



# Southwest Border Violence: Issues in Identifying and Measuring Spillover Violence

**Kristin M. Finklea, Coordinator**  
Analyst in Domestic Security

**William J. Krouse**  
Specialist in Domestic Security and Crime Policy

**Marc R. Rosenblum**  
Specialist in Immigration Policy

August 25, 2011

Congressional Research Service

7-5700

[www.crs.gov](http://www.crs.gov)

R41075

## Summary

There has been an increase in the level of drug trafficking-related violence within and between the drug trafficking organizations in Mexico. This violence has generated concern among U.S. policy makers that the violence in Mexico might spill over into the United States. U.S. federal officials have denied that the increase in drug trafficking-related violence in Mexico has resulted in a spillover into the United States, but they acknowledge that the prospect is a serious concern.

The most recent threat assessment indicates that the Mexican drug trafficking organizations pose the greatest drug trafficking threat to the United States, and this threat is driven partly by U.S. demand for drugs. Mexican drug trafficking organizations are the major suppliers and key producers of most illegal drugs smuggled into the United States across the Southwest border (SWB). The nature of the conflict between the Mexican drug trafficking organizations in Mexico has manifested itself, in part, as a struggle for control of these smuggling routes into the United States. Further, in an illegal marketplace—such as that of illicit drugs—where prices and profits are elevated due to the risks of operating outside the law, violence or the threat of violence becomes the primary means for settling disputes.

When assessing the potential implications of the increased violence in Mexico, one of the central concerns for Congress is the potential for what has been termed “spillover” violence—an increase in drug trafficking-related violence in United States. While the interagency community has defined spillover violence as violence targeted primarily at civilians and government entities—excluding trafficker-on-trafficker violence—other experts and scholars have recognized trafficker-on-trafficker violence as central to spillover. When defining and analyzing changes in drug trafficking-related violence within the United States to determine whether there has been (or may be in the future) any spillover violence, critical elements include who may be implicated in the violence (both perpetrators and victims), what type of violence may arise, when violence may appear, and where violence may occur (both along the SWB and in the nation’s interior).

Currently, no comprehensive, publicly available data exist that can definitively answer the question of whether there has been a significant spillover of drug trafficking-related violence into the United States. Although anecdotal reports have been mixed, U.S. government officials maintain that there has not yet been a significant spillover. In an examination of data that could provide insight into whether there has been a significant spillover in drug trafficking-related violence from Mexico into the United States, CRS analyzed violent crime data from the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s Uniform Crime Report program. The data, however, do not allow analysts to determine what proportion of the violent crime rate is related to drug trafficking or, even more specifically, what proportion of drug trafficking-related violent crimes can be attributed to spillover violence. In conclusion, because the trends in the overall violent crime rate may not be indicative of trends in drug trafficking-related violent crimes, CRS is unable to draw definitive claims about trends in drug trafficking-related violence spilling over from Mexico into the United States.

## Contents

Introduction.....	1
The Southwest Border Region and the Illicit Drug Trade Between the United States and Mexico .....	2
Demand for Drugs in the United States.....	3
Supply of Illegal Drugs from Mexico.....	4
Mexican Drug Trafficking Organizations.....	5
Partnerships in the United States.....	9
Activities .....	10
Relationship Between Illicit Drug Markets and Violence .....	11
What Is Spillover Violence? .....	12
Characteristics of Spillover Violence .....	13
Who May Be Implicated in Violence.....	14
What Type of Violence May Arise .....	15
When Violence May Appear .....	16
Where Violence May Occur .....	16
Challenges in Evaluating and Responding to Spillover Violence.....	17
Complexity of the Issue.....	17
Defining Goals and Objectives.....	18
Measuring the Problem.....	19
Is There Spillover Violence? .....	20
Analysis.....	20
Conclusion .....	25
Securing the Border.....	38

## Figures

Figure 1. Drug Routes Within Mexico and at the United States-Mexico Border .....	7
Figure 2. U.S. Cities Reporting the Presence of Mexican Drug Trafficking Organizations.....	8
Figure 3. Violent Crime Rate in Selected MSAs .....	22
Figure 4. Violent Crime Rate in Selected Southwest Border MSAs .....	24
Figure A-1. OCDETF Cases Referred to the USAOs, by Federal Agency.....	48
Figure A-2. OCDETF Case Filings and Convictions.....	49

## Tables

Table 1. U.S. Illegal Drug Seizures Along the Southwest Border .....	5
--	---

## Appendixes

Appendix. Selected U.S. Efforts and Issues .....	26
--	----

## **Contacts**

Author Contact Information.....	49
Key Policy Staff .....	50
Acknowledgments .....	50

## Introduction

There has been an increase in the level of drug trafficking-related violence within and between the drug trafficking organizations (DTOs) in Mexico—a country with which the United States shares a nearly 2,000-mile border.<sup>1</sup> Estimates have placed the number of drug trafficking-related deaths in Mexico between December 2006 (when Mexican President Felipe Calderón began his campaign against the DTOs) and December 2010 at over 34,500.<sup>2</sup> Some have estimated the death toll for 2010 alone at over 11,600.<sup>3</sup> Further, Mexico’s most violent city, Ciudad Juárez—with over 3,000 murders in 2010—is located directly across the border from El Paso, TX. This violence has generated concern among U.S. policy makers that the violence in Mexico might spill over into the United States. Currently, U.S. federal officials deny that the increase in drug trafficking-related violence in Mexico has resulted in a spillover into the United States, but they acknowledge that the prospect is a serious concern.<sup>4</sup> As an extension of its counternarcotics policy, as well as in response to the possibility of violence spillover, the U.S. government is supporting Mexico’s crackdown campaign against DTOs in Mexico through bilateral security initiatives, including the Mérida Initiative.<sup>5</sup> It is also enhancing border security programs and reducing the movement of contraband (drugs, money, and weapons) in both directions across the Southwest border.

When discussing drug trafficking-related violence in the United States, one important point to note is that the *mere presence* of Mexican DTOs in the United States is not in and of itself an indication of any *spillover* of Mexican drug trafficking-related violence into the United States. While their presence may be an indication of the drug problem in general, it does not necessarily reflect activity directly tied to the recent violence seen in Mexico. The DTOs (Mexican and others) have been developing sophisticated illicit drug smuggling and trafficking networks for years. These activities engender violence and associated criminal activity, not just along the Southwest border but in other areas throughout the country, such as along domestic interstate distribution networks and in major metropolitan areas.<sup>6</sup> The United States has experienced levels of drug trafficking-related crime for many years.<sup>7</sup> The immediate question confronting policy

---

<sup>1</sup> For information on the drug-related violence in Mexico, see CRS Report R41576, *Mexico’s Drug Trafficking Organizations: Source and Scope of the Rising Violence*, by June S. Beittel.

<sup>2</sup> See University of San Diego, Trans-Border Institute, <http://justiceinmexico.org/2011/02/07/trans-border-institute-releases-report-on-drug-violence-in-mexico/>.

<sup>3</sup> Trans-Border Institute (TBI), *Justice in Mexico December 2010 News Report*. *Reforma* is the generally respected source of data on drug trafficking-related deaths in Mexico. For further explanation of why these data are preferred over other sources, see TBI, “Drug Violence in Mexico: Data and Analysis from 2001-2009,” January, 2010, [http://www.justiceinmexico.org/resources/pdf/drug\\_violence.pdf](http://www.justiceinmexico.org/resources/pdf/drug_violence.pdf). There have been varying reports about the actual number of drug-related deaths. For instance, the *Washington Post* also tracks this number, and the data are available at <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/graphic/2009/04/01/GR2009040103531.html>.

<sup>4</sup> See, for example, “CBP Chief Assesses the Border: Alan Bersin, in El Paso, Assures Safety, Backs Mexico’s Fight,” *El Paso Times*, January 6, 2011; as well as Department of Homeland Security, *Remarks on Border Security at the University of Texas at El Paso*, January 31, 2011, [http://www.dhs.gov/ynews/speeches/sp\\_1296491064429.shtm](http://www.dhs.gov/ynews/speeches/sp_1296491064429.shtm).

<sup>5</sup> The Mérida Initiative is a multi-year initiative for \$1.4 billion in U.S. counterdrug and anticrime assistance to Mexico and Central America. The details of the Mérida Initiative are not discussed in this report; for more information, see CRS Report R41349, *U.S.-Mexican Security Cooperation: The Mérida Initiative and Beyond*, by Clare Ribando Seelke and Kristin M. Finklea.

<sup>6</sup> Drug Enforcement Administration, *Statement of Joseph M. Arabit Special Agent in Charge, El Paso Division*, Regarding “Violence Along the Southwest Border” Before the House Appropriations Committee, Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice, Science and Related Agencies, March 24, 2009, <http://www.usdoj.gov/dea/speeches/s032409.pdf>.

<sup>7</sup> The Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Forces (OCDETF) Program, for instance, has been operating since 1982 to combat major drug trafficking and money laundering organizations. For more information on the OCDETF (continued...)

makers is whether the increasing violence between DTOs in Mexico impacts either the level or character of drug trafficking-related violence in the United States. A related question is whether evidence of spillover violence would necessitate a policy response from Congress that is qualitatively different from the current efforts to combat drug trafficking.

This report focuses on how policy makers would identify any spillover of drug trafficking-related violence into the United States. This report provides (1) an overview of Mexican drug trafficking organization structures, how they conduct business, and the relationship between the drug trafficking organizations in Mexico and their partnerships operating here in the United States; (2) a discussion of the illicit drug trade between Mexico and the United States, as well as a discussion of factors implicated in drug trafficking-related violence; (3) an analysis of the possible nature of any spillover violence that may arise, as well as issues involved in accurately identifying and measuring such violence; and (4) an evaluation of available crime rate data and a discussion of how this data may or may not reflect changes in drug trafficking-related crime. This report does not include a discussion of illicit drug enforcement issues,<sup>8</sup> nor does it include specific policy options that may be considered to stem a potential uptick in drug trafficking-related violence. The **Appendix** describes selected U.S. efforts undertaken to address the possibility of spillover violence and the drug control problem.

## **The Southwest Border Region and the Illicit Drug Trade Between the United States and Mexico**

The nature of the conflict between the DTOs in Mexico has manifested itself, in part, as a struggle for control of the smuggling routes into the United States.<sup>9</sup> Therefore, the prospects for spillover violence are most keenly anticipated in the Southwest border (SWB) region of the United States because the region represents the arrival zone for the vast majority of illicit drugs that are smuggled into the country. The size, geography, and climate of the SWB region have long presented unique challenges to law enforcement. The southern border with Mexico stretches nearly 2,000 miles in length, is sparsely populated in some areas, and is dotted with legitimate crossing points (ports of entry)—both large and small. *The National Drug Threat Assessment, 2008*, summarized the illicit drug threat scenario along the SWB in stark terms:

The Southwest Border Region is the most significant national-level storage, transportation, and transshipment area for illicit drug shipments that are destined for drug markets throughout the United States. The region is the principal arrival zone for most drugs smuggled into the United States; more illicit drugs are seized along the Southwest Border than in any other arrival zone. Mexican DTOs have developed sophisticated and expansive

---

(...continued)

Program, see <http://www.justice.gov/dea/programs/ocdetf.htm>. The trends in drug trafficking-related crime across the United States are currently unknown because federal law enforcement agencies do not systematically track and report drug trafficking related crimes.

<sup>8</sup> For more information, see archived CRS Report R40732, *Federal Domestic Illegal Drug Enforcement Efforts: Are They Working?* by Celinda Franco.

<sup>9</sup> In addition, the drug related violence in Mexico is also resulting from a struggle between the drug trafficking organizations and the Mexican government attempting to crack down on the DTOs. For more information, see Scott Stewart and Alex Posey, *Mexico: The War with the Cartels in 2009*, Stratfor Global Intelligence, November 9, 2009, [http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/20091209\\_mexico\\_war\\_cartels\\_2009](http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/20091209_mexico_war_cartels_2009).

drug transportation networks extending from the Southwest Border to all regions of the United States. They smuggle significant quantities of illicit drugs through and between ports of entry (POEs) along the Southwest Border and store them in communities throughout the region. Most of the region's principal metropolitan areas, including Dallas, El Paso, Houston, Los Angeles, Phoenix, San Antonio, and San Diego, are significant storage locations as well as regional and national distribution centers. Mexican DTOs and criminal groups transport drug shipments from these locations to destinations throughout the country.<sup>10</sup>

The most recent threat assessment indicates that the Mexican DTOs pose the greatest drug trafficking threat to the United States.<sup>11</sup> Demand for illicit drugs in the United States partly drives this threat.

## **Demand for Drugs in the United States**

The United States is the largest consumer of illegal drugs and sustains a multi-billion dollar market in illegal drugs.<sup>12</sup> According to the Central Intelligence Agency, the United States is the largest consumer of Colombian-produced cocaine and heroin, as well as a large consumer of Mexican-produced heroin, marijuana, and methamphetamine.<sup>13</sup>

The latest National Household Survey on Drug Use and Health (NSDUH),<sup>14</sup> in 2009, surveyed individuals aged 12 and older regarding their drug use during the previous month. In 2009, about 21.8 million individuals were current (in the past month) illegal drug users, representing 8.7% of individuals aged 12 and older.<sup>15</sup> While this percentage of users had remained relatively stable since 2002, the 2009 percentage was the highest within this time period.<sup>16</sup> Among these drug users, marijuana was the most commonly used drug, with an estimated 16.7 million users (6.6% of the population), followed by nonmedical use of prescription-type psychotherapeutic drugs (7.0 million users, or 2.8% of individuals). The survey also estimated that there were 1.6 million users of cocaine (0.7% of Americans), as well as 1.3 million users of hallucinogens (0.5% of the population)—of which 555,000 reported use of Ecstasy. Results also estimated 502,000 methamphetamine users.

---

<sup>10</sup> U.S. Department of Justice, National Drug Intelligence Center, *National Drug Threat Assessment, 2008*, Product No. 2007-Q0317-003, October 2007, p. v, <http://www.usdoj.gov/ndic/pubs25/25921/25921p.pdf>. Hereinafter, NDTA, 2008.

<sup>11</sup> U.S. Department of Justice, National Drug Intelligence Center, *National Drug Threat Assessment 2010*, Product No. 2010-Q0317-001, February 2010, <http://www.justice.gov/ndic/pubs38/38661/38661p.pdf>. Hereinafter, NDTA, 2010. The 2010 NDTA is the most recent threat assessment.

<sup>12</sup> Oriana Zill and Lowell Bergman, "Do the Math: Why the Illegal Drug Business is Thriving," *PBS Frontline*, <http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/drugs/>.

<sup>13</sup> U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, *World Fact Book*, available at <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/index.html>.

<sup>14</sup> NSDUH is an annual survey of approximately 67,500 people, including residents of households, non-institutionalized group quarters, and civilians living on military bases. The survey is administered by the Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration of the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services and is available at <http://oas.samhsa.gov/NSDUHlatest.htm>.

<sup>15</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>16</sup> According to the NSDUH, within the period 2002-2009, the annual percentage of illicit drug users in the 12 and older age group ranged from 7.9% to 8.7%.

## Supply of Illegal Drugs from Mexico

Mexican DTOs are the major suppliers and key producers<sup>17</sup> of most illegal drugs smuggled into the United States across the SWB. Moreover, Mexico is the major transit country for cocaine. According to the U.S. State Department, “[a]pproximately 95 percent of the estimated cocaine flow toward the United States transits the Mexico-Central America corridor from its origins in South America.”<sup>18</sup> According to the National Drug Intelligence Center’s (NDIC’s) 2010 National Drug Threat Assessment, cocaine availability was lower in 2007, 2008, and 2009 (relative to previous years) in certain areas of the United States for a number of reasons, including cocaine eradication, cocaine seizures, increased worldwide demand for cocaine, pressure on drug trafficking organizations in Mexico, inter-cartel violence, and border security.<sup>19</sup> While cocaine availability decreased, the availability of heroin; marijuana; methamphetamine; and 3,4-Methylenedioxymethamphetamine (MDMA) remained, and even increased in some areas.<sup>20</sup>

In addition to controlling most of the wholesale cocaine distribution in the United States, Mexican DTOs also control more of the wholesale distribution of heroin, methamphetamine, and marijuana than other major drug trafficking organizations in the United States. In 2008, there was an increase in heroin produced in Mexico and a subsequent increase in its availability in the United States. With respect to methamphetamine, there was a decline in seizures of Mexican-produced methamphetamine beginning in 2006 and continuing in 2007, in part because of Mexican import restrictions on precursor drugs beginning in 2005, as well as because some Mexican-based methamphetamine producers have more recently moved their laboratories into the United States.<sup>21</sup> However, by 2008, the DTOs had circumvented the Mexican chemical control laws and were using non-ephedrine based production methods, including the phenyl-2-propanone (P2P) method.<sup>22</sup> This has enabled a subsequent uptick in Mexican methamphetamine flow into the United States. Marijuana availability in the United States has also increased due to factors such as rising marijuana production in Mexico, increasing marijuana cultivation in the United States led by Mexican DTOs, and decreasing marijuana eradication in Mexico.<sup>23</sup>

The true quantity of drugs produced and transported by Mexican DTOs, however, is unknown. Available data provide insight into the quantity of drugs seized along the SWB, though this data cannot speak to the total amount of drugs produced and/or transported into the United States, nor does it provide information about the proportion of these drugs that are actually seized along the SWB. For instance, **Table 1** illustrates federal seizures of illegal drugs along the SWB for calendar years (CY) 2005-2010. Total drug seizures (measured in kilograms) generally increased during this time period, despite declines in 2008 and 2010. The decline in seizures for 2010 was primarily driven by a nearly 141,000 kg drop in marijuana seizures compared to 2009.

---

<sup>17</sup> Mexican DTOs distribute cocaine (produced primarily in Colombia), and they produce as well as distribute heroin, methamphetamine, and marijuana.

<sup>18</sup> U.S. Department of State, Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, *2011 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report* (INCSR), vol. 1, March 2011, p. 383.

<sup>19</sup> NDTA, 2010.

<sup>20</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 27.

<sup>21</sup> U.S. Department of Justice, National Drug Intelligence Center, *National Drug Threat Assessment 2009*, Product No. 2008-Q0317-005, December 2008, p.9, <http://www.usdoj.gov/ndic/pubs31/31379/31379p.pdf>. Hereinafter, NDTA, 2009.

<sup>22</sup> NDTA, 2010, p. 34.

<sup>23</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 36.



Additionally, cocaine seizures along the SWB decreased in 2007 and 2008 relative to previous years when cocaine seizures had been increasing, but seizures began to increase again in 2009, a year that was marked by an increase in all major illegal drug seizures except for seizures of MDMA. MDMA seizures continued to decline in 2010 as well. These data, however, do not provide insight into the total amount of drugs illegally produced and transported by the DTOs. Rather, these data reflect an unknown proportion of drugs that the Mexican DTOs are bringing into the United States through a variety of transportation modes.

