



# Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy

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## Summary

Stated U.S. policy is to ensure that Afghanistan will not again become a base for terrorist attacks against the United States. Following policy reviews in 2009, the Obama Administration asserted that it was pursuing a well-resourced and integrated military-civilian strategy intended to pave the way for a gradual transition to Afghan leadership that will begin in July 2011 and be completed by the end of 2014. To carry out U.S. policy, a total of 51,000 additional U.S. forces were authorized by the two 2009 reviews, bringing U.S. troop numbers to a high of about 99,000, with partner forces adding about 42,000. On June 22, 2011, President Obama announced that the policy had accomplished most major U.S. goals and that a drawdown of 33,000 U.S. troops would take place by September 2012. The first 10,000 of these are to be withdrawn by the end of 2011 in concert with the July 2011 start of a long-planned transition to Afghan security leadership. That transition has begun in the first wave of areas, four cities and three full provinces, and some U.S. troops have been withdrawn. Amid widespread doubts that Afghan governance and security institutions will be strong enough to protect themselves by the end of 2014, U.S. and Afghan officials are negotiating a “strategic partnership” that would guide the long term relationship, although differences over U.S. latitude to conduct operations is slowing completion. The start of the transition coincides with the turnover of the top U.S. and NATO command from General Petraeus to Lt. Gen. John Allen on July 18, and the arrival of Ryan Crocker as Ambassador to Afghanistan on July 25.

The death of Al Qaeda founder Osama bin Laden in a U.S. raid on May 1, 2011, has caused some to argue that overarching U.S. goals will not be jeopardized by the drawdown. However, Al Qaeda has had a minimal presence on the Afghanistan battlefield itself since 2001, and the official U.S. military view is that security gains achieved against mostly Taliban and affiliated Afghan insurgent groups in 2010 remain “fragile and reversible.” Some believe that a negotiated settlement to the Afghanistan conflict has become more likely in the aftermath of bin Laden’s death, and some preliminary talks with Taliban figures, led by the State Department, have begun. There are major concerns among Afghanistan’s minorities and among its women that reconciliation might produce compromises that erode the freedoms enjoyed since 2001. Some strategists doubt that Afghanistan can be rendered permanently stable unless Afghan militants are denied safe haven in Pakistan. Others believe that all of Afghanistan’s neighbors, including Iran, should cease using Afghanistan to promote their own interests and instead help Afghanistan reemerge as a major regional trade route.

Others believe that the crucial variable is the quality and extent of Afghan governance. In particular, President Hamid Karzai’s failure to forcefully confront governmental corruption has caused a loss of Afghan support for his government. However, the Administration view is that governance is expanding and improving slowly. U.S. officials also hope to draw on Afghanistan’s vast mineral resources to promote long term growth—several major mining, agricultural, and even energy development programs, mostly funded by private investment have begun in the past few years, with more in various stages of consideration.

Much of the development to date has been accomplished with foreign, particularly U.S., help, although donor aid is likely to decline as the transition proceeds. Through the end of FY2011, the United States has provided over \$67 billion in assistance to Afghanistan since the fall of the Taliban, of which about \$30 billion has been to equip and train Afghan forces. During FY2001-FY2011, the Afghan intervention has cost about \$443 billion, including all costs. For FY2012, about \$17 billion in aid (including train and equip) is requested, in addition to about \$100 billion for U.S. military operations there. (See CRS Report RS21922, *Afghanistan: Politics, Elections, and Government Performance*, by Kenneth Katzman.)

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## **Background**

Afghanistan has a history of a high degree of decentralization, and resistance to foreign invasion and occupation. Some have termed it the “graveyard of empires.”

### **From Early History to the 19<sup>th</sup> Century**

Alexander the Great conquered what is now Afghanistan in three years (330 B.C.E. to 327 B.C.E), although at significant cost and with significant difficulty, and requiring, among other steps, marriage to a resident of the conquered territory. From the third to the eighth century, A.D., Buddhism was the dominant religion in Afghanistan. At the end of the seventh century, Islam spread in Afghanistan when Arab invaders from the Umayyad Dynasty defeated the Persian empire of the Sassanians. In the 10<sup>th</sup> century, Muslim rulers called Samanids, from Bukhara (in what is now Uzbekistan), extended their influence into Afghanistan, and the complete conversion of Afghanistan to Islam occurred during the rule of the Gaznavids in the 11<sup>th</sup> century. They ruled over the first vast Islamic empire based in what is now Ghazni province of Afghanistan.

In 1504, Babur, a descendent of the conquerors Tamarlane and Genghis Khan, took control of Kabul and then moved onto India, establishing the Mughal Empire. (Babur is buried in the Babur Gardens complex in Kabul, which has been refurbished with the help of the Agha Khan Foundation.) Throughout the 16<sup>th</sup> and 17<sup>th</sup> centuries, Afghanistan was fought over by the Mughal Empire and the Safavid Dynasty of Persia (now Iran), with the Safavids mostly controlling Herat and western Afghanistan, and the Mughals controlling Kabul and the east. A monarchy ruled by ethnic Pashtuns was founded in 1747 by Ahmad Shah Durrani, who was a senior officer in the army of Nadir Shah, ruler of Persia, when Nadir Shah was assassinated and Persian control over Afghanistan weakened.

A strong ruler, Dost Muhammad Khan, emerged in Kabul in 1826 and created concerns among Britain that the Afghans were threatening Britain’s control of India; that fear led to a British decision in 1838 to intervene in Afghanistan, setting off the first Anglo-Afghan War (1838-1842). Nearly all of the 4,500-person British force was killed in that war, which ended with a final British stand at Gandamak. The second Anglo-Afghan War took place during 1878-1880.

### **Early 20<sup>th</sup> Century and Cold War Era**

King Amanullah Khan (1919-1929) launched attacks on British forces in Afghanistan (Third Anglo-Afghan War) shortly after taking power and won complete independence from Britain as recognized in the Treaty of Rawalpindi (August 8, 1919). He was considered a secular modernizer presiding over a government in which all ethnic minorities participated. He was succeeded by King Mohammad Nadir Shah (1929-1933), and then by King Mohammad Zahir Shah. Zahir Shah’s reign (1933-1973) is remembered fondly by many older Afghans for promulgating a constitution in 1964 that established a national legislature and promoting freedoms for women, including dropping a requirement that they cover their face and hair. However, possibly believing that he could limit Soviet support for Communist factions in Afghanistan, Zahir Shah also entered into a significant political and arms purchase relationship with the Soviet Union. The Soviets began to build large infrastructure projects in Afghanistan during Zahir Shah’s time, such as the north-south Salang Pass/Tunnel and Bagram airfield. He also accepted agricultural and other development aid from the United States, including large

USAID-funded irrigation and hydroelectric dam projects in Helmand Province. In part, the countryside was secured during the King's time by local tribal militias called *arbokai*.

Afghanistan's slide into instability began in the 1970s when the diametrically opposed Communist Party and Islamic movements grew in strength. While receiving medical treatment in Italy, Zahir Shah was overthrown by his cousin, Mohammad Daoud, a military leader who established a dictatorship with strong state involvement in the economy. Daoud was overthrown and killed<sup>1</sup> in April 1978 by People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA, Communist party) military officers under the direction of two PDPA (Khalq faction) leaders, Hafizullah Amin and Nur Mohammad Taraki, in what is called the *Saur* (April) Revolution. Taraki became president, but he was displaced in September 1979 by Amin. Both leaders drew their strength from rural ethnic Pashtuns and tried to impose radical socialist change on a traditional society, in part by redistributing land and bringing more women into government. The attempt at rapid modernization sparked rebellion by Islamic parties opposed to such moves. The Soviet Union sent troops into Afghanistan on December 27, 1979, to prevent a seizure of power by the Islamic militias, known as the *mujahedin* (Islamic fighters). Upon their invasion, the Soviets replaced Amin with another PDPA leader perceived as pliable, Babrak Karmal (Parcham faction of the PDPA), who was part of the 1978 PDPA takeover but was exiled by Taraki and Amin.

Soviet occupation forces, which numbered about 120,000, were never able to pacify the outlying areas of the country. The *mujahedin* benefited from U.S. weapons and assistance, provided through the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in cooperation with Pakistan's Inter-Service Intelligence directorate (ISI). The *mujahedin* were also relatively well organized and coordinated by seven major parties that in early 1989 formed a Peshawar-based "Afghan Interim Government" (AIG). The seven party leaders were Mohammad Nabi Mohammadi; Sibghatullah Mojaddedi; Gulbuddin Hikmatyar; Burhanuddin Rabbani; Yunus Khalis; Abd-i-Rab Rasul Sayyaf; and Pir Gaylani. Mohammadi and Khalis have died in recent years of natural causes, but the others are still active in Afghan politics and governance or, in the case of Hikmatyar, fighting the Afghan government.

The *mujahedin* weaponry included U.S.-supplied portable shoulder-fired anti-aircraft systems called "Stingers," which proved highly effective against Soviet aircraft. The United States decided in 1985 to provide these weapons to the *mujahedin* after substantial debate within the Reagan Administration and some in Congress over whether they could be used effectively and whether doing so would harm broader U.S.-Soviet relations. The *mujahedin* also hid and stored weaponry in a large network of natural and manmade tunnels and caves throughout Afghanistan. Partly because of the effectiveness of the Stinger in shooting down Soviet helicopters and fixed wing aircraft, the Soviet Union's losses mounted—about 13,400 Soviet soldiers were killed in the war, according to Soviet figures—turning Soviet domestic opinion against the war. In 1986, after the reformist Mikhail Gorbachev became leader, the Soviets replaced Karmal with the director of Afghan intelligence, Najibullah Ahmedzai (known by his first name). Najibullah was a Ghilzai Pashtun, and was from the Parcham faction of the PDPA. Some Afghans say that some aspects of his governing style were admirable, particularly his appointment of a prime minister (Sultan Ali Keshtmand and others) to handle administrative duties and distribute power.

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<sup>1</sup> Daoud's grave was discovered outside Kabul in early 2008. He was reburied in an official ceremony in Kabul in March 2009.



## Geneva Accords (1988) and Soviet Withdrawal

On April 14, 1988, Gorbachev agreed to a U.N.-brokered accord (the Geneva Accords) requiring it to withdraw. The withdrawal was completed by February 15, 1989, leaving in place the weak Najibullah government. A warming of relations moved the United States and Soviet Union to try for a political settlement to the Afghan conflict, a trend accelerated by the 1991 collapse of the Soviet Union, which reduced Moscow's capacity for supporting communist regimes in the Third World. On September 13, 1991, Moscow and Washington agreed to a joint cutoff of military aid to the Afghan combatants.

The State Department has said that a total of about \$3 billion in economic and covert military assistance was provided by the U.S. to the Afghan *mujahedin* from 1980 until the end of the Soviet occupation in 1989. Press reports say the covert aid program grew from about \$20 million per year in FY1980 to about \$300 million per year during FY1986-FY1990.<sup>2</sup> The Soviet pullout decreased the perceived strategic value of Afghanistan, causing a reduction in subsequent covert funding. As indicated in **Table 11**, U.S. assistance to Afghanistan remained at relatively low levels from the time of the Soviet withdrawal, validating the views of many that the United States largely considered its role in Afghanistan “completed” when Soviets troops left, and there was little support for a major U.S. effort to rebuild the country. The United States closed its embassy in Kabul in January 1989, as the Soviet Union was completing its pullout, and it remained so until the fall of the Taliban in 2001.

With Soviet backing withdrawn, Najibullah rallied the PDPA Army and the party-dominated paramilitary organization called the *Sarandoy*, and successfully beat back the first post-Soviet withdrawal *mujahedin* offensives. Although Najibullah defied expectations that his government would immediately collapse after a Soviet withdrawal, military defections continued and his position weakened in subsequent years. On March 18, 1992, Najibullah publicly agreed to step down once an interim government was formed. That announcement set off a wave of rebellions primarily by Uzbek and Tajik militia commanders in northern Afghanistan—particularly Abdul Rashid Dostam, who joined prominent *mujahedin* commander Ahmad Shah Masud of the Islamic Society, a largely Tajik party headed by Burhannudin Rabbani. Masud had earned a reputation as a brilliant strategist by preventing the Soviets from occupying his power base in the Panjshir Valley of northeastern Afghanistan. Najibullah fell, and the *mujahedin* regime began April 18, 1992.<sup>3</sup> Each year, a public parade is held to mark that day. (Some major *mujahedin* figures did not attend the 2010 celebration because of a perception that they are under Afghan and international criticism of their immunity from alleged human rights abuses during the anti-Soviet war.)

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<sup>2</sup> For FY1991, Congress reportedly cut covert aid appropriations to the *mujahedin* from \$300 million the previous year to \$250 million, with half the aid withheld until the second half of the fiscal year. See “Country Fact Sheet: Afghanistan,” in *U.S. Department of State Dispatch*, vol. 5, no. 23 (June 6, 1994), p. 377.

<sup>3</sup> After failing to flee, Najibullah, his brother, and aides remained at a U.N. facility in Kabul until the Taliban movement seized control in 1996 and hanged them.

**Table I. Comparative Social and Economic Statistics**

Population	28 million +. Kabul population is 3 million, up from 500,000 in Taliban era.
Ethnicities/Religions	Pashtun 42%; Tajik 27%; Uzbek 9%; Hazara 9%; Aimak 4%; Turkmen 3%; Baluch 2%.
Size of Religious Minorities	Religions: Sunni (Hanafi school) 80%; Shiite (Hazaras, Qizilbash, and Isma'ilis) 19%; other 1% Christians-estimated 500-8,000 persons; Sikh and Hindu-3,000 persons; Bahai's-400 (declared blasphemous in May 2007); Jews-1 person; Buddhist- small numbers, mostly foreigners. No Christian or Jewish schools. One church.
Literacy Rate	28% of population over 15 years of age. 43% of males; 12.6% of females.
GDP and Growth Rates (2010)	\$29.8 billion purchasing power parity (PPP). 109 <sup>th</sup> in the world. Per capita: \$1,000 purchasing power parity. 212 <sup>th</sup> in the world. Growth: about 9% for 2010 and expected for 2011. GDP was about \$10 billion (PPP) during last year of Taliban rule.
Unemployment Rate	40%
Children in School/Schools Built since 2002	7.1 million, of which 40% are girls. Up from 900,000 boys in school during Taliban era. 4,000 schools built (all donors) and 140,000 teachers hired since Taliban era. 17 universities, up from 2 in 2002. 75,000 Afghans in universities in Afghanistan; 5,000 when Taliban was in power. 35% of university students in Afghanistan are female.
Afghans With Access to Health Coverage	65% with basic health services access-compared to 8% during Taliban era. Infant mortality down 22% since Taliban to 135 per 1,000 live births. 680 clinics built .
Roads Built	About 2,500 miles paved post-Taliban, including repaving of "Ring Road" (78% complete) that circles the country. Kabul-Qandahar drive reduced to 6 hours.
Judges/Courts	Over 1,000 judges (incl. 200 women) trained since fall of Taliban.
Banks Operating	17, including branches in some rural areas, but about 90% of the population still use <i>hawalas</i> (informal money transfer services). Zero banks existed during Taliban era. Some limited credit card use. Some Afghan police now paid by cell phone (E-Paisa).
Access to Electricity	15%-20% of the population. Much of its electricity imported from neighboring states.
Government Revenues (excl. donor funds)	About \$1.7 billion in 2010; more than double the \$720 million 2007. Total Afghan budget is about \$4.5 billion (including development funds)—shortfall covered by foreign donors, including through Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund.
Financial Reserves/Debt	About \$4.4 billion, up from \$180 million in 2002. Includes amounts due Central Bank. \$8 billion bilateral debt, plus \$500 million multilateral. U.S. forgave \$108 million in debt in 2004, and \$1.6 billion forgiven by other creditors in March 2010.
Foreign/Private Investment	About \$500 million to \$1 billion per year. Four Afghan airlines: Ariana (national) plus at least two privately owned: Safi and Kam. Turkish Air and India Air fly to Kabul.
Mining/Minerals	Vast untapped minerals affirmed by U.S. experts (June 2010). Chinese firm mining copper in Lowgar Province. December 2010: contracts let to produce oil in Sar-I-Pol Province (north) and for private investors to mine gold in Baghlan Province.
Legal Exports/ Agriculture	80% of the population is involved in agriculture. Self-sufficiency in wheat production as of May 2009 (first time in 30 years). Exports: \$403 million (2009): fruits, raisins, melons, pomegranate juice (Anar), nuts, carpets, lapis lazuli gems, marble tile, timber products (Kunar, Nuristan provinces). July 2010 Afghanistan-Pakistan trade agreement.
Imports	Imports: \$3.4 billion (2009): food, energy, capital goods, textiles, autos. Top five trading partners (in descending order): Pakistan, Russia, Iran, India, United States.
Oil Proven Reserves	3.6 billion barrels of oil, 36.5 trillion cubic feet of gas. Current oil production negligible, but USAID funding project to revive oil and gas facilities in the north.
Cellphones/Tourism	About 6.5 million cellphone subscribers, up from negligible amounts during Taliban era. Tourism: National park opened in Bamiyan June 2009. Increasing tourist visits.

**Sources:** CIA, *The World Factbook*; various press and U.S. government official testimony.

## **The *Mujahedin* Government and Rise of the Taliban**

The fall of Najibullah exposed the differences among the *mujahedin* parties. The leader of one of the smaller parties (Afghan National Liberation Front), Islamic scholar Sibghatullah Mojadeddi, was president during April-May 1992. Under an agreement among the major parties, Rabbani became President in June 1992 with agreement that he would serve until December 1994. He refused to step down at that time, saying that political authority would disintegrate without a clear successor. Kabul was subsequently shelled by other *mujahedin* factions, particularly that of nominal “Prime Minister” Gulbuddin Hikmatyar, a Pashtun, who accused Rabbani of monopolizing power. Hikmatyar, who never formally assumed a working prime ministerial role in Kabul because of suspicions of Rabbani, was purportedly backed by Pakistan. Hikmatyar’s radical faction of the Islamist Hizb-e-Islami (Islamic Party) had received a large proportion of the U.S. aid during the anti-Soviet war.

Yunus Khalis, an Islamic cleric, led a more moderate Hizb-e-Islami *mujahedin* party during that war, although Khalis turned anti-U.S. in the mid-1990s. Taliban leader Mullah Umar was a fighter in Khalis’s party during the anti-Soviet war. Khalis died in 2006.

In 1993-1994, Afghan Islamic clerics and students, mostly of rural, Pashtun origin, formed the Taliban movement. Many were former *mujahedin* who had become disillusioned with conflict among *mujahedin* parties and had moved into Pakistan to study in Islamic seminaries (“madrassas”) mainly of the “Deobandi” school of Islam.<sup>4</sup> Some say this interpretation of Islam is similar to the “Wahhabism” that is practiced in Saudi Arabia. Taliban practices were also consonant with conservative Pashtun tribal traditions.

The Taliban viewed the Rabbani government as corrupt and anti-Pashtun, and the four years of civil war (1992-1996) created popular support for the Taliban as able to deliver stability. With the help of defections, the Taliban peacefully took control of the southern city of Qandahar in November 1994. By February 1995, it was approaching Kabul, after which an 18-month stalemate ensued. In September 1995, the Taliban captured Herat province, bordering Iran, and imprisoned its governor, Ismail Khan, ally of Rabbani and Masud, who later escaped and took refuge in Iran. In September 1996, new Taliban victories near Kabul led to the withdrawal of Rabbani and Masud to the Panjshir Valley north of Kabul with most of their heavy weapons; the Taliban took control of Kabul on September 27, 1996. Taliban gunmen subsequently entered a U.N. facility in Kabul to seize Najibullah, his brother, and aides, and then hanged them.

## **Taliban Rule (September 1996-November 2001)**

The Taliban regime was led by Mullah Muhammad Umar, who lost an eye in the anti-Soviet war while fighting as part of the Hizb-e-Islami *mujahedin* party of Yunis Khalis. Umar held the title of Head of State and “Commander of the Faithful,” remaining in the Taliban power base in Qandahar and almost never appearing in public, although he did occasionally receive high-level foreign officials. Umar forged a political and personal bond with bin Laden and refused U.S. demands to extradite him. Like Umar, most of the senior figures in the Taliban regime were

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<sup>4</sup> The Deobandi school began in 1867 in a seminary in Uttar Pradesh, in British-controlled India, that was set up to train Islamic clerics and to counter the British educational model.

Ghilzai Pashtuns, which predominate in eastern Afghanistan. They are rivals of the Durrani Pashtuns, who are predominant in the south.

The Taliban progressively lost international and domestic support as it imposed strict adherence to Islamic customs in areas it controlled and employed harsh punishments, including executions. The Taliban authorized its “Ministry for the Promotion of Virtue and the Suppression of Vice,” headed by Maulvi Qalamuddin, to use physical punishments to enforce strict Islamic practices, including bans on television, Western music, and dancing. It prohibited women from attending school or working outside the home, except in health care, and it publicly executed some women for adultery. In what many consider its most extreme action, and which some say was urged by bin Laden, in March 2001 the Taliban blew up two large Buddha statues carved into hills above Bamiyan city, considering them idols.

The Clinton Administration held talks with the Taliban before and after it took power, but was unable to moderate its policies. The United States withheld recognition of Taliban as the legitimate government of Afghanistan, formally recognizing no faction as the government. The United Nations continued to seat representatives of the Rabbani government, not the Taliban. The State Department ordered the Afghan embassy in Washington, DC, closed in August 1997. U.N. Security Council Resolution 1193 (August 28, 1998) and 1214 (December 8, 1998) urged the Taliban to end discrimination against women. Women’s rights groups urged the Clinton Administration not to recognize the Taliban government. In May 1999, the Senate-passed S.Res. 68 called on the President not to recognize an Afghan government that oppresses women.

## **U.S. Efforts Against Al Qaeda During Taliban Rule**

The Taliban’s hosting of Al Qaeda’s leadership gradually became the Clinton Administration’s overriding agenda item with Afghanistan. In April 1998, then U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Bill Richardson (along with Assistant Secretary of State Karl Inderfurth and NSC senior official Bruce Riedel) visited Afghanistan, but the Taliban refused to hand over bin Laden. They did not meet Mullah Umar. After the August 7, 1998, Al Qaeda bombings of U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, the Clinton Administration progressively pressured the Taliban, imposing U.S. sanctions and achieving adoption of some U.N. sanctions as well. On August 20, 1998, the United States fired cruise missiles at alleged Al Qaeda training camps in eastern Afghanistan, but bin Laden was not hit.<sup>5</sup> Some observers assert that the Administration missed several clearer opportunities to strike him, including a purported sighting of him by an unarmed Predator drone at the Tarnak Farm camp in Afghanistan in the fall of 2000.<sup>6</sup> Clinton Administration officials said that domestic and international support for ousting the Taliban militarily was lacking.

## **The “Northern Alliance” Congeals**

The Taliban’s policies caused different Afghan factions to ally with the ousted President Rabbani and Masud and their ally in the Herat area, Ismail Khan—the Tajik core of the anti-Taliban opposition—into a broader “Northern Alliance.” In the Alliance were Uzbek, Hazara Shiite, and even some Pashtun Islamist factions discussed in **Table 6**. Virtually all the figures mentioned

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<sup>5</sup> A pharmaceutical plant in Sudan (Al Shifa) believe to be producing chemical weapons for Al Qaeda also was struck that day, although U.S. reviews later corroborated Sudan’s assertions that the plant was strictly civilian in nature.

<sup>6</sup> <http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/4540958>.

remain key players in politics in Afghanistan, sometimes allied with and at other times feuding with President Hamid Karzai. (For more information on many of these figures, see CRS Report RS21922.)

- **Uzbeks/General Dostam.** One major faction was the Uzbek militia (the Junbush-Melli, or National Islamic Movement of Afghanistan) of General Abdul Rashid Dostam. Frequently referred to by some Afghans as one of the “warlords” who gained power during the anti-Soviet war, Dostam first joined those seeking to oust Rabbani during his 1992-1996 presidency, but later joined Rabbani’s Northern Alliance against the Taliban.
- **Hazara Shiites.** Members of Hazara tribes, mostly Shiite Muslims, are prominent in Bamiyan, Dai Kundi, and Ghazni provinces (central Afghanistan) and are always fearful of, and subject to some extent to, repression by Pashtuns and other larger ethnic factions. The Hazaras have tended to serve in working class and domestic household jobs, although more recently they have been prominent in technology jobs in Kabul, raising their economic status. They are also increasingly cohesive politically, leading to gains in the September 2010 parliamentary elections. During the various Afghan wars, the main Hazara Shiite militia was Hizb-e-Wahdat (Unity Party, composed of eight different groups). Hizb-e-Wahdat suffered a major setback in 1995 when the Taliban captured and killed its leader Abdul Ali Mazari. One of Karzai’s vice president’s Karim Khalili, is a Hazara. Another prominent Hazara faction leader is Mohammad Mohaqeq.
- **Pashtun Islamists/Sayyaf.** Abd-i-Rab Rasul Sayyaf, now a leading Islamic conservative in parliament, headed a Pashtun-dominated hardline Islamist *mujahedin* faction called the Islamic Union for the Liberation of Afghanistan (*Ittihad Islami*) during the anti-Soviet war. Even though he is an Islamist conservative, Sayyaf viewed the Taliban as selling out Afghanistan to Al Qaeda and he joined the Northern Alliance.

## **Policy Pre-September 11, 2001**

Throughout 2001, but prior to the September 11 attacks, Bush Administration policy differed little from Clinton Administration policy—applying economic and political pressure while retaining dialogue with the Taliban, and refraining from militarily assisting the Northern Alliance. The September 11 Commission report said that, in the months prior to the September 11 attacks, Administration officials leaned toward such a step and that some officials also wanted to assist ethnic Pashtuns who were opposed to the Taliban. Other covert options were reportedly under consideration as well.<sup>7</sup> In a departure from Clinton Administration policy, the Bush Administration stepped up engagement with Pakistan to try to reduce its support for the Taliban. At that time, there were allegations that Pakistani advisers were helping the Taliban in their fight against the Northern Alliance. In accordance with U.N. Security Council Resolution 1333, in February 2001 the State Department ordered the Taliban representative office in New York

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<sup>7</sup> Drogin, Bob. “U.S. Had Plan for Covert Afghan Options Before 9/11.” *Los Angeles Times*, May 18, 2002.

closed, although Taliban representative Abdul Hakim Mujahid continued to operate informally.<sup>8</sup> In March 2001, Administration officials received a Taliban envoy to discuss bilateral issues.

Even though the Northern Alliance was supplied with Iranian, Russian, and Indian financial and military support—all of whom had different motives for that support—the Northern Alliance nonetheless continued to lose ground to the Taliban after it lost Kabul in 1996. By the time of the September 11 attacks, the Taliban controlled at least 75% of the country, including almost all provincial capitals. The Alliance suffered a major setback on September 9, 2001 (two days before, and possibly an integral part of, the September 11 attacks), when Ahmad Shah Masud was assassinated by Al Qaeda operatives posing as journalists. He was succeeded by his intelligence chief, Muhammad Fahim,<sup>9</sup> a veteran figure but one who lacked Masud's undisputed authority.

### **September 11 Attacks and Operation Enduring Freedom**

After the September 11 attacks, the Bush Administration decided to militarily overthrow the Taliban when it refused a final U.S. offer to extradite bin Laden in order to avoid military action. President Bush articulated a policy that equated those who harbor terrorists to terrorists themselves, and judged that a friendly regime in Kabul was needed to enable U.S. forces to search for Al Qaeda personnel there. The Administration sought and obtained U.N. backing: U.N. Security Council Resolution 1368 of September 12, 2001, said that the Council

expresses its readiness to take all necessary steps to respond (implying force) to the September 11 attacks.

This was widely interpreted as a U.N. authorization for military action in response to the attacks, but it did not explicitly authorize Operation Enduring Freedom to oust the Taliban. Nor did the Resolution specifically reference Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter, which allows for responses to threats to international peace and security.

In Congress, S.J.Res. 23 (passed 98-0 in the Senate and with no objections in the House, P.L. 107-40, signed September 18, 2001), was somewhat more explicit than the U.N. Resolution, authorizing<sup>10</sup>

all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001 *or harbored such organizations or persons*.

Major combat in Afghanistan (Operation Enduring Freedom, OEF) began on October 7, 2001. It consisted primarily of U.S. air-strikes on Taliban and Al Qaeda forces, facilitated by the cooperation between small numbers (about 1,000) of U.S. special operations forces and CIA operatives. The purpose of these operations was to help the Northern Alliance and Pashtun anti-Taliban forces by providing information to direct U.S. air strikes against Taliban positions. In part, the U.S. forces and operatives worked with such Northern Alliance contacts as Fahim and

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<sup>8</sup> Mujahid has reconciled with the current Afghan government, and serves as one of the deputy leaders of the 70 member High Council on political reconciliation.

<sup>9</sup> Some Afghan sources refer to him by the name “Fahim Khan,” or “Marshal Fahim.”

<sup>10</sup> Another law (P.L. 107-148) established a “Radio Free Afghanistan” under RFE/RL, providing \$17 million in funding for it for FY2002.

Amrollah Saleh, who during November 2001–June 2010 served as Afghanistan’s intelligence director, to weaken Taliban defenses on the Shomali plain north of Kabul (and just south of Bagram Airfield. That airfield marked the forward position of the Northern Alliance during Taliban rule). Some U.S. combat units (about 1,300 Marines) moved into Afghanistan to pressure the Taliban around Qandahar at the height of the fighting (October–December 2001), but there were few pitched battles between U.S. and Taliban soldiers.

The Taliban regime unraveled rapidly after it lost Mazar-e-Sharif on November 9, 2001, to forces led by Dostam.<sup>11</sup> Other, mainly Tajik, Northern Alliance forces—the commanders of which had initially promised then-Secretary of State Colin Powell that they would not enter Kabul—entered the capital on November 12, 2001, to popular jubilation. The Taliban subsequently lost the south and east to U.S.-supported Pashtun leaders, including Hamid Karzai. The end of the Taliban regime is generally dated as December 9, 2001, when the Taliban surrendered Qandahar and Mullah Umar fled the city, leaving it under tribal law administered by Pashtun leaders such as the Noorzai clan.

Subsequently, U.S. and Afghan forces conducted “Operation Anaconda” in the Shah-i-Kot Valley south of Gardez (Paktia Province) during March 2–19, 2002, against 800 Al Qaeda and Taliban fighters. In March 2003, about 1,000 U.S. troops raided suspected Taliban or Al Qaeda fighters in villages around Qandahar (Operation Valiant Strike). On May 1, 2003, Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld announced an end to “major combat.”

## **Post-Taliban Governance-Building Efforts<sup>12</sup>**

With Afghanistan devastated after more than 20 years of warfare by the time of the 2001 fall of the Taliban regime, there were questions about the extent of a U.S. and international commitment to Afghanistan. Taking the view that leaving the region after the 1989 Soviet pullout allowed Afghanistan to degenerate into chaos, the Bush Administration decided to try to build a relatively strong Afghan central government and economy. The effort, which many outside experts described as “nation-building,” was supported by major international institutions and U.S. partners in several post-Taliban international meetings.

The Obama Administration’s strategy review in late 2009, the results of which were announced on December 1, 2009, narrowed official U.S. goals to preventing terrorism safe haven in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Subsequent policy reviews did not alter that stance,<sup>13</sup> but the elements of Obama Administration strategy during 2009–2011 continued, or in some cases, expanded the nation-building programs put in place by the Bush Administration. The task has proved slower and more difficult than anticipated because of the devastation that years of war wrought on governing institutions, on the education system, and on the already limited infrastructure. Some observers believe the international community had unrealistic expectations of what could be achieved in a relatively short time frame.

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<sup>11</sup> In the process, Dostam captured Taliban fighters and imprisoned them in freight containers, causing many to suffocate. They were buried in a mass grave at *Dasht-e-Laili*.

<sup>12</sup> See also CRS Report RS21922, *Afghanistan: Politics, Elections, and Government Performance*, by Kenneth Katzman, which covers the issues in this section in substantially greater depth.

<sup>13</sup> Text of the released summary is at <http://documents.nytimes.com/the-obama-administrations-overview-on-afghanistan-and-pakistan>.

