI had been obligated and 8% had been expended. According to the
Government Accountability Office (GAO), the slow pace is the result of a number of challenges
faced by the agencies charged with implementing the initiative, including insufficient staff to
administer programs, the time-consuming U.S. government procurement process, and legislative
withholding requirements that prevent some funds from being released until certain reporting
requirements are met.118 The need to negotiate agreements with seven different countries has also
proved challenging. Changes in the governments of El Salvador and Panama, and repeated
changes in top-level officials in Guatemala, required U.S. officials to restart negotiations and
delay program implementation.119 In Honduras, the June 2009 ouster of President Manuel Zelaya
led the United States to suspend assistance and cooperation with the country until the
inauguration of a new President in February 2010.120
Implementation appears to be accelerating now that agreements with partner nations are in place,
initial planning is complete, and programs are under way. As of March 10, 2011, 88% of the
funds appropriated for Mérida/CARSI had been obligated and 19% had been expended (see Table
4).121 U.S. agencies have helped expedite the process in several ways. Some posts in Central
America reprogrammed existing bilateral assistance funds in order to initiate CARSI activities
while waiting for CARSI funds to become available.122 Likewise, the Department of State is
addressing staffing issues by creating up to 20 new INL positions in the region and setting up
enhanced procurement support in Colombia.123
115 U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), “Community-Based Crime and Violence Prevention Project,”
News Bulletin, October 2010.
116 U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), “Central America Regional Security Initiative (CARSI),”
Fact Sheet, June 17, 2010; CRS interview with USAID officials in El Salvador, January 18, 2011.
117 U.S. Congress, House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere, Assessing the
Merida Initiative: A Report from the Government Accountability Office (GAO), 111th Cong., 2nd sess., July 21, 2010,
Serial No. 111-109 (Washington: GPO, 2010); CRS interviews with Central American embassy officials, October 25,
November 3 and 9, 2010.
118 GAO, July 2010, op. cit. For more information on withholding requirements, see “Funding from FY2008-FY2012”
above and “Human Rights Concerns” below.
119 Ibid.
120 INCSR, March 2011, op. cit.
121 Data provided to CRS by the State Department, March 28, 2011.
122 GAO, July 2010, op. cit.
123 CRS interview with State Department official, February 25, 2011.
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Table 4. Status of Assistance Appropriated, as of March 2011
($ in thousands)
Amount
Amount
Amount
Percent
Percent
Account
Appropriateda
Obligated
Expended
Obligated
Expended
ESF 66,000
60,850
14,500 92 22
INCLE 159,800
134,930 28,230
84
18
NADR 6,200 6,200 5,160 100 83
FMF 28,000
25,900
1,410 93 5
Total
260,000 227,880 49,300
88
19
Source: U.S. Department of State data provided to CRS, March 28, 2011.
Notes: ESF = Economic Support Fund; INCLE = International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement; NADR
= Nonproliferation, Anti-Terrorism, De-mining and Related Programs; and FMF = Foreign Military Financing.
a. Includes al funds appropriated for Mérida-Central America/CARSI between FY2008 and FY2010.
Performance Measures
To measure the effects of CARSI, USAID is overseeing an impact evaluation of its crime
prevention programs. The evaluation, conducted by Vanderbilt University’s Latin American
Public Opinion Project (LAPOP), consists of five elements: (1) community surveys; (2) reviews
of demographic data; (3) focus groups; (4) interviews with stakeholders; and (5) community
observations. LAPOP will measure these citizen security indicators every 18 months, both in
treatment communities where USAID crime prevention programs are in place and in control
communities where no activities have been implemented. By tracking perception changes over
time, USAID hopes to identify successful crime prevention programs and why they succeed so
that resources can be dedicated to the most effective programs and best practices can be replicated
throughout the region.124
CARSI programs other than USAID’s crime prevention programs are generally measured in
terms of outputs, such as the number of people trained or the amount of equipment delivered. The
GAO asserts that these types of measures limit the U.S. government’s ability to assess the
performance of CARSI programs since they do not measure the impact of the training or
equipment or if it has been successfully employed.125
Additional Issues for Congressional Consideration
Funding Issues
As Congress evaluates budget priorities and how to best utilize scarce resources, it is likely to
consider the form of U.S. security assistance to Central America. When the Mérida Initiative was
first announced, some Members of Congress questioned why the Bush Administration’s budget