**Table 1. U.S. Illegal Drug Seizures Along the Southwest Border**  
(in kilograms)

	<b>CY2005</b>	<b>CY2006</b>	<b>CY2007</b>	<b>CY2008</b>	<b>CY2009</b>	<b>CY2010</b>
Cocaine	22,653	28,284	22,656	16,755	17,583	18,623
Heroin	228	489	404	556	839	1,062
Marijuana	1,034,102	1,146,687	1,472,536	1,253,054	1,859,258	1,718,424
MDMA	23	16	39	92	80	59
Methamphetamine	2,918	2,798	1,860	2,201	3,788	5,253
<b>Total</b>	<b>1,059,924</b>	<b>1,178,274</b>	<b>1,497,495</b>	<b>1,272,658</b>	<b>1,881,548</b>	<b>1,743,421</b>

**Source:** CY2005 – CY2008 data are from the U.S. Department of Justice, National Drug Intelligence Center, *National Drug Threat Assessment 2010*, Product No. 2010-Q0317-001, February 2010, p.20, <http://www.justice.gov/ndic/pubs38/38661/38661p.pdf>. The NDIC uses data from the National Seizure System. CY2009 and CY2010 data were provided to CRS by the NDIC.

The 2010 *National Drug Threat Assessment* indicates that Mexican DTOs, in addition to being the major supplier of illegal drugs being smuggled into the United States, have a strong presence within the United States.<sup>24</sup>

## Mexican Drug Trafficking Organizations<sup>25</sup>

Mexican DTOs are transnational organized crime groups whose criminal activities center primarily around the drug trade.<sup>26</sup> In general, organized crime groups attempt to fill particular illicit market niches. Specifically, DTOs respond to the societal demand for illegal drugs. Some experts have likened drug trafficking organizations to corporations or even small nation-states. They are influenced by factors such as geography, politics, economics, and culture.<sup>27</sup>

<sup>24</sup> Ibid, p. 9.

<sup>25</sup> The terms drug trafficking organization (DTO) and drug cartel are terms often used interchangeably. Cartel is one of the dominant terms used colloquially and in the press, but some experts disagree with using this term because “cartel” often refers to price-setting groups and because it is not clear that the Mexican drug trafficking organizations are setting illicit drug prices. For the purpose of consistency, this report uses the term *drug trafficking organization*. For more information on the Mexican DTOs, see archived CRS Report RL34215, *Mexico’s Drug Cartels*, by Colleen W. Cook. For information on the current violence between the DTOs in Mexico, see CRS Report R41576, *Mexico’s Drug Trafficking Organizations: Source and Scope of the Rising Violence*, by June S. Beittel.

<sup>26</sup> For more information on organized crime in the United States, see CRS Report R40525, *Organized Crime in the United States: Trends and Issues for Congress*, by Kristin M. Finklea; and CRS Report R41547, *Organized Crime: An Evolving Challenge for U.S. Law Enforcement*, by Jerome P. Bjelopera and Kristin M. Finklea.

<sup>27</sup> Stratfor Global Intelligence, *Mexican Drug Cartels: The Net Assessment*, March 9, 2008, [http://www.stratfor.com/podcast/mexican\\_drug\\_cartels\\_net\\_assessment](http://www.stratfor.com/podcast/mexican_drug_cartels_net_assessment).

Geographically, for example, Mexican DTOs are situated between the world's largest producer of cocaine (Colombia) and the world's largest consumer of cocaine (United States), leading Mexico to be a natural drug transshipment route between the two countries.<sup>28</sup> In addition, major Mexican criminal organizations focus primarily (though not exclusively) on drugs, because the drug trade has, to date, generally proven to be more economically lucrative than other illicit activities such as kidnapping and extortion.<sup>29</sup> Nonetheless, Mexican DTOs have diversified their operations, adding to their portfolio crimes ranging from kidnapping and extortion to human trafficking and intellectual property rights violations.<sup>30</sup> These enterprises may help the DTOs supplement their drug trafficking-related income.

Mexican DTOs either (1) transport or (2) produce and transport drugs north across the United States-Mexico border.<sup>31</sup> **Figure 1** illustrates the drug trafficking routes within Mexico and at the United States-Mexico border. After being smuggled across the border by DTOs, the drugs are distributed and sold within the United States. The illicit proceeds may then be laundered or smuggled south across the border. The proceeds may also be used to purchase weapons in the United States that are then smuggled into Mexico.<sup>32</sup> This leads to a general pattern of drugs flowing north across the border and money and guns flowing south.

---

<sup>28</sup> Stratfor Global Intelligence, *Organized Crime in Mexico*, March 11, 2008, [http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/organized\\_crime\\_mexico](http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/organized_crime_mexico).


<sup>29</sup> Ibid. Refer to the section in the report, "Activities," for more information on other illicit activities engaged in by the drug trafficking organizations.

<sup>30</sup> Grace Wyler, "The Mexican Drug Cartels Are A National Security Issue," *Borderland Beat*, June 14, 2011, <http://www.borderlandbeat.com/2011/06/mexican-drug-cartels-are-national.html>.

<sup>31</sup> As mentioned, Mexican DTOs distribute cocaine (produced in Colombia, Venezuela, and Brazil), and they produce as well as distribute heroin, methamphetamine, and marijuana.

<sup>32</sup> For more information on gun trafficking on the Southwest border, see CRS Report R40733, *Gun Trafficking and the Southwest Border*, by Vivian S. Chu and William J. Krouse.

Figure 1. Drug Routes Within Mexico and at the United States-Mexico Border



Source: Fred Burton and Ben West, *When the Mexican Drug Trade Hits the Border*, Stratfor Global Intelligence, April 15, 2009, [http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/20090415\\_when\\_mexican\\_drug\\_trade\\_hits\\_border](http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/20090415_when_mexican_drug_trade_hits_border).

Although Mexican DTOs have been active for some time, they have become more prominent since the decline of the powerful Colombian DTOs beginning in the 1980s.<sup>33</sup> The NDIC, in its 2009 threat assessment, estimated that Mexican DTOs maintain drug distribution networks—or supply drugs to distributors in at least 230 U.S. cities, as illustrated in **Figure 2**.<sup>34</sup> More recent NDIC estimates reportedly indicate that the DTOs have expanded operations and are present in at least 1,286 U.S. cities. Of these operations, 143 are reported to be controlled directly by DTO members in Mexico.<sup>35</sup> Mexican DTOs annually transport multi-ton quantities of illicit drugs from Mexico into the United States using a variety of multi-modal transportation methods.<sup>36</sup> Estimates are that these drugs generate between \$18 billion and \$39 billion in U.S. wholesale drug proceeds for the Colombian and Mexican DTOs annually.<sup>37</sup>

<sup>33</sup> Stratfor Global Intelligence, *Organized Crime in Mexico*, March 11, 2008, [http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/organized\\_crime\\_mexico](http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/organized_crime_mexico). See also archived CRS Report RL34215, *Mexico's Drug Cartels*, by Colleen W. Cook.


<sup>34</sup> NDTA, 2009, p. 49.

<sup>35</sup> "Mexican Cartels Migrating to the USA," *Borderland Beat*, April 11, 2011, <http://www.borderlandbeat.com/2011/04/mexican-cartels-migrate-to-usa.html>. See also Anthony Kimery, "Mexican DTOs' Symbols, Other 'Identifiers' Described in Intel Bulletin," *Homeland Security Today*, February 11, 2011, <http://www.hstoday.us/blogs/the-kimery-report/blog/mexican-dtos-symbols-other-identifiers-described-in-intel-bulletin/fca4201347ffe1c131d3f71e57c604ab.html>.

<sup>36</sup> NDTA, 2009., p. 45.

<sup>37</sup> NDTA, 2009., p. 49. According to ONDCP data, the trafficking and distribution of cocaine generates about \$3.9 billion, marijuana generates about \$8.5 billion, and methamphetamine generates about \$1 billion. Jane's, *Security, Mexico*, February 20, 2009.

**Figure 2. U.S. Cities Reporting the Presence of Mexican Drug Trafficking Organizations**  
 January 1, 2006-April 8, 2008



**Source:** National Drug Intelligence Center (NDIC), National Drug Threat Assessment, 2009, Map A5. U.S. cities reporting the presence of Mexican DTOs, January 1, 2006, through September 30, 2008, U.S. Department of Justice, Product No. 2008-Q0317-005, December 2008, <http://www.usdoj.gov/ndic/pubs31/31379/appenda.htm#Map5>.

When conceptualizing Mexican drug trafficking organizations as businesses, policy makers may question the impact of possible drug trafficking-related violence spillover (into the United States) on the drug trafficking *business*—selling drugs in the U.S. black market. Although the effects of violence on businesses in the black market may not mirror those effects on business in the licit market, one way of examining this question may be to look at the impact that violence or violent crimes have on business in general. One study, for example, examined the impact of surges in violence on businesses in various industries in locations of varying crime rates.<sup>38</sup> Results suggested that surges in violence had the most negative impact on those businesses that were service-related (e.g., retail and personal service industries) and located in typically low-crime areas. Specifically, the impact on business was in terms of a reduction in the number of new businesses, a decrease in business expansions, and a lack of overall business growth. In order to generalize these findings from retail businesses to drug businesses, one underlying assumption must be that the locations for buying retail goods and personal services are the same as those for purchasing drugs. If these findings can be generalized to the drug trafficking business, this could suggest that any spillover in drug trafficking-related violence to the United States could adversely affect those service-related businesses (including drug trafficking businesses) in cities with relatively (pre-spillover) low crime rates. On the other hand, if violence affects businesses in the licit and illicit markets differently, these findings may not apply to potential effects of drug trafficking-related violence on drug trafficking business.

There have been anecdotal predictions regarding the impact of violence on drug trafficking business; Douglas, AZ, police chief Alberto Melis has said that “spillover violence would be bad for business ... and they’re [the drug traffickers] businessmen.”<sup>39</sup> Further, the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) has expressed moderate confidence that there will not be a significant increase in spillover violence—at least in the short term—because “Mexican trafficking organizations understand that intentional targeting of U.S. persons or interests unrelated to the drug trade would likely undermine their own business interests.”<sup>40</sup> Some have suggested that major acts of violence in the United States would lead to a federal law enforcement response. And, the resulting incarceration of perpetrators would be detrimental to the drug trafficking business.<sup>41</sup>

## **Partnerships in the United States**

The NDIC has indicated that in order to facilitate the distribution and sale of drugs in the United States, Mexican DTOs have formed relationships with U.S. street gangs, prison gangs, and outlaw motorcycle gangs.<sup>42</sup> Although these gangs have historically been involved with retail-level drug distribution, their ties to the Mexican DTOs have allowed them to become increasingly involved

---

<sup>38</sup> Robert T. Greenbaum and George E. Tita, “The Impact of Violence Surges on Neighbourhood Business Activity,” *Urban Studies*, vol. 41, no. 13 (December 2004), pp. 2495-2514.

<sup>39</sup> Brady McCombs and Tim Steller, “Drug Violence Spillover More Hype Than Reality: Southern Arizona Lawmen Discount Threat of Cartel Warfare Crossing Border,” *Arizona Daily Star*, April 26, 2009, Tucson Region.

<sup>40</sup> Drug Enforcement Administration, *Statement of Joseph M. Arabit Special Agent in Charge, El Paso Division*, Regarding “Violence Along the Southwest Border” Before the House Appropriations Committee, Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice, Science and Related Agencies, March 24, 2009, <http://www.usdoj.gov/dea/speeches/s032409.pdf>.

<sup>41</sup> Geoffrey Ramsey, “Rethinking the ‘Spillover’ Effect of Mexican Violence,” *In Sight: Organized Crime in the Americas*, April 12, 2011, <http://insightcrime.org/insight-latest-news/item/770-rethinking-the-spillover-effect-of-mexican-violence>.

<sup>42</sup> NDTA, 2009, p. 46.

at the wholesale level as well.<sup>43</sup> These gangs facilitate the movement of illicit drugs to urban, suburban, and rural areas of the United States. Not only do these domestic gangs distribute and sell the drugs, but they also aid in smuggling and enforcing the collection of drug proceeds.<sup>44</sup> For example, Barrio Azteca is one of at least nine prominent U.S. prison gangs with ties to Mexican DTOs.<sup>45</sup> Barrio Azteca primarily generates money from smuggling marijuana, heroin, and cocaine across the Southwest border for the DTOs—namely, the Juárez cartel—but they are also involved in other crimes, such as extortion, kidnapping, and alien smuggling.<sup>46</sup>

## Activities

Like other organized crime groups, Mexican DTOs are profit-driven. While the primary goods trafficked by DTOs are drugs, some experts have noted that these organizations do generate income from other illegal activities, such as the smuggling<sup>47</sup> of humans and weapons, counterfeiting and piracy, kidnapping for ransom, and extortion.<sup>48</sup> If the DTOs are not able to generate income from the drugs—due to any number of reasons (increased Mexican or U.S. law enforcement, decreased drug supply, decreased drug demand, etc.)—they may increase their involvement in other money-generating illegal activities, such as kidnapping and home invasions.

Take, for example, the number of drug trafficking-related kidnappings for ransom in Phoenix, AZ.<sup>49</sup> In 2009, the NDIC reported 358 such incidents in 2007 and 357 in 2008 (through December 15, 2008), and indicated that nearly every incident was drug-related.<sup>50</sup> These statistics were revised in the 2010 National Drug Threat Assessment, indicating that kidnappings in Phoenix reached 260 in 2007, 299 in 2008, and 267 in 2009.<sup>51</sup> This decrease in the number of

---

<sup>43</sup> Wholesale refers to the sale of goods to retailers for resale to consumers rather than selling goods directly to consumers. Retailers, on the other hand, sell goods directly to consumers. Wholesalers tend to sell larger quantities of goods to retailers, who then sell smaller quantities to consumers.

<sup>44</sup> NDTA, 2009., pp. 43-46. See also, National Gang Intelligence Center and National Drug Intelligence Center, *National Gang Threat Assessment, 2009*, Product No. 2009-M0335-001, January 2009, <http://www.fbi.gov/publications/ngta2009.pdf>.

<sup>45</sup> Fred Burton and Ben West, *The Barrio Azteca Trial and the Prison Gang-Cartel Interface*, Stratfor Global Intelligence, November 19, 2008, [http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/20081119\\_barrio\\_azteca\\_trial\\_and\\_prison\\_gang\\_cartel\\_interface](http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/20081119_barrio_azteca_trial_and_prison_gang_cartel_interface).

<sup>46</sup> For more information, see Tom Diaz, “Barrio Azteca—Border Boys Linked to Mexican Drug Trafficking Organizations—Part Three,” April 17, 2009, <http://tomdiaz.wordpress.com/2009/04/17/barrio-azteca%E2%80%93border-bad-boys-linked-to-mexican-drug-trafficking-organizations-%E2%80%94part-three/>. See also the U.S. Department of Justice website at <http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/gangunit/gangs/prison.html>.

<sup>47</sup> While drug trafficking organizations may not be directly involved in alien or gun smuggling, they may tax the smugglers who wish to use the established drug trafficking routes. Further, the NDIC has indicated that drug trafficking organizations may engage in violent confrontations with the smuggling organizations, as the drug traffickers fear that the smugglers’ use of their routes may lead to the traffickers’ apprehension. See National Drug Intelligence Center, Office of National Drug Control Policy, *Arizona High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area: Drug Market Analysis 2009*, Product No. 2009-R0813-002, March 2009, p.14, <http://www.justice.gov/ndic/pubs32/32762/32762p.pdf>.

<sup>48</sup> Jane’s, *Security, Mexico*, February 20, 2009. Also, Stratfor Global Intelligence, *Mexican Drug Cartels: The Net Assessment*, March 9, 2008, [http://www.stratfor.com/podcast/mexican\\_drug\\_cartels\\_net\\_assessment](http://www.stratfor.com/podcast/mexican_drug_cartels_net_assessment).

<sup>49</sup> Sam Quinones, “Phoenix, Kidnap-For-Ransom Capital,” *Los Angeles Times*, February 12, 2009. See also, National Drug Intelligence Center, Office of National Drug Control Policy, *Arizona High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area: Drug Market Analysis 2009*, Product No. 2009-R0813-002, March 2009, <http://www.justice.gov/ndic/pubs32/32762/32762p.pdf>.

<sup>50</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 18.

<sup>51</sup> NDTA, 2010, pp. 15-16.



reported kidnappings for 2007 and 2008 was reportedly due to a reclassification of certain cases by the Phoenix Police Department.<sup>52</sup> Further, the NDIC reports that kidnappings may be generally underreported because victims may fear retaliation for reporting or may expose their own involvement in drug trafficking. Still, Tucson, AZ, police have reported that although there has been an increase in kidnappings for ransom and home invasions, the suspects in the cases are local criminals—not active DTO members from Mexico.<sup>53</sup> This disparity in reports indicates that while there may be an increase in certain illegal activities that *may* be tied to drug smuggling and trafficking, these illegal activities are *not necessarily* directly related to drug trafficking in general or to Mexican drug trafficking organizations in particular. As such, they may not be valid or reliable indicators for the presence or absence of drug trafficking-related spillover violence.

## Relationship Between Illicit Drug Markets and Violence

In an illegal marketplace, where prices and profits are elevated due to the risks of operating outside the law, violence or the threat of violence becomes the primary means for settling disputes and maintaining a semblance of order—however chaotic that “order” might appear to the outside observer. This was a fundamental conclusion reached by the National Academy of Sciences Panel on the Understanding and Control of Violent Behavior.<sup>54</sup> Because illegal drug markets operate outside the law, no courts or other forms of peaceful mediation<sup>55</sup> exist for resolving disputes between drug producers, traffickers, and their customers. As with other black markets, drug markets are necessarily governed by the threat of violence, which may lead to actual violence. Illegal drugs and violence, then, are linked primarily through the operations of underground drug markets.<sup>56</sup>

Drug trafficking-related violence in Mexico has been on the rise, and in 2010, there were more than 11,600 drug trafficking-related murders in Mexico.<sup>57</sup> Mexican drug trafficking organizations are now at war with each other as well as with the police and military personnel who are attempting to enforce the drug laws in northern Mexico along the U.S. border. The DTOs, as a result of enforcement actions in Mexico, along with increasing border enforcement measures taken by the United States, are finding it more difficult and more costly to control the production zones and smuggling routes. One of the consequences of this increasingly competitive

---

<sup>52</sup> Of note, the DOJ Inspector General investigated the 2008 Phoenix kidnapping statistics. A preliminary report from the investigation allegedly finds that of the 358 kidnappings reported, 109 should not have been counted and an additional 85 cases were in question. See, for example, “Federal audit: Major problems in PHX statistics,” *abcnews.com*, April 25, 2011, [http://www.abc15.com/dpp/news/region\\_phoenix\\_metro/central\\_phoenix/federal-audit%3A-major-problems-in-phx-statistics](http://www.abc15.com/dpp/news/region_phoenix_metro/central_phoenix/federal-audit%3A-major-problems-in-phx-statistics).

<sup>53</sup> Brady McCombs and Tim Steller, “Drug violence spillover more hype than reality: Southern Arizona lawmen discount threat of cartel warfare crossing border,” *Arizona Daily Star*, April 26, 2009, Tucson Region.

<sup>54</sup> Jeffrey A. Roth, “Psychoactive Substances and Violence,” National Institute of Justice (Research in Brief Series), February 1994 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Justice).

<sup>55</sup> Negotiated settlements do occur, although they often feature intimidation.