## Post-Taliban Political Transition Process

**Table 2** depicts, in brief, the process and events that led to the formation of the post-Taliban government of Afghanistan. For more detail, see CRS Report RS21922, *Afghanistan: Politics, Elections, and Government Performance*.

**Table 2. Afghanistan Political Transition Process**

Interim Administration	Formed by Bonn Agreement. Headed by Hamid Karzai, an ethnic Pashtun, but key security positions dominated by mostly minority “Northern Alliance.” Karzai reaffirmed as leader by June 2002 “emergency <i>loya jirga</i> .” (A <i>jirga</i> is a traditional Afghan assembly).
Constitution	Approved by January 2004 “Constitutional <i>Loya Jirga</i> ” (CLJ). Set up strong presidency, a rebuke to Northern Alliance that wanted prime ministership to balance presidential power, but gave parliament significant powers to compensate. Gives men and women equal rights under the law, allows for political parties as long as they are not “un-Islamic;” allows for court rulings according to Hanafi (Sunni) Islam (Chapter 7, Article 15). Set out electoral roadmap for simultaneous (if possible) presidential, provincial, and district elections by June 2004. Named ex-King Zahir Shah to non-hereditary position of “Father of the Nation;” he died July 23, 2007.
Presidential Election	Elections for President and two vice presidents, for 5-year term, held Oct. 9, 2004. Turnout was 80% of 10.5 million registered. Karzai and running mates (Ahmad Zia Masud, a Tajik and brother of legendary <i>mujahedin</i> commander Ahmad Shah Masud, who was assassinated by Al Qaeda two days before the Sept. 11 attacks, and Karim Khalili, a Hazara) elected with 55% against 16 opponents. Second highest vote getter, Northern Alliance figure (and Education Minister) Yunus Qanooni (16%). One female ran. Funded with \$90 million from donors, including \$40 million from U.S. (FY2004, P.L. 108-106).
First Parliamentary Elections	Elections held Sept. 18, 2005, on “Single Non-Transferable Vote” System; candidates stood as individuals, not in party list. Parliament consists of a 249 elected lower house ( <i>Wolesi Jirga</i> , House of the People) and a selected 102 seat upper house ( <i>Meshrano Jirga</i> , House of Elders). 2,815 candidates for <i>Wolesi Jirga</i> , including 347 women. Turnout was 57% (6.8 million voters) of 12.5 million registered. Upper house is appointed by Karzai (34 seats, half of which are to be women), and by the provincial councils (68 seats). When district councils are elected, they will appoint 34 of the seats. Funded by \$160 million in international aid, including \$45 million from U.S. (FY2005 supplemental, P.L. 109-13).
First Provincial Elections/ District Elections	Provincial elections held Sept. 18, 2005, simultaneous with parliamentary elections. Exact powers vague, but now taking lead in deciding local reconstruction Provincial council sizes range from 9 to the 29 seats on the Kabul provincial council. Total seats are 420, of which 121 held by women. 13,185 candidates, including 279 women. District elections not held due to complexity and potential tensions of drawing district boundaries.
Second Presidential/Provincial Elections Parliamentary Elections	Presidential and provincial elections were held Aug. 20, 2009, but required a runoff because no candidate received over 50% in certified results issued October 20. Second round not held because Dr. Abdullah, pulled out of runoff. Election costs: \$300 million. Originally set for May 22, 2010; held September 18, 2010. Results disputed, but agreement reached for Karzai inaugurate new lower house on January 26, 2011, six days after original date. 70 women elected, two more than quota. Speaker selected on February 27, Abdul Raouf Ibrahim, an ethnic Uzbek. Special tribunal set up to investigate results and on June 23 ruled that 62 results be altered, prompting a backlash from those who might be deprived of seats and threats of impeaching Karzai. Crisis eased on August 11, 2011, when Karzai disbanded special tribunal and announced that only the election bodies have standing to overturn results. Independent Election Commission announced August 21 that nine lower house winners would be unseated for fraud. For the upper house, 68 seats council are appointed to four year terms by the elected provincial councils in each of Afghanistan’s 34 provinces, and remain in office. Karzai made his 34 appointments on February 19. The speaker of that body is Muslim Year (a Pashtun).
Third Presidential Election	To be held in 2014. In August, 2011, Karzai told the National Assembly he will not seek to alter the constitution to allow him to run again (the constitution permits only two consecutive terms).



## Major Governance Issues

Building the capacity of and reforming Afghan governance has been consistently and widely judged to be key to the success of U.S. policy. This has been stated explicitly in each Obama Administration policy review, strategy statement, and report on progress in Afghanistan. The centrality of governance was emphasized at the two major international conferences on Afghanistan in 2010—the January 28, 2010, “London Conference” and the July 20, 2010, “Kabul Conference.”<sup>14</sup> This issue is expected to be a focus of an international conference on Afghanistan—to be chaired and organized by the Afghan government—in Bonn in December 2011, the 10<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the Bonn Agreement that began the post-Taliban political transition. Although the issue of governance is inseparable from that of securing Afghanistan, the sections below briefly outline Afghan-generated and international community-led efforts to build Afghanistan’s governing capacity. The issues below are covered extensively in CRS Report RS21922, *Afghanistan: Politics, Elections, and Government Performance*, by Kenneth Katzman.

### “Warlords”

Governing Afghanistan is complicated by the continuing influence of local strongmen (often referred to as “warlords”), many of whom wield personal militias or have other indirect influence. Although U.S. policy has been to build up Afghanistan’s government as a monopoly of authority, in some cases U.S. and Afghan government officials have worked with faction leaders to stabilize areas of Afghanistan. Several of these figures are discussed in CRS Report RS21922.

### Anti-Corruption

U.S. officials believe that rife corruption at all levels of the Afghan government has undermined U.S. domestic support for the U.S. mission in Afghanistan, and caused the Afghan population to sour on the Karzai government. Therefore, a trend in U.S. policy—and emphasized in every Obama Administration strategy review as well as by many in Congress—has been to press Karzai to confront governmental corruption. One reported decision of the Administration in late 2010 was to focus on lower level corruption rather than investigations of senior Afghans or Afghans close to President Karzai. Doing so in 2009 and early 2010 had proved counter-productive by causing Karzai to become suspicious of U.S. intent and to ally with undemocratic elements in Afghanistan. A major corruption-related issue that has caused tensions between the United States and the Afghan government is the scandal surrounding concessionary lending to allies of senior government figures by the Kabul Bank, an issue that has led to the suspension of the IMF aid program and related withholding of some donor funds. Some observers believe that international attention to reducing corruption may fade during the course of the 2011-2014 transition to Afghan leadership. The FY2011 appropriation (P.L. 112-10, Section 2122) contains strict requirements for Afghanistan to take steps against corruption as a condition of receiving U.S. aid funds.

### Expanding Local Governance

In part because building the central government has gone slowly and because official corruption is widespread, there has been a U.S. shift, predating the Obama Administration, toward promoting

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<sup>14</sup> A draft of the final communiqué of the Kabul Conference is at [http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20100720.ap\\_on\\_re\\_as/as\\_afghanistan/print](http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20100720.ap_on_re_as/as_afghanistan/print).

local governance. Some argue that, in addition to offering the advantage of bypassing an often corrupt central government, doing so is more compatible with Afghan traditions of local autonomy. Building local governance has suffered from a deficit of trained and respected Afghan administrators ready or willing to serve, particularly where hostilities are ongoing. On the other hand, the DOD report on stability in Afghanistan, covering late 2010 and early 2011, reports that governance is emerging or taking root in large portions of districts that have been the focus of U.S. and NATO stability operations in 2010.<sup>15</sup> The slow pace of progress accounts for many of the uncertainties clouding the prospects for transition to Afghan security leadership by the end of 2014.

### **Human Rights and Democracy/Women's Rights**

The Administration and Afghan government claim progress in building a democratic Afghanistan that adheres to international standards of human rights practices. The State Department report on human rights practices for 2010 (released April 8, 2011)<sup>16</sup> presented a substantial list of human rights deficiencies in Afghanistan, including extra-judiciary killings, torture, arbitrary arrest and detention, restriction on freedom of the press, limits on freedom of assembly, official corruption, violence against women, sexual abuse of children, child labor, and abuse of workers rights. Still, the report attributes many of the shortfalls to the overall state of continued conflict and virtually all observers agree that Afghans are freer than they were under the Taliban.

A major debate is over whether gains made by women since the fall of the Taliban can be sustained as the U.S.-led coalition transitions to Afghan leadership and, particularly if there is an overall political settlement between the government and insurgent leaders. Women enjoy legal protections and play public roles unheard of during the Taliban era, although conservatives attitudes prevail and often undermine the intentions of formal laws and regulations. These issues are covered in substantial depth in CRS Report RS21922.

### **Narcotics Trafficking/Insurgent Financing<sup>17</sup>**

Narcotics trafficking is regarded by some as a core impediment to the U.S. mission in Afghanistan by undermining rule of law and providing funds to the insurgency. It is an area on which there has been progress in recent years, although there are questions whether progress is sustainable. The trafficking is said to generate an estimated \$70 million–\$100 million per year for the Taliban. A UNODC report of September 2010, continued a relatively positive trend in reporting on this issue, noting that all of the 20 provinces (out of 34 provinces in Afghanistan) in the “poppy free” category remain that way. Total production in 2010 was estimated at 3,600 metric tons, a 48% decrease from 2009, although this was due to a crop disease, for the most part.<sup>18</sup> The UNODC winter survey, released April 19, 2011, said that the price for opium increased dramatically in late 2010, and that there is likely to be a rise in cultivation in northern and western Afghanistan, with several “poppy free” provinces likely to fall out of that category.

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<sup>15</sup> [http://www.defense.gov/news/1230\\_1231Report.pdf](http://www.defense.gov/news/1230_1231Report.pdf).

<sup>16</sup> For text, see <http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2010/sca/154477.htm>.

<sup>17</sup> For a detailed discussion and U.S. funding on the issue, see CRS Report RL32686, *Afghanistan: Narcotics and U.S. Policy*, by Christopher M. Blanchard.

<sup>18</sup> UNDOC. Opium Survey 2010. [http://www.unodc.org/documents/crop-monitoring/Afghanistan/Afg\\_opium\\_survey\\_2010\\_exsum\\_web.pdf](http://www.unodc.org/documents/crop-monitoring/Afghanistan/Afg_opium_survey_2010_exsum_web.pdf)

The Obama Administration approach focuses on promoting legitimate agricultural alternatives to poppy growing—and that sector is discussed extensively later in this paper—in line with Afghan government preferences. In July 2009, the United States ended its prior focus on eradication of poppy fields on the grounds that this practice was driving Afghans into the arms of the Taliban as protectors of their ability to earn a living. The de-emphasis on eradication also put aside the long-standing differences over whether to conduct aerial spraying of fields; that concept was strenuously opposed by Karzai and not implemented. Congress sided with Karzai's view; the successive annual appropriations laws since FY2008 have prohibited U.S. counter-narcotics funding from being used for aerial spraying on Afghanistan poppy fields without Afghan concurrence. Other policies, such as “good governance” U.S.-funded bonuses, give an incentive to provinces to actively work against cultivation.

How consistently to use U.S. and NATO forces to combat narcotics has been under almost constant debate. Britain's forces, for example, focus on interdicting traffickers and raiding drug labs. The U.S. military, in support of the effort after initial reluctance, is flying Afghan and U.S. counter-narcotics agents (Drug Enforcement Agency, DEA) on missions and identifying targets; it also evacuates casualties from counter-drug operations and assists an Afghan helicopter squadron to move Afghan counter-narcotics forces around the country. To help break up narcotics trafficking networks, the DEA presence in Afghanistan is has expanded from 13 agents in 2008 to over 80 in Afghanistan by the start of 2011.

The Obama Administration has placed additional focus on the other sources of Taliban funding, including continued donations from wealthy residents of the Persian Gulf. It established a multinational task force to combat Taliban financing generally, not limited to narcotics, and U.S. officials are emphasizing with Persian Gulf counterparts the need for cooperation.

The Bush and Obama Administrations have exercised waiver provisions to required certifications of full Afghan cooperation needed to provide more than congressionally stipulated amounts of U.S. economic assistance to Afghanistan. A certification requirement (to provide amounts over \$300 million) was contained in the FY2008 appropriation (P.L. 110-161); in the FY2009 regular appropriation, P.L. 111-8 (\$200 million ceiling); and the FY2010 appropriation, P.L. 111-117, (\$200 million ceiling). The FY2009 supplemental (P.L. 111-32) withheld 10% of State Department narcotics funding (International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement, INCLE) pending a report that Afghanistan is removing officials involved in narcotics trafficking or gross human rights violations. No specific counter-narcotics requirement was in the FY2011 appropriation (P.L. 112-10) although there are more general certification requirements that Afghanistan is taking steps to eliminate official corruption. No funds for Afghanistan have been held up on these grounds. Narcotics trafficking control was perhaps the one issue on which the Taliban regime satisfied much of the international community. However, cultivation flourished in provinces under Northern Alliance control, such as Badakhshan.

## **Civilian Policy Structure**

Building the capacity of the Afghan government, and helping it develop economically, is primarily, although not exclusively, the purview of U.S. and international civilian officials and institutions. In line with the prioritization of Afghanistan policy, in February 2009, the Administration set up the position of appointed “Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan” (SRAP), occupied first by Ambassador Richard Holbrooke, reporting to Secretary of State Clinton. Holbrooke died on December 13, 2010, but his team at the State Department, led as of February 2011 by Ambassador Marc Grossman, remains largely intact, consisting mainly of

members detailed from several different agencies; several have long-term experience on Afghanistan and Pakistan affairs.

At the U.S. Embassy in Kabul, Karl Eikenberry, who served as commander of U.S. forces in Afghanistan during 2004-2005, was U.S. Ambassador from 2009 until his replacement by Ambassador Ryan Crocker on July 25, 2011. Crocker is expected to improve the embassy's relations with President Karzai – relations that suffered partly because of Ambassador Eikenberry's blunt criticisms of the Karzai government's shortcomings. There is a "deputy Ambassador" (currently State Department official David Pearce) and separate Ambassador rank officials to manage U.S. economic assistance issues and to oversee Embassy operations. Another official of Ambassador rank, Hans Klemm, (as of June 2010) coordinates U.S. rule of law programs. Ambassador Timothy Carney oversaw U.S. policy for the 2009 elections.

The U.S. Embassy has progressively expanded its personnel and facilities to accommodate the additional civilian hires and Foreign Service officers who have been posted to Afghanistan since 2009 as mentors and advisers to the Afghan government. U.S. officials say there are more than 1,130 U.S. civilian officials in Afghanistan, as of June 2011, up from only about 400 in early 2009. Of these at least 400 serve outside Kabul as part of initiatives such as the 32 "District Support Teams" and the "District Working Groups." That is up from 67 outside Kabul in 2009.

On February 7, 2010, in an effort to improve civilian coordination between the United States, its foreign partners, and the Afghan government, a NATO "Senior Civilian Representative" in Afghanistan, UK Ambassador Mark Sedwill, took office. This official works not only with U.S. military officials but with representatives of the embassies of partner countries and with a special U.N. Assistance Mission–Afghanistan (UNAMA, see **Table 3**). As of April 15, 2011, Sedwill has been replaced by the former British Ambassador to Iran, Sir Simon Gass. The contribution of the United Nations to enhancing governance and coordinating donors is discussed below.

Afghan Ambassador to the United States, Sayed Tayib Jawad, served as Ambassador from 2004 until his recall in August 2010. He was recalled because of complaints in Kabul about Western-style parties that were being held at the Afghan embassy in the United States, and deputy Foreign Minister Eklil Hakimi has replaced him as of February 23, 2011.

### **Consulates in Mazar-e-Sharif and Herat**

The tables at the end of this report include U.S. funding for State Department and USAID operations, including Embassy construction and running the "Embassy air wing," a fleet of twin-engine turboprops that ferry U.S. officials and contractors around Afghanistan. In a significant development attempting to signal normalization of certain areas of Afghanistan, in early 2010 the United States formally inaugurated U.S. consulates in Herat and Mazar-e-Sharif. In November 2010 contracts were announced for expansion of the U.S. Embassy (\$511 million) and to construct the two consulates (\$20 million for each facility). As discussed below, both cities are in the first tranche of areas to be transitioned to Afghan control.

**Table 3. U.N. Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA)**

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The United Nations is extensively involved in Afghan governance and national building, primarily in factional conflict resolution and coordination of development assistance. The coordinator of U.N. efforts is the U.N. Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA), headed as of March 22, 2010, by Swedish diplomat Staffan de-Mistura, replacing Norwegian diplomat Kai Eide. Mistura formerly played a similar role in Iraq. U.N. Security Council Resolution 1806 of March 20, 2008, expanded UNAMA's authority to coordinating the work of international donors and strengthening cooperation between the international peacekeeping force (ISAF, see below) and the Afghan government. In concert with the Obama Administration's emphasis on Afghan policy, UNAMA is to open offices in as many of Afghanistan's 34 provinces as financially and logistically permissible. (The mandate of UNAMA, was renewed for another year on March 22, 2011 (Resolution 1974).) As did Resolution 1917 the previous year, Resolution 1974 largely restated UNAMA's expanded mandate and coordinating role with other high-level representatives in Afghanistan, and election support role, while referring to UNAMA's role in facilitating the coming transition to Afghan leadership.

In keeping with its expanding role, in 2008 U.S. Ambassador Peter Galbraith was appointed as Eide's deputy, although he left Afghanistan in early September 2009 in a reported dispute with Eide over how vigorously to insist on investigating fraud in the August 20 Afghan election. Galbraith reportedly pressed Afghan and independent election bodies to be as vigorous as possible in the interests of rule of law and election legitimacy; Eide purportedly was willing to encourage an Afghan compromise to avoid a second round run-off. The split led U.N. Secretary General Ban Ki Moon to remove Galbraith from his post at UNAMA in late September 2009 on the grounds that the disharmony was compromising the UNAMA mission. The turmoil may have caused Eide to leave his post when his contract with the U.N. expired in March 2010.

UNAMA is co-chair of the joint Afghan-international community coordination body called the Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board (JCMB), and is helping implement the five-year development strategy outlined in a "London Compact," (now called the Afghanistan Compact) adopted at the January 31-February 1, 2006, London conference on Afghanistan. The priorities developed in that document comport with Afghanistan's own "National Strategy for Development," presented on June 12, 2008, in Paris. During his term, Eide urged the furnishing of additional capacity-building resources, and he complained that some efforts by international donors are redundant or tied to purchases by Western countries. In statements and press conferences, Eide continued to note security deterioration but also progress in governance and in reduction of drug cultivation, and he publicly supported negotiations with Taliban figures to end the war. His final speech before leaving criticized the U.S.-led coalition for focusing too much on military success and not enough on governance. UNAMA also often has been involved in local dispute resolution among factions, and it helps organize elections. Under a March 2010 compromise with Karzai, it nominates two international members of the five person Electoral Complaints Commission (ECC), one fewer than the three it selected under the prior election law. UNAMA was a co-convenor of the January 28, 2010, and July 20, 2010, London and Kabul Conferences, respectively.

The difficulties in coordinating U.N. with U.S. and NATO efforts were evident in a 2007 proposal to create a new position of "super envoy" that would represent the United Nations, the European Union, and NATO in Afghanistan. The concept advanced and in January 2008, with U.S. support, U.N. Secretary General Ban Ki Moon tentatively appointed British diplomat Paddy Ashdown as the "super envoy." However, Karzai rejected the appointment reportedly over concerns about the scope of authority of such an envoy. Ashdown withdrew his name on January 28, 2008. However, the concept reportedly was floated again in late 2009, but was again suppressed by Karzai and others. The NATO senior civilian representative. post, discussed above, appears to represent a step in the direction of improved donor coordination in Afghanistan and streamlining of the foreign representative structure there.

For more information on UNAMA, see CRS Report R40747, *United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan: Background and Policy Issues*, by Rhoda Margesson.

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## **Security Policy and 2011-2014 “Transition”<sup>19</sup>**

Although the formal Obama Administration policy goal is to prevent Afghanistan from again becoming a safe haven for global terrorism, since 2002 the U.S. criteria for judging achievement of that goal has been the degree to which the Afghan government and security force can defend itself, govern effectively, and develop economically. The President’s June 22, 2011, speech on Afghanistan announcing a U.S. troop drawdown makes clear that the Afghan government will increasingly assume the lead on security as the United States reduces its overall level of military effort over the next several years. Until the transition is complete, the basic pillars of U.S. and NATO security strategy that have been in place since 2001 will largely continue. Aside from the civilian advice and aid discussed above and later in this paper, U.S.-led activities have included (1) combat operations by U.S. forces and a NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) to “provide space” for the expansion of Afghan governance, security leadership, and economic development; (2) U.S. and NATO operation of “provincial reconstruction teams” (PRTs) to serve as enclaves to facilitate the strategy; and (3) the equipping, training, and expansion of Afghanistan National Security Forces (ANSF).

## **Who Is “The Enemy”? Taliban, Al Qaeda, and Related Insurgents**

As noted in Defense Department reports on Afghanistan stability, the most recent of which was released on May 3, 2011, security is being challenged by a confluence of related and, to varying degrees, cooperating armed groups whose tactics continue to evolve based on experiences from previous fighting.<sup>20</sup> Of these groups, Al Qaeda has been among the least materially significant to the insurgency in Afghanistan, although it may pose the greatest transnational threat to the United States and its allies. There has not been agreement about the relative strength of insurgents in all of the areas where they operate. U.S. assessments are that there are up to 25,000 total Afghan insurgents operating in Afghanistan, up from a few thousand in 2003.

As far as tactics, U.S. commanders have, prior to mid-2001, worried most about insurgent use of improvised explosive devices (IEDs), including roadside bombs. IED’s are the leading cause of U.S. combat deaths, although the Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization, a part of DOD, reported in February 2011 substantial progress finding IED’s before they explode. In January 2010, President Karzai issued a decree banning importation of fertilizer chemicals (ammonium nitrate) commonly used for the roadside bombs, but there reportedly is informal circumvention of the ban for certain civilian uses, and the material reportedly still comes into Afghanistan from at least two major production plants in Pakistan. U.S. commanders have said they have verified some use of surface-to-air missiles,<sup>21</sup> although it does not appear that sophisticated missiles were involved in the apparent shootdown of a U.S. Chinook helicopter in which about 30 U.S. soldiers (mostly Special forces) were killed on August 6, 2011. Throughout 2011, insurgents appear to have made increasing use of infiltrators within the Afghan security forces, persons impersonating Afghan security personnel, or recruits to their ranks from among aides trusted by Afghan leaders. Afghan officials have tried to increase monitoring over the sale

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<sup>19</sup> Some of the information in this section is taken from Department of Defense. “Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan.” April 2011.

<sup>20</sup> [http://www.defense.gov/news/1230\\_1231Report.pdf](http://www.defense.gov/news/1230_1231Report.pdf).

<sup>21</sup> Major General John Campbell, commander of RC-E, July 28, 2010, press briefing.

of military-style clothing that might be used for such attacks. Other insurgents, particularly in southern Afghanistan, appear to be making increasing use of bombs hidden in turbans, which are generally not searched out of respect for Afghan religious traditions.

### **Groups: The Taliban (“Quetta Shura Taliban”)**

The core of the insurgency remains the Taliban movement centered around Mullah Umar, who led the Taliban regime during 1996-2001. He and many of his top advisers reportedly run the insurgency from their safe haven in Pakistan, possibly the city of Quetta, according to Afghan officials, thus accounting for the term usually applied to Umar and his aides: “Quetta Shura Taliban” (QST). Some, such as Mullah Dadullah, his son Mansoor, and Mullah Usmani have been killed or captured. Others, such as Mullah Hassan Rahmani, former Taliban governor of Qandahar, are said to have come under some Pakistani pressure to refrain from militant activities.

For now still committed to insurgent action, Umar has been making appointments to replenish the QST leadership ranks. When his top deputy, Mullah Bradar was arrested in Pakistan in February 2011, Umar replaced him with younger and reputedly hardline, anti-compromise leaders Mullah Abdul Qayyum Zakir, a U.S. detainee in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba until 2007, and Akhtar Mohammad Mansoor, a logistics expert.<sup>22</sup> The Taliban has several official spokespersons still at large, including Qari Yusuf Ahmadi and Zabiullah Mujahid, and it operates a clandestine radio station, “Voice of Shariat” and publishes videos.

Some believe that Umar and his inner circle blame their past association with Al Qaeda for their loss of power and want to distance themselves from Al Qaeda. Other experts see continuing close association that is likely to continue were the Taliban movement to return to power. It is unclear how this internal Taliban debate might be affected by the death of Al Qaeda founder Osama bin Laden on May 1, 2011. Some within the movement might argue that his removal from the regional picture might lessen international military pressure on the Taliban. Others might argue that his death will lead to a weakening of Al Qaeda in the immediate region and association with Al Qaeda has little value to the Taliban effort. Even before the death of bin Laden, U.S. officials argued that the successes produced by the U.S. “surge” in Afghanistan were causing some Taliban leaders to mull the concept of a political settlement. “Preliminary” talks were reported as of March 2011 with figures purporting to represent the QST, as discussed later in the section on “reconciliation.”

### **Al Qaeda/Bin Laden**

U.S. officials have long considered Al Qaeda to have been largely expelled from Afghanistan itself. This view was enhanced by the May 1, 2011, death of bin Laden. U.S. commanders have, for several years, characterized any Al Qaeda militants in Afghanistan as facilitators of militant incursions into Afghanistan rather than active fighters in the Afghan insurgency. Then-Director of Central Intelligence (now Defense Secretary) Leon Panetta said on June 27, 2010, that Al Qaeda fighters in Afghanistan itself might number 50-100.<sup>23</sup> Contradicting those comments to some extent, NATO/ISAF officials said in October 2010, that Al Qaeda cells may be moving back into

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<sup>22</sup> Ibid.; Moreau, Ron. “New Leaders for the Taliban.” *Newsweek*, January 24, 2011.

<sup>23</sup> Text of the Panetta interview with ABC News is at <http://abcnews.go.com/print?id=11025299>.

remote areas of Kunar and Nuristan provinces,<sup>24</sup> particularly in areas vacated by U.S.-led forces. Press reports in April 2011 added that some Al Qaeda training camps may have been established inside Afghanistan, but then top U.S. and NATO commander in Afghanistan General Petraeus tried to refute these stories on April 10, 2011, by saying that the Al Qaeda presence in Afghanistan remains small at “less than 100 or so.” Some of the Al Qaeda fighters are believed to belong to Al Qaeda affiliates such as the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU).

Until the May 1, 2011, death of bin Laden, there had been frustration within the U.S. government that Al Qaeda’s top leadership had eluded U.S. efforts to capture them. In December 2001, in the course of the post-September 11 major combat effort, U.S. Special Operations Forces and CIA operatives reportedly narrowed Osama bin Laden’s location to the Tora Bora mountains in Nangarhar Province (30 miles west of the Khyber Pass), but the Afghan militia fighters who were the bulk of the fighting force did not prevent his escape. Some U.S. military and intelligence officers (such as Gary Berntsen and Dalton Fury, who have written books on the battle) have questioned the U.S. decision to rely mainly on Afghan forces in this engagement.

U.S. efforts to find Al Qaeda leaders are expected to now focus on his close ally Ayman al-Zawahiri, who is also presumed to be on the Pakistani side of the border and who was named new leader of Al Qaeda in June 2011. CNN reported October 18, 2010, that assessments from the U.S.-led coalition said Zawahiri (and bin Laden) was likely in a settled area near the border with Afghanistan, and not living in a very remote uninhabited area. A U.S. strike reportedly missed Zawahiri by a few hours in the village of Damadola, Pakistan, in January 2006, suggesting that there was intelligence on his movements.<sup>25</sup> Many observers say that Zawahiri is not well liked within Al Qaeda and may have trouble holding the leading figures of the group together.

Other senior Al Qaeda leaders are either in or are allowed to transit or reside in Iran. Among them are Al Qaeda’s former spokesman, Kuwait-born Sulayman Abu Ghaith, as well as Sayf al Adl. The United States has no diplomatic relations with Iran and therefore has no known anti-terrorism operations in Iran, but instead has called on Iran to arrest and submit any Al Qaeda operatives to international authorities for trial.

U.S. efforts in the region have killed numerous senior operatives other than bin Laden. A January 2008 strike near Damadola killed Abu Laith al-Libi, who purportedly masterminded, among other operations, the bombing at Bagram Air Base in February 2007 when Vice President Cheney was visiting. In August 2008, an airstrike was confirmed to have killed Al Qaeda chemical weapons expert Abu Khabab al-Masri, and two senior operatives allegedly involved in the 1998 embassy bombings in Africa reportedly were killed by an unmanned aerial vehicle (Predator) strike in January 2009. Following the killing of bin Laden, another top Al Qaeda leader, Ilyas Kashmiri, was reportedly killed by an armed drone strike in June 2011. Such aerial-based strikes have become more frequent under President Obama, indicating that the Administration sees the tactic as effective in preventing attacks. Unmanned vehicle strikes are also increasingly used on the Afghanistan battlefield itself and against Al Qaeda affiliated militants in such countries as Yemen.

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<sup>24</sup> Dreazen, Yochi. “Al Qaida Returning to Afghanistan for New Attacks.” *Nationaljournal.com*. October 18, 2010.

<sup>25</sup> Gall, Carlotta and Ismail Khan. “U.S. Drone Attack Missed Zawahiri by Hours.” *New York Times*, November 10, 2006.



## **Hikmatyar Faction**

Another “high value target” identified by U.S. commanders is the faction of former *mujahedin* party leader Gulbuddin Hikmatyar (Hizb-e-Islami Gulbuddin, HIG) allied with Al Qaeda and Taliban insurgents. As noted above, Hikmatyar was one of the main U.S.-backed *mujahedin* leaders during the Soviet occupation era. Hikmatyar’s faction received extensive U.S. support against the Soviet Union, but is now active against U.S. and Afghan forces in Kunar, Nuristan, Kapisa, and Nangarhar provinces, north and east of Kabul. On February 19, 2003, the U.S. government formally designated Hikmatyar as a “Specially Designated Global Terrorist,” under the authority of Executive Order 13224, subjecting it to financial and other U.S. sanctions. It is *not* designated as a “Foreign Terrorist Organization” (FTO).

While U.S. commanders continue to battle Hikmatyar’s militia, on March 22, 2010, both the Afghan government and Hikmatyar representatives confirmed they were in talks in Kabul, including meetings with Karzai. Hikmatyar has expressed a willingness to discuss a cease-fire with the Karzai government since 2007, and several of Karzai’s key allies in the National Assembly are members of a moderate wing of Hikmatyar’s party. The newly selected speaker of the lower house, Abdul Raouf Ibrahim, is said to be a member of this group. In January 2010, Hikmatyar outlined specific conditions for a possible reconciliation with Karzai, including elections under a neutral caretaker government following a U.S. withdrawal. Some close to Hikmatyar apparently attended the consultative peace *loya jirga* on June 2-4, 2010, which discussed the reconciliation issue, as analyzed further below.

## **Haqqani Faction<sup>26</sup>**

Another militant faction, cited repeatedly as a major threat to stabilization efforts in Afghanistan, is the “Haqqani Network” led by Jalaludin Haqqani. As a *mujahedin* commander during the U.S.-backed war against the Soviet Union, he was a U.S. ally. He subsequently joined the Taliban regime (1996-2011) and served as Minister of Tribal Affairs in that government. Since the ousting of the Taliban regime in 2001, he has been a staunch opponent of the Karzai government and his faction is believed closer to Al Qaeda than to the ousted Taliban leadership in part because one of his wives is purportedly Arab. Press reports indicate that the few Al Qaeda fighters that are in Afghanistan are mostly embedded with Haqqani fighters. Now led mostly by his sons, Siraj (or Sirajuddin) and Badruddin, the faction is active around its key objective, Khost city, capital of Khost Province. Another Haqqani brother, Mohammad, was reportedly killed by a U.S. unmanned vehicle strike in late February 2010, although Mohammad was not thought to be a key militant commander. On August 16, 2011, the Obama Administration designated a Haqqani member, Mullah Sangeen Zadran, “shadow governor” of Paktika Province, as a specially-designated global terrorist.