124 GAO, July 2010, op. cit.; USAID CARSI Fact Sheet, June 2010, op. cit.
125 GAO, July 2010, op. cit.
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request included only $50 million for Central America, as compared to $500 million for
Mexico.126 Then-Assistant Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere Affairs Thomas Shannon
noted that it was an initial request and that the Administration hoped that it could work with
Central American nations to build a larger program over time.127 Although annual U.S. assistance
provided to the region through Mérida/CARSI has increased by nearly 70% since FY2008,
Central American leaders and some Members of Congress assert that the resources being
provided are insufficient given the challenges facing the region.128 Many analysts note that
CARSI, at its current funding level, is unlikely to alter outcomes given the relatively weak
positions from which most Central American nations are starting.129 At the same time, some U.S.
officials maintain that the region must move away from the mind-set that the United States is the
fundamental solution to every problem, and that current CARSI funding demonstrates that the
United States is committed to working in partnership with the region to address security
challenges.130
When debating future funding levels, Congress may consider the political will of Central
American nations. Some analysts assert that even if the United States were to greatly increase the
amount of assistance it provides through CARSI, it would do little good as long as Central
American leaders lack the political will to tackle long-standing issues such as incomplete
institutional reforms, precarious tax bases, and the lack of opportunities for young people.131
Despite frequent promises from leaders to address these issues, few have actually taken concrete
steps toward doing so. For example, although the Presidents of Costa Rica, El Salvador,
Guatemala, and Honduras have all pushed for fiscal reforms designed to increase revenues to
fund security efforts, only Honduras has successfully enacted such a measure.132 Without greater
commitment from partner countries to undertake necessary reforms and sustain current efforts,
CARSI programs could meet the same end as previous U.S.-backed counternarcotics programs in
the region, which simply faded away once U.S. assistance declined.133
Another funding issue Congress may consider is resource coordination, both within the U.S.
government and between the U.S. government and other international donors. In FY2011, Central
American countries are scheduled to receive $101.5 million through CARSI. This represents only
slightly more than one-third of the $290 million in total U.S. assistance being allocated to the
region for security purposes during the current fiscal year.134 While some U.S. embassies in
Central America appear to be closely coordinating the use of CARSI, Department of Defense, and
126 U.S. Congress, House Committee on Foreign Affairs, The Merida Initiative: Assessing Plans to Step Up Our
Security Cooperation with Mexico and Central America, 110th Cong., 1st sess., November 14, 2007, Serial No. 110-135
(Washington: GPO, 2008).
127 Shannon testimony, November 2007, op. cit.
128 U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere, Peace Corps and
Global Narcotics Affairs, U.S. Policy Towards Latin America, 112th Cong., 1st sess., February 17, 2011; Mary Beth
Sheridan, “Central American leaders plead for more U.S. anti-drug help,” Washington Post, September 30, 2010.
129 Dudley, May 2010, op. cit.; Kevin Casas-Zamora, “Paying Attention to Central America’s Drug Trafficking Crisis,”
Brookings Institution, November 1, 2010.
130 CRS interview with State Department official in El Salvador, January 18, 2011.
131 Casas-Zamora, November 2010, op. cit.
132 “Honduras Approves New Tax to Boost Drug Fight,” Reuters, June 23, 2011.
133 GAO, August 1994, op. cit.
134 Secretary of State Clinton, June 2011, op. cit; CRS discussions with State Department officials, June 2011.
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bilateral USAID and Department of State assistance so that the activities receiving funding serve
complementary purposes,135 it is unclear whether this is true throughout the region.
Even if there is close coordination among U.S. agencies, U.S. assistance accounts for only a
portion of the total security assistance being provided to the region. According to a recent study,
international donors committed a combined $1.7 billion in grants and loans to Central America
for citizen security efforts between January 2009 and June 2011. Looking only at projects already
being implemented, the United States accounts for approximately $378 million (28%) of the $1.3
billion provided by the international community. The study reveals a lack of coordination among
the various donors’ efforts, and indicates that, in some cases, donors fund programs that duplicate
efforts or even support conflicting goals.136 Improved international coordination could allow the
United States to better focus its own efforts and thereby increase the impact of its programs. At
the June 2011 SICA conference, Secretary of State Clinton asserted that the Obama
Administration “intends to establish an ongoing, effective, high-level mechanism to ensure
sustained coordination” among those involved in security efforts in Central America.137
Human Rights Concerns
Congress remains concerned about how alleged human rights abuses committed by military and
police forces in some Central American countries are investigated and punished, the transparency
of judiciary systems in the region (particularly in Nicaragua), and whether security forces accused
of committing past abuses are being held accountable for their actions (particularly in
Guatemala).138 As with Mexico, appropriations legislation that has provided funding for Mérida
Initiative and CARSI programs in Central America has contained vetting requirements (per
Section 620J of the Foreign Assistance Act [FAA] of 1961)139 and human rights conditions.