<sup>56</sup> See for example, Peter Andreas and Joel Wallman, “Illicit market and violence: what is the relationship?,” *Crime, Law, and Social Change*, vol. 52, no. 3 (September 2009), pp. 225-230, and Peter Reuter, “Systemic violence in drug markets,” *Crime, Law and Social Change*, vol. 52, no. 3 (September 2009), pp. 275-285.

<sup>57</sup> Trans-Border Institute (TBI), *Justice in Mexico December 2010 News Report*. *Reforma* is the generally respected source of data on drug trafficking-related deaths in Mexico.

environment is a rise in the level of violence associated with the illicit drug trade as the DTOs struggle for control over territory, markets, and smuggling routes. Policy makers are thus confronted with the uncomfortable possibility that increased law enforcement (which leads to increased difficulty and costs to control production zones and smuggling routes, and which in turn leads to the need to resolve disputes over such territories) could result in increased drug trafficking-related violence. This appears to be the situation that has recently developed in Mexico.

This relationship gives rise to a number of important issues for policy makers. One such matter is evaluating the relative costs and benefits of increased enforcement of the current drug policy against the potentially elevated levels of violence that such increased enforcement might engender.<sup>58</sup> Could the drug trafficking-related violence currently evidenced in Mexico reach a level that would prompt U.S. policy makers to consider policy actions that could alter the underpinnings of the illegal drug market? It does not appear as if the violence has reached such a level as yet. Policy makers, however, have expressed significant concern over the possibility of the current violence in Mexico spilling over into the United States.

## What Is Spillover Violence?

When assessing the potential implications of increased violence in Mexico as a result of the increasing tensions between the DTOs located in Mexico, one of the central concerns for U.S. policy makers is the potential for what has recently been termed “spillover” violence—an increase in drug trafficking-related violence in United States. Given this concern, it is critical to develop an understanding of what “spillover” is, what it might look like, how it might be measured, and what potential triggers for policy action can be identified from this analysis.

To date, Congress has not adopted a formal definition of spillover violence.<sup>59</sup> Several definitions and/or qualities of spillover violence have been provided by government officials, as well as experts and analysts. For instance, according to the DEA, the interagency community has defined spillover violence in the following manner:

[S]pillover violence entails deliberate, planned attacks by the cartels on U.S. assets, including civilian, military, or law enforcement officials, innocent U.S. citizens, or physical institutions such as government buildings, consulates, or businesses. This definition does not include trafficker on trafficker violence, whether perpetrated in Mexico or the U.S.<sup>60</sup>

---

<sup>58</sup> A Mexican study of the cost-effectiveness of using the military in the drug war (in Ciudad Juarez) has found that there is a high cost with little success, as murders, kidnappings, extortions, and other crimes continue to increase. See <http://narcosphere.narconews.com/notebook/kristin-bricker/2009/11/numbers-dont-add-mexicos-drug-war>.

<sup>59</sup> In the 112<sup>th</sup> Congress, H.R. 2124 would, among other things, provide a definition of cross-border violence. This violence would include “spillover violence,” which would be defined as “(i) violence that starts in Mexico as part of a conflict among Trans-national Criminal Organizations (TCOs) or between TCOs and the Government of Mexico that carries over into the United States or threatens United States personnel or interests in Mexico; and (ii) offensive violence organized or directed by TCOs against United States personnel or interests in the United States or Mexico.”

<sup>60</sup> Drug Enforcement Administration, *Statement of Joseph M. Arabit Special Agent in Charge, El Paso Division*, Regarding “Violence Along the Southwest Border” Before the House Appropriations Committee, Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice, Science and Related Agencies, March 24, 2009, <http://www.usdoj.gov/dea/speeches/s032409.pdf>.



This definition of spillover provides a relatively narrow scope of what may constitute spillover violence. In particular, it excludes the category of violence—trafficker-on-trafficker violence—in which the vast majority of drug trafficking-related violence in Mexico has occurred. If policy makers and law enforcement are concerned that the drug trafficking-related violence, as seen in Mexico, may spill over into the United States, they are necessarily concerned with this predominant category of trafficker-on-trafficker violence that is excluded from the interagency community’s definition of spillover violence. The boundaries of what may constitute spillover violence, as defined by the interagency community, thus makes the likelihood that the United States will experience this form of spillover violence relatively small. Further, by generally constraining the definition of spillover violence to those acts that target the government and innocent civilians, the type of violence necessary to constitute spillover (according to the interagency definition) may begin to resemble acts of terrorism.<sup>61</sup> If so, policy makers and experts may be challenged with discriminating between spillover violence and terrorism.

Several experts and scholars have also discussed qualities of drug trafficking-related violence that may constitute spillover, including aspects of trafficker-on-trafficker violence. Such qualities are analyzed in the following section and may provide policy makers with additional definitions of spillover violence. Of note, this report does not address non-violent indicators—such as rising corruption of U.S. officials and law enforcement—that could be related to drug trafficking-related violence spillover.

## **Characteristics of Spillover Violence**

Some experts have suggested that a spillover of violence into the United States may look similar to the recent surge of violence in Mexico. In Mexico, this increasing violence has been seen through a rise in both the number of drug trafficking-related murders and the brutality of the murders. It is also taking the forms of increasing intimidation and fear, attacks on security forces, assassinations of high-ranking officials, growing arsenals of weapons, and indiscriminate killing of civilians.<sup>62</sup>

While a potential spillover of violence into the United States could appear similar to the violence in Mexico, the violence may be contingent upon numerous factors that differ between the United States and Mexico. For instance, the U.S. government may respond differently to domestic drug trafficking-related violence than the Mexican government has, and these differences in responses could in turn influence the nature of the drug trafficking-related violence seen in each country. This section of the report discusses several factors that may be of concern as Congress debates the potential spillover of drug trafficking-related violence. These factors include who may be

---

<sup>61</sup> 18 U.S.C. § 2331 defines terrorism as “activities that (A) involve violent acts or acts dangerous to human life that are a violation of the criminal laws of the United States or of any State, or that would be a criminal violation if committed within the jurisdiction of the United States or of any State; (B) appear to be intended—(i) to intimidate or coerce a civilian population; (ii) to influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion; or (iii) to affect the conduct of a government by mass destruction, assassination, or kidnapping; and (C) occur primarily outside the territorial jurisdiction of the United States, or transcend national boundaries in terms of the means by which they are accomplished, the persons they appear intended to intimidate or coerce, or the locale in which their perpetrators operate or seek asylum.” Of note, legislation (H.R. 1270) has been introduced in the 112<sup>th</sup> Congress that would designate selected Mexican DTOs as foreign terrorist organizations.

<sup>62</sup> Stratfor Global Intelligence, *Mexican Drug Cartels: Government Progress and Growing Violence*, December 11, 2008, pp. 15-16, <http://web.stratfor.com/images/MEXICAN%20Cartels%202008.pdf>.

implicated in the violence, what type of violence may arise, when violence may appear, and where violence may occur.

## **Who May Be Implicated in Violence**

If the drug trafficking-related violence were to spill over from Mexico into the United States, Congress may be concerned with both the individuals perpetrating the violence as well as the victims of the violence.

### *Perpetrators*

Reports on the drug trafficking-related violence in Mexico generally indicate that the perpetrators of violence are active members of DTOs who are vying for territory, avenging betrayals, and reacting against the Mexican government's crackdown on the traffickers.<sup>63</sup> If violence were to spill into the United States, policy makers may question whether the perpetrators of the violence will continue to be active drug trafficking members from Mexico, or whether violence will be inflicted by others who may be more indirectly tied to the DTOs. As mentioned, the DTOs have connections with U.S. groups such as street gangs, prison gangs, and outlaw motorcycle gangs who distribute and sell drugs, aid in smuggling drugs, and enforce the collection of drug proceeds.<sup>64</sup> To date, reports from law enforcement on drug trafficking-related violence in the United States are mixed; while some suggest that violence may be carried out by drug traffickers or other criminals from Mexico,<sup>65</sup> others indicate that domestic drug traffickers or gang members may be responsible.<sup>66</sup>

### *Victims*

The violence plaguing Mexico has been directed toward several groups: competing DTOs vying for territory, Mexican security forces, government officials, and those indebted to the traffickers. In fact, Mexican government officials have estimated that 90% of the murders in Mexico have targeted members of drug trafficking organizations.<sup>67</sup> Although there have been reports of civilian bystanders being killed and isolated events of indiscriminate killing, there are not consistent reports of the drug traffickers targeting civilians who are unconnected to the drug trade.<sup>68</sup> There have been concerns, however, raised by the isolated incidents of U.S. law enforcement agents killed both in the United States and in Mexico by suspected drug smugglers and traffickers. For

---

<sup>63</sup> CRS Report R41576, *Mexico's Drug Trafficking Organizations: Source and Scope of the Rising Violence*, by June S. Beittel.

<sup>64</sup> NDTA, 2009., pp. 43-46.

<sup>65</sup> See, for example, Randal C. Archibold, "Mexican Drug Cartel Violence Spills Over, Alarming U.S.," *The New York Times*, March 22, 2009.

<sup>66</sup> Brady McCombs and Tim Steller, "Drug Violence Spillover More Hype Than Reality: Southern Arizona lawmen discount threat of cartel warfare crossing border," *Arizona Daily Star*, April 26, 2009, Tucson Region.

<sup>67</sup> See testimony by David Shirk, Director, Trans-Border Institute, University of San Diego, before the U.S. Congress, House Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice, Science, and Related Agencies, *Federal Law Enforcement Response to US-Mexico Border Violence*, 111<sup>th</sup> Cong., 1<sup>st</sup> sess., March 24, 2009.

<sup>68</sup> CRS Report R41576, *Mexico's Drug Trafficking Organizations: Source and Scope of the Rising Violence*, by June S. Beittel. See also Stratfor Global Intelligence, *Mexican Drug Cartels: Government Progress and Growing Violence*, December 11, 2008, <http://web.stratfor.com/images/MEXICAN%20Cartels%202008.pdf>.

example, U.S. Border Patrol Agent Brian Terry was killed in December 2010 in Arizona,<sup>69</sup> and in February 2011, two ICE agents were shot, one fatally, while driving between Monterrey and Mexico City.<sup>70</sup> Experts have suggested that “[i]f the current security trends [in Mexico] continue to worsen ... the deliberate and sustained targeting of U.S. government personnel will become more likely.”<sup>71</sup>

If there were to be a significant spillover of violence into the United States, policy makers may question whether the victims would be of a similar group as the victims of violence in Mexico. To date, the anecdotal reports of drug trafficking-related violence in the United States indicate that not only the perpetrators, but the victims of the crimes as well, are all somehow involved in the drug trade.<sup>72</sup> If any significant spillover of drug trafficking-related crime were to follow a similar pattern, policy makers could expect that individuals on both sides of the violence are connected to the drug trade.

There are circumstances, however, under which the drug trafficking victims in the United States could extend to groups beyond those involved in trafficking. If there is an increase in violence and the U.S. government cracks down on the DTOs similarly to the Mexican government, the traffickers’ reactions in the United States may be similar to that seen in Mexico—a surge in violence against security forces and government officials. Federal officials have indicated that increased targeting of U.S. law enforcement personnel, similar to that which has occurred in Mexico, would constitute evidence of spillover.<sup>73</sup> If, however, the U.S. response differs from that of Mexico, the reactions from the DTOs may also differ. Further, a change in the victim pattern—to include innocent bystanders, for instance—may represent a departure from current patterns of drug trafficking-related violence and thus could represent a reasonable trigger for policy action to mitigate the effects of spillover violence.

## **What Type of Violence May Arise**

In Mexico, the drug trafficking-related violence most often reported is murder—over 34,500 since December 2006.<sup>74</sup> There have also been reports of kidnappings, home invasions, and assaults, among other crimes. In the United States, many of the anecdotal reports citing an increase in violence point to an increase in drug trafficking-related kidnappings and home invasions. However, the true number of these crimes across the country, and how many have clear

---

<sup>69</sup> U.S. Customs and Border Protection, “Border Patrol Agent Killed; Suspects in Custody, Others Sought,” press release, December 16, 2010, [http://www.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/newsroom/news\\_releases/national/12162010.xml](http://www.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/newsroom/news_releases/national/12162010.xml).

<sup>70</sup> U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, “ICE special agents brutally attacked; suspects sought by authorities,” press release, February 16, 2011, <http://www.ice.gov/news/releases/1102/110216washingtondc.htm>. See also Tracy Wilkinson, “ICE Agent Killed, Second Wounded at Mexico Drug Gang Blockade, Officials Say,” *Los Angeles Times*, February 16, 2011, <http://articles.latimes.com/2011/feb/16/world/la-fg-mexico-us-agents-20110216>.

<sup>71</sup> David A. Shirk, *The Drug War in Mexico: Confronting a Shared Threat*, Council on Foreign Relations, Center for Preventive Action, Council Special Report No. 60, March 2011, pp. 3-4, <http://www.cfr.org/mexico/drug-war-mexico/p24262>.

<sup>72</sup> See, for example, Randal C. Archibold, “Mexican Drug Cartel Violence Spills Over, Alarming U.S.,” *The New York Times*, March 22, 2009.

<sup>73</sup> Arthur H. Rotstein, “Bersin: Mexican Drug Violence Threat Major Concern,” *The Associated Press*, July 15, 2009, quoting Alan Bersin the Department of Homeland Security Special Representative of Border Affairs. Further, this type of violence would be consistent with the interagency definition of spillover violence.

<sup>74</sup> See University of San Diego, Trans-Border Institute, <http://justiceinmexico.org/2011/02/07/trans-border-institute-releases-report-on-drug-violence-in-mexico/>.

ties to drug trafficking, is unknown. It is also unknown whether or not different types of violence are more associated with certain crimes (committed by drug traffickers) than with others. If there were to be a substantial spillover of drug trafficking-related violence from Mexico, policy makers and law enforcement may be concerned with what types of violence may appear. Would the types of drug trafficking-related violence already seen in the United States to date (i.e., kidnappings and home invasions) become more prevalent, or would there be a greater emergence of the types of violence seen in Mexico (i.e., murders)?

In addition to the type of violence, a spillover or increase in violence could also be measured by the nature of the violence. As mentioned, the rise in the number of murders in Mexico was also accompanied by increasing brutality, intimidation, and attacks on individuals other than those directly involved in the illicit drug trade (i.e., security forces and governmental officials).<sup>75</sup> If any spillover of violence into the United States followed a similar pattern as the violence in Mexico, there may be an increase in the brutality of crimes in addition to an increase in the pure *number* of crimes.

### **When Violence May Appear**

Critical to the assessment of whether the United States is experiencing spillover violence is the establishment of a realistic timeline for measuring the change in drug trafficking-related violence in the United States. If the policy goal is to determine if any spillover violence is occurring in the United States as a result of the increasing violence in Mexico, then it would be logical to look at trends in drug trafficking-related crime in the United States since the onset of the conditions that precipitated the recent violence in Mexico—roughly beginning around when Mexican President Felipe Calderon took office in December, 2006.<sup>76</sup> A comparison of the trends in drug-trafficking related violence (in the United States) before and after this reference point might shed some light on whether or not the United States is experiencing spillover violence.

As noted, the United States has experienced and continues to experience certain levels of drug trafficking-related crime. It may be difficult to isolate those drug trafficking-related violent crimes that are occurring either directly or indirectly as a result of the situation in Mexico. Therefore, it may also be useful for policy makers to use this same timeframe to measure changes in other spillover indicators, such as changes in the profile of victims of drug trafficking-related crime, the number and nature of violent attacks on U.S. law enforcement personnel, and changes in the nature of drug trafficking-related violence. This could be one means to standardize the measurement of any potential spillover and to provide policy makers with a more concrete idea of the trends. The discussion of *when* the violence occurs begs the question of *where* to measure any potential change in violence.

### **Where Violence May Occur**

As may be expected, the majority of the discussion surrounding the prospects of spillover violence in the United States has been focused on the Southwest border (SWB). Initially, this

---

<sup>75</sup> Stratfor Global Intelligence, *Mexican Drug Cartels: Government Progress and Growing Violence*, December 11, 2008, pp. 15-16, <http://web.stratfor.com/images/MEXICAN%20Cartels%202008.pdf>.

<sup>76</sup> CRS Report R41576, *Mexico's Drug Trafficking Organizations: Source and Scope of the Rising Violence*, by June S. Beittel.

makes intuitive sense. Even the very term “spillover” suggests the spread of violence across the border from Mexico—almost by osmosis. From a policy perspective, it is useful to question whether or not a focus exclusively on the border makes sense. Certainly this is where the analysis should begin as the SWB region is the primary region that links production and smuggling operations within Mexico to the United States. As noted, however, the drug trafficking organizations’ operations within the United States are geographically dispersed in as many as 1,286 or more cities.<sup>77</sup> DTOs are businesses, and they not only maintain their own presence in the United States but also have relationships with U.S. groups such as street gangs, prison gangs, and outlaw motorcycle gangs to facilitate the distribution and sale of drugs within the United States.

Given that drug trafficking-related violence is prevalent throughout the United States, the task for policy makers is to concentrate the geographic analysis of changes in drug trafficking-related violence around areas that would have the greatest likelihood of eliciting evidence of spillover. One possible method of accomplishing this task could be to look at the various factors discussed above—changes in the levels, nature, and victim pattern of drug trafficking-related violence in selected geographic locations—along a timeline that corresponds with the escalation of drug trafficking violence in Mexico. Of course, the critical issue is selecting those geographic locations. Areas already identified as strategically important to drug trafficking operations here in the United States would be an optimal place to start. These locations would include cities, states, and localities in the SWB region, as well as along significant inland distribution routes. Policy makers may also wish to examine geographic areas that are not currently identified as strategically important to drug trafficking operations here in the United States, as a control for comparison.

## Challenges in Evaluating and Responding to Spillover Violence

This section of the report discusses some of the challenges facing policy makers when considering policy options dealing with drug control and border security issues in general. These issues are discussed more generally because they provide the context within which any specific options for dealing with the potential spillover of drug trafficking-related violence will be determined. These policy challenges include the complexity of the issue, defining goals and objectives, and measuring the problem.

### Complexity of the Issue

As evidenced through some of the above discussion, there are many federal agencies, state and local entities, task forces, intelligence centers, and various other groups that are not only involved in drug control policy in general, but have specific roles in countering threats posed by the Mexican DTOs. Each of these agencies has different authorities, budgets, resources, and responsibilities when it comes to the drug control issue (the **Appendix** to this report details

---

<sup>77</sup> “Mexican Cartels Migrating to the USA,” *Borderland Beat*, April 11, 2011, <http://www.borderlandbeat.com/2011/04/mexican-cartels-migrate-to-usa.html>. See also Anthony Kimery, “Mexican DTOs’ Symbols, Other ‘Identifiers’ Described in Intel Bulletin,” *Homeland Security Today*, February 11, 2011, <http://www.hstoday.us/blogs/the-kimery-report/blog/mexican-dtos-symbols-other-identifiers-described-in-intel-bulletin/fca4201347ffe1c131d3f71e57c604ab.html>.

selected drug control efforts of these agencies). This complexity has also been evident in the federal government's current response to the increasing drug trafficking-related violence in Mexico. The policy implication of this intricate web of jurisdictions is that it is difficult to centralize the establishment, implementation, and evaluation of policies—be they drug control policies in general, or the specific policy responses to the increased drug trafficking-related violence in Mexico.