Suggesting it may act as a tool of Pakistani interests, the Haqqani network has claimed responsibility for attacks on India’s embassy in Kabul and other India-related targets. It is estimated that there may be as many as 3,000 Haqqani fighters. That the faction has a degree of protection in the North Waziristan area of Pakistan has been a vexing problem for U.S. commanders. Pakistan (particularly its Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate, or ISI) is said to be tacitly protecting the faction as a potential ally in any new Afghan political structure that might be

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<sup>26</sup> A profile of the faction and its activities is provided in: Joshua Partlow. “In Afghan War, Haqqani Group Is ‘Resilient’ Foe.” *Washington Post*, May 30, 2011.

produced by a political settlement in Afghanistan. In addition to pressing Pakistan to deny the group safehaven, U.S. officials say they are continuing to pressure the Haqqani network with military action in Afghanistan and air strikes on the Pakistani side of the border, as well as with direct ground action, such as a raid in late July 2011 that reportedly killed over 80 Haqqani network militants. During a visit to Afghanistan on July 31, 2011, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Mullen said that recent U.S. efforts to prevent the movement of Haqqani fighters from Pakistan into Afghanistan were yielding successes. Pakistan reportedly arrested a minor family member (Nasruddin Haqqani) in December 2010—a possible indication that Pakistan senses U.S. pressure for increased action against the network. However, the faction is viewed as resilient and able to tap a seemingly infinite pool of recruits.

The faction has generally been considered least amenable to a political settlement with the Afghan government, but it is possible that the May 1, 2011, raid that killed Osama bin Laden will reinforce those within the faction who might want to reassess that stance. To facilitate such a reassessment by the faction, in July 2010, General Petraeus advocated that the Haqqani network be named as an FTO under the Immigration and Naturalization Act. Such a move would be intended to signal to Pakistan that it should not continue to support the Haqqani network.<sup>27</sup> In May 2011, there were reports that ISI is pushing the Haqqani network to join nascent settlement talks under way between the Afghan government and other insurgent factions.

## **Pakistani Groups**

The Taliban of Afghanistan are increasingly linked politically and operationally to Pakistani Taliban militants. The Pakistani groups might see a Taliban recapture of Afghanistan's government as helpful to the prospects for these groups inside Pakistan or in their Kashmir struggle. A major Pakistani group, the Pakistani Taliban (Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan, TTP), is primarily seeking to challenge the government of Pakistan, but they facilitate the transiting into Afghanistan of Afghan Taliban and support the Afghan Taliban goals of recapturing Afghanistan. The TTP may also be seeking to target the United States, an assessment based on a failed bombing in New York City in May 2010. The State Department designated the TTP as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) under the Immigration and Naturalization Act on September 2, 2010, allegedly for having close connections to Al Qaeda. Its current leader, Hakimullah Mehsud, was named as terrorism supporting entities that day. (He succeeded Baitullah Mehsud, who was killed in a U.S. drone strike in August 2009.)

Another Pakistani group said to be increasingly active inside Afghanistan is Laskhar-e-Tayyiba (LET, or Army of the Righteous). LET is an Islamist militant group that has previously been focused on operations against Indian control of Kashmir.

## **The U.S.-Led Military Effort: 2001-2008**

To combat the insurgency, in partnership with 49 other countries and the Afghan government and security forces (see **Table 24**), there were about 99,000 U.S. troops in Afghanistan as of the beginning of July 2011 – the height of the U.S. presence. The vast majority operate under NATO/ISAF command, but about 9,000 are part of the post-September 11 anti-terrorism mission

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<sup>27</sup> Jane Perlez, Eric Schmitt, and Carlotta Gall, "Pakistan Is Said to Pursue Foothold in Afghanistan," *New York Times*, June 24, 2010.

Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF). On April 28, 2011, President Obama nominated the top U.S. and NATO commander in Afghanistan, General David Petraeus to become CIA Director, and Lieutenant General John Allen took over the command on July 18. Serving under the top U.S. and NATO/ISAF commander since 2009 was Major General David Rodriguez, who headed a NATO-approved “Intermediate Joint Command” focused primarily on day-to-day operations. Major General Rodriguez was succeeded in July 2011 by Lieutenant General Curtis Scaparrotti.

Prior to the U.S. surge in 2009, most U.S. forces were in eastern Afghanistan and lead Regional Command East of the NATO/ISAF operation. These U.S. forces belong to Combined Joint Task Force 101. The most restive provinces in RC-E are Paktia, Paktika, Khost, Kunar, and Nuristan. Helmand, Qandahar, Uruzgan, Zabol, Nimruz, and Dai Kundi provinces constituted a “Regional Command South (RC-S),” a command formally transferred to NATO/ISAF responsibility on July 31, 2006. The growing U.S. troop strength in RC-S in 2009 and 2010—a product of the fact that most of the 2009-2010 U.S. “surge” was focused on the south—prompted a May 2010 NATO decision to bifurcate RC-S, with the United States leading at first leading a “southwest” subdivision for Helmand and Nimruz. U.S. commanders now lead both RC-S and RC-SW. About 4,000 U.S. forces are under German command in RC-N, headquartered in Konduz.

### **Perception of “Victory” in the First Five Post-Taliban Years**

During 2001 to mid-2006, U.S. forces and Afghan troops fought relatively low levels of insurgent violence with focused combat operations against Taliban concentrations in the south and east. For example, the United States and partner forces conducted “Operation Mountain Viper” (August 2003); “Operation Avalanche” (December 2003); “Operation Mountain Storm” (March-July 2004); “Operation Lightning Freedom” (December 2004–February 2005); and “Operation Pil” (Elephant, October 2005). By late 2005, U.S. and partner commanders appeared to believe that the combat, coupled with overall political and economic reconstruction, had virtually ended any insurgency. Anticipating further stabilization, NATO/ISAF assumed lead responsibility for security in all of Afghanistan during 2005-2006.

Contrary to U.S. expectations, violence increased significantly in mid-2006, particularly in the east and the south, where ethnic Pashtuns predominate. Reasons for the deterioration include some of those discussed above in the sections on governance: Afghan government corruption; the absence of governance or security forces in many rural areas. Other factors included the safe haven enjoyed by militants in Pakistan; the reticence of some NATO contributors to actively combat insurgents; a popular backlash against civilian casualties caused by NATO and U.S. military operations; and the slow pace of economic development. Many Afghans are said to have turned to the Taliban as a source of impartial and rapid justice, in contrast to the slow and corrupt processes instituted by the central government.

### **Perception of Deterioration and Growing Force Levels in 2007 and 2008**

Since 2006, and particularly during 2010, the key theater of implementation of U.S. strategy has been eastern and southern Afghanistan, especially Helmand and Qandahar provinces. NATO counter-offensives during 2006-2008—such as Operation Mountain Lion, Operation Mountain Thrust, and Operation Medusa (August-September 2006, in Panjwai district of Qandahar Province)—cleared key districts but did not prevent subsequent reinfiltration because Afghan governance was not established in cleared areas.

As a further response, NATO and OEF forces tried to apply a more integrated strategy involving preemptive combat and increased development work. Major combat operations in 2007 included U.S. and NATO attempted preemption of an anticipated Taliban “spring offensive” (“Operation Achilles,” March 2007) in the Sangin district of Helmand Province, around the Kajaki dam, and Operation Silicon (May 2007), also in Helmand. (In September 2010, Britain turned over security leadership in Sangin to U.S. forces. That district produced half of Britain’s casualties in Afghanistan to date.)

Despite the additional resources put into Afghanistan, throughout 2008, growing concern took hold within the Bush Administration. Pessimism was reflected in such statements as a September 2008 comment by Joint Chiefs of Staff chairman Admiral Mike Mullen that “I’m not sure we’re winning” in Afghanistan. Several major incidents supported that assessment, including (1) expanding Taliban operations in provinces where it had not previously been active, particularly Lowgar, Wardak, and Kapisa, close to Kabul; (2) high-profile attacks in Kabul, such as the January 14, 2008, attack on the Serena Hotel in Kabul and the July 7, 2008, suicide bombing at the Indian Embassy in Kabul, killing more than 50; (3) the April 27, 2008, assassination attempt on Karzai during a military parade celebrating the ouster of the Soviet Union; and (4) a June 12, 2008, Sarposa prison break in Qandahar, in which several hundred Taliban captives were freed, as part of an emptying of the 1,200 inmates there.

To try to arrest deterioration, the United States and its partners decided to increase force levels. The added forces partly fulfilled a mid-2008 request by General McKiernan for 30,000 additional U.S. troops (beyond the approximately 35,000 there at the time of the request). However, as the November 2008 U.S. presidential election approached, the decision whether to fulfill the entire request was deferred to the next Administration. U.S. troop levels started 2006 at 30,000; climbed slightly to 32,000 by December 2008; and reached 39,000 by April 2009 (shortly after President Obama took office). Partner forces were increased significantly as well, by about 6,000 during this time, to a total of 39,000 at the end of 2009 (rough parity between U.S. and non-U.S. forces). Many of the U.S. forces deployed in 2008 and 2009 were Marines that deployed to Helmand, large parts of which had fallen out of coalition/Afghan control.

In September 2008, the U.S. military and NATO each began strategy reviews. The primary U.S. review was headed by Lieutenant General Douglas Lute, the Bush Administration’s senior adviser on Iraq and Afghanistan (who is in the Obama NSC with responsibility for Afghanistan). These reviews were briefed to the incoming Obama Administration.

## **Obama Administration Policy: March 2009 Policy Announcement/Initial Troop Increase/McChrystal Appointment and Assessment**

The Obama Administration maintained that Afghanistan needed to be given a higher priority than it was during the Bush Administration, but also that the U.S. mission in Afghanistan not be indefinite. The new Administration integrated the reviews under way at the end of the Bush Administration’s into an overarching 60-day inter-agency “strategy review.” It was chaired by South Asia expert Bruce Riedel and co-chaired by Ambassador Holbrooke and Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Michele Flournoy.

Following its initial review, President Obama announced a “comprehensive” strategy on March 27, 2009.<sup>28</sup> In conjunction, he announced the deployment of an additional 21,000 U.S. forces, of which about 4,000 would be trainers. Shortly after the announcement, the Administration decided that U.S. military leadership in Afghanistan was insufficiently innovative. On May 11, 2009, then Secretary of Defense Gates announced that General McKiernan would be replaced by General Stanley McChrystal, considered an innovative commander as head of U.S. Special Operations forces from 2003 to 2008. He assumed command in Afghanistan on June 15, 2009.

General McChrystal, after assuming command, assessed the security situation and suggested a strategy in a report of August 30, 2009, and presented to NATO on August 31, 2009,<sup>29</sup> as follows:

- That the goal of the U.S. military should be to protect the population—and to help the Afghan government take steps to earn the trust of the population—rather than to focus on searching out and combatting Taliban concentrations. Indicators of success such as ease of road travel, participation in local *shuras*, and normal life for families are more significant than counts of enemy fighters killed.
- That there is potential for “mission failure” unless a fully resourced, comprehensive counter-insurgency strategy is pursued and reverses Taliban momentum within 12-18 months. About 44,000 additional U.S. combat troops (beyond those approved by the Obama Administration strategy review in March 2009) would be needed to have the greatest chance for his strategy’s success.

## **Late 2009 Review: “Surge” Coupled With Transition**

The McChrystal assessment set off debate within the Administration and another policy review, taking into account the McChrystal recommendations and the marred August 20, 2009, presidential election. Some senior U.S. officials, such as then Secretary of Defense Gates, were concerned that adding many more U.S. forces could create among the Afghan people a sense of “occupation” that could prove counter-productive. The high-level review included at least nine high-level meetings, chaired by President Obama, and reportedly concluded on November 19, 2009. The President announced his decisions in a speech at West Point military academy on December 1, 2009.<sup>30</sup> The major features of the December 1 statement included the following.

- That 30,000 additional U.S. forces (a “surge”) would be sent (bringing U.S. levels close to 100,000) to “reverse the Taliban’s momentum” and strengthen the capacity of Afghanistan’s security forces and government.
- That there would be a transition, beginning in July 2011, to Afghan leadership of the stabilization effort and a corresponding beginning of a drawdown of U.S. force levels. The July 2011 “deadline” caused significant controversy, as discussed below.

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<sup>28</sup> “White Paper”: [http://www.whitehouse.gov/assets/documents/Afghanistan-Pakistan\\_White\\_Paper.pdf](http://www.whitehouse.gov/assets/documents/Afghanistan-Pakistan_White_Paper.pdf).

<sup>29</sup> Commander NATO International Security Assistance Force, Afghanistan, and U.S. Forces, Afghanistan. “Commander’s Initial Assessment.” August 30, 2009, available at [http://media.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/politics/documents/Assessment\\_Redacted\\_092109.pdf?](http://media.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/politics/documents/Assessment_Redacted_092109.pdf?)

<sup>30</sup> President Obama speech, op. cit. Testimony of Secretary Gates, Secretary Clinton, and Admiral Mullen before the Senate Armed Services Committee and the House Foreign Affairs Committee. December 2, 2009.

## **McChrystal Replaced by Petraeus**

On June 23, 2010, President Obama accepted the resignation of General McChrystal after summoning him to Washington, DC, to discuss the comments by him and his staff to a reporter for *Rolling Stone* magazine that disparaged several civilian figures involved in Afghanistan policy. He named General Petraeus as General McChrystal's successor. In a June 23, 2010, statement, President Obama attributed the change purely to the *Rolling Stone* comments, and stated that Afghanistan policy would not change. General Petraeus was confirmed by the Senate on June 30, 2010, and assumed command on July 4, 2010.

## **July 2011 "Deadline" Yields to "Transition" By the End of 2014**

The Obama Administration emphasis on transition to Afghan security leadership beginning in July 2011 was perhaps the most widely debated aspect of policy. Debate over whether to announce such a timeframe is described in the 2010 book by Bob Woodward called *Obama's Wars*. The 2011 "deadline" was interpreted by some Administration critics—and by some Afghan and regional leaders—as laying the groundwork for winding down U.S. involvement in coming years.<sup>31</sup> The Administration explained the time frame as a means of demonstrating to a war-weary public that U.S. military involvement in Afghanistan is not open-ended, and to compel the Afghan government to assume greater ownership and responsibility for the mission. Perhaps to address perceived criticism of such a deadline in the upper ranks of the U.S. military, in an August 31, 2010, statement, the President asserted that the pace and scope of any drawdown would be subject to conditions on the ground.

The debate over the July 2011 drawdown abated substantially with an agreement between the United States and NATO partner forces to focus on allowing a longer time frame for transition to Afghan leadership. At the November 19-20, 2010, NATO summit in Lisbon, it was agreed that the transition to Afghan leadership would begin in 2011 and would be completed by the end of 2014. The 2014 date is one that Karzai articulated in 2009 as a time when Afghan forces would be able to secure Afghanistan.

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<sup>31</sup> Commander NATO International Security Assistance Force, Afghanistan, and U.S. Forces, Afghanistan. "Commander's Initial Assessment." August 30, 2009, available at [http://media.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/politics/documents/Assessment\\_Redacted\\_092109.pdf](http://media.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/politics/documents/Assessment_Redacted_092109.pdf). White House. Remarks by the President In Address to the Nation on the Way Forward in Afghanistan and Pakistan. December 1, 2009; Chandrasekaran, Rajiv. "Differing Views of New Afghanistan Strategy." *Washington Post*, December 26, 2009.

### **Table 4. Summary of Current U.S. Strategy and Implementation**

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The major outlines of Obama Administration strategy have taken shape as outlined below.

*Goals:* (1) disrupt terrorist networks in Afghanistan and Pakistan to degrade their ability to launch international terrorist attacks; (2) promote a more capable, accountable, and effective government in Afghanistan; (3) develop self-reliant Afghan security forces; and (4) involve the international community to achieve these objectives.

*Strategy Definition:* to employ the U.S. and NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) to protect the population and build Afghan institutions and prepare them for a transition to full responsibility for securing and developing Afghanistan by the end of 2014. A U.S. drawdown has begun in July 2011 in concert with the start of a transition to Afghan security leadership in seven areas specified by President Karzai in March 2011 (four cities and three provinces). The United States and Afghanistan are negotiating a long term security partnership agreement that will outline the broader longterm U.S.-Afghanistan relationship and the continuing U.S. commitment to Afghan stability subsequent to 2014.

*Surge and then Drawdown:* With the buildup of troops (surge) announced in December 2009, U.S. commanders asserted that resource “inputs” were, as of October 2010, aligned with mission requirements. U.S. force levels reached a high of 99,000. A U.S. drawdown of 33,000 is to be completed by September 2012, with the remaining drawdown plan until 2014 to be determined at a NATO meeting in Chicago in May 2012.

*Improving and Expanding Afghan Governance:* A key strategy component is to develop Afghan institutions, particularly at the provincial and local levels. The Administration asserts that the Karzai government is being held to account for its performance, although no specific penalties have been imposed on the Afghan government for shortfalls.

*Reintegration and Reconciliation:* As discussed later, the Administration supports Afghan efforts to provide financial and social incentives to persuade insurgents to lay down their arms and accept the Afghan constitution. The United States was at first skeptical but is now increasingly supporting Karzai’s policy of offering negotiations with insurgent leaders.

*Pakistan:* Engagement with Pakistan and enlisting its increased cooperation is pivotal to U.S. policy. More information is in the section on Pakistan, below, and in CRS Report RL33498, *Pakistan-U.S. Relations*, by K. Alan Kronstadt.

*International Dimension:* New international diplomatic mechanisms have been formed to better coordinate all “stakeholders” in the Afghanistan issue (NATO, Afghanistan’s neighbors, other countries in Afghanistan’s region, the United Nations, and other donors). Meetings such as the January 28, 2010, meeting in London and the July 20, 2010, Kabul Conference are part of that effort. Another conference is to be held in Bonn in December 2011.

*Partner Contributions:* Currently, there is U.S. effort to encourage partner forces to remain in Afghanistan at least until the completion of the transition.

*Metrics:* The Administration will continue to measure progress along clear metrics. P.L. 111-32 (FY2009 supplemental appropriation) requires that the President submit to Congress, 90 days after enactment (by September 23, 2009), metrics by which to assess progress, and a report on that progress every 180 days thereafter. The Administration’s approximately 50 metrics<sup>32</sup> and reports are submitted regularly, the latest of which was issued in April 2011. In its September 22, 2009, report on the situation in Afghanistan (A/64/364-S/2009/475), the United Nations developed its own “benchmarks” for progress.

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## **Surge Implementation and Results**

The pace and scope of the transition to Afghan security leadership was intended to depend on assessments of how well U.S. policy is working. Prior to the surge, the Karzai government was estimated by to control about 30% of the country, while insurgents controlled 4% (13 out of 364 districts). Insurgents “influenced” or “operated in” another 30% (Afghan Interior Ministry estimates in August 2009). Tribes and local groups with varying degrees of loyalty to the central government control the remainder. Some outside groups report higher percentages of insurgent

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<sup>32</sup> [http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2009/09/16/evaluating\\_progress\\_in\\_afghanistan\\_pakistan](http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2009/09/16/evaluating_progress_in_afghanistan_pakistan).

control or influence.<sup>33</sup> The Taliban had named “shadow governors” in 33 out of 34 of Afghanistan’s provinces, although many provinces in northern Afghanistan were assessed as having minimal Taliban presence.

In assessing the early results of the surge, General Petraeus stated in his March 15 and 16, 2011, testimony before the two armed services committees of Congress that U.S. strategy is showing results, particularly in the provinces of focus (Helmand, Qandahar) although such gains are “fragile and reversible.” That same assessment was reflected in a White House report to Congress submitted in March 2011 and covering July 2010-March 2011,<sup>34</sup> and in the DOD “1230 Report” of April 2011, covering the six months prior to April 1, 2011. In his June 22, 2011, speech, President Obama stated that the United States had achieved its core objectives, articulated in the December 2009 speech, of pressuring Al Qaeda, reversing Taliban momentum, and building capable Afghan security forces. Some specifics include:

- Opening of a contiguous secure corridor for commerce between Helmand and Qandahar, and markets, and other signs of normal life proliferating in Helmand and Qandahar. Less progress has been achieved in RC-East, where a relatively small proportion of the U.S. surge forces were deployed. However, as noted above, U.S. and partner forces are increasing defenses along the border with Pakistan to prevent the movement of Haqqani and other militants into Afghanistan.
- U.S. commanders receiving overtures from local insurgent leaders who have lost morale and seek to discuss possible terms for their reintegration. Commanders also say they have obtained internal insurgent communications indicating low morale and reluctance to obey orders on the part of insurgent fighters.
- The Afghan forces are becoming increasingly large, adding 70,000 personnel since mid-2009, and are increasingly in the lead on operations.

Still, many commanders attributed the signs of progress not only to the increase in numbers of U.S. forces, but to General Petraeus’ tactics, including nearly tripling Special Operations Force operations in Afghanistan since 2009 (nearly 2,000 such missions during January – August 2011) and greatly increased UAV (unmanned aerial vehicle) strikes on concentrations across the border in Pakistan to try to drive insurgents to reconcile with the Karzai government and cease fighting. In November 2010, General Petraeus approved the deployment of about 17 M1A1 tanks for use by the Marines in southern Afghanistan in order to put further pressure on militants.

Less optimistic assessments of the surge are based on observations that the insurgents continue to be able to operate in normally quiet provinces, including cities in the first group to be transitioned, such as Herat. Others say the insurgents are making successful use of bombings against key officials, such as a bombing that killed a top Afghan security official Daoud Daoud in Takhar Province on May 28, 2011 (in which the top German commander in Afghanistan was slightly wounded). There was a multiple suicide bomber attack on August 13, 2011, on the governor’s compound in normally quiet Parwan province, which killed 22 (but not governor Abdul Basir Salangi). Moreover, observers note an apparent increase in major attacks in Kabul, which is generally considered secure: on June 28, insurgents stormed the historic Intercontinental

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<sup>33</sup> [http://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/12/world/asia/12afghan.html?\\_r=1](http://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/12/world/asia/12afghan.html?_r=1).

<sup>34</sup> White House. “Report on Afghanistan and Pakistan, March 2011.” Released April 5, 2011, at <http://abcnews.go.com/images/Politics/UNCLASS%20Report%20on%20Afghanistan%20and%20Pakistan.pdf>.



Hotel in Kabul, prompting a several hour gun battle with Afghan authorities backed by NATO-led forces. On August 19, 2011, insurgents attacked the compound of the British Council in Kabul, on the anniversary of Afghanistan's formal independence from Britain in 1919.

U.S. casualties also increased during the surge. There were about 310 U.S. soldiers killed in 2009, nearly double the previous year, and U.S. deaths in 2010 reached a new high for the Afghan conflict of just over 500. There were about 210 soldiers from partner countries killed during 2010. According to a UNAMA report issued in December 2010, covering the fall of 2010, there was a 66% increase in security incidents as compared to the same period in 2009. A subsequent UNAMA report, released on July 15, 2011, said that civilian deaths increased in the January – June 2011 period 15% over the same time period in 2010. Over 80% of the civilian deaths are purportedly caused by insurgent attacks, causing U.N. Secretary General Ban Ki Moon to call the Taliban “totally irresponsible” for causing civilian deaths. Still others say that Afghan governance is lagging to the point where the Afghans will not be able to hold U.S./NATO gains on their own and insurgents will be able to regroup as soon as international forces thin out.

### **Significant Progress Reported in Helmand and Qandahar**

U.S. policymaker hopes that the surge would yield clear results in the most restive provinces of Helmand and Qandahar appear to have been realized. The reports of progress in Helmand, particularly the settled areas along the Helmand River, include gains from “Operation Mosh-tarek” (Operation Together) in Marjah. That consisted of about 15,000 U.S., foreign partner, and Afghan forces (about 8,000 of the total) that, beginning on February 13, 2010, sought to clear Taliban militants from Marjah city (85,000 population) in Helmand. An Afghan governing structure was identified in advance, the population had substantial warning, and there were meetings with regional elders just before the offensive began—all of which were an apparent effort to cause militants to flee and to limit civilian losses.<sup>35</sup> The city, for the most part, was declared cleared of militants as of February 26, 2010, but some militants continued to fight in and on the outskirts of Marjah and to assassinate and intimidate Afghans cooperating with U.S. and Afghan forces. That activity reportedly began to diminish in January 2011 and has quieted further since.

### ***Qandahar***

There are perceptions of major progress in Qandahar Province. In early 2010, U.S. commanders had emphasized that the Qandahar effort would focus less on combat and more on conducting consultations and *shuras* with tribal leaders and other notables to enlist their cooperation against insurgents. Some U.S. commanders described the operation as more of a “process”: a slow push into restive districts by setting up Afghan checkpoints to secure the city and districts around it (particularly Arghandab, Zhari, and Panjwai) and not a classic military offensive. Qandahar's population is far larger (about 2 million in the province), and Qandahar province and city have functioning governments, which Marjah did not. The city hosts numerous businesses and has always remained vibrant, despite some Taliban clandestine activity.

After arriving in Afghanistan in July 2010, General Petraeus also increased operations by U.S. Special Operations Forces against key militants near the city<sup>36</sup> and subsequently expanded the

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<sup>35</sup> Holbrooke interview on CNN, March 14, 2010, op. cit.

<sup>36</sup> “U.S. Elite Units Step Up Effort in Afghan City.” *New York Times*, April 26, 2010.

U.S. force presence in partnership with Afghan forces. The strategy ended Taliban control of many neighborhoods and Afghan checkpoints have been established. Further *shuras* have been held to promote Afghan governance. On the other hand, the escape of 450 prisoners, mostly insurgents, through a tunnel dug from Sarposha prison in Qandahar, contradicted assessments of progress, to some extent, as did insurgent attacks in the city during May 7-8, 2011. In the latter incidents, about 25 militants disrupted the city by attacking government locations, including the governor's compound, and sparking a two-day gun battle.

The Qandahar effort suffered a significant setback on July 12, 2011 when a trusted aide killed President Karzai's half-brother, Ahmad Wali Karzai, chair of the provincial council.<sup>37</sup> The death shook confidence in the U.S.-led effort and could still provoke a power struggle with rivals to Karzai's Popolzai tribe. Karzai has named another brother, Shah Wali Karzai, as head of the Popolzai subsequently, although Shah Wali is said to lack the dynamism and effect of Ahmad Wali. Unconfirmed reports suggest Karzai might appoint a replacement to Governor Tooryalai Wesa, a low key technocrat who has tried to balance the flow of U.S. and international funds to the various tribes and clans in the province but who lacked Ahmad Wali Karzai's influence in the province. On the other hand, some say that Shah Wali and other alternative leadership in the province could help alleviate some of the grudges and jealousies of Ahmad Wali's often arbitrary exercise of influence and result in a net increase in stability. Karzai's influence in Qandahar was further weakened on July 27, 2011, when the mayor of Qandahar city, Ghulam Haider Hamidi, was killed. Separately, DOD and USAID are also working to expand electricity availability in and around Qandahar by refurbishing substations, a large effort that prompted a request for the "Afghanistan Infrastructure Fund" mechanism discussed later.

## **Initial Transition and U.S. Drawdown Announced**

Despite doubts about the durability of progress to date, the stated transition to Afghan leadership is to begin in July 2011. On March 22, 2011, as expected, Karzai announced the first set of areas to be transitioned during June 22-July 22, 2011. They are:

- Three provinces: Kabul (except Sarobi district, which is still restive), Panjshir, and Bamiyan. The latter two are considered highly stable. In Kabul, Afghan forces have already been in the lead for at least one year.
- Four cities: Herat, Mazar-e-Sharif, Lashkar Gah, and Mehtarlam. The former two cities are widely considered stable. The latter two are in restive areas, Helmand and Laghman provinces, respectively, and the announcement of transition in these cities surprised many observers.

In each area of transition, the process of completing the transition to Afghan responsibility is to take about 12-18 months, according to U.S. commanders. As the transition process proceeds, U.S. forces are to be withdrawn or thinned out; some forces may be "reinvested" (redeployed) to areas where extra combat force is required. All seven areas began the transition process in July 2011, beginning with Bamiyan on July 17.

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<sup>37</sup> Partlow, Joshua. "U.S. Seeks to Bolster Kandahar Governor, Upend Power Balance." *Washington Post*, April 29, 2010.

## **Pace of First U.S. Drawdowns Set and Drawdown Begun**

General Petraeus' recommendations about the size of the initial drawdown were submitted in mid-June, and, according to his testimony (confirmation hearings as CIA Director) and that of Admiral Mullen on June 23, 2011, recommended a gradual drawdown in which the overwhelming majority of the 30,000 "surge" forces would be in combat through the end of 2012. They also had wanted to redeploy some troops to RC-E, where there had not been as intensive an effort since 2010 as in RC-S or RC-SW. President Obama, asserting that key goals of the surge had been accomplished, announced his decision on June 22, 2011, as

- the drawdown of 10,000 U.S. forces by the end of 2011.
- the removal of another 23,000 forces (the remainder of the surge forces) by September 2012. The United States will have about 66,000-68,000 after this drawdown is completed. The first 800 U.S. forces left Afghanistan on July 14, and the exact drawdown schedule for all 33,000 surge forces to be removed is to be developed by the Defense Department by October 2011.
- a decision on a drawdown plan for the remaining forces, from 2012 until the 2014 transition completion, to be decided at a NATO meeting in Chicago in May 2012. Many experts say that, even after the 2014 transition, the United States will likely keep about 25,000 troops in Afghanistan for overwatch and training the ANSF for at least several years thereafter.

Press reports say the President's decision was colored by the perception that the killing of Osama bin Laden represented a key accomplishment of the core U.S. mission, and because of the financial needs to reduce the size of the U.S. budget deficit.

The President did not announce a scaled-back strategy to a "counter-terrorism" or "counter-terrorism plus" mission (discussed below). General Petraeus and Admiral Mullen, in their testimonies the following day, acknowledged that the President's decision represented an "aggressive" drawdown but both said that they could still carry out U.S. policy with it. In a press interview, Secretary Gates indicated that U.S. strategy would progressively evolve to more of "overwatch" and counter-terrorism but that, for the near term, the current counter-insurgency approach could still be pursued in some areas of Afghanistan. President Karzai backed the drawdown as well.

## **Beyond 2014: Long-Term Commitment/Strategic Partnership Agreement**

As noted, President Obama and other senior U.S. officials say that 2014 is not a date certain for a complete U.S. pullout, but rather for a transition to Afghan leadership, with some international forces remaining after 2014 to train and mentor the Afghans. During a visit to Afghanistan, Vice President Biden reiterated on January 10, 2011, that U.S. forces would likely be required to help secure Afghanistan after 2014.

In addition to these statements of reassurance, President Obama, at a May 12, 2010, press conference with visiting President Karzai, stated that the United States and Afghanistan would renew and expand a five-year-old strategic partnership. A strategic partnership agreement might be modeled along that of a "Security Agreement" agreed with Iraq in 2008. It stipulated an end

date for U.S. military involvement in Iraq. However, unlike Iraq, no major Afghan figures are calling for an end to U.S. military involvement in Afghanistan.

Negotiations on a long-term strategic partnership began with the February 24-28, 2011, visit to Washington, DC, of Afghan Defense Minister Wardak and Interior Minister Khan; the talks continued with the March 2011 visit to Afghanistan of a U.S. negotiating team, as stated by Secretary Gates on March 7, 2011. The Administration intent was to finalize the new strategic partnership to coincide with the beginning of the U.S. drawdown in July 2011, although that goal was not met. Press reports indicate that negotiations have bogged down over Afghan insistence on firm deadlines for Afghan institutions to assume control over detention centers and decisions on nighttime and other U.S.-led raids on insurgents. The Afghan side is also said to have overly ambitious plans to buy major U.S. combat systems, such as F-16s, that the Afghans cannot sustain without significant longterm assistance. President Karzai has indicated he would put the accord to a special *loya jirga* for ratification

The strategic partnership was first established on May 23, 2005, when Karzai and President Bush issued a “joint declaration”<sup>38</sup> providing for U.S. forces to have access to Afghan military facilities, in order to prosecute “the war against international terror and the struggle against violent extremism.” The joint statement did not give Karzai enhanced control over facilities used by U.S. forces, over U.S. operations, or over prisoners taken during operations. Some of the bases, both in and near Afghanistan, that support combat in Afghanistan, include those in **Table 8**. Karzai’s signing of the partnership had been blessed by Afghan representatives on May 8, 2005, when he summoned about 1,000 delegates to a consultative *jirga* in Kabul on whether to host permanent U.S. bases. That *jirga* supported an indefinite presence of international forces to maintain security but urged Karzai to delay a decision. He stated on March 22, 2011, that he would likely call another *loya jirga* to evaluate any renewal of the partnership. A FY2009 supplemental appropriation (P.L. 111-32) and the FY2010 and FY2011 National Defense Authorization Acts (P.L. 111-84 and H.R. 6523, respectively) prohibit the U.S. establishment of permanent bases in Afghanistan.