Specifically, P.L. 110-252, P.L. 111-8, P.L. 111-117, and P.L. 112-10 have required that 15% of
INCLE and FMF assistance be withheld until the Secretary of State reports in writing that the
governments of the countries in Central America are taking action in three areas:
1. establishing police complaints commissions with authority and independence to
receive complaints and carry out effective investigations;
2. implementing reforms to improve the capacity and ensure the independence of
the judiciary; and
3. investigating and prosecuting members of the federal police and military forces
who have been credibly alleged to have committed violations of human rights.
135 CRS interview with the CARSI Working Group in Guatemala, January 19, 2011.
136 IDB and WOLA, June 2011, op. cit..
137 Secretary of State Clinton, June 2011, op. cit.
138 For a summary of recent human rights developments in each country, see U.S. Department of State, Country
Reports on Human Rights Practices, available at http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/.
139 According to Section 620J of the FAA of 1961, units of a foreign country’s security forces are prohibited from
receiving assistance if the Secretary of State receives “credible evidence” that such units have committed “gross
violations of human rights.” In response to this provision, the State Department has developed vetting procedures for
potential security force trainees.
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Each of those appropriations bills has placed additional restrictions on FMF and international
military education and training (IMET) assistance to Guatemala and limited them to certain parts
of the Guatemalan military.
The State Department has submitted human rights progress reports to congressional appropriators
for Belize, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Panama for FY2011. It once again
did not submit a human rights report for Nicaragua in FY2011 since it was unable to report
progress.
Human rights organizations have generally lauded the inclusion of human rights conditions in
Mérida/CARSI legislation, but some U.S. officials have privately complained about the number
of restrictions and requirements placed on the assistance. When combined with the delay in
appropriations legislation for each of the past several fiscal years, consultations with
congressional appropriators related to the so-called “15% withholding requirement” reports
mentioned above have contributed to significant delays in funds being released. While FMF funds
can be spent over two fiscal years, INCLE funds must be spent in the fiscal year in which they are
appropriated. In recent years, this has created challenges for embassies, which have not received
some Mérida/CARSI funding until July or August that must be obligated by the end of the fiscal
year in September.
Relation to Other U.S. Government Policies
An innovative component of the Mérida Initiative, as it was originally conceived, was the
principle of “shared responsibility,” or the idea that all countries involved in the initiative—the
United States, Mexico, and the seven countries of Central America—would take steps to tackle
domestic problems contributing to drug trafficking and crime in the region.140 The Mexican and
Central American governments committed to address corruption and reform their law
enforcement and judicial institutions. For its part, the U.S. government pledged to address drug
demand, money laundering, and weapons smuggling.141 The importance of “shared
responsibility” has been reiterated by President Obama, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, and
other Administration officials in meetings and public events with Mexican and Central American
officials. The Obama Administration has also begun to address some Central American
governments’ concerns about U.S. deportation policy. While Mexican and Central American
officials have welcomed the new rhetoric, they have periodically challenged the U.S.
government’s commitment to matching words with deeds, particularly with respect to U.S. gun
policy and addressing drug consumption.142
U.S. government efforts to address each of the issues mentioned above are carried out by several
different domestic agencies. When debating future support for CARSI, Congress may consider
whether to provide additional funding simultaneously for these or other domestic activities that
would enhance the United States’ abilities to fulfill its pledges. The Obama Administration
included an increased focus on reducing U.S. drug demand, particularly among youth, in its 2010
and 2011 National Drug Control Strategies and asked for slight increases in funding for
140 U.S. Department of State and Government of Mexico, “Joint Statement on the Mérida Initiative: A New Paradigm
for Security Cooperation,” October 22, 2007.
141 For more information, see CRS Report R41349, U.S.-Mexican Security Cooperation: The Mérida Initiative and
Beyond , by Clare Ribando Seelke and Kristin M. Finklea.
