Iraq: Politics, Governance, and Human Rights
Kenneth Katzman
Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs
August 9, 2011
Congressional Research Service
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Iraq: Politics, Governance, and Human Rights

Summary
Iraq’s political system is increasingly characterized by peaceful competition and formation of
cross-sectarian alliances, but ethnic and sectarian political infighting continues, often involving
violence or the questionable use of key levers of power and legal institutions. This infighting is
based on the belief that holding political power may mean the difference between poverty and
prosperity, or even life and death, for the various political communities. The schisms delayed
agreement on a new government following the March 7, 2010, national elections for the Council
of Representatives (COR, parliament). With U.S. diplomatic help, on November 10, 2010, major
ethnic and sectarian factions finally agreed on a framework (“Irbil Agreement”) for a new
government under which Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki is serving a second term.
In recent months, and with a complete U.S. withdrawal from Iraq looming at the end of 2011, the
optimism of that agreement has faded and relations among major factions have frayed. Sunni
Arabs still fear that Maliki and his Shiite allies will try to monopolize power. The Kurds are wary
that Maliki will not honor pledges to resolve Kurd-Arab territorial and financial disputes. Sunni
Arabs and the Kurds dispute territory and governance in parts of northern Iraq, particularly
Nineveh Province. Some Iraqi communities, including Christians in northern Iraq, are not
necessarily at odds with the government but are often caught in the crossfire between the Sunni
Arabs and the Kurds. These splits have created conditions under which the insurgency that
hampered U.S. policy during 2004-2008 continues to succeed in conducting occasional high
casualty attacks, and in which Shiite militias are rearming and conducting attacks on U.S. forces
still in Iraq.
These political disputes and ongoing violence—coupled with U.S. concerns about the
effectiveness of Iraq’s 650,000 member security forces—have created momentum for the United
States and Iraq to modify the firm deadline for a complete U.S. military withdrawal from Iraq at
the end of 2011. That deadline is enshrined in a 2008 U.S.-Iraq Security Agreement. With the
formal end of the U.S. combat mission on August 31, 2010, U.S. forces have dropped to a current
level of about 47,000, from a 2008 high of 170,000. In several high-level visits and statements
during 2011, senior U.S. officials have said that Iraq should request a continuing, but likely
sharply reduced, presence of U.S. forces after 2011. An Iraqi decision on such a request was long
hampered by all the same political schisms discussed above, as well as the Sadr threats to rearm
his followers if U.S. forces remain after 2011. However, Maliki obtained sufficient consensus in
July 2011 to announce the start of negotiations with the United States on extension of the U.S.
military presence. The retention of some U.S. troops leave might reduce some of the concerns
about the ability of the U.S. State Department to secure its facilities and personnel and to carry
out its mission on its own.
The Administration is hopeful that, no matter the outcome of discussions on the U.S. military
presence, all factions will cooperate to act on key outstanding legislation crucial to attracting
foreign investment, such as national hydrocarbon laws. The new government took action on some
long-stalled initiatives, including year-long tensions over Kurdish exports of oil. However, the
lack of a broader and sustained focus on governance, or on improving key services, such as
electricity, created popular frustration that manifested as protests since February 2011. The
demonstrations were partly inspired by the wave of unrest that has broken out in many other
Middle Eastern countries, but were not centered on overthrowing the regime or wholesale
political change.
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Contents
Overview of the Political Transition/First Elections........................................................................ 1
Initial Transition and Construction of the Political System....................................................... 1
January 30, 2005, Elections for an Interim Government........................................................... 1
Permanent Constitution ............................................................................................................. 2
December 15, 2005, Elections................................................................................................... 3
Post-2005 Elections and Steps Toward Reconciliation.................................................................... 3
Benchmarks and a Troop Surge................................................................................................. 3
The Strengthening of Maliki and the Iraqi Government: 2008-2009 ........................................ 4
Attempts to Decentralize Governance: Provincial Powers Law and
January 31, 2009, Provincial Elections ............................................................................ 4
The March 7, 2010, Elections: Coalitions and Political Infighting ........................................... 7
Election Law Dispute and Final Provisions ........................................................................ 8
Election Parameters............................................................................................................. 9
Flashpoint: Disqualification of Some Prominent Sunnis .................................................. 10
Election and Results.......................................................................................................... 11
Post-Election Government ................................................................................................ 12
Political Agreement (“Irbil Agreement”) Reached............................................................ 13
New Government Formed................................................................................................. 14
Unresolved Political Schisms .................................................................................................. 15
Sunni Community ............................................................................................................. 15
KRG-Central Government Disputes/Combined Security Mechanism.............................. 16
The Sadr Faction and Its Position ..................................................................................... 18
Related Governance Issues ............................................................................................................ 19
2011 Unrest.............................................................................................................................. 20
Government Response and Prospects................................................................................ 21
General Human Rights Issues.................................................................................................. 22
Trafficking in Persons ....................................................................................................... 22
Media and Free Expression............................................................................................... 22
Labor Rights...................................................................................................................... 23
Situation of the Christian Religious Minority ................................................................... 23
Corruption ......................................................................................................................... 24
Mass Graves ...................................................................................................................... 24
Camp Ashraf...................................................................................................................... 24
Regional Dimension ...................................................................................................................... 24
Implications for the Wind Down of the U.S. Military Mission ..................................................... 25
Scenarios for Drawdown or Withdrawal ................................................................................. 26
Other Elections Possible.......................................................................................................... 30

Tables
Table 1. Major Coalitions for 2010 National Elections ................................................................... 8
Table 2. March 2010 COR Election: Final, Certified Results by Province ................................... 29
Table 3. U.S. Assistance to Iraq: FY2003-FY2012 Request.......................................................... 31
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Table 4. Recent Democracy Assistance to Iraq.............................................................................. 32
Table 5. January 31, 2009, Provincial Election Results (Major Slates)......................................... 33
Table 6. Election Results (January and December 2005) .............................................................. 34
Table 7. Assessments of the Benchmarks ...................................................................................... 34

Contacts
Author Contact Information........................................................................................................... 37

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Overview of the Political Transition/First Elections
Iraq has completed a political transition from the dictatorship of Saddam Hussein to a plural
polity that encompasses varying sects and ideological and political factions. That transition has
been accomplished through a series of elections that began in 2005, after a one-year occupation
period and a subsequent seven-month interim period of Iraqi self-governance. However, disputes
over the relative claim of each community on power and economic resources permeate almost
every issue in Iraq, including security, elections, economic decision making, and foreign policy.
The constant infighting over these issues has contributed to popular frustration over the lack of
focus on improving governance and delivery of services.
Initial Transition and Construction of the Political System
After the fall of Saddam Hussein’s regime in April 2003, the United States set up an occupation
structure, reportedly based on concerns that immediate sovereignty would favor major factions
and not produce democracy. In May 2003, President Bush, reportedly seeking strong leadership in
Iraq, named Ambassador L. Paul Bremer to head a “Coalition Provisional Authority” (CPA),
which was recognized by the United Nations as an occupation authority. Bremer discontinued a
tentative political transition process and instead appointed (July 13, 2003) a non-sovereign Iraqi
advisory body, the 25-member “Iraq Governing Council” (IGC). During that year, U.S. and Iraqi
negotiators, advised by a wide range of international officials and experts, drafted a “Transitional
Administrative Law” (TAL, interim constitution), which became effective on March 4, 2004.
After about one year of occupation, the United States, following a major debate between the CPA
and various Iraqi factions over the modalities and rapidity of a resumption of Iraqi sovereignty,
handed sovereignty to an appointed Iraqi interim government on June 28, 2004. That date was
two days ahead of the TAL-specified date of June 30, 2004, for the handing over of Iraqi
sovereignty and the end of the occupation period, which also laid out the elections roadmap
discussed below. The interim government was headed by a prime minister, Iyad al-Allawi, leader
of the Iraq National Accord, a secular, non-sectarian faction but whose supporters are mostly
Sunni Arabs. Allawi is a Shiite Muslim but many INA leaders were Sunnis, and some of them
were formerly members of the Baath Party. The president was Sunni tribalist, Ghazi al-Yawar.
January 30, 2005, Elections for an Interim Government
A series of elections in 2005 produced the full-term government structure that is in place today. In
accordance with the dates specified in the TAL, the first post-Saddam election was held on
January 30, 2005. The voting was for a 275-seat transitional National Assembly (which formed an
executive), four-year term provincial councils in all 18 provinces and a Kurdistan regional
assembly (111 seats). The election for the transitional Assembly was conducted according to the
“proportional representation/closed list” election system, in which voters chose among “political
entities” (a party, a coalition of parties, or persons). A total of 111 entities were on the national
ballot, of which nine were multi-party coalitions.
Still restive over their displacement from power in the 2003 U.S. invasion, Sunni Arabs (20% of
the overall population) boycotted, winning only 17 Assembly seats, and only one seat on the 51-
seat Baghdad provincial council. That council was dominated (28 seats) by representatives of the
Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI), then led by Abd al-Aziz al-Hakim. (In August 2003,
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when Abd al-Aziz’s brother, Mohammad Baqr al-Hakim, was assassinated in a bombing outside a
Najaf mosque, Abd al-Aziz succeeded his brother as ISCI leader. After Abd al-Aziz al-Hakim’s
death from lung cancer in August 2009, his son Ammar, born in 1971, succeeded him.)
Radical Shiite cleric Moqtada Al Sadr, whose armed faction (the militia operated under the name
Mahdi Army) was then at odds with U.S. forces, also boycotted, leaving his faction poorly
represented on provincial councils in the Shiite south and in Baghdad. The resulting transitional
government placed Shiites and Kurds in the highest positions—Patriotic Union of Kurdistan
(PUK) leader Jalal Talabani was president and Da’wa (Shiite party) leader Ibrahim al-Jafari was
prime minister. Sunnis were Assembly speaker, deputy president, a deputy prime minister, and six
ministers, including defense.
Permanent Constitution
The elected Assembly was to draft a permanent constitution by August 15, 2005, to be put to a
referendum by October 15, 2005, subject to veto by a two-thirds majority of voters in any three
provinces. On May 10, 2005, a 55-member drafting committee was appointed, but with only two
Sunni Arabs (15 Sunnis were later added as full members and 10 as advisors). In August 2005,
the talks produced a draft, providing for
• a December 31, 2007, deadline to hold a referendum on whether Kirkuk (Tamim
province) would join the Kurdish region (Article 140);
• designation of Islam as “a main source” of legislation;1
• a 25% electoral goal for women (Article 47);
• families choosing which courts to use for family issues (Article 41); making only
primary education mandatory (Article 34);
• having Islamic law experts and civil law judges on the federal supreme court
(Article 89).
Many women opposed the two latter provisions as giving too much discretion to male family
members. It made all orders of the U.S.-led occupation authority (Coalition Provisional Authority,
CPA) applicable until amended (Article 126), and established a “Federation Council” (Article
62), a second chamber with size and powers to be determined in future law (not adopted to date).
The major disputes—never fully resolved—centered on regional versus centralized power. The
draft permitted two or more provinces together to form new autonomous “regions”—reaffirmed
in passage of an October 2006 law on formation of regions. Article 117 allows “regions” to
organize internal security forces, legitimizing the fielding of the Kurds’ peshmerga militia
(allowed by the TAL). Article 109 requires the central government to distribute oil and gas
revenues from “current fields” in proportion to population, and gave regions a role in allocating
revenues from new energy discoveries. Disputes over these concepts continue to hold up passage
of national hydrocarbons legislation. Sunnis dominate areas of Iraq that have few proven oil or
gas deposits, and favor centralized control of oil revenues, whereas the Kurds want to maintain
maximum control of their own burgeoning energy sector.

