Presidential Appointments, the Senate’s
Confirmation Process, and Proposals for
Change, 112th Congress
Maeve P. Carey
Analyst in Government Organization and Management
Betsy Palmer
Analyst on Congress and the Legislative Process
June 17, 2011
Congressional Research Service
7-5700
www.crs.gov
R41872
CRS Report for Congress
P
repared for Members and Committees of Congress
Presidential Appointments, the Senate’s Confirmation Process, and Proposals for Change
Summary
The responsibility for populating top positions in the executive and judicial branches of
government is one the Senate and the President share. The President nominates an individual, the
Senate may confirm him, and the President would then present him with a signed commission.
The Constitution divided the responsibility for choosing those who would run the federal
government by granting the President the power of appointment and the Senate the power of
advice and consent.
Several hundred people go through the appointments process each year. The pace of the
appointment and confirmation processes has been the subject of a series of critical reports and
proposals for change. Critics believe that the executive branch vetting, and/or the confirmation
process in the Senate, is too long and difficult and discourages people from seeking government
office. Others, however, contend that most nominations are successful, suggesting that the process
is functioning as it should, and that careful scrutiny of candidates is appropriate.
Recently, a bipartisan group of several Senators crafted two measures they contend will make the
process easier and quicker. S. 679, the Presidential Appointment Efficiency and Streamlining Act
of 2011, would simply remove the requirement for Senate confirmation for certain nominees,
leaving it to the President to chose the official. S.Res. 116, a resolution “to provide for expedited
Senate consideration of certain nominations subject to advice and consent,” would establish a
potentially faster Senate confirmation process for a second group of nominees.
This report provides a brief background on advice and consent issues, an overview of the
appointment process in both the executive and legislative branches, and a brief discussion of
recent concerns about the system. Next, the report explores the events in the 112th Congress
leading up to the introduction of the legislation and then provides an analysis of the two measures
at issue.
This report will be updated as events warrant.
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Presidential Appointments, the Senate’s Confirmation Process, and Proposals for Change
Contents
Background: Advice and Consent................................................................................................ 1
The Executive Branch Process: Selection, Clearance, and Nomination ........................................ 3
The Legislative Branch Process: Confirmation ............................................................................ 4
Recent Concerns over the Appointment and Confirmation Process .............................................. 6
Number of PAS Positions ...................................................................................................... 7
Length of the Vetting Process ................................................................................................ 7
Presidential Transitions ......................................................................................................... 8
Proposals in the 112th Congress to Change the Appointments Process .......................................... 9
S. 679: The Presidential Appointment Efficiency and Streamlining Act of 2011 ................... 10
Provisions of S. 679 ...................................................................................................... 10
Implications of S. 679 ................................................................................................... 11
Privileged Nominations, S.Res. 116..................................................................................... 13
Provisions of S.Res. 116................................................................................................ 14
Implications of S.Res. 116............................................................................................. 14
Concluding Remarks........................................................................................................... 17
Tables
Table A-1. Positions Proposed to No Longer Require Senate Confirmation Under S. 679 ......... 18
Table B-1. Positions Included in New Senate Confirmation Process Under S.Res. 116............... 23
Appendixes
Appendix A. Positions Proposed to No Longer Require Senate Confirmation Under S.
679 ........................................................................................................................................ 18
Appendix B. “Privileged” Nominations, S.Res. 116................................................................... 23
Contacts
Author Contact Information ...................................................................................................... 24
Acknowledgments .................................................................................................................... 24
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Presidential Appointments, the Senate’s Confirmation Process, and Proposals for Change
he responsibility for populating top positions in the executive and judicial branches of
government is one the Senate and the President share. The President nominates an
T individual, the Senate may confirm him, and the President would then present him with a
signed commission. The Constitution divided the responsibility for choosing the most senior
leaders who run the federal government. Article II, Section 2 says that the President
shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint
Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, Judges of the supreme Court, and all other
Officers of the United States, whose Appointments are not herein otherwise provided for,
and which shall be established by Law; but the Congress may by Law vest the Appointment
of such inferior Officers, as they think proper, in the President alone, in the Courts of Law,
or in the Heads of Departments.
Sharing the process for appointing and confirming nominations can pose challenges to the
President and the Senate, and it has sometimes been the focus of significant tension between the
branches. Currently, hundreds of people go through the appointment and confirmation process
each year. The pace of the appointment and confirmation processes has been the subject of a
series of reports and proposals, with many critics charging that the vetting by the executive
branch is excessive or that the confirmation process by the Senate is too long and difficult, which
discourages people from seeking government service.
Recently, a bipartisan group of several Senators crafted two measures they contend will make the
process easier and quicker. S. 679, the Presidential Appointment Efficiency and Streamlining Act
of 2011, would simply remove the requirement for Senate confirmation for certain nominees,
leaving it to the President to chose the official. S.Res. 116, a resolution “to provide for expedited
Senate consideration of certain nominations subject to advice and consent,” would establish a
potentially faster Senate confirmation process for a second group of nominees.
This report provides a brief background on advice and consent issues, an overview of the
appointment process in both the executive and legislative branches, and a brief discussion of
recent concerns about the system. Next, the report explores the events in the 112th Congress
leading up to the introduction of the legislation and then provides an analysis of the two measures
at issue.
This report does not discuss the nomination and confirmation of federal judges, which are not
covered by the two measures introduced.1
Background: Advice and Consent
While the Constitution includes the Senate in the confirmation process, it does not spell out how
the chamber should fulfill its stated role of providing advice and consent to a nomination. The
extent of legislative and executive control of the process has in many respects remained
undetermined, and there has been debate since the earliest days of the country over how the
Senate has chosen to exercise its responsibilities.
Some have asserted that the Senate should have a co-equal role with the President in the process.
1 For more information on issues involving the confirmation process of federal judges please see CRS Report RL34405,
Role of Home State Senators in the Selection of Lower Federal Court Judges, by Denis Steven Rutkus.
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The Senate’s responsibility for confirming presidential nominees, although fixed firmly in
the Constitution, remains unsettled in its application. The Senate was not meant to be a
passive participant. Delegates to the Philadelphia convention believed that the Senate would
be knowledgeable about nominees and capable of voting wisely. Yet, for the most part, it has
acted cautiously, uncertain of the scope of its own constitutional power. The source of this
uncertainty is not the Constitution. Nowhere in that document, or in its history, is there an
obligation on the part of the Senate to approve a nomination. On the contrary, the burden
should be on the President to select and submit a nominee with acceptable credentials.2
Others have said that the Senate should allow the President greater leeway in his choices for
office than is currently the case. For example, law professor John C. Eastman told the Senate
Rules Committee on June 5, 2003, that
... the appointment power is located in Article II of the Constitution, which defines the
powers of the President, not in Article I, which defines the powers of the legislature. As the
Supreme Court itself has noted, by vesting appointment power in Article II, the framers of
our Constitution intended to place primary responsibility for appointments in the President.
The “advice and consent” role for the Senate, then, was to be narrowly construed.3
The practice of the Senate, however, has not systematically reflected either of these perspectives.
Historically, the nomination and confirmation of presidential appointments has been regulated not
by strict, formal rules, but rather by informal customs that can change (and have changed) over
the years, as the relative balance of power between the President and the Senate ebbs and flows. It
is these customs which form the process, according to appointments expert Michael J. Gerhardt.
These informal arrangements—those not clearly required or clearly prohibited by the
Constitution—have come to define the dynamic in the federal appointments process. The
informal arrangements through which the system operates—including senatorial courtesy;
logrolling; individual holds, “blue slips;” consultation between presidents, members of
Congress, and other interested parties, including judges; interest group lobbying; strategic
leaking by administrations, senators and interest groups; manipulation of the press; the
media’s effort to influence the news; and nominees’ campaigning—are the sum and
substance of the federal appointments process. Studying these arrangements provides even
greater illumination than studying Supreme Court decisions or the Constitution itself of how
the different branches of the federal government interact on matters of mutual concern.4
Under these informal customs, individual Senators have, historically, been deeply involved in the
nomination and confirmation process. The procedures and traditions that have developed have
tended to protect the autonomy of individual Senators to choose how to fulfill the advice and
consent role, rather than to dictate the process for all Senators.