Several congressional hearings have been held on various aspects of the drug control and drug trafficking-related violence issues,<sup>78</sup> and some congressional policy makers have voiced their concerns over the lack of centralized direction on these issues. In particular, Congress has expressed concern over who is taking the lead—not just among the involved agencies—but within Congress itself.<sup>79</sup> Complicated congressional jurisdiction spread across a variety of committees in both houses means that oversight of the drug control and the drug trafficking-related violence issues is equally complex. Consequently, coordination of oversight of the areas is problematic and difficult to manage.

Adding further complexity is the fact that few of the agencies involved in the drug control effort are solely dedicated to a counterdrug mission (DEA and ONDCP being two of few exceptions). This presents several challenges in analyzing drug control policy. One challenge, for example, involves disaggregating an agency's drug control mission and activities from its other missions and activities. Take, for instance, interdiction at ports of entry. CBP officers select people, goods, and conveyances for additional scrutiny based on a variety of factors. Often, officers have no idea what the ultimate outcome of a physical inspection might be. The inspection might uncover illicit drugs, or it might uncover cash, weapons, or any number of items that are prohibited from entering the country. How then, may one estimate the portion of CBP officers' time that is spent on the counterdrug effort? This same question applies to the multitude of other agencies that also have drug control responsibilities. The question becomes even more difficult to answer when the aim is to analyze a specific drug control policy—such as specific policies targeted toward any potential spillover violence from Mexico. Disaggregating the drug control mission (or specific policies), however, is critical on several levels; not only does it affect the measurement of an agency's progress in implementing drug control efforts, but it also affects the directing of resources towards these efforts or specific policies.

## **Defining Goals and Objectives**

The definition of success is a critical aspect of policy evaluation. As noted above, the existing complexities surrounding drug control policies in general, and policies to address the potential spillover violence from Mexico in particular, complicate the evaluation of these policies. For this reason, it is important to identify appropriate goals or objectives either for what might be an overall strategy or for specific policies.

---

<sup>78</sup> See, for example, U.S. Congress, House Committee on Homeland Security, Subcommittee on Oversight, Investigations, and Management, *On the Border and in the Line of Fire: U.S. Law Enforcement, Homeland Security and Drug Cartel Violence*, 112<sup>th</sup> Cong., 1<sup>st</sup> sess., May 11, 2011; and U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, *Southern Border Violence*, 111<sup>th</sup> Cong., 1<sup>st</sup> sess., March 25, 2009.

<sup>79</sup> See for example, Rob Margetta, "Lawmakers Want to Know Who Takes the Lead in Battling Border Violence," *CQ Today Online News*, March 10, 2009.

For example, the appropriate domestic policy response to the increased drug trafficking-related violence in Mexico is difficult to articulate. This is because several forces are at work; it is tempting to conflate the response to a specific iteration of the problem (the change in drug trafficking-related violence in Mexico) with the drug control problem in general and, at the same time, to disaggregate the issue down to so many constituent parts (outbound inspections at the border, kidnappings in Phoenix, straw purchases<sup>80</sup> in Houston, a drug trafficking-related shooting in El Paso, etc.). This allows for the potential to obscure the actual policy problem to be confronted. From a policy perspective also, the degree to which this conflation or disaggregation occurs may not matter in the final analysis if the appropriate metrics are ultimately used to evaluate each.

With particular relevance to the subject of this report, if the policy task is to identify any potential or actual drug trafficking-related spillover violence in the United States, and the appropriate drug activity indicators can be accurately identified, the issue becomes how to correlate any change in drug activity indicators to the increased drug trafficking-related violence in Mexico. One potential complication with such an analysis is uniformly defining what constitutes drug-related violence.

This could potentially be broken down into three general categories: crimes committed by people under the influence of drugs; economic-compulsive crimes (crimes committed in order to obtain money or drugs to support drug use); and what are termed systemic drug crimes—crimes that result from the business of trafficking illicit drugs.<sup>81</sup> These definitions are important, because while the commission of crimes by people who are under the influence of illegal drugs and economic-compulsive crimes present important policy issues in and of themselves, changes in these indicators contribute little value to the determination of whether or not the United States is experiencing any spillover violence from Mexico *particularly related to the recent increase in drug trafficking-related violence*.

## **Measuring the Problem**

The issue of measurement is important in several different contexts. There are issues with the collection and reporting of drug control statistics, as well as questions concerning what value the reported measures have. Because the drug control issue is complex, and so many agencies participate in its execution, invariably there are going to be differences in how agencies collect and report enforcement statistics. Central to the issue at hand in this report is the question of how to measure changes in drug-related violence, and specifically drug trafficking-related violence.

Even an indicator that conceptually could provide some value added to the central question (to choose an example popularly cited in the media—violent crimes excluding robberies) is difficult to evaluate. For example, in Tucson, the number of violent crimes excluding robberies from January to March of 2009 was 632; for the same period in 2008 the number was 651. So, there were fewer violent crimes in Tucson in the first three months of 2009 than in 2008.<sup>82</sup> These are not necessarily drug trafficking-related violent crimes, but if the premise—that the United States

---

<sup>80</sup>Straw purchases occur when guns are purchased from licensed gun dealers by eligible persons and then knowingly transferred to prohibited persons. Straw purchases are illegal under U.S. law (18 U.S.C. § 924(a)(1)(A)).

<sup>81</sup> Paul J. Goldstein, “The Drugs/Violence Nexus: A Tripartite Conceptual Framework,” *Journal of Drug Issues*, vol. 14 (1985), pp. 493-506.

<sup>82</sup> Gabriel Arana, “There’s No Drug Crime Wave at the Border, Just a lot of Media Hype,” *The Nation*, May 29, 2009.

is experiencing spillover violence stemming from the drug trafficking activity in Mexico—is accurate, one would expect violent crimes to go up, and drug trafficking-related violent crimes would be included in the more general violent crime reporting. On the other hand, a significant drop in non-drug trafficking-related violence could obscure a rise in actual drug trafficking-related violent crime. However, the true driver of the change in *drug trafficking-related* violent crime cannot be ascertained from these statistics.

Another measurement issue is where to look for changes in drug-trafficking-related violence. This is another area where the problems with available data are manifested. Ideally, to conduct this analysis, one would have access to drug-trafficking-related violent crime data from the geographic areas of interest (border and interior locations with known drug trafficking activity). This data would be available in small geographic increments so that local differences could be taken into account, and it would be consistently available in comparable sets across an adequately long time period so as to conduct a statistically significant trend analysis. Unfortunately, this and other data are not readily available for analysis, as detailed in the section outlining the Congressional Research Service's (CRS's) evaluation of available data.

## **Is There Spillover Violence?**

As discussed, a multitude of factors are involved in both defining as well as measuring spillover violence. Currently, there is no comprehensive, publicly available data that can definitively answer the question of whether there has been a significant spillover of drug trafficking-related violence into the United States. Although anecdotal reports have been mixed, U.S. government officials maintain that there has not yet been a significant spillover.

### **Analysis**

In an examination of data that could provide insight into whether there has been a significant spillover in drug trafficking-related violence from Mexico into the United States, CRS undertook an analysis of violent crime data from the FBI's Uniform Crime Report (UCR) program.<sup>83</sup> Of note, however, the UCR data does not allow analysts to determine what proportion of the violent crime rate is related to drug trafficking or, even more specifically, what proportion of drug trafficking-related violent crimes can be attributed to spillover violence. The UCR compiles data from monthly reports from approximately 17,000 local police departments or state agencies, and it provides some of the most commonly cited crime statistics in the United States. Under the UCR program, the FBI collects data on the number of offenses known to police, the number and characteristics of persons arrested, and the number of "clearances" for eight different offenses, collectively referred to as Part I offenses. Part I offenses include murder and nonnegligent manslaughter, forcible rape, robbery, aggravated assault, burglary, larceny-theft, motor vehicle theft, and arson.<sup>84</sup> Within the Part I offenses, crimes are categorized as either violent or property

---

<sup>83</sup> The UCR is most commonly referenced when discussing crime rates, and for the purpose of this report, we present and analyze crime rates as reported by the UCR program. For more information on how crime in the United States is measured and on the UCR program, see archived CRS Report RL34309, *How Crime in the United States Is Measured*, by Nathan James and Logan Rishard Council. See also <http://www.fbi.gov/ucr/ucr.htm>.

<sup>84</sup> The FBI also collects data on the number of arrests made for 21 other offenses, known as Part II offenses. Part II offenses include Other Assaults; Forgery and Counterfeiting; Fraud, Embezzlement; Stolen Property: Buying, Receiving, or Possessing; Vandalism; Weapons: Carrying, Possessing, etc.; Prostitution and Commercialized Vice; Sex Offenses; Drug Abuse Violations; Gambling; Offenses Against the Family and Children; Driving Under the Influence; (continued...)



crimes. *Violent crimes* include murder and nonnegligent manslaughter, forcible rape, robbery, and aggravated assault. *Property crimes* include burglary, larceny-theft, motor vehicle theft, and arson. The UCR, however, is not a comprehensive source for data on crime in the United States. It collects offense data on a limited number of crimes (Part I crimes), which means that offense data are available only for a small number of all crimes committed in the United States. For instance, it does not include data on kidnapping—one of the oft-cited drug trafficking-related crimes discussed as evidence of spillover violence. Further, the inclusivity of the UCR data is affected by other factors such as whether or not local law enforcement chooses to report data to the FBI, the variety in reporting and data classification practices of local law enforcement agencies, and the imputation methods used by the FBI to estimate crime in jurisdictions that have not reported for an entire year.<sup>85</sup>

For the purpose of this report, CRS presents and analyzes *violent* crime rates as reported by the UCR program, as policy makers have repeatedly expressed concern about the possibility of drug trafficking-related violent crimes increasing.<sup>86</sup> In addition to providing the overall national violent and property crime rates annually, the UCR program also provides these crime rates for metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs).<sup>87</sup> In the present analysis of violent crime rate data, CRS relies upon the violent crime rate data *for the MSAs* as calculated by the UCR program. As mentioned, the violent crime rate includes murder and nonnegligent manslaughter, forcible rape, robbery, and aggravated assault.

As mentioned, the NDIC estimates that Mexican DTOs maintain drug distribution networks—or supply drugs to distributors in at least 230 U.S. cities (as illustrated in **Figure 2**).<sup>88</sup> Because this information is assimilated based on state and local law enforcement agency estimations, as well as law enforcement interviews with NDIC staff, this is not necessarily a comprehensive or nuanced picture of Mexican drug trafficking presence in cities around the United States. For instance, while some cities may experience a larger amount of drug trafficking activity than others, these cities are considered as equally experiencing drug trafficking presence for the purpose of the NDIC estimate. In addition, there may be other cities not reporting the presence of DTOs, even if these organizations are active in those cities. If drug trafficking-related violence is in fact increasing in those cities reporting a presence of Mexican DTOs, one may expect to see an increase in such violence in the 230 cities identified by the NDIC—or perhaps only in those cities that are situated along the SWB if the violence is truly spilling directly across the border. Further, if this increase in violence were to follow a similar time frame as the escalating violence in

---

(...continued)

Liquor Laws; Drunkenness; Disorderly Conduct; Vagrancy; All Other Offenses; Suspicion; Curfew and Loitering Laws (Persons under 18); and Runaways (Persons under 18).

<sup>85</sup> For more information, see archived CRS Report RL34309, *How Crime in the United States Is Measured*, by Nathan James and Logan Rishard Council.

<sup>86</sup> This does not exclude the possibility that policy makers may be equally concerned with drug trafficking-related property crimes. However, this report focuses on violent crimes. For information on national trends in both violent and property crime rates, see CRS Report R40812, *Federal Crime Control Issues in the 111<sup>th</sup> Congress*, by Kristin M. Finklea.


<sup>87</sup> The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) defines MSAs as having at least one urbanized area of 50,000 or more in population, plus adjacent territory that has a high degree of social and economic integration with the core as measured by commuting ties. For more information, see Executive Office of the President, Office of Management and Budget, Update of Statistical Area Definitions and Guidance on Their Uses, OMB Bulletin No. 10-02, December 1, 2009, <http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/assets/bulletins/b10-02.pdf>.

<sup>88</sup> NDTA, 2009., p. 45.

Mexico, one may expect to see an increase in violence since December 2006, when Mexican President Felipe Calderon took office and began to crack down on the DTOs.<sup>89</sup> For each of these 230 cities, CRS determined whether there was a corresponding MSA and violent crime rate reported in the UCR for that MSA. CRS identified 138 such MSAs, 8 of which directly abut the border between the United States and Mexico.<sup>90</sup> As illustrated in **Figure 3**, CRS calculated the average violent crime rate across the border MSAs and the non-border MSAs for each of fiscal years 1999 through 2009.

**Figure 3. Violent Crime Rate in Selected MSAs**

FY 1999-FY2009



**Source:** CRS analysis and presentation of UCR data. UCR data is available from the Federal Bureau of Investigation at <http://www.fbi.gov/ucr/ucr.htm>. 2010 UCR data is still preliminary, and thus is not included in this analysis.

**Notes:** The UCR data is based on the average violent crime rate data across selected MSAs. The selected MSAs are those that correspond to cities identified by the NDIC as having a presence of Mexican drug trafficking organizations. Border MSAs (N = 8) are those which directly abut the border between the United States and Mexico, and non-border MSAs (N = 130) are those which do not touch the SWB. The national violent crime rate is presented as a point of reference. CRS performed an ANOVA comparing the average violent crime rate between border and non-border MSAs across fiscal years 1999 through 2009. The data indicate that there is no evidence of a statistically significant difference between violent crime rates in border and non-border MSAs,  $F(1,20) = 2.38, p > .05$ .

CRS analysis of available data suggests that the violent crime rate has not significantly increased in those areas where there is an identified presence of Mexican DTOs, as well as available data on the violent crime rate for those MSAs. Further, such analysis suggests there is no statistically

<sup>89</sup> See CRS Report R41576, *Mexico's Drug Trafficking Organizations: Source and Scope of the Rising Violence*, by June S. Beittel.

<sup>90</sup> These MSAs include the cities of San Diego, CA; El Centro, CA; Yuma, AZ; Las Cruces, NM; El Paso, TX; Laredo, TX; McAllen, TX; and Brownsville, TX—all which were identified by the NDIC as having the presence of Mexican drug trafficking organizations.

significant difference in the average violent crime rate in these border and non-border MSAs between fiscal years 1999 and 2009. Since 2001, the average violent crime rate in the eight selected border MSAs has generally declined, and it has remained below the national violent crime rate since 2005.<sup>91</sup> It is unknown, however, whether trends in the violent crime rate are related to changes in drug trafficking-related violent crimes. Because the violent crime rate is a compilation of violent crimes both related and unrelated to drug trafficking, an increase in drug trafficking-related violent crime could be masked by a decrease in those violent crimes not related to trafficking—or vice versa.

Looking at the aggregate of border and non-border MSAs, however, may not provide information as to trends in individual MSAs or cities. For example, **Figure 4** illustrates the trends in violent crime rates in eight border MSAs. As mentioned, if spillover violence were to trend in time with the escalating violence in Mexico, analysts may expect to see an increase in drug trafficking-related violence in 2007, 2008, and 2009 relative to previous years. For instance, although one MSA—El Paso, TX—experienced an increase in the violent crime rate in 2007, 2008, and 2009 compared to 2006, the violent crime rate in the El Paso MSA remained lower than the violent crime rates in FY1999-FY2004. This may be counterintuitive to some who expect that a “spillover” in violence may touch those cities closest in proximity to the violence in Mexico; El Paso sits directly across the Southwest border from one of the most violent Mexican cities—Juarez.<sup>92</sup> Further, anecdotal reports suggest that while some cities have seen a spillover in drug trafficking-related violence, El Paso has not.<sup>93</sup>

---


<sup>91</sup> In 2005, the national violent crime rate was 469 and the average violent crime rate across the selected border MSAs was 465.9.

<sup>92</sup> Samuel Logan, “Mexican Drug Cartel Recruitment of Teenagers in the USA,” *Mexidata.Info*, December 14, 2009, <http://mexidata.info/id2495.html>.

<sup>93</sup> Deborah Tedford, “Mexico Violence Not Spilling Into Texas Border Cities,” *National Public Radio*, March 24, 2009, <http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=102256207>.

**Figure 4. Violent Crime Rate in Selected Southwest Border MSAs**

FY1999-FY2009



**Source:** CRS analysis and presentation of UCR data. UCR data is available from the Federal Bureau of Investigation at <http://www.fbi.gov/ucr/ucr.htm>.

**Notes:** The selected MSAs are those that correspond to cities identified by the NDIC as having a presence of Mexican drug trafficking organizations. The national violent crime rate is presented as a point of reference.

Spillover violence may not occur uniformly across the entire SWB during the same time periods. There may be hot-spot “flare-ups” in response to Mexican drug trafficking activity directly across the border. If this were true, violence would have climbed in Laredo, TX, in 2004 and 2005 when there was an increase in drug trafficking-related violence across the border in Nuevo Laredo. It did not. Also using this hot-spot analysis, the more recent increase in violence in Juarez should be linked to an increase in violence in El Paso, TX, in 2008 and 2009. In this case, an increase in violence in a Mexican city does appear to be correlated with an increase in violence in a neighboring U.S. city. This further illustrates that relying on trends in overall violent crime rates may not provide an accurate depiction of trends in violent crime (or more specifically, in drug trafficking-related violent crime) around the country.

Another possibility is that there may be a time lag between drug trafficking-related violence in Mexico and any associated violence in the United States. For instance, after settling territorial disputes in Mexico, rival DTOs may engage in violent conflict on the U.S. side of the border. With the data available, however, it is not possible to separate out a time lag from other factors that may influence levels of drug trafficking-related violence that may be seen in the United States.

## Conclusion

Mexico has experienced an increase in the level of drug trafficking-related violence within and between the drug trafficking organizations (DTOs), and the number of drug trafficking-related deaths in Mexico since December 2006 has been estimated at over 34,500.<sup>94</sup> Congress remains concerned with the possibility that the current drug trafficking-related violence in Mexico may spill over into the United States. One of the primary challenges in assessing this violence is defining the term *spillover*. While the interagency community has defined spillover violence as violence targeted primarily at civilians and government entities—excluding trafficker-on-trafficker-violence—other experts and scholars have recognized trafficker-on-trafficker violence as central to spillover. When defining and analyzing changes in drug trafficking-related violence within the United States to determine whether there has been (or may be in the future) any spillover violence, critical elements include who may be implicated in the violence (both perpetrators and victims), what type of violence may arise, when violence may appear, and where violence may occur (both along the Southwest border and in the nation's interior).