1 http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/10/12/AR2005101201450.html.
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With contentious provisions unresolved, Sunnis registered in large numbers (70%-85%) to try to
defeat the constitution, prompting a U.S.-mediated agreement (October 11, 2005) providing for a
panel to propose amendments within four months after a post-December 15 election government
took office (Article 137), to be voted on within another two months (under the same rules as the
October 15 referendum). The Sunni provinces of Anbar and Salahuddin (which includes
Saddam’s home town of Tikrit) had a 97% and 82% “no” vote, respectively, but the constitution
was adopted because Nineveh province only voted 55% “no,” missing the threshold for a “no”
vote by a two-thirds majority in three provinces.
December 15, 2005, Elections
The December 15, 2005, elections were for a full-term (four-year) national government (also in
line with the schedule laid out in the TAL). Under the voting mechanism used for that election,
each province contributed a predetermined number of seats to a “Council of Representatives”
(COR)—a formula adopted to attract Sunni participation. Of the 275-seat body, 230 seats were
allocated this way, with 45 “compensatory” seats for entities that would have won additional seats
had the constituency been the whole nation. There were 361 political “entities,” including 19
multi-party coalitions, competing in a “closed list” voting system (in which party leaders choose
the persons who will actually sit in the Assembly). As shown in Table 5, voters chose lists
representing their sects and regions, and the Shiites and Kurds again emerged dominant. The
COR was inaugurated on March 16, 2006, but political infighting caused the Shiite bloc “United
Iraqi Alliance” to replace Jafari with another Da’wa figure, Nuri Kamal al-Maliki, as prime
minister.
On April 22, 2006, the COR approved Talabani to continue as president. His two deputies were
Adel Abd al-Mahdi (incumbent) of the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI) and Tariq al-
Hashimi, leader of the broad Sunni-based coalition called the Accord Front (“Tawafuq”—within
which Hashimi leads the Iraqi Islamic Party). Another Accord figure, the hardline Mahmoud
Mashhadani (National Dialogue Council party), became COR speaker. Maliki won COR approval
of a 37-member cabinet (including two deputy prime ministers) on May 20, 2006. Three key slots
(Defense, Interior, and National Security) were not filled permanently until June 2006, due to
infighting. Of the 37 posts, there were 19 Shiites; nine Sunnis; eight Kurds; and one Christian.
Four were women.
Post-2005 Elections and Steps Toward Reconciliation
The 2005 elections were, at the time, considered successful by the Bush Administration but did
not resolve the Sunni-Arab grievances over their diminished positions in the power structure.
Some argue that the elections in 2005 worsened the violence by exposing the new-found
subordination of the Sunni Arabs. The Sunni-led insurgency accelerated in the two subsequent
years, in turn prompting the empowerment of Shiite militia factions to counter the insurgency.
The sectarian violence was so serious that many experts, by the end of 2006, were considering the
U.S. mission as failing.
Benchmarks and a Troop Surge
In August 2006, the Administration and Iraq agreed on a series of “benchmarks” that, if adopted
and implemented, might achieve political reconciliation. Under Section 1314 of a FY2007
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supplemental appropriation (P.L. 110-28), “progress” on 18 political and security benchmarks—
as assessed in Administration reports due by July 15, 2007, and then September 15, 2007—was
required for the United States to provide $1.5 billion in Economic Support Funds (ESF) to Iraq.
President Bush used the waiver provision. The law also mandated an assessment by the GAO, by
September 1, 2007, of the degree to which the benchmarks have been met, as well as an outside
assessment of the Iraqi security forces (ISF).
In early 2007, the United States began a “surge” of about 30,000 additional U.S. forces (bringing
U.S. troop levels from their 2004-2006 baseline of about 138,000 to about 170,000 at the height
of the surge) intended to blunt insurgent momentum and take advantage of growing Sunni Arab
rejection of extremist groups. As 2008 progressed, citing the achievement of many of the major
legislative benchmarks and a dramatic drop in sectarian violence that was attributed to surge—the
Bush Administration asserted that political reconciliation was advancing. However, U.S. officials
maintained that the extent and durability of reconciliation would depend on the degree of
implementation of adopted laws, on further compromises among ethnic groups, and on continued
attenuated levels of violence. For Iraq’s performance on the benchmarks, see Table 7.
The Strengthening of Maliki and the Iraqi Government: 2008-2009
The passage of Iraqi laws in 2008 considered crucial to reconciliation, continued reductions in
violence accomplished by the U.S. surge, and the continued turn of many Sunni militants away
from violence, enhanced Maliki’s political position. A March 2008 offensive ordered by Maliki
against the Sadr faction and other militants in Basra and environs (“Operation Charge of the
Knights”) pacified the city and caused many Sunnis and Kurds to see Maliki as even-handed.
This contributed to a decision in July 2008 by the Accord Front to end its one-year boycott of the
cabinet. Other cabinet vacancies were filled with independents, and Maliki’s position was
secured. (Earlier, in 2007 the Accord Front, the Sadr faction, and the bloc of former Prime
Minister Iyad al-Allawi pulled out of the cabinet, leaving it with 13 vacant seats, out of 37 cabinet
slots.)
Attempts to Decentralize Governance: Provincial Powers Law and
January 31, 2009, Provincial Elections
Although Maliki gained adherents within the political structure, the January 31, 2009, provincial
elections represented an opportunity to try to ensure that neither he, nor any future prime minister,
could centralize power to the extent witnessed under Saddam Hussein’s rule. In addition to the
checks and balances established in the central government, a 2008 “provincial powers law” was
intended to decentralize Iraq by setting up powerful provincial councils that decide on local
allocation of resources. The provincial councils in Iraq choose each province’s governor and
governing administrations—in contrast to Afghanistan, where provincial governors are appointed
by the president. Some central government funds are given directly to provincial administrations
for their use, although most Iraqi funds are allocated centrally.
ISCI, which had already been distancing itself from its erstwhile ally, Maliki’s Da’wa Party, ran
under a separate slate in the provincial elections—thus splitting up the formerly powerful UIA.
Ideologically, ISCI favors more power for the provinces and less for the central government;
Maliki prefers centralization.
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The provincial elections had originally been planned for October 1, 2008, but were delayed when
Kurdish restiveness over integrating Kirkuk and other disputed territories into the KRG caused a
presidential council veto of the July 22, 2008, election law needed to hold these elections. That
draft provided for equal division of power in Kirkuk (among Kurds, Arabs, and Turkomans) until
its status is finally resolved, a proposal strongly opposed by the Kurds. On September 24, 2008,
the COR passed a final election law, providing for the elections by January 31, 2009, and putting
off provincial elections in Kirkuk and the three KRG provinces.2
In the elections, about 14,500 candidates vied for the 440 provincial council seats in the 14 Arab-
dominated provinces of Iraq. About 4,000 of the candidates were women. The average number of
council seats per province was about 30,3 down from a set number of 41 seats per province
(except Baghdad) in the 2005-2009 councils. The Baghdad provincial council has 57 seats. This
yielded an average of more than 30 candidates per council seat. However, the reduction in
number of seats also meant that many incumbents were not reelected.
The provincial elections were conducted on an “open list” basis—voters were able to vote for a
party slate, or for an individual candidate (although they also had to vote for that candidate’s
slate). This procedure encouraged voting for slates and strengthened the ability of political parties
to choose who on their slate will occupy seats allotted for that party. This election system was
widely assessed to favor larger, well-organized parties, because smaller parties might not meet the
vote threshold to obtain any seats on the council in their province.4 This was seen as likely to set
back the hopes of some Iraqis that the elections would weaken the Islamist parties, both Sunni
and Shiite, that have dominated post-Saddam politics.
About 17 million Iraqis (any Iraqi 18 years of age or older) were eligible for the vote, which was
run by the Iraqi Higher Election Commission (IHEC). Pre-election-related violence was minimal,
although five candidates and several election/political workers were killed. There were virtually
no major violent incidents on election day. Turnout was about 51%, somewhat lower than some
expected. Some voters complained of being turned away at polling places because their names
were not on file. Other voters had been displaced by sectarian violence in prior years and were
unable to vote in their new areas of habitation.
The vote totals were finalized on February 19, 2009, and were certified on March 29, 2009.
Within 15 days of that (by April 13, 2009) the provincial councils began to convene under the
auspices of the incumbent provincial governor, and to elect a provincial council chairperson and
deputy chairperson. Within another 30 days after that (by May 12, 2009) the provincial councils
selected (by absolute majority) a provincial governor and deputy governors. The term of the
provincial councils is four years from the date of their first convention.

2 The election law also stripped out provisions in the vetoed version to allot 13 total reserved seats, spanning six
provinces, to minorities. An October 2008 amendment restored six reserved seats for minorities: Christian seats in
Baghdad, Nineveh, and Basra; one seat for Yazidis in Nineveh; one seat for Shabaks in Nineveh; and one seat for the
Sabean sect in Baghdad.
3 Each provincial council has 25 seats plus one seat per each 200,000 residents over 500,000.
4 The threshold for winning a seat is the total number of valid votes divided by the number of seats up for election.
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Outcomes
Some concerns of Maliki’s opponents—and of those who favor decentralized power—were
realized when his allies in his “State of Law Coalition” were clear winners of the provincial
elections. His Shiite opponents (his former allies) all ran separate slates and fared generally
poorly. With 28 out of the 57 total seats, the Maliki slate gained control of the Baghdad provincial
council, displacing ISCI. Da’wa also emerged very strong in most of the Shiite provinces of the
south, including Basra, where it won an outright majority (20 out of 35 seats).
Although Maliki’s coalition fared well, the subsequent efforts to form provincial administrations
demonstrated that he still needed to strike bargains with rival factions, including Sadr, ISCI, and
even the Sunni list of Saleh al-Mutlaq (National Dialogue Front) that contains many ex-Baathists.
The provincial administrations that took shape are discussed in Table 5. Aside from the victory of
Maliki’s slate, the unexpected strength of secular parties, such as that of former Prime Minister
Iyad al-Allawi, corroborated the view that voters favored slates committed to Iraqi nationalism
and strong central government.
The apparent big loser in the elections was ISCI, which had been favored because it is well
organized and well funded. ISCI did not win outright in Najaf province, which it previously
dominated and which, because of Najaf’s revered status in Shiism, is considered a center of
political gravity in southern Iraq. It won seven seats there, the same number that was won by the
Maliki slate. ISCI won only 3 seats on the Baghdad province council, down from the 28 it held
previously, and only 5 in Basra. Some observers believe that the poor showing for ISCI was a
product not only of its call for devolving power out of Baghdad, but also because of its perceived
close ties to Iran, which some Iraqis believed was exercising undue influence on Iraqi politics.
Others say ISCI was perceived as interested in political and economic gain for its supporters.
The Sadr faction, represented mainly in the “Independent Liberals Trend” list, did not come close
to winning outright control of any councils, although it won enough seats in several southern
provinces to, through deal-making, gain senior positions in a few southern provinces. The
showing of the Sadrists was viewed as reflecting voter disillusionment with parties that field
militias—which many Iraqis blame for much of post-Saddam violence.
Another important trend noted in the 2009 provincial elections was the increasing Sunni entry
into the political process. Participating in the provincial elections were Sunni tribal leaders
(“Awakening Councils”) who had recruited the “Sons of Iraq” fighters and who were widely
credited for turning Iraqi Sunnis against Al Qaeda-linked extremists in Iraq. These Sunni tribalists
had largely stayed out of the December 2005 elections because their attention was focused
primarily on the severe violence in the Sunni provinces, particularly Anbar. These tribal figures
were, at the time of the December 2005 election, still intimidated by Al Qaeda in Iraq’s
admonition that Sunnis stay out of the political process. However, in the 2009 provincial
elections, as the violence ebbed, Sunni tribalists offered election slates and showed strength at the
expense of the established Sunni parties, particularly the Iraqi Islamic Party (IIP) and the National
Dialogue Council. The main “Iraq Awakening” tribal slate came in first in Anbar Province. The
tribalists benefitted from the decline of the IIP and other mostly urban Sunni parties, including the
National Dialogue Council. In Diyala Province, hotly contested among Shiite and Sunni Arab and
Kurdish slates, the provincial version of the (Sunni Arab) Accord Front edged out the Kurds for
first place, and subsequently allied with the Kurds and with ISCI to set up the provincial
administration.
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The March 7, 2010, Elections: Coalitions and Political Infighting
After his slate’s strong showing in the January 2009 provincial elections, Maliki became the
immediate favorite to retain his position in the March 7, 2010, COR elections. The elected COR
chooses the full-term government, as discussed above. With many perceiving Maliki as the likely
winner for another term, Maliki was able to include some political competitors in some provinces,
including those dominated by Sunni Arabs and Sunni tribalists, into his State of Law coalition
that would compete in the national elections for a new COR. However, Sunnis were not in high
positions on his slate, and his slate was still perceived as primarily Shiite.
Maliki derived further political benefit from the U.S. implementation of the U.S.-Iraq “Security
Agreement” (SA, sometimes referred to as the Status of Forces Agreement, or SOFA), discussed
below in the section on the U.S. military mission. However, as 2009 progressed, Maliki’s image
as protector of law and order was tarnished by several high-profile attacks from mid-2009 to the
eve of the election. Realizing the potential for security lapses to reduce his chances to remain
prime minister, Maliki ordered several ISF commanders questioned for lapses in connection with
the major bombings in Baghdad on August 20, 2009, in which almost 100 Iraqis were killed and
the buildings housing the Ministry of Finance and of Foreign Affairs were heavily damaged.
Makeshift alternate Ministry of Finance buildings were attacked again on December 7, 2009.
After this latter bombing, which also resulted in the parliament’s insistence that it hear Maliki’s
explanation of his responses, Maliki replaced the commander of the Baghdad Brigade. He also
attempted to place substantial blame for the lapses on Interior Minister Jawad Bolani, who was
heading a rival slate in the elections. (See Table 1 on major slates in the election.)
Politically, sensing Maliki’s weakness and a more open competition for prime minister, Shiite
unity broke down and a rival Shiite slate took shape as a competitor to Maliki’s State of Law. The
“Iraqi National Alliance (INA)” was composed of ISCI, Sadr, and other Shiite figures. The INA
coalition believed that each of its component factions would draw support from their individual
constituencies to produce an election majority or clear plurality. Sistani remained completely
neutral in the election, endorsing no slate, but calling on all Iraqis to participate.
To Sunni Arabs, the outwardly cross-sectarian Iraq National Movement (“Iraqiyya”) of former
transitional Prime Minister Iyad al-Allawi had strong appeal. There was an openly Sunni slate,
leaning Islamist, called the Accordance slate (“Tawaffuq”) led by IIP figures, but it was not
expected to fare well compared to Allawi’s less sectarian bloc. Some Sunni figures were recruited
to join Shiite slates.