142 Fred Hiatt, “What Felipe Calderón Wants from the United States,” Washington Post, March 4, 2011.
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prevention and treatment programs in its FY2012 budget request.143 Nevertheless, the U.S. drug
control budget remains largely focused on overseas supply-reduction programs and domestic law
enforcement efforts.144
In the past few years, U.S. Customs and Border Patrol (CBP) and U.S. Immigration and Customs
Enforcement (ICE) have worked together to increase operations against bulk cash smuggling and
other forms of money laundering. CBP has increased southbound inspections of vehicles and
trains for bulk cash flowing into Mexico and Central America. In December 2009, ICE opened a
bulk cash smuggling detection center to assist U.S. federal, state, and local law enforcement
agencies in tracking and disrupting illicit funding flows. Despite these efforts, the vast majority of
illicit monetary transfers and shipments continue to flow southward undetected.145
The Department of Justice and its Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF)
have made efforts to staunch the flow of illegal guns from the United States to Mexico and
Central America. They have stepped up enforcement of domestic gun control laws, and have
sought to improve coordination with law enforcement bodies in the region. ATF maintains a
foreign attaché in Mexico City and a Regional Firearms Advisor in El Salvador to support
firearms-related investigations throughout the region. For example, ATF trains Central American
law enforcement officers how to use the eTrace program, through which investigators are
sometimes able to determine the origin and commercial trail of seized firearms, identify gun
trafficking trends, and develop investigative leads.146
In addition to the issues mentioned above, policymakers in Central America have expressed
concerns that increasing U.S. deportations of individuals with criminal records are worsening the
gang and security problems in the region.147 The Central American countries of Honduras,
Guatemala, and El Salvador have received the highest numbers of U.S. deportations (after
Mexico) for the past several fiscal years. Central American countries have typically had a lower
percentage of individuals deported on criminal grounds than other top-receiving countries like
Mexico, Jamaica, and the Dominican Republic. In FY2009 and FY2010, however, the percentage
of Central Americans deported on criminal grounds increased significantly.
For the past several years, Central American officials have asked the U.S. government to consider
providing a complete criminal history for each deportee who has been removed on criminal
grounds, including whether he or she is a member of a gang. While ICE does not provide a
complete criminal record for deportees, it may provide some information regarding an
individual’s criminal history when specifying why the individual was removed from the United
States. ICE does not indicate gang affiliation unless it is the primary reason for the individual
being deported. Law enforcement officials in receiving countries are able to contact the FBI to
143 For more information on the National Drug Control Strategy and the Office of National Drug Control Policy, see
CRS Report R41535, Reauthorizing the Office of National Drug Control Policy: Issues for Consideration, by Kristin
M. Finklea.
144 See Office of National Drug Control Policy, "Fact Sheet: Changes to the National Drug Control Budget," press
release, February 2011, http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/publications/pdf/fy12budget_fs.pdf.
145 William Booth and Nick Miroff, “Stepped-up Efforts by U.S., Mexico Fail to Stem Flow of Drug Money South,”
Washington Post, August 25, 2010.
146 U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs, “U.S. Actions to Combat Trafficking in Arms in
the Western Hemisphere,” Fact Sheet, June 21, 2011.
147 Kate Joynes et al., “Central America, Mexico and the United States Formulate Shared Strategy to Fight Gang
Violence,” Global Insight Daily Analysis, April 9, 2008.
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request a criminal history check on particular criminal deportees after they have arrived in that
country. With support from the Mérida Initiative/CARSI, ICE and the FBI have developed a pilot
program called the Criminal History Information Program (CHIP) to provide more information
about deportees with criminal convictions to officials in El Salvador.
The U.S. government does not currently fund any deportee reintegration services programs for
adults in Central America, although it has in the past.148 As a result of budget shortfalls in many
countries, the types of support services provided to deportees returning from the United States are
very limited. The few programs that do exist tend to be funded and administered by the Catholic
Church, nongovernmental organizations, or the International Organization for Migration.
Outlook
The seven nations of Central America face significant security challenges. Well-financed and
heavily armed criminal threats, fragile political and judicial systems, and persistent social
hardships such as poverty and unemployment contribute to widespread insecurity in the region.