### **Resolving Operational Differences/SOFA?**

Some of the differences clouding completion of a U.S.-Afghanistan strategic partnership involve Afghan opposition to continuing civilian casualties caused by U.S. operations. Beginning in 2008, when the Afghan cabinet reacted to some high-profile instances of accidental civilian deaths, the Afghan side has demanded negotiation of a formal “Status of Forces Agreement” (SOFA). A SOFA is typically negotiated to spell out the combat authorities of non-Afghan forces, and might limit the United States to airstrikes, detentions, and house raids.<sup>39</sup> U.S. forces currently operate in Afghanistan under relatively vague “diplomatic notes” between the United States and the interim government of Afghanistan—primarily one that was exchanged in November 2002. That agreed note gives the United States legal jurisdiction over U.S. personnel serving in Afghanistan and states the Afghan government’s acknowledgment that U.S.-led military operations were “ongoing.” A draft SOFA—or technical agreement clarifying U.S./coalition authorities in Afghanistan—reportedly has been under discussion between the United States and Afghanistan since 2007.

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<sup>38</sup> See <http://merln.ndu.edu/archivepdf/afghanistan/WH/20050523-2.pdf>.

<sup>39</sup> Gall, Carlotta. Two Afghans Lose Posts Over Attack. *New York Times*, August 25, 2008.

The Afghan position is a result of several major incidents. One major such incident occurred near Herat on August 22, 2008, in which a NATO bomb killed up to 90 civilians, as well as the incident in September 2009 in Konduz in which Germany's contingent called in an airstrike on Taliban fighters who captured two fuel trucks; killing several civilians as well as Taliban fighters. However, ISAF-caused civilian casualties continue and usually lead to recriminations from President Karzai, including a veiled threat from Karzai in May 2011 that continued civilian casualties would cause Afghans to view international forces as occupiers, and Karzai instructions to Afghan military leaders to play in approving NATO operations. He made similar comments in June 2011, causing outgoing Ambassador Eikenberry to rebuke him indirectly but publicly.

### **Threats to Long-Term U.S. Presence: 2011 Protests**

If there is a decision to retain international forces in Afghanistan beyond 2014, the attitudes of the Afghan population might become a factor. The insurgent forces had always used the presence of foreign forces on Afghan soil as a rallying and recruiting point, but the vast bulk of Afghans have, in surveys, generally appreciated the need for foreign forces to secure Afghanistan. There were signs in April 2011 that the public welcome of foreign forces might be eroding. On April 1, 2011, crowds of Afghans in the northern city of Mazar-e-Sharif demonstrated against the March 2011 burning of a Quran by a Florida pastor. The demonstration turned violent, with protesters storming the U.N. compound in the city and killing 12, including 7 U.N. staff. Demonstrations in other Afghan cities followed, including anti-U.S. slogans and posters echoing the Taliban's anti-U.S., anti-Western rhetoric. The demonstrations raised questions as to whether the Afghan public has begun to see international forces as occupiers, and appeared to illustrate that a long-term presence of large numbers of international forces might be opposed broadly within Afghanistan. Additionally, a riot erupted on May 19, 2011, in normally quiet Takhar Province to protest a NATO night raid there that allegedly killed four civilians.

**Table 5. Operation Enduring Freedom Partner Forces**

Operation Enduring Freedom continues as a separate combat track, led by the United States but joined by at least twelve partners. The caveat issue is less of a factor with OEF, since OEF is known as a combat-intensive mission conducted in large part by special forces contingents of contributing nations. The overwhelming majority of non-U.S. forces are under the NATO/ISAF mission. Prior to NATO assumption of command in October 2006, 19 coalition countries—primarily Britain, France, Canada, and Italy contributing approximately 4,000 combat troops to OEF-Afghanistan. Now, that figure is lower as most have been rebadged to ISAF. However, several foreign contingents, composed mainly of special operations forces, including a 200 person unit from the UAE, are still part of OEF-Afghanistan. This includes about 500 British special forces, some German special forces, and other special forces units. In early 2010, U.S. Special Forces operating in Afghanistan were brought under direct command of the top U.S. command in Afghanistan, now General Petraeus.

Under OEF, Japan provided naval refueling capabilities in the Arabian sea, but the mission was suspended in October 2007 following a parliamentary change of majority there in July 2007. The mission was revived in January 2008 when the new government forced through parliament a bill to allow the mission to resume. It was renewed again, over substantial parliamentary opposition, in December 2008, but the opposition party won September 2009 elections in Japan and reportedly has decided on an alternative to continuing the refueling mission—by increasing its financial contributions to economic development in Afghanistan. That led to an October 2009 pledge by Japan—already the third largest individual country donor to Afghanistan, providing about \$1.9 billion in civilian reconstruction aid since the fall of the Taliban—to provide another \$5 billion over five years. It has been requested to be a major financial donor of an Afghan army expansion, and, in March 2009, it pledged to pay the costs of the Afghan National Police for six months.

As part of OEF outside Afghanistan, the United States leads a multi-national naval anti-terrorist, anti-smuggling, anti-proliferation interdiction mission in the Persian Gulf/Arabian Sea, headquartered in Bahrain. That mission was expanded after the fall of Saddam Hussein to include protecting Iraqi oil platforms in the Gulf.

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## **Policy Component During Transition: Building Afghan Forces and Establishing Rule of Law**

Since the Taliban were ousted from power, a key tenet of U.S. and NATO policy—and the key to their “exit strategy” from Afghanistan—has been to build capable Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF), consisting of the Afghan National Army (ANA) and Afghan National Police (ANP). This policy will be emphasized to an even greater degree as the transition to Afghan lead proceeds, and particularly as the 2014 deadline for transition completion approaches.

Although the ANSF has expanded considerably since 2002, it has been considered a struggle to bring these forces to a level of capability that would allow for a transition from international forces in securing Afghanistan. Obama Administration strategy emphasizes expanding the ANSF and improving it through partnering and more intense mentoring and training—about 70% of Afghan units are now partnered with international forces. The Department of Defense “1230 Report” for late 2010 and early 2011, cited earlier, provides a detailed assessment of what it says is “significant progress” of the ANSF, as well as continued deficiencies. That assessment was repeated by the commander in charge of training the ANSF, General William Caldwell, mentioned below, in early June 2011.

On January 21, 2010, the joint U.N.-Afghan “Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board” (JCMB) agreed that, by October 2011, the ANA would expand to 171,600 and the ANP to about 134,000, for a total ANSF of 305,600. Both forces are, as of August 2011, very close to that target level. Both forces reached a lower interim size of 134,000 and 109,000 respectively in August 2010, two months earlier than planned. About 1% of the ANSF is female. General Caldwell stated in

June 2011 that the United States is also helping the ANSF build up an indigenous weapons production capability.

A Gen. Petraeus recommendation to raise the target level for both forces to 378,000 was to be put to the JCMB in January 2011, but U.S. and partner country concerns about the Afghan ability to sustain so large a force put the plan on hold. While holding to his recommendation for the 78,000 increase, General Petraeus testified on March 15 and 16, 2011, that he considers the ANSF to need a minimum of 44,000 more authorized forces than the current target. That latter figure is close to the 47,000 figure that is being reported as the size of the expansion that will be approved by the Obama Administration. If that figure is confirmed, the new total target size of the ANSF will be about 352,000.

U.S. forces, along with partner countries and contractors, train the ANSF. In February 2010, the U.S.-run “Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan” (CSTC-A) that ran the training was subordinated to the broader NATO Training Mission—Afghanistan (NTM-A). NTM-A is commanded by U.S. Major General William Caldwell. CSTC-A’s mission was reoriented to building the capacity of the Afghan Defense and Interior Ministries, and to provide resources to the ANSF. The total number of required trainers (U.S. and partner) for these institutions is 4,750. The unfilled gap of trainers totaling about 750 is discussed in the section on Alliances below, and particular attention has been called to the need for 290 police trainers to staff five new police training centers scheduled to open in 2011.<sup>40</sup>

A separate France-led 300-person European Gendarmerie Force (EGF) has been established to train Afghan forces out in the provinces. The European Union is providing a 190-member “EUPOL” training effort, and 60 other experts to help train the ANP. These efforts are subsumed under NTM-A.

A core element of NATO’s training efforts are its mentoring teams—known as Operational Mentoring Liaison Teams (OMLTs) and Police Operational Mentoring and Liaison Teams (POMLTs). While NTM-A focuses on building institutional capacity in the ANSF and on training initial recruits, OMLTs and POMLTs are responsible for training and mentoring deployed ANSF units. OMLTs, which operate with the Afghan National Army (ANA), consist of 11-28 personnel from one or several countries. POMLTs, which teach and mentor the Afghan National Police (ANP), are composed of 15-20 personnel each. In addition to the training, Obama Administration strategy emphasizes expanding the ANSF and improving it through partnering—about 70% of Afghan units are now partnered with international forces.

According to General Caldwell, much of the deficiency throughout the ANSF is due to illiteracy, which is estimated at about 90%. That has prompted NTM-A to increasingly focus on providing literacy training, which is also seen as a large driver of recruits who want the literacy education. The April 2011 DOD report says there were 60,000 Afghan soldiers and police undergoing literacy training as of March 2011.

## **Afghan National Army**

The Afghan National Army has been built “from scratch” since 2002—it is not a direct continuation of the national army that existed from the 1880s until the Taliban era. That national

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<sup>40</sup> Deb Riechmann, “NATO:740 Trainers still needed for Afghan forces,” Associated Press, February 13, 2010.

army all but disintegrated during the 1992-1996 *mujahedin* civil war and the 1996-2001 Taliban period. However, some Afghan officers who served prior to the Taliban have joined the ANA.

U.S. and allied officers say that the ANA is becoming a major force in stabilizing the country and a national symbol. It now has at least some presence in most of Afghanistan's 34 provinces, working with the PRTs, and it deployed outside Afghanistan to assist relief efforts for victims of the October 2005 Pakistan earthquake. ANA battalions, or "Kandaks," are the main unit of the Afghan force.

The ANA is able to lead a growing percentage of all combat operations, but there is substantial skepticism within the U.S. defense establishment that it can assume full security responsibility by 2014, which is the target time frame announced by Karzai. Among examples of the ANA taking overall responsibility, in August 2008, the ANA took over security of Kabul city from Italy, and it took formal control of Kabul Province in early 2009. The commando forces of the ANA, trained by U.S. Special Operations Forces, and numbering about 5,300, are considered well-trained and are taking the lead in some operations against high-value targets.

However, some U.S. military assessments say the force remains poorly led. It still suffers from at least a 20% desertion rate. Some accounts say that a typical ANA unit is only at about 50% of its authorized strength at any given time, and there are significant shortages in about 40% of equipment items. The high desertion rate complicates U.S.-led efforts to steadily grow the force. Some recruits take long trips to their home towns to remit funds to their families, and often then return to the ANA after a long absence. Others, according to U.S. observers, often refuse to serve far from their home towns. The FY2005 foreign aid appropriation (P.L. 108-447) required that ANA recruits be vetted for terrorism, human rights violations, and drug trafficking.

The United States has built five ANA bases: Herat (Corps 207), Gardez (Corps 203), Qandahar (Corps 205), Mazar-e-Sharif (Corps 209), and Kabul (Division HQ, Corps 201, Air Corps). Coalition officers conduct heavy weapons training for a heavy brigade as part of the "Kabul Corps," based in Pol-e-Charki, east of Kabul.

### *Ethnic and Factional Considerations/Defense Minister Wardak*

At the time the United States first began establishing the ANA, Northern Alliance figures who were then in key security positions weighted recruitment for the national army toward its Tajik ethnic base. Many Pashtuns, in reaction, refused recruitment or left the ANA program. The naming of a Pashtun, Abdul Rahim Wardak, as Defense Minister in December 2004 reduced desertions among Pashtuns (he remains in that position). U.S. officials in Afghanistan say this problem was further alleviated with better pay and more close involvement by U.S. forces, and that the force is ethnically integrated in each unit and representative. With about 41% Pashtuns, 34% Tajiks, 12% Hazaras, and 8% Uzbeks, the force is roughly in line with the broad demographics of the country, according to the April 2010 DOD report. However, U.S. commanders say that those Pashtuns who are in the force are disproportionately eastern Pashtuns (from the Ghilzai tribal confederations) rather than southern Pashtuns (mostly Durrani tribal confederations). Defense Minister Wardak said in February 2011 that a greater proportion of southern Pashtuns are being recruited to redress that imbalance somewhat. The chief of staff was General Bismillah Khan, a Tajik who was a Northern Alliance commander, although as of June 2010 he is Interior Minister.



There were press reports in April 2011 that Karzai might be planning to replace Wardak (as well as Finance Minister Omar Zakhiwal) partly because he perceives them as working too closely with their U.S. counterparts. A name that has surfaced to potentially replace Wardak is General Abdul Rauf Begi, an ethnic Uzbek who is close to Abdul Rashid Dostam; his appointment would represent a Karzai move to further consolidate support from the Uzbek community, but could alienate the Pashtuns in the military.

### **Afghan Air Force**

Equipment, maintenance, and logistical difficulties continue to plague the Afghan Air Force, and it remains mostly a support force for ground operations rather than a combat-oriented force. However, the Afghan Air Force has been able to make ANA units nearly self-sufficient in airlift. The force is a carryover from the Afghan Air Force that existed prior to the Soviet invasion, and is expanding gradually after its equipment was virtually eliminated in the 2001-2002 U.S. combat against the Taliban regime. It now has about over 3,000 personnel, including 400 pilots, as well as a total of about 46 aircraft (of a planned fleet of 146 aircraft). Afghan pilots are based at Bagram air base. There are some female Afghan Air Force personnel; four arrived in the United States in July 2011 for training as military helicopter pilots.

Afghanistan is seeking the return of 26 aircraft, including some MiG-2s that were flown to safety in Pakistan and Uzbekistan during the past conflicts in Afghanistan. U.S. plans do not include supply of fixed-wing combat aircraft such as F-16s, which Afghanistan wants, according to U.S. military officials. There is a concern that Afghanistan does not have the capability, to date, to sustain operations of an aircraft as sophisticated as the F-16. In 2010, Russia and Germany supplied MI-8 helicopters to the Afghan Air Force.

### **Afghan National Police (ANP)**

U.S. and Afghan officials believe that building up a credible and capable national police force is at least as important to combating the insurgency as building the ANA. The April 2011 DOD report on Afghanistan, cited earlier, contains substantial detail on U.S.-led efforts to continue what it says are “significant strides [that] have been made in professionalizing the ANP.” Outside assessments are widely disparaging, asserting that there is rampant corruption to the point where citizens mistrust and fear the ANP. Among other criticisms are a desertion rate far higher than that of the ANA; substantial illiteracy; involvement in local factional or ethnic disputes because the ANP works in the communities its personnel come from; and widespread use of drugs. It is this view that has led to consideration of stepped up efforts to promote local security solutions such as those discussed above.

Bismillah Khan, the Interior Minister, was highly respected as ANA chief of staff and has taken new steps to try to improve the police force, including through unannounced visits to ANP bases and stations around the country. He has also instituted salary increases and objective standards for promotions and assignments. Still, some Pashtuns might resent his Tajik ethnicity. These efforts build on those taken in March 2010, by then-Interior Minister Atmar when he signed a “strategic guidance” document for the ANP, which prioritizes eliminating corruption within the ANP and winning public confidence. About 1,000 ANP are women, demonstrating some commitment to gender integration of the force.

Other U.S. commanders credit a November 2009 raise in police salaries (nearly doubled to about \$240 per month for service in high combat areas)—and the streamlining and improvement of the payments system for the ANP—with reducing the solicitation of bribes by the ANP. The raise also stimulated an eightfold increase in the number of Afghans seeking to be recruited. Others note the success, thus far, of efforts to pay police directly (and avoid skimming by commanders) through cell phone-based banking relationships (E-Paisa, run by Roshan cell network).

There have been few quick fixes for the chronic shortage of equipment in the ANP. Most police are under-equipped, lacking ammunition and vehicles. In some cases, equipment requisitioned by their commanders is being sold and the funds pocketed by the police officers. These activities contributed to the failure of a 2006 “auxiliary police” effort that attempted to rapidly field large numbers of new ANP officers. On the other hand, according to General Caldwell in June 2011, the ANP is increasingly being provided with heavy weapons and now have about 5,000 armored vehicles countrywide.

The U.S. police training effort was first led by State Department/INL, but the Defense Department took over the lead in police training in April 2005. Some U.S. officials believe that the United States and its partners still have not centered on a clearly effective police training strategy. A training reorganization implemented since 2007, called “*focused district development*,” received little discussion in the April 2011 DOD report on Afghanistan stability. In that program, a district police force was taken out and retrained, its duties temporarily performed by more highly trained police (Afghan National Civil Order Police, or ANCOP, which number about 9,400 nationwide), and then reinserted after the training is complete. However, the ANCOP officers are currently being used mostly to staff new checkpoints that are better securing the restive districts in southern and eastern Afghanistan.

Police training now includes instruction in human rights principles and democratic policing concepts, and the State Department human rights report on Afghanistan, referenced above, says the government and outside observers are increasingly monitoring the police force to prevent abuses.

## **Rule of Law/Criminal Justice Sector**

Many experts believe that an effective justice sector is vital to Afghan governance. Some of the criticisms and allegations of corruption at all levels of the Afghan bureaucracy have been discussed throughout this report. U.S. justice sector programs generally focus on promoting rule of law and building capacity of the judicial system, including police training and court construction. The rule of law issue is covered in detail in CRS Report R41484, *Afghanistan: U.S. Rule of Law and Justice Sector Assistance*, by Liana Sun Wyler and Kenneth Katzman.

## **U.S. Security Forces Funding/“CERP”**

Because the Afghan government has so few resources, the Afghan security sector is funded almost entirely through international donations. In December 2009, Karzai asserted that the Afghan government could not likely fund its own security forces until 2024. More than half of all U.S. assistance to Afghanistan since 2002 has gone toward building the ANSF. U.S. and other donor funds are used to cover ANA salaries as well as to equip and train them. Recent appropriations for the ANA and ANP are contained in the tables at the end of this report, which also contain breakdowns for Commanders Emergency Response Program funds, or CERP, which

is used for projects that build goodwill and presumably reduce the threat to use forces. CERP has also been used for projects that are traditionally considered suitable for management by USAID, a point of contention among some observers. The tables at the end also list breakdowns for ANSF funding. As noted in the tables, as of FY2005, the security forces funding has been DOD funds, not State Department funds (Foreign Military Financing, FMF).

### ***NATO Trust Fund for the ANA***

In 2007, ISAF set up a trust fund for donor contributions to fund the transportation of equipment donated to and the training of the ANA; the mandate was expanded in 2009 to include sustainment costs. U.S. funding for the ANSF is provided separately, not through this fund. The fund is estimated to require \$2 billion per year. NATO allies in Europe have contributed about \$375 million to the fund.

### ***Law and Order Trust Fund for the ANP***

There is also a separate “Law and Order Trust Fund” (LOTF) for Afghanistan, run by the U.N. Development Program, which is used to pay the salaries of the ANP and other police-related functions. From 2002-2010, donors contributed \$1.74 billion to the Fund, of which the United States contributed about \$620 million, according to the April 2011 DOD report (p. 41). Japan’s 2009 pledge to pay the expenses of the Afghan police for at least six months (about \$125 million for each six month period) is implemented through the LOTF.

## **Policy Component: Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs)**

U.S. and partner officials have generally praised the effectiveness of “Provincial Reconstruction Teams” (PRTs)—enclaves of U.S. or partner forces and civilian officials that provide safe havens for international aid workers to help with reconstruction and to extend the writ of the Kabul government—in accelerating reconstruction and assisting stabilization efforts. The PRTs, the concept for which was announced in December 2002, perform activities ranging from resolving local disputes to coordinating local reconstruction projects, although most U.S.-run PRTs and most PRTs in combat-heavy areas focus on counter-insurgency. Many of the additional U.S. civilian officials deployed to Afghanistan during 2009 and 2010 are based at PRTs, which have facilities, vehicles, and security. Some aid agencies say they have felt more secure since the PRT program began,<sup>41</sup> but several relief groups do not want to associate with military forces because doing so might taint their perceived neutrality. Others, such as Oxfam International, argue that the PRTs are delaying the time when the Afghan government has the skills and resources to secure and develop Afghanistan on its own. It is likely that the PRTs in Afghanistan will either be phased out or transitioned to purely civilian leadership and roles as the transition unfolds.

The list of PRTs in operation, including lead country, is shown in **Table 25**. Virtually all the PRTs are now under the ISAF mission. Each PRT operated by the United States has U.S. forces; Defense Department civil affairs officers; representatives of USAID, State Department, and other agencies; and Afghan government (Interior Ministry) personnel. Most PRTs, including those run

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<sup>41</sup> Kraul, Chris. “U.S. Aid Effort Wins Over Skeptics in Afghanistan.” *Los Angeles Times*, April 11, 2003.

by partner forces, have personnel to train Afghan security forces. USAID officers assigned to the PRTs administer PRT reconstruction projects.

### **Karzai Criticism of PRTs**

As far as use of PRTs to jump-start development, USAID observers say there is little Afghan input, either into development project decision making or as contractors for facility and other construction. That lack of input has fed criticism by Karzai, most recently at his February 6, 2011, speech at a security conference in Munich, that the PRTs should be abolished and all aid funds channeled through the Afghan government. USAID spending on PRT projects is in the table on USAID spending in Afghanistan at the end of this report, and there is a database on development projects sponsored by each PRT available to CRS, which can be provided on request.

To address criticism from Karzai as well as from aid organizations, some donor countries—as well as the United States—are trying to enhance the civilian component of the PRTs and change their image from military institutions. There has been long been consideration to turn over the lead in the U.S.-run PRTs to civilians rather than military personnel, presumably State Department or USAID officials. That was first attempted in 2006 with the establishment of a civilian-led U.S.-run PRT in the Panjshir Valley. As noted, in March 2009, the Netherlands converted its PRT to civilian lead, although that alteration has not continued with the assumption of U.S. and Australian PRT command as of July 2010. Turkey opened a PRT, in Wardak Province, on November 25, 2006, to focus on providing health care, education, police training, and agricultural alternatives in that region.

As of November 2009, the “civilianization” of the PRT concept has evolved further with the decision to refer to PRTs as Interagency Provincial Affairs (IPA) offices or branches. In this new concept—a local parallel to the Senior Civilian Representatives now assigned to each regional command—State Department officers enjoy enhanced decision-making status at each PRT.

### **Policy Component: Cooperation With Allies and Burdensharing/Preventing Allied “Rush for the Exits”**

Since the fall of the Taliban, the U.S.-led mission in Afghanistan has been in cooperation with partners. Since 2006, the vast bulk of all U.S. troops in Afghanistan have served under the umbrella of the NATO-led “International Security Assistance Force” (ISAF). ISAF consists of all 26 NATO members states plus partner countries—a total of 50 countries including the United States. President Obama’s December 1, 2009, policy speech on Afghanistan was explicit in seeking new partner troop commitments, and pledges met or exceeded what some U.S. officials expected. However, as the transition to Afghan leadership began in July 2011, U.S. officials are attempting to prevent a “rush to the exits” in which partner forces pull out before their areas of responsibility are ready for transition. Rather, U.S. officials want—and thus far achieved—partner drawdowns to occur at roughly the same rate and proportion as the U.S. drawdown occurs.

Even before President Obama’s June 22, 2011, speech, virtually all the European governments were under pressure from their publics and parliaments to end or reduce their military involvement in Afghanistan. Before the speech, several key contingents (1) already ended their combat missions (the Netherlands), (2) announced firm ends to those missions (Canada, by the mission completion accomplished as of late July 2011, to be replaced by about 950 trainers for the ANSF), or (3) set notional times to depart before the 2014 completion of the transition.

Other partner countries announced their own drawdowns immediately after President Obama's June 22, 2011, speech. France announced it would cut about 10% of its force (about 400 troops) by September 2011. Britain has announced it would withdraw about 800 of its force by the end of 2011. Italy, Poland, and Germany have also indicated an intent to try to wind down their involvement in Afghanistan before the end of 2014, and Germany's parliament in January 2011 only renewed the German participation for one year, although that might be reviewed in late 2011. Partner forces that continue to bear the brunt of combat in Afghanistan include Britain, Canada, Poland, France, Denmark, Romania, and Australia.

**Table 6. Background on NATO/ISAF Formation and U.N. Mandate**

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The International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) was created by the Bonn Agreement and U.N. Security Council Resolution 1386 (December 20, 2001, a Chapter 7 resolution),<sup>42</sup> initially limited to Kabul. In October 2003, after Germany agreed to contribute 450 military personnel to expand ISAF into the city of Konduz, ISAF contributors endorsed expanding its presence to several other cities, contingent on formal U.N. approval—which came on October 14, 2003, in U.N. Security Council Resolution 1510. In August 2003, NATO took over command of ISAF—previously the ISAF command rotated among donor forces including Turkey and Britain.

NATO/ISAF's responsibilities broadened significantly in 2004 with NATO/ISAF's assumption of security responsibility for northern and western Afghanistan (Stage 1, Regional Command North, in 2004 and Stage 2, Regional Command West, in 2005, respectively). The transition process continued on July 31, 2006, with the formal handover of the security mission in southern Afghanistan to NATO/ISAF control. As part of this "Stage 3," a British/Canadian/Dutch-led "Regional Command South" (RC-S) was formed. Britain is the lead force in Helmand; Canada is lead in Qandahar, and the Netherlands was lead in Uruzgan until its departure in July 2010; the three rotated the command of RC-S. "Stage 4," the assumption of NATO/ISAF command of peacekeeping in 14 provinces of eastern Afghanistan (and thus all of Afghanistan), was completed on October 5, 2006. As part of the completion of the NATO/ISAF takeover, the United States put about half the U.S. troops then operating in Afghanistan under NATO/ISAF in "Regional Command East" (RC-E).

The ISAF mission was renewed (until October 13, 2011) by U.N. Security Council Resolution 1943 (October 13, 2010), which reiterated previous resolutions' support for the Operation Enduring Freedom mission. Tables at the end of this report list contributing forces, areas of operations, and their Provincial Reconstruction Teams.

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## **Major Contingent Developments During the U.S. "Surge"**

In indicating a propensity to draw down their forces, U.S. partners note that they have repeatedly answered the U.S. call to support the mission. Following the Obama Administration's March 27, 2009, policy announcement, some additional pledges came through at the April 3-4, 2009, NATO summit. Major new force pledges were issued in conjunction with the January 28, 2010, conference in London. Among major pledges (troops and major aid funds) that were intended to show support for the U.S. surge:

- November 10, 2009: Ahead of President Obama's visit to Asia, Japan announced a pledge of \$5 billion over the next five years for Afghanistan civilian development, although it suspended its naval refueling mission. Japan has been covering about half of the \$250 million yearly salary costs of the ANP.
- July 2009: South Korea announced it would increase its aid contribution to Afghanistan by about \$20 million, in part to expand the hospital capabilities at

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<sup>42</sup> Its mandate was extended until October 13, 2006, by U.N. Security Council Resolution 1623 (September 13, 2005); and until October 13, 2007, by Resolution 1707 (September 12, 2006).

Bagram Air Base. In November 2009, it announced a return of about 150 engineers to Afghanistan for development missions, protected by 300 South Korean forces. The forces deployed to Parwan Province in July 2010.<sup>43</sup>

- December 2009-January 2010 (London conference): A total of about 9,000 forces were pledged (including retaining 2,000 sent for the August 2009 election who were due to rotate out). Several countries pledged police trainers.
- In July 2010, Malaysia became a new contributor to the Afghanistan effort, furnishing 40 military medics.
- In March 2011, Germany said it would add 300 forces to operate surveillance systems, although this decision was related to its refusal to participate in military action against Libya rather than to an Afghanistan-specific requirement.
- In May 2011, Kazakhstan became the first Central Asian state to announce a troop contribution, pledging four non-combat troops to the mission.

### ***National “Caveats” on Combat Operations***

One of the most thorny issues has been the U.S. effort to persuade other NATO countries to adopt flexible rules of engagement that allow all contributing forces to perform combat missions. NATO and other partner forces have not, as they pledged at the NATO summit in April 2008, removed the so-called “national caveats” on their troops’ operations that Lieutenant General McChrystal says limits operational flexibility. For example, some nations refuse to conduct night-time combat. Others have refused to carry Afghan personnel on their helicopters. Others do not fight after snowfall. These caveats were troubling to NATO members like Canada, with forces in heavy combat zones; such countries feel they are bearing the brunt of the fighting.

### **Security Innovations To Facilitate the Transition**

Despite the assessments of progress, the U.S. military view is that ending the conflict on favorable terms requires new approaches that convince insurgent leaders that further conflict is futile and that a negotiated settlement should be pursued. Some of the more recent strategy and policy innovations designed to shape an “end game” in Afghanistan are discussed below.

### **“Reintegration” and “Reconciliation” With Insurgents**

The issue of reintegrating insurgent fighters into society, and reconciling with insurgent leaders, is receiving increasing high level attention, to the point where SRAP Grossman is said to focus primarily on this issue. Both are Afghan-led processes but they have concerned some in the international community and Afghanistan because of the potential for compromises with insurgents that may produce backsliding on human rights. Most insurgents are highly

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<sup>43</sup> Until December 2007, 200 South Korean forces at Bagram Air Base, mainly combat engineers, were part of Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF); they left in December 2007 in fulfillment of a decision by the South Korean government the previous year. However, many observers believe South Korea did not further extend its mission beyond that, possibly as part of an agreement in August 2007 under which Taliban militants released 21 kidnapped South Korean church group visitors. Two were killed during their captivity. The Taliban kidnappers did not get the demanded release of 23 Taliban prisoners held by the Afghan government.

conservative Islamists who agreed with the limitations in women's rights that characterized Taliban rule. Many leaders of ethnic minorities are also skeptical of the effort because they fear that it might further Pashtun political strength within Afghanistan, and enhance the influence of Pakistan in Afghan politics. General Petraeus has said that the way conflicts like the one in Afghanistan end is through a political settlement. The United States and the Karzai government agree that any settlement requires that fighters and insurgent leaders agree, as an outcome,<sup>44</sup> to (1) cease fighting, (2) accept the Afghan constitution, and (3) sever any ties to Al Qaeda or other terrorist groups.

### *Reintegration/"Peace Jirga"*

Before the more recent emphasis on reconciliation, the concept of providing incentives to persuade insurgents to surrender and reenter their communities received most of the U.S. attention. The elements included in a reintegration plan drafted by the Afghan government and adopted by a "peace *loya jirga*" during June 2-4, 2010<sup>45</sup> included providing surrendering fighters with jobs, amnesty, protection, and an opportunity to be part of the security architecture for their communities. In its final declaration, the *peace jirga* backed the plan, but also called for the release of some detained insurgents where allegations against them are weak. The day after the *jirga* concluded, Karzai sought to implement that recommendation by calling for a review of the cases of all insurgent detentions. In late June 2010, President Karzai issued a decree to implement the plan, which involves outreach by Afghan local leaders to tribes and others who can convince insurgents to lay down their arms. The Afghan plan received formal international backing at the July 20, 2010, Kabul Conference. Britain, Japan, and several other countries, including the United States, have announced a total of about \$235 million in donations to a new fund to support the reintegration process, of which \$134 million has been received.<sup>46</sup> The U.S. contribution is to be about \$100 million (CERP funds), of which \$50 million was formally pledged in April 2011.<sup>47</sup>

Despite the international funding for the effort, the Afghan-led reintegration process has moved forward slowly. As of August 2011, according to U.S. commanders, about 2,000 fighters have reintegrated, but they are mostly from the north and west and not the more violent south and east. However, another 1,000-2,000, including a higher percentage of those from the south, are expected to begin the process in the near future. Some accounts attribute the slow progress to delays by Afghan officials who say they are not ready to provide the promised protection and job training services to reintegrating fighters. In addition, short of formal reintegration, U.S. military meetings with tribal elders have, in some cases, persuaded Taliban and other insurgents in their areas to stop fighting. On the other hand, some observers say there have been cases in which reintegrated fighters have committed Taliban-style human rights abuses against women and others, suggesting that the reintegration process might have unintended consequences.