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Table 1. Major Coalitions for 2010 National Elections
State of Law Coalition
Led by Maliki and his Da’wa Party. Includes Anbar Salvation Front of Shaykh
Hatim al-Dulaymi, which is Sunni, and the Independent Arab Movement of Abd
(slate no. 337)
al-Mutlaq al-Jabbouri. Appealed to Shi te sectarianism during the campaign by
backing the exclusion of candidates with links to outlawed Baath Party. Was
favored in the 2010 election due to strong showing in 2009 provincial elections.
Iraqi National Alliance
Formed in August 2009, was initially considered the most formidable challenger
to Maliki’s slate. Consists mainly of his erstwhile Shiite opponents and is
(slate no. 316)
perceived as somewhat more Islamist than the other slates. Includes ISCI, the
Sadrist movement, the Fadilah Party, the Iraqi National Congress of Ahmad
Chalabi, and the National Reform Movement (Da’wa faction) of former Prime
Minister Ibrahim al-Jafari. Possible Prime ministerial candidate from this bloc was
deputy President Adel Abd al-Mahdi, a moderate well respected by U.S. officials.
However, some observers say Chalabi—the key architect of the effort to
exclude candidates with Baathist ties—wanted to replace Maliki. This slate was
considered close to Ayatol ah Sistani, but did not receive his formal
endorsement.
Iraqi National Movement
Formed in October 2009. Led by former Prime Minister Iyad al-Al awi (Iraq
National Accord) who is Shi te but his faction appeals to Sunnis, and Sunni leader
(“Iraqiyya”—slate no. 333)
Saleh al-Mutlaq (ex-Baathist who leads Iraq Front for National Dialogue). Backed
by Iraqi Islamic Party leader and Deputy President Tariq Al-Hashimi as well as
other powerful Sunnis, including Usama al-Nujaifi and Rafi al-Issawi. However,
Justice and Accountability Commission (formerly the De-Baathification
Commission) disqualified Mutlaq and another senior candidate on this slate,
Dhafir al Ani, for supporting the outlawed Baath Party. An appeals court affirmed
their disqualification (decision legislatively reversed after the election).
Kurdistan Alliance
Competed again in 2010 as a joint KDP-PUK Kurdish list. However, Kurdish
solidarity was shaken by July 25, 2009, Kurdistan elections in which a breakaway
(slate no. 372)
PUK faction called Change (Gorran) did unexpectedly well. Gorran ran its own
separate list for the March 2010 elections. However, PUK’s ebbing strength in
the north did not jeopardize Talabani’s continuation as president, although Sunnis
sought that position.
Unity Alliance of Iraq
Led by Interior Minister Jawad Bolani, a moderate Shiite who has a reputation for
political independence. Bolani has not previously been affiliated with the large
(slate no. 348)
Shiite parties such as ISCI and Dawa, and was only briefly affiliated with the
Sadrist faction (which has been strong in Bolani’s home town of Amarah, in
southeastern Iraq). Considered a non-sectarian slate, this list Included Sunni
tribal faction led by Shaykh Ahmad Abu Risha, brother of slain leader of the Sunni
Awakening movement in Anbar. The list included first post-Saddam defense
minister Sadun al-Dulaymi.
Iraqi Accordance
A coalition of Sunni parties, including breakaway factions of the Iraqi Islamic Party
(IIP). Led by Ayad al-Samarrai, speaker of the COR. Viewed as a weak
(slate no. 338)
competitor for Sunni votes against Allawi slate.
Sources: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace; various press.
Election Law Dispute and Final Provisions
While coalitions formed to challenge Maliki, disputes emerged over the ground rules for the
election. The holding of the elections required passage of an election law setting out the rules and
parameters of the election. Under the Iraqi constitution, the elections were to be held by January
31, 2010, in order to allow 45 days before the March 15, 2010, expiry of the current COR’s term.
Iraq’s election officials had ideally wanted a 90-day time frame between the election law passage
and the election date, in order to facilitate the voter registration process.
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Because the provisions of the election law (covering such issues as voter eligibility, whether to
allot quota seats to certain constituencies, the size of the next COR) have the potential to shape
the election outcome, the major Iraqi communities were divided over its substance. These
differences caused the COR to miss almost every self-imposed deadline to pass it. One dispute
was over the election system, with many COR members leaning toward a closed list system
(which gives the slates the power to determine who occupies actual COR seats after the election),
despite a call by Grand Ayatollah Sistani for an open list vote (which allows voters to also vote
for candidates as well as coalition slates). Each province served as a single constituency and a
fixed number of seats for each province (see Table 2, which includes number of COR seats per
province).
There was also a dispute over how to apply the election in disputed Tamim (Kirkuk) province,
where Kurds feared that the election law drafts would cause Kurds to be underrepresented. The
version of the election law passed by the COR on November 8, 2009 (141 out of 195 COR
deputies voting), called for using 2009 food ration lists as representative of voter registration. The
Kurds had sought this provision, facing down the insistence of many COR deputies to use 2005
voter lists, which presumably would contain fewer Kurds. A compromise in that version of the
law allowed for a process to review, for one year, complaints about fraudulent registration, thus
easing Sunni and Shiite Arab fears about an excessive Kurdish vote in Kirkuk.
However, this version guaranteed only a small quota of seats for Iraqis living abroad or who are
displaced—and Sunnis believed they would therefore be undercounted because it was mainly
Sunnis who had fled Iraq. On this basis, one of Iraq’s deputy presidents, Tariq al Hashimi, a Sunni
Arab, vetoed the law. The veto, on November 18, sent the law back to the COR. A new version
was adopted on November 23, but it was viewed as even less favorable to Sunni Arabs than the
first version, because it eliminated any reserved seats for Iraqis in exile. Hashimi again threatened
a veto, which he was required to exercise within 10 days. As that deadline was about to lapse, the
major factions, reportedly at the urging of U.S. and other diplomats, adopted a new law
(December 6, 2009).
Election Parameters
The compromise version, not vetoed by any member of the presidency council, provided for:
• Expansion of the size of the COR to 325 total seats. Of these, 310 were allocated
by province, with the constituency sizes ranging from Baghdad’s 68 seats to
Muthanna’s seven. The COR size, in the absence of a recent census, was based
on taking 2005 population figures and adding 2.8% per year growth.5
• The remaining 15 seats were to be minority reserved seats (8) and “compensatory
seats” (7)—seats allocated from “leftover” votes; votes for parties and slates that
did not meet a minimum threshold to achieve any seats outright.
• No separate electoral constituency for Iraqis in exile, so Iraqis in exile had their
votes counted in the provinces where these voters originated.

5 Analysis of Iraq expert Reidar Visser. “The Hashemi Veto.” http://gulfanalysis.wordpress.com/2009/11/18/the-
hashemi-veto/.
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• An open list election system.
• An election date set for March 7, 2010.
Flashpoint: Disqualification of Some Prominent Sunnis
The electoral process was at least partly intended to bring Sunni Arabs ever further into the
political structure and to turn them away from violence and insurgency. Sunnis boycotted the
January 2005 parliamentary and provincial elections and were, as a result, poorly represented in
all governing bodies. Sunni slates, consisting mainly of urban, educated Sunnis, did participate in
the December 2005 parliamentary elections, an apparent calculation that it would not serve Sunni
interests to remain permanently alienated from the political process.
The Sunni commitment to the political process appeared in some jeopardy in the context of a
major dispute over candidate eligibility for the March 2010 elections. Although a Sunni boycott
of the elections did not materialize, there was a Sunni Arab perception that the election might be
unfair because of this dispute. The acute phase of this political crisis began in January 2010 when
the Justice and Accountability Commission (JAC, the successor to the “De-Baathification
Commission” that worked since the fall of Saddam to purge former Baathists from government)
invalidated the candidacies of 499 individuals (out of 6,500 candidates running), spanning many
different slates. The JAC was headed by Ali al-Lami, a Shiite who had been in U.S. military
custody during 2005-2006 for alleged assistance to Iranian agents active in Iraq. He was
perceived as answerable to or heavily influenced by Ahmad Chalabi, who had headed the De-
Baathification Commission. Both were part of the Iraqi National Alliance slate and both are
Shiites, leading many to believe that the disqualifications represented an attempt to exclude
prominent Sunnis from the vote.
The JAC argued that the disqualifications were based on law and careful evaluation of candidate
backgrounds and not based on sect, because many of the candidates disqualified were Shiites. The
IHEC reviewed and backed the invalidations on January 14, 2010; disqualified candidates had
three days to file an appeal in court. Apparently due in part to entreaties from the U.S. Embassy,
Vice President Joseph Biden (during a visit to Iraq on January 22, 2010) and partner embassies in
Iraq—all of which feared a return to instability—the appeals court at first ruled that disqualified
candidates could run in the election and clear up questions of Baathist affiliation afterwards.
However, reported pressure by Maliki and other Shiites caused the court to reverse itself on
February 12, 2010, and to disqualify 145 candidates. Twenty-six candidates were reinstated. The
remaining approximately 300 disqualified candidates had already been replaced by other
candidates on their respective slates. The slate most affected by the disqualifications was
Iraqiyya, because two of its leading candidates, National Dialogue Front party leader Saleh al-
Mutlaq and Dhafir al-Ani, both Sunnis, were barred from running.
The Iraqiyya slate did not, as a whole, call for a broad boycott—nor did Mutlaq himself call for a
boycott. Mutlaq was replaced as a candidate by his brother. The slate campaigned vigorously, and
many Sunnis seemed to react by recommitting to a high turnout among their community, in order
to achieve political results through the election process. Even the JAC’s disqualification of an
additional 55 mostly Iraqiyya candidates the night before the election did not prompt a boycott.
The crisis appeared to prompt the February 16, 2010, comments by General Ray Odierno, then
the top U.S. commander in Iraq (who was replaced as of September 1, 2010, by his deputy,
General Lloyd Austin), that Iran was working through Chalabi and al-Lami to undermine the
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legitimacy of the elections. General Odierno specifically asserted that Chalabi was in close
contact with an Iraqi, COR member Jamal al-Ibrahimi, who is an ally of Iranian General Qasem
Soleimani, who commands the Qods Force unit of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps
(IRGC).6 Chalabi’s successful efforts to turn the election into a campaign centered on excluding
ex-Baathists—which Sunnis view as a codeword for their sect—caused particular U.S. alarm.
Possibly because of the disqualification dispute, Lami was assassinated on May 26, probably by
Sunnis who viewed him as an architect of the perceived election discrimination. Chalabi, now a
member of parliament, replaced Lami as manager of the JAC, but Maliki dismissed him in that
role, appointing instead the Minister for Human Rights.
Election and Results
About 85 total coalitions were accredited for the March 7, 2010, election. There were about 6,170
total candidates running on all these slates and, as noted, Iraqis were able to vote for individual
candidates as well as overall slates. The major blocs are depicted in Table 1. All blocs offered
voters gifts and favors at pre-election rallies, and all available press reports indicate that
campaigning was vibrant and vigorous. Total turnout was about 62%, according to the IHEC.
Turnout was slightly lower in Baghdad because of the multiple insurgent bombings that took
place there just as voting was starting.
The final count was announced on March 26, 2010, by the IHEC. As noted in Table 2, Iraqiyya
won a plurality of seats, winning a narrow two-seat margin over Maliki’s State of Law slate. The
Iraqi constitution (Article 73) mandates that the COR “bloc with the largest number” of members
gets the first opportunity to form a government. On that basis, Allawi, leader of the Iraqiyya slate,
demanded the first opportunity to form a government. However, on March 28, 2010, Iraq’s
Supreme Court issued a preliminary ruling that any group that forms after the election could be
deemed to meet that requirement, laying the groundwork for Allawi to be denied the right to the
first opportunity to form a government.
The vote was to have been certified by April 22, 2010, but factional wrangling delayed this
certification. On March 21, 2010, before the count was final, Prime Minister Maliki issued a
statement, referring to his role as armed forces commander-in-chief, demanding the IHEC
respond to requests from various blocs for a manual recount of all votes. The IHEC responded
that any recount decisions are under its purview and that a comprehensive recount would take an
extended period of time. Several international observers, including U.N. Special Representative
for Iraq Ad Melkert, indicated that there was no cause, at that point, to suggest widespread fraud.
However, in response to an appeal by Maliki’s faction, on April 19, 2010, an Iraqi court ordered a
recount of votes in Baghdad Province. The recount in the province, which has 68 elected seats,
was completed on May 15, 2010, and did not result in an alteration of seat totals. This followed a
few days after the major factions agreed to put aside any JAC disqualifications of winning
candidates. With the seat count holding, the way was set for Iraq’s Supreme Court to certify the
results.