At present, there is no comprehensive, publicly available data that can definitively answer the question of whether there has been a significant spillover of drug trafficking-related violence into the United States. Although anecdotal reports have been mixed, U.S. government officials maintain that there has not yet been a significant spillover. CRS analyzed violent crime data from the Federal Bureau of Investigation's (FBI's) Uniform Crime Report program in order to examine data that could provide insight into whether there has been a significant spillover in drug trafficking-related violence from Mexico into the United States. However, the overall violent crime data do not allow CRS to determine the proportion of violent crimes that are related to drug trafficking or, even more specifically, the proportion of drug trafficking-related violent crimes that are attributable to spillover violence. In its analysis, CRS calculated the average violent crime rate across eight selected Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSAs) along the Southwest border and 130 selected non-border MSAs—identified by the National Drug Intelligence Center (NDIC) as having the presence of Mexican DTOs—for each of fiscal years 1999 through 2009. CRS analysis suggests that the violent crime rate has not significantly increased in those areas where there is an identified presence of Mexican DTOs. Further, there appears to be no significant difference in the average violent crime rate in the selected border and non-border MSAs between fiscal years 1999 and 2009. In conclusion, however, because the trends in the overall violent crime rate may not be indicative of trends in drug trafficking-related violent crimes, CRS is unable to draw definitive claims about trends in drug trafficking-related violence spilling over from Mexico into the United States.

---

<sup>94</sup> See University of San Diego, Trans-Border Institute, <http://justiceinmexico.org/2011/02/07/trans-border-institute-releases-report-on-drug-violence-in-mexico/>.

## Appendix. Selected U.S. Efforts and Issues

Various departments and agencies are involved in combating drug-related activity both along the Southwest border and throughout the United States. This Appendix outlines selected U.S. efforts to counter the body of threats posed by drug trafficking organizations (DTOs). Although these efforts are not necessarily tailored to the current violence in Mexico or to the prospect of a spillover of violence into the United States, they include strategies and operations that may address the violence.

### Stopping the Flow of Drugs, Guns, and Money

In continued to enhance U.S.-Mexican security cooperation, the U.S. government has pledged to “intensify its efforts to address all aspects of drug trafficking (including demand-related portions) and to continue to combat trafficking of weapons and bulk currency to Mexico.”<sup>95</sup> Various agencies have introduced initiatives to stop the northbound flow of drugs into the United States while also stemming the southbound flow of money and guns into Mexico. For example, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has increased efforts both on land and at sea. According to DHS, Customs and Border Protection (CBP) launched 100% southbound rail screening in March of 2009 at all SWB rail crossings.<sup>96</sup> Also, DHS announced its intention to increase maritime interdictions, with a special emphasis on go-fast boats.<sup>97</sup>

### Drugs

The Department of Justice (DOJ) is the federal agency responsible for enforcing federal criminal laws, and within it, the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) is the only federal agency whose sole mission is to enforce federal drug laws. Working with its counterpart agencies on both sides of the border, the DEA pursues investigations and develops intelligence with the goal of identifying, infiltrating, and destroying DTOs and disrupting their operations. As of May 2009, the DEA had 1,171 Special Agent positions working in domestic offices with responsibilities for the SWB, amounting to approximately 29% of DEA’s total domestic Special Agent workforce.<sup>98</sup>

The Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP), located in the Executive Office of the President, is the agency responsible for coordinating the national drug control effort, promulgating the federal drug control strategy, and overseeing the strategy’s implementation.<sup>99</sup>

---

<sup>95</sup> U.S. Department of State and Government of Mexico, “Joint Statement on the Mérida Initiative: A New Paradigm for Security Cooperation,” October 22, 2007, <http://merln.ndu.edu/archivepdf/ARA/State/93817.pdf>.

<sup>96</sup> U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “Fact Sheet: Southwest Border: The Way Ahead,” press release, April 15, 2009, [http://www.dhs.gov/ynews/releases/pr\\_1239821496723.shtm](http://www.dhs.gov/ynews/releases/pr_1239821496723.shtm).

<sup>97</sup> Ibid.

<sup>98</sup> Drug Enforcement Administration, *Statement of Stuart Nash, Associate Deputy Attorney General and Director, Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Forces, Department of Justice; William Hoover, Acting Deputy Director, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives, Department of Justice; Anthony P. Placido, Acting Administrator for Intelligence, Drug Enforcement Administration, Department of Justice*, Regarding “Escalating Violence in Mexico and the Southwest Border as a Result of the Illicit Drug Trade?” Before the House Judiciary Committee, Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security, May 6, 2009, <http://www.justice.gov/dea/pubs/cngrtest/ct050609.pdf>.

<sup>99</sup> For more information on ONDCP, see CRS Report R41535, *Reauthorizing the Office of National Drug Control Policy: Issues for Consideration*, by Kristin M. Finklea.

The ONDCP director, also known as the Drug Czar, is responsible for submitting to Congress every two years a SWB Counternarcotics Strategy, the 2011 version of which is discussed later in this Appendix. ONDCP also participates in the Southwest Border-Mérida Initiative Interagency Policy Committee and its associated Deputy Committee meetings. This entity addresses all policy issues concerning domestic Southwest border issues as well as implementation of the Mérida Initiative.<sup>100</sup>

### ***Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Force (OCDETF) Program***

The Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Force (OCDETF) Program targets—with the intent to disrupt and dismantle—major drug trafficking and money laundering organizations. Federal agencies that participate in the OCDETF Program include the DEA; Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI); U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE); Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives (ATF); U.S. Marshals; Internal Revenue Service (IRS); U.S. Coast Guard (USCG); the 94 U.S. Attorneys Offices; and DOJ’s Criminal and Tax Divisions. These federal agencies also collaborate with state and local law enforcement.<sup>101</sup> There are nine OCDETF strike forces around the country as well as an OCDETF Fusion Center. The OCDETFs target those organizations that have been identified on the Consolidated Priority Organization Targets (CPOT) List, which is the “most wanted” list for leaders of drug trafficking and money laundering organizations.<sup>102</sup> For FY2010, 12% (566 cases) of active OCDETF investigations were linked to valid CPOTs, and an additional 4% (209 cases) were linked to Regional Priority Organization Targets (RPOTs).<sup>103</sup>

### ***High Intensity Drug Trafficking Areas (HIDTAs)***

The ONDCP director has the authority to designate areas within the United States that are centers of illegal drug production, manufacturing, importation, or distribution as High Intensity Drug Trafficking Areas (HIDTAs). Four main criteria are considered when designating an area as a HIDTA:

[1] the extent to which the area is a significant center of illegal drug production, manufacturing, importation, or distribution; [2] the extent to which State, local, and tribal law enforcement agencies have committed resources to respond to the drug trafficking problem in the area, thereby indicating a determination to respond aggressively to the problem; [3] the extent to which drug-related activities in the area are having a significant harmful impact in the area, and in other areas of the country; and [4] the extent to which a significant increase in allocation of Federal resources is necessary to respond adequately to drug related activities in the area.<sup>104</sup>

---

<sup>100</sup> For more information on bi-national security cooperation and the Mérida Initiative, see CRS Report R41349, *U.S.-Mexican Security Cooperation: The Mérida Initiative and Beyond*, by Clare Ribando Seelke and Kristin M. Finklea.

<sup>101</sup> Drug Enforcement Administration, *Statement of Joseph M. Arabit Special Agent in Charge, El Paso Division*, Regarding “Violence Along the Southwest Border” Before the House Appropriations Committee, Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice, Science and Related Agencies, March 24, 2009, <http://www.usdoj.gov/dea/speeches/s032409.pdf>.

<sup>102</sup> U.S. Department of Justice, *FY2012 Interagency Crime and Drug Enforcement, Congressional Budget Submission*, p. 5, <http://www.justice.gov/jmd/2012justification/pdf/fy12-ocdetf-justification.pdf>.

<sup>103</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 24.

<sup>104</sup> Office of National Drug Control Policy, *The High-Intensity Drug Trafficking Area Program: An Overview*, <http://whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/hidta/overview.html>.

Currently, there are 28 designated HIDTAs in the United States and its territories. One of these HIDTAs, the Southwest Border Region HIDTA, includes portions of California, Arizona, New Mexico, and Texas. The HIDTA collects and shares intelligence and coordinates task forces composed of federal, state, and local agents that target drug-trafficking operations along the border.

### ***Border Enforcement Security Task Forces (BEST)***

The BEST initiative<sup>105</sup> consists of a series of multi-agency investigative task forces, of which ICE is the lead agency. They seek to identify, disrupt, and dismantle criminal organizations posing significant threats to border security along the northern border with Canada and Southwest border with Mexico as well as within Mexico.

Other agency participants include CBP, DEA, ATF, FBI, USCG, and the U.S. Attorneys Offices, and state and local law enforcement. The Mexican law enforcement agency Secretaría de Seguridad Pública is a partner along the Southwest border. On the northern border, Canadian law enforcement agencies like the Canada Border Services Agency, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, the Ontario Provincial Police, the Niagara Regional Police Service, the Toronto Metropolitan Police, the Windsor Police Service, and the Amherstburg Police Service are active members. The Argentinean customs agency is part of the Miami BEST and the Colombian National Police is part of both the Miami and New York-New Jersey BESTs.<sup>106</sup>

Currently, there are 21 BESTs with locations around the United States and in Mexico:

- Arizona (Phoenix, Tucson, and Yuma);
- California (Imperial Valley, Los Angeles/Long Beach Seaport, San Diego);
- Florida (Miami Seaport);
- Mexico (Mexico City);
- Michigan (Detroit);
- New Mexico (Albuquerque, Deming, Las Cruces);
- New York (Buffalo, New York Seaport);
- New Jersey (New Jersey Seaport);
- Texas (El Paso, Laredo, Rio Grande Valley);
- Washington (Blaine, Seattle Seaport);
- Gulf Coast (New Orleans Seaport, Mobile Seaport, Gulfport Seaport); and
- Southeast Coastal (Wilmington Seaport, Charleston Seaport, Savannah and Seaport).

---

<sup>105</sup> Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), *Fact Sheet: Border Enforcement Security Task Forces*, August 2010, <http://www.ice.gov/news/library/factsheets/best.htm>.

<sup>106</sup> Ibid.



Each BEST concentrates on the prevalent threat in its area. On the southern border, this entails cross-border violence, weapons smuggling and trafficking, illegal drug and other contraband smuggling, money laundering and bulk cash smuggling, and human smuggling and trafficking. For example, in testimony to Congress the Assistant Secretary for ICE noted that the El Paso BEST is working collaboratively with Mexico's Tactical-Operative Intelligence Unit (UNITO) Juárez taskforce to address four primary threats in the El Paso-Juárez corridor: 1) narcotics smuggling; 2) weapons violations; 3) money laundering; and 4) human smuggling/trafficking.<sup>107</sup>

## **Guns<sup>108</sup>**

According to DOJ, ATF is the lead law enforcement agency responsible for stopping illegal gun trafficking from the United States to Mexico, given the bureau's statutory mission and authority.<sup>109</sup> In recent years, ATF has increased its efforts to suppress illegal gun trafficking in the Southwest border region of the United States under a program known as "Project Gunrunner." ATF reports that Mexican DTOs are increasingly sending enforcers—individuals responsible for intimidating individuals, collecting drug debts, and ensuring compliance with DTO activities—across the border to hire surrogates (straw purchasers)<sup>110</sup> who buy several "military-style" firearms at a time from federal firearms licensees (FFLs). The DTOs reportedly favor pistols that are equipped to accept high-capacity magazines and are chambered to accommodate comparatively high velocity cartridges capable of piercing through armor vests typically worn by law enforcement officers. Less frequently, but no less troubling to law enforcement, the DTOs have also sought .50 caliber sniper rifles.

Nevertheless, ATF's efforts to reduce border-related gun trafficking have generated controversy on two counts. First, the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) and ATF have obtained approval from the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) for an information collection initiative under which federally licensed gun dealers in Southwest border states would be required to submit multiple sales reports on certain rifles, as a means of more readily identifying possible straw purchasers and gun traffickers.<sup>111</sup> Second, ATF is alleged to have allowed firearms to be transferred to suspected straw purchasers.<sup>112</sup> Then, either intentionally or unintentionally, ATF allowed those suspected criminals or their associates to smuggle those firearms across the border, in an effort to build more complex investigations designed to uncover and dismantle larger gun

---

<sup>107</sup> U.S. Congress, House Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on Homeland Security, *Update on Southwest Border; The Challenges that DHS Continues to Face*, Testimony of John Morton, Assistant Secretary for ICE, April 10, 2010, [http://www.dhs.gov/ynews/testimony/testimony\\_1274112299629.shtm](http://www.dhs.gov/ynews/testimony/testimony_1274112299629.shtm). (Hereafter: Morton Testimony, April 10, 2010).

<sup>108</sup> See also CRS Report R40733, *Gun Trafficking and the Southwest Border*, by Vivian S. Chu and William J. Krouse.

<sup>109</sup> U.S. Department of Justice, Statement of David Ogden, Deputy Attorney General, before the United States Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, "Southern Border Violence: Homeland Security Threats, Vulnerabilities, and Responsibilities," March 25, 2009, p.11.

<sup>110</sup> Straw purchases occur when guns are purchased from licensed gun dealers by eligible persons and then knowingly transferred to prohibited persons. Straw purchases are illegal under U.S. law (18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(6) and § 924(a)(1)(A)).

<sup>111</sup> U.S. Department of Justice, "Statement of Deputy Attorney General James Cole Regarding Information Requests for Multiple Sales of Semi-Automatic Rifles with Detachable Magazines," press release, July 11, 2011.

<sup>112</sup> A "straw purchase" occurs when a person, who is otherwise eligible to purchase a firearm, purchases a firearm from a federally licensed dealer for another person, who is either prohibited from possessing a firearm or does not want a paper trail linking him to the purchased firearm.

trafficking conspiracies.<sup>113</sup> Some of those firearms were allegedly used in the deaths of two U.S. federal agents, and perhaps hundreds have been seized by authorities in Mexico.<sup>114</sup> If these allegations should prove true, they could potentially have serious international implications because neither DOJ nor ATF are reported to have informed their Mexican counterparts about these investigations and the possibility that some of these firearms could be reaching their country.<sup>115</sup>

### ***Firearms Enforcement***

The Gun Control Act of 1968 (GCA), as amended, contains the principal federal restrictions on domestic commerce in small arms and ammunition. The statute requires all persons manufacturing, importing, or selling firearms as a business to be federally licensed; prohibits the interstate mail-order sale of all firearms; and prohibits interstate sale of handguns generally and sets forth categories of persons to whom firearms or ammunition may not be sold, such as persons under a specified age or with criminal records. It also authorizes the Attorney General to prohibit the importation of non-sporting firearms, requires that dealers maintain records of all commercial gun sales, and establishes special penalties for the use of a firearm in the perpetration of a federal drug trafficking offense or crime of violence.

Although there is no definition for “gun trafficking” in the GCA, it essentially entails the movement or diversion of firearms from legal to illegal markets.<sup>116</sup> Unlike other forms of contraband, almost all illegal firearms used criminally in the United States were diverted at some point from legal channels of commerce.<sup>117</sup>

### ***Inspections of Federal Firearms Licensees***

ATF inspects FFLs, or licensed gun dealers, to monitor their compliance with the GCA, and to prevent the diversion of firearms from legal to illegal channels of commerce. In the past, despite its crime-fighting mission, ATF’s business relationships with the firearms industry and larger gun-owning community have been a perennial source of tension, which from time to time has been the subject of congressional oversight.<sup>118</sup> Nevertheless, under current law, ATF Special Agents and

---

<sup>113</sup> “Is Obama A Gunrunner?,” *Investor’s Business Daily*, May 9, 2011, p. A16.

<sup>114</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>115</sup> Kim Murphy, “AK-47s At Death Scene Were Part of ATF Probe,” *Los Angeles Times*, February 3, 2011.

<sup>116</sup> U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives, *Project Gunrunner: The Southwest Border Initiative*, ATF P 3317.6, March 2009, available at <http://www.atf.gov/publications/download/p/atf-p-3317-6.pdf>.

<sup>117</sup> Greg Ridgeway, Glenn L. Pierce, and Anthony A. Braga, et al., *Strategies for Disrupting Illegal Firearms Markets: A Case Study of Los Angeles*, RAND Corporation, 2008, p. 1.

<sup>118</sup> For example, in the 109<sup>th</sup> Congress, the House Judiciary Crime subcommittee held two oversight hearings examining ATF firearms enforcement operations at gun shows in Richmond, Virginia, in 2005. ATF agents reportedly provided state and local law enforcement officers with confidential information from background check forms (ATF Form 4473s), so that those officers could perform residency checks on persons who had otherwise legally purchased firearms at those gun shows. Questions were also raised as to whether ATF agents had profiled gun purchasers at those gun shows on the basis of race, ethnicity, and gender. See U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security, Oversight Hearing on the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives (BATFE) Parts I & II: Gun Show Enforcement, February 15 and 28, 2006. Also see Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General, *The Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives’ Investigative Operations at Gun Shows, I-2007-007*, June 2007.

Industry Operations Investigators are authorized to inspect or examine the inventory and records of an FFL without search warrants under three scenarios:<sup>119</sup>

- in the course of a reasonable inquiry during the course of a criminal investigation of a person or persons other than the FFL;
- to ensure compliance with the record keeping requirements of the GCA—not more than once during any 12-month period, or at any time with respect to records relating to a firearm involved in a criminal investigation that is traced to the licensee; or
- when such an inspection or examination is required for determining the disposition of one or more firearms in the course of a criminal investigation.

For 2008, ATF reported that there were 6,647 FFLs in the United States operating in the Southwest border region of Texas, New Mexico, Arizona, and California.<sup>120</sup> By inspecting the firearms transfer records that FFLs are required by law to maintain, ATF investigators are often able to uncover evidence of corrupt FFLs dealing in firearms “off the books,” straw purchases, and other patterns of possibly illegal behavior.

### ***Straw Purchases and the Ant Run***

Routine, small-scale smuggling of guns across the border often involves a series of straw purchases, during which guns are purchased from FFLs in border states and then sold to a middle man, who then smuggles the guns across the border. Repeated trips across the border of one to three guns, referred to in border parlance as the ant (hormiga) run, is a common way firearms are smuggled into Mexico.<sup>121</sup> In the United States, straw purchases are illegal under the GCA.<sup>122</sup> When a person buys a firearm from an FFL, the buyer and the FFL are required to fill out an ATF Form 4473. The FFL is required to verify the purchaser’s name, address, date of birth, and other information by examining a state-issued piece of identification, most often a driver’s license. If the purchaser or dealer falsifies any information on the Form 4473, it is a federal offense punishable by no more than 10 years imprisonment and/or a fine.<sup>123</sup> It is also illegal for the gun trafficker to sponsor the straw purchase, because it is a federal offense for any person to aid, abet, counsel, command, or solicit a criminal act;<sup>124</sup> or engage in a conspiracy to defraud the United States. It is also illegal to smuggle firearms out of the United States.<sup>125</sup>

---

<sup>119</sup> 18 U.S.C. § 923(g)(1)(B).

<sup>120</sup> ATF briefing provided to CRS on May 5, 2008.

<sup>121</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>122</sup> 18 U.S.C. § 921 *et seq.*

<sup>123</sup> 18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(6); 18 U.S.C. § 924 (a)(2).

<sup>124</sup> 18 U.S.C. § 2.