To help the process along from the international perspective, in November 2009, ISAF set up a "force reintegration cell" to develop additional programs and policies to accelerate the effort to

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<sup>44</sup> The concept that this stipulations could be an "outcome" of negotiations was advanced by Secretary of State Clinton at the first annual Richard C. Holbrooke Memorial Address. February 18, 2011.

<sup>45</sup> Afghanistan National Security Council. "Afghanistan Peace and Reintegration Program." April 2010.

<sup>46</sup> United Nations. Report of the Secretary General: "The Situation in Afghanistan and Its Implications for International Peace and Security." March 9, 2011.

<sup>47</sup> The National Defense Authorization Act for FY2010 (P.L. 111-84) authorized the use of CERP funds to win local support, to "reintegrate" Taliban fighters.

cause insurgents to change sides. These strategies are similar to what was employed successfully in Anbar Province in Iraq in 2006 and 2007.

Karzai has consistently advocated talks with Taliban militants who want to end their fight. Noted above is the “Program for Strengthening Peace and Reconciliation” (referred to in Afghanistan by its Pashto acronym “PTS”) headed by *Meshrano Jirga* speaker Sibghatullah Mojadeddi and former Vice President Karim Khalili, and overseen by Karzai’s National Security Council. The program is credited with persuading 9,000 Taliban figures and commanders to renounce violence and join the political process.

### ***Reconciliation With Taliban/Insurgent Leaders***

The separate but related initiative is to conduct negotiations with senior insurgent leaders. Senior U.S. officials have grown more optimistic about reconciliation as contacts between Taliban representatives and the Karzai government have continued and proliferated. On April 7, 2011, the Afghan head of the reintegration process, Mohammad Stanekzai (who is also the secretary of the High Peace Council) said that the government is in talks with Taliban representatives. The issue garnered further attention in May 2011 amid reports that U.S. officials have met at least three times in 2011 with Tayeb Agha, a figure believed close to Mullah Umar. In late June 2011, those meetings were confirmed both by Karzai and by outgoing Defense Secretary Gates, who said the talks have been led by the State Department (deputy SRAP Frank Ruggiero, but not current SRAP Marc Grossman), and have been facilitated by Germany and Qatar. Secretary of State Clinton, in testimony on June 23, 2011, said that negotiations with the Taliban are a necessary if unpleasant requirement for settling the Afghan conflict. To facilitate the talks, there is discussion of allowing the Taliban to open a political office in Turkey or in Qatar.

Still, there is no certainty that the Taliban has fundamentally reassessed its decision not to pursue a political settlement, although it might do so by the end of 2011 if current trends continue. The Taliban continues to demand that (1) all foreign troops leave Afghanistan; (2) a new “Islamic” constitution be adopted; and (3) Islamic law is imposed. However, those are viewed as opening positions; the Afghan government, for its part, may have softened its position on changes to the Afghan constitution as part of a settlement. Secretary Clinton said in India on July 20, 2011 that any settlement must not result in an undoing of “the progress that has been made [by women and ethnic minorities] in the past decade.”

Many in the international community, including within the Obama Administration, initially withheld endorsement of reconciliation, fearing it might result in the incorporation into the Afghan political system of insurgent leaders who retain ties to Al Qaeda and commit abuses similar to those under the Taliban regime. Representing a U.S. and international shift on the issue, the July 20, 2010, Kabul Conference endorsed establishment of an Afghan High Peace Council to build Afghan consensus on the issue. That Council was established on September 5, 2010, and its 70 members met for the first time under the leadership of Tajik leader Rabbani on October 10, 2010. Yet, the direct role of the Council in negotiations is unclear; it might be asked to review and endorse any settlement that is reached. In a significant step, the leadership of the Afghan High Peace Council visited Pakistan several times during 2011, to discuss with senior Pakistani officials some of the issues that might promote a negotiated settlement in Afghanistan. Rabbani also attended the Contact Group meeting in Jeddah, mentioned above, on March 3, 2011. Provincial representative offices have been established in 27 provinces, as of June 2011. On the other hand, some of the nine women on the Council say their views are largely dismissed.



Prior to the 2011 reports, amid reports of talks during 2010, hopes were dashed when it was revealed that one of the purported senior Taliban interlocutors was an imposter. Still, Mullah Bradar, who is close to Mullah Umar, was said by the Afghan side to have been engaged in talks with the Afghan government prior to his arrest by Pakistan in February 2010. Karzai reportedly believes that Pakistan arrested Bradar in order to be able to influence the course of any Afghan government-Taliban settlement. The Taliban as a movement was not invited to the June 2-4, 2010, consultative peace *jirga*, but some Taliban sympathizers reportedly were there.

Other talks have taken place over the past few years, although with less apparent momentum than is the case in 2010. Press reports said that Afghan officials (led by Karzai's brother Qayyum) and Taliban members had met each other in Ramadan-related gatherings in Saudi Arabia in September 2008. Another round of talks was held in January 2009 in Saudi Arabia, and there were reports of ongoing contacts in Dubai, UAE. Some of these talks apparently involved Arsala Rahmani, a former Taliban official now in parliament, and the former Taliban Ambassador to Pakistan, Abdul Salam Zaef, who purportedly is in touch with Umar's inner circle. These same Taliban representatives may be involved in the ongoing talks referred to by Stanekzai, above. Separately, as discussed above, in advance of the peace *jirga*, the Karzai government and representatives of Hikmatyar confirmed peace talks on March 21, 2010, in which Karzai and several Northern Alliance figures met with the Hikmatyar representatives.

*Removing Taliban Figures From U.N. Sanctions Lists.* The consultative peace *jirga*, in its final declaration, supported Karzai's call for the removal of the names of some Taliban figures from U.N. lists of terrorists, lists established pursuant to Resolution 1267 and Resolution 1333 (October 15, 1999, and December 19, 2000, both pre-September 11 sanctions against the Taliban and Al Qaeda) and Resolution 1390 (January 16, 2002). Press reports before the July 20, 2010, Kabul Conference said the Afghan government has submitted a list of 50 Taliban figures it wants taken off this list (which includes about 140 Taliban-related persons or entities) as a confidence-building measure. The Conference called on Afghanistan to engage with the U.N. Security Council to provide evidence to justify such de-listings, and U.N., U.S., and other international officials said they would support considering de-listings on a case-by-case basis. On January 26, 2010, Russia, previously a hold-out against such a process, dropped opposition to removing five Taliban-era figures from these sanctions lists, including Taliban-era foreign minister Wakil Mutawwakil, who ran in 2005 parliamentary elections. Also removed was Abdul Hakim Monib, who has served Karzai as governor of Uruzgan, Abdul Hakim Mujahid, who was Taliban representative in the United States, and three others. Mujahid now is one of three deputy chairs of the High Peace Council. "Mullah Rocketi," not on the sanctions list, is a former Taliban commander who ran for president in the August 2009 elections.

On June 17, 2011, in concert with U.S. confirmations of talks with Taliban figures, the U.N. Security Council adopted Resolution 1988 and 1989. The resolutions drew a separation between the Taliban and Al Qaeda with regard to the sanctions. However, a decision on whether to remove the 50 Taliban figures from the list, as suggested by Afghanistan, was deferred. On July 21, 2011, fourteen Taliban figures were removed from the "1267" sanctions list; among them were four members of the High Peace Council (including Arsala Rahmani, mentioned above).

## **Local Security Experiments: Afghan Provincial Protection Program (APPP), Afghan Local Police (ALP), and Village Stability Operations**

Until mid-2008, U.S. military commanders opposed assisting local militias anywhere in Afghanistan for fear of creating rivals to the central government. The urgent security needs in Afghanistan caused reconsideration and, during his command, General Petraeus expanded local security experiments, based on successful experiences in Iraq and after designing mechanisms to reassure Karzai that any local security organs would be firmly under Afghan government control.

### *Afghan Local Police*

One major initiative is the “Afghan Local Police” (ALP), a program in which local security organs are formed from local recruits who want to defend their communities. The local units are under the control of district police chiefs and each fighter is vetted by a local shura as well as Afghan intelligence (Petraeus testimony, March 15 and 16, 2011). As of August 2011, the initiative has recruited a total of about 6,000 ALP from 40 different districts in several different provinces. There are three ALP centers in Helmand province. According to August 2011 press reports, 100 districts have been approved for the program, each with about 300 fighters, which would bring the target size of the program to about 30,000. The Defense Department notified Congress in September 2010 that it will reprogram about \$35 million in Afghan security forces funding to support the initiative.

### *Afghan Provincial Protection Program*

The ALP initiative builds on another program begun in 2008, termed the “Afghan Provincial Protection Program” (APPP, commonly called “AP3”) and is funded with DOD (CERP) funds. The APPP got under way in Wardak Province (Jalrez district) in early 2009 and 100 local security personnel “graduated” in May 2009. It has been expanded to 1,200 personnel, in a province with a population of about 500,000. U.S. commanders say that no U.S. weapons are supplied to the militias, but this is an Afghan-led program and the Afghan government is providing weapons (Kalashnikov rifles) to the local groups, possibly using U.S. funds. Participants in the program are given \$200 per month. General Petraeus showcased Wardak in August 2010 as an example of the success of the APPP and similar efforts. The National Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 111-84) called for a report on the program within 120 days of the October 28, 2009, enactment.

### *Village Stability Operations*

A separate program, the Local Defense Initiative, began in February 2010 in Arghandab district of Qandahar Province. U.S. Special Forces organized about 25 villagers into a neighborhood watch group, which is armed. The program has been credited by U.S. commanders as bringing normal life back to the district. A different militia was allowed to operate in Konduz to help secure the northern approaches to that city. Problems arose when the militia began arbitrarily administering justice, fueling the concerns discussed above these local security approaches. This program apparently has evolved into a joint Afghan-ISAF program called “Village Stability Operations,” in which personnel from these forces live in remote communities to help improve governance, security and development. The program is discussed in the April 2011 DOD “1230 report.”

The local security experiments to date are not *arbokai*, which are private tribal militias. Still, some believe that the *arbokai* concept should be revived as a means of securing Afghanistan, as

the *arbokai* did during the reign of Zahir Shah and in prior pre-Communist eras. Reports persist that some tribal groupings have formed *arbokai* without specific authorization.

### ***Reversal of Previous Efforts: DDR and DIAG programs***

As noted, the local security programs appear to reverse the 2002-2007 efforts to disarm local sources of armed force.

*DDR*: The main program, run by UNAMA, was called the “DDR” program—Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration—and it formally concluded on June 30, 2006. The program got off to a slow start because the Afghan Defense Ministry did not reduce the percentage of Tajiks in senior positions by a July 1, 2003, target date, dampening Pashtun recruitment. In September 2003, Karzai replaced 22 senior Tajiks in the Defense Ministry officials with Pashtuns, Uzbeks, and Hazaras, enabling DDR to proceed. The major donor for the program was Japan, which contributed about \$140 million. Figures for collected weapons are in and U.S. spending on the programs are in the U.S. aid tables later in the report.

The DDR program was initially expected to demobilize 100,000 fighters, although that figure was later reduced. (Figures for accomplishment of the DDR and DIAG programs are contained in **Table 7**) Of those demobilized, 55,800 former fighters have exercised reintegration options provided by the program: starting small businesses, farming, and other options. U.N. officials say at least 25% of these found long-term, sustainable jobs. Some studies criticized the DDR program for failing to prevent a certain amount of rearmament of militiamen or stockpiling of weapons and for the rehiring of some militiamen.<sup>48</sup> Part of the DDR program was the collection and cantonment of militia weapons, but generally only poor-quality weapons were collected. As one example, Fahim, still the main military leader of the Northern Alliance faction, continues to turn heavy weapons over to U.N. and Afghan forces (including four Scud missiles), although the U.N. Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) says that large quantities of weapons remain in the Panjshir Valley.

Despite the earlier demobilization, which affected many of the northern minorities, there are indications that some faction leaders may be seeking to revive disbanded militias. The minorities may fear increased Taliban influence as a result of the Karzai reconciliation efforts, and the minorities want to be sure they could combat any Taliban abuses that might result if the Taliban achieves a share of power.

*DIAG*: Since June 11, 2005, the disarmament effort has emphasized another program called “DIAG”—Disbandment of Illegal Armed Groups. It is run by the Afghan Disarmament and Reintegration Commission, headed by Vice President Khalili. Under the DIAG, no payments are available to fighters, and the program depends on persuasion rather than use of force against the illegal groups. DIAG has not been as well funded as was DDR: it has received \$11 million in operating funds. As an incentive for compliance, Japan and other donors have made available \$35 million for development projects where illegal groups have disbanded. These incentives were intended to accomplish the disarmament of a pool of as many as 150,000 members of 1,800 different “illegal armed groups”: militiamen that were not part of recognized local forces (Afghan Military Forces, AMF) and were never on the rolls of the Defense Ministry. These goals were not

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<sup>48</sup> For an analysis of the DDR program, see Christian Denny. *Disarmament, Demobilization and Rearmament?*, June 6, 2005, <http://www.jca.apc.org/~jann/Documents/Disarmament%20demobilization%20rearmament.pdf>.

met by the December 2007 target date in part because armed groups in the south say they need to remain armed against the Taliban, but UNAMA reports that 100 out of 140 districts planned for DIAG are now considered “DIAG compliant.” (U.N. Secretary General Report, March 9, 2011).

**Table 7. Major Security-Related Indicators**

<b>Force</b>	<b>Current Level</b>
Total Foreign Forces in Afghanistan	About 141,000: About 98,000 U.S. and 42,000 non-U.S. partner forces. (U.S. total was: 25,000 in 2005; 16,000 in 2003; 5,000 in 2002. ISAF totals were: 12,000 in 2005; and 6,000 in 2003.) US. forces deployed at 88 bases in Afghanistan, and include 1 air wing (40 aircraft) and 1 combat aviation brigade (100 aircraft).
U.S. Casualties in Afghanistan	1,635 killed, of which 1,362 by hostile action. Additional 99 U.S. deaths in other OEF theaters, including the Philippines and parts of Africa. 150 U.S. killed from October 2001-January 2003. 315 killed in 2009, and about 500 killed in 2010. Over 300 UK forces killed in Afghanistan to date.
NATO Sectors (Regional Commands—South, east, north, west, and central/Kabul)	RC-S: 35,000 (U.K. lead). RC-Southwest: 27,000 (U.S. lead); RC-E: 32,000 (U.S. lead); RC-N: 11,000 (German lead); RC-W: 6,000 (Italy lead) RC-Kabul: 5,000 (Turkey, Afghan lead).
Afghan National Army (ANA)	Close to the current goal of 171,600 by Oct. 2011. About 2,000 trained per month. 5,300 are commando forces, trained by U.S. Special Forces. ANA private paid about \$200 per month; generals receive about \$750 per month.
Afghan National Police (ANP)	Close to current goal of 134,000 by Oct. 2011. Of the force, 20,000 are Border Police; 3,800+ counter-narcotics police; 9,400 Civil Order Police (ANCOP). 1,000+ are female. ANP salaries raised to \$240 per month in November 2009, from \$120, to counter corruption. Some police paid by E-Paisa system of Roshan cell network.
ANSF Salaries	About \$800 million per year total, paid by donor countries bilaterally or via donor trust funds
U.S. and Partner Trainers	About 4,000, with target of 4,750. Pledges to fill the 750 person gap still required
Armed Fighters disarmed by DDR or DIAG	63,380 demobilized by DDR—all of the pool identified for the program. 100 out of 140 districts identified for DIAG deemed “DIAG compliant” as of March 2010.
Number of Al Qaeda	“Less than 100 or so”, according to General Petraeus in April 2011. Also, small numbers of Lashkar-e-Tayyiba, Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, Pakistan Taliban, others.
Number of Taliban fighters	Up to 25,000 (U.S. military and Afghan estimates). Some estimates higher. Plus about 3,000 Haqqani faction and 1,000 Hikmatyar (HIG).
Insurgents Reintegrated	About 2,000 since 2010 with at least another 1,000 awaiting processing
Attacks per day (average)	1,500+ per month in 2010; compared to 800 per month in 2007; 400 in 2005.
Afghan casualties	See CRS Report R41084, <i>Afghanistan Casualties: Military Forces and Civilians</i> , by Susan G. Chesser.

**Sources:** CRS; testimony and public statements by DOD officials.

## **Current and Post-Transition Policy Alternatives/Support for Rapidly Reducing U.S. Military Involvement**

As the transition proceeds in July 2011, there is growing discussion of alternative strategies and policies. Some of these proposals may have been mooted by the President’s June 22 speech, but some experts believe that alternatives need to stay under active consideration, depending on how well the mission proceeds as U.S. forces are reduced.

## **Counter-Terrorism/Counter-Terrorism “Plus” Proposals**

During the late 2009 strategy review, some, purportedly including Vice President Joseph Biden, favored a more limited mission for Afghanistan designed solely to disrupt Al Qaeda in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Some believed that the President might adopt this strategy when he made his June 22 drawdown announcement. However, he appears to have leaned toward a modified version of this strategy called “counter-terrorism plus,” in which combat is conducted by Special Operations forces against high value targets but some regular U.S. forces remain to protect some key population centers. Still, some believe the President might adopt a counter-terrorism strategy as long-term U.S. policy in Afghanistan beyond 2014.

As noted, a counter-terrorism strategy was not adopted in 2009. However, U.S. commanders say that some of the most effective current U.S. operations consist of Special Operations forces tracking and killing selected key mid-level insurgent commanders, even though such operations were not intended to be the centerpiece of current U.S. strategy. Some of these operations reportedly involve Afghan commandos trained by U.S. Special Forces.

Critics of the limited counter-terrorism strategy express the view that the Afghan government might collapse and Al Qaeda would have safe haven again in Afghanistan if there are insufficient numbers of U.S. forces there.<sup>49</sup> Others say that it would be difficult to identify targets to strike with unmanned or manned aircraft unless there were sufficient forces on the ground to identify targets.

## **Expand Afghan Forces/Rapid Transition to Afghan Lead**

Some have long advocated a rapid build-up of Afghan security forces as an alternative to large numbers of U.S. troops. During the Administration debate over strategy in late 2009, some Members of Congress, including Senate Armed Services Committee Chairman Carl Levin, took this position. Still, the focus on building up Afghan forces as a central feature of the President’s June 22 drawdown announcement indicates that this option has been adopted to a large extent.

## **Make Concessions to the Taliban/De-Facto Partition**

Some experts, such as former U.S. Ambassador to India Robert Blackwill and members of a working group sponsored by the Century Foundation (including former negotiator Lakhdar Brahimi and former high-ranking State Department official Thomas Pickering), believe that a preferable strategy would be to work with Pakistan and other neighboring states to reach a political settlement that might be favorable to the Taliban. These plans might involve allowing the Taliban to control large parts of the south and east, where the insurgency is most active, and to work with the Northern Alliance to keep other parts of Afghanistan relatively peaceful. These plans are referred to by experts as partition or de-facto partition plans, although those terms are usually used by experts who believe these plans amount to little more than a managed U.S. defeat.

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<sup>49</sup> Ibid.

## **Legislatively Mandated Drawdown**

In Congress, some have expressed support for efforts or plans to wind down the U.S. involvement in Afghanistan far more rapidly than those outlined by the Administration. That effort appears to have gained momentum in the aftermath of the death of Osama bin Laden on May 1, 2011. In the 111<sup>th</sup> Congress, H.Con.Res. 248, a resolution introduced by Representative Kucinich to require removal of U.S. forces from Afghanistan not later than December 31, 2010, was defeated in the House by a vote of 65 to 356 on March 10, 2010. Other legislation, requiring the Administration to develop (by January 1, 2011) plans to wind down the U.S. military presence in Afghanistan failed 18-80, May 27, 2010) in a Senate vote during consideration of a FY2010 supplemental appropriation (H.R. 4899). On July 1, 2010, the House voted 162-260 to reject a plan in that bill to require the Administration to submit, by April 4, 2011, a plan and timetable to redeploy from Afghanistan. Earlier, in House consideration of a FY2010 National Defense Authorization Act (H.R. 2647), a similar provision failed on June 25, 2009, by a vote of 138-278.

However, in the 112<sup>th</sup> Congress, on May 26, 2011, an amendment to the defense authorization bill (H.R. 1540) that would have required a plan to accelerate the transition to Afghan-lead security failed narrowly by a vote of 204-215. The amendment contained the main elements of the “Afghanistan Exit and Accountability Act” (H.R. 1735), which was introduced after the death of bin Laden. A day earlier (May 25), an amendment that would require U.S. troops to withdraw and leave in place only U.S. counter-terrorism operations failed 123-294. Among other bills, H.R. 651 requires an agreement with Afghanistan under which U.S. forces redeploy from Afghanistan within one year of entry into that agreement, and H.Con.Res. 28, H.R. 780, and H.Con.Res. 248 require a withdrawal. The latter bill failed by a vote of 356 to 65 on March 10, 2011. The fate of such legislation is uncertain given that the President has now announced a way forward for winding down the U.S. military involvement in Afghanistan.

## **Regional Dimension**

Most of Afghanistan’s neighbors believed that the fall of the Taliban in Afghanistan would stabilize the region, but Islamist militants have continued to challenge the Afghan government and have battled the government of Pakistan and conducted acts of terrorism in India and elsewhere in the region. The Obama Administration’s 2009 announcement that a “transition” to Afghan leadership would begin in July 2011 led some regional powers to plan for what they believe might be a post-U.S. presence scramble for influence in Afghanistan—or at least for the ability to deny their rivals influence there. Iran, which shares with India a fear of any return of radical Taliban (Sunni Muslim) extremism in Afghanistan, has begun over the past year to engage more substantively on the future of Afghanistan with other regional countries and, to a lesser extent, with other international actors. These maneuverings, to some extent, cast doubt on the commitment of Afghanistan’s six neighbors to a non-interference pledge (Kabul Declaration) on December 23, 2002. State Department officials say that one of the goals of the December 2011 Bonn Conference on Afghanistan will be for regional countries to publicly recommit to the Declaration. That meeting purportedly is to be attended by high level representatives from 90 countries.

At the same time, Afghanistan has been re-integrating into regional security and economic organizations that reflect an effort to conduct relatively normal commerce and diplomatic relationships and which could make Afghanistan the Central Asia-South Asia trading hub that is an increasing focus of Administration policy for Afghanistan now that the transition is under way. In November 2005, Afghanistan joined the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), and Afghanistan has observer status in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, a security coordination body that includes Russia, China, and several Central Asian states. U.S. officials have sought to enlist both regional and greater international support for Afghanistan through the still-expanding 44-nation “International Contact Group,” which held its latest meeting in Jeddah on March 3, 2011.

Several regional summit meeting series have been established involving Afghanistan, including summit meetings between Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Turkey; and between Iran, Afghanistan, and Pakistan. The latest Iran-Afghanistan-Pakistan meeting took place in Tehran on June 25. The fifth of the Turkey-led meetings occurred on December 24, 2010, and resulted in a decision for joint military exercises in March 2011 between Turkey, Afghanistan, and Pakistan, and support from Karzai for the Taliban to set up an office in Istanbul for conducting reconciliation talks. There is to be a major meeting on Afghanistan in Turkey in November 2011 immediately preceding the Bonn Conference the following month. Russia has put together two “quadrilateral summits,” the latest of which was on August 18, 2010, among Pakistan, Russia, Afghanistan, and Tajikistan, and focused on counter-narcotics and anti-smuggling.

Other regional collaborations include the Regional Economic Cooperation Conference on Afghanistan, which was launched in 2005. Another is a UNAMA-led “Kabul Silk Road” initiative, to promote regional cooperation on Afghanistan. As shown in the table below, cooperation from several of the regional countries are crucial to U.S. and ISAF operations and resupply in Afghanistan.

**Table 8. Afghan and Regional Facilities Used for Operations in and Supply Lines to Afghanistan**

<b>Facility</b>	<b>Use</b>
Bagram Air Base	50 miles north of Kabul, the operational hub of U.S. forces in Afghanistan, and base for CJTF-82. At least 2000 U.S. military personnel are based there. Handles many of the 150+ U.S. aircraft (including helicopters) in country. Hospital constructed, one of the first permanent structures there. FY2005 supplemental (P.L. 109-13) provided about \$52 million for various projects to upgrade facilities at Bagram, including a control tower and an operations center, and the FY2006 supplemental appropriation (P.L. 109-234) provided \$20 million for military construction there. NATO also using the base and sharing operational costs. Bagram can be accessed directly by U.S. military flights following April 2010 agreement by Kazakhstan to allow overflights of U.S. lethal equipment.
Qandahar Air Field	Just outside Qandahar, the hub of military operations in the south. Turned over from U.S. to NATO/ISAF control in late 2006 in conjunction with NATO assumption of peacekeeping responsibilities. Enhanced (along with other facilities in the south) at cost of \$1.3 billion to accommodate influx of U.S. combat forces in the south.
Shindand Air Base	In Farah province, about 20 miles from Iran border. Used by U.S. forces and combat aircraft since October 2004, after the dismissal of Herat governor Ismail Khan, who controlled it.
Peter Ganci Base: Manas, Kyrgyzstan	Used by 1,200 U.S. military personnel as well as refueling and cargo aircraft for shipments into Afghanistan. Leadership of Kyrgyzstan changed in April 2005 in an uprising against President Askar Akayev and again in April 2010 against Kurmanbek Bakiyev. Previous Kyrgyz governments demanded the U.S. vacate the base but in both cases, (July 2006 and July 2009) agreement to use the base was extended in exchange for large increase in U.S. payments for its use (to \$60 million per year in the latter case). Interim government formed in April 2010 first threatened then retracted eviction of U.S. from the base, but the issue remains subject to decision making by a new government elected in Kyrgyzstan on October 11, 2010. Some questions have arisen in Congress over alleged corruption involving fuel suppliers of U.S. aircraft at the base.
Incirlik Air Base, Turkey	About 2,100 U.S. military personnel there; U.S. aircraft supply U.S. forces in Iraq and Afghanistan. U.S. use repeatedly extended for one year intervals by Turkey.
Al Dhafra, UAE	Air base used by about 1,800 U.S. military personnel, to supply U.S. forces and related transport into Iraq and Afghanistan. Could see increasing use if Manas closes.
Al Udeid Air Base, Qatar	Largest air facility used by U.S. in region. About 5,000 U.S. personnel in Qatar. Houses central air operations coordination center for U.S. missions in Iraq and Afghanistan; also houses CENTCOM forward headquarters. Could see increased use if Manas closes.
Naval Support Facility, Bahrain	U.S. naval command headquarters for OEF anti-smuggling, anti-terrorism, and anti-proliferation naval search missions, and Iraq-related naval operations (oil platform protection) in the Persian Gulf and Arabian Sea. About 5,100 U.S. military personnel there.
Karsi-Khanabad Air Base, Uzbekistan	Not used by U.S. since September 2005 following U.S.-Uzbek dispute over May 2005 Uzbek crackdown on unrest in Andijon. Once housed about 1,750 U.S. military personnel (900 Air Force, 400 Army, and 450 civilian) supplying Afghanistan. Uzbekistan allowed German use of the base temporarily in March 2008, indicating possible healing of the rift. U.S. relations with Uzbekistan improved in 2009, but U.S. officials said in 2010 that the use of the air base is still not under active discussion. Some shipments beginning in February 2009 through Navoi airfield in central Uzbekistan, and U.S. signed agreement with Uzbekistan on April 4, 2009, allowing nonlethal supplies for the Afghanistan war. Goods are shipped to Latvia and Georgia, some transits Russia by rail, then to Uzbekistan.
Tajikistan	Some use of air bases and other facilities by coalition partners, including France, and emergency use by U.S. India also uses bases under separate agreement. New supply lines to Afghanistan established in February 2009 ("northern route") make some use of Tajikistan.
Pakistan	As discussed below, most U.S. supplies flow through Pakistan. Heavy equipment docks in Karachi and is escorted by security contractors to the Khyber Pass crossing.



## **Pakistan/Pakistan-Afghanistan Border<sup>50</sup>**

Pakistan's determination to retain influence over Afghanistan is heavily colored by fears of historic rival India. Pakistan views a friendly Afghanistan as providing Pakistan strategic depth against rival India, and Pakistan seeks to ensure that any Afghan government does not align closely with India. Pakistan says India is using its Embassy and four consulates in Afghanistan (Pakistan says India has nine such consulates) to train and recruit anti-Pakistan insurgents, and is using its reconstruction funds to build influence there.

The Obama Administration policy reviews in 2009 and 2010 all emphasized the linkage between militant safehaven in Pakistan and the difficulty stabilizing Afghanistan. The December 2010 U.S. policy review said that greater cooperation with Pakistan is necessary to address militant safehavens there, but that denial of safehavens also requires effective development strategies inside Pakistan. The Administration report on progress in Afghanistan, released April 5, 2011, cited earlier, noted that Pakistan has, in some ways, been deficient in pursuing militants and eliminating safehavens on its side of the border. Questions about Pakistan's commitment to the overall effort against militants increased substantially after the May 1, 2011, U.S. raid on bin Laden's compound in Abbotabad, a compound which he apparently inhabited for more than five years without being discovered by Pakistani intelligence. That event has led to some public recriminations by Pakistan about U.S. interference, but continuing on-the-ground cooperation between the two countries, by most accounts.

Other U.S. concerns reflect Pakistan's efforts to secure its interests in any settlement between the Afghan government and the insurgent leadership. As noted above, Pakistan is perceived as protecting the Haqqani network in order to carve out a role for the group as a Pakistan ally in a post-settlement Afghanistan. At the same time, since 2010 Karzai has met frequently with Pakistan's army chief of staff General Ashfaq Kiyani and the head of Pakistan's Inter Services Intelligence Directorate (ISI), General Ahmad Shuja Pasha to discuss a potential settlement to the Afghan conflict. Through meetings such as these, Pakistan has sought to rebut allegations that its Inter-Service Intelligence (ISI) directorate is supporting the Haqqani faction and others.<sup>51</sup>

## **Increased Direct U.S. Action Against Afghan Militants in Pakistan<sup>52</sup>**

Aside from the raid on bin Laden's compound, the Obama Administration has generally tried to combat Afghanistan-focused militants in Pakistan without directly violating Pakistan's restrictions on the U.S. ability to operate "on the ground" in Pakistan. The Obama Administration has significantly increased the use of Predator and Reaper unmanned aircraft to strike militant targets in Pakistan as compared to the Bush Administration. Pakistani militant group Tehrik-e-Taliban (TTP, Pakistan Taliban) leader Baitullah Mehsud was killed in such a U.S. strike in August 2009. Some militant websites say the strikes are taking a major toll on their operations and networks.

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<sup>50</sup> For extensive analysis of U.S. policy toward Pakistan, and U.S. assistance to Pakistan in conjunction with its activities against Al Qaeda and the Taliban, see CRS Report RL33498, *Pakistan-U.S. Relations*, by K. Alan Kronstadt.

<sup>51</sup> Mazzetti, Mark and Eric Schmitt. "CIA Outlines Pakistan Links With Militants." *New York Times*, July 30, 2008.

<sup>52</sup> CRS Report RL34763, *Islamist Militancy in the Pakistan-Afghanistan Border Region and U.S. Policy*, by K. Alan Kronstadt and Kenneth Katzman.

## **Pakistan's Cooperation Against Al Qaeda**

For the first several years after the September 11, 2001, attacks, Pakistani cooperation against Al Qaeda had been considered by U.S. officials to be relatively consistent and effective. During 2001-2006, the Bush Administration praised then President Pervez Musharraf for Pakistani accomplishments against Al Qaeda, including the arrest of over 700 Al Qaeda figures since the September 11 attacks.<sup>53</sup> After the attacks, Pakistan provided the United States with access to Pakistani airspace, some ports, and some airfields for OEF. Others say Musharraf acted against Al Qaeda only when it threatened him directly; for example, after the December 2003 assassination attempts against him.

U.S. criticism of Pakistan's commitment increased following a *New York Times* report (February 19, 2007) that Al Qaeda had reestablished some small terrorist training camps in Pakistan, near the Afghan border. As noted above, Pakistan's commitment has come under major question as a result of the discovery of the Abbotabad compound of Osama bin Laden, although no evidence has come to light suggesting that senior Pakistani officials knew he was there.