It is this combination—unwritten Senate traditions and the protection of each Senator’s rights—
that has led critics to call for changes in the legislative branch’s process. “[T]he Senate’s
confirmation process is entirely consistent with all of its other norms, traditions and rules.
2 Louis Fisher, Constitutional Conflicts Between Congress and the President (Lawrence, KS: University Press of
Kansas, 1997), p. 38.
3 Testimony of Professor Eastman, in U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Rules and Administration, Senate Rule
XXII and Proposals to Amend This Rule, 108th Cong., 1st sess., June 5, 2003. The testimony is available online from
the committee website, http://rules.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?p=CommitteeHearings.
4 Michael J. Gerhardt, The Federal Appointments Process: A Constitutional and Historical Analysis (Durham, NC:
Duke University Press, 2000), p. 338.
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Concern for the rights and prerogatives of individual senators gives rise to numerous
opportunities for obstruction and delay,” argued political scientists Nolan McCarty and Rose
Razaghian.5
On the other hand, as congressional scholar Sarah Binder noted, “Most presidential nominees
emerge from the Senate confirmation process and are eventually confirmed.”6 In the 111th
Congress, for example, the President submitted 964 nominations and 843 of those were
eventually confirmed for an 87% success rate.7
The Senate is currently considering making changes to the appointments process, which will be
discussed throughout the remainder of this report. This is not the first time in recent years that the
appointments process has been addressed. Changes to the appointments process during
presidential transitions were included in the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of
2004, for example.8 The changes, following recommendations from the 9/11 Commission, were
intended to expedite the presidential appointments process during presidential transitions. It is
unclear whether these changes were successful in achieving that goal.9
The Executive Branch Process: Selection, Clearance,
and Nomination
The appointment process begins with the President (or the President-Elect). Initial selection and
preliminary vetting is done by the White House Office of Presidential Personnel (OPP). OPP is
located within the White House, which allows the President to be personally engaged in
personnel decisions and in the selection of nominees.
Members of Congress and interest groups sometimes may recommend candidates for specific
advice and consent (PAS) positions to the President.10 They may offer their suggestions by letter,
for example, or by contact with a White House liaison. The White House is under no obligation to
follow such recommendations.
Once a nominee has been selected, other executive branch entities become involved in the vetting
process.11 The Office of Counsel to the President oversees the clearance of nominees, which often
5 Nolan McCarty and Rose Razaghian “Advice and Consent: Senate Responses to Executive Branch Nominations,
1885-1996,” American Journal of Political Science, vol. 43, no. 4 (October 1999), p. 1125.
6 Sarah A. Binder, “The Senate as a Black Hole: Lessons Learned from the Judicial Appointment Experience,” The
Brookings Review, vol. 19, spring 2001, p. 37.
7 Analysis done by CRS using the nominations database of the Legislative Information System.
8 P.L. 108-458.
9 See CRS Report R40119, Filling Advice and Consent Positions at the Outset of a New Administration, by Henry B.
Hogue, Maureen Bearden, and Betsy Palmer.
10 For an extensive historical study of the pre-nomination process and the level of cooperation between the President
and Congress, see Mitchell A. Sollenberger, The President Shall Nominate: How Congress Trumps Executive Power
(Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 2008).
11 The selection and vetting process is slightly different for judicial appointees, which are not covered in this report. For
judicial positions, the FBI conducts a background check, and other entities such as Justice Department officials and/or
White House aides investigate the candidate’s public record and background. For further information about the
Supreme Court appointment process, see CRS Report RL31989, Supreme Court Appointment Process: Roles of the
(continued...)
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includes further investigations performed by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Internal
Revenue Service (IRS), Office of Government Ethics (OGE), and an ethics official for the agency
to which the candidate is to be appointed. During the selection and vetting process, the candidate
submits several forms, including the “Public Financial Disclosure Report” (Standard Form (SF)
278), the “Questionnaire for National Security Positions” (SF 86), and the White House “Personal
Data Statement Questionnaire.” If the background investigation reveals a conflict of interest,
OGE and the agency ethics official may work with the candidate to mitigate the conflict.
The selection and initial vetting process concludes after the Office of Counsel to the President has
cleared the candidate. Once the candidate is cleared, the President submits the nomination to the
Senate.
The Legislative Branch Process: Confirmation
Rule XXXI of the Senate’s standing rules sets out the basics of the confirmation process in the
Senate (though it is critical to note that almost any requirement of Rule XXXI can be and
frequently may be set aside or altered by a unanimous consent agreement among all Senators).12
After the Senate receives the President’s nomination, the nomination is referred to a standing
committee based on the committee’s jurisdiction. The committee may hold a hearing on the
nomination (though this is not required) and also may report a nomination to the full Senate.
The decision by a committee to report a nomination is critical: to be considered on the Senate
floor, the nomination must have been reported from the committee of jurisdiction or all Senators
must agree to its consideration.13
The Senate’s committees perform an important information-gathering function on those
nominated to top posts of the government. Each committee typically gathers biographical and
financial information on each of the nominations it receives. The executive branch does not
routinely provide the information it has gathered on the nominee to the Senate, so committees
may have to do their own research. Sometimes, committees also review the results of an FBI
investigation on the nominee. Most committees will not act on a nomination until all of this
information is obtained; some formalize this by including in their rules a waiting period between
the committee’s receipt of the nomination and committee action on it.14
(...continued)
President, Judiciary Committee, and Senate, by Denis Steven Rutkus.
12 For more on the confirmation process, please see CRS Report RL31980, Senate Consideration of Presidential
Nominations: Committee and Floor Procedure, by Elizabeth Rybicki, and CRS Report RL31948, Evolution of the
Senate’s Role in the Nomination and Confirmation Process: A Brief History, by Betsy Palmer.
13 A nomination that is without controversy may come to the Senate floor by a unanimous consent agreement to
discharge the committee of jurisdiction. This is typically done when there is no desire on the part of any Senator to
debate or contest the nomination on the floor.
14 See, for example, the Senate Armed Services Committee rules for the 112th Congress, which require a seven day
waiting period between receipt of the nomination and committee action on it. Senator Levin, “Committee on Armed
Services Rules of Procedure,” Senate proceedings, Congressional Record, daily edition, vol. 158 (March 1, 2011), p.
S1054.
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Committees consider nominations at business meetings, also called markups. A majority of the
committee must be physically present to report the nomination to the full Senate, and a majority
must support the motion to report the nomination.15 Typically, committees do not write reports on
nominations, as they may do with legislation reported from committee.
Nominations reported by a committee are placed on the Senate’s Executive Calendar,16 and must
lay over one day before the full Senate may act on them. A simple majority vote, a quorum being
present, is required to confirm a nomination, but, if there is significant opposition, supporters of a
nomination may first need to win a super-majority vote to end debate (60 votes) before the simple
majority confirmation vote can take place.
The majority leader is responsible for setting the agenda for the Senate, including scheduling
debate and votes on nominations. Although the motion to consider a nomination is typically not
debatable, the nomination itself is subject to debate. That means Senators who are opposed to a
nomination may prevent the Senate from taking a final vote on it by means of extended debate.