<sup>125</sup> 18 U.S.C. § 554.1. Depending on the type of firearm, it is also a violation of either the Arms Export Control Act (AECA; 22 U.S.C. § 2778 *et seq.*) or the Export Administration Act of 1979 (EAA; 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 2401-2420) to transport a handgun, rifle, or shotgun across the border into Mexico without proper authorization of the U.S. government.

### ***Gun Shows and Private Firearms Transfers***

Private, intrastate firearm transfers are legal in some states at gun shows and flea markets. A person who is not “engaged in the business” of dealing firearms may transfer firearms to another person as long as he does not do so knowingly to a prohibited person, and as long as he does not knowingly transfer a handgun to a person who is not a resident of the state in which the transfer occurs.<sup>126</sup> It is notable that firearms acquired through private transfers, particularly multiple private transfers, are much more difficult to trace. Consequently, there is likely to be a premium for such firearms in illegal markets on both sides of the border, as there would also be for some stolen firearms, because there are no paper trails for these firearms. Southwest border states in which private transfers at gun shows are legal include Texas, New Mexico, Arizona, and California, but gun shows and all private firearm transfers are more strictly regulated in California.<sup>127</sup>

### ***Firearms Tracing for Mexican Authorities***

ATF also maintains a foreign attaché in Mexico City to administer an Electronic Trace Submission System (ETSS), also known as the e-Trace program, for Mexican law enforcement authorities. Successful firearm traces are instrumental in developing investigative leads in homicide and gun trafficking cases. According to ATF, some of those cases uncover corrupt FFLs who were involved in larger criminal conspiracies to smuggle firearms into Mexico.<sup>128</sup> In January 2008, ATF announced that e-Trace technology would be deployed to an additional nine U.S. consulates in Mexico (Mérida, Juarez, Monterrey, Nogales, Hermosillo, Guadalajara, Tijuana, Matamoros, and Nueva Laredo).<sup>129</sup>

In June 2009, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) reported that ATF had traced more than 23,159 firearms from FY2004 through FY2008 for Mexican authorities.<sup>130</sup> Approximately 86.6% of those firearms were determined to have originated in the United States.<sup>131</sup> It is notable, however, that Mexican authorities had submitted information on only a fraction of the firearms that had been recovered in Mexico. In FY2008, for example, the Mexican Attorney General’s Office submitted information on 7,200 firearms to ATF for tracing, but nearly 30,000 firearms had been recovered in that fiscal year.<sup>132</sup> GAO recommended in its June 2009 report that the Attorney General should direct ATF to regularly update its reporting on aggregate firearms trafficking data and trends.

In a departure from past practices, however, ATF has arguably released very little trace data to congressional requesters for FY2009 and FY2010. Nevertheless, in April 2011 the U.S. Embassy in Mexico City reported that from FY2007 through FY2010, ATF processed 78,194 trace requests

---

<sup>126</sup> 18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(5).

<sup>127</sup> See Brady Center to Prevent Gun Violence website on state gun laws, <http://www.stategunlaws.org/>.

<sup>128</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>129</sup> Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives, Office of Public Affairs, “ATF Expands Efforts to Combat Illegal Flow of Firearms to Mexico,” January 16, 2008.

<sup>130</sup> U.S. Government Accountability Office, *Firearms Trafficking: U.S. Efforts to Combat Arms Trafficking to Mexico Face Planning and Coordination Challenges*, GAO-09-709, June 29, 2009, p. 18, <http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d09709.pdf>.

<sup>131</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 15.

<sup>132</sup> *Ibid.*

for Mexican authorities.<sup>133</sup> Then, in June 2011 ATF released limited trace data to the Senate Caucus on International Narcotics Control.<sup>134</sup> According to the Senate Caucus, ATF processed 29,284 trace requests on firearms that were reportedly recovered in calendar years 2009 and 2010. Of those firearms, 20,504 (70%) were either manufactured in, or imported into, the United States.

### ***Project Gunrunner***

ATF leads Project Gunrunner, an initiative designed to disrupt the illegal flow of firearms from the United States to Mexico. Between FY2005 and FY2010, Project Gunrunner had led to the arrest of 1,800 defendants—1,170 of whom had been convicted—and the seizure of over 8,700 firearms.<sup>135</sup> House and Senate appropriations report language indicated that Congress had appropriated about \$60 million for Project Gunrunner for FY2010.<sup>136</sup> With this FY2010 funding, ATF dedicated 224 special agents, 165 industry operations investigators, and 32 other positions to the SWB states.<sup>137</sup> In November 2010, the DOJ Inspector General (IG) released an evaluation of Project Gunrunner.<sup>138</sup> The IG recommended that ATF work with DOJ to develop a reporting requirement for multiple long gun sales, because Mexican DTOs have demonstrated a marked preference for military-style firearms capable of accepting high-capacity magazines. The IG also recommended that ATF focus its investigative efforts on more complex criminal conspiracies involving high-level traffickers rather than on low-level straw purchasers.

In December 2010, DOJ and ATF requested that OMB approve a “60-day emergency notice of information collection” by January 5, 2011, under the Paperwork Reduction Act (44 U.S.C. § 3507).<sup>139</sup> Under this proposed initiative, ATF would require federally licensed gun dealers to report whenever they make multiple disposals of one or more rifles within five consecutive business days to an unlicensed person. Such reporting would be limited to firearms that are (1) semiautomatic, (2) chambered for ammunition of greater than .22 caliber, and (3) capable of accepting a detachable magazine. Several Members of Congress strongly opposed the proposal. They maintain that if Congress authorized multiple handgun sales reporting in statute in 1986, then it is incumbent upon ATF to request similar statutory authority from Congress for multiple rifles sales reporting. While OMB initially denied ATF emergency approval, it approved this information collection request on July 11, 2011.<sup>140</sup> In addition, instead of the of the one-year

---

<sup>133</sup> U.S. Embassy in Mexico City, “Fact Sheet: Combating Arms Trafficking,” April 2011.

<sup>134</sup> U.S. Senate Caucus on International Narcotics Control, *Halting U.S. Firearms Trafficking to Mexico: A Report by Senators Dianne Feinstein, Charles Schumer, and Sheldon Whitehouse*, 112<sup>th</sup> Cong., 1<sup>st</sup> sess., June 2011, p. 6.

<sup>135</sup> U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives, *ATF Congressional Budget Submission, Fiscal Year 2012*, February 2011, p. 5.

<sup>136</sup> U.S. Congress, House Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice, Science, and Related Agencies, *Commerce, Justice, Science, and Related Agencies Appropriations Bill, 2010, to accompany H.R. 2847*, 111<sup>th</sup> Cong., 1<sup>st</sup> sess., June 12, 2009, H.Rept. 111-149, p. 66; and U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice, Science, and Related Agencies, *Commerce, Justice, Science, and Related Agencies Appropriations Bill, 2010, to accompany H.R. 2847*, 111<sup>th</sup> Cong., 1<sup>st</sup> sess., June 25, 2009, p. 68.

<sup>137</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>138</sup> U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General, *Review of ATF’s Project Gunrunner*, I-2011-001, November 2010, <http://www.justice.gov/oig/reports/ATF/e11101.pdf>.

<sup>139</sup> Department of Justice, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives, “60-Day Emergency Notice of Information Collection Under Review: Report of Multiple Sale or Other Disposition of Certain Rifles,” *75 Federal Register* 79021, December 17, 2010.

<sup>140</sup> U.S. Department of Justice, “Statement of Deputy Attorney General James Cole Regarding Information Requests for Multiple Sales of Semi-Automatic Rifles with Detachable Magazines,” press release, July 11, 2011; Evan Perez, (continued...)

“pilot” period originally requested by ATF, OMB approved the information collection request for a three-year period (through July 31, 2014).<sup>141</sup> Opponents of this initiative quickly responded. On July 12, 2011, Representative Denny Rehberg successfully amended the FY2012 Commerce, Justice, Science Appropriations bill in full committee markup to prohibit ATF from implementing its information collection initiative by a vote of 25 to 16.<sup>142</sup>

In February 2011, Project Gunrunner came under scrutiny for a Phoenix, AZ-based investigation known as Operation Fast and Furious, when ATF whistleblowers alleged to Members of Congress that suspected straw purchasers were allowed to amass relatively large quantities of firearms as part of a long-term gun trafficking investigation.<sup>143</sup> They further alleged that ATF allowed those firearms to “walk,” meaning that ATF allowed known straw purchasers to transfer firearms to gunrunners without taking additional steps to surveil those suspects, monitor the movement of those firearms, or expeditiously arrest either the suspected straw purchasers or gunrunners. Two of those firearms—AK-47 style rifles—were reportedly found at the scene of a shootout near the U.S.-Mexico border during which U.S. Border Patrol Agent Brian Terry was shot to death.<sup>144</sup> Questions, moreover, have been raised about whether a firearm—an AK-47 style handgun—that was reportedly used to murder U.S. ICE Special Agent Jamie Zapata and wound Special Agent Victor Avila in Mexico on February 15, 2011, was initially trafficked by a subject of a Houston, TX-based ATF Project Gunrunner investigation.<sup>145</sup> While it remains an open question whether ATF or other federal agents were in a position to interdict the firearms used in these deadly attacks before they were smuggled into Mexico,<sup>146</sup> neither DOJ nor ATF informed their Mexican counterparts about these investigations and the possibility that some of these firearms could be reaching Mexico.<sup>147</sup>

Legislators in both countries have voiced their concern about Operation Fast and Furious,<sup>148</sup> but it has been largely the efforts of Senator Charles E. Grassley and Representative Darrell E. Issa that have illuminated serious missteps that were possibly made by both DOJ and ATF.<sup>149</sup> Arguably,

---

(...continued)

“U.S. News: New Rules on Border Gun Sales,” *Wall Street Journal*, July 12, 2011.

<sup>141</sup> Office of Management and Budget, Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, Reviews Completed in the Last 30 Days, DOJ-ATF, Report of Multiple Sale or Other Disposition of Certain Semi-Automatic Rifles, OMB Control Number: 1140-0100, available at <http://www.reginfo.gov/public/do/PRAMain;jsessionid=9f8e89cb30d6399089b4c8ac4da993b6c0e60ddbeff2.e340bxiKbN0Sci0SbhaSa3aLchr0n6jAmljGr5XDqQLvpAe>.

<sup>142</sup> Previously, on February 19, 2011, the House adopted an amendment offered by Representative Rehberg to the Full-Year Continuing Appropriations Act, 2011 (H.R. 1) that would have prohibited ATF from implementing this requirement. While the House passed H.R. 1, the Senate rejected this bill on March 9, 2011, for budgetary considerations.

<sup>143</sup> James V. Grimaldi and Sari Horwitz, “ATF Probe Strategy Is Questioned,” *Washington Post*, February 2, 2011.

<sup>144</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>145</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>146</sup> Operation Fast and Furious was launched in November 2009. It was approved as an Organized Crime and Drug Enforcement Task Force (OCDETF) investigation in February 2010. As an OCDETF investigation, it was then directed largely by the U.S. Attorney’s Office in Phoenix. While Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) and Internal Revenue Service (IRS) agents were also part of this investigation, so far their role in this operation has not generated public or congressional scrutiny.

<sup>147</sup> Richard A. Serrano, “U.S. Embassy Kept in Dark as Guns Flooded Mexico,” *Salt Lake Tribune*, July 25, 2011.

<sup>148</sup> Dennis Wagner, “Gun Shop Told ATF Sting Was Perilous,” *Arizona Republic*, April 15, 2011, p. A1.

<sup>149</sup> See U.S. Congress, Joint Staff Report, *Department of Justice’s Operation Fast and Furious: Accounts of ATF Agents*, prepared for Representative Darrell E. Issa, Chairman, United States House of Representatives, Committee on (continued...)

their repeated inquiries made to DOJ about these matters prompted U.S. Attorney General Eric Holder to direct his Inspector General to conduct a third, yet-to-be-completed evaluation of Project Gunrunner.<sup>150</sup> Meanwhile, Representative Issa, Chairman of the Oversight and Government Reform Committee, has also held three hearings related to this operation.<sup>151</sup> And, as Senator Grassley originally called for, the House Appropriations Committee has approved report language that recommends that “an outside, independent investigator” be appointed and charged with conducting “a thorough investigation of the allegations against ATF with respect to Operation Fast and Furious and policies guiding this and similar operations.”<sup>152</sup> To date, Operation Fast and Furious has resulted in the indictment of 20 individuals on multiple counts of straw purchasing and other federal offenses related to firearms, drug trafficking, and money laundering.<sup>153</sup> Over the 15-month operation, they stand accused of trafficking 2,020 firearms, of which 227 have been recovered in Mexico and 363 have been recovered in the United States.<sup>154</sup> ATF officials maintain that the investigation may yield additional arrests of “high-level traffickers.”<sup>155</sup>

### *Armas Cruzadas*

To combat the illicit smuggling of weapons from the United States into Mexico, ICE initiated *Operation Armas Cruzadas*. As part of this initiative, agencies within DHS and the Government of Mexico have partnered on interdiction, investigation, and intelligence-sharing activities to identify, disrupt, and dismantle trans-border criminal networks that smuggle weapons from the United States into Mexico.<sup>156</sup>

As part of *Operation Armas Cruzadas*, bilateral law enforcement and intelligence sharing operations are synchronized in order to identify, disrupt, and dismantle trans-border weapons smuggling networks. Among its activities, ICE Border Liaisons are deployed to the border to strengthen bilateral communication. There is also a Weapons Virtual Task Force, a virtual online community where U.S. and Mexican investigators can share intelligence and communicate in a secure environment.<sup>157</sup>

---

(...continued)

Oversight and Government Reform & Senator Charles E. Grassley, Ranking Member, United States Senate, Committee on the Judiciary, 112<sup>th</sup> Cong., 1<sup>st</sup> sess., June 14, 2011; and U.S. Congress, Joint Staff Report, *Department of Justice's Operation Fast and Furious: Fueling Cartel Violence*, prepared for Rep. Darrell E. Issa, Chairman, United States House of Representatives, Committee on Oversight and Government Reform & Senator Charles E. Grassley, Ranking Member, United States Senate, Committee on the Judiciary, 112<sup>th</sup> Cong., 1<sup>st</sup> sess., July 26, 2011, 60 pp.

<sup>150</sup> Jerry Seper, “ATF Knew Risks in Border Operation; Instructed Arizona Gun Dealer To Engage in ‘Suspicious Sales’ Despite Concerns,” *Washington Times*, April 15, 2011, p. 5.

<sup>151</sup> Those hearings include “Obstruction of Justice: Does the Justice Department Have to Respond to a Lawfully Issued Valid Congressional Subpoena,” June 13, 2011; “Operation Fast and Furious: Reckless Decisions, Tragic Outcomes,” June 15, 2011; Operation Fast and Furious: The Other Side of the Border,” July 26, 2011.

<sup>152</sup> U.S. Congress, House Committee on Appropriations, *Commerce, Justice, Science and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 2012*, 112<sup>th</sup> Cong., 1<sup>st</sup> sess., July 20, 2011, H.Rept. 112-169, p. 57.

<sup>153</sup> Indictment, United States v. Avila, No. 11-cr-00126-JAT (D. Ariz. Jan. 19, 2011).

<sup>154</sup> Sari Horwitz, “A Gunrunning Sting Gone Fatally Wrong: Operation Meant to Seize Firearms Bound for Cartels Allows Weapons into the Streets,” *Washington Post*, July 26, 2011, p. A1.

<sup>155</sup> Ibid.

<sup>156</sup> ICE, *Fact Sheet: Armas Cruzadas*, November 3, 2009, <http://www.ice.gov/news/library/factsheets/armas-cruzadas.htm> (Hereafter: ICE, Armas Cruzadas.)

<sup>157</sup> U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Judiciary, Subcommittee on Crime and Drugs, *Law Enforcement Responses to* (continued...)

ICE is the lead law enforcement agency for *Operation Armas Cruzadas*. It has the broadest authorities of any U.S. government agency in the areas of illegal export of munitions, small arms and weapon sanctions violations. In addition to these authorities, ICE has primary jurisdiction over investigations relating to the cross-border smuggling of firearms and other weapons out of the United States.<sup>158</sup> ATF participates as a result of its authority over weapons being illegally sold and transported within the United States. CBP is also a participating agency due to its border security responsibilities.

## Money

As mentioned, the sale of illegal drugs in the United States generates somewhere between \$18 billion and \$39 billion in annual wholesale proceeds for Mexican and Colombian DTOs.<sup>159</sup> Money from the DTOs' illegal sale of drugs in the United States is moved south across the border into Mexico. Moving these funds from the United States into Mexico fuels the drug traffickers' criminal activities. This money is not directly deposited into the U.S. financial system, but rather is illegally laundered through mechanisms such as bulk cash smuggling, the Black Market Peso Exchange<sup>160</sup> (BMPE), or placed in financial institutions, cash-intensive front businesses, prepaid stored value cards (PSVCs), or money services businesses (MSBs). The NDIC indicates that the development of new technologies has provided outlets through which DTOs may conceal their illicit proceeds.

The National Drug Intelligence Center (NDIC) indicates that the development of new technologies has provided outlets through which DTOs may conceal their illicit proceeds.<sup>161</sup> Increasingly, the use of stored value cards,<sup>162</sup> mobile banking systems, and other technologies allow traffickers to move profits more quickly and stealthily. In addition, profits that the Mexican DTOs generate from the sale of Colombian cocaine can be moved directly from the United States to the source country without traversing through middlemen.<sup>163</sup>

The National Southwest Border Counternarcotics Strategy (discussed below) places specific emphasis on drug control efforts in the Southwest border region.<sup>164</sup> Among the efforts to curb the

---

(...continued)

*Mexican Drug Cartels*, Statement of Kumar C. Kibble, Deputy Director, ICE Office of Investigations, 111<sup>th</sup> Cong., March 17, 2009.

<sup>158</sup> ICE, *Armas Cruzadas*.

<sup>159</sup> NDTA, 2009., p. 49.

<sup>160</sup> The Department of the Treasury defines the BPME as “a large-scale money laundering system used to launder proceeds of narcotic sales in the United States by Latin American drug cartels by facilitating swaps of dollars in the U.S. for pesos in Colombia through the sale of dollars to Latin America businessmen seeking to buy U.S. goods to export,” [http://www.fincen.gov/statutes\\_regs/guidance/html/advis04282006.html](http://www.fincen.gov/statutes_regs/guidance/html/advis04282006.html).

<sup>161</sup> See *NDTA, 2010*, pp. 47 – 50 for more information on developments in illicit finance.

<sup>162</sup> According to the Code of Federal Regulations, stored value are “funds or monetary value represented in digital electronics format (whether or not specially encrypted) and stored or capable of storage on electronic media in such a way as to be retrievable and transferable electronically,” 31 C.F.R. § 103.11(vv).

<sup>163</sup> Douglas Farah, “Money Laundering and Bulk Cash Smuggling: Challenges for the Merida Initiative,” in *Shared Responsibility: U.S.-Mexico Policy Options for Confronting Organized Crime*, ed. Eric L. Olson, David A. Shirk, and Andrew D. Selee (2010), p. 144. (Hereafter, Farah, *Money Laundering*.)