## **Pakistan-Afghanistan Relations**

The U.S. mission in Afghanistan also depends on healthy, consistent, and operationally significant cooperation between Pakistan and Afghanistan. However, Afghanistan-Pakistan relations have tended to fluctuate. Many Afghans fondly remember Pakistan's role as the hub for U.S. backing of the mujahedin that forced the Soviet withdrawal in 1988-89, but, later, most Afghan leaders came to resent Pakistan as the most public defender of the Taliban movement when it was in power. (Pakistan was one of only three countries to formally recognize it as the legitimate government; Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates are the others.)

Since 2008, the end of the Musharraf era, there has been a significant improvement in Afghanistan-Pakistan relations. Karzai attended the September 9, 2008, inauguration of Zardari. A "peace *jirga*" process—a series of meetings of notables on each side of the border—was launched at a September 28, 2006, dinner hosted by President Bush for Karzai and Musharraf, and meetings of 700 Pakistani and Afghan tribal elders were held in August 2007 and again in October, 2008. Zardari visited Kabul on January 9, 2009, where he and Karzai signed a joint declaration against terrorism that affects both countries. (A September 2010 meeting between them appeared to be a rededication of this declaration.) Afghan and Pakistani ministers jointly visited Washington, DC, during February 23-27, 2009, to participate in the first Obama Administration strategic review. As noted above, Karzai and Zardari conducted a joint visit to Washington, DC, in May 2009.

The relationship was again placed under strain following the killing of bin Laden, with many Afghan figures, including President Karzai, using the discovery of bin Laden's hiding place to portray Pakistan as insincere and as a harbinger of regional militant figures. Still, Karzai had what were widely described as productive meetings in Islamabad during June 10-11, 2011, including the announcement of implementation of the new transit trade agreement discussed below. The summit paved the way for a U.S.-Pakistan-Afghanistan meeting on June 28, 2011, attended by

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<sup>53</sup> Among those captured by Pakistan are top bin Laden aide Abu Zubaydah (captured April 2002); alleged September 11 plotter Ramzi bin Al Shibh (September 11, 2002); top Al Qaeda planner Khalid Shaikh Mohammed (March 2003); and a top planner, Abu Faraj al-Libbi (May 2005).

SRAP Grossman, the purpose of which was to discuss possible pathways to reconciliation in the Afghan conflict. However, the tripartite meeting was clouded somewhat by Afghan allegations that several hundred rockets had been fired into Afghanistan from Pakistan in prior days – allegations that have continued since.

In April 2008, in an extension of the Tripartite Commission’s work, the three countries agreed to set up five “border coordination centers” (BCCs) which include networks of radar nodes to give liaison officers a common view of the border area. These centers build on an agreement in May 2007 to share intelligence on extremists’ movements. Four have been established to date, including one near the Torkham Gate at the Khyber Pass, but all four are on the Afghan side of the border. The White House report released April 5, 2011, said that Pakistan had not fulfilled its pledge (May 2009) to establish one on the Pakistani side of the border. In June 2008, Pakistan ended a six-month suspension in attendance at meetings of the Tripartite Commission under which NATO, Afghan, and Pakistani military leaders meet regularly on both sides of the border.

Regarding the long-term relationship, Pakistan wants the government of Afghanistan to pledge to abide by the “Durand Line,” a border agreement reached between Britain (signed by Sir Henry Mortimer Durand) and then Afghan leader Amir Abdul Rahman Khan in 1893, separating Afghanistan from what was then British-controlled India (later Pakistan after the 1947 partition). The border is recognized by the United Nations, but Afghanistan continues to indicate that the border was drawn unfairly to separate Pashtun tribes and should be renegotiated. As of October 2002, about 1.75 million Afghan refugees have returned from Pakistan since the Taliban fell, but as many as 3 million might still remain in Pakistan, and Pakistan says it plans to expel them back into Afghanistan in the near future.

### ***Afghanistan-Pakistan Transit Trade Agreement (APTTA)***

Pakistan has also sought to control Afghanistan’s trade, particularly with India, leading to U.S. efforts to persuade Pakistan to forge a “transit trade” agreement with Afghanistan. That effort bore success with the signature of a trade agreement between the two on July 18, 2010, allowing for an easier flow of Afghan products, which are mostly agricultural products that depend on rapid transit. On June 12, 2011, in the context of a Karzai visit to Islamabad, both countries began full implementation of the agreement. It is expected to greatly expand the \$2 billion in trade per year the two countries were doing prior to the agreement. The agreement represented a success for the Canada-sponsored “Dubai Process” of talks between Afghanistan and Pakistan on modernizing border crossings, new roads, and a comprehensive border management strategy to meet IMF benchmarks.

The Afghanistan-Pakistan trade agreement came after earlier signs of growing cooperation, including Afghan agreement to send more Afghan graduate students to study in Pakistan, and a June 2010 Afghan agreement to send small numbers of ANA officers to undergo training in Pakistan.<sup>54</sup> In early January 2011, Secretary of Homeland Security Janet Napolitano visited Afghanistan and announced a future tripling (from 25 to 77) of the number of U.S. customs agents that will train Afghan border and customs officers.

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<sup>54</sup> Partlow, Joshua. “Afghans Build Up Ties With Pakistan.” *Washington Post*, July 21, 2010.

## **Iran**

Aside from its always tense relations with the United States, Iran perceives its key national interests in Afghanistan as exerting its traditional influence over western Afghanistan, which Iran borders and was once part of the Persian empire, to protect Afghanistan's Shiite and other Persian-speaking minorities, and to deny the United States a base from which to pressure or attack Iran. There are mixed views on how influential Iran is in Afghanistan; most experts appear to see Iran as a relatively marginal player, particularly compared to Pakistan.

The Obama Administration initially saw Iran as potentially helpful to its strategy for Afghanistan; the late SRAP Holbrooke was an advocate of cooperation with Iran on Afghanistan issues. Early in the Administration, Secretary of State Clinton made a point of announcing that Iran would be invited to the U.N.-led meeting on Afghanistan at the Hague on March 31, 2009. At the meeting, the late SRAP Holbrooke briefly met the Iranian leader of his delegation to the meeting, and handed him a letter on several outstanding human rights cases involving Iranian-Americans. At the meeting, Iran pledged cooperation on combating Afghan narcotics and in helping economic development in Afghanistan—both policies Iran is pursuing to a large degree.

Still, suggesting that the concept of cooperation with Iran on Afghanistan still resonates with some U.S. officials and outside experts, Iran's attendance of the October 18, 2010, International Contact Group<sup>55</sup> meeting in Rome, including a briefing by General Petraeus. Earlier, the United States and Iran took similar positions at a U.N. meeting in Geneva in February 2010 that discussed drug trafficking across the Afghan border. Iran did not attend the January 28, 2010, international meeting in London, but it did attend the July 28, 2010, international meeting in Kabul (both discussed above). As a member of the OIC, an Iranian representative attended the March 3, 2011, Contact Group meeting at OIC headquarters in Jeddah.

## **Iran's Development Aid for Afghanistan**

Iran has pledged at least \$400 million in aid to Afghanistan, according to the Afghan government, much of which has been used to build roads and bridges in western Afghanistan. In cooperation with India, Iran has been building roads that would connect western Afghanistan to Iran's port of Chahbahar, and provide Afghan and other goods an easier outlet to the Persian Gulf. Iran also has provided credits to the Afghan private sector and helped develop power transmission lines in the provinces bordering Iran.

## **Iranian Assistance to Afghan Militants and to Pro-Iranian Groups and Regions**

A sustained U.S.-Iran dialogue on Afghanistan, were it to be established, would presumably be intended to address the U.S. concerns about Iran's support for groups that operate against U.S. forces. Iran may be arming groups in Afghanistan to try to pressure U.S. forces that use Afghanistan's Shindand air base,<sup>55</sup> which Iran fears the United States might use to attack or conduct surveillance against Iran. Or, Iran's policy might be to gain broader leverage against the United States by demonstrating that Iran is in position to cause U.S. combat deaths in Afghanistan.

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<sup>55</sup> Rashid, Ahmed. "Afghan Neighbors Show Signs of Aiding in Nation's Stability." *Wall Street Journal*, October 18, 2004.

The State Department report on international terrorism for 2009, released August 5, 2010, said the Qods Force of the Revolutionary Guard of Iran continues to provide training to the Taliban on small unit tactics, small arms, explosives, and indirect weapons fire, as well as ships arms to “selected Taliban members” in Afghanistan. Weapons provided, according to the State Department report, include mortars, 107mm rockets, rocket-propelled grenades, and plastic explosives. On March 9, 2011, NATO said it had seized 48 Iranian-made rockets in Nimruz Province, bound for Afghan militants; the 122mm rockets, have a range (13 miles) greater than those previously provided by Iran. On August 3, 2010, the Treasury Department, acting under Executive Order 13224, named two Qods Force officers as terrorism supporting entities (freezing assets in the United States, if any). They are: Hossein Musavi, Commander of the Qods Force Ansar Corps, which is the key Qods unit involved in Afghanistan, and Hasan Mortezaei, who is a Qods officer responsible for providing funds and materiel to the Taliban, according to the Treasury Department.<sup>56</sup>

### *Assistance to Ethnic and Religious Factions in Afghanistan*

Others are puzzled by Iran’s support of Taliban fighters who are Pashtun, because Iran has traditionally supported Persian-speaking non-Pashtun factions in Afghanistan, many of whom have been oppressed by the Pashtuns. Some of Iran’s funding has been intended to support pro-Iranian groups in the west as well as Hazara Shiites in Kabul and in the Hazara heartland of Bamiyan, Ghazni, and Dai Kundi, in part by providing scholarships and funding for technical institutes. Iran has used some of its funds to construct mosques in Herat, pro-Iranian theological seminaries in Shiite districts of Kabul, and Shiite institutions in Hazara-dominated areas. Iran also offers scholarships to Afghans to study in Iranian universities, and there are consistent allegations that Iran has funded Afghan provincial council and parliamentary candidates who are perceived as pro-Tehran.<sup>57</sup> These efforts have helped Iran retain close ties with Afghanistan’s leading Shiite cleric, Ayatollah Mohammad Mohseni.

### **Bilateral Government-to-Government Relations**

Iran’s interest in a broad relationship with Karzai has not, to date, been affected by Iran’s continued support for Taliban and other militants in Afghanistan. Karzai has, at times, called Iran a “friend” of Afghanistan; in March 2010 he met with Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad on two occasions, possibly to signal to the United States that he might realign with regional actors if the United States continues to criticize his leadership. One of the meetings was just after the departure of visiting Defense Secretary Gates. Previously, Karzai received Ahmadinejad in Kabul in August 2007, and he visited Tehran at the end of May 2009 as part of the tripartite diplomatic process between Iran, Pakistan, and Afghanistan. During a visit to the United States in May 2009, Karzai said he had told both the United States and Iran that Afghanistan must not become an arena for the broader competition and disputes between the United States and Iran.<sup>58</sup> The latest Afghanistan-Pakistan-Iran summit meeting was held in Tehran during June 24-25, 2011. It came a few days after a visit to Afghanistan by Iran’s Defense Minister, Ahmad Vahidi, to sign a bilateral border security agreement.

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<sup>56</sup> Treasury Department. Fact Sheet: U.S. Treasury Department Targets Iran’s Support for Terrorism. August 3, 2010.

<sup>57</sup> King, Laura. “In Western Afghan City, Iran Makes Itself Felt.” *Los Angeles Times*, November 14, 2010.

<sup>58</sup> Comments by President Karzai at the Brookings Institution. May 5, 2009.

A controversy arose in late October 2010 when Karzai acknowledged accepting about \$2 million per year in cash payments from Iran, via his chief of Staff Mohammad Daudzai. On the other hand, in December 2010, Iran suddenly ceased shipping fuel into Afghanistan, causing some spot dislocations in Afghanistan, including in Kabul. The move could have been related to reported shortages of gasoline inside Iran, which are a result of U.S. sanctions imposed on sales of gasoline to Iran in July 2010.

Many Afghans look fondly on Iran for helping them try to oust the Taliban regime when it was in power. Iran saw the Taliban regime, which ruled during 1996-2001, as a threat to its interests in Afghanistan, especially after Taliban forces captured Herat in September 1995. Iran subsequently drew even closer to the ethnic minority-dominated Northern Alliance than previously, providing its groups with fuel, funds, and ammunition.<sup>59</sup> In September 1998, Iranian and Taliban forces nearly came into direct conflict when Iran discovered that nine of its diplomats were killed in the course of the Taliban's offensive in northern Afghanistan. Iran massed forces at the border and threatened military action, but the crisis cooled without a major clash, possibly out of fear that Pakistan would intervene on behalf of the Taliban. Iran offered search and rescue assistance in Afghanistan during the U.S.-led war to topple the Taliban, and it also allowed U.S. humanitarian aid to the Afghan people to transit Iran. Iran helped construct Afghanistan's first post-Taliban government, in cooperation with the United States—at the December 2001 “Bonn Conference.” In February 2002, Iran expelled Karzai-opponent Gulbuddin Hikmatyar, but it did not arrest him. At other times, Afghanistan and Iran have had disputes over Iran's efforts to expel Afghan refugees. About 1.2 million remain, mostly integrated into Iranian society, and a crisis erupted in May 2007 when Iran expelled about 50,000 into Afghanistan. About 300,000 Afghan refugees have returned from Iran since the Taliban fell.

## **India**

The interests and activities of India in Afghanistan are almost the exact reverse of those of Pakistan. India's goal is to deny Pakistan “strategic depth” in Afghanistan, and to deny Pakistan the ability to block India from trade and other connections to Central Asia and beyond. Some believe India has been concerned that any negotiated settlement of the Afghanistan conflict will give Pakistan preponderant influence in Afghanistan, and India, which supported the Northern Alliance against the Taliban in the mid-1990s, has stepping up its contacts with those factions to discuss possible contingencies in the event of an Afghan settlement deal. Still, possibly at U.S. urging, in May 2011, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh publicly expressed India's support for the reconciliation process.

Many of the families of Afghan leaders have lived in India at one time or another and, as noted above, Karzai studied there. India saw the Taliban's hosting of Al Qaeda as a major threat to India itself because of Al Qaeda's association with radical Islamic organizations in Pakistan, such as LET (Lashkar-e-Tayyiba, or Army of the Righteous), one of the groups that was formed in Pakistan to challenge India's control of part of the disputed territories of Jammu and Kashmir. Some observers believe Pakistan wants to retain the ability to stoke these militants against India, even though these militants may be aiding Islamist groups challenging Pakistan's stability. Some of these groups have committed major acts of terrorism in India, and there might be connections

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<sup>59</sup> Steele, Jonathon. “America Includes Iran in Talks on Ending War in Afghanistan.” *Washington Times*, December 15, 1997.

to the militants who carried out the terrorist attacks in Mumbai in November 2008, as well as another attack in that city in July 2011.

Pakistan accuses India of using its four consulates in Afghanistan (Pakistan says there are nine such consulates) to spread Indian influence in Afghanistan. However, many U.S. observers believe India's role in Afghanistan is constructive, and some would support an Indian decision to deploy more security forces in Afghanistan to protect its construction workers, diplomats, and installations. India reportedly decided in August 2008 to improve security for its officials and workers in Afghanistan, but not to send actual troops there. Yet, Tajikistan, which also supported the mostly Tajik Northern Alliance against the Taliban when it was in power, allows India to use one of its air bases.

India is the fifth-largest single country donor to Afghan reconstruction, funding projects worth over \$1.2 billion. Indian officials assert that all their projects are focused on civilian, not military, development and are in line with the development priorities set by the Afghan government. India, along with the Asian Development Bank, financed a \$300 million project, mentioned above, to bring electricity from Central Asia to Afghanistan. It has also renovated the well-known Habibia High School in Kabul and committed to a \$25 million renovation of Darulaman Palace as the permanent house for Afghanistan's parliament. India financed the construction of a road to the Iranian border in remote Nimruz province, and it is currently constructing the 42 megawatt hydroelectric Selwa Dam in Herat Province at a cost of about \$80 million. This will increase electricity availability in the province. India is also helping the IDLG with its efforts to build local governance organizations, and it provides 1,000 scholarships per year for Afghans to undergo higher education in India. Some Afghans want to enlist even more Indian assistance in training Afghan bureaucrats in accounting, forensic accounting, oversight, and other disciplines that will promote transparency in Afghan governance.

## **Russia, Central Asian States, and China**

Some neighboring and nearby states take an active interest not only in Afghan stability, but in the U.S. military posture that supports U.S. operations in Afghanistan. The region to the north of Afghanistan is a growing factor in U.S. efforts to rely less on supply routes through Pakistan.

### **Russia/Northern Distribution Network**

Russia wants to reemerge as a great power and to contain U.S. power in Central Asia, including Afghanistan. At the same time, by supporting the "Northern Distribution Network" supply route for NATO forces in Afghanistan, Russia supports U.S. and NATO efforts to combat militants in the region who have sometimes posed a threat to Russia itself. Its hosting of the "quadrilateral summits" mentioned above, could represent stepped up efforts by Russia to exert influence on the Afghanistan issue. President Medvedev is expected to visit Afghanistan later in 2011, a high profile visit given the sensitivities Afghans have about Russia's past involvement in Afghanistan. Previously, Russia had kept a low profile in the country because it still feels humiliated by its withdrawal in 1989 and senses some Afghan resentment of the Soviet occupation.

In June 2010, Russia said more economic and social assistance is needed for Afghanistan. Russia reportedly is considering investing \$1 billion in Afghanistan to develop its electricity capacity and build out other infrastructure. Included in those investments are implementation of an agreement, reached during a Karzai visit to Moscow on January 22, 2011, for Russia to resume long dormant

Soviet occupation-era projects such as expanding the Salang Tunnel connecting the Panjshir Valley to Kabul, hydroelectric facilities in Kabul and Baghlan provinces, a customs terminal, and a university in Kabul. Since 2002, Russia has been providing some humanitarian aid to Afghanistan.

During the 1990s, after its 1989 withdrawal and the breakup of the Soviet Union, Russia supported the Northern Alliance against the Taliban with some military equipment and technical assistance in order to blunt Islamic militancy emanating from Afghanistan.<sup>60</sup> Although Russia supported the U.S. effort against the Taliban and Al Qaeda in Afghanistan out of fear of Islamic (mainly Chechen) radicals, Russia continues to seek to reduce the U.S. military presence in Central Asia. Russian fears of Islamic activism emanating from Afghanistan may have ebbed since 2002 when Russia killed a Chechen of Arab origin known as “Hattab” (full name is Ibn al-Khattab), who led a militant pro-Al Qaeda Chechen faction. The Taliban government was the only one in the world to recognize Chechnya’s independence, and some Chechen fighters fighting alongside Taliban/Al Qaeda forces have been captured or killed.

### ***Northern Distribution Network and Other Aid to Afghan Security***

Russian cooperation is crucial to the U.S. effort in Afghanistan. In February 2009, Russia paved the way for the expansion of the Northern Distribution Network by allowing the resumption of shipment of non-lethal equipment into Afghanistan through Russia (following a suspension in 2008 caused by differences over the Russia-Georgia conflict). There are discussions with Russia over possibly allowing some lethal equipment to transit as well. About half of all ground cargo for U.S. forces in Afghanistan now flow through the Northern Distribution Network.

Russia has also responded to NATO requests to provide helicopters and spare parts to the Afghan forces (which still make heavy use of Russian-made Hind helicopters) as well as fuel. In April 2011, there was agreement to establish a “Helicopter Maintenance Trust Fund.” Russia has also delivered 24 helicopters to Afghan forces, financed by the United States. Russia reportedly has pledged to train Afghan security forces.

In November 2010, in its most significant intervention in Afghanistan since its occupation, Russian officers reportedly joined U.S. and Afghan forces attempting to interdict narcotics trafficking in Afghanistan. However, the move prompted a complaint by President Karzai because he was not consulted about the inclusion of the Russians.

### **Central Asian States**

These states are crucial to U.S. strategy in Afghanistan. As shown in the table, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan and Kazakhstan are pivotal actors in U.S. efforts to expand the Northern Distribution Network supply route as an alternative to reliance on routes through Pakistan. These states are also becoming crucial to Afghanistan’s strategy to attempt to emerge as a trade crossroads between South and Central Asia—a strategy that could net Kabul substantial customs duties and other economic benefits. The possible revival of a long-standing plan to establish Afghanistan as a transit hub for Central Asian natural gas (*TAPI* pipeline) is discussed later in this paper under long-term economic development opportunities. Turkmenistan is key to this natural

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<sup>60</sup> Risen, James. “Russians Are Back in Afghanistan, Aiding Rebels.” *New York Times*, July 27, 1998.



gas project but, perhaps to avoid offending Pakistan or other actors, it takes a position of “positive neutrality” on Afghanistan and does not allow its territory to be part of the Northern Distribution Network. No U.S. forces have been based in Turkmenistan.

On security cooperation, Tajikistan allows access primarily to French combat aircraft, and Kazakhstan has allowed use of facilities in case of emergency. In May 2011, Kazakhstan became the first Central Asian state to pledge forces to Afghanistan (four non-combat troops). In April 2010, Kazakhstan agreed to allow U.S. overflights of lethal military equipment to Afghanistan, allowing the United States to use polar routes to fly materiel directly from the United States to Bagram Airfield.

In 1996, several of the Central Asian states banded together with Russia and China into a regional grouping called the Shanghai Cooperation Organization to discuss the Taliban threat. It includes China, Russia, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan. Reflecting Russian and Chinese efforts to limit U.S. influence in the region, the group has issued statements, most recently in August 2007, that security should be handled by the countries in the Central Asia region. A meeting of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization to discuss Afghanistan was held in Moscow on March 25, 2009, and was observed by a U.S. official, as well as by Iran.

Uzbekistan, a sponsor of Afghan faction leader Abdul Rashid Dostam, an ethnic Uzbek, allowed use of Karshi-Khanabad air base by OEF forces from October 2001 until a rift emerged in May 2005 over Uzbekistan’s crackdown against riots in Andijon, and U.S.-Uzbek relations remained largely frozen. Uzbekistan’s March 2008 agreement with Germany for it to use Karshi-Khanabad air base temporarily, for the first time since the rift in U.S.-Uzbek relations developed in 2005, suggests that U.S.-Uzbek cooperation on Afghanistan and other issues might be rebuilt. Renewed U.S. discussions with Uzbekistan apparently bore some fruit with the Uzbek decision in February 2009 to allow the use of Navoi airfield for shipment of U.S./NATO goods into Afghanistan. The late Ambassador Holbrooke visited in February 2010, indicating further warming.

An increasing amount of trade is flowing from Afghanistan to and through the Central Asian states. As noted below, railway lines are being build to Uzbekistan. The Panj bridge, built largely with U.S. funds, has become a major thoroughfare for goods to move between Afghanistan and Tajikistan. Kazakhstan is funding a \$50 million program to develop Afghan professionals.

### *Central Asian Activities During Taliban Rule*

During Taliban rule, Russian and Central Asian leaders grew increasingly alarmed that radical Islamic movements were receiving safe haven in Afghanistan. Uzbekistan, in particular, has long asserted that the group Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), allegedly responsible for four simultaneous February 1999 bombings in Tashkent that nearly killed President Islam Karimov, is linked to Al Qaeda.<sup>61</sup> One of its leaders, Juma Namangani, reportedly was killed while commanding Taliban/Al Qaeda forces in Konduz in November 2001. Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan do not directly border Afghanistan, but IMU guerrillas transited Kyrgyzstan during incursions into Uzbekistan in the late 1990s.

Of the Central Asian states that border Afghanistan, only Turkmenistan chose to seek close relations with the Taliban leadership when it was in power, possibly viewing engagement as a

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<sup>61</sup> The IMU was named a foreign terrorist organization by the State Department in September 2000.

more effective means of preventing spillover of radical Islamic activity from Afghanistan. It saw Taliban control as facilitating construction of the natural gas pipeline, discussed above, that was under consideration during Taliban rule. The September 11 events stoked Turkmenistan's fears of the Taliban and its Al Qaeda guests and the country publicly supported the U.S.-led war.

## **China<sup>62</sup>**

China's involvement in Afghanistan policy appears to be growing, perhaps to secure access to Afghan minerals and resources, and perhaps also to help its ally, Pakistan, avoid encirclement by India. Like Pakistan, China has been a rival of India. China also is concerned about the potential for Islamic militancy in Afghanistan to inflame Islamist sentiment among China's Uighur community in China. A major organizer of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, China has a small border with a sparsely inhabited sliver of Afghanistan known as the "Wakhan Corridor," and it is building border access routes and supply depots to facilitate China's access to Afghanistan through the corridor. Chinese delegations continue to assess the potential for new investments in such sectors as mining and energy,<sup>63</sup> and the cornerstone is the development of the Aynak copper mine south of Kabul. For more information, see the sections below on the Afghan economy: mining sector. In late 2009, China allocated an additional \$75 million in economic aid to Afghanistan, adding to the \$130 million it has provided during 2002-2009. On March 20, 2010, ahead of a visit to China by Karzai, China called for more international support for Afghanistan. During the visit, China stressed that its investments in Afghanistan would continue.

China has not taken any direct role in securing Afghanistan. Having established significant strategic and economic interests in post-Taliban Afghanistan, there were indications in 2009 that China was considering contributing some People's Liberation Army (PLA) forces, possibly in a non-combat role, to help secure Afghanistan. A communiqué from the Obama visit to China in November 2009 implied a possible larger role for China to help stabilize Afghanistan. However, no such Chinese mission has been announced.

In December 2000, sensing China's increasing concern about Taliban policies, a Chinese official delegation met with Mullah Umar. However, China did not enthusiastically support U.S. military action against the Taliban, possibly because China was wary of a U.S. military buildup nearby.

## **Persian Gulf States: Saudi Arabia and UAE**

The Gulf states are considered a key part of the effort to stabilize Afghanistan. As noted, the late Ambassador Holbrooke focused substantial U.S. attention—and formed a multilateral task force—to try to curb continuing Gulf resident donations to the Taliban in Afghanistan. He maintained that these donations are a larger source of Taliban funding than is the narcotics trade. The Gulf states have also been a source of development funds and for influence with some Afghan clerics and factions.

Saudi Arabia has a role to play in Afghanistan in part because, during the Soviet occupation, Saudi Arabia channeled hundreds of millions of dollars to the Afghan resistance, primarily

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<sup>62</sup> For more information, see CRS Report RL33001, *U.S.-China Counterterrorism Cooperation: Issues for U.S. Policy*, by Shirley A. Kan.

<sup>63</sup> CRS conversations with Chinese officials in Beijing. August 2007.

Hikmatyar and Sayyaf. Drawing on its reputed intelligence ties to Afghanistan during that era, Saudi Arabia worked with Taliban leaders to persuade them to suppress anti-Saudi activities by Al Qaeda. Some press reports indicate that, in late 1998, Saudi and Taliban leaders discussed, but did not agree on, a plan for a panel of Saudi and Afghan Islamic scholars to decide bin Laden's fate. A majority of Saudi citizens practice the strict Wahhabi brand of Islam similar to that of the Taliban, and Saudi Arabia was one of three countries to formally recognize the Taliban government. The Taliban initially served Saudi Arabia as a potential counter to Iran, but Iranian-Saudi relations improved after 1997 and balancing Iranian power ebbed as a factor in Saudi policy toward Afghanistan.

Saudi Arabia has played a role as a go-between for negotiations between the Karzai government and "moderate" Taliban figures. This role was recognized at the London conference on January 28, 2010, in which President Karzai stated in his opening speech that he sees a role for Saudi Arabia in helping stabilize Afghanistan. As noted, some reports say that a political settlement might involve Mullah Umar going into exile in Saudi Arabia.

According to U.S. officials, Saudi Arabia cooperated extensively, if not publicly, with OEF. It broke diplomatic relations with the Taliban in late September 2001 and quietly permitted the United States to use a Saudi base for command of U.S. air operations over Afghanistan, but it did not permit U.S. airstrikes from it.

### **UAE Involvement**

The United Arab Emirates, the third country that recognized the Taliban regime, is emerging as another major donor to Afghanistan. Its contribution of about 250 troops mostly to OEF was discussed above (35 of them are assigned to ISAG). The UAE has donated at least \$135 million to Afghanistan since 2002, according to the Afghan Finance Ministry. Projects funded include housing in Qandahar, roads in Kabul, a hospital in Zabol province, and a university in Khost. At the same time, the UAE property market has been an outlet for investment by Afghan leaders who may have acquired their funds through soft loans from the scandal-plagued Kabul Bank or through corruption connected to donor contracts or other businesses.

## **Keys to Afghanistan's Post-War Future: U.S. and International Aid and Economic Development**

Some experts have long believed that accelerating economic development would do more to improve the security situation than combat operations, and that economic development is widely considered pivotal to Afghanistan's ability to shape its future after the bulk of international forces depart. This belief appears to constitute a major element of Obama Administration policy, although some believe the link between economic development and security is unproved. The United States and partner countries provide large amounts of assistance, but many economic sectors have been developed with private investment, including by wealthy or well-connected Afghans who have founded companies. The multiple overlapping funding streams complicate efforts to determine the effects on Afghanistan's economy of aid, as compared to the effects of investment, trade, and other variables. At the same time, there is substantial concern about the effects on the Afghan economy of the transition to Afghan lead, which will likely see donor funds reduced substantially. In July 2011, Secretary of State Clinton and other U.S. officials began to

articulate a post-transition vision of greater Afghan economic integration in the region and its role in a “New Silk Road” trading system.

Hindering that vision is that Afghanistan’s economy and society are still fragile after decades of warfare that left about 2 million dead, 700,000 widows and orphans, and about 1 million Afghan children who were born and raised in refugee camps outside Afghanistan. More than 3.5 million Afghan refugees have since returned, although a comparable number remain outside Afghanistan. The U.N. High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) supervises Afghan repatriation and Afghan refugee camps in Pakistan. As discussed, the literacy rate is very low and Afghanistan has a small, although growing, pool of skilled labor, middle managers, accountants, and information professionals.

There are debates over virtually all aspects of international aid to Afghanistan, including amounts, mechanisms for providing it, coordination among donors, and how aid is distributed within Afghanistan. For example, some of the more stable provinces, such as Bamiyan and Balkh, are complaining that U.S. and international aid is flowing mostly to the restive provinces in an effort to quiet them, and ignoring the needs of poor Afghans in peaceful areas. Later in this report are tables showing U.S. appropriations of assistance to Afghanistan, and **Table 23** lists U.S. spending on all sectors for FY2001-FY2010.

## **U.S. Assistance to Afghanistan**

During the 1990s, the United States became the largest single provider of assistance to the Afghan people. During Taliban rule, no U.S. aid went directly to that government; monies were provided through relief organizations. Between 1985 and 1994, the United States had a cross-border aid program for Afghanistan, implemented by USAID personnel based in Pakistan. Citing the difficulty of administering this program, there was no USAID mission for Afghanistan from the end of FY1994 until the reopening of the U.S. Embassy in Afghanistan in late 2001.

For all of FY2002-FY2011, the United States has provided about \$67.4 billion in assistance, including military “train and equip” for the ANA and ANP (which is about \$39.5 billion of these funds). The figures in the tables do not include costs for U.S. combat operations. Including those costs, the United States spent about \$105 billion for FY2010 and expects to spend about \$120 billion for FY2011. A total of \$118 billion in DOD funds is requested for FY2012 for *both* Afghanistan and Iraq. For further information on combat costs, see CRS Report RL33110, *The Cost of Iraq, Afghanistan, and Other Global War on Terror Operations Since 9/11*, by Amy Belasco.

## **Aid Oversight**

Still heavily dependent on donors, Karzai has sought to reassure the international donor community by establishing a transparent budget and planning process. Some in Congress want to increase independent oversight of U.S. aid to Afghanistan; the conference report on the FY2008 defense authorization bill (P.L. 110-181) established a “special inspector general” for Afghanistan reconstruction, (SIGAR) modeled on a similar outside auditor for Iraq (“Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction,” SIGIR). Funds provided for the SIGAR are in the tables below.