6 Gertz, Bill. “Inside the Ring.” Washington Times, February 18, 2010.
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The final certification came on June 1, 2010, and the following timelines were to apply:
• Fifteen days after certification (by June 15), the new COR was to be seated and
to elect a COR speaker and deputy speaker. (The deadline to convene was met,
although, as noted, the COR did not elect a leadership team and did not meet
again until November 11, 2010.)
• After electing a speaker, but with no deadline, the COR is to choose a president
(by a two-thirds vote). (According to Article 138 of the Iraqi constitution, after
this election, Iraq is to have a president and at least one vice president—the
“presidency council” concept was an interim measure that expired at the end of
the first full-term government.)
• Within another 15 days, the largest COR bloc is tapped by the president to form a
government. (The selection of a president occurred on November 11, 2010, and
Maliki was formally tapped to form a cabinet on November 25, 2010.)
• Within another 30 days (by December 25), the prime minister-designate (Maliki)
is to present a cabinet to the COR for confirmation (by majority vote).
Post-Election Government
In accordance with timelines established in the Constitution, the newly elected COR did convene
on June 15, 2010. However, the session ended after only 18 minutes and, because of the political
deadlock, did not elect a COR leadership team. Under Article 52 of the Constitution, the “eldest
member” of the COR (Kurdish legislator Fouad Massoum) became acting COR speaker. During
the period when no new government was formed, the COR remained inactive, with most COR
members in their home provinces while still collecting their $10,000 per month salaries. The
resentment over this contributed to the popular unrest in February 2011.
Allawi’s chances of successfully forming a government appeared to suffer a substantial setback in
May 2010 when Maliki’s slate and the rival Shiite INA bloc agreed to an alliance called the
“National Alliance.” However, the alliance was not able to agree to a prime minister selectee,
with the Sadr faction and ISCI opposing Maliki. With no agreement, the COR aborted its second
meeting scheduled for July 27, 2010. On August 3, 2010, this putative alliance splintered.
The various factions made little progress through August 2010, as Maliki insisted he remain
prime minister for another term. With the factional disputes unresolved, Maliki remained prime
minister in a caretaker role. Some observers assert that he continued to govern as a caretaker,
having had little incentive to see a new government formed.
With the end of the U.S. combat mission on August 31, 2010, approaching, the United States
reportedly stepped up its involvement in political talks. Some discussions were held between
Maliki and Allawi’s bloc on a U.S.-proposed formulas under which Allawi, in return for
supporting Maliki, would head a new council that would have broad powers as a check and
balance on the post of prime minister. Alternate proposals had Allawi being given the presidency,
although the Kurds refused to cede that post to another community, fearing loss of leverage on
other demands. The Kurds’ insistence was despite the fact that there would not be a “presidency
council” with an executive veto in the next government—the transitional provision for that power
expired after the first four-year government ended. An expectation that the August 10-September
11, 2010, Ramadan period would enable the blocs to reach an agreement was not met.
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On October 1, 2010, Iraq earned the distinction of having gone longer than any other country
without an agreed government following an election. Part of the difficulty forming a government
was the close result, and the dramatic implications of gaining or retaining power in Iraq, where
politics is often seen as a “winner take all” proposition. Others blamed Allawi for the impasse,
claiming that he was insisting on a large, powerful role for himself even though he could not
assemble enough COR votes to achieve a majority there.
Political Agreement (“Irbil Agreement”) Reached
On October 1, 2010, Maliki, possibly due to Iranian intervention, received the backing of most of
the 40 COR deputies of Shiite cleric Moqtada Al Sadr, bringing Maliki within striking distance of
obtaining enough votes for another term as prime minister. The United States reportedly was
alarmed at the prospect that Maliki might be able to form a government primarily by allying with
Sadr, but, in early November 2010, the United States, Allawi, and many of the Sunni Arab
regional states acquiesced to a second Maliki term. The key question that remained was whether
Maliki, and Iraq’s Kurds—who held the swing vote that could determine the next government—
would agree to form a broad based government that meets the demands of Iraqiyya for substantial
Sunni Arab inclusion. Illustrating the degree to which the Kurds reclaimed their former role of
“kingmakers,” Maliki, Allawi, and other Iraqi leaders met in the capital of the Kurdistan Regional
Government-administered region in Irbil on November 8, 2010, to continue to negotiate on a new
government. (Sadr did not attend the meeting in Irbil, but ISCI/Iraq National Alliance slate leader
Ammar Al Hakim did.)
On November 10, 2010, with reported direct intervention by President Obama, the “Irbil
Agreement” was reached in which: (1) Allawi agreed to support Maliki and Talabani to remain in
their offices for another term, and for Iraqiyya to join the new government; (2) an Iraqiyya figure
reportedly would become COR Speaker, another (presumably Allawi himself) would chair the
enhanced oversight body discussed above, though renamed the “National Council for Strategic
Policies;”7 (3) Iraqiyya would obtain several major cabinet posts, including the Defense Minister
post; and (4) amending the de-Baathification laws that had barred some Iraqis, such as Saleh al-
Mutlaq, from holding political positions. Although some of the provisions of the agreement have
been subsequently disputed or not implemented, as discussed below, observers praised it as
helpful to U.S. policy because an agreement was signed among major factions, with Masoud
Barzani and U.S. Ambassador to Iraq James Jeffries attending. The agreement did not specify
concessions to the Sadr faction, a development that observers viewed as a setback to Iran.
The November 11, 2010, COR session that would implement the agreement was held, and
Iraqiyya figure Usama al-Nujaifi (brother of controversial Nineveh governor Atheel Nujaifi) was
elected COR speaker, as agreed. However, Allawi and most of his bloc walked out after three
hours over the refusal of the other blocs to readmit the three Iraqiyya members who had been
disqualified from running for the COR by the JAC (see above on the disqualification crisis). The
walkout raised U.S. and other fears that the agreement might immediately unravel, but the
remaining COR members were sufficient for a quorum and Talabani was re-elected president
after two rounds of voting. Fears were calmed on November 13, 2010, when most of Allawi’s
bloc attended the COR session and continued to implement the settlement agreement; Allawi
himself did not attend. On November 25, 2010, Talabani formally tapped Maliki as the prime

7 Fadel, Leila and Karen DeYoung. “Iraqi Leaders Crack Political Deadlock.” Washington Post, November 11, 2010.
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minister-designate, giving him 30 days (until December 25) to name and achieve majority COR
confirmation for a new cabinet.
New Government Formed8
The stage was set for a new cabinet to be announced after December 19, when Allawi reaffirmed
his intent to join the government. Allawi’s assurance came the same day that the COR voted (with
barely a quorum achieved after a Shiite walkout of the vote) to reinstate to politics the three
senior members of his bloc, including Saleh al-Mutlaq, who had been barred from politics by the
JAC, as discussed above. Mutlaq was subsequently named one of the three deputy prime
ministers.
On December 21, 2010, in advance of the December 25, 2010, deadline, Maliki presented a
cabinet to the COR (42 seats, including the posts of prime minister, three deputy prime ministers,
and 38 ministries and ministers of state) receiving broad approval. No permanent appointments
were named for seven ministries. Still, the government formed was inclusive of all major
factions. Among major outcomes were the following.
• As for the State of Law list, Maliki remained prime minister, and retained for
himself the Defense, Interior, and National Security posts pending permanent
nominees for those positions. The faction holds seven other cabinet posts, in
addition to the post of first deputy president (Khudair Al Khuzai of the Da’wa
Party) and deputy prime minister for energy issues (Hussein Shahristani,
previously the oil minister).
• For Iraqiyya, in addition to Mutlaq becoming a deputy prime minister, Tariq al-
Hashimi remains a deputy president (the second deputy).9 The bloc also obtained
nine ministerial posts, of which a senior Iraqiyya figure, Rafi al-Issawi
(previously a deputy prime minister), is finance minister.
• For the Iraqi National Alliance, a senior figure, Adel Abdul Mahdi, remained one
of the three deputy presidents. The alliance also obtained 13 cabinet positions,
parceled out among its various factions. An INA technocrat Abd al Karim Luaibi,
was appointed oil minister. A Fadilah party member, Bushra Saleh, is a minister
of state without portfolio and was the only woman in the cabinet until the
February 13, 2011, naming of Ibtihal Al Zaidy as minister of state for women’s
affairs (although she is not from the INA). Another Fadila activist was named
minister of justice.
• Of the 13 INA cabinet seats, Sadr faction members head eight ministries,
including Housing, Labor and Social Affairs, Ministry of Planning (Ali Abd al-
Nabi, appointed in April 2011), and Tourism and Antiquities. A Sadrist also is one
of two deputy COR speakers. However, these positions are relatively junior
within the cabinet and appeared to represent less influence for the Sadrists than
was anticipated when Sadr threw his backing to Maliki in October. Still, the Sadr

8 The following information is taken from Iraqi news accounts presented in http://www.opensource.gov.
9 Some sources say that Hashimi and another figure, Adel Abdul Mahdi, may not have received permanent
appointments to these second and third deputy presidential posts.
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faction receive some compensatory influence when one of its members becoming
governor of Maysan Province.
• The Kurdistan Alliance received major posts. Talabani stayed president; and the
third deputy prime minister is Kurdish figure (PUK faction) Rows Shaways, who
has served in various central and KRG positions since the fall of Saddam. Arif
Tayfour is second deputy COR speaker. Alliance members have six other cabinet
seats, including longtime Kurdish (KDP) stalwart Hoshyar Zebari remaining in
position. He has been foreign minister since the transition governments that
followed the fall of Saddam. Khairallah Hassan Babakir, was named trade
minister in the February 13, 2011, “second wave” of ministerial appointments.
Unresolved Political Schisms
Ambassador to Iraq Jim Jeffries testified before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on
February 1, 2011, describing the Iraqi government as a success for U.S. foreign policy because it
is inclusive and “focused on power sharing.” However, continuing schisms exist among the
various Iraqi communities and factions, and all of Iraq’s ethnic communities and sects remain
suspicious of the others’ longer-term intentions. Among the sources of ongoing political friction is
the fact that Maliki continues to holds the security posts, an issue that has caused written
recriminations between him and Allawi since April 2011 and which threatens to potentially
unravel the delicate governing consensus. On July 9, 2011, with Talabani acting as mediator, the
main political blocs again failed to reach agreement on nominees for the security-related
ministries, as well as on the issue of whether to request that some U.S. troops remain in Iraq past
2011 (although the deadlock on this issue was resolved on August 3, 2011, as discussed further
below). Maliki interprets the Irbil Agreement as requiring appointment of a Sunni Arab, such as
Sadoun Dulaymi, as Defense Minister, and not necessarily a member of the Iraqiyya faction.
Allawi’s view is that an Iraqiyya member is required to be appointed under the Irbil Agreement.
A further cause of tension between Maliki and Alawi is the continuing stalemate over the
formation of the National Council for Strategic Policies. Some proposals call for the council to
include the prime minister, president, their deputies, and a representative of all major blocs—and
for decisions of the council to be binding on Maliki if they achieve support of 80% of the council
members. However, the powers have not been voted on by the COR, and Allawi is considered
unlikely to chair the body unless it is given significant authorities.
Sunni Community
The earlier disqualification crisis—and the denial to Allawi of the ability to try to form a
government after his bloc won the most seats—leaves unanswered questions about the long-term
loyalty of Sunni Arabs to the central government. Separately, Sunni Arabs resented the slow pace
with which the Maliki government implemented its pledge to fully integrate the approximately
100,000 “Sons of Iraq” fighters (former insurgents who ended their fight and cooperating with
U.S. forces against Al Qaeda in Iraq and other militants) into the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) or
provide them with government jobs. In 2009 and 2010, there were repeated reports that some
Sons of Iraq had been dropped from payrolls, harassed, arrested, or sidelined, and that the Maliki
government might want to strangle the program. However, Ambassador Jeffries testified on
February 1, 2011, that no payment difficulties existed as of that time, and no U.S. official has
since amended or altered that assertion. As of August 2011, more than half of them (about 50,000)
have been integrated into the ISF or given civilian government jobs.
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KRG-Central Government Disputes/Combined Security Mechanism10
The COR elections and cabinet formation were not expected to—and did not—heal KRG-central
government disputes. All the existing territorial and political disputes between the KRG and the
central government had been aggravated by the 2009 provincial elections. In that vote, Sunni
Arabs wrested control of the Nineveh (Mosul) provincial council from the Kurds, who won
control of that council in the 2005 election because of the broad Sunni Arab boycott of that
election. A Sunni list (al-Hadba’a) won a clear plurality of the 2009 Nineveh vote and
subsequently took control of the provincial administration there. Al-Hadba’a is composed of
hardline Sunni Arabs who openly oppose Kurdish encroachment in the province and who are
committed to the “Arab and Islamic identity” of the province. A member of the faction, Atheel al-
Nufaiji, is the governor (brother of 2010-2014 COR speaker Usama al-Nujaifi), and, even before
the popular unrest that broke out in Iraq as of February 2011, the Kurds had been preventing his
visitation of areas of Nineveh where the Kurds’ peshmerga militia operates.
In the runup to the March 2010 national COR election, KRG President Masoud Barzani visited
Washington, D.C. (January 2010) and, according to participants in his meetings, discussed with
senior officials ways in which the Kurds would cooperate with Iraq’s Arabs after the election.
That was widely interpreted as an Administration admonition not to establish territorial-related
preconditions to join a governing coalition after the elections. However, KRG Prime Minister
Barham Salih said on June 15, 2010, that Kurdish leaders submitted 19 specific demands from
Iraq’s Arab leaders as a condition of providing Kurdish votes for any new governing coalition.
The most notable demand was that the Kurds retain the presidency for one of their own, and
many of the others concerned the Kirkuk and other territorial disputes discussed below. Although
receiving from Maliki only vague assurances on their key demands, the main Kurdish factions
eventually threw their weight behind Maliki to continue as prime minister, as discussed above.
Additional friction was created in the context of the KRG’s parliamentary and presidential
elections on July 25, 2009. The KRG leadership had been planning, during that vote, to conduct a
referendum on a separate KRG constitution. However, the central government asserted that a
KRG constitution would conflict with the publicly adopted national constitution, and that the
KRG draft constitution, adopted by the Kurdish parliament on June 23, 2009, claimed Kurdish
control over disputed territories and oil resources. The KRG did not hold the referendum.
Combined Security Mechanism at Kurd-Arab Frontier
In part to prevent outright violence, in August 2009 then-top U.S. commander in Iraq General
Odierno developed an unprecedented plan to partner U.S. forces with peshmerga units and with
ISF units in the province to build confidence between the two forces and reassure Kurdish, Arab,
Turkomen, and other province residents. Implementation of this “combined security mechanism”
(CSM) began in January 2010 and U.S. officials said on August 16, 2010, that the joint (ISF-U.S-
Kurdish) patrols, maintenance of 22 checkpoints, and U.S. training would continue until the U.S.
pullout at the end of 2011. As of October 2010, the United States had ceased participating at four
of them, in concert with the U.S. change of mission to a non-combat role (Operation New Dawn)
on September 1, 2010. The mechanism is administered through provincial level Combined
Coordination Centers, which bring the parties together to play operations in disputed areas.