<sup>164</sup> Office of National Drug Control Policy, *National Southwest Border Counternarcotics Strategy*, June 2011, [http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/publications/swb\\_counternarcotics\\_strategy11/swb\\_counternarcotics\\_strategy11.pdf](http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/publications/swb_counternarcotics_strategy11/swb_counternarcotics_strategy11.pdf). (Hereinafter, SWBCS, 2011.) The SWBCS is implemented by the Director of (continued...)



southbound flow of money from the sale of illicit drugs in the United States, the strategy includes several goals: stemming the flow of southbound bulk cash smuggling, prosecuting the illegal use of MSBs and electronic payment devices, increasing targeted financial sanctions, enhancing multilateral/bi-national collaboration, and empirically assessing the money laundering threat.<sup>165</sup>

### ***Bulk Cash Smuggling***

Bulk cash smuggling is one of the primary means by which DTOs launder their illicit proceeds south across the United States-Mexico border. Annually, perhaps between \$20 billion and \$25 billion in bank notes is smuggled across the Southwest border into Mexico.<sup>166</sup> How much of this is profit from the sale of illicit drugs and then laundered is unclear.<sup>167</sup> One factor contributing to the lack of clarity in estimating the true amount of bulk cash flowing from the United States to Mexico is that federal agencies record information on bulk cash smuggling. These agencies include the DEA (through the El Paso Intelligence Center's National Seizure System), ICE (through the Bulk Cash Smuggling Center), and the Department of the Treasury (through the Treasury Enforcement Communications System database). Because each of these databases is distinct from the others, ONDCP has recommended that increased information sharing between federal—as well as between federal, state, and local law enforcement—could aid in investigations of DTOs involved in bulk cash smuggling.<sup>168</sup>

ICE has found that as successful enforcement has made the transfer of illicit funds between banks and other financial institutions more difficult, criminal organizations are increasing their use of bulk cash smuggling.<sup>169</sup> In 2005, the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS's) U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) and U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) launched a program known as "Operation Firewall," which increased operations against bulk cash smuggling in the U.S.-Mexico border region. Since 2005, Operation Firewall has resulted in 999 arrests and 5,123 seizures totaling more than \$494 million.<sup>170</sup> U.S. efforts against money laundering and bulk cash smuggling are increasingly moving beyond the federal level as well, as experts have recommended.<sup>171</sup> In December 2009, for example, ICE opened a bulk cash smuggling center to assist U.S. federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies track and disrupt illicit funding flows. Still, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) has identified several ways in which CBP outbound inspections and other U.S. efforts against bulk cash

---

(...continued)

National Drug Control Policy, in conjunction with the DHS Office of Counternarcotics Enforcement as well as the DOJ Office of the Deputy Attorney General.

<sup>165</sup> Ibid., pp. 32-36.

<sup>166</sup> William Booth and Nick Miroff, "Stepped-Up Efforts by U.S., Mexico Fail to Stem Flow of Drug Money South," *Washington Post*, August 25, 2010, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/08/25/AR2010082506161.html>.

<sup>167</sup> For a discussion of estimates, see Farah, *Money Laundering*, p. 147.

<sup>168</sup> SWBCS, 2011, p. 32.

<sup>169</sup> U.S. Congress, House Appropriations Committee, Subcommittee on Homeland Security, *Border Security Enforcement Task Force*, Statement of Marcy Forman, Director, ICE Office of Investigations, 111<sup>th</sup> Cong., March 10, 2009.

<sup>170</sup> Email from DHS official, February 7, 2011.

<sup>171</sup> Farah, *Money Laundering*.

smuggling, particularly those aimed at combating the use of stored value cards, might be improved.<sup>172</sup>

The United States and Mexico have also created a Bilateral Money Laundering Working Group to coordinate the investigation and prosecution of money laundering and bulk cash smuggling.

### ***Stored Value***

While bulk cash smuggling is an important means by which criminals move illegal profits from the United States into Mexico, they have increasingly turned to stored value cards to move money. With these cards, criminals are able to avoid the reporting requirement under which they would have to declare any amount over \$10,000 in cash moving across the border.<sup>173</sup> Current federal regulations regarding international transportation only apply to monetary instruments as defined under the Bank Secrecy Act.<sup>174</sup> Stored value cards are not considered monetary instruments under current law.

The Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN), under the Department of the Treasury, has issued a notice of proposed rulemaking, intending to define “stored value” as “prepaid access” and to implement regulations regarding the recordkeeping and suspicious activity reporting requirements for prepaid access products and services.<sup>175</sup> The proposed rule would not, however, directly address whether stored value or prepaid access cards would be subject to current regulations regarding the international transportation of monetary instruments. Even if FinCEN were to implement regulations requiring individuals leaving the United States to declare stored value, GAO has identified several challenges that would remain.<sup>176</sup> These challenges relate to law enforcement’s ability to detect the actual cards and to differentiate legitimate from illegitimate stored value on cards; travelers’ abilities to remember the amount of stored value on any given card; and law enforcement’s ability to determine where illegitimate stored value is physically held and subsequently freeze and seize the assets.

### **Securing the Border**

DHS is responsible for screening travelers at ports of entry and maintaining border security. Within DHS, CBP’s Office of Field Operations has primary responsibility for border security and

---

<sup>172</sup> GAO, *Moving Illegal Proceeds: Challenges Exist in the Federal Government’s Effort to Stem Cross Border Smuggling*, GAO-11-73, October 2010, <http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-73>.

<sup>173</sup> Legislation was introduced in the 111<sup>th</sup> Congress (H.R. 5127) that would have, among other things, classified stored value cards as monetary instruments in order to require individuals to declare to Customs amounts over \$10,000 that they are carrying on a stored value card.

<sup>174</sup> 31 U.S.C. § 5312 defines a monetary instrument as “(A) United States coins and currency; (B) as the Secretary may prescribe by regulation, coins and currency of a foreign country, travelers’ checks, bearer negotiable instruments, bearer investment securities, bearer securities, stock on which title is passed on delivery, and similar material; and (C) as the Secretary of the Treasury shall provide by regulation for purposes of sections 5316 and 5331, checks, drafts, notes, money orders, and other similar instruments which are drawn on or by a foreign financial institution and are not in bearer form.”

<sup>175</sup> U.S. Department of the Treasury, FinCEN, “Financial Crimes Enforcement Network; Amendment to the Bank Secrecy Act Regulations—Definitions and Other Regulations Relating to Prepaid Access,” 75 *Federal Register*, pp. 36589–36608, June 28, 2010, <http://edocket.access.gpo.gov/2010/pdf/2010-15194.pdf>.

<sup>176</sup> GAO, *Moving Illegal Proceeds: Challenges Exist in the Federal Government’s Effort to Stem Cross Border Smuggling*, October 2010, pp. 48–49.

passenger screening at ports of entry, and CBP's U.S. Border Patrol has primary responsibility for enforcing U.S. immigration law and other federal laws along the border between ports of entry. ICE also conducts enforcement operations in the border region, with a quarter of all ICE personnel assigned to the southwest border as of October 2010.<sup>177</sup>

Since the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, the tension between travel and trade facilitation on one hand and maintaining security on the other has been felt most keenly at the inbound lanes of U.S. land borders, as CBP has taken numerous measures to enhance the screening of people and goods entering the United States. Less attention has been paid to people and goods leaving the country. As a response to the violence in Mexico, DHS announced a new Southwest Border Initiative in March 2009 to guard against spillover crime and violence, to support Mexico's crackdown against DTOs, and to reduce the movement of contraband in both directions across the border.<sup>178</sup>

### **Shifting/Enhancing Resources**

Continuing an overall trend since the 1980s,<sup>179</sup> DHS has allocated new personnel and resources to augment border security efforts. As part of the 2009 initiative, DHS announced plans to double the number of ICE special agents assigned to Border Enforcement Security Task Forces (BESTs) from 95 to 190. According to DHS, the 95 additional ICE investigators were to augment BEST task forces at the following locations: San Ysidro and Imperial Valley, CA; Phoenix and Tucson, AZ.; Deming and Las Cruces, NM; and El Paso, Laredo, and Rio Grande Valley, TX. ICE also detailed 26 additional analysts to the Southwest border, thereby tripling the previous number. The ICE Attaché personnel in Mexico reportedly increased by 50% (from 24 to 36), to support the Mexican government, as well as domestic ICE offices, by pursuing investigations inside Mexico involving money laundering, narcotics or human trafficking, and weapons smuggling. Finally, DHS announced a quadrupling of the number of ICE Border Liaison Officers (BLOs) assigned along the Southwest border, from 10 to 40 officers.<sup>180</sup>

With the aid of \$600 million in supplemental appropriations passed by Congress in 2010, DHS also added 1,000 new Border Patrol agents and 250 new CBP officers. The appropriations were also used to improve BCP tactical communications systems, add two new forward operating bases, and add additional CBP unmanned aircraft systems.<sup>181</sup> As of July 2011, more than 17,700 Border Patrol agents were assigned to the southwest border, along with 1,200 National Guard troops who have been deployed temporarily to supplement DHS's counter-narcotics efforts.<sup>182</sup>

---

<sup>177</sup> Department of Homeland Security, "Fact Sheet: Southwest Border Overview," October 18, 2010, [http://www.dhs.gov/files/gc\\_1287434745257.shtm](http://www.dhs.gov/files/gc_1287434745257.shtm).

<sup>178</sup> Department of Homeland Security, "Fact Sheet: Southwest Border: The Way Ahead," press release, April 15, 2009, [http://www.dhs.gov/ynews/releases/pr\\_1239821496723.shtm](http://www.dhs.gov/ynews/releases/pr_1239821496723.shtm).

<sup>179</sup> See CRS Report RL32562, *Border Security: The Role of the U.S. Border Patrol*, by Chad C. Haddal.

<sup>180</sup> Department of Homeland Security, "Fact Sheet: Southwest Border: The Way Ahead," press release, April 15, 2009, [http://www.dhs.gov/ynews/releases/pr\\_1239821496723.shtm](http://www.dhs.gov/ynews/releases/pr_1239821496723.shtm).

<sup>181</sup> U.S. Customs and Border Protections, *Statement of Commissioner Alan Bersin*, regarding "Money Laundering and Bulk Cash Smuggling" before the Senate Caucus on International Narcotics Control, March 9, 2011, [http://www.dhs.gov/ynews/testimony/testimony\\_1299698014975.shtm](http://www.dhs.gov/ynews/testimony/testimony_1299698014975.shtm).

<sup>182</sup> Department of Homeland Security, "Secure and Manage Our Borders," July 20, 2011, [http://www.dhs.gov/xabout/gc\\_1240606351110.shtm](http://www.dhs.gov/xabout/gc_1240606351110.shtm).

DHS has also supported other federal, state, local, and tribal law enforcement agencies through Operation Stonegarden, a federal grant program to reimburse law enforcement agencies for additional law enforcement personnel, overtime pay, and other expenses related to border security. As part of the Southwest Border Initiative, Secretary Napolitano waived the 50% cap on personnel and operational activity costs for local eligible jurisdictions along the border to provide additional resources where they are needed most. In 2009 and 2010, DHS provided a record \$123 million in Operation Stonegarden funding to southwest border law enforcement agencies.<sup>183</sup>

### ***Bilateral Cooperation***

Every border crossing has two sides, and the United States has placed a premium on collaboration with Mexico.<sup>184</sup> As Secretary of Homeland Security Janet Napolitano observed in April 2009:

The notion is that we will share the southbound inspections with Mexico, meaning that they will do some, we will do some. In other words, we're both not going to be everywhere all the time on southbound. Right now, Mexican customs or their equivalent doesn't do any southbound. So we're ... working with Mexico to change that dynamic, and share some responsibility along that border.<sup>185</sup>

In February 2010, Secretary Napolitano and Mexico's Secretary of Public Safety Genaro García Luna signed a Declaration of Principles of Cooperation that allows for the expansion of coordinated intelligence sharing and joint strategic intelligence-driven plans to target transnational criminal activity.<sup>186</sup> And in March 2010, Secretary Napolitano signed a pair of agreements with Mexican Interior Secretary Fernando Gómez-Montt to bolster aviation and border security.<sup>187</sup> In FY2010, CBP and Mexican Customs participated in 22 joint operations along the southwest border, resulting in the seizure of over \$113,000 in currency, 23.8 kilograms of narcotics, and the recovery of five stolen vehicles.<sup>188</sup>

As of July 2011, 55 agents were assigned to CBP's International Liaison Unit (ILU), working full-time with Mexican security forces to enhance joint enforcement efforts around the border.<sup>189</sup> Border Patrol agents conduct regular joint-training exercises with their Mexican counterparts focused on detection of concealed compartments and fraudulent documents. The ILU has established procedures to assist Mexican enforcement agents by interdicting Mexican fugitives crossing into the United States and for Mexican officials to intervene when CBP agents are the

---

<sup>183</sup> Ibid.

<sup>184</sup> This section is not meant to provide a comprehensive view of U.S.-Mexican security cooperation. For more information on this issue, including a discussion of bilateral law enforcement efforts, see CRS Report R41349, *U.S.-Mexican Security Cooperation: The Mérida Initiative and Beyond*, by Clare Ribando Seelke and Kristin M. Finklea.

<sup>185</sup> Department of Homeland Security, "Remarks by Secretary Napolitano at the Border Trade Alliance International Conference," press release, April 21, 2009, [http://www.dhs.gov/ynews/speeches/sp\\_1240361190144.shtm](http://www.dhs.gov/ynews/speeches/sp_1240361190144.shtm).

<sup>186</sup> Department of Homeland Security, "Secretary Napolitano Highlights Border Security Accomplishments on One Year Anniversary of Southwest Border Initiative," press release, March 26, 2010, [http://www.dhs.gov/ynews/releases/pr\\_1269622234690.shtm](http://www.dhs.gov/ynews/releases/pr_1269622234690.shtm).

<sup>187</sup> Ibid.

<sup>188</sup> U.S. Customs and Border Protections, *Statement of Commissioner Alan Bersin*, regarding "Money Laundering and Bulk Cash Smuggling" before the Senate Caucus on International Narcotics Control, March 9, 2011, [http://www.dhs.gov/ynews/testimony/testimony\\_1299698014975.shtm](http://www.dhs.gov/ynews/testimony/testimony_1299698014975.shtm).

<sup>189</sup> Based on CRS discussions with Border Patrol officials in Washington, DC, July 18, 2011.

targets of “rocking” attacks from the Mexican side of the border.<sup>190</sup> And Mexican and U.S. enforcement agents, including representatives of CBP, ICE, local law enforcement, U.S. military agencies, and their Mexican counterparts meet on a monthly basis within each of the nine southern Border Patrol sectors to share information and maintain open lines of communication.<sup>191</sup>

### **At the Ports of Entry**

All travelers seeking admission at U.S. ports of entry are required to present travel documents; and CBP conducts immigration, customs, and agricultural inspections to prevent illegal entries and the admission of contraband goods. CBP must manage the border in such a way that the institution of enhanced security measures does not unduly restrict or delay the processing of legitimate travel and trade. CBP relies on a risk-based model to subject certain travelers, vehicles, and shipping containers to enhanced secondary inspections; and CBP also operates several trusted-traveler and trusted-trader programs to allow certain pre-cleared travelers to be admitted on an expedited basis.<sup>192</sup>

As part of the Southwest Border Initiative, DHS made several security enhancements at ports of entry. Among the measures was the deployment of seven additional dual-detection canine teams, for a total of 12 teams in California, Arizona, and Texas. DHS deployed two additional mobile x-ray units to Texas and Arizona, complementing the seven previously deployed units along the Southwest border in Texas and California. In addition, CBP announced plans to replace existing automated license plate readers in 52 outbound lanes at 16 Southwest border crossings. License plate readers are intended to automatically read vehicle license plates and conduct law enforcement queries; the updated readers are intended to improve accuracy rates and enhance capability.<sup>193</sup>

The escalation of DTO-related violence in Mexico, and the concern that this violence might spill over in to the United States, has led for calls to enhance U.S. inspections of conveyances (cars, trucks, railcars) crossing the border from the United States into Mexico. The focus of these outbound inspections is stemming the flow of guns and money from the United States into Mexico. Thus, the Southwest Border Initiative also created an Outbound Programs Division within CBP’s Office of Field Operations and placed additional personnel at ports of entry to focus on southbound screening. One hundred Border Patrol agents were reassigned from noncritical tasks to southbound vehicle and pedestrian screening; and DHS tripled the number of Mobile Response Teams (from four to twelve) focused on southbound inspections.<sup>194</sup> Using nonintrusive inspections systems, CBP began screening 100% of southbound rail shipments for illegal weapons, drugs, and cash.<sup>195</sup> In FY2009 and FY2010, CBP seized more than \$104 million in

---

<sup>190</sup> Ibid.

<sup>191</sup> Ibid.

<sup>192</sup> See U.S. Customs and Border Protection, “C-TPAT Overview,” December 13, 2007, [http://www.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/trade/cargo\\_security/ctpat/what\\_ctpat/ctpat\\_overview.xml](http://www.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/trade/cargo_security/ctpat/what_ctpat/ctpat_overview.xml); and U.S. Customs and Border Protection, “Trusted Traveler Programs,” [http://www.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/travel/trusted\\_traveler/](http://www.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/travel/trusted_traveler/).

<sup>193</sup> Department of Homeland Security, “Fact Sheet: Southwest Border: The Way Ahead,” press release, April 15, 2009, [http://www.dhs.gov/ynews/releases/pr\\_1239821496723.shtm](http://www.dhs.gov/ynews/releases/pr_1239821496723.shtm).

<sup>194</sup> Ibid.

<sup>195</sup> Ibid.

southbound illegal currency, up from \$28 million in FY2007-FY2008; and CBP seized more than 1,900 illegal southbound weapons in FY2010, up from 1,000 in FY2008.<sup>196</sup>

## **Between the Ports of Entry**

Over the past several years, DHS has adopted a new strategy for fighting drug smuggling, illegal immigration, and other illicit cross-border activities. This strategy—known as the Secure Border Initiative (SBI)—has sought to gain operational control over the Southwest border of the United States, with the eventual goal of gaining such control over all of the country’s border regions. The purpose of such a strategy has essentially been to “push the fight” against potential violators of the law to the ports of entry where screening and tracking resources are located.

In order to achieve such a funneling effect, in addition to adding personnel as noted above, DHS had installed 650 miles of fencing along the Southwest border as of July 2011, including 350 miles of pedestrian fence and 299 miles of vehicular barriers.<sup>197</sup> These barriers are designed to consistently slow, delay, and be an obstacle to illegal cross-border activity. DHS also relies on surveillance technologies, including aerial surveillance vehicles (regular aircraft and unmanned aerial systems, UASs), remote video systems (RVSs), ground sensors, and truck-mounted mobile surveillance systems (MSSs) to identify illegal inflows, conduct risk assessments, and direct personnel to interdict illegal people and contraband.<sup>198</sup> Despite the installation of these barriers, Border Patrol agents continue to be subject to attacks from the Mexico side of the border.<sup>199</sup> These attacks, however, have been ongoing for a number of years and do not appear to be linked to the recent feud between the DTOs.<sup>200</sup>

Although not confirmed by currently available research, officials for DHS have speculated that part of the violence that has erupted between Mexican DTOs can be attributed to this strategy by DHS. These officials believe that the efforts to funnel smuggling and trafficking activities towards ports of entry have disrupted a number of the previous supply channels for such operations, thereby limiting the ability to conduct illegal cross-border activities. These speculations are to some degree supported by media reports that Mexican smugglers and traffickers have become more aggressive in their attempted efforts at corrupting CBP officers. Such factors, along with the SBI strategy and the large numbers of new hires being brought in as CBP officers have placed an increased pressure on the Southwest border points of entry.