On May 30, 2008, Major General Arnold Fields (Marine, ret.) was named to the position. His office has filed several reports on Afghan reconstruction, which include discussions of SIGAR

staffing levels and activities, as well as several specific project audits. However, he acknowledged that criticisms in a July 2010 “peer review” of SIGAR operations by the Inspectors General of several U.S. agencies were valid, attributing many of the shortcomings to slow pace of fully funding his office.<sup>64</sup> One recent SIGAR report noted deficiencies in the ability of the Afghan government’s Central Audits Office to monitor how funds are used. Another (January 2011) assesses the degree of coordination in U.S. programs to help women and girls. Some Members of Congress criticized the SIGAR for ineffective oversight and called for his replacement; General Fields (ret) announced his resignation in January 2011. His deputy, Herb Richardson, replaced him on an acting basis as of February 2011, but in August 2011, Richardson announced his departure, leaving the permanent top position at SIGAR again in transition. The acting deputy, Steve Trent, reportedly will be acting SIGAR as of September 2011.

### **Aid Authorization: Afghanistan Freedom Support Act**

A key post-Taliban aid authorization bill, S. 2712, the Afghanistan Freedom Support Act (AFSA) of 2002 (P.L. 107-327, December 4, 2002), as amended, authorized about \$3.7 billion in U.S. civilian aid for FY2003-FY2006. The law, whose authority has now expired, was intended to create a central source for allocating funds; that aid strategy was not implemented. However, some of the humanitarian, counter-narcotics, and governance assistance targets authorized by the act were met or exceeded by appropriations. No Enterprise Funds authorized by the act have been appropriated. The act authorized the following:

- \$60 million in total counter-narcotics assistance (\$15 million per year for FY2003-FY2006);
- \$30 million in assistance for political development, including national, regional, and local elections (\$10 million per year for FY2003-FY2005);
- \$80 million total to benefit women and for Afghan human rights oversight (\$15 million per year for FY2003-FY2006 for the Afghan Ministry of Women’s Affairs, and \$5 million per year for FY2003-FY2006 to the Human Rights Commission of Afghanistan);
- \$1.7 billion in humanitarian and development aid (\$425 million per year for FY2003-FY2006);
- \$300 million for an Enterprise Fund;
- \$550 million in drawdowns of defense articles and services for Afghanistan and regional militaries. (The original law provided for \$300 million in drawdowns. That was increased by subsequent appropriations laws.)

A subsequent law (P.L. 108-458, December 17, 2004), implementing the recommendations of the 9/11 Commission, contained “The Afghanistan Freedom Support Act Amendments of 2004.” The subtitle mandated the appointment of a U.S. coordinator of policy on Afghanistan and requires additional Administration reports to Congress.

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<sup>64</sup> [http://www.sigar.mil/pdf/peer\\_review/Section5.pdf](http://www.sigar.mil/pdf/peer_review/Section5.pdf).

### ***Afghan Freedom Support Act Reauthorization***

In the 110<sup>th</sup> Congress, H.R. 2446, passed by the House on June 6, 2007 (406-10), would have reauthorized AFSA through FY2010. A version (S. 3531), with fewer provisions than the House bill. It was not taken up by the full Senate, possibly over concerns that it might limit Administration flexibility in allocating aid. H.R. 2446 would have authorized about \$1.7 billion in U.S. economic aid and \$320 in military aid (including drawdowns of equipment) per fiscal year. It also would have authorized a pilot program of crop substitution to encourage legitimate alternatives to poppy cultivation; and a cut off of U.S. aid to any Afghan province in which the Administration reports that the leadership of the province is complicit in narcotics trafficking. AFSA reauthorization was not reintroduced in the 111<sup>th</sup> Congress.

### **Direct Support to the Afghan Government**

Although the Afghan government has been increasing its revenue (about \$1.5 billion for 2010), its revenues cover only about one-third of its overall budget of about \$4.5 billion (including donated development funds). USAID and other donors provide funding to help the Afghan government meet gaps in its operating budget. As shown in the tables below, some U.S. funds are provided both directly and through a U.N.-run multi-donor Afghan Reconstruction Trust Fund (ARTF) account, run by the World Bank. As of February 2011, 31 donors have contributed \$4.1 billion to the ARTF, with \$2.1 billion for Afghan salaries and over \$1.2 billion for priority investments. (DOD “1230 report,” April 2011, p. 86.)

Currently, the United States disburses more than 40% of its donated aid funds through the Afghan government. The Kabul Conference (July 20, 2010) communiqué endorsed a goal of increasing that to about 50% and for 80% of all funds to align with Afghan government priorities. Karzai has long complained about the high percentage of donor aid not channeled through the Afghan government and this criticism of what he calls a “parallel government” was emphasized in his February 6, 2011, speech at a Munich security conference.<sup>65</sup>

### ***National Solidarity Program***

Through the ARTF, the United States supports an Afghan government program that promotes local decision making on development—the “National Solidarity Program” (NSP). The program provides block grants of about \$60,000 per project to local councils to implement their priority projects, most of which are water projects. The Afghan implementer is the Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development. As discussed in a SIGAR report of March 2011, it is widely hailed as a highly successful, Afghan-run program, although the report says its contributions to improving local governance are unclear. Still, it is being implemented in almost every district of Afghanistan, and it employs over 800 Afghans. Donors have provided the program with \$600 million through March 2011, of which U.S. funding (through October 2010) has been \$528 million (DOD “1230 report,” April 2011, p. 86).

U.S. funds for the program are drawn from a broad category of ESF for “good governance.” P.L. 111-32, the FY2009 supplemental discussed above, earmarks \$70 million to defray a large part of

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<sup>65</sup> <http://www.afghanistan-un.org/2011/02/statement-by-his-excellency-hamid-karzai-president-of-the-islamic-republic-of-afghanistan-at-the-47th-munich-security-conference-msc/>.

a shortfall in that program. The FY2010 consolidated appropriation (P.L. 111-117) earmarked another \$175 million in ESF for the program. A total of almost \$800 million in good governance funds are requested for FY2012, meaning that the NSP funding provided by the U.S. will likely meet prior years' levels, if the funds are appropriated. The FY2010 National Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 111-84) authorizes the use of some CERP funds, controlled by the U.S. military, to supplement the funding for the NSP. However, this authorization, if implemented, incurred opposition from some international NGOs who are opposed to combining military action with development work.

**Table 9. Major Reporting Requirements**

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Several provisions require Administration reports on numerous aspects of U.S. strategy, assistance, and related issues.

- P.L. 108-458, The Afghanistan Freedom Support Act Amendments required, through the end of FY2010, an overarching annual report on U.S. strategy in Afghanistan. Other reporting requirements expired, including required reports: (1) on long-term U.S. strategy and progress of reconstruction; (2) on how U.S. assistance is being used; (3) on U.S. efforts to persuade other countries to participate in Afghan peacekeeping; and (4) a joint State and Defense Department report on U.S. counter-narcotics efforts in Afghanistan.
  - P.L. 110-181 (Section 1230), FY2008 Defense Authorization Act requires a quarterly DOD report on the security situation in Afghanistan; the first was submitted in June 2008. It is required by that law through FY2011. Section 1231 requires a report on the Afghan National Security Forces through the end of FY2010.
  - Section 1229 of the same law requires the quarterly report of the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR).
  - P.L. 111-8 (Omnibus Appropriation, explanatory statement) required a State Department report on the use of funds to address the needs of Afghan women and girls (submitted by September 30, 2009).
  - P.L. 111-32, FY2009 Supplemental Appropriation (Section 1116), required a White House report, by the time of the FY2011 budget submission, on whether Afghanistan and Pakistan are cooperating with U.S. policy sufficiently to warrant a continuation of Administration policy toward both countries, as well as efforts by these governments to curb corruption, their efforts to develop a counter-insurgency strategy, the level of political consensus in the two countries to confront security challenges, and U.S. government efforts to achieve these objectives. The report was released with a date of September 30, 2010.
  - The same law (Section 1117) required a report, by September 23, 2009, on metrics to be used to assess progress on Afghanistan and Pakistan strategy. A progress report measured against those metrics is to be submitted by March 30, 2010, and every six months thereafter, until the end of FY2011.
  - Section 1228 of the FY2010 National Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 111-84) required a report, within 120 days, on the Afghan Provincial Protection Program and other local security initiatives. Section 1235 authorized a DOD-funded study of U.S. force levels needed for eastern and southern Afghanistan, and Section 1226 required a Comptroller General report on the U.S. "campaign plan" for the Afghanistan (and Iraq) effort.
  - The FY2011 National Defense Authorization Act (H.R. 6523, P.L. 111-383) provides for (Section 1231) a one year extension—through FY2012—on the security situation in Afghanistan that was begun in P.L. 110-181: a two year extension (Section 1232) in the reporting requirement—through FY 2012—on the Afghan National Security Forces; (Section 1535) a report within six months of enactment on U.S. economic strategy for Afghanistan and a plan, to be submitted concurrent with the FY2012 budget submission, to transition the duties of the Task Force for Business and Stability Operations in Afghanistan to the Department of State; and a report by State, DOD, and USAID on the use of contractors in Afghanistan.
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## **International Reconstruction Pledges/National Development Strategy**

As shown in **Table 10**, non-U.S. donors, including such institutions as the EU and the Asian Development Bank, have provided over \$29 billion in assistance to Afghanistan since the fall of the Taliban. When combined with U.S. aid, this by far exceeds the \$27.5 billion for reconstruction identified by the IMF as required for 2002-2010. Major pledges have been made primarily at

donor conferences such as Tokyo (2002), Berlin (April 2004), Kabul (April 2005), London (February 2006), Paris (June 2008), and London (January 2010). The December 2011 is not, according to U.S. officials, intended as a “pledging conference,” although it is likely some donor pledges will be announced in connection with that meeting.

Among multilateral lending institutions, in May 2002, the World Bank reopened its office in Afghanistan after 20 years. Its projects have been concentrated in the telecommunications and road and sewage sectors. The Asian Development Bank (ADB) has also been playing a major role in Afghanistan, including in financing railway construction. Another of its projects in Afghanistan was funding the paving of a road from Qandahar to the border with Pakistan, and as noted above, it is contributing to a project to bring electricity from Central Asia to Afghanistan. On the eve of the London conference on January 28, 2010, the IMF and World Bank announced \$1.6 billion in Afghanistan debt relief. As noted in CRS Report RS21922, however, the IMF credit program has been in suspension since late 2010 because of the Kabul Bank scandal. As a condition of resuming the program, the IMF demands that those responsible be held accountable and that efforts be made to recoup the estimated \$900 million in Kabul Bank losses.

## **Development in Key Sectors**

Efforts to build the legitimate economy are showing some results, by accounts of senior U.S. officials. Some sectors, discussed below, are being developed primarily (although not exclusively) with private investment funding. There has been substantial new construction, particularly in Kabul, such as the Serena luxury hotel (opened in November 2005); a \$25 million Coca Cola bottling factory (opened in September 2006); and numerous apartment complexes, marriage halls, office buildings, and other structures. The bottling factory is located near the Bagrami office park (another private initiative), which includes several other factories. The Serena was built by the Agha Khan foundation, a major investor in Afghanistan.

An arm of the Defense Department, called the Task Force for Business and Stability Operations, headed by deputy undersecretary Paul Brinkley, is attempting to facilitate the investment. On the other hand, that Task Force reportedly has seen many of its personnel depart because of a provision of the FY2011 Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 111-383) that the Task Force be folded into State/USAID-led assistance structures by the end of FY2011. Others say that private investment could be healthier if not for the influence exercised over it by various faction leaders and Karzai relatives.

The following are some key sectors and what has been accomplished with U.S. and international donor funds, as well as with private investment.

### **Education**

Despite the success in enrolling Afghan children in school since the Taliban era (see statistics above), setbacks have occurred because of Taliban attacks on schools, causing some to close. In addition, Afghanistan’s university system is said to be woefully underfunded, in part because Afghans are entitled to free higher education (to the B.A. level) by the Constitution which means that demand for the higher education far outstrips Afghan resources. The shortfall is impeding the development of a large enough pool of skilled workers for the Afghan government. Afghanistan



requires about \$35 million to operate its universities and institutes for one year; USAID has requested \$20 million to help fund those activities for FY2012.<sup>66</sup>

## **Health**

The health care sector, as noted by Afghan observers, has made considerable gains in reducing infant mortality and giving about 65% of the population at least some access to health professionals. In addition to U.S. assistance to develop the health sector's capacity, Egypt operates a 65-person field hospital at Bagram Air Base that instructs Afghan physicians. Jordan operates a similar facility in Mazar-e-Sharif.

## **Roads**

Road building is considered a U.S. priority and has been USAID's largest project category there, taking up about 25% of USAID spending since the fall of the Taliban. Roads are considered key to enabling Afghan farmers to bring legitimate produce to market in a timely fashion, and former commander of U.S. forces in Afghanistan General Eikenberry (later Ambassador) said "where the roads end, the Taliban begin." The major road, the Ring Road, is nearly all repaved, and the 150 miles in the northwest remaining to be repaved is being funded by a \$350 million Asian Development Bank donation. Among other major projects completed are a road from Qandahar to Tarin Kowt, (Uruzgan province) built by U.S. military personnel, inaugurated in 2005; and a road linking the Panjshir Valley to Kabul. In several of the most restive provinces, U.S. funds (sometimes CERP funds) are being used to build roads that link up farming communities to the market for their products. Other key priorities are completing a Khost-Gardez road, under way currently, but slowed by security concerns, and a Salang Bypass Road through Bamiyan province.

## **Bridges**

Afghan officials are said to be optimistic about increased trade with Central Asia now that a new bridge has opened (October 2007) over the Panj River, connecting Afghanistan and Tajikistan. The bridge was built with \$33 million in (FY2005) U.S. assistance. The bridge is helping what press reports say is robust reconstruction and economic development in the relatively peaceful and ethnically homogenous province of Panjshir, the political base of the Northern Alliance.

## **Railways**

Afghanistan does not currently have any functioning railway. However, three railway projects are under way. One, from Mazar-i-Sharif to Hairaton, on the border with Uzbekistan, was completed in March 2011 with \$165 million from the Asian Development Bank. It is to become operational in summer 2011. With funding from Japan and China, other rail lines will extend from Iran to Herat Province, and from the Tajikistan border down to Konduz. The various segments are eventually to link up and parallel the Ring Road that circles Afghanistan. The railway will integrate Afghanistan to the former Soviet railway system in Central Asia, increasing Afghanistan's economic integration in the region.

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<sup>66</sup> Boak, Josh. "Afghan Universities Struggling for Funding." *Washington Post*, February 13, 2011.

## **Electricity**

At least 10% of USAID funds for Afghanistan have been spent on power projects, although that percentage is rising in 2010 and 2011. The Afghanistan Compact states that the goal is for electricity to reach 65% of households in urban areas and 25% in rural areas by 2010, a goal that has not been met. However, severe power shortages in Kabul, caused in part by the swelling of Kabul's population to about 3 million, up from half a million when the Taliban was in power, are fewer now than two years ago. Power to the capital has grown due to the Afghan government's agreements with several Central Asian neighbors to import electricity, as well as construction of new substations. Many shops in Kabul are now lit up at night, as observed by numerous visitors over the past few years, including CRS. On the other hand, there has been some criticism of a 105 Megawatt power generating plants built by USAID at Tarakhil, in north Kabul at a cost of about \$300 million because of the high costs of fuel, the questionable need for the plant given alternative plants built recently, and the possible inability of the Afghan authorities to maintain them. As noted above, in January 2011, Russia pledged to resume work on some long dormant hydroelectric projects in Afghanistan that were suspended when Soviet troops withdrew in 1989.

### *Kajaki Dam and Qandahar Power Initiative*

A major USAID and DOD focus is on power projects in southern Afghanistan. The key longterm project is to expand the capacity of the Kajaki Dam, located in Helmand Province. USAID has allocated about \$500 million to restore and expand the capacity of the dam. As of October 2009, two turbines were operating—one was always working, and the second was repaired by USAID contractors. This has doubled electricity production in the south and caused small factories and other businesses to come to flourish. USAID plans to further expand capacity of the dam by installing a third turbine (which there is a berth for but which never had a turbine installed.) In an operation involving 4,000 NATO troops (Operation Ogap Tsuka), components of the third turbine were successfully delivered to the dam in September 2008. It was expected to be operational in mid-late 2009 but technical and security problems, such as inability to secure and build roads leading to the dam, have delayed the project, and there is no public estimate as to when the third turbine will be completed.

In the interim, and to the consternation of some who want longterm, sustainable solutions for Afghanistan rather than short term palliatives, the U.S. military and USAID began in February 2011 to implement a plan ("Qandahar Power Initiative") to focus on smaller substations and generator projects that can bring more electricity to Qandahar and other places in the south quickly. The initiative has been pursued in order to facilitate the U.S.-military led counter-insurgency strategy in Qandahar, even though the initiative may not produce sustainable gains over the longer term. Some of the power provided by additional diesel generators is being used to supply the Qandahar Industrial Park. For this and other power projects, the Administration requested legislative authority for an "Infrastructure Fund" to be funded by DOD (\$500 million is requested for FY2012) but controlled jointly by DOD and USAID. That authority is provided in the FY2011 DOD authorization bill (P.L. 111-383), and is funded in P.L. 112-10. President Karzai said in a CNN interview on June 26, 2011, that the Afghan government favored emphasizing the longer-term Kajaki Dam project rather than the interim generator project.

## **Solar Power**

There is also an apparent increasing emphasis on providing electricity to individual homes and villages through small solar power installations. A contractor to USAID, IRG, is providing small solar powered-electricity generators to homes in several districts of Afghanistan, alleviating the need to connect such homes to the national power grid. However, there are technical drawbacks, including weather-related inconsistency of power supply and the difficulty of powering appliances that require substantial power. The U.S. broadcasting service to Afghanistan, Radio Azadi, run by Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, has given out 20,000 solar-powered radios throughout Afghanistan, according to RFE/RL in December 2010.

## **Agriculture**

With about 80% of Afghans living in rural areas, the agriculture sector has always been key to Afghanistan's economy and stability. The late Ambassador Holbrooke, including in his January 2010 strategy document, outlined U.S. policy to boost Afghanistan's agriculture sector not only to reduce drug production but also as an engine of economic growth. Prior to the turmoil that engulfed Afghanistan in the late 1970s, Afghanistan was a major exporter of agricultural products.

USAID has spent about 15% of its Afghanistan funds on agriculture (and "alternative livelihoods" to poppy cultivation), and this has helped Afghanistan double its legitimate agricultural output over the past five years. One emerging "success story" is growing Afghan exports of high-quality pomegranate juice called Anar. Other countries are promoting not only pomegranates but also saffron rice and other crops that draw buyers outside Afghanistan. Another emerging success story is Afghanistan's November 2010 start of exports of raisins to Britain.<sup>67</sup> Wheat production was robust in 2009 because of healthy prices for that crop, and Afghanistan is again self-sufficient in wheat production. According to April 2011 DOD report, the U.S. Department of Agriculture has about 110 personnel in Afghanistan on long-term and priority projects; there are also at least 25 agriculture experts from USAID in Afghanistan. Their efforts include providing new funds to buy seeds and agricultural equipment, and to encourage agribusiness. In addition, the National Guard from several states is deploying nine (as of March 2011) "Agribusiness Development Teams" in several provinces to help Afghan farmers with water management, soil enhancement, crop cultivation, and improving the development and marketing of their goods.

U.S. strategy has addressed not only crop choice but also trying to construct the entirety of the infrastructure needed for a healthy legitimate agriculture sector, including road building, security of the routes to agriculture markets, refrigeration, storage, transit through Pakistan and other transportation of produce, building legitimate sources of financing, and other aspects of the industry. U.S. officials in Kabul say that Pakistan's restrictions on trade between Afghanistan and India had prevented a rapid expansion of Afghan pomegranate exports to that market, but the transit trade agreement between Afghanistan and Pakistan, discussed above, is expected to alleviate some of these bottlenecks. Dubai is another customer for Afghan pomegranate exports.

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<sup>67</sup> Lemmon, Gayle Tzemach. "New Hope for Afghan Raisin Farmers." *New York Times*, October 9, 2010.

There is a vibrant timber industry in the northeast provinces. However, the exports are illegal. Deforestation has been outlawed because of the potential for soil erosion and other economic and environmental effects.

In terms of specific programming, USAID has a \$150 million program for the relatively safe areas of Afghanistan to continue to develop licit crops. The Incentives Driving Economic Alternatives for the North, East, and West (IDEA-NEW) program is planned to run through FY2014. In southern and eastern areas of the country where counterinsurgency operations are ongoing, USAID's \$474 million Afghanistan Vouchers for Increased Production in Agriculture (AVIPA-Plus) program is scheduled to run through FY2011 and includes initiatives coordinated with U.S. counterinsurgency operations in Helmand and Qandahar provinces. The program provides vouchers for wheat seed, fertilizer, and tools, in addition to supporting cash for work programs and small grants to local cooperatives.

### **Telecommunications**

Several Afghan telecommunications firms have been formed. With startup funds from the Agha Khan Foundation (the Agha Khan is leader of the Isma'ili community, which is prevalent in northern Afghanistan), the highly successful Roshan cellphone company was founded. Another Afghan cellphone firm is Afghan Wireless. The most significant post-Taliban media network is Tolo Television, owned by Moby Media. U.S. funds are being used to supplement the private investment; a \$4 million U.S. grant, in partnership with the Asia Consultancy Group, is being used to construct communication towers in Bamiyan and Ghor provinces. The Afghan government says it plans to link all major cities by fiber optic cable by the end of 2011.

### **Airlines**

The 52-year-old national airline, Ariana, is said to be in significant financial trouble due to corruption that has affected its safety ratings and left it unable to service a heavy debt load. However, there are new privately run airlines, such as Safi Air (run by the Safi Group, which has built a modern mall in Kabul), and Kam Air. Another, Pamir, was ordered closed in 2010 due to safety concerns.

### **Mining and Gems**

Afghanistan's mining sector has been largely dormant since the Soviet invasion. Some Afghan leaders complain that not enough has been done to revive such potentially lucrative industries as minerals mining, such as of copper and lapis lazuli (a stone used in jewelry). The issue became more urgent in June 2010 when a Defense Department development team announced, based on surveys, that Afghanistan may have untapped minerals worth over \$1 trillion.<sup>68</sup> General Petraeus, in an interview with NBC News on August 15, 2010, said the amount could be in the "trillions." Although copper and iron are the largest categories by value, there are believed to also be significant reserves of such minerals as lithium in western Afghanistan—lithium is crucial to the new batteries being used to power electric automobiles.

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<sup>68</sup> Risen, James. "U.S. Identifies Mineral Riches in Afghanistan." *New York Times*, June 14, 2010.

As noted above, a major project, signed in November 2007, is with China Metallurgical Group for the company to invest \$3.0 billion to develop Afghanistan's Aynak copper field in Lowgar Province. The agreement, viewed as generous to the point where it might not be commercially profitable for China Metallurgical Group, includes construction of two coal-fired electric power plant (one of which will supply more electricity to Kabul city); a segment of railway (discussed above); and a road from the project to Kabul. Work on the mine reportedly has been slowed by various factors, including the need to clear mines in the area and to excavate ancient artifacts that the Afghan government seeks to preserve. Actual digging at the mine is expected to begin in mid-2012. U.S. forces do not directly protect the project, but U.S. forces have set up small bases on some of the roads leading to the mine project to provide general stability there.

On December 14, 2010, with involvement of the DOD Task Force for Business and Stability Operations, 10 outside investors announced \$50 million in investment in a gold mine in Baghlan Province. There is another gold mine operating in neighboring Takhar Province. Bids are being accepted for another large mining project, the Haji Gak iron ore mine (which may contain 60 billion tons of iron ore) near Kabul. China Metallurgy, as well as companies from India, are said to be finalists for the project.

### **Oil, Gas, and Related Pipelines**

Afghanistan has no hydrocarbons energy export industry and a small refining sector that provides some of Afghanistan's needs for gasoline or other fuels. Almost all of Afghanistan's fuel comes from neighboring states. As noted, Afghanistan has had virtually no operational hydrocarbon energy sector. However, Afghanistan's prospects in this sector appeared to brighten by the announcement in March 2006 of an estimated 3.6 billion barrels of oil and 36.5 trillion cubic feet of gas reserves. Experts believe these amounts, if proved, could make Afghanistan relatively self-sufficient in energy and able to export energy to its neighbors. In a major development, on December 15, 2010, the Afghan government let a six-month contract to a local firm, Ghazanfar Neft Gas, to collect and market crude oil from the Angot field in northern Afghanistan (part of a field that may contain 80 million barrels of oil), initially producing at the low rate of 800 barrels per day. However, the sector is expected to expand to more fields in the Amu Darya basin (northern Afghanistan), and a tender will be offered to develop a larger oil field in Balkh Province (Kasha Kari bloc), estimated to hold 1.8 billion barrels of oil. Separately, USAID is funding a test project to develop gas resources in northern Afghanistan.

*TAPI (Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India) Gas Pipeline Project.* Another major energy project remains under consideration. During 1996-1998, the Clinton Administration supported proposed natural gas and oil pipelines through western Afghanistan as an incentive for the warring factions to cooperate. A consortium led by Los Angeles-based Unocal Corporation proposed a \$7.5 billion Central Asia Gas Pipeline that would originate in southern Turkmenistan and pass through Afghanistan to Pakistan, with possible extensions into India.<sup>69</sup> The deterioration in U.S.-Taliban relations after 1998 suspended hopes for the pipeline projects, but prospects for the project improved in the post-Taliban period. In a summit meeting in late May 2002 between the leaders of Turkmenistan, Afghanistan, and Pakistan, the three countries agreed to revive the

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<sup>69</sup> Other participants in the Unocal consortium include Delta of Saudi Arabia, Hyundai of South Korea, Crescent Steel of Pakistan, Itochu Corporation and INPEX of Japan, and the government of Turkmenistan. Some accounts say Russia's Gazprom would probably receive a stake in the project. *Nezavisimaya Gazeta* (Moscow), October 30, 1997, p. 3.

project. Sponsors held an inaugural meeting on July 9, 2002, in Turkmenistan, signing a series of preliminary agreements. On December 12, 2010, in the Turkmenistan capital Ashkabad, the relevant leaders reaffirmed their intent to complete the project. Disagreements remain over the proportion of gas supplied to the line by individual countries, and over pricing, but Afghan officials say the Asian Development Bank has agreed to finance the project, removing what had been a major hurdle. U.S. officials view this project as a superior alternative to a proposed gas pipeline from Iran to India, transiting Pakistan.

## **Trade Promotion/Reconstruction Opportunity Zones**

As noted above, the United States is trying to build on Afghanistan's post-war economic rebound—and ensure continued economic progress during and after the security transition—with trade promotion initiatives. The United States is doing so by promoting regional economic integration, discussed above, as well as through bilateral economic agreements with Afghanistan. In September 2004, the United States and Afghanistan signed a bilateral trade and investment framework agreement (TIFA). These agreements are generally seen as a prelude to a broader and more complex bilateral free trade agreement, but negotiations on an FTA have not yet begun. On December 13, 2004, the 148 countries of the World Trade Organization voted to start membership talks with Afghanistan.

USAID is funding a five year project (\$63 million total during 2010-2014) to simplify the customs clearance process. This includes new import procedures that have reduced the time needed for imports to clear customs by 45%.

Another initiative supported by the United States is the establishment of joint Afghan-Pakistani “Reconstruction Opportunity Zones” (ROZ's) which would be modeled after “Qualified Industrial Zones” run by Israel and Jordan in which goods produced in the zones receive duty free treatment for import into the United States. For FY2008, \$5 million in supplemental funding was requested to support the zones, but P.L. 110-252 did not specifically mention the zones.

Bills in the 110<sup>th</sup> Congress, S. 2776 and H.R. 6387, would have authorized the President to proclaim duty-free treatment for imports from ROZ's to be designated by the President. In the 111<sup>th</sup> Congress, a version of these bills was introduced (S. 496 and H.R. 1318). President Obama specifically endorsed passage of these bills in his March 2009 strategy announcement. H.R. 1318 was incorporated into H.R. 1886, a Pakistan aid appropriation that is a component of the new U.S. strategy for the region, and the bill was passed by the House on June 11, 2009, and then appended to H.R. 2410. However, another version of the Pakistan aid bill, S. 1707, did not authorize ROZ's; it was passed and became law (P.L. 111-73).

**Table 10. Major Non-U.S. Donors to Afghanistan 2002-2011**

(in \$ millions)

Japan	3,150
European Union	2,880
Asian Development Bank	2,270
Britain	2,220
World Bank	2,140
Germany	2,130
India	1,515
Canada	1,255
Netherlands	775
Norway	745
Australia	645
Italy	645
Sweden	635
United Nations	445
Denmark	435
Iran	400
France	320
Spain	220
Turkey	210
Finland	160
Russia	150
Saudi Arabia	140
China	140
UAE	135
Switzerland	120
South Korea	115
Czech Republic	105
<b>Total</b>	<b>\$24,900</b>
<b>(includes donors of under \$100 million, not listed)</b>	<b>(of which \$19,700 disbursed – about 80%)</b>

**Notes and Source:** Afghanistan Ministry of Finance: Development Cooperation Report, 2010. Released July 2011. Table includes donors of over \$100 million only.

**Table II. U.S. Assistance to Afghanistan, FY1978-FY1998**

(\$ in millions)

Fiscal Year	Devel. Assist.	Econ. Supp. (ESF)	P.L. 480 (Title I and II)	Military	Other (Incl. Regional Refugee Aid)	Total
1978	4.989	—	5.742	0.269	0.789	11.789
1979	3.074	—	7.195	—	0.347	10.616
1980	—	(Soviet invasion-December 1979)			—	—
1981	—	—	—	—	—	—
1982	—	—	—	—	—	—
1983	—	—	—	—	—	—
1984	—	—	—	—	—	—
1985	3.369	—	—	—	—	3.369
1986	—	—	8.9	—	—	8.9
1987	17.8	12.1	2.6	—	—	32.5
1988	22.5	22.5	29.9	—	—	74.9
1989	22.5	22.5	32.6	—	—	77.6
1990	35.0	35.0	18.1	—	—	88.1
1991	30.0	30.0	20.1	—	—	80.1
1992	25.0	25.0	31.4	—	—	81.4
1993	10.0	10.0	18.0	—	30.2	68.2
1994	3.4	2.0	9.0	—	27.9	42.3
1995	1.8	—	12.4	—	31.6	45.8
1996	—	—	16.1	—	26.4	42.5
1997	—	—	18.0	—	31.9 <sup>a</sup>	49.9
1998	—	—	3.6	—	49.14 <sup>b</sup>	52.74

**Source:** Department of State.

- a. Includes \$3 million for demining and \$1.2 million for counternarcotics.
- b. Includes \$3.3 million in projects targeted for Afghan women and girls, \$7 million in earthquake relief aid, 100,000 tons of 416B wheat worth about \$15 million, \$2 million for demining, and \$1.54 for counternarcotics.



**Table 12. U.S. Assistance to Afghanistan, FY1999-FY2002**

(\$ in millions)

	<b>FY1999</b>	<b>FY2000</b>	<b>FY2001</b>	<b>FY2002 (Final)</b>
U.S. Department of Agriculture (DOA) and USAID Food For Peace (FFP), via World Food Program(WFP)	42.0 worth of wheat (100,000 metric tons under "416(b)" program.)	68.875 for 165,000 metric tons. (60,000 tons for May 2000 drought relief)	131.1 (300,000 metric tons under P.L. 480, Title II, and 416(b))	198.12 (for food commodities)
State/Bureau of Population, Refugees and Migration (PRM) via UNHCR and ICRC	16.95 for Afghan refugees in Pakistan and Iran, and to assist their repatriation	14.03 for the same purposes	22.03 for similar purposes	136.54 (to U.N. agencies)
State Department/ Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA)	7.0 to various NGOs to aid Afghans inside Afghanistan	6.68 for drought relief and health, water, and sanitation programs	18.934 for similar programs	113.36 (to various U.N. agencies and NGOs)
State Department/HDP (Humanitarian Demining Program)	2.615	3.0	2.8	7.0 to Halo Trust/other demining
Aid to Afghan Refugees in Pakistan (through various NGOs)	5.44 (2.789 for health, training— Afghan females in Pakistan)	6.169, of which \$3.82 went to similar purposes	5.31 for similar purposes	
Counter-Narcotics			1.50	63.0
USAID/Office of Transition Initiatives			0.45 (Afghan women in Pakistan)	24.35 for broadcasting/media
Department of Defense				50.9 ( 2.4 million rations)
Foreign Military Financing				57.0 (for Afghan national army)
Anti-Terrorism				36.4
Economic Support Funds (E.S.F)				105.2
Peacekeeping				24.0
<b>Totals</b>	<b>76.6</b>	<b>113.2</b>	<b>182.6</b>	<b>815.9</b>

Source: CRS.