10 For more information on Kurd-Baghdad disputes, see CRS Report RS22079, The Kurds in Post-Saddam Iraq, by
Kenneth Katzman.
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Disagreements are referred to a Senior Working Group and a High Level Ministerial
Committee.11
Many who assert that at least some U.S. forces should to remain in Iraq after 2011 do so on the
grounds that U.S. troops are needed to continue the CSM.12 In the event U.S. troops do not
remain, as noted by Ambassador Jeffries and top U.S. commander in Iraq General Lloyd Austin
on February 1, 2011, it is possible that a United Nations force, or even NATO, might take over
this mediating and confidence-building role. It is not clear that this idea is supported by the Iraqi
factions involved Other ideas advanced by the U.N. Assistance Mission—Iraq (UNAMI) say that
civilians (Iraqi or international) could take over the mediating role now played by U.S. troops in
the CSM.
Broader Territorial Issues (“Disputed Internal Boundaries”)
The CSM is not a substitute for a broader settlement of the various territorial disputes between the
Kurds and Iraq’s Arabs—the most emotional of which is the Kurdish insistence that Tamim
Province (which includes oil-rich Kirkuk) be formally affiliated to the KRG. There was to be a
census and referendum on the affiliation of the province by December 31, 2007—in accordance
with Article 140 of the Constitution- but the Kurds have agreed to repeated delays in order to
avoid jeopardizing overall progress in Iraq. Nor has the national census that is pivotal to any such
referendum been conducted; it was scheduled to begin on October 24, 2010, although on October
2, 2010, Prime Minister Maliki postponed it until at least December 2010. The move presumably
was intended to allow time for a full-term government to be put in place, which would oversee
the census. The census has not begun, as of August 2011, in part because of continued factional
disputes over how to account for movements of populations into or out of the Kurdish controlled
provinces. Attempting to resolve these long-standing disputes is another issue within the mandate
of UNAMI, and consultations with all parties are ongoing, according to UNAMI head Ad Melkert
in February 2011.13
The three Kurdish-controlled provinces and the disputed province of Kirkuk did not hold
provincial elections with the rest of Iraq on January 31, 2009. Elections had been rescheduled for
November 2010 but were not held. However, the Property Claims Commission that is
adjudicating claims from the Saddam regime’s forced resettlement of Arabs into the KRG region
is functioning and about 10,000 Iraqi Arabs have relocated back to their original provinces as of
the end of 2010.
There continues to be substantial friction between Sunni and Shiite Arabs in Diyala province.
This is in part because of disputes over territory in the province that are inhabited by Kurds and
Arabs. In addition, there is tension in the province between Sunni and Shiite Arabs there because
Sunni militants drove out many Shiites from the province at the height of the civil conflict during
2005-2007.

11 “Managing Arab-Kurd Tensions in Northern Iraq After the Withdrawal of U.S. Troops.” Rand Corporation, 2011.
12 Ibid.
13 Meeting with congressional staff, February 24, 2011.
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KRG Oil Exports
Another issue remains over the ability of the Kurds to export oil that is discovered and extracted
in the KRG region. Oil exports from the KRG have been suspended since late 2009 over central
government opposition to proposed mechanisms for paying the international investors who are
performing the extraction and exportation. However, Ambassador Jeffries testified on February 1,
2011, that, as a consequence of the formation of a government and greater factional harmony, a
compromise had been reached that would allow the KRG energy exports to resume, and
exportation of about 100,000 barrels of crude oil per day has resumed from the KRG fields as of
March 1, 2011.
Intra-Kurdish Divisions
Further complicating the political landscape are widening divisions within the Kurdish
community. The KRG elections also, to some extent, shuffled the political landscape. A
breakaway faction of President Talabani’s PUK, called “Change” (“Gorran”), won an
unexpectedly high 25 seats (out of 111) in the Kurdistan national assembly, embarrassing the
PUK and weakening it relative to the KDP. KRG President Masoud Barzani, leader of the KDP,
easily won reelection against weak opposition. Gorran ran its own list in the March 2010
elections and constituted a significant challenge to the Kurdistan Alliance in Sulaymaniyah
Province, according to election results. As a result, of the 57 COR seats held by Kurds, 14 are
held by parties other than the Kurdistan Alliance. Gorran has 8, the Kurdistan Islamic Union has
4, and the Islamic Group of Kurdistan has 2.
These divisions may also be playing a role in the popular demonstrations that have occurred in
Sulaymaniyah since February 2011. The demonstrations reflect frustration over jobs and services
but possibly also over the monopolization of power in the KRG by the Barzani and Talabani
clans. Some of these have been suppressed by peshmerga.
The Sadr Faction and Its Position
The young Shiite cleric, Moqtada Al Sadr, sees himself and his faction as the main representative
for Iraq’s Shiites, causing an inherent rivalry with Maliki and other more mainstream Shiite
leaders in Iraq. As noted above, Sadr was part of the anti-Maliki Shiite coalition Iraqi National
Alliance for the March 2010 national elections. On October 17, 2009, the Sadr movement held a
“primary” election to determine who would fill the 329 total candidate slots that will be fielded
by the Sadr movement in the elections (as part of the broader Iraqi National Alliance bloc
discussed above). About 800 total candidates competed.
After the election, the Sadr faction, acting on instructions from Moqtada Al Sadr who was still in
Iran, initially insisted that Maliki should be replaced by another Shiite. However, the shift by the
faction in late September 2010 was decisive in Maliki’s success in achieving another term. In
return, as discussed above, Sadrists were given several seats in the cabinet and a Sadrist governor
was later installed in Maysan Province, which includes the Sadrist stronghold of Amarah. The
governor reportedly refuses to meet with U.S. military commanders.
Moqtada Al Sadr has been more politically visible and active since he returned to Iraq on January
5, 2011. Since his return, he has given several speeches that, among other themes, insist on full
implementation of a planned U.S. withdrawal by the end of 2011. Sadr’s position on this appeared
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so firm that, in an April 9, 2011, statement, he threatened to reactivate his Mahdi Army militia if
U.S. forces remained in Iraq beyond the December 31, 2011, deadline. Despite his indication in a
May 13, 2011, sermon in Najaf that he might withdraw this threat if there were a strong
consensus among the other blocs that U.S. troops should stay,14 his followers conducted a large
march in Baghdad on May 26, 2011, to make clear that the faction would go to great lengths to
oppose any extension of the U.S. presence in Iraq beyond 2011. On August 7, 2011, Sadr
threatened to direct his followers to attack U.S. troops if they remain in Iraq beyond 2011. Sadr
has also issued statements opposing the awarding of Iraqi energy contracts to American firms.
Sadr’s threats may not be completely idle. In June and July 2011, U.S. officials accused pro-Sadr
Shiite militias for an elevated level of U.S. troop deaths in June 2011 (14 killed, the highest in any
month in over one year). These officials have accused Iran of arming the militias with upgraded
rocket-propelled munitions, possibly in an effort to ensure a full U.S. withdrawal and to claim
credit for forcing that withdrawal. U.S. officials reportedly requested that the ISF act against
these militias and prevail on Iran to stop aiding the militias. Press reports in early August 2011
suggested the strategy had, for now, succeeded in reducing Shiite attacks on U.S. forces in Iraq.
While Sadr has long sought to highlight Maliki’s failures to bolster his own influence, the Sadr
faction’s extensive participation in the post-2010 government complicates the Sadrist efforts to
paint governmental failures as purely the fault of Maliki and other elites. Some U.S. officials say
they believe the faction may have instigated some of the unrest to discredit Maliki. In addition,
the Sadr faction is said to be using its fundraising ability to develop charity and employment
networks that rival or displace those of the central government—employing a political model
similar to that of Hizballah in Lebanon.15
Related Governance Issues
The formation of the government in December 2010 raised hopes that Iraq was well on its way to
permanent stability, the strengthening of democracy and institution-building, and a turning of
Iraqi official attention toward basic governance and economic issues. U.S. officials, as testified by
Ambassador Jeffries on February 1, 2011, saw signs that the factional comity evidenced in the
new government would enable the COR to move quickly on long-stalled initiatives. In terms of
immediate Iraqi legislative business, the COR turned to and was able, by the end of February
2011, to adopt a calendar year 2011 budget. The draft $67 billion budget was submitted to the
COR on December 18, and was subsequently adopted. Ambassador Jeffries pointed to other signs
of progress, including resolving the dispute over the de-Baathification issue. In February 2011,
other observers reported progress toward enactment of the national hydrocarbon laws that are
needed to encourage foreign investment in Iraq’s relatively undeveloped energy sector. However,
these laws have not been adopted, to date.
Some note that efforts to rein in official corruption are failing because no comprehensive anti-
corruption law has been passed. Also not passed are laws addressing the environment, other
elections, consumer protections, intellectual property rights, building codes, and a new national
flag.

14 Davis, Aaron. “Shiite Infighting May Be Key to U.S. Extension in Iraq.” Washington Post, May 15, 2011.
15 Healy, Jack. “Cleric’s Anti-U.S. Forces Poised for Gains in Iraq.” New York Times, December 20, 2010.
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Many factions continued to remain wary of Prime Minister Maliki’s long-term intentions. Some
Iraqi suspicions of a lack of commitment to governing transparency were reinforced by Maliki’s
request that Iraq’s Supreme Court rule that several independent commissions—including the
Independent Higher Election Commission and the anti-corruption commission—be supervised by
the cabinet. The court ruled in Maliki’s favor on January 23, 2011, although the court also said in
its ruling that the institutions must remain free of political interference.16
Others express concern that Maliki intends to consolidate control over all armed forces. In 2008,
he began to create or restructure security organs to report to his office rather than the Defense or
Interior ministries. Through his Office of the Commander-in-Chief, he commands direct
command of the National Counter-Terrorism Force (about 10,000 personnel) as well as the
Baghdad Brigade, responsible for security in the capital. Reports quoting U.S. commanders in
Iraq in June 2011 say that lower level commanders often bypass the official chain of command
and report directly to Maliki’s office. The concerns about Maliki’s intentions could account for a
failure, to date, to reach agreement with the other factions on appointing permanent ministers for
the three security ministries; all three positions remain held by Maliki as of August 2011. As an
earlier example, in February 2010, Maliki’s government reportedly directed the Iraqi Army’s
Fourth Division to cordon a provincial council building in Tikrit to influence the resolution of a
dispute over the Salahuddin provincial council’s ousting of the former governor of the province.17
2011 Unrest
Iraq’s government, although flawed, is the product of democratic choices. Therefore, many
experts were surprised when protests that have ousted leaders in Egypt and Tunisia spread to Iraq.
Small protests began in several provinces on February 6, 2011, and later expanded to numerous
provinces including Baghdad, Maysan, Sulaymaniyah, Basra, Anbar, Nineveh, Kirkuk, and
Diwayniyah provinces. Protests, although small compared to those witnessed in other Middle
Eastern countries during the period, resulted in 20 deaths alone on the February 25, 2011, “Day of
Rage” demonstrations called by activists. However, most experts agree that the protesters,
although to some extent inspired by the uprisings throughout the Middle East, do not have the
similar objective of toppling Iraq’s leadership because Iraq’s government is the product of
democratic processes.
The spread of unrest into Iraq suggested to many that Iraqis have been frustrated by what they
perceive as a nearly exclusive focus of the major factions on politics rather than governing or
improving services. Many protesters expressed particular outrage at the still severe shortages of
electricity in Iraq, as well as to the lack of job opportunities and to perceived elite corruption.
Iraqis who cannot afford their own generators (or to share a generator with a few others), face
repeated power outages every day.
Politically, the protests have affected all factions. The demonstrations caused the resignations of
provincial governors in Wasit and Basra provinces and of several municipal leaders in Anbar
Province. The governor of Nineveh, discussed above, survived a political challenge there even
though Maliki (backed by the Kurds who distrust governor Nujaifi) reportedly sought to use the
unrest to oust this political rival from that post. Jafar Al Sadr, who obtained the second most votes