The only recourse the majority leader has to force an end to the debate on a nomination is to use
the cloture process, which would then require the support of 60 Senators to end the debate and
vote on the confirmation of the nomination.17
The vast majority of the Senate’s business, however, especially on nominations, is conducted
pursuant to a unanimous consent (UC) agreement. A UC agreement establishes the procedural
blueprint for consideration of a measure or matter. It must be agreed upon by all Senators to take
effect. For example, a UC on a nomination might set a date and time the Senate will begin debate
on it and perhaps include a specific time length for the debate, three hours. Such a UC, if agreed
to by the Senate, would preclude a Senator from delaying the final vote by extended debate.18
When a Senator informs his or her party leader that they would object to a unanimous consent
agreement to debate and vote on a nomination, this is typically referred to as a “hold.” Absent a
unanimous consent agreement, the majority leader may decide not to bring up a nomination even
though a majority of the Senate may support the nominee, because the Senate would have to
spend several days of session to end debate and get to the confirmation vote.19
Even after a committee reports a nomination, lack of floor action may send the process back to
the beginning. Anytime the Senate is in a recess of more than 30 days, all nominations not yet
confirmed are to be returned to the President. If the President still desires to fill the jobs with the
15 Committees have three options for reporting nominations. They may report them favorably, unfavorably or without
recommendation. In practice, if a committee decides to vote on a nomination, the recommendation is almost always to
report favorably. If the committee did not want the nominee confirmed, it is more likely to just not act than to report the
nomination unfavorably or without recommendation. The main exceptions to this practice are Supreme Court
nominations. It has been the tradition of the Committee on the Judiciary to report out nominees to the high court, even
if the committee is not in favor of their ultimate confirmation.
16 The Executive Calendar lists all nominations and treaties available for floor action.
17 This statement assumes there is no more than one vacancy in the Senate. For more on the cloture process and the
time needed to file and consider cloture motions, please see CRS Report RL30360, Filibusters and Cloture in the
Senate, by Richard S. Beth, Valerie Heitshusen, and Betsy Palmer.
18 For more on the unanimous consent process, please see CRS Report 98-225, Unanimous Consent Agreements in the
Senate, by Walter J. Oleszek.
19 For more on holds please see CRS Report 98-712, “Holds” in the Senate, by Walter J. Oleszek.
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people he had chosen, he must resubmit the nominations to the Senate, and they all must go
through the committee process, even those that the committees had previously reported.
At any of the above stages, the Senate may alter how the process works if all Senators agree. For
example, some nominations for Cabinet secretaries do not get referred to committee and may be
considered by the Senate the same day they are received. Or Senators may agree not to refer a
nomination to committee (and perhaps allow its immediate consideration on the floor) or to
discharge the nomination from the committee and agree to its immediate confirmation.
Frequently, before the annual August recess, the Senate agrees to a unanimous consent agreement
that prevents all but a few nominations from returning to the President, despite the requirements
discussed above.
There is no requirement that either the committee or the Senate act on a nomination they receive.
In fact, the most common way a nomination fails to be confirmed is through lack of action: either
the committee never takes up the nomination or the Senate fails to consider it, despite committee
action.
Recent Concerns over the Appointment and
Confirmation Process
The President’s ability to fill advice and consent positions has been a topic of study by many
individuals and organizations, especially in recent years. Many of these studies have raised
concerns regarding the process.
For example, the National Commission on the Public Service, also known as the Volcker
Commission, released a report in 2003 in which it discussed “the presidential appointee
problem.” The report identified a two-part problem: (1) an increase in the number of PAS
positions and (2) a general slowing of the appointments process due to greater scrutiny applied
during the vetting processes in both the executive and legislative branches.
Contemporary presidents face two daunting difficulties in filling the top posts in their
administrations: the number of appointments is very large, and the appointments process is
very slow… The time required to fill each of these positions has expanded exponentially in
recent decades… In part, this results from the more thorough and professional recruitment
procedures employed by recent administrations. But most of the elongation of the
appointments process is the consequence of a steady accumulation of inquiries,
investigations, and reviews aimed at avoiding political embarrassment. These include
extensive vetting, lengthy interviews, background checks, examinations of government
computer records, completion of questionnaires and forms composed of hundreds of
questions, FBI full-field investigations, public financial disclosure, and conflicts of interest
analysis. Much of the process is duplicated when a nomination goes to the Senate and is
subjected to the confirmation process.20
20 The National Commission on the Public Service, Urgent Business for America: Revitalizing the Federal
Government for the 21st Century, January 2003, p. 18, available at http://www.brookings.edu/gs/cps/volcker/
reportfinal.pdf.
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Number of PAS Positions
The current number of PAS positions in the executive branch is approximately between 1,200 and
1,400 positions.21 According to data from various editions of the Plum Book, the number of
executive branch PAS positions has increased by approximately 365 since the outset of the
Kennedy Administration. Most of this increase can be attributed to the creation of new
departments and agencies with PAS positions over that time period. For example, the
Departments of Transportation, Energy, Education, and Homeland Security all have a number of
PAS positions; other agencies created during that period with PAS positions include the
Environmental Protection Agency, the Federal Election Commission, and the Consumer Product
Safety Commission. Additionally, existing agencies saw a gradual increase in the number of PAS
positions.22
Of those 1,200 to 1,400 positions, approximately 900 to 1,000 are full-time positions, including
positions within Cabinet departments, independent agencies, and independent regulatory
agencies. The remaining positions are part-time, which consist mostly of seats on various boards.
Length of the Vetting Process
The second part of the “appointee problem,” as identified by the Volcker Commission, is the
extensive nature of the background checks for presidential nominees. As discussed above, there
are several executive branch entities involved in the background check process, including the
White House, OGE, and the FBI. Any information that is overlooked during a background check
and surfaces later can be potentially embarrassing to a President, so it is in the President’s interest
to have a very thorough vetting process for nominees. As a result, the scrutiny that has been
applied to nominees has increased over time, according to a former director of presidential
personnel, with candidates often answering similar questions at least two or three times.23
The increasing size of the executive branch over time has been accompanied by an increase in the
number of PAS positions to fill. As a result, the president has more positions to fill and the
21 The precise number of PAS positions is difficult to identify. Various sources provide different estimates of the
number. CRS primarily uses the Plum Book for data on the total number of PAS positions, although some errors have
been identified in the Plum Book’s data. Though the publication is usually referred to as the Plum Book, the official
citation for this edition is U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, United
States Government Policy and Supporting Positions, 110th Cong., 2nd sess., committee print, November 12, 2008
(Washington: GPO, 2008). The Plum Book-based estimate of 1,200 to 1,400 includes full-time and part-time positions
in the executive branch. It does not include positions that are typically considered to be routine nominations, including
officer corps positions in the civilian uniformed services of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration in
the Department of Commerce; members of the Public Health Service in the Department of Health and Human Services;
members of the officer corps in the military services; and some positions in the Foreign Service.
22 Although there is often a general sense that the number of PAS positions steadily increases over time, the number is
fluid. Occasionally, some PAS positions are eliminated, or have their advice and consent requirement removed. For
example, 15 examiners-in-chief in the U.S. Patent Office had the advice and consent requirement removed from their
positions in 1975. PAS positions were also eliminated in 1965 when a reorganization of the Customs Service
eliminated 53 collectors-of-customs positions. However, on the whole, observers of the confirmation process are
correct to point to an increase in the total number of positions over time.
23 Testimony of Clay Johnson III, U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs,
Eliminating the Bottlenecks: Streamlining the Nominations Process, 112th Cong., 1st sess., March 2, 2011.
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selection process has slowed.24 Thus, before the President even sends a nomination to the Senate,
the selection and vetting of that nominee may be time consuming.
The background checks for nominees are essentially restarted once the nomination is sent to the
Senate, since it appears that the President tends not to share the background information with the
Senate. The Ethics in Government Act requires OGE to give an ethics report to the appropriate
committee of jurisdiction for each nomination.25 The ethics report includes one of the standard
forms for financial disclosure, as well as an ethics agreement describing potential conflicts of
interest. Senate committees often request additional information since there is minimal cross-
branch coordination with regard to background information.26
Presidential Transitions
Particularly during the time of a presidential transition, delays can occur while a new President or
President-Elect’s team selects its nominees, because new Presidents have the responsibility of
filling leadership positions that are vacated at the end of the previous administration. This
includes hundreds of positions in Cabinet departments and many positions in other independent
agencies, such as the Environmental Protection Agency and the Central Intelligence Agency. A
large number of vacancies, especially during a party turnover transition, can lead to a bottleneck
in the selection and vetting process.27
Some studies have identified the appointments process during presidential transitions as
particularly problematic. For example, the Obama Administration’s transition, according to a
2010 study, started out well-organized and well-financed. After the inauguration, however, issues
such as “a shift in personnel directors from the transition to the White House, Senate delays, a
decision to stiffen vetting requirements following nominee tax issues and other problems” slowed
the President’s rate of filling his Administration.28
Other recent events have also highlighted some characteristics of the duration of the presidential
appointments process. The 9/11 Commission identified several Cabinet positions that were still
vacant during the first few months of the George W. Bush Administration, suggesting that the
President’s delayed ability in getting his team together may have compromised some national
security policymaking in those first few months of the new Administration. Because of the
delayed election results after the election of 2000, the Bush Administration was at a particular
disadvantage for filling vacant positions in a timely manner.29
24 James P. Pfiffner, “Presidential Appointments: Recruiting Executive Branch Leaders,” in Innocent Until Nominated:
The Breakdown of the Presidential Appointments Process, ed. G. Calvin Mackenzie (Washington, DC: Brookings
Institution Press, 2001), p. 51.
25 5 U.S.C. app. § 103(c).
26 Testimony of Clay Johnson III, U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs,
Eliminating the Bottlenecks: Streamlining the Nominations Process, 112th Cong., 1st sess., March 2, 2011. pp. 8-10.
27 For more information on filling presidential administrations during transition years, see CRS Report R40119, Filling
Advice and Consent Positions at the Outset of a New Administration, by Henry B. Hogue, Maureen Bearden, and Betsy
Palmer.
28 Partnership for Public Service, Ready to Govern: Improving the Presidential Transition, Washington, DC, January
2010, p. 1, available at http://www.ourpublicservice.org/OPS/publications/viewcontentdetails.php?id=138.
29 U.S. National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, The 9/11 Commission Report (Washington:
GPO, 2004), p. 198.
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There may be several consequences of a slow appointments process. For example, a slow
appointments process may have a negative effect on the new President’s ability to govern. One
study suggested that a high number of vacancies at the outset of a new President’s Administration
can contribute to a lag in agency productivity: “These delays in agency staffing have detrimental
consequences. Without political appointees, regulation and enforcement actions have lagged.”30
The same report also suggested that vacancies in Senate-confirmed positions may give a higher
level of influence within the President’s administration to some presidential advisors who are not
subject to advice and consent.31 Others have suggested that the President may use recess
appointments to circumvent the Senate’s confirmation process, which has met some criticism
from Members of Congress.
Proposals in the 112th Congress to Change the
Appointments Process
The 112th Congress began in the Senate with a robust debate over changing its rules, and it was
this debate that led to the current proposals to change the appointments process. “What has
happened this time is a result of the discussion we had earlier in the year about making the Senate
a more effective place to work,” said one Senator, who was involved.32
In particular, some Senators, frustrated with the pace of the Senate and the ease with which a
minority of Senators can block or stall a bill or nomination, proposed a series of changes designed
to make it harder to wage a filibuster. Senators debated placing new limits on floor debate or
imposing new restrictions on the ability of any Senator to hold the floor at length.
The Senate considered its confirmation process for presidential nominations as a part of this
larger debate on its rules and the conduct of its business. As with most other business in the
Senate, a determined opposition in the Senate can force the majority to expend time to confirm a
nomination, even if there is overwhelming support for the nominee within the Senate. The
majority leader may decide that, while the nomination has majority support, he is unwilling to
spend perhaps as many as three days of Senate sessions to confirm one nomination.
At the end of the debate on its rules, the Senate approved a change designed to prevent Senators
from being able to place a “hold” on a nomination (or measure) anonymously (S.Res. 28).
Senators also informally agreed to examine the confirmation process. An informal group of
Senators, led by of Rules and Administration Committee Chair Senator Charles Schumer, and the
committee’s ranking Republican Senator Lamar Alexander, met and, after extensive negotiations,
came up with two measures, S. 679 and S.Res. 116, that are designed to take away some of the
confirmation burden on the Senate in some cases while speeding up the process in others. They
30 Anne Joseph O'Connell, Waiting for Leadership: President Obama’s Record in Staffing Key Agency Positions and
How to Improve the Appointments Process, Center for American Progress, April 2010, p. 3,
http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2010/04/pdf/dww_appointments.pdf.
31 Ibid., and William A. Galston and E.J. Dionne, Jr., A Half-Empty Government Can't Govern: Why Everyone Wants
to Fix the Appointments Process, Why It Never Happens, and How We Can Get It Done, Brookings Institution,
Washington, DC, December 14, 2010, p. 2, available at http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/rc/papers/2010/
1214_appointments_galston_dionne/1214_appointments_galston_dionne.pdf.
32 Sen. Lamar Alexander, remarks in Senate, Congressional Record, daily edition, vol. 157 (March 30, 2011), p. S1986.
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have significant support in the Senate, including the backing of the majority and minority leaders,
though some opposition has emerged.
S. 679: The Presidential Appointment Efficiency and Streamlining
Act of 2011
This section outlines the objectives and provisions of S. 679 and discusses some of the concerns
that have been raised over the bill’s contents.
Provisions of S. 679
The main objective of S. 679, as identified by its sponsor and co-sponsors, is to make the
presidential appointments process more efficient. To accomplish that goal, the bill contains two
major provisions. The first identifies approximately 200 positions and eliminates the requirement
for advice and consent of the Senate in the President’s appointment to those positions. The second
provision would establish a working group to make recommendations to speed up the vetting of
nominees.
When Congress establishes a federal agency, it designates which positions in that agency (if any)
will be subject to advice and consent. For example, in the Homeland Security Act of 2002 that
established the Department of Homeland Security, the section of the law that established the
position of Secretary read as follows: “There is a Secretary of Homeland Security, appointed by
the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate.”33 Other statutes creating PAS
positions have similar language. To remove the advice and consent requirements for the
approximately 200 positions in S. 679, the legislation would amend the section of the U.S. Code
that established each of those positions by striking the phrase “by and with advice and consent of
the Senate.” The President would then have the ability to fill these positions without consulting
the Senate. The positions would be converted to “PA” positions, or presidentially appointed
positions.34
The bill’s supporters have said that the positions listed in the bill are not significant enough to
necessitate Senate consideration, which is why these particular positions were chosen to be
included. Many of the positions are assistant secretaries for public and legislative affairs, chief
financial officers, and other lower-level policy positions within agencies. Senator Alexander, one
of the bill’s co-sponsors, said on the Senate floor upon introduction of the bill that “these are the
ones the Senate does not need to spend time on.”35 Senator Schumer also stated that “all of the
33 Sec. 102, P.L. 107-296.
34 According to the 2008 edition of the Plum Book, as of 2008, there were just over 300 PA positions, approximately
125 of which were full-time positions. Of the approximately 300 positions, a plurality of the positions were in the
Executive Office of the President (116). Another 55 PA positions comprise the U.S. Holocaust Memorial Council, and
the rest of the organizations with PA positions listed in the Plum Book have 15 or fewer PA positions. Other examples
of organizations with PA positions include the Advisory Council on Historic Preservation (11 PA positions); the
American Battle Monuments Commission (12 PA positions), the Architectural and Transportation Barriers Compliance
Board (13 PA positions); the Christopher Columbus Fellowship Foundation (13 PA positions); the Committee for
Purchase from People Who Are Blind or Severely Disabled (15 PA positions); and the Nuclear Waste Technical
Review Board (11 PA positions).
35 Sen. Lamar Alexander, remarks in the Senate, Congressional Record, daily edition, vol. 157, part 44 (March 30,
2011), p. S1986.
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positions covered in this proposal tend to be non-controversial and most closely resemble
appointments that are currently made without Senate approval.”36 According to these and other
floor statements on the bill, “Removing these positions from Senate confirmation will allow a
new administration to be set up with more efficiency and speed, thus making government work
better for the people.”37
The second major provision of S. 679 is the establishment of a working group to study the pre-
nomination process. The goal of the working group would be to help streamline the selection and
vetting processes.
The working group would be composed of government officials representing several agencies
that are involved in the vetting process. The chair would be either the director of the Office of
Presidential Personnel or another federal officer designated by the President. The President would
also appoint representatives from government agencies that are involved in the vetting process.
The other members would be appointed by the chair of the working group, and they would be
individuals who have relevant experience with the selection and vetting process.
The working group would be required to write two reports and to submit them to the President,
the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, and the Senate
Committee on Rules and Administration. The first report, submitted within 90 days of the
enactment of S. 679, would make recommendations for the streamlining of paperwork required
for executive branch nominations. The report would be expected to include recommendations for
instituting a “Smart Form,” which would consolidate the information obtained during the vetting
process into a centralized location. The form could provide information in a more efficient way to
the Senate, the White House, the FBI, and other entities that are involved in the vetting process.
The second report from the working group would look at the background investigations that are
currently required of nominees. This section of the bill is predicated on the notion that not all
nominees require the same level of scrutiny in their background checks. The legislation suggests
varying the scope of the background investigation dependent upon the nature of the position for
which the individual is under consideration. This second report would be required within 270
days of the enactment of S. 679.
Implications of S. 679
If enacted, S. 679 would ease the Senate’s workload on processing nominations by removing the
advice and consent requirements for approximately 200 positions.38 The positions are listed in
Appendix A. They are mostly chief financial officers, assistant secretary positions for legislative
and public affairs, and other lower-level policy positions within executive branch agencies. The
inclusion of these groups of positions in the bill has simplified the overall attempt at reducing the
number of advice and consent positions. Rather than targeting PAS positions within specific
36 Sen. Charles Schumer, remarks in the Senate, Congressional Record, daily edition, vol. 157, part 44 (March 30,
2011), p. S1988.
37 Ibid.
38 The bill would also take away the advice and consent requirements for 319 members of the NOAA Officer Corps and
2,536 members of the Public Health Service. These nominations are usually considered to be noncontroversial and are
usually considered en bloc, meaning that a few or even hundreds of individuals are listed and voted on in a single
nomination.
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agencies or specific committees, the bill’s sponsors have chosen to take a more systematic
approach. This approach may help to garner more broad support within the Senate, especially
from committee chairs whose committees have jurisdiction over these positions.
The 200 positions are fairly spread out among the committees, meaning that the enactment of S.
679 would save several committees the time they might have invested in processing nominations
and performing background checks over nominees.
The enactment of S. 679 could also lead to a number of recommendations about how to speed up
the selection and vetting process of nominees both at the executive branch, pre-nomination stage,
as well as during the period of Senate consideration. The working group, according to the bill’s
sponsors, would be composed of highly experienced and knowledgeable government officials
who could potentially offer strong recommendations over how to improve the process.
Some concerns over the legislation have been raised since its introduction. The remainder of this
section discusses some of these issues.
The Role of the Senate in the Appointments Process
Some concerns have been raised regarding certain provisions of S. 679. One general concern has
been whether it is in the Senate’s interest to give up its advice and consent for these select
positions. Proponents of the bill point to delay in the Senate and a heavy workload for Senate
committees in dealing with nominations, while opponents defend the role of the Senate in
oversight of the President and executive branch.
Article II, Section 2 of the Constitution grants the President the ability to appoint the principal
officers of the United States, as well as some subordinate officers. Officers of the United States
are those individuals serving in high-ranking positions that have been established by Congress
and “exercising significant authority pursuant to the laws of the United States” (emphasis
added).39 The section above entitled “Background: Advice and Consent” discussed the tension
between the President and the Senate over the appointments process. Those who wish to protect
the Senate’s role in the confirmation process may be concerned that the Senate would be giving
up its role for approximately 200 positions.
Nature of the Positions Included in S. 679
Another broader issue surrounding S. 679 is hesitation over some of the particular positions
included in the bill that would no longer require the Senate’s advice and consent. Based upon
statements of the bill’s supporters, it appears that the list of positions is composed primarily of
positions that are seen as lower-level or administrative positions. The list includes a number of
agency chief financial officers, Assistant Secretaries for Public Affairs and Congressional
Relations, and some other policy positions located within agencies.
39 Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 126 (1976). For further information on the distinction between officers and employees
of the United States, as well as the distinction between principal and inferior officers, see CRS Report R40856, The
Debate Over Selected Presidential Assistants and Advisors: Appointment, Accountability, and Congressional
Oversight, by Barbara L. Schwemle et al.
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Chief Financial Officers. One concern some individuals have raised is whether it would be
appropriate for Congress to remove the advice and consent requirement for chief financial
officers (CFOs). Some individuals have raised concerns over whether the move would reduce the
stature of CFOs within agencies. A recent news article quoted several officials explaining that
with advice and consent in the Senate comes a certain amount of respect in the agency. Linda
Combs, who was CFO at the Department of Transportation during President George W. Bush’s
Administration, said that the “‘PAS’ gives you a credibility that you can potentially get as a career
appointee, but you have to work awfully, awfully hard to get it.”40 Other supporters have
articulated similar concerns: that having chief financial officers who have the full respect of other
agency employees is important in ensuring successful financial operations within agencies.
Supporters of changing the CFO positions to PA positions say it would allow Presidents to “hit
the ground running” while filling other positions at the beginning of a term. As one of the bill’s
supporters said, “that means being able to appoint the person who deals with the press, the person
who deals with the legislature, to be able to appoint their chief financial officers and not have to
wait six months.”41
Assistant Secretaries. Another category of positions included in the legislation is a number of
assistant secretaries for public and/or legislative affairs. As with the CFOs, the bill’s sponsors
have said that these positions should not require Senate confirmation, and the President should be
able to appoint those individuals immediately upon entering the White House to get the new
Administration up and running. As one of the bill’s cosponsors stated, “Many of these positions
have little or no policy role, such as the Assistant Secretary for Legislative Affairs at the
Department of Commerce, or are internal management or administration positions, such as chief
financial officers or assistant secretaries for public affairs.”42
On the other hand, one critic of the S. 679 suggested that Congress may want to preserve its
advice and consent role over those positions, since assistant secretaries for legislative and public
affairs are those who are responsible for the agencies’ interaction with Congress and the public.43
Other Positions. The “other” positions included in S. 679 appear to be positions that the sponsors
of the legislation consider to be lower-level policy positions. For example, these include the Rural
Utilities Service administrator, director of the Mint, and seven commissioners of the Mississippi
River Commission.
Privileged Nominations, S.Res. 116
S.Res. 116, which was also introduced by Senator Schumer, would create a new process for
Senate consideration of nominations to 244 positions on certain oversight boards and advisory
councils. These nominations would bypass formal committee consideration unless any single
40 Brian Friel, “Opponents of Confirmations Bill Fear CFOs Won't ‘PAS’ Status Test,” CQ Today Online News, April
14, 2011.
41 Statement of Senator Lamar Alexander, as quoted in CQ Today Online News. Brian Friel, “Opponents of
Confirmations Bill Fear CFOs Won't ‘PAS’ Status Test,” April 14, 2011.
42 Sen. Susan Collins, remarks in the Senate, Congressional Record, daily edition, vol. 157, part 44 (March 30, 2011),
p. S1988.
43 David S. Addington, “Speed Up Nominations and Confirmations, But Do Not Enact S. 679,” the Heritage
Foundation, April 1, 2011, p. 2, available at http://report.heritage.org/wm3211.
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Senator objected to using the expedited process. While the nominations at issue in this resolution
tend not to be controversial and typically require little individual floor debate, they must remain
advice and consent positions because of the responsibilities of the boards and councils, under the
Appointments Clause of the Constitution.44
In addition, many of the boards are structured to have a partisan political balance, and Senator
Schumer said that retaining advice and consent over these positions allows the Senate to protect
the bipartisan balance.45
S.Res. 116 was approved by the Senate Rules and Administration Committee on May 11, 2011.
Provisions of S.Res. 116
Under the new process, once the Senate received a nomination to one of those boards or councils
from the President, it would be placed on the Senate’s Executive Calendar, in a new section
called “Privileged Nominations – Information Requested.” The nomination would not formally be
referred to committee, but the committee would still be responsible for gathering the biographical
and financial information used to evaluate the nomination.
Once the chair of the committee of jurisdiction notified the Senate’s executive clerk in writing
that all the information requested had been received, the nomination would then move to another
new category on the Executive Calendar called “Privileged Nominations – Information
Received.” The nomination would remain on this list for 10 days of session, after which it would
move to the existing section called “Nominations” on the Calendar. Presumably, a nomination
would not be eligible for floor consideration until it had moved to the “Nominations” section of
the Executive Calendar, though the resolution does not specifically state this.
At any time after the receipt of a nomination and until it is placed on the “Nominations” section
of the calendar, any Senator would be able to request that the nomination be referred to
committee, and not be considered using the new process. The nomination would then proceed
using the existing confirmation process, beginning with referral to committee. In this way, the
new system would utilize the existing practices of the Senate’s unanimous consent process, where
objection from even one Senator would prevent it from being used.
These new procedures would go into effect for new nominations submitted 60 days after the
Senate adopts S.Res. 116.
Implications of S.Res. 116
One of the biggest changes to come from adoption of the resolution would not be in the Senate’s
rules but in its expectations: with adoption of S.Res. 116 the Senate would essentially be agreeing
44 For a discussion of what kinds of positions require the Senate’s confirmation, please see CRS Report R40856, The
Debate Over Selected Presidential Assistants and Advisors: Appointment, Accountability, and Congressional
Oversight, by Barbara L. Schwemle et al. The discussion begins at the section entitled, “The Appointments Clause and
Presidential Advisors.”
45 Sen. Charles Schumer, remarks in Senate, Congressional Record, daily edition, vol. 157 (March 30, 2011), p.
S1988.
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that, barring anything unusual, nominees to this group of positions should be confirmed relatively
easily.
Supporters of the resolution say it would make for quicker, easier confirmation for the 244
positions covered. “This retains the authority of the Senate over these positions, but streamlines
the process, lessening the burden on the Senate for routine, non-controversial nominations and
providing for a faster road to confirmation as well,” said one Senator upon introduction of the
resolution.46
“We are confident this package will eliminate many of the delays in the current confirmation
process,” said resolution sponsor Senator Schumer. He noted that it is his expectation the
nominations, once placed on the Nominations section of the Executive Calendar, would receive
quick approval from the Senate: “The presumption for these part-time positions is, as I said, that
they will be approved by unanimous consent and not be held up as a part of other battles or
leverage or whatever else.”47
By removing the committees’ need to act on these nominations, the new process, it could be
argued, might save the committees time. As students of the Senate know, a good deal of member
and staff time is used before and during committee markups, business meetings where the
committee would decide whether to report nominations to the full Senate. Senate rules require a
majority of a committee to physically be present in order to report anything to the parent
chamber, and, with the press of business on the Senate floor and in other committees, it can be
difficult to schedule meetings efficiently. Time could also be saved if the committees did not need
to hold hearings on any of the nominations in this group.
The committees would retain the information gathering function, and would be able to signal to
other Senators their approval or disapproval of the nominations through informal discussions and
floor speeches. The importance of the committee of jurisdiction in the process can be seen in the
analysis of the nominations in the 111th Congress.
Nominations, 111th Congress
The resolution, approved by the Senate Rules Committee in May 2011, specifies the 30
organizations and 244 positions that the measure would cover (for the list of covered
nominations, please see Appendix B). The positions included in this group are to boards of
directors, advisory boards, and commissions, such as the Internal Revenue Service Oversight
Board, the National Peace Corps Advisory Council or the Commission on Public Diplomacy.
During the 111th Congress, President Obama sent the Senate nominations to fill 76 of the 244
positions covered by the resolution, roughly 31% of the positions.48 One of those nominations
46 Sen. Susan Collins, remarks in Senate, Congressional Record, daily edition, vol. 157 (March 30, 2011), p. S1990.
47 Sen. Schumer, remarks in Senate, Congressional Record, daily edition, vol. 157 (March 30, 2011), p. S1988.
48 That number of nominations is reflective of how many positions in this group came open during the 111th Congress.
Many of the positions are term limited, and they may come open at various points during a President’s Administration.
The analysis of the nominations in this group in the 111th Congress is based on information in the Legislative
Information Service (LIS) nominations database, available to the congressional community at
http://www.congress.gov/nomis/.
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was withdrawn. Of the remaining 75 nominations, 47 or 63% were confirmed, all by voice vote.
The remaining 28 nominations were not confirmed and were returned to the President.49
Of the 47 confirmed nominations, all had been reported favorably from the committees of
jurisdiction. Of the 28 unconfirmed nominations, none had been acted on by the committees of
jurisdiction. So, all the nominations in this group that saw action by the committees to which they
were referred were confirmed, and all those whose nomination was not acted upon by committees
were not confirmed.
Role of Committees and Single Senators
The absolute correlation between committee action and confirmation in the data from the 111th
Congress shows that the committee action did seem to play a central role in the fate of a
nomination, though it is unclear whether the role was supportive (i.e., the Senate felt comfortable
confirming a nomination that had received the endorsement of the committee), negative (i.e., the
Senate could not act on a nomination if the committee was unwilling or unable to report it out), or
a combination of both. It could also reflect an understanding on the part of the committee that the
full Senate was unlikely to consider the nomination(s) and, therefore, that there was no benefit for
the committee to report the nominations.
On the other hand, the new process would remove the official role of the committees of
jurisdiction, and in doing so, take some portion of control away from the chairs and other
members of the committees over the fate of the nominations. While critics charge that members
have too much say over who gets confirmed, members may want to preserve the ability of a
committee to have its say on a nomination simply by not acting on it.
Supporters of the resolution might counter that the single objection provision in the rule would
take care of this problem. The new process would not apply to a nomination if any Senator
objects to it. So, if a committee chair or member felt strongly that a certain nomination needed to
have more time and attention devoted to it, he or she could trigger the exemption and the
nomination would revert back to the regular confirmation process.
In fact, a Senator desiring to lengthen the regular confirmation process for any nominee to one of
these positions could do so by waiting to object to the new process until the nomination had been
on the calendar section entitled “Privileged Nominations – Information Received” for nine days
of session. The objection would re-start the confirmation process at the beginning, referral to
committee, well after the Senate had received the nomination, instead of immediately upon
receipt of the nomination.
This failsafe mechanism in the resolution—the ability of one Senator to derail the special process
for any nominee—could be both the strength of the resolution and also its weakest point. If, as
sponsors believe, the positions included in this group, and the nominations intended to fill them
are non-controversial, then the new process could streamline the confirmation process for those
nominees, especially if Senators are assured that they retain an ultimate ability to influence the
path of any nomination. If, however, any Senator desired to require that any nominee in this
group proceed through the regular confirmation process, they can do so, essentially leaving open
the question of how effective S.Res. 116 would be as a new procedure. Adoption of the
49 Information based on the nominations database of the Legislative Information Service of the Library of Congress.
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resolution, however, could put the Senate on record as saying it wants to act on these nominations
quickly, whatever the process that is followed.
Concluding Remarks
Both S. 679 and S.Res. 116 present the Senate with an opportunity to streamline their work on
confirmations of presidential nominations, but both measures also have some potential risks, such
as losing influence over a nomination or unexpected problems resulting from a new process.
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Appendix A. Positions Proposed to No Longer
Require Senate Confirmation Under S. 679
Table A-1. Positions Proposed to No Longer
Require Senate Confirmation Under S. 679
Positions As Listed by the Bill’s Sponsors Upon Introduction, by Senate Committee of Jurisdiction
Agriculture, Nutrition and Forestry
Assistant Secretary for Congressional Relations,
Assistant Secretary for Administration, Department of
Department of Agriculture
Agriculture
Chief Financial Officer, Department of Agriculture
Rural Utilities Service Administrator, Department of Agriculture
Directors (7), Commodity Credit Corporation
Armed Services
Assistant Secretary for Networks and Information
Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Financial
Integration, Department of Defense
Management/Comptroller
Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs, Department of
Assistant Secretary of the Army for Financial
Defense
Management/Comptroller
Assistant Secretary for Legislative Affairs, Department of
Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Financial
Defense
Management/Comptroller
Members (6), National Security Education Board
Director, Office of Selective Service Recordsa
Chief Financial Officer, Department of Defenseb
Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs
Administrator, Community Development Financial
Director of the Mint, Department of the Treasury
Institution Fund, Department of the Treasury
Chief Financial Officer, Department of Housing and Urban
Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs, Department of Housing
Developmentc
and Urban Development
Assistant Secretary for Congressional and
Members (2), Council of Economic Advisers
Intergovernmental Relations, Department of Housing and
Urban Development
Commerce, Science, and Transportationd
Assistant Secretary for Legislative Affairs, Department of
Chief Scientist, National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Commerce
Administration
Assistant Secretary for Administration and Chief Financial
Administrator, St. Lawrence Seaway Development Corporation
Officer, Department of Commerce
Chief Financial Officer, National Aeronautics and Space
Federal Coordinator, Alaska Natural Gas Transportation
Administratione
Project
Assistant Secretary for Budget and Programs/Chief
Deputy Administrator, Federal Aviation Administration
Financial Officer, Department of Transportation
Assistant Secretary for Governmental Affairs, Department
of Transportation
Energy and Natural Resources
Chief Financial Officer, Department of Energyf
Assistant Secretary for Congressional and Intergovernmental
Affairs, Department of Energy
Chief Financial Officer, Department of the Interiorg
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Environment and Public Works
Alternate Federal Co-Chairman, Appalachian Regional
Commissioners (7), Mississippi River Corporation
Commission
Chief Financial Officer, Environmental Protection Agencyh
Finance
Deputy Under Secretary/Assistant Secretary for Legislative Assistant Secretary for Management and Chief Financial Officer,
Affairs, Department of Treasury
Department of Treasury
Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs and Director of
Treasurer of the United States
Policy Planning, Department of Treasuryi
Foreign Relations
Assistant Secretary for Legislative and Intergovernmental
Governor, Asian Development Bankk
Affairs, Department of Statej
Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs, Department of State
Alternate Governor, Asian Development Bankm
Assistant Secretary for Administration, Department of
Governor, International Monetary Fundk
State
Chief Financial Officer, Department of Statel
Alternate Governor, International Monetary Fundm
Assistant Administrator for Legislative and Public Affairs,
Governor, International Bank for Reconstruction and
U.S. Agency for International Development
Developmentk
Assistant Administrator for Management, U.S. Agency for
Alternate Governor, International Bank for Reconstruction and
International Development
Developmentm
Governor, African Development Bankk
Governor, African Development Fundk
Alternate Governor, African Development Bankm
Alternate Governor, African Development Fundm
Health, Education, Labor and Pensionsn
Chief Financial Officer, Department of Educationo
Chief Financial Officer, Department of Laborp
Assistant Secretary for Management, Department of
Assistant Secretary for Congressional Affairs, Department of
Education
Laborq
Assistant Secretary for Legislation and Congressional
Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs, Department of Labor
Affairs, Department of Education
Commissioner, Rehabilitation Services Administration,
Chairperson, National Council on Disabilityr
Department of Education
Commissioner, Education Statistics, Department of
Vice Chairperson (2), National Council on Disabilityr
Education
Assistant Secretary for Resources and Technology/Chief
Members (12), National Council on Disability
Financial Officer, Department of Health and Human
Servicess
Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs, Department of
Members (24), National Science Foundation
Health and Human Services
Assistant Secretary for Legislation, Department of Health
Managing Directors (2), Corporation on National and
and Human Services
Community Service
Commissioner, Administration for Children, Youth,
Members (15), National Board of Education Sciences
Families, Department of Health and Human Services
Assistant Secretary for Administration and Management,
Members (10), National Institute for Literacy Advisory Board
Department of Labor
Director of the Women's Bureau, Department of Labor
Members (20), National Museum and Library Services Board,
National Foundation of the Arts and Humanities
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Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs
Chief Financial Officer, Department of Homeland Security Chief Medical Officer, Department of Homeland Securityt
Controller, Office of Federal Financial Management, Office
Administrator, U.S. Fire Administration, Department of
of Management and Budget
Homeland Security
Director, Office of Counternarcotics Enforcement,
Assistant Administrator for Grant Programs, Federal Emergency
Department of Homeland Security
Management Administration, Department of Homeland Security
Director, Office for Domestic Preparedness, Federal
Emergency Management Administration, Department of
Homeland Security
Indian Affairs
Commissioner, Administration for Native Americans,
Members (13), Board of Trustees, Institute of American Indian
Department of Health and Human Servicesu
and Alaska Native Culture and Arts Development
Commissioner, Office of Navajo and Hopi Indian
Relocation
Judiciary
Assistant Attorney General for Legislative Affairs,
Director, Office for Victims of Crime, Department of Justice
Department of Justice
Director, Bureau of Justice Statistics, Department of
Deputy Director, Office of National Drug Control Policy,
Justice
Executive Office of the President
Director, Bureau of Justice Assistance, Department of
Deputy Director, Demand Reduction, Office of National Drug
Justice
Control Policy, Executive Office of the President
Director, National Institute of Justice, Department of
Deputy Director, Supply Reduction, Office of National Drug
Justice
Control Policy, Executive Office of the President
Chief Financial Officer, Department of Justicev
Deputy Director, State and Local Affairs, Office of National
Drug Control Policy, Executive Office of the Presidentw
Administrator, Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency
Prevention, Department of Justice
Veterans’ Affairs
Assistant Secretary for Management, Department of
Assistant Secretary for Congressional and Legislative Affairs,
Veterans Affairs
Department of Veterans Affairs
Assistant Secretary for Human Resources and
Assistant Secretary for Public and Intergovernmental Affairs,
Administration, Department of Veterans Affairs
Department of Veterans Affairs
Assistant Secretary for Operations, Security, and
Chief Financial Officer, Department of Veterans Affairsy
Preparedness, Department of Veterans Affairsx
Source: Congressional Research Service, based upon the lists provided in the Congressional Record upon its
introduction (Congressional Record, vol. 157, part 44 (March 30, 2011), pp. 1985-1990). Changes made in
committee markup were identified through Congressional Quarterly and are available at
http://www.cq.com/pdf/3852080. Committee jurisdiction was determined based upon the list provided in the
Congressional Record upon the bill’s introduction, as well as examination of past referrals of nominations in the
Legislative Information System’s nominations database.
Notes: Senate committees that do not have positions that would be affected by S. 679 include Budget, Select
Committee on Intelligence, Rules and Administration, and Small Business and Entrepreneurship. Some other
positions were originally included in S. 679 but were subsequently removed from the list in committee markup. If
enacted, S. 679 would eliminate the advice and consent requirement for agency CFOs. Under current law, the
President may nominate an individual to serve as CFO with the advice and consent of the Senate, or he may
choose someone in the agency who has already received advice and consent for another position to serve as
CFO. Some agencies have a stand-alone CFO, while others combine the CFO position with another position,
such as an Assistant Secretary. In the cases of Assistant Secretary positions that are typical y combined with the
CFO position, some of those Assistant Secretary positions would have their advice and consent requirement
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removed by S. 679, while others would not. CRS attempted to present the CFO positions as they are typical y
used within each agency. If a single CFO position is listed, it is usually either a stand-alone position or it is usually
held by an Assistant Secretary that would not have the advice and consent requirement removed. If an Assistant
Secretary position and a CFO position are listed together in the table, both positions would have their advice
and consent requirement removed. Footnotes throughout the table provide specific details for these positions.
a. This position was added to S. 679 in committee markup. The Office of the Selective Service Records was
established in 1947 by 61 Stat. 31. CRS was unable to identify any nominations to the position of director in
recent Congresses.
b. The CFO position at the Department of Defense is currently held by the Under Secretary of Defense
(Comptroller). That position is not included in S. 679, but the CFO portion of the position is included.
c. The CFO position at the Department of Housing and Urban Development currently appears to be a stand-
alone position.
d. An additional 319 National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration Officer Corps positions are typical y
referred to the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation. These are included in S. 679 and
would no longer be considered by the Senate. Nominations for the NOAA Officer Corps are sometimes
considered en bloc, or in a list that receives a single vote.
e. In the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, the individual serving as CFO also currently serves as
Agency Chief Acquisition Officer, a position that does not require advice and consent.
f.
In the Department of Energy, the CFO position currently appears to be a stand-alone position.
g. The Department of the Interior’s CFO functions appear to be carried out by the Assistant Secretary for
Management and Budget, a position that would remain advice and consent.
h. The CFO position at the Environmental Protection Agency currently appears to be a stand-alone position.
i.
In the Treasury Department, this position is sometimes referred to as the Assistant Secretary for Public
Affairs.
j.
In the State Department, this position is known as the Assistant Secretary for Legislative Affairs.
k. Typically, the U.S. Governor of the International Monetary Fund, U.S. Governor of the International Bank
for Reconstruction and Development, U.S. Governor of the Inter-American Development Bank, U.S.
Governor of the African Development Bank, U.S. Governor of the Asian Development Bank, U.S. Governor
of the African Development Fund, and the U.S. Governor of the European Bank for Reconstruction and
Development are included in a single nomination and passed by the Senate as a single nomination.
l.
It appears that in recent years, the same individual has been separately and simultaneously nominated for
the positions of CFO and the Assistant Secretary for Resource Management, a position that would remain
advice and consent.
m. Typically, the U.S. Alternate Governor of the International Monetary Fund, U.S. Alternate Governor of the
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, U.S. Alternate Governor of the Inter-American
Development Bank, U.S. Alternate Governor of the African Development Bank, U.S. Alternate Governor of
the Asian Development Bank, U.S. Alternate Governor of the African Development Fund, and the U.S.
Alternate Governor of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development are included in a single
nomination and passed by the Senate as a single nomination.
n. An additional 2,536 Public Health Services Officer Corps positions would have their advice and consent
requirements eliminated if S. 679 is enacted. These nominations are typical y considered to be non-
controversial and are considered by the Senate en bloc, with the Senate considering a large number of
nominees and casting a single vote for the entire list. The list may include dozens or even hundreds of
nominees.
o. The CFO in the Department of Education currently appears to be treated as a stand-alone position.
p. The CFO in the Department of Labor currently appears to be treated as a stand-alone position.
q. In the Labor Department, this position is referred to as the Assistant Secretary for Congressional and
Intergovernmental Affairs.
r. It appears that the President designates the Chairperson and Vice Chairpersons of the National Council on
Disability. CRS was unable to identify any nominations to those positions in recent Congresses.
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s. The Department of Health and Human Services calls this position the Assistant Secretary for Financial
Resources (ASFR). According to the department’s website, one of the formal and informal roles the ASFR
has is that of HHS Chief Financial Officer.
t. The Chief Medical Officer position in the Department of Homeland Security currently appears to be treated
as a stand-alone position.
u. This position was listed in the Congressional Record as belonging under the jurisdiction of the Health,
Education, Labor and Pensions Committee, but it has previously been referred to the Indian Affairs
Committee.
v. The CFO position at the Department of Justice is general y held by the Assistant Attorney General for
Administration, which would remain an advice and consent position.
w. Within the Executive Office of the President, this position is referred to as the Deputy Director for State,
Local, and Tribal Affairs.
x. This position was added to S. 679 in committee markup.
y. The most recently confirmed individual to this position also served as Assistant Secretary for Management,
a position that would also have its advice and consent requirement eliminated in S. 679.
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Appendix B. “Privileged” Nominations, S.Res. 116
Table B-1. Positions Included in New Senate Confirmation Process Under S.Res. 116
Positions As Listed by the Bill’s Sponsors Upon Introduction, by Senate Committee of Jurisdiction
Agriculture, Nutrition and Forestry (5)
Members (5), Board of Directors, Federal Agricultural
Mortgage Corporation
Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs (23)
Members (6), Board of Directors, National Institute of
Members (3), Board of Directors, National Consumer
Building Sciencesa
Cooperative Bank
Directors (5), Securities Investor Protection
Corporation
Budget (0)
Commerce, Science and Transportation (8)
Members (3), Board of Directors, Metropolitan
Members (5), Advisory Board, St. Lawrence Seaway
Washington Airport Authority
Development Corporation
Environment and Public Works (9)
Members (9), Board of Trustees, Morris K. Udall
Scholarship and Excel ence in National Environmental
Policy Foundation
Finance (16)
Member (7), Board, Internal Revenue Service Oversight
Members (2), Board of Trustees, Federal Hospital Insurance
Trust Fund
Member (2), Board of Trustees, Federal Old Age and
Members (2), Board of Trustees, Federal Supplemental Medical
Survivors Fund
Insurance Trust Fund
Members (3), Advisory Board, Social Security
Foreign Relations (59)
Chairman, Advisory Board for Cuba Broadcasting
Members (8), Advisory Board for Cuba Broadcasting
Members (7), Board of Directors, African Development
Commissioners (7), U.S. Advisory Commission on Public
Foundation
Diplomacy
Members (9), Board of Directors, Inter-American
Members (4), Board of Directors, Millennium Challenge
Foundation
Corporation
Members (15), National Peace Corps Advisory Council
Members (8), Board of Directors, Overseas Private Investment
Corporation
Health, Education, Labor and Pensions (104)
Members (15), Corporation for National and
Members (26), National Council on the Humanities;
Community Service;
Chairman, Board of Directors, U.S. Institute of Peace
Vice Chairman, Board of Directors, U.S. Institute of Peace
Members (10), Board of Directors, U.S. Institute of
Members (8), Board of Trustees, Goldwater Scholarship
Peace
Members (8), Board of Trustees, Truman Scholarship
Members (6), Board of Trustees, Madison Fel owship
Members (11), Board of Directors, Legal Services
Members (18), National Council on the Arts
Corporation
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Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs (5)
Members (5), Boards, Federal Retirement Thrift
Investment
Judiciary (13)
Members (2), Foreign Claims Settlement Commission
Members (11), Board of Directors, State Justice Institute
Source: Congressional Research Service, using the list provided in the Congressional Record by the bill’s sponsors
upon its introduction.
Notes: Senate committees that do not have positions that would be affected by S.Res. 116 include Armed
Services, Budget, Energy and Natural Resources, Select Committee on Intelligence, Rules and Administration,
Smal Business and Entrepreneurship, and Veterans’ Affairs.
a. The National Institute of Building Sciences was created in 1974 by the Housing and Community
Development Act of 1974 (12 U.S.C. § 1701j-2). According to this law, the Board of Directors was to have
between 15 and 21 members appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate. After
the first five years of operation, the President is directed to appoint two members each year to three-year
terms (see the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981, P.L. 97-35, §339(E)(b), 97 Stat. 417). Thus, the
current board has six members appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate.
Author Contact Information
Maeve P. Carey
Betsy Palmer
Analyst in Government Organization and
Analyst on Congress and the Legislative Process
Management
bpalmer@crs.loc.gov, 7-0381
mcarey@crs.loc.gov, 7-7775
Acknowledgments
Henry B. Hogue, Maureen Bearden, and Lawrence Kapp provided analytical and technical support.
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