---

<sup>196</sup> U.S. Customs and Border Protections, *Statement of Commissioner Alan Bersin*, regarding “Money Laundering and Bulk Cash Smuggling” before the Senate Caucus on International Narcotics Control, March 9, 2011, [http://www.dhs.gov/ynews/testimony/testimony\\_1299698014975.shtm](http://www.dhs.gov/ynews/testimony/testimony_1299698014975.shtm).

<sup>197</sup> Department of Homeland Security, “Secure and Manage Our Borders,” July 20, 2011, [http://www.dhs.gov/xabout/gc\\_1240606351110.shtm](http://www.dhs.gov/xabout/gc_1240606351110.shtm). DHS plans to install two additional miles of fencing, bringing total fencing to 652 miles. Also see CRS Report RL33659, *Border Security: Barriers Along the U.S. International Border*, by Chad C. Haddal and Michael John Garcia.

<sup>198</sup> As of March 15, 2011, DHS deployed 250 RVSs, 38 MSSs, 130 planes and helicopters, and 4 UASs on the southwest border with two additional UASs added in May 2011; see U.S. Congress, House Committee on Homeland Security, Border and Maritime Security, *Testimony of Assistance Commissioner Mark Borkowski, DHS Office of Technology, Innovation, and Acquisition*, “After SBI-net - The Future of Technology on the Border,” 112<sup>th</sup> Cong., 1<sup>st</sup> sess., March 15, 2011.

<sup>199</sup> Based on CRS discussions with CBP and Border Patrol officials in El Paso, TX, December 3, 2008.

<sup>200</sup> *Ibid.*

## **Cross-Cutting Efforts**

### **National Southwest Border Counternarcotics Strategy<sup>201</sup>**

The National Southwest Border Counternarcotics Strategy (SWBCS) is a companion strategy to complement the overarching National Drug Control Strategy and to place specific emphasis on drug control efforts in the SWB region. One of the aims of the National Drug Control strategy is to disrupt the trafficking of illicit narcotics as close to the source zone as possible. The SWBCS is specifically focused on those shipments that are not intercepted in the source or transit zones, and directs resources to the arrival zone—the SWB of the United States.

The SWBCS is comprised of 10 strategic objectives that are incorporated into the overall strategic goal of reducing the flow of drugs, money, and weapons across the Southwest border. In order to accomplish this goal, the strategy outlines major efforts in the areas of:

- improving intelligence and information sharing,
- preventing smuggling at the ports of entry,
- preventing smuggling between the ports of entry,
- utilizing air and marine assets,
- disrupting and dismantling DTOs operating along the SWB,
- stemming the flow of illicit proceeds from the United States to Mexico,
- stemming the flow of illegal weapons from the United States to Mexico,
- enhancing counterdrug technological capabilities for investigations and interdiction activities,
- developing strong and resilient communities, and
- enhancing U.S.-Mexican bilateral counterdrug efforts.<sup>202</sup>

### ***Southwest Border Initiative (SWBI)***

The Southwest Border Initiative (SWBI) is a multi-agency (DEA, ATF, FBI, U.S. Customs Service, and U.S. Attorneys) initiative targeting Mexican and Colombian-based DTOs.<sup>203</sup> Federal agencies target the communication systems of DTO command and control centers (in part, by conducting wiretaps) to identify all levels of the organizations. The SWBI, in operation since 1994, allows federal agencies to track the flow of drugs from Colombia or Mexico into the United States.

---

<sup>201</sup> SWBCS, 2011.

<sup>202</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 2-3.

<sup>203</sup> For more information on the SWBI, see the Drug Enforcement Administration, *Southwest Border Initiative*, <http://www.usdoj.gov/dea/programs/sbi.htm>.

## ***Mérida and Direct Support to Mexico***

Congress has provided funding for the Mérida Initiative,<sup>204</sup> a multi-year initiative for \$1.4 billion in U.S. counterdrug and anticrime assistance to Mexico and Central America.<sup>205</sup> With assistance to date largely in the form of equipment and training, goals of the Initiative include breaking the power and impunity of criminal organizations; assisting the Mexican and Central American governments in strengthening border, air, and maritime controls; improving the capacity of justice systems in the region; and curtailing gang activity in Mexico and Central America and diminishing the demand for drugs in the region.

## **Enhancing Intelligence**

### ***El Paso Intelligence Center (EPIC)***

EPIC was established in 1974 as an intelligence center to collect and disseminate information relating to drug, alien, and weapon smuggling in support of field enforcement entities throughout the region. Following 9/11, counterterrorism also became part of its mission. EPIC is jointly operated by the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) and U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP).<sup>206</sup>

Today, EPIC is a fully coordinated, multi-agency tactical intelligence center supported by databases and resources from member agencies. Its online query capability consists of 33 federal databases, six commercial databases, and its own internal database. EPIC operates a 24/7 watch program manned by special agents, investigative assistants and intelligence analysts to provide timely tactical intelligence to the field on request.

Agencies represented at EPIC include DEA, CBP, ICE, U.S. Coast Guard, U.S. Secret Service, Department of Defense (DOD), Department of the Interior, FBI, ATF, U.S. Marshals Service, Federal Aviation Administration, National Drug Intelligence Center (NDIC), Internal Revenue Service, National Geospatial–Intelligence Agency, Joint Task Force–North, Joint Interagency Task Force–South, Texas Department of Public Safety, Texas Air National Guard, and the El Paso County Sheriff’s Office.

### ***DHS Office of Intelligence and Analysis (I&A)***<sup>207</sup>

DHS I&A is a member of the Intelligence Community (IC) and is responsible for collecting, analyzing, and disseminating information related to homeland security threats “to the full spectrum of homeland security customers in the Department, at state, local, and tribal levels, in the private sector, and the IC.”<sup>208</sup> The Under Secretary for I&A is the Chief Intelligence Officer

---

<sup>204</sup> CRS Report R41349, *U.S.-Mexican Security Cooperation: The Mérida Initiative and Beyond*, by Clare Ribando Seelke and Kristin M. Finklea.

<sup>205</sup> This includes the countries of Belize, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua and Panama.

<sup>206</sup> See DEA, *El Paso Intelligence Center*. <http://www.usdoj.gov/dea/programs/epic.htm>.

<sup>207</sup> For more information on the DHS intelligence enterprise, see CRS Report R40602, *The Department of Homeland Security Intelligence Enterprise: Operational Overview and Oversight Challenges for Congress*, by Jerome P. Bjelopera.

<sup>208</sup> DHS, *Office of Intelligence and Analysis*. [http://www.dhs.gov/xabout/structure/gc\\_1220886590914.shtm](http://www.dhs.gov/xabout/structure/gc_1220886590914.shtm).



for the Department and manages the entire DHS Intelligence enterprise consisting of I&A and the six DHS operational components with intelligence offices—U.S. Customs and Border Protection, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, Transportation Security Administration, U.S. Coast Guard, and U.S. Secret Service.

To enhance its support to border security activities, I&A established an Integrated Border Intelligence Program (IBIP). Under IBIP, additional personnel and support infrastructure have been committed to support all of the Department's border security operations. The program is designed to link DHS intelligence resources, and those of state and local partners, with the IC in order to deliver actionable intelligence to front-line operators and to fuse national intelligence with law enforcement information. In order to enhance the intelligence component of the effort to stop the flow of illegal weapons into Mexico, Secretary Napolitano announced in March 2009 that DHS will triple the number of intelligence analysts at the Southwest border.<sup>209</sup>

An important initiative within the IBIP is the Homeland Intelligence Support Team (HIST). The first HIST team was deployed in 2007 to El Paso, TX. It consists of intelligence officers from I&A whose mission is to coordinate and facilitate the delivery of national intelligence and enhance information fusion to support DHS operational missions at the border. In this regard it serves as a bridge between the national and field levels and between I&A and the component intelligence staffs at the border. It can also push/pull information from state and local law enforcement officials. The HIST also helps provide context to I&A analysts on topics such as border violence. Its focus areas are alien smuggling, border violence, weapons trafficking, illicit finance, drug trafficking, and the nexus between crime and terrorism. Its location at the El Paso Intelligence Center (EPIC) gives the HIST staff immediate access to each of the DHS operational components plus 16 other federal, state, and local agencies.

### ***CBP Border Field Intelligence Center (BORFIC)***

Originally established as the Border *Patrol* Field Intelligence Center in 2004 in El Paso, TX, BORFIC conducts all-source intelligence activities to support the border security mission of the BP and other DHS and CBP elements to predict, detect, deter, and interdict terrorists, terrorist weapons, and human traffickers and contraband smugglers entering the United States.<sup>210</sup>

BORFIC is responsible for supporting security efforts on both the northern and southern borders. It exchanges intelligence and law enforcement information with numerous federal, state, local, and tribal organizations agencies and actively participates in several interagency and bilateral groups. On the Southwest border, these include the El Paso Interagency Intelligence Working Group, consisting of EPIC, DOD's Joint Task Force-North, and the FBI; and the Bilateral Interdiction Working Group with Mexico. BORFIC shares law enforcement intelligence information with state and local fusion centers through the Homeland Security State and Local Intelligence Community of Interest (HS-SLIC) portal.<sup>211</sup> Currently, BORFIC has four personnel

---

<sup>209</sup> White House Press Release, "Administration Officials Announce US Mexico Border Security Policy: A Comprehensive Response and Commitment," March 24, 2009. [http://www.whitehouse.gov/the\\_press\\_office/Administration-Officials-Announce-US-Mexico-Border-Security-Policy-A-Comprehensive-Response-and-Commitment/](http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Administration-Officials-Announce-US-Mexico-Border-Security-Policy-A-Comprehensive-Response-and-Commitment/)

<sup>210</sup> CBP BORFIC, Briefing for CRS, Dec. 3, 2008.

<sup>211</sup> The Homeland Security State and Local Intelligence Community of Interest (HS-SLIC) allows intelligence analysts in 45 states, the District of Columbia and seven federal agencies to share sensitive homeland security intelligence information and analysis on a daily basis. It is hosted on a portal of the Homeland Security Information Network (continued...)

assigned to EPIC who work in tandem with the Homeland Intelligence Support Team also located there. CBP plans to relocate BORFIC to EPIC to enhance coordination efforts.

### ***CBP Air and Marine Operations Center (AMOC)***

Located in Riverside, CA, the AMOC is a 24/7, multi-agency coordination center that detects, sorts, and monitors air and marine tracks of interest<sup>212</sup> across the nation's borders and maritime approaches. The AMOC is staffed with intelligence operations specialists who provide connectivity to DHS and other intelligence community agencies. It also has liaison officers assigned from the USCG, Federal Aviation Administration, DOD National Guard Bureau, and the Government of Mexico.<sup>213</sup>

The AMOC produces a comprehensive air surveillance radar picture from as many as 450 sensors, including an extensive network of military and civilian radars across the United States and Canada. It allows the AMOC to provide real-time data on suspicious or non-cooperative aircraft and marine vessels to support interdiction operations as well as to other DHS intelligence and operations centers. In addition to aircraft and vessel location data, Detection Systems Specialists at the AMOC have access to numerous law enforcement and other databases that allow them to provide operational units with information regarding the flight plans, history, ownership, and registration of aircraft and vessels and criminal background information on pilots and vessel crew.

### ***ICE Field Intelligence Groups (FIG)***

The ICE Office of Investigations has 26 Field Offices that manage the investigative activities within their area of responsibility. Each office is supported by a co-located FIG consisting of an intelligence director or advisor and a staff of intelligence and operational personnel. FIG personnel identify and analyze criminal trends, threats, methods and systemic vulnerabilities related to ICE strategic priorities within their office's area. FIG intelligence reports, assessments, and other products primarily support the ICE leadership and field managers, but are also disseminated to other DHS, law enforcement, and IC member agencies.<sup>214</sup> FIG's at or near the Southwest border are those co-located with the ICE Office of Investigation Field Offices in Dallas, El Paso, Houston, and San Antonio in Texas; and Los Angeles and San Diego in California.

ICE maintains that their FIGs play a critical role in building actionable intelligence against the DTOs. Following the murders of the persons associated with the U.S. Consulate in Ciudad Juarez,

---

(...continued)

(HSIN).

<sup>212</sup> Among the reasons for an aircraft or vessel to be considered a track of interest is that it is unidentified, uncooperative (i.e., not responding to air traffic control or law enforcement direction), or otherwise behaving suspiciously.

<sup>213</sup> U.S. Government Accountability Office, *Opportunities Exist to Enhance Collaboration at 24/7 Operations Centers Staffed by Multiple DHS Agencies*, 07-89, October 2006, pp. 13-14.

<sup>214</sup> This summary of FIG mission and functions is from *Ibid.*, p. 1.

FIG El Paso was instrumental in identifying Barrio Azteca (BA) members who crossed into the United States following the murders.<sup>215</sup>

### ***ICE Border Violence Intelligence Cell (BVIC)***

The BVIC was established in January 2008 in order to provide intelligence support for ICE weapons smuggling investigations and government-wide efforts to combat violence along the United States-Mexico border.<sup>216</sup> ICE co-located the BVIC at EPIC to enhance information sharing with its law enforcement partners. It also works closely with I&A's HIST. ICE claims that its partnership with ATF's EPIC Gun Desk, for example, has helped coordinate firearms tracing efforts and identified smuggling routes between the United States into Mexico. In addition, on March 31, 2010, BVIC research helped the EPIC Airwatch Command positively identify a known drug trafficker who was seeking to purchase a plane ostensibly for illicit purposes. The information resulted in that seizure of a small aircraft valued at \$1.1 million.<sup>217</sup>

As the level of violence along the U.S.-Mexican border intensified in the past two years, ICE has partnered with Mexican and other U.S. law enforcement agencies on three initiatives described below to enhance border security, disrupt transnational criminal organizations, and stop the illegal flow of firearms from the United States into Mexico. These are the Border Enforcement Security Task Forces (BEST), Armas Cruzadas, and Operation Firewall (all described elsewhere in this report). The BVIC supports all three programs. At the BVIC, all-source intelligence is analyzed and operational leads are provided to the BEST task forces and ICE attaché offices. The BVIC also analyzes data from arrests and seizures by the BEST task forces and exchange intelligence with Mexican law enforcement agencies.

In November 2008, the BVIC, in collaboration with CBP and DHS I&A, produced an Intelligence Report, *United States Southbound Weapons Smuggling Assessment*, which examined U.S. southbound weapon smuggling trends. This report was designed to support the BEST's and other operational components in planning and conducting outbound firearms smuggling operations. In December 2008, the BVIC also co-authored a strategic-level analysis for the ICE and DHS leadership on the same issue.

### ***Operation Black Flag***

In reaction to the escalation of drug-related violence along the U.S.-Mexican border, DEA initiated Operation Black Flag in April 2008.<sup>218</sup> Collecting intelligence from law enforcement agencies and confidential sources on both sides of the border, the operation's main goal is to track and report actionable intelligence on the capability and likelihood of Mexican DTOs extending their violent activities across the border and onto American soil.

---

<sup>215</sup> Morton Testimony, April 10, 2010.

<sup>216</sup> ICE, *BVIC Fact Sheet*, June 2008.


<sup>217</sup> Morton Testimony, April 10, 2010.

<sup>218</sup> Drug Enforcement Administration, *Statement of Joseph M. Arabit Special Agent in Charge, El Paso Division*, Regarding "Violence Along the Southwest Border" Before the House Appropriations Committee, Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice, Science and Related Agencies, March 24, 2009, <http://www.usdoj.gov/dea/speeches/s032409.pdf>.

### Prosecuting OCDETF Cases

As mentioned, multiple federal agencies are involved in investigating the Mexican DTOs. Often, these cases are investigated in OCDETF investigations. **Figure A-1** illustrates the number of OCDETF cases referred to the United States Attorney Offices (USAOs) from various agencies in FY2010.

**Figure A-1. OCDETF Cases Referred to the USAOs, by Federal Agency**  
FY2010




**Source:** CRS representation of data provided by USAO Congressional Affairs.

Generally, over the past 12 years, the number of OCDETF cases filed with the U.S. Attorneys has decreased by slightly more than 16% from 3,332 in FY1999 to 2,783 in FY2010,<sup>219</sup> as illustrated in **Figure A-2**. While this has been an overall decrease, there have been year-to-year fluctuations. One possible explanation for the general decline in OCDETF case filings is that U.S. law enforcement has not focused efforts on OCDETF cases, and therefore did not file as many cases with the USAOs. A second explanation may be that increasing enforcement has been effective in reducing the illegal activities of DTOs and money laundering organizations, thus leading to a decrease in the number of OCDETF cases referred to the USAOs.

<sup>219</sup> Data provided to CRS by USAO Congressional Affairs.

**Figure A-2. OCDETF Case Filings and Convictions**  
FY1999-FY2010



**Source:** CRS representation of data provided by USAO Congressional Affairs.

**Notes:** Data represents the total number of OCDETF cases filed with the USAOs. This includes cases relating Mexican DTOs as well as other drug trafficking and money laundering organizations.

The data on OCDETF cases do not, however, allow analysts to determine the proportion of cases focused on particular drug trafficking and money laundering organizations—such as Mexican DTOs. It is unclear whether the *proportion* of OCDETF cases related to Mexican DTOs has changed significantly throughout the past 12 years. If the proportion of OCDETF cases related to Mexican DTOs has remained constant, then the total number of OCDETF cases has decreased relative to FY1999. If this proportion has increased, however, this could suggest several things, including an increase in Mexican DTOs’ illegal activities or an increase in administration prioritization of Mexican DTOs.

## Author Contact Information

Kristin M. Finklea, Coordinator  
Analyst in Domestic Security  
kfinklea@crs.loc.gov, 7-6259

Marc R. Rosenblum  
Specialist in Immigration Policy  
mrosenblum@crs.loc.gov, 7-7360

William J. Krouse  
Specialist in Domestic Security and Crime Policy  
wkrouse@crs.loc.gov, 7-2225

## Key Policy Staff

---

<b>Area of Expertise</b>	<b>Name</b>	<b>Phone</b>	<b>E-mail</b>
Border Security	Marc Rosenblum	7-7360	mrosenblum@crs.loc.gov
Customs	Marc Rosenblum	7-7360	mrosenblum@crs.loc.gov
Drug Policy and Enforcement	Kristin Finklea	7-6259	kfinklea@crs.loc.gov
	Lisa Sacco	7-6228	lsacco@crs.loc.gov
Drug Trafficking Organizations	Kristin Finklea	7-6259	kfinklea@crs.loc.gov
Gun Control	William Krouse	7-2225	wkrouse@crs.loc.gov
Money Laundering	Kristin Finklea	7-6259	kfinklea@crs.loc.gov

---

## Acknowledgments

Jennifer Lake, as well as former CRS analysts Mark Randol, Chad Haddal, Mark Eddy, and Celinda Franco, contributed to an earlier version of this report.