16 Parker, Ned and Salar Jaff. “Electoral Ruling Riles Maliki’s Rivals.” Los Angeles Times, January 23, 2011.
17 Myers, Steven Lee and Anthony Shadid. “Maliki Faulted On Using Army in Iraqi Politics.” New York Times,
February 11, 2010.
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in the March 2010 elections on Maliki’s list (after Maliki himself), resigned from the COR on
February 17, 2011, to protest what he sees as elite interest in politics over governing. The use of
force was also at odds with statements by Grand Ayatollah Sistani supporting the right to
peacefully protest; a Sistani representative reportedly attended the Day of Rage demonstrations.
Moqtada Al Sadr also supported peaceful demonstrations, although its assumption of some of the
service-related ministries has complicated the efforts of his faction to absolve itself for
responsibility for governmental failures to provide services.
Unrest in the KRG region appears to reflect deep frustrations and has been more consistent and
intense than in the rest of Iraq. The unrest in Sulaymaniyah resulted in the deaths of at least three
protestors at the hands of peshmerga and Kurdish intelligence (Asayesh), and is said to rattle the
top Kurdish leaders who fear the KRG’s image as an oasis of stability and prosperity in Iraq is
being clouded. Demonstrations in Sulaymaniyah on February 17, also revived long-standing but
suppressed tensions between the PUK and the KDP as the KDP retaliated for protester attacks on
some of its offices.
Both major Kurdish parties have used the unrest to advance pan-Kurdish issues rather than
combat each other. After the February 17 clashes discussed above, the two parties ordered
peshmerga forces into disputed Kirkuk ostensibly to protect demonstrators from Sunni Arab
insurgents, although Sunni Arabs saw the move as an attempt to stake the Kurdish claim to
Kirkuk through armed force. The governor and provincial council chairs of Kirkuk resigned on
March 15, 2011, and a member of the Turkmen minority that is numerous in Kirkuk is expected
to become the new council chair. The new governor is, like his predecessor, a Kurd. Most, but not
all, peshmerga had withdrawn from Kirkuk as of April 1, 2011.
Government Response and Prospects
The government has sought to defuse the unrest in Iraq, with mixed success to date. In early
February 2011, Maliki announced a voluntary cut in his salary (from about $350,000 per year to
about half that) and indicated he would not seek a third term when his current term expires in
2014. On February 27, 2011, he announced that his new cabinet would have “100 days” to prove
their effectiveness or face replacement. That deadline expired on June 7, 2011, without significant
incident, although U.S. diplomats say the government has begun public works projects and
provided some fuel supplies as part of its efforts to show results by that time. In addition, on May
31, 2011, third deputy president Adel Abdul Mahdi resigned in an effort to show that the
government is committed to cutting its bloated bureaucracy. To reinforce that commitment, the
COR voted on July 30, 2011, to back Maliki’s plan to reduce the number of cabinet posts from
the current 42 to 29.
Other government actions appear intended to assert long-standing positions. For example, in
response to the unrest, 12 out of 28 members of the Najaf provincial council petitioned to convert
the province to a “region,” as provided for in the constitution. Although the petition meets the
constitutional requirement (one-third of a provincial council filing a petition) to start that process,
it is not clear that a referendum will achieve a popular majority in the province to accomplish that
transition.
Another component of the response was to appoint several technocrats to permanently fill cabinet
slots in ministries that deliver services to the public. In a wave of appointments on February 13,
2011, an Iraqiyya technocrat, Raad Shallal, was appointed minister of Electricity and Power. In
addition, Municipality and Public Works minister Adel Mohder was named, as were appointments
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to be ministers of state for tribal affairs, civilian community affairs, and national reconciliation.
Shallal was removed in August 2011, most likely as a scapegoat for continued electricity
shortages, although the stated cause of his removal was a failure to follow proper procedures in
signing $1.7 billion worth of power plant construction contracts with Canadian and German
firms.
The government has also used a modest amount of repression. In early June 2011, in advance of
the June 7 “100 day” deadline, the government detained several dozen activists in order to
preempt protests. Additional steps have been taken since to curb protests, including tolerating
pro-government thugs to beat demonstrators on June 10, 2011. Either because of the repression or
because of lack of popular support, demonstrations that continue have been relatively scattered
and small.
General Human Rights Issues
U.S. and international officials say they expect the 2010-2014 government to make further
progress establishing rule of law and adherence to international standards of human rights. The
State Department’s report on human rights for 2010 released April 8, 2011, largely repeated the
previous year’s characterizations of Iraq’s human rights record as follows: “Extremist violence,
coupled with weak government performance in upholding the rule of law, resulted in widespread
and severe human rights abuses.”18 The State Department report cited a wide range of human
rights problems committed by Iraqi government security and law enforcement personnel,
including some unlawful killings; torture and other cruel punishments; poor conditions in prison
facilities; denial of fair public trials; arbitrary arrest; arbitrary interference with privacy and
home; limits on freedoms of speech, assembly, and association due to sectarianism and extremist
threats; lack of protection of stateless persons; wide scale governmental corruption; human
trafficking; and limited exercise of labor rights.
Trafficking in Persons
The State Department’s Trafficking in Persons report for 2011, released on June 27, 2011, places
Iraq in “Tier 2 Watch List.” This is one rank below Tier 3, the lowest ranking. The relatively
negative rating is on the grounds that, during the reporting period, Iraq did not demonstrate
evidence of significant efforts to punish traffickers or proactively identify victims. The report says
the Iraqi government has a written plan that, if implemented, would go a long way toward
complying with minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking and, for that reason, was not
given a Tier 3 ranking.
Media and Free Expression
While State Department and other reports attribute most of Iraq’s human rights difficulties to the
security situation and factional infighting, apparent curbs on free expression appear independent
of such factors. The State Department human rights report for 2010 noted numerous laws that
restrict press freedoms, and instances in which officials have beaten or intimidated journalists

18 http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2010/nea/154462.htm.
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who try to do their work. In some past cases, Maliki has sued publications that have written
articles alleging corruption or nepotism on his part.
One issue that troubles human rights activists is a draft law on freedom of expression. The draft
reportedly allows authorities to curtail rights in order to protect “the public interest.” The draft
was approved by the Council of Ministers (the cabinet) on May 16, 2011, and remains under
consideration in the National Assembly. The draft allows for peaceful protest but would require
demonstration organizers to obtain a permit.
Labor Rights
A 1987 (Saddam era) labor code remains in effect. Although Iraqis are legally allowed to join
unions, the labor code virtually rules out independent union activity. Unions have no legal power
to negotiate with employers or protect workers’ rights through collective bargaining. However,
some of the February 2011 street demonstrations protesting lack of services have included
demands for more worker rights.
Situation of the Christian Religious Minority
In regard to human rights, a major concern is the safety and security of Iraq’s Christian
population, which is concentrated in northern Iraq as well as in Baghdad. Attacks on members of
the community appear to occur in spates. In the run-up to the January 2009 provincial elections,
about 1,000 Christian families reportedly fled the province in October 2008, although Iraqi
officials report that most families returned by December 2008. The issue faded in 2009 but then
resurfaced late in that year when about 10,000 Christians in northern Iraq, fearing bombings and
intimidation, fled the areas near Kirkuk during October-December 2009. On October 31, 2010, a
major attack on Christians occurred when a church in Baghdad was besieged by militants and as
many as 60 worshippers were killed. The siege shook the faith of the Christian community in
their security. Several other attacks appearing to target Iraqi Christians have taken place since.
Partly as a result, Christian celebrations of Christmas 2010 were said to be subdued—following
three years in which Christians had felt confident enough to celebrate that holiday more openly.
Some Iraqi Christians blame all the various attacks on them on Al Qaeda in Iraq, which is still
somewhat strong in Nineveh Province and which associates Christians with the United States.
Some human rights groups allege that it is the Kurds who are committing abuses against
Christians and other minorities in the Nineveh Plain, close to the KRG-controlled region. Kurdish
leaders deny the allegations, and the State Department human rights report for 2010 says the
KRG has permitted Christians fleeing violence in Baghdad to relocate into KRG-controlled areas.
The FY2008 consolidated appropriation earmarked $10 million in ESF from previous
appropriations to assist the Nineveh Plain Christians. A supplemental appropriation for 2008 and
2009 (P.L. 110-252) earmarked another $10 million for this purpose. The Consolidated
Appropriations Act of 2010 (P.L. 111-117) made a similar provision for FY2010, although
focused on Middle East minorities generally and without a specific dollar figure mandated for
Iraqi Christians. In the 112th Congress, a bill, H.R. 440, which would establish a post of Special
Envoy to promote religious freedom in the Middle East and South Central Asia, passed the House
on July 29, 2011, by a vote of 402-20.
Before the 2010-2011 rounds of violence against Christians, about 400,000 Christians had left
Iraq since the fall of Saddam Hussein—a large proportion of the approximately 1 million–1.5
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million Christian population that was there during Saddam’s time. Christian priests have been
kidnapped and killed; the body of Chaldean Catholic archbishop Faraj Rahho was discovered in
Mosul on March 13, 2008, two weeks after his reported kidnapping. An attack on the Yazidis in
August 2007, which killed about 500 persons, appeared to reflect the precarious situation for Iraqi
minorities. Even at the height of the U.S. military presence in Iraq, U.S. forces did not
specifically protect Christian sites at all times, partly because Christian leaders do not want to
appear closely allied with the United States.
Corruption
The State Department human rights report for 2010 contains substantial detail on the relative lack
of progress in curbing official corruption. The report discusses political and other factors that
have caused anti-corruption institutions, such as the Commission on Integrity, to be regularly
thwarted or hampered in attempts to investigate and prosecute corruption. The COR has its own
Integrity Committee that oversees the executive branch and the governmental anti-corruption
bodies.
Mass Graves
As is noted in the State Department report on human rights for 2010, the Iraqi government
continues to uncover mass graves of victims of the Saddam regime. This effort is under the
authority of the Human Rights Ministry. On April 15, 2011, a mass grave of more than 800 bodies
became the latest such discovery. The largest to date was a mass grave in Mahawil, near Hilla,
that contained 3,000 bodies; the grave was discovered in 2003, shortly after the fall of the regime.
Camp Ashraf
The Iraqi government treatment of the population of Camp Ashraf, a camp in which over 3,000
Iranian oppositionists have resided, is an indicator of the government performance on human
rights. The residents of the camp accuse the government of repression and of scheming to expel
the residents or extradite them to Iran, where they might face prosecution or death. An Iraqi
military redeployment at the camp on April 8, 2011, resulted in major violence against camp
residents in which 35 of them were killed. This issue is discussed in substantially greater detail in
CRS Report RL32048, Iran: U.S. Concerns and Policy Responses, by Kenneth Katzman.
Regional Dimension
For Iraq’s neighbors as well as for the United States, the stakes in the outcome of the political
process in Iraq have been high. First and foremost, according to most experts, the United States
sought to prevent the emergence of a governing coalition that left Sunni Arabs disillusioned, or
which bolstered the influence of the most pro-Iranian factions such as that of Sadr. The key U.S.
objectives were met, in large part because of the inclusion of senior Iraqiyya figures in high
positions and the lower-than-expected profile of Sadrists in the new cabinet.
Iran may be seeking to enhance its influence as the U.S. presence in Iraq ends or is sharply
reduced at the end of 2011. Iran’s reported weapons deliveries to pro-Sadr militias could be
intended to ensure that all U.S. forces leave, or to give the impression that the militias are driving
the United States out of Iraq. However, if that is Tehran’s intent, it appeared to fail on August 3,
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2011, when Iraqi factions, with the exception of the Sadrist, gave Maliki backing to negotiate an
extension of the U.S. presence beyond 2011. Senior U.S. officials, include then Secretary of
Defense Gates, has articulated that one compelling reason to keep some U.S. troops in Iraq past
2011 is to ensure that Iran does not gain preponderant influence in Iraq.
The United States also appeared to benefit from the formation of a government that seems able to
integrate with all of Iraq’s neighbors, including Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Turkey. However, the
long-term degree of regional acceptance for the new government might depend on the extent to
which Iyad al-Allawi and his Iraqiyya bloc continue to participate in government and have
influence over decisions. Allawi had been favored for prime minister by the Sunni-dominated
regional neighbors such as Saudi Arabia and even by Syria, which is mostly Sunni but allied with
Iran. Syria hosted numerous meetings among faction leaders, although no agreement was reached
among them under Syrian sponsorship.
As a possible indication of greater acceptance of the Iraqi government by Sunni regional states,
Kuwait’s prime minister visited Iraq on January 12, 2011. Maliki subsequently visited Kuwait on
February 16, 2011. These key exchanges took place after the U.N. Security Council on December
15, 2010, passed three resolutions (1956, 1957, and 1958) that had the net effect of lifting most
Saddam-era sanctions on Iraq, although the U.N.-run reparations payments process remains intact
(and which deducts 5% from Iraq’s total oil revenues). On the other hand, Saudi Arabia has not,
to date, opened its embassy in Baghdad, a move the United States has long urged.
Implications for the Wind Down of the
U.S. Military Mission
These continuing splits within Iraq, and continuing high profile attacks by insurgent groups and
Shiite militas, cloud the approaching completion of a U.S. military withdrawal from Iraq at the
end of 2011, in keeping with a November 2008 U.S.-Iraq Security Agreement (SA), which took
effect on January 1, 2009. Following the SA’s entry into force, President Obama, on February 27,
2009, outlined a U.S. troop drawdown plan that provided for a drawdown of U.S. combat
brigades by the end of August 2010, with a residual force of 50,000 primarily for training the Iraq
Security Forces, to remain until the end of 2011. An interim benchmark in the SA was the June
30, 2009, withdrawal of U.S. combat troops from Iraq’s cities. This was strictly implemented by
U.S. forces, to the point where U.S. forces pulled out of locations in the restive Mosul area and
from Sadr City, where U.S. commanders felt U.S. forces should stay. Maliki hailed this interim
milestone as a “victory” and declared it a national holiday. With the formal end of the U.S.
combat mission on August 31, 2010, U.S. forces dropped to 47,000. Retaining substantial U.S.
troops in Iraq beyond 2011 requires the renegotiation of the Security Agreement, although not
necessarily a vote of the Iraqi COR on an extension.
A separate Strategic Framework Agreement (SFA), signed and entering into effect at the same
time as the SA, presents a framework for long-term U.S.-Iraqi relations. The SFA implies ongoing
U.S. assistance, but does not stipulate specific anticipated U.S. assistance levels or offer anything
beyond vague promises that the United States will assist Iraq in accomplishing various goals. The
SFA provides for the following (among other provisions):
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• There is to be U.S.-Iraq cooperation “based on mutual respect,” and that the
United States will not use Iraqi facilities to launch any attacks against third
countries, and will not seek permanent bases.
• There will be U.S support for Iraqi democracy and support for Iraq in regional
and international organizations.
• There will be cultural cooperation through several exchange programs, such as
the Youth Exchange and Study Program and the International Visitor Leadership
Program.
Scenarios for Drawdown or Withdrawal
With the end of 2011 deadline in the SA for all U.S. troops to be out of Iraq approaching, The
continuing high profile attacks, coupled with deficiencies in Iraq’s 650,000 member security
forces, have caused U.S. officials to question Iraqi stability were the United States to withdraw
completely as provided in the SA. As noted, there are also continuing U.S. concerns over Iranian
influence over Iraq as U.S. forces depart, particularly given the activism of radical pro-Iranian
Shiite cleric Moqtada Al Sadr.
In his semi-annual report to Congress dated July 30, 2011, the Special Inspector General for Iraq
Reconstruction (SIGIR) stated that Iraq has become less safe in the past twelve months than it
was previously. Among major recent attacks that shake confidence are a suicide bombing at an
Iraqi Army recruiting station in Baghdad in August 2010 that killed nearly 60 Iraqis; a wave of
approximately 15 bombings across Baghdad on the night of November 2, 2010, that killed at least
60 Iraqis; a series of major bombings, causing numerous casualties, that took place in Tikrit,
Diyala province, Karbala, and other places in January 2011; the killing of 20 in Baghdad in mid-
May 2011 in a spate of bombings; and attacks in Tikrit on June 3, 2011, that killed 20. Many
blame much of the continuing violence on Al Qaeda in Iraq, which was assessed to have about
1,000 fighters in Iraq by Defense Secretary-nominee Director Leon Panetta at his June 9, 2011,
confirmation hearings. The SIGIR report also noted Shiite militia attacks on U.S. troops as a
factor in its assessment.
While praising the dramatic progress of the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) over the past two years,
U.S. officials appear to lack confidence in the ability of the ISF to secure Iraq on their own. There
are concerns the ISF cannot reverse the recent negative security trend and, particularly, that it
cannot defend Iraq’s airspace and borders from neighbors such as Iran. Others believe that the
reduction in U.S. leverage and influence in Iraq already under way will allow rifts among major
ethnic and sectarian communities to widen to the point where Iraq could still become a “failed
state” after 2011, unless some U.S. troops remain after that time. Still others note that U.S. troops
are required beyond 2011 to ensure that the Kurd-Arab tensions in northern Iraq do not cause
conflict—the deployment of Kurdish peshmerga to Kirkuk in March 2011 did not become violent
because U.S. troops interceded between them and the Sunni Arabs in the province.
The purpose of several high-level U.S. visits and statements in 2011 have been to urge the Iraqis
to consider making such a request. On April 22, 2011, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
Admiral Mike Mullen, on a visit to Iraq, said U.S. logistical and operational considerations
required that an Iraqi request for U.S. troops to remain in Iraq beyond 2011 come within a few
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weeks of his visit.19 Prime Minister Maliki told visiting Speaker of the House John Boehner,
during his April 16, 2011, visit to Baghdad, that Iraqi forces were capable of securing Iraq after
2011, but that Iraq would welcome U.S. training and arms after that time.20
Subsequent to Boehner visit, Maliki appeared to lay the groundwork for a possible extension of
the U.S. presence. He stated that a request for U.S. troops might be made if there were a
“consensus” among political blocs, which he defined as not necessarily unanimity but at least
70% concurrence.21 This statement appeared to be an effort to isolate the Sadr faction, which has
been the most vocal opponent of a continuing U.S. presence. In June 2011, and following
comments by outgoing Defense Secretary Gates recommending that some U.S. troops remain,
some U.S. officials, including Defense Secretary-nominee Panetta, have said they expect an Iraqi
request for U.S. forces to remain beyond 2011. In his first visit to Iraq as Defense Secretary on
July 11, 2011, Panetta urged Iraqi leaders to make a decision on whether to request U.S. troops
remain, and that such a decision be affirmative given the continuing need. Joint Chiefs Chairman
Mullen, on an August 1, 2011, visit, his last scheduled to Iraq before retiring in October 2011,
again stressed the urgency of any Iraqi request. The visit appeared to galvanize the Iraqi political
system to make a firm decision and, on August 3, 2011, major factions (except the Sadrists) gave
Maliki their backing to negotiate an SA extension. Press reports have indicated that the Defense
Department had shaped its final withdrawal in such a way as to allow for certain units to remain
in Iraq even if a U.S.-Iraq agreement to keep U.S. troops there materialized very late in 2011.
If the SA is renegotiated successfully, it is not clear what the size of any extended presence might
be; however, experts on Iraq have had informal discussions in 2011 on this issue and a figure of
about 15,000 U.S. troops appears to receive substantial discussion.22 Some press reports cite
lower figures of 8,000 – 10,000 might be sufficient to achieve mission goals. The United States
insists that U.S. forces retain the legal protections contained in the existing SA, although it is
possible that there could be a U.S.-Iraq agreement to keep U.S. forces in Iraq without a formal
extension of the SA, but rather under some lesser memorandum of understanding.
If an SA extension negotiation fails, previous plans called for establishing a large (up to 4,000
person) military liaison office (Office of Security Cooperation-Iraq) engaged mostly in training
and assisting Iraq in the use of U.S. arms sold to Iraq, such as combat aircraft. That office would
be under the authority of the U.S. Ambassador and some of its facilities around Iraq will be
shared with the State Department. Such an arrangement might not require formal amendment of
the security agreement. The OSC-I was expected to focus on a planned sale of up to 36 F-16
aircraft to Iraq. Iraq had said on July 12, 2011, that the buy was postponed due to needs to fund
food rations and other items – possibly a decision influenced by the popular protests in 2011.
However, on July 31, 2011, Maliki announced the purchase request would go forward.
Whether or not some U.S. troops remain after 2011, the State Department will transition to the
lead U.S. agency in Iraq as of October 1, 2011, with all attendant responsibilities. In July 2011, as
part of the transition, the United States formally opened planned consulates in Basra and Irbil.
Embassy branch offices are in various stages of opening in Mosul and Kirkuk, although there are