**Table 13. U.S. Assistance to Afghanistan, FY2003**

(\$ in millions; same acronyms as **Table 12**)

<b>FY2003 Foreign Aid Appropriations (P.L. 108-7)</b>	
Development/Health	90
P.L. 480 Title II (Food Aid)	47
Peacekeeping	10
Disaster Relief	94
ESF	50
Non-Proliferation, De-mining, Anti-Terrorism (NADR)	5
Refugee Relief	55
Afghan National Army (ANA) train and equip (FMF)	21
<b>Total from this law</b>	<b>372</b>
<b>FY2003 Supplemental (P.L. 108-11)</b>	
Road Construction (ESF, Kabul-Qandahar road)	100
Provincial Reconstruction Teams (ESF)	10
Afghan government support (ESF)	57
ANA train and equip (FMF)	170
Anti-terrorism/de-mining (NADR, some for Karzai protection)	28
<b>Total from this law</b>	<b>365</b>
<b>Total for FY2003</b>	<b>737</b>

**Source:** CRS.

**Note:** Earmarks for programs benefitting women and girls totaled \$65 million. Of that amount, \$60 million was earmarked in the supplemental and \$5 million in the regular appropriation.

**Table 14. U.S. Assistance to Afghanistan, FY2004**

(\$ in millions, same acronyms as previous tables)

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Afghan National Police (FMF)	160
Counter-Narcotics	125.52
Afghan National Army (FMF)	719.38
Presidential Protection (NADR)	52.14
DDR Program (disarming militias)	15.42
MANPAD destruction	1.5
Terrorist Interdiction Program	0.41
Border Control (WMD)	0.23
Good Governance Program	113.57
Political Competition, Consensus Building (Elections)	24.41
Rule of Law and Human Rights	29.4
Roads	348.68
Education/Schools	104.11
Health/Clinics	76.85
Power	85.13
PRTs	57.4
CERP (DOD funds to build good will)	39.71
Private Sector Development/Economic Growth	63.46
Water Projects	28.9
Agriculture	50.5
Refugee/IDPs	82.6
Food Assistance	88.25
De-mining	12.61
State/USAID Program Support	203.02
<b>Total Aid for FY2004</b>	<b>2,483.2</b>

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Laws Derived: FY2004 supplemental (P.L. 108-106); FY2004 regular appropriation (P.L. 108-199). Regular appropriation earmarked \$5 million for programs benefitting women and girls.

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**Table 15. U.S. Assistance to Afghanistan, FY2005**

(\$ in millions)

Afghan National Police (State Department funds, FMF, and DOD funds, transition to DOD funds to Afghan security forces)	624.46
Counter-Narcotics	775.31
Afghan National Army (State Department funds, FMF, and DOD funds)	1,633.24
Presidential (Karzai) Protection (NADR funds)	23.10
DDR	5.0
Detainee Operations	16.9
MANPAD Destruction	0.75
Small Arms Control	3.0
Terrorist Interdiction Program	0.1
Border Control (WMD)	0.85
Good Governance	137.49
Political Competition/Consensus-Building/Election Support	15.75
Rule of Law and Human Rights	20.98
Roads	334.1
Afghan-Tajik (Nizhny Panj) Bridge	33.1
Education/Schools	89.63
Health/Clinics	107.4
Power	222.5
PRTs	97.0
CERP	136.0
Civil Aviation (Kabul International Airport)	25.0
Private Sector Development/Economic Growth	77.43
Water Projects	43.2
Agriculture	74.49
Refugee/IDP Assistance	54.6
Food Assistance (P.L. 480, Title II)	108.6
Demining	23.7
State/USAID Program Support	142.84
<b>Total Aid for FY2005</b>	<b>4,826.52</b>

Laws Derived: FY2005 Regular Appropriations (P.L. 108-447); Second FY2005 Supplemental (P.L. 109-13). The regular appropriation earmarked \$50 million to be used for programs to benefit women and girls.

**Source:** CRS.

**Note:** In FY2005, funds to equip and train the Afghan national security forces was altered from State Department funds (Foreign Military Financing, FMF) to DOD funds.

**Table 16. U.S. Assistance to Afghanistan, FY2006**

(\$ in millions)

Afghan National Police (DOD funds)	1,217.5
Counter-narcotics	419.26
Afghan National Army (DOD funds)	735.98
Presidential (Karzai) protection (NADR funds)	18.17
Detainee Operations	14.13
Small Arms Control	2.84
Terrorist Interdiction	.10
Counter-terrorism Finance	.28
Border Control (WMD)	.40
Bilateral Debt Relief	11.0
Budgetary Support to the Government of Afghanistan	1.69
Good Governance	10.55
Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund	47.5
Political Competition/Consensus Building/Elections	1.35
Civil Society	7.77
Rule of Law and Human Rights	29.95
Roads	235.95
Education/Schools	49.48
Health/Clinics	51.46
Power	61.14
PRTs	20.0
CERP Funds (DOD)	215.0
Private Sector Development/Economic Growth	45.51
Water Projects	.89
Agriculture	26.92
Food Assistance	109.6
De-mining	14.32
Refugee/IDP aid	36.0
State/USAID program support	142.42
<b>Total</b>	<b>3,527.16</b>

Laws Derived: FY2006 Regular Foreign Aid Appropriations (P.L. 109-102); FY06 supplemental (P.L. 109-234). The regular appropriation earmarked \$50 million for programs to benefit women and girls.

**Source:** CRS.

**Table 17. U.S. Assistance to Afghanistan, FY2007**

(\$ in millions)

Afghan National Police (DOD funds)	2,523.30
Afghan National Army (DOD funds)	4,871.59
Counter-Narcotics	737.15
Presidential (Karzai) Protection (NADR)	19.9
Detainee Operations	12.7
Small Arms Control	1.75
Terrorist Interdiction Program	0.5
Counter-Terrorism Finance	0.4
Border Control (WMD)	0.5
Budget Support to Afghan Government	31.24
Good Governance	107.25
Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund (incl. National Solidarity Program)	63
Political Competition/Election support (ESF)	29.9
Civil Society (ESF)	8.1
Rule of Law/Human Rights (ESF)	65.05
Roads (ESF)	303.1
Education/Schools (ESF)	62.75
Health/Clinics	112.77
Power (ESF)	194.8
PRTs (ESF)	126.1
CERP (DOD funds)	206
Private Sector Development/Economic Growth	70.56
Water Projects (ESF)	2.3
Agriculture (ESF)	67.03
Refugee/IDP Assistance	72.61
Food Assistance	150.9
Demining	27.82
State/USAID Program Support	88.7
<b>Total</b>	<b>9,984.98</b>

Laws Derived: Regular Appropriation P.L. 110-5; DOD Appropriation P.L. 109-289; and FY2007 Supplemental Appropriation P.L. 110-28. The regular appropriation earmarked \$50 million for programs to benefit women/ girls. Providing ESF in excess of \$300 million subject to certification of Afghan cooperation on counter-narcotics.

**Sources:** CRS; Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, October 2008 report.

**Table 18. U.S. Assistance to Afghanistan, FY2008**

(appropriated; \$ in millions)

Afghan National Army (DOD funds)	1,724.68
Afghan National Police (DOD funds)	1,017.38
Counter-Narcotics (INCLE and DOD funds)	619.47
NADR (Karzai protection)	6.29
Radio Free Afghanistan	3.98
Detainee operations	9.6
Small Arms Control	3.0
Terrorist Interdiction Program	.99
Counter-Terrorism Finance	.60
Border Control (WMD)	.75
Commanders Emergency Response Program (CERP, DOD funds)	269.4
Direct Support to Afghan Government	49.61
Good Governance	245.08
Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund (incl. National Solidarity program)	45.0
Election Support	90.0
Civil Society Building	4.01
Rule of Law and Human Rights	125.28
Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR)	2.0
Roads	324.18
Education/Schools	99.09
Health/Clinics	114.04
Power (incl. Kajaki Dam rehabilitation work)	236.81
PRT programs	75.06
Economic Growth/Private Sector Development	63.06
Water Projects	16.4q
Agriculture	34.44
Refugee/IDP Assistance	42.1
Food Aid	101.83
De-Mining	15.0
State/USAID Program Support	317.4
<b>Total</b>	<b>5,656.53</b>

Appropriations Laws Derived: Regular FY2008 (P.L. 110-161); FY2008 Supplemental (P.L. 110-252). The regular appropriation earmarked \$75 million for programs to benefit woman and girls. ESF over \$300 million subject to narcotics cooperation certification.

**Sources:** Special Inspector General Afghanistan Reconstruction, October 2008 report; CRS.

**Table 19. U.S. Assistance to Afghanistan, FY2009**

(\$ in millions)

	Regular Appropriation (P.L. 111-8)	Bridge Supplemental (P.L. 110-252)	FY2009 Supplemental (P.L. 111-32)	Total
ANSF Funding		2,000	3,607	5,607
CERP (DOD funds)		683		683
Detainee ops (DOD)		4		4
Counternarcotics (C-N) (DOD)	24	150	57	232
C-N (DEA)	19			19
C-N—Alternative. Livelihoods (INCLE)	100	70	87	257
C-N—Eradication, Interdiction (INCLE)	178	14	17	209
IMET	1.4			1.4
ARTF (Incl. National Solidarity Program)	45	20	85	150
Governance building	100	68	115	283
Civil Society promotion	8	4		12
Election Support	93	56	25	174
Strategic Program Development			50	50
Rule of Law Programs (USAID)	8	15	20	43
Rule of Law (INCLE)	34	55	80	169
Roads (ESF)	74	65		139
Power (ESF)	73	61		134
Agriculture (ESF and DA)	25		85	110
PRTs/Local Governance (ESF)	74	55	159	288
Education	88	6		94
Health	61	27		88
Econ Growth/"Cash for Work"	49	37	220	306
Water, Environment, Victims Comp.	31	3		34
Karzai Protection (NADR)	32		12	44
Food Aid (P.L. 480, Food for Peace)	14	44		58
Migration, Refugee Aid		50	7	57
State Ops/Embassy Construction	308	131	450	889
USAID Programs and Ops	18	2	165	185
State/USAID IG/SIGAR	3	11	7	20
Cultural Exchanges, International Orgs	6	10		16
<b>Totals</b>	<b>1,463</b>	<b>3,640</b>	<b>5,248</b>	<b>10,352</b>

**Notes:** P.L. 111-32 (FY2009 supplemental): provides requested funds, earmarks \$70 million for National Solidarity Program; \$150 million for women and girls (all of FY2009); ESF over \$200 million subject to narcotics certification; 10% of supplemental INCLE subject to certification of Afghan government moves to curb human rights abuses, drug involvement.



**Table 20. FY2010 Assistance (Includes Supplemental)**

(\$ in millions)

Afghan Security Forces Funding (DOD funds)	9,162 (6,563 appropriated plus 2,600 supplemental request)
CERP (DOD funds)	1,000
Counternarcotics (DOD)	361
INCLE: all functions: interdiction, rule of law, alternative livelihoods	620 (420 regular approp. plus 200 supplemental request)
IMET	1.5
Global Health/Child Survival	92.3
Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund (Incl. National Solidarity Program) (ESF)	200
Governance building (ESF)	191
Civil Society promotion (ESF)	10
Election Support (ESF)	90
Strategic Program Development (ESF)	100
USAID Rule of Law Programs (ESF)	50
Roads (ESF)	230
Power (ESF)	230
Agriculture (ESF)	230
PRT programs/Local governance (ESF)	251
Education (ESF)	95
Health (ESF)	102
Econ Growth/"Cash for Work" (ESF)	274
Water, Environment, Victim Comp. (ESF)	15
Karzai Protection (NADR)	58
Food Aid (P.L. 480, Food for Peace)	16
Refugees and Migration	11
State Ops/Embassy Construction	697 (486 regular plus 211 supplemental)
Cultural Exchanges	6
SIGAR	37 (23 regular plus 14 supp request)
FY2010 supplemental ESF request (for ESF programs above)	1,576
<b>Total Appropriated (Incl. Supplemental)</b>	<b>15,700</b>
Laws derived: FY2010 foreign aid appropriation in Consolidated Appropriation (P.L. 111-117), which earmarks: \$175 million (ESF and INCLE) for programs for women and girls, and \$175 million (ESF) for the National Solidarity Program. The FY2010 Defense Appropriation (P.L. 111-118), which cut \$900 million from the requested amount for the ANSF (regular defense appropriation). FY2010 supplemental funds appropriated by H.R. 4899 (P.L. 111-212)	

Source: CRS.

**Table 21. FY2011**

(\$ in millions)

Program/Area	Request/Enacted in April 2011 Budget Agreement
Afghan National Security Forces (DOD funds)	11,620
	(enacted, as requested)
CERP	400
Afghanistan Infrastructure Fund (DoD funds)	400
Business Stability Task Force (DoD funds)	150
DoD Counternarcotics	333
Economic Support Funds (ESF)	1,967
	(of 3,316 requested)
Refugee Accounts	65
Food Aid	15
Global Health/ Child Survival	70
International Disaster Assistance	30
INCLE	400
Karzai Protection (NADR funds)	69.3
IMET	1.5
State Department Operations (not incl. security)	754
SIGAR	24
<b>Total Request</b>	<b>16,303</b>

Budget agreement is H.R. 1473. The Administration requested to authorize an “Afghanistan Infrastructure Fund,” to contain mostly DOD funds, beginning with \$400 million in FY2011, was authorized in H.R. 6523, the National Defense Authorization Act for FY2011, P.L. 111-383). Funds were appropriated. The fund will be used mostly for electricity projects, including an ongoing major electricity project for Qandahar, but could be used for other infrastructure projects later on, such as roads.

**Table 22. FY2012 Request**

(\$ in millions)

Program/Area	Request
ANSF Funding	12,800
Economic Support Funds (incl.: \$227 m for health, \$115 m for education, \$790 m for “good governance,” \$185 m for agriculture, \$66 m for “private sector competitiveness”)	2,804 (of which 1,216 is Overseas Contingency Operations funding)
Health and Child Survival (State)	0.5
Health and Child Survival (USAID)	0.5
Food For Peace Title II	15.5
INCLE (counter-narcotics, rule of law)	324
NADR funds (Karzai protection, explosives removal, counter-terrorism)	66.2
IMET	2.4
Diplomatic and Consular (embassy construction, personnel)	758
Diplomatic and Consular (security)	190
SIGAR	44
CERP (regular)	400
CERP (contribution to Afghan Infrastructure Fund)	500
CERP (Taskforce for Business)	150
<b>Total</b>	<b>18,050</b>
Figures do not include about \$100 billion in U.S. military operations costs	

**Table 23. Total Obligations for Major Programs: FY2001-FY2010**

(From SIGAR quarterly report, July 2010. \$ in millions. Some FY2010 sector breakdowns not available)

<b>Security Related Programs</b> (mostly DOD funds)	
Afghan National Security Forces (incl. FMF, and train and equip)	26,746
Commander Emergency Response Program (CERP)	2,639
Karzai Protection (NADR funds)	371.6
Counter-Narcotics (INCLE, DOD, DEA)	4,237.4
De-Mining Operations (Halo Trust, other contractors)	98.53
International Military Education and Training Funds (IMET)	8.3
Afghanistan Freedom Support Act (defenses article drawdown under AFSA)	550
<b>Humanitarian-Related Programs</b>	
Food Aid (USDA and USAID: P.L. 480 Title I and II; Food for Progress, 416(b), Food for Education)	961.1
Migration and Refugee aid (including emergency)	614
Debt Relief for Afghan government	11
<b>Economic Support Funds (ESF) and Development Assistance (DA)</b>	
	10,625+
(For some categories below, some funds may be drawn from other accounts)	
Afghan government budget support	81 + FY2010
Good Governance	1,951
Afghan Reconstruction Trust Fund (for National Solidarity Program, etc)	973
(SIGAR March 22, 2011, report, p. 5)	(of which 490 is for NSP)
Civil Society programs	54
Election support	600 + FY2010
Rule of Law and Human Rights (incl. some INCLE funds)	935
Roads	1,908 + FY2010
Power/Electricity	934.4 + FY2010
Education	683.6
Health Sector	706.3
Water	128 + FY2010
Agriculture	903.3
PRT projects	698 + FY2010
Private Sector Development/Econ. Growth (incl IT, communications)	882
<b>Embassy Operations, Construction, Aid Oversight</b>	<b>3,720.9</b>
<b>Other Aid:</b>	
Child Survival and Health	486.4
Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC)	25.87
Treasury Technical Assistance	3.5
USAID (other)	31.37
<b>Total</b> (including minor amounts not included in table)	<b>51,501.8</b>

**Table 24. NATO/ISAF Contributing Nations**

(as of August 16, 2011)

<http://www.isaf.nato.int/images/stories/File/Placemats/16%20August%202011%20Placemat.pdf>

NATO Countries		Non-NATO Partners	
Belgium	521	Albania	285
Bulgaria	602	Armenia	126
Canada	513*	Austria	3
Czech Republic	620	Australia	1550
Denmark	750	Azerbaijan	94
Estonia	159	Bosnia-Herzegovina	55
France	3939	Croatia	321
Germany	5000	Finland	156
Greece	160	Georgia	937
Hungary	433	Ireland	7
Iceland	4	Jordan	0
Italy	3974	Macedonia	163
Latvia	173	Malaysia	31
Lithuania	235	Mongolia	114
Luxemburg	11	Montenegro	36
Netherlands	184	New Zealand	190
Norway	428	Singapore	40
Poland	2579	South Korea	350
Portugal	140	Sweden	500
Romania	1949	Ukraine	22
Slovakia	309	United Arab Emirates	35
Slovenia	78	Tonga	55
Spain	1523		
Turkey	1840		
United Kingdom	9500		
United States	90000		

**Total Listed ISAF: 130,697**

**Note:** As noted elsewhere in this report, U.S. force totals in Afghanistan (including those not under NATO/ISAF) are approximately 98,000. In addition, the NATO/ISAF site states that troop numbers in this table are based on broad contribution and do not necessarily reflect the exact numbers on the ground at any one time. Kazakhstan announced in May 2011 that it would send 4 non-combat officers to join ISAF. \*ISAF figures now reflect Canada combat troop pullout in July-August 2011; numbers listed are to train the ANSF. Numbers in the table for the United States may not reflect the start of a U.S. drawdown in July 2011.

**Table 25. Provincial Reconstruction Teams**

Location (City)	Province/Command	
<b>U.S.-Lead (all under ISAF banner)</b>		
1. Gardez	Paktia Province (RC-East, E)	
2. Ghazni	Ghazni (RC-E). with Poland.	
3. Jalalabad	Nangarhar (RC-E)	
4. Khost	Khost (RC-E)	
5. Qalat	Zabol (RC-South, S). with Romania.	
6. Asadabad	Kunar (RC-E)	
7. Sharana	Paktika (RC-E). with Poland.	
8. Mehtarlam	Laghman (RC-E)	
9. Jabal o-Saraj	Panjshir Province (RC-E), State Department lead	
10. Qala Gush	Nuristan (RC-E)	
11. Farah	Farah (RC-SW)	
<b>Partner Lead (most under ISAF banner)</b>		
PRT Location	Province	Lead Force/Other forces
12. Qandahar	Qandahar (RC-S)	Canada (seat of RC-S)
13. Lashkar Gah	Helmand (RC-S)	Britain. with Denmark and Estonia
14. Tarin Kowt	Uruzgan (RC-S)	Australia (and U.S.) (Replaced Netherlands in August 2010)
15. Herat	Herat (RC-W)	Italy (seat of RC-W)
16. Qalah-ye Now	Badghis (RC-W)	Spain
17. Mazar-e-Sharif	Balkh (RC-N)	Sweden
18. Konduz	Konduz (RC-N)	Germany (seat of RC-N)
29. Faizabad	Badakhshan (RC-N)	Germany. with Denmark, Czech Rep.
20. Meymaneh	Faryab (RC-N)	Norway. with Sweden.
21. Chaghcharan	Ghowr (RC-W)	Lithuania. with Denmark, U.S., Iceland
22. Pol-e-Khomri	Baghlan (RC-N)	Hungary
23. Bamiyan	Bamiyan (RC-E)	New Zealand (not NATO/ISAF).
24. Maidan Shahr	Wardak (RC-C)	Turkey
25. Pul-i-Alam	Lowgar (RC-E)	Czech Republic
26. Shebergan	Jowzjan (RC-N)	Turkey
27. Charikar	Parwan (RC-E)	South Korea (Bagram, in Parwan Province, is the base of RC-E)

**Note:** RC = Regional Command.

**Table 26. Major Factions/Leaders in Afghanistan**

Party/ Leader	Leader	Ideology/ Ethnicity	Regional Base
Taliban	Mullah (Islamic cleric) Muhammad Umar (still at large possibly in Afghanistan. Umar, born in Tarin Kowt, Uruzgan province, is about 65 years old.	Ultra-orthodox Islamic, Pashtun	Insurgent groups, mostly in the south and east.
Haqqani Network	Jalaludin Haqqani. Allied with Taliban and Al Qaeda. Said to be heavily influenced by elements within Pakistani military intelligence.	Same as above	Paktia, Paktika, Khost, Kabul
Islamic Society (leader of “Northern Alliance”)	Burhannudin Rabbani/ Yunus Qanooni (speaker of lower house)/Muhammad Fahim/Dr. Abdullah Abdullah (Foreign Minister 2001-2006). Ismail Khan, a so-called “warlord,” heads faction of the grouping in Herat area. Khan, now Minister of Energy and Water, visited United States in March 2008 to sign USAID grant for energy projects.	Moderate Islamic, mostly Tajik	Much of northern and western Afghanistan, including Kabul
National Islamic Movement of Afghanistan	Abdul Rashid Dostam. During OEF, impressed U.S. commanders with horse-mounted assaults on Taliban positions at Shulgara Dam, south of Mazar-e-Sharif, leading to the fall of that city and the Taliban’s subsequent collapse. Was Karzai rival in October 2004 presidential election, then his top “security adviser.”	Secular, Uzbek	Jowzjan, Balkh, Faryab, Sar-i-Pol, and Samangan provinces.
Hizb-e-Wahdat	Composed of Shiite Hazara tribes from central Afghanistan. Karim Khalili is Vice President, but Mohammad Mohaqiq is Karzai rival in 2004 presidential election and parliament. Generally pro-Iranian. Was part of Rabbani 1992-1996 government, and fought unsuccessfully with Taliban over Bamiyan city. Still revered by Hazara Shiites is the former leader of the group, Abdul Ali Mazari, who was captured and killed by the Taliban in March 1995.	Shiite, Hazara tribes	Bamiyan, Ghazni, Dai Kundi province
Pashtun Leaders	Various regional governors and local leaders in the east and south; central government led by Hamid Karzai.	Moderate Islamic, Pashtun	Dominant in the south and east
Hizb-e-Islam Gulbuddin (HIG)	<i>Mujahedin</i> party leader Gulbuddin Hikmatyar. Was part of Soviet-era U.S.-backed “Afghan Interim Government” based in Peshawar, Pakistan. Was nominal “prime minister” in 1992-1996 mujahedin government but never actually took office. Lost power base around Jalalabad to the Taliban in 1994, and fled to Iran before being expelled in 2002. Still allied with Taliban and Al Qaeda in operations east of Kabul, but open to ending militant activity. Leader of a rival Hizb-e-Islam faction, Yunus Khalis, the mentor of Mullah Umar, died July 2006.	Orthodox Islamic, Pashtun	Small groups in Nangarhar, Nuristan, and Kunar provinces
Islamic Union	Abd-I-Rab Rasul Sayyaf. Islamic conservative, leads a pro-Karzai faction in parliament. Lived many years in and politically close to Saudi Arabia, which shares his “Wahhabi” ideology. During anti-Soviet war, Sayyaf’s faction, with Hikmatyar, was a principal recipient of U.S. weaponry. Criticized the U.S.-led war against Saddam Hussein after Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait.	orthodox Islamic, Pashtun	Paghman (west of Kabul)

Source: CRS.

## Residual Issues from Past Conflicts

A few issues remain unresolved from Afghanistan's many years of conflict, such as Stinger retrieval and mine eradication.

### Stinger Retrieval

Beginning in late 1985 following internal debate, the Reagan Administration provided about 2,000 man-portable "Stinger" anti-aircraft missiles to the *mujahedin* for use against Soviet aircraft. Prior to the ouster of the Taliban, common estimates suggested that 200-300 Stingers remained at large, although more recent estimates put the number below 100.<sup>70</sup> The Stinger issue resurfaced in conjunction with 2001 U.S. war effort, when U.S. pilots reported that the Taliban fired some Stingers at U.S. aircraft. No hits were reported. The danger of these weapons has become apparent on several past occasions. Iran bought 16 of the missiles in 1987 and fired one against U.S. helicopters in the Persian Gulf. India claimed that it was a Stinger supplied to Islamic rebels in Kashmir by sympathizers in Afghanistan, that shot down an Indian helicopter over Kashmir in May 1999.<sup>71</sup> Soviet-made SA-7 "Strella" man-portable launchers, which allegedly have been used in the past by Al Qaeda, including against an Israeli passenger jet in Kenya on November 30, 2002, were discovered in Afghanistan by U.S. forces in December 2002.

In 1992, after the fall of the Russian-backed government of Najibullah, the United States reportedly spent about \$10 million to buy the Stingers back, at a premium, from individual *mujahedin* commanders. The *New York Times* reported on July 24, 1993, that the buy back effort failed because the United States was competing with other buyers, including Iran and North Korea, and that the CIA would spend about \$55 million in FY1994 in a renewed effort. On March 7, 1994, the *Washington Post* reported that the CIA had recovered only about 50 or 100 at-large Stingers. In February 2002, the Afghan government found and turned over to the United States "dozens" of Stingers.<sup>72</sup> In January 2005, Afghan intelligence began buying Stingers back, at a reported cost of \$150,000 each.<sup>73</sup> Any Stingers that remain in Afghanistan likely pose little threat, in part because of deteriorating components. No recent uses are reported.

### Mine Eradication

Land mines laid during the Soviet occupation constitute one of the principal dangers to the Afghan people. The United Nations estimates that 5 million to 7 million mines remain scattered throughout the country, although some estimates are lower. U.N. teams have destroyed one million mines and are now focusing on de-mining priority-use, residential and commercial property, including lands around Kabul. Amounts contributed by the United States to the de-mining effort are shown in the tables above. Most of the funds have gone to HALO Trust, a British organization, and the U.N. Mine Action Program for Afghanistan. The Afghanistan Compact adopted in London in February 2006 states that by 2010, the goal should be to reduce the land area of Afghanistan contaminated by mines by 70%.

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<sup>70</sup> Saleem, Farrukh. "Where Are the Missing Stinger Missiles? Pakistan," *Friday Times*. August 17-23, 2001.

<sup>71</sup> "U.S.-Made Stinger Missiles—Mobile and Lethal." Reuters, May 28, 1999.

<sup>72</sup> Fullerton, John. "Afghan Authorities Hand in Stinger Missiles to U.S." Reuters, February 4, 2002.

<sup>73</sup> "Afghanistan Report," Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty. February 4, 2005.



## **Appendix. U.S. and International Sanctions Lifted**

Virtually all U.S. and international sanctions on Afghanistan, some imposed during the Soviet occupation era and others on the Taliban regime, have now been lifted.

- P.L. 108-458 (December 17, 2004, referencing the 9/11 Commission recommendations) repealed bans on aid to Afghanistan outright. On October 7, 1992, President George H.W. Bush had issued Presidential Determination 93-3 that Afghanistan is no longer a Marxist-Leninist country, but the determination was not implemented before he left office. Had it been implemented, the prohibition on Afghanistan's receiving Export-Import Bank guarantees, insurance, or credits for purchases under Section 8 of the 1986 Export-Import Bank Act, would have been lifted. In addition, Afghanistan would have been able to receive U.S. assistance because the requirement would have been waived that Afghanistan apologize for the 1979 killing in Kabul of U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan Adolph "Spike" Dubs. (Dubs was kidnapped in Kabul in 1979 and killed when Afghan police stormed the hideout where he was held.)
- U.N. sanctions on the Taliban imposed by Resolution 1267 (October 15, 1999), Resolution 1333 (December 19, 2000), and Resolution 1363 (July 30, 2001) have now been narrowed to penalize only Al Qaeda (by Resolution 1390, January 17, 2002). Resolution 1267 banned flights outside Afghanistan by Ariana, and directed U.N. member states to freeze Taliban assets. Resolution 1333 prohibited the provision of arms or military advice to the Taliban (directed against Pakistan); ordered a reduction of Taliban diplomatic representation abroad; and banned foreign travel by senior Taliban officials. Resolution 1363 provided for monitors in Pakistan to ensure that no weapons or military advice was provided to the Taliban.
- On January 10, 2003, President Bush signed a proclamation making Afghanistan a beneficiary of the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP), eliminating U.S. tariffs on 5,700 Afghan products. Afghanistan had been denied GSP on May 2, 1980, under Executive Order 12204 (45 F.R. 20740).
- On April 24, 1981, controls on U.S. exports to Afghanistan of agricultural products and phosphates were terminated. Such controls were imposed on June 3, 1980, as part of the sanctions against the Soviet Union for the invasion of Afghanistan, under the authority of Sections 5 and 6 of the Export Administration Act of 1979 [P.L. 96-72; 50 U.S.C. app. 2404, app. 2405].
- In mid-1992, the George H.W. Bush Administration determined that Afghanistan no longer had a "Soviet-controlled government." This opened Afghanistan to the use of U.S. funds made available for the U.S. share of U.N. organizations that provide assistance to Afghanistan.
- On March 31, 1993, after the fall of Najibullah in 1992, President Clinton, on national interest grounds, waived restrictions provided for in Section 481 (h) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 mandating sanctions on Afghanistan, including bilateral aid cuts and suspensions, including denial of Ex-Im Bank credits; the casting of negative U.S. votes for multilateral development bank loans; and a non-allocation of a U.S. sugar quota. Discretionary sanctions included denial of GSP; additional duties on exports to the United States; and


- curtailment of air transportation with the United States. Waivers were also granted in 1994 and, after the fall of the Taliban, by President Bush.
- On May 3, 2002, President Bush restored normal trade treatment to the products of Afghanistan, reversing the February 18, 1986, proclamation by President Reagan (Presidential Proclamation 5437) that suspended most-favored nation (MFN) tariff status for Afghanistan (51 F.R. 4287). The Foreign Assistance Appropriations for FY1986 [Section 552, P.L. 99-190] had authorized the denial of U.S. credits or most-favored-nation (MFN) status for Afghanistan.
  - On July 2, 2002, the State Department amended U.S. regulations (22 C.F.R. Part 126) to allow arms sales to the new Afghan government, reversing the June 14, 1996, addition of Afghanistan to the list of countries prohibited from importing U.S. defense articles and services. Arms sales to Afghanistan had also been prohibited during 1997-2002 because Afghanistan had been designated under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (P.L. 104-132) as a state that is not cooperating with U.S. anti-terrorism efforts.
  - On July 2, 2002, President Bush formally revoked the July 4, 1999, declaration by President Clinton of a national emergency with respect to Taliban because of its hosting of bin Laden. The Clinton determination and related Executive Order 13129 had blocked Taliban assets and property in the United States, banned U.S. trade with Taliban-controlled areas of Afghanistan, and applied these sanctions to Ariana Afghan Airlines, triggering a blocking of Ariana assets (about \$500,000) in the United States and a ban on U.S. citizens' flying on the airline. (The ban on trade with Taliban-controlled territory had essentially ended on January 29, 2002, when the State Department determination that the Taliban controls no territory within Afghanistan.)

**Figure A-I. Map of Afghanistan**



Source: Map Resources. Adapted by CRS.

Figure A-2. Map of Afghan Ethnicities



**Source:** 2003 National Geographic Society. <http://www.afghan-network.net/maps/Afghanistan-Map.pdf>. Adapted by Amber Wilhelm, CRS Graphics.

**Notes:** This map is intended to be illustrative of the approximate demographic distribution by region of Afghanistan. CRS has no way to confirm exact population distributions.

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