The United States has allocated $361.5 million in security assistance to support Central America
since FY2008 under what is now known as the Central America Regional Security Initiative;
however, security conditions have continued to deteriorate. As Congress evaluates budget
priorities and debates the form of U.S. security assistance to the region, it may consider the fact
that many analysts think that improving security conditions in the region will be a difficult,
multifaceted endeavor. Central American leaders will need to address long-standing issues such
as incomplete institutional reforms, precarious tax bases, and the lack of opportunities for young
people.149 International donors will need to provide extensive support over an extended period of
time.150 And all of the stakeholders involved will need to better coordinate their efforts to support
comprehensive long-term strategies that strengthen institutions and address the root causes of
citizen insecurity.151
148 Testimony of Maureen Achieng, Chief of Mission for the International Organization for Migration (IOM) in Haiti
before the House Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere, July 24, 2007. Although the U.S. government is not
currently funding deportee reintegration programs for adults in Central America, it is providing small amounts of
funding to IOM to assist unaccompanied minors who have been returned to El Salvador and Nicaragua. CRS phone
interview with State Department official, December 2, 2010.
149 Casas-Zamora, November 2010, op. cit.
150 Villiers Negroponte, Spring 2010, op. cit.
151 Adriana Beltrán, “Stronger than the Iron Fist: Funes Administration Attempts a Different Approach to Crime and
Violence in El Salvador,” WOLA, March 18, 2011.
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Appendix. Central America Social Indicators152
Table A-1. Central America Development Indicators
Human
Gross
Development
Life
Mean Years of
National
Index (HDI)
Expectancy at
Schooling
Income (GNI)
GNI Per
Country
Rank
Birth
(Adults)
US $ billions
Capita US $
Out of 169
countries
2010 2010 2008 2008
Panama 54
76.0
9.4
21.0
6,180
Costa Rica
62
79.1
8.3
27.5
6,060
Belize 78
76.9
9.2
0.001
3,820
El Salvador
90
72.0
7.7
21.4
3,480
Honduras 106 72.6 6.5 13.0
1,800
Nicaragua 115 73.8 5.7 6.1 1,080
Guatemala 116 70.8 4.1 36.6 2,680
Source: HDI Rank, Life Expectancy at Birth, Mean Years of Schooling from the U.N. Development Program
(UNDP), Human Development Report 2010; GNI and GNI per capita from the World Bank, World Development
Report 2010.
Definitions: HDI Rank is determined by using UNDP’s Human Development Index, which is a composite
measure of three basic dimensions of human development: health, education, and income. Calculated for 169
countries, with 1 = highest human development. Life Expectancy at Birth is the number of years a newborn is
expected to live if patterns of mortality prevailing at its birth were to stay the same throughout its life. Mean
Years of Schooling = average number of years of education received by people 25 years old and older in their
lifetime. Gross national income (GNI) from World Bank Atlas Method is the broadest measure of national
income. It measures total value added from domestic and foreign sources claimed by residents. GNI per capita is
GNI divided by midyear population.
152 Prepared by Julissa Gomez-Granger, CRS Information Research Specialist.
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Table A-2. Central America Poverty and Inequality Indicators
Population Below
Area in
Population
National Poverty
Income Gini
Country
Square Miles
(2011 Estimate)
Line (%)
Co-efficients
Belize
8,867
319,000
n/a
n/a
Costa Rica
19,730
4,703,000
18.9 (2009)
48.9 (2007)
El Salvador
21,041
6,226,000
47.9 (2009)
46.9 (2007)
Guatemala
42,042
14,729,000
54.8 (2006)
53.7 (2006)
Honduras
43,278 7,773,000 68.9
(2007)
55.3
(2006)
Nicaragua
59,998 5,896,000 61.9
(2005)
52.3
(2005)
Panama
30,193 3,562,000 26.4
(2009)
54.9
(2006)
Source: Area from U.S. Department of State, Country Background Notes; Population and Population Below
National Poverty Line from ECLAC, Statistical Yearbook for Latin America and the Caribbean 2010; Gini Co-
efficients from UN Human Development Report online: http://hdr.undp.org/en/statistics/.
Note: Gini Co-efficient—a value of 0 represents absolute equality; a value of 100 represents absolute inequality.
Author Contact Information
Peter J. Meyer
Clare Ribando Seelke
Analyst in Latin American Affairs
Specialist in Latin American Affairs
pmeyer@crs.loc.gov, 7-5474
cseelke@crs.loc.gov, 7-5229
Acknowledgments
Julissa Gomez-Granger, Information Research Specialist, contributed to this report.
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