19 Schmidt, Michael and Tim Arango. “Iraq Must Decide Within Weeks If U.S. Troops Will Stay Past 2011, Top
Official Says.” New York Times, April 23, 2011.
20 Prashant Rao. “Maliki Tells US’ Boehner Iraqi Troops Are Ready.” Agence France Presse, April 16, 2011.
21 Aaron Davis. “Maliki Seeking Consensus on Troops.” Washington Post, May 12, 2011.
22 Author conversations with Iraq experts in Washington, DC, 2011.
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continuing security issues in Mosul. There is a vibrant U.S. debate over whether the State
Department, using security contractors, will be able to fully secure its personnel in Iraq if all U.S.
forces were to depart. A staff report of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, released January
31, 2011, expresses substantial skepticism.23 No matter the outcome of that debate, State
Department officers will continue to promote Iraqi political reconciliation and peaceful dispute
resolution, as well as economic ties, cultural ties, educational ties, and broader relations under the
Strategic Framework Agreement. Table 4 provides information on U.S. assistance to promote
Iraqi democracy and peaceful political competition and consensus building. If Iraq’s major
factions have permanently shifted away from supporting violence and toward peaceful political
competition, some might argue that U.S. funding has contributed to that transition. Others might
argue that the change was caused by numerous factors, such as the improvement of security and
rejection of foreign terrorist influence, and that it is virtually impossible to assess the contribution
made by U.S. assistance.

23 Senate Foreign Relations Committee. “Iraq: The Transition From a Military Mission to A Civilian-Led Effort.” S.Prt.
112-3. January 31, 2011.
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Table 2. March 2010 COR Election: Final, Certified Results by Province
Elected Seats in
Province
COR Results
Baghdad
68
Maliki: 26 seats; Iraqiyya: 24 seats; INA: 17 seats; minority
reserved: 2 seats
Nineveh (Mosul)
31
Iraqiiya: 20; Kurdistan Alliance: 8; INA: 1; Accordance: 1; Unity
(Bolani): 1; minority reserved: 3
Qadisiyah
11
Maliki: 4; INA: 5; Iraqiyya: 2
Muthanna
7
Maliki: 4; INA: 3
Dohuk
10
Kurdistan Alliance: 9; other Kurdish lists: 1; minority reserved:
1
Basra
24
Maliki: 14 ; INA: 7; Iraqiyya: 3
Anbar
14
Iraqiyya: 11; Unity (Bolani): 1; Accordance: 2
Karbala
10
Maliki: 6; INA: 3; Iraqiyya: 1
Wasit
11
Maliki: 5; INA: 4; Iraqiyya: 2
Dhi Qar
18
Maliki: 8; INA: 9; Iraqiyya: 1
Sulaymaniyah
17
Kurdistan Alliance: 8; other Kurds: 9
Kirkuk (Tamim)
12
Iraqiyya: 6; Kurdistan Alliance: 6
Babil
16
Maliki: 8; INA: 5; Iraqiyya: 3
Irbil
14
Kurdistan Alliance: 10; other Kurds: 4
Najaf
12
Maliki: 7; INA: 5
Diyala
13
Iraqiyya: 8; INA: 3; Maliki: 1; Kurdistan Alliance: 1
Salahuddin
12
Iraqiyya: 8; Unity (Bolani): 2; Accordance: 2
Maysan
10
Maliki: 4; INA: 6
Total Seats
325
Iraqiyya: 89 + 2 compensatory = 91
(310 elected + 8
Maliki: 87 + 2 compensatory = 89
minority reserved + 7
compensatory)
INA: 68 + 2 compensatory = 70 (of which about 40 are Sadrist)
Kurdistan Alliance: 42 +1 compensatory = 43
Unity (Bolani): 4
Accordance: 6
other Kurdish: 14
minority reserved: 8
Source: Iraqi Higher Election Commission, March 26, 2010.
Notes: Seat totals are approximate and their exact allocation may be subject to varying interpretations of Iraqi
law. Total seat numbers include likely allocations of compensatory seats. Total seats do not add to 325 total
seats in the COR due to some uncertainties in allocations.

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Other Elections Possible
There had been speculation that the March COR elections would be held concurrently with a
referendum on the U.S.-Iraq Security Agreement. The referendum was to be held by July 31,
2009, but the United States, which views the referendum as unnecessary, supported a delay. In
mid-October 2009, Iraqi parliamentarians quietly shelved the referendum vote by failing to act on
legislation to hold the referendum and focusing instead on the broader election law needed for the
National Assembly elections.24
District and sub-district elections were previously slated for July 31, 2009, as well. However,
those are delayed, and the United Nations Secretary General Ban Ki Moon said in a report on
U.N. operations in Iraq, released August 3, 2009, that these elections would likely be held later in
2010, after the National Assembly elections. No date for these elections has been announced.
There could also be a vote on amendments to Iraq’s 2005 constitution if and when the major
factions agree to finalize the recommendations of the constitutional review commission (CRC).
There have been no recent major developments reported that would indicate if and when such a
referendum might be ready.
As noted above, there is discussion of provincial elections in the Kurdish region, which were not
held during the January 2009 provincial elections in the other areas of Iraq, and were not held in
the March 7, 2010, nationwide vote. Nor were they held in November 2010, as was scheduled,
and no date is set. There could be a vote on a Kirkuk referendum, if a negotiated settlement is
reached.
Some Iraqis believe that the 2011 unrest has created a need for new nationwide provincial
elections. However, existing provincial councils mostly maintain that doing so would be contrary
to the constitution, which allows a four-year term to the councils elected in 2009.


24 Sly, Liz. “Iraqi Push Fades For Referendum on U.S. Troop Pullout.” Los Angeles Times, October 16, 2009.
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Table 3. U.S. Assistance to Iraq: FY2003-FY2012 Request
(appropriations/allocations in millions of $)
Total
FY
FY
FY
FY
FY
FY
FY
FY
FY
FY2003-
FY2012
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011 FY2011
Req.
IRRF
2,475
18,389 —
10.0 — — — — —
20,874
––
ESF
—
—
— 1,535.4 1,676.8 429.0 541.5 382.5
? 4,565
325.7
Democracy
Fund
— — — —
250.0
75.0 — — — 325.0
––
IFTA
(Treasury
Dept.
Asst.)
— — — 13.0 2.8 — — — — 15.8
––
NADR
—
—
3.6
—
18.4
20.4
35.5
30.3
?
108.2
––
Refugee
Accounts
(MRA and
ERMA)

39.6
.1
—
— 78.3 277.8 260.0 300.0
— 955.8
––
IDA
21.8
— 7.1
.3 45.0 85.0 50.8 42.0 — 252.0
––
Other
USAID
Funds
469.9 — — — —
23.8 — — — 493.7
––
INCLE

—
— — 91.4 170.0 85.0 20.0 702.0
? 1,068
1,000.0
Foreign
Military
Financing –– –– –– –– –– –– –– –– ––
––
1,000.0
IMET
—
1.2
—
—
1.1
—
2.0
2.0
?
6.3
2.0
DOD - ISF
Fund

—
— 5,391 3,007 5,542 3,000 1,000 1,000 1,500 20,440
—
DOD -
Iraq
Army 51.2 —
210.0
— — — — — — 261.2
—
DOD -
CERP
— 140 718 708 750 996 339
263 70 3,984
—
DOD - Oil
Repair
802 — — — — — — — — 802
—
DOD -
Business
Support
—
— —
— 50.0 50.0 74.0 — — 174.0
—
Total

3,859 18,548 6,329 5,365 8,584 5,042 2,322 2,721 1,570 54,325 2,327
Sources: State Department FY2012 Foreign Operations Congressional Budget Justification; SIGIR Report to
Congress, April 30, 2011; and CRS calculations.
Notes: Table prepared by Curt Tarnoff, Specialist in Foreign Affairs, on May 5, 2011. FY2011 amount is
appropriation/al ocation figure available to date. Most 150 account al ocations are expected in June 2011;
humanitarian and other aid figures become available during course of year. This table does not contain agency
operational costs, including CPA, State Department, and PRTs, except where these are embedded in the larger
reconstruction accounts. Estimated operational costs to date are an additional $5.7 billion. IG oversight costs
estimated at $322 million. IMET=International Military Education and Training; IRRF=Iraq Relief and
Reconstruction Fund; INCLE=International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Fund; ISF=Iraq Security Force;
NADR=Nonproliferation, Anti-Terrorism, Demining and Related: ESF=Economic Support Fund;
IDA=International Disaster Assistance.

