Honduran-U.S. Relations
Peter J. Meyer
Analyst in Latin American Affairs
July 14, 2011
Congressional Research Service
7-5700
www.crs.gov
RL34027
CRS Report for Congress
P
repared for Members and Committees of Congress
Honduran-U.S. Relations
Summary
On January 27, 2010, Porfirio “Pepe” Lobo Sosa was inaugurated president of Honduras,
assuming power after seven months of domestic political crisis and international isolation that
had resulted from the June 28, 2009, ouster of President Manuel Zelaya. While the strength of
Lobo’s National Party in the legislature has enabled the administration to pass much of its policy
agenda, Lobo has made only limited progress in addressing the challenges inherited as a result of
the political crisis. Several efforts to foster political reconciliation have helped Honduras secure
international recognition but have done little to lessen domestic polarization. Likewise, human
rights abuses—which increased significantly in the aftermath of Zelaya’s ouster—have continued,
and the citizen security situation has deteriorated. In June 2011, 45% of Hondurans approved of
Lobo’s performance in office.
In addition to the political problems inherited as a result of the 2009 ouster, Lobo has had to
contend with a weak economy. Honduras suffered an economic contraction of 2.1% in 2009 as
the global financial crisis, together with the domestic political crisis, led to significant declines in
tourism, remittances, export earnings, and foreign investment. Lobo has pushed a number of
reforms through Congress designed to restore macroeconomic stability, strengthen public
finances, and encourage sustained economic growth. Although these reforms have generated
considerable opposition from some sectors of Honduran society, they have the support of the
international financial institutions, which are now providing Honduras with access to much
needed development financing. The economy began to recover in 2010, with estimated growth of
2.8%, and is expected to grow by 3.8% in 2011. Nonetheless, significant development challenges
remain. Approximately 60% of Honduras’ 8 million citizens live below the poverty line and the
country performs poorly on a number of social indicators.
Although relations were strained during the political crisis, the United States has traditionally had
a close relationship with Honduras. Broad U.S. policy goals in the country include a strengthened
democracy with an effective justice system that protects human rights and promotes the rule of
law, and the promotion of sustainable economic growth with a more open economy and improved
living conditions. In addition to providing Honduras with substantial amounts of foreign
assistance ($50.2 million in FY2010) and maintaining significant military and economic ties, the
United States cooperates with Honduras on transnational issues such as migration, crime,
narcotics trafficking, trafficking in persons, and port security.
The 111th Congress expressed considerable interest in Honduras as a result of the 2009 political
crisis and its aftermath. Several resolutions were introduced and multiple hearings were held.
Issues such as human rights abuses, the state of democracy, security challenges, and the treatment
of U.S. businesses have continued to be of interest to the 112th Congress. On June 15, 2011, a bill
(H.R. 2200) was introduced in the House to limit U.S. assistance to Honduras unless the President
certifies that the Government of Honduras has settled all outstanding expropriation claims
brought by U.S. companies.
This report examines current political and economic conditions in Honduras as well as issues in
Honduran-U.S. relations. For a more detailed examination of the Honduran political crisis, see
CRS Report R41064, Honduran Political Crisis, June 2009-January 2010.
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Contents
Recent Developments.................................................................................................................. 1
Political Situation........................................................................................................................ 2
Background .......................................................................................................................... 2
Political Crisis....................................................................................................................... 3
Detention and Expulsion of Zelaya.................................................................................. 3
Micheletti Government ................................................................................................... 4
November 2009 Elections ............................................................................................... 5
Lobo Administration ............................................................................................................. 7
Political Reconciliation ................................................................................................... 7
Truth Commission..................................................................................................... 7
Constitutional Reform............................................................................................... 9
Return of Zelaya ..................................................................................................... 10
Human Rights ............................................................................................................... 11
Press Freedom and the Killing of Journalists ........................................................... 11
International Recognition .............................................................................................. 12
Economic and Social Conditions ............................................................................................... 13
Background ........................................................................................................................ 13
Crises and Recovery............................................................................................................ 14
Issues in U.S.-Honduran Relations ............................................................................................ 16
Foreign Assistance .............................................................................................................. 17
Military Cooperation........................................................................................................... 18
Trade and Investment .......................................................................................................... 19
Migration Issues.................................................................................................................. 20
Temporary Protected Status........................................................................................... 20
Remittances .................................................................................................................. 21
Deportations ................................................................................................................. 21
Crime, Violence, and Drug Trafficking................................................................................ 22
Honduran Security Efforts............................................................................................. 23
U.S. Cooperation........................................................................................................... 24
Human Trafficking.............................................................................................................. 24
Port Security ....................................................................................................................... 25
Figures
Figure 1. Map of Honduras ......................................................................................................... 2
Figure 2. Party Affiliation in the Unicameral Honduran National Congress.................................. 6
Tables
Table 1. U.S. Bilateral Assistance to Honduras, FY2008-FY2012 .............................................. 17
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Contacts
Author Contact Information ...................................................................................................... 26
Acknowledgments .................................................................................................................... 26
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Recent Developments
On July 7, 2011, the Truth and Reconciliation Commission appointed by President Lobo to
investigate the June 28, 2009, ouster of President Manuel Zelaya issued its report. (For more
information, see “Truth Commission.”)
On June 26, 2011, an assembly of the leftist National Popular Resistance Front (FNRP) approved
the creation of a political party—the Broad Front of Popular Resistance (FARP)—to contest the
November 2013 Honduran elections.
On June 14, 2011, the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere held a
hearing on U.S. policy toward Honduras titled, “Holding Honduras Hostage: Revoked Visas and
U.S. Policy.”
On June 1, 2011, the member-states of the Organization of American States (OAS) voted 32-1 to
lift Honduras’ suspension from the organization. (For more information, see “International
Recognition.”)
On May 31, 2011, 87 U.S. Members of Congress signed a letter to Secretary of State Clinton that
expressed concern about the protection of human rights, freedom of expression, and the rule of
law in Honduras, and called for the suspension of U.S. police and military assistance to the
country “due to the lack of mechanisms in place to ensure security forces are held accountable for
abuses.”
On May 28, 2011, nearly two years after he was first forced into exile, former President Zelaya
returned to Honduras. (For more information, see “Return of Zelaya.”)
On May 22, 2011, President Lobo and former President Zelaya signed the “Accord for National
Reconciliation and the Consolidation of the Democratic System in Honduras.” Among other
provisions, the accord (1) guarantees the right of Zelaya and his exiled supporters to return to
political life in Honduras; (2) reaffirms that the Honduran government has an obligation to protect
human rights; (3) ensures that the FNRP can register as a political party; and (4) reiterates that the
recent reforms to the Honduran constitution guarantee citizens’ rights to seek national plebiscites
on issues of fundamental importance.
On May 2, 2011, the Honduran Court of Appeals voted 2-1 to annul criminal charges against
former President Zelaya.
On March 9, 2011, Honduran police discovered a Mexican-run cocaine lab, the first ever found in
the country. (For more information, see “Crime, Violence, and Drug Trafficking.”)
On February 17, 2011, the Honduran National Congress approved a measure that makes it easier
for citizens to call plebiscites and referendums, and allows such citizen initiatives to address
“issues of fundamental importance to national life,” potentially including constitutional changes.
(For more information, see “Constitutional Reform.”)
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Figure 1. Map of Honduras
Source: CRS.
Political Situation
Background
A Central American nation of 8 million people, Honduras enjoyed 27 years of uninterrupted
democratic, constitutional governance prior to the forced removal of President Manuel Zelaya
from office in June 2009. The Liberal (PL) and National (PN) Parties have been Honduras’ two
dominant political parties since the military relinquished political control in 1982. Both have
traditionally been based around patron-client networks and there appear to be few ideological
differences between them. Both parties have generally been considered to be ideologically center-
right; however, the PL is heterogeneous and includes some center-left factions.1
1 Honduras: A Country Study, ed. Tim L. Merrill, 3rd ed. (Washington, DC: Library of Congress, Federal Research
Division, 1995).
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Manuel Zelaya of the PL was elected president in November 2005, narrowly defeating the PN’s
Porfirio Lobo. As a wealthy landowner who founded a center-left faction within the PL, Zelaya
was regarded as a moderate when he was inaugurated to a four-year term in January 2006.2 As his
term progressed, however, Zelaya advanced a number of populist policies, including a 60%
increase in the minimum wage in December 2008.3 Zelaya also forged closer relations with
Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez, joining initiatives such as PetroCaribe, which provides oil at
preferential discounted rates, and the Bolivarian Alternative for the Americas (Alternativa
Bolivariana para las Américas, ALBA), a socially oriented trade block.4 Although Zelaya’s
populist policies helped him maintain support among certain sectors of Honduran society, they
alienated many within the traditional economic and political elite. Likewise, his administration’s
inability to achieve concrete results on a number of issues of importance—such as poverty and
violent crime—significantly weakened his public standing.5
Political Crisis6
Detention and Expulsion of Zelaya
On June 28, 2009, the Honduran military detained President Zelaya and flew him to forced exile
in Costa Rica. The ouster followed several months of political polarization between Honduran
governmental institutions resulting from Zelaya’s intention to hold a non-binding referendum and
eventually amend the constitution. While Zelaya insisted that the non-binding referendum was
nothing more than an opinion poll to consult the Honduran populace on the possibility of voting
to convene a constituent assembly,7 others in Honduras viewed it as an unconstitutional attempt to
perpetuate himself in power.8 In the aftermath of Zelaya’s expulsion, the Honduran Supreme
Court9 produced documents asserting that an arrest warrant for President Zelaya had been issued
in secrecy on June 26, 2009, as a result of his noncompliance with judicial rulings suspending all
activities related to the non-binding referendum.10 Likewise, the Honduran National Congress
ratified the ouster by accepting an alleged letter of resignation, which Zelaya declared
2 “People Profile: Manuel ‘Mel’ Zelaya,” Latin News Daily, November 15, 2005; “Manuel Zelaya to Head Honduras
and Redefine His Party,” Latin America Data Base, NotiCen, December 15, 2005; “Country Profile: Honduras,”
Economist Intelligence Unit, November 14, 2006.
3 “Elevan a L.5,500 el Salario Mínimo en Honduras,” El Heraldo (Honduras), December 24, 2008.
4 It should be noted that the National Congress ratified Honduras’ entrance into both PetroCaribe and ALBA.
“Honduras: Congress Signs Up to PetroCaribe” Latin American Caribbean & Central America Report, March 2008;
“Honduras: Congress Approves Alba, With Caveats,” Latin American Caribbean & Central America Report, October
2008.
5 Mica Rosenberg, “Protests Erupt, Gunshots Heard After Honduras Coup,” Reuters, June 28, 2009.
6 For a more detailed examination of the Honduran political crisis, see CRS Report R41064, Honduran Political Crisis,
June 2009-January 2010.
7 The non-binding referendum would have asked Hondurans, “Do you agree that in the general elections of 2009, a
fourth ballot box should be installed in which the people decide on the convocation of a National Constituent
Assembly?” “Llegó el Día de Verdad,” El Tiempo (Honduras), June 28, 2009.
8 “Honduras: Fiscalía Dice Zelaya No Puede Llamar a Consulta Popular,” Associated Press, March 25, 2009.
9 The U.S. State Department’s 2010 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices states that “although the constitution
and the law provide for an independent judiciary,” the Honduran judicial system is “subject to patronage, corruption,
and political influence.”
10 Poder Judicial de Honduras, Expediente Judicial Relación Documentada Caso Zelaya Rosales,
http://www.poderjudicial.gob.hn/.
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fraudulent,11 and passing a decree that disapproved of Zelaya’s conduct, removed him from
office, and named the head of Congress, Roberto Micheletti, as the president of Honduras for the
remainder of Zelaya’s term.12
The legality of Zelaya’s removal has been heavily debated; however, most legal and political
analysts—including the Truth and Reconciliation Commission appointed to investigate the
ouster—have declared Zelaya’s removal a “coup d’état.”13 They assert that although Zelaya
disobeyed judicial rulings by attempting to carry out the non-binding referendum, the Honduran
military denied the president due process by expelling him from the country. Additionally, they
maintain that the Honduran National Congress did not have any legal authority to remove Zelaya
from office, and the interim government of Roberto Micheletti was therefore unconstitutional.
Micheletti Government
Contrary to the findings of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, Roberto Micheletti has
insisted that he took office through a “constitutional succession.”14 While in power, Micheletti
and the Honduran National Congress passed a 2009 budget that severely reduced government
expenditures, and enacted measures that annulled more than a dozen decrees and reforms
approved under Zelaya, including Honduras’ accession to ALBA.15
Micheletti also maintained tight control of Honduran society, severely restricting the political
opposition. On the day of Zelaya’s ouster, security forces patrolled the streets, a curfew was put in
place, and a number of local and international television and radio stations were shut down or
intimidated.16 Over the next several months, the Micheletti government periodically implemented
curfews—often with little or no prior notification—and issued decrees restricting civil liberties.17
The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR), an autonomous body of the
Organization of American States (OAS), asserts that during the Micheletti government, serious
violations of human rights occurred, including “deaths, an arbitrary declaration of a state of
emergency, suppression of public demonstrations through disproportionate use of force,
criminalization of public protest, arbitrary detentions of thousands of persons, cruel, inhuman and
degrading treatment and grossly inadequate conditions of detention, militarization of Honduran
territory, a surge in incidents of racial discrimination, violations of women’s rights, serious and
11 “Zelaya Ofrece Conferencia en Costa Rica,” La Prensa (Honduras), June 28, 2009.
12 “El Decreto de la Separación de Zelaya,” El Heraldo (Honduras), June 28, 2009.
13 See, for example, Edmundo Orellana, “El 28 de Junio y la Constitución,” La Tribuna (Honduras), August 1, 2009;
Tim Johnson, “All Parties Broke Law in Honduras Coup, Envoy Wrote,” McClatchy Newspapers, November 28, 2010;
and Comisión de la Verdad y la Reconciliación (CVR), Para que los Hechos No se Repitan: Informe de la Comisión de
la Verdad y la Reconciliación, San José, Costa Rica, July 2011, http://www.cvr.hn/home/noticias/hojas-de-prensa/para-
que-los-hechos-no-se-repitan-informe-de-la-comision-de-la-verdad-y-la-reconciliacion-cvr/.
14 Roberto Micheletti, “Moving Forward in Honduras,” Washington Post, September 22, 2009; Testimony of Roberto
Micheletti, before the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere, June 14, 2011.
15 “Honduras: Micheletti Prepares to Leave on High Note,” Latin News Weekly Report, January 21, 2010.
16 “Honduras: Decretan Toque de Queda por 48 Horas,” La Prensa (Honduras), June 28, 2009; “Honduras: Media
Blackout, Protests Reported,” STRATFOR, June 29, 2009.
17 “Honduras Suspende Derechos Constitucionales Durante Toque Queda,” Reuters, July 1, 2009; Amnesty
International, “Honduras: Human Rights Crisis Threatens as Repression Increases,” August 2009.
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arbitrary restrictions on the right to freedom of expression, and grave violations of political
rights.”18
Although some sectors of Honduran society strongly supported Micheletti, a December 2010 poll
found that 64% of Hondurans considered Zelaya’s expulsion a coup d’état, and nearly 59%
thought Micheletti should be put on trial.19
November 2009 Elections
On November 29, 2009, Honduras held general elections to fill nearly 3,000 posts nationwide,
including the presidency and all 128 seats in the unicameral National Congress.20 Former
President of Congress and 2005 National Party (PN) presidential nominee Porfirio Lobo easily
defeated his closest rival, former Vice President Elvin Santos of the Liberal Party (PL), 56.6% to
38.1%. Three minor party candidates won a combined 5.3% of the presidential vote.21 Lobo’s PN
also won an absolute majority in the unicameral National Congress, with 71 of the 128 seats.
The election was a major defeat for the PL, which has traditionally had the broadest base of
support in Honduras. On top of its poor presidential showing, it won just 45 seats in Congress,
down from 62 in 2005 (see Figure 2 below for the change in the legislative balance of power).22
According to some analysts, many Hondurans held the PL responsible for the country’s political
crisis as a result of Zelaya and Micheletti both belonging to the party. Likewise, traditional PL
supporters were divided over the ouster, leading many from the Zelaya-allied faction to stay home
on election day.23
There has been considerable debate—both in Honduras and the international community—
concerning the legitimacy of the November 2009 elections as a result of them being held under
the Micheletti government. Supporters of the elections note that the electoral process was
initiated, and the members of the autonomous Supreme Electoral Tribunal (TSE) were chosen,
prior to Zelaya’s ouster. They also note that the candidates were selected in internationally
observed primary elections in November 2008,24 and that election day was largely25 free of
18 Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Honduras: Human Rights and the Coup D'état, Organization of
American States, OEA/Ser.L/V/II. Doc. 55, December 30, 2009.
19 Universidad Centroamericana José Simeón Cañas, Instituto Universitario de Opinion Publica (IUDOP), Los
Hondureños y Hondureñas Opinan Sobre la Situación Política y Evalúan el Primer Año de Gestión de Porfirio Lobo,
Boletín de Prensa, Año XXV, No.1, San Salvador, January 19, 2011.
20 “Elecciones, Incierto Antídoto Contra la Crisis Socio Política,” El Tiempo (Honduras), August 31, 2009.
21 “TSE Confirma el Triunfo de ‘Pepe’ en las Elecciones,” El Heraldo (Honduras), December 21, 2009.
22 “Final Results in Honduras,” Latin News Daily, December 22, 2009.
23 Noé Leiva, “El Partido Liberal de Zelaya, el Gran Perdedor de los Comicios Hondureños,” Agence France Presse,
November 30, 2009; “Partido Liberal Sacrificó el Poder para Salvar Democracia,” La Tribuna (Honduras), December
3, 2009.
24 Former Vice President Elvin Santos, although originally ruled constitutionally ineligible to run by the TSE, became
the PL presidential nominee following a series of events that included congressional passage of a special decree and a
52%-32% primary victory by his stand-in-candidate, Mauricio Villeda, over then President of Congress, Roberto
Micheletti. “Honduras’ Vice President Regains the Right to Run; Elvin Santos is Partido Liberal Presidential
Candidate,” Latin America Data Base, NotiCen, March 5, 2009.
25 A demonstration in San Pedro Sula by those opposed to the government of Roberto Micheletti was forcefully
dispersed on election day. “Police Fire Tear Gas on Honduras Poll Protesters,” Agence France Presse, November 29,
2009.
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political violence.26 Nonetheless, some Hondurans and international observers have argued that
the Micheletti government’s suppression of opposition media and demonstrators prevented a fair
electoral campaign from taking place. This led to election boycotts and a number of left-leaning
candidates for a variety of offices withdrawing from the elections.27 It also led organizations that
traditionally observe elections in the hemisphere, such as the OAS, the European Union (EU),
and the Carter Center, to cancel their electoral observation missions.28 Critics of the elections also
assert that the electoral turnout, which was just under 50% (five points lower than 2005),
demonstrated a rejection of the elections by the Honduran people. Supporters of the elections
counter this assertion by arguing that Lobo won more absolute votes in 2009 than Zelaya did in
2005, and that the electoral rolls are artificially inflated—distorting the turnout rate—as a result
of Honduras not purging the rolls of those who have died or migrated abroad.29
Figure 2. Party Affiliation in the Unicameral Honduran National Congress
(2005 and 2009 Election Results)
Source: CRS.
26 José Saúl Escobar Andrade, Enrique Ortez Sequeira, and David Andrés Matamoros Batso, “Honduran Elections,”
Remarks at the Inter-American Dialogue, Washington, DC, October 22, 2009; International Republican Institute,
“Hondurans Turn Out to Polls in Credible Elections: IRI’s Preliminary Statement on Honduras’ 2009 National
Elections,” November 30, 2009.
27 “Seguidores de Zelaya No Particparán en Elecciones Aunque Haya Restitución,” EFE News Service, November 8,
2009; “Renuncian Importantes Dirigentes del Liberalismo,” El Tiempo (Honduras), November 22, 2009.
28 Gustavo Palencia, “Honduras Busca Convencer Observadores para Cuestionada Elección,” Reuters, November 12,
2009; “La CE Dice que No Hay Tiempo para una Misión Electoral y Envía Dos Expertos,” EFE News Service,
November 11, 2009.
29 “Honduras: Tug of War Between Opposition and De Facto Regime Regarding Flow of Voters,” Latin America Data
Base, NotiCen, December 3, 2009; “Final Results in Honduras,” Latin News Daily, December 22, 2009.
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Lobo Administration
A year and a half after his inauguration to a four-year term, President Lobo continues to face
daunting challenges stemming from Honduras’ seven-month political crisis. Efforts to foster
political reconciliation, including the creation of a truth commission, the passage of a political
reform measure, and an agreement to allow former President Zelaya to return to the country have
produced mixed results. Although these reconciliation efforts have won support from the
international community, they have done little to reduce domestic polarization. Moreover, there
has been little improvement in the country’s poor human rights situation. Murders of journalists,
political activists, and human rights defenders have continued and law enforcement officials have
proven unwilling or unable to bring those responsible to justice.
Lobo’s popularity has also suffered as a result of the public’s perception that the government has
made little progress in addressing issues of importance such as unemployment and the
deteriorating security situation. While the strength of Lobo’s National Party in the legislature has
enabled the government to secure passage of several policies designed to address these issues,
Hondurans have seen few improvements thus far (see “Economic and Social Conditions” and
“Crime, Violence, and Drug Trafficking” below). In June 2011, Hondurans were split in their
opinions of President Lobo with 45% approving and 44% disapproving of his performance in
office.30
Political Reconciliation
President Lobo has taken a number of steps to ease political polarization in Honduras, but still
faces significant challenges. Upon taking office in late January 2010, Lobo arranged safe passage
out of the country for former President Zelaya31 and immediately signed a bill providing political
amnesty to Zelaya and those who removed him from office. The amnesty covers political and
common crimes committed prior to and after the removal of Zelaya, but does not include acts of
corruption or violations of human rights.32 President Lobo also appointed a national unity cabinet
with representatives of each of the five official political parties, and pledged to engage in
dialogue with all sectors of Honduran society. Since then, Lobo has established a truth
commission to investigate the events surrounding the 2009 ouster, passed a constitutional reform
to grant greater power to citizen initiatives, and forged an agreement with former President
Zelaya to facilitate his return to Honduras.
Truth Commission
In April 2010, President Lobo established a Truth and Reconciliation Commission (Comisión de
la Verdad y la Reconciliación, CVR) to investigate the events surrounding the ouster of President
Zelaya and to make recommendations to prevent similar events from occurring in the future.33
The creation of a truth commission had previously been agreed to by Zelaya and Micheletti as
30 “8 de 10 Creen que País Va por Rumbo Equivocado,” La Prensa (Honduras), June 28, 2011.
31 Zelaya had clandestinely returned to Honduras in September 2009, but was unable to leave the Brazilian Embassy
where he had taken refuge.
32 “Lobo Secures Exit from Honduras for Zelaya,” Latin News Daily, January 21, 2010; “Congreso Aprueba Amnistía
para Delitos Políticos Comunes Conexos,” El Tiempo (Honduras), January 27, 2010.
33 Honduras, Presidencia de la República, Decreto Ejecutivo Número PCM-011-2010.
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part of the Tegucigalpa-San José Accord, which they signed in late October 2009 in a failed
attempt to end the political crisis. Although the accord fell apart almost immediately, Lobo has
implemented several of its provisions since taking office as part of his efforts to facilitate political
reconciliation. The five-member CVR was led by former Guatemalan Vice President Eduardo
Stein, and included two Hondurans and two additional international representatives.34 It officially
began its work in May 2010.
Reflecting the political polarization in Honduras, the CVR was immediately criticized by both the
right and the left. Critics on the right feared that the CVR could be used as a means to promote
the constitutional reforms that former President Zelaya proposed in the lead up to the country’s
political crisis. In June 2010, President Lobo even suggested that some extremist elements on the
right were plotting to overthrow him as a result of his reconciliation efforts.35 Human rights
groups criticized President Lobo for establishing the CVR on his own without consultation with
civil society groups. Likewise, the leftist National Popular Resistance Front36 (Frente Nacional de
Resistencia Popular, FNRP)—an umbrella group of those who were opposed to Zelaya’s
removal—viewed the CVR as an attempt to “whitewash” the ouster. As a result, Zelaya called on
officials from his government not to cooperate with the CVR and the FNRP established an
alternative truth commission.37
On July 7, 2011, the CVR issued its final report. Among other findings, the report asserts (1)
Zelaya refused to recognize or obey orders from the judicial branch and other governmental
institutions to halt activities related to the proposed non-binding referendum; (2) the Honduran
military partially acted on a judicial order in detaining Zelaya but the high command’s decision to
force the president into exile violated due process and thus amounted to a coup d’état; (3) the
Honduran National Congress had no power to remove President Zelaya or name a substitute and
therefore the government of Roberto Micheletti was illegal; (4) there is no reliable evidence that
President Zelaya intended to dissolve Congress, remain in office, or directly install a national
constituent assembly after holding the non-binding referendum; (5) the November 2009 elections
were legitimate; and (6) members of the Honduran military and police killed at least 12 citizens
as a result of the disproportionate use of force to suppress political demonstrations during the
Micheletti government. The CVR’s report also provides a wide variety of recommendations to
avoid similar crises in the future. These include reforming the constitution to establish clear
impeachment procedures and investigating, processing, and punishing those responsible for the
human rights abuses that took place in the aftermath of the ouster.38
34 The other members of the CVR were Canadian diplomat Michael Kergin; former Peruvian judicial official María
Amadilia Zavala Valladares; Julieta Castellas, the rector of the National Autonomous University of Honduras (UNAH);
and Jorge Omar Casco, the former rector of UNAH.
35 Germán Reyes, “Lobo Pide No Temer a Comisión de Verdad y Avala Consulta para Constituyente,” Agencia EFE,
May 4, 2010; “Presidente Hondureño Insinúa que se está Gestando Otro Golpe de Estado,” Agence France Presse, June
8, 2010.
36 The FNRP initially was formed after Zelaya’s ouster as the National Resistance Front Against the Coup d’état.
Zelaya serves as the General Coordinator of the FNRP, which also includes an executive committee representative of
the movement’s composite parts: labor unions, worker and campesino organizations, human rights advocates, the
Zelaya-allied faction of the Liberal Party, and other civil society groups.
37 “Zelaya Calls on Former Officials Not to Collaborate with Truth Commission,” ACAN-EFE, June 8, 2010;
“Honduran Resistance Sets Up Alternative Commission,” Latin News Weekly Report, July 1, 2010.
38 Comisión de la Verdad y la Reconciliación (CVR), Para que los Hechos No se Repitan: Informe de la Comisión de
la Verdad y la Reconciliación, San José, Costa Rica, July 2011, http://www.cvr.hn/home/noticias/hojas-de-prensa/para-
que-los-hechos-no-se-repitan-informe-de-la-comision-de-la-verdad-y-la-reconciliacion-cvr/.
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Constitutional Reform
As noted above, President Zelaya was advocating constitutional reform at the time of his ouster.
Zelaya, the FNRP, and others maintain that the current constitution, which was written in 1982 by
a constituent assembly elected under the military government, reinforces political and economic
exclusion of the majority of the Honduran population. They believe the only way to overcome
this exclusion is to convene a democratic and inclusive constituent assembly to draft a new
constitution.39 The FNRP claims to have gathered over 1.3 million signatures in support of such
an assembly, which—if verified—would surpass the number of votes received by Lobo in
November 2009.40
President Lobo, who never ruled out the idea of abstract constitutional changes as a candidate,
called for a national dialogue to discuss potential political, economic, and social reforms in
October 2010. After consulting with each of the political parties and various sectors of Honduran
society, Lobo proposed a measure that would grant greater power to citizen initiatives. The
proposal, which was approved by the Honduran National Congress in February 2011, amended
the constitutional provisions governing referendums and plebiscites to allow such citizen
initiatives to address “issues of fundamental importance to national life,” potentially including
changes to the currently unalterable portions of the constitution.41 Lobo held another dialogue in
July 2011, in which he invited representatives from the five officially recognized political parties
and seven parties in the process of formation to suggest constitutional reforms. After holding
similar discussions with unions, business federations, and other civil society organizations, Lobo
intends to suggest potential reforms to the National Congress.42
Much like the truth commission, Lobo’s efforts around the issue of constitutional reform have
largely failed to reduce polarization. The FNRP and others think the changes made thus far are
insufficient. They note that any reforms suggested through citizen initiatives or Lobo’s national
dialogue would need to be approved by the National Congress, an institution they believe
represents entrenched interests that benefit from the status quo. Consequently, they have
continued to push for a constituent assembly capable of drafting a new constitution.43 On the
other hand, conservative elements within the traditional parties and civil society have reacted to
Lobo’s efforts with suspicion. While conceding that abstract changes may be necessary, they are
opposed to the idea of convoking a constituent assembly or any attempt to change the unalterable
portions of the constitution. They also have accused Lobo of seeking reelection and catering to
small radical groups instead of addressing real issues of national importance.44
39 “Rafael Alegría: Queremos Constituyente Democrática y Popular,” La Tribuna (Honduras), July 4, 2011.
40 “Hondureños Reclaman en las Calles una Constituyente en el Día del Trabajdor,” Agence France Presse, May 1,
2010; Frente Nacional De Resistencia Popular, “Comunicado No.74: Avanzamos Seguros Hacia la Constituyente,”
September 17, 2010.
41 “Honduras Congress Approves Referendums,” Latin News Daily, February 18, 2011.
42 Pedro Membreño, “Reformas Políticas Deben Proponerse este Año,” El Heraldo (Honduras), July 5, 2011; Francisco
Rodriguez, “Dirigentes Políticos Coinciden en Reformas Constitucionales,” El Tiempo (Honduras), July 9, 2011.
43 “Honduras: Constitutional Change Tests Opposition Unity,” Oxford Analytica, February 14, 2011; “Rafael Alegría:
Queremos Constituyente Democrática y Popular,” La Tribuna (Honduras), July 4, 2011; Frente Amplio de Resistencia
Popular, “Posicionamiento Frente Amplio de Resistencia Popular,” July 9, 2011.
44 Unión Cívica Democrática, “Posición de la Unión Cívica Democrática Relacionada con la Reforma del Articulo 5 de
la Constitución de la República,” November 11, 2010; “Anduray Postula Movimiento para Defender Constitución,” La
Tribuna (Honduras), June 13, 2011; “‘Lobo y Hernández Gastan 2,000 Millones en Política’,” La Prensa (Honduras),
July 11, 2011.
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Return of Zelaya
Following Lobo’s inauguration, domestic groups like the FNRP and a number of countries called
on the president to create the conditions necessary to allow former President Zelaya to return to
Honduras. Lobo encouraged Zelaya to return from exile but insisted that the former president
would have to stand trial for the charges that were brought against him following his ouster,
including fraud, falsification of public documents, and embezzlement of $2.95 million from the
presidency and the Honduran Fund for Social Investment. Zelaya insisted that the charges were
politically motivated and refused to return until they were dropped. On May 2, 2011, the
Honduran court of appeals voted 2-1 to annul the criminal charges against Zelaya due to
procedural irregularities.45
With criminal charges out of the way, former President Zelaya entered into a dialogue with
President Lobo that was mediated by President Hugo Chávez of Venezuela and President Manuel
Santos of Colombia. On May 22, 2011, Lobo and Zelaya signed the “Accord for National
Reconciliation and the Consolidation of the Democratic System in Honduras.” Among other
provisions, the Accord (1) guarantees the right of Zelaya and his exiled supporters to return to
political life in Honduras; (2) reaffirms that the Honduran government has an obligation to protect
human rights; (3) ensures that the FNRP can register as a political party; and (4) reiterates that the
recent reforms to the Honduran constitution guarantee citizens’ rights to seek national plebiscites
on issues of fundamental importance.46
Former President Zelaya returned to Honduras on May 28, 2011, and immediately reentered
politics. The FNRP, which had previously named Zelaya its general coordinator, voted to create a
political party—the Broad Front of Popular Resistance (Frente Amplio de Resistencia Popular,
FARP)—to contest the 2013 elections. Zelaya hopes to unite members of the FNRP, his
supporters in the PL, and others who opposed his ouster under the FARP banner.47 It remains
unclear how much popular support the new political party will be able to attract. While the
majority of the delegates at the FNRP assembly supported the creation of the FARP, some sectors
are opposed to pursuing electoral politics.48 At the same time, many of the top PL officials that
previously supported Zelaya and/or opposed his ouster have decided not to follow him into the
FARP.49 On the other hand, over 80% of Hondurans have little or no faith in the existing political
parties,50 and Xiomara Castro de Zelaya, the former president’s wife and a potential candidate for
the presidency in 2013, has the second-highest favorability ratings in the country among public
figures.51
45 “Zelaya Free to Roam,” Latin News Daily, May 3, 2011; “Honduras: Zelaya Ruling Removes Final Hurdle – Or