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Table 4. Recent Democracy Assistance to Iraq
(in millions of current $)

FY2009
FY2010 (act.)
FY2011 (req.)
FY2012 (req.)
Rule of Law and Human Rights
32.45
33.3
16.5
29.75
Good Governance
143.64
117.40
90.33
100.5
Political
41.00 52.60 30.00
16.25
Competition/Consensus-Building
Civil
Society
87.53 83.6 32.5
55.5
Totals 304.62
286.9
169.33
202.0
Source: Congressional Budget Justification, March 2011.
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Table 5. January 31, 2009, Provincial Election Results (Major Slates)
Baghdad—55 regular seats, plus one
State of Law (Maliki)—38% (28 seats); Independent Liberals Trend (pro-Sadr)—9%
Sabean and one Christian set-aside
(5 seats); Accord Front (Sunni mainstream)—9% (9 seats); Iraq National (Allawi)—
seat
8.6%; Shahid Mihrab and Independent Forces (ISCI)—5.4% (3 seats) ; National
Reform list (of former P.M. Ibrahim al-Jafari)—4.3% (3 seats)
Basra—34 regular seats, plus one
State of Law—37% (20); ISCI—11.6% (5); Sadr—5% (2); Fadhila (previously
Christian seat
dominant in Basra)—3.2% (0); Allawi—3.2% (0); Jafari list—2.5% (0). Governor :
Shiltagh Abbud (Maliki list); Council chair: Jabbar Amin (Maliki list)
Nineveh—34 regular seats, plus one
Hadbaa—48.4%; Fraternal Nineveh—25.5%; IIP—6.7%; Hadbaa took control of
set aside each for Shabaks, Yazidis,
provincial council and administration. Governor is Atheel al-Nujaifi (Hadbaa).
and Christians
Najaf—28 seats
State of Law—16.2% (7); ISCI—14.8% (7); Sadr—12.2% (6); Jafari—7% (2); Allawi—
1.8% (0); Fadhila—1.6% (0). Council chairman: Maliki list
Babil—30 seats
State of Law—12.5% (8); ISCI—8.2% (5); Sadr—6.2% (3); Jafari—4.4% (3); Allawi—
3.4%; Accord Front—2.3% (3); Fadhila—1.3%. New Council chair: Kadim Majid
Tuman (Sadrist); Governor—Salman Zirkani (Maliki list)
Diyala—29 seats
Accord Front list—21.1%; Kurdistan Alliance—17.2%; Allawi—9.5%; State of Law—
6 %. New council leans heavily Accord, but allied with Kurds and ISCI.
Muthanna—26 seats
State of Law—10.9% (5); ISCI—9.3% (5); Jafari—6.3% (3); Sadr—5.5% (2); Fadhila—
3.7%.
Anbar—29 seats
Iraq Awakening (Sahawa-Sunni tribals)—18%; National Iraqi Project Gathering
(established Sunni parties, excluding IIP)—17.6%;; Al awi—6.6%; Tribes of Iraq—
4.5%.
Maysan—27 seats
State of Law—17.7% (8); ISCI—14.6% (8); Sadr—7; Jafari—8.7% (4); Fadhila—3.2%;
Allawi—2.3%. New Governor: Mohammad al-Sudani (Maliki); Council chair:
Hezbollah Iraq
Dhi Qar—31 seats
State of Law—23.1% (13); pro-Sadr—14.1% (7); ISCI—11.1% (5); Jafari—7.6% (4);
Fadhila—6.1%; Allawi—2.8%. Governor—Maliki list; Council chair: Sadrist
Karbala—27 seats
List of Maj. Gen. Yusuf al-Habbubi (Saddam-era local official)—13.3% (1 seat); State
of Law—8.5% (9); Sadr—6.8% (4); ISCI—6.4% (4); Jafari—2.5% ; Fadhila—2.5%.
Salah Ad Din—28 seats
IIP-led list—14.5%; Al awi—13.9%; Sunni list without IIP—8.7%; State of Law—3.5%;
ISCI—2.9%. Council leans Accord/IIP
Qadissiyah—28 seats
State of Law—23.1% (11); ISCI—11.7% (5); Jafari—8.2% (3); Al awi—8%; Sadr—
6.7% (2); Fadhila—4.1%. New governor: Salim Husayn (Maliki list)
Wasit—28 seats
State of Law—15.3% (13); ISCI—10% (6); Sadr—6% (3); Al awi—4.6%; Fadhila—
2.7%. Governor: Shiite independent; Council chair: ISCI
Source: UNAMI translation of results issued February 2, 2009, by the Independent Higher Election Commission
of Iraq; Vissar, Reidar. The Provincial Elections: The Seat Allocation Is Official and the Coalition-Forming Process
Begins. February 19, 2009.

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Table 6. Election Results (January and December 2005)
Seats
Seats
Bloc/Party
(Jan. 05)
(Dec. 05)
United Iraqi Alliance (UIA, Shiite Islamist). 85 seats after departure of Fadilah (15 seats)
and Sadr faction (28 seats) in 2007. Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq of Abd al-Aziz al-
140 128
Hakim has 30; Da’wa Party (25 total: Maliki faction, 12, and Anizi faction, 13);
independents (30).
Kurdistan Alliance—KDP (24); PUK (22); independents (7)
75
53
Iraqis List (secular, Allawi); added Communist and other mostly Sunni parties for Dec.
40 25
vote.
Iraq Accord Front. Main Sunni bloc; not in Jan. vote. Consists of Iraqi Islamic Party (IIP,
— 44
Tariq al-Hashimi, 26 seats); National Dialogue Council of Khalaf Ulayyan (7); General
People’s Congress of Adnan al-Dulaymi (7); independents (4).
National Iraqi Dialogue Front (Sunni, led by former Baathist Saleh al-Mutlak) Not in Jan.
— 11
2005 vote.
Kurdistan Islamic Group (Islamist Kurd) (votes with Kurdistan Alliance)
2
5
Iraqi National Congress (Chalabi). Was part of UIA list in Jan. 05 vote
—
0
Iraqis Party (Yawar, Sunni); Part of Allawi list in Dec. vote
5
—
Iraqi Turkomen Front (Turkomen, Kirkuk-based, pro-Turkey)
3
1
National Independent and Elites (Jan)/Risalyun (Message, Dec) pro-Sadr
3
2
People’s Union (Communist, non-sectarian); on Allawi list in Dec. vote
2
—
Islamic Action (Shiite Islamist, Karbala)
2
0
National Democratic Alliance (non-sectarian, secular)
1
—
Rafidain National List (Assyrian Christian)
1
1
Liberation and Reconciliation Gathering (Umar al-Jabburi, Sunni, secular)
1
3
Ummah (Nation) Party. (Secular, Mithal al-Alusi, former INC activist)
0
1
Yazidi list (smal Kurdish, heterodox religious minority in northern Iraq)
—
1
Notes: Number of polling places: January: 5,200; December: 6,200; Eligible voters: 14 million in January election;
15 million in October referendum and December; Turnout: January: 58% (8.5 million votes)/ October: 66%
(10 million)/December: 75% (12 million).

Table 7. Assessments of the Benchmarks
Subsequent Actions and Assessments—May
2008 Administration report, June 2008 GAO
July 12,
Sept. 14,
report, International Compact with Iraq
2007,
GAO
2007,
Review in June 2008, and U.S. Embassy
Admin.
(Sept.
Admin.
Weekly Status Reports
Benchmark
Report
07)
Report
(and various press sources)
1. Forming Constitutional
(S)
unmet
S
CRC filed final report in August 2008 but major
Review Committee (CRC)
satisfactory
issues remain unresolved and require achievement of
and completing review
consensus among major faction leaders.
2. Enacting and
(U)
unmet
S
“Justice and Accountability Law” passed Jan. 12, 2008.
implementing laws on De-
unsatisfact.
Al ows about 30,000 fourth ranking Baathists to
Baathification
regain their jobs, and 3,500 Baathists in top three
party ranks would receive pensions. Could al ow for
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Subsequent Actions and Assessments—May
2008 Administration report, June 2008 GAO
July 12,
Sept. 14,
report, International Compact with Iraq
2007,
GAO
2007,
Review in June 2008, and U.S. Embassy
Admin.
(Sept.
Admin.
Weekly Status Reports
Benchmark
Report
07)
Report
(and various press sources)

judicial prosecution of al ex-Baathists and bars ex-
Saddam security personnel from regaining jobs. As
noted, De-Baathification officials used this law to try
to harm the prospects of rivals in March 2010
elections.
3. Enacting and
U
unmet
U
Framework and three implementing laws stalled over
implementing oil laws that
KRG-central government disputes; only framework
ensure equitable
law has reached COR to date. Revenue being
distribution of resources
distributed equitably, and 2009 budget maintains 17%
revenue for KRG. Kurds also getting that share of oil
exported from newly producing fields in KRG area.
Some U.S. assessments say factions closer to
agreement as a result of the November 2010
formation of a broad-based government.
4. Enacting and
S partly
S
Regions law passed October 2006, with relatively low
implementing laws to form
met
threshold (petition by 33% of provincial council
semi-autonomous regions
members) to start process to form new regions, took
effect April 2008. November 2008: petition by 2% of
Basra residents submitted to IHEC (another way to
start forming a region) to convert Basra province
into a single province “region. Signatures of 8% more
were required by mid-January 2009; not achieved.
March 2011: more than 33% of provincial council of
Najaf has asked for a referendum to become a
province.
5. Enacting and
S on (a)
overall S on (a) and Draft law stipulating powers of provincial
implementing: (a) a law to
and U on
unmet; (c)
governments adopted February 13, 2008, took effect
establish a higher electoral
the others
(a)
April 2008. Implementing election law adopted
commission, (b) provincial
met
September 24, 2008, provided for provincial elections
elections law; (c) a law to
by January 31, 2009. Those elections were held, as
specify authorities of
discussed above.
provincial bodies, and (d)
set a date for provincial
elections
6. Enacting and
no rating
unmet
Same as July Law to amnesty “non-terrorists” among 25,000 Iraq-
implementing legislation
held detainees passed February 13, 2008. Most of
addressing amnesty for
these have been released. 19,000 detainees held by
former insurgents
U.S. were transferred to Iraqi control under Security
Agreement.
7. Enacting and
no rating
unmet
Same as July March 2008 Basra operation, discussed above, viewed
implementing laws on
as move against militias. On April 9, 2008, Maliki
militia disarmament
demanded all militias disband as condition for their
parties to participate in provincial elections. Law on
militia demobilization stalled.
8. Establishing political,
S
met
met
No longer applicable; U.S. “surge” has ended and U.S.
media, economic, and
troop total in Iraq now about 50,000, down from
services committee to
about 170,000 at the 2008 height of the surge.
support U.S. “surge”
9. Providing three trained
S
partly
S
No longer applicable. Eight brigades were assigned to
and ready brigades to
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Subsequent Actions and Assessments—May
2008 Administration report, June 2008 GAO
July 12,
Sept. 14,
report, International Compact with Iraq
2007,
GAO
2007,
Review in June 2008, and U.S. Embassy
Admin.
(Sept.
Admin.
Weekly Status Reports
Benchmark
Report
07)
Report
(and various press sources)
support U.S. surge
met
assist the surge when it was in operation.
10. Providing Iraqi
U
unmet
S to pursue
No significant change. Still some U.S. concern over
commanders with
extremists
the Office of the Commander in Chief (part of
authorities to make
U on
Maliki’s office) control over appointments to the
decisions, without political
political
ISF—favoring Shiites. Some politically motivated
intervention, to pursue all
interference leaders remain in ISF. But, National Police said to
extremists, including Sunni
include more Sunnis in command jobs and rank and
insurgents and Shiite
file than one year ago.
militias
11. Ensuring Iraqi Security
U unmet
S
on
U.S. interpreted March 2008 Basra operation as
Forces (ISF) providing
military, U
effort by Maliki to enforce law even-handedly. Tribal
even-handed enforcement
on police
support councils not even-handed, and still
of law
widespread Iraqi public complaints of politically-
motivated administration of justice.
12. Ensuring that the surge
S partly
S
No longer applicable with end of surge. Ethno-
plan in Baghdad will not
met
sectarian violence has fal en sharply in Baghdad.
provide a safe haven for
any outlaw, no matter the
sect
13. (a) Reducing sectarian
Mixed. S
unmet
same as July Sectarian violence has not re-accelerated outright,
violence and (b) eliminating
on (a); U
12
although there are fears the unrest since February
militia control of local
on (b)
2011 could reignite sectarian conflict. Shiite militias
security
weak but have potential to reactivate operations.
14. Establishing Baghdad
S
met
S
Over 50 joint security stations operated in Baghdad
joint security stations
at the height of U.S. troop surge. Closed in
compliance with June 30, 2009, U.S. pull out from the
cities.
15. Increasing ISF units
U
unmet
U
ISF expected to secure Iraq by the end of 2011 under
capable of operating
the Security Agreement, which requires U.S. troops
independently
to depart. Obama Administration officials say ISF will
meet the challenges. Iraqi Air Force not likely to be
able to secure airspace by then and DOD has
approved potential sale to Iraq of F-16s and other
major equipment.
16. Ensuring protection of
S
met
S
No change. Rights of minority parties protected by
minority parties in COR
Article 37 of constitution. Minorities given a
minimum seat allocated in election law for march
vote.
17. Al ocating and spending
S partly
S
About 63% of the $10 billion 2007 allocation for
$10 billion in 2007 capital
met
capital projects was spent.
budget for reconstruction.
18. Ensuring that Iraqi
U
unmet
U
Some governmental recriminations against some ISF
authorities not falsely
officers still observed.
accusing ISF members
Source: Compiled by CRS.

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Author Contact Information

Kenneth Katzman

Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs
kkatzman@crs.loc.gov, 7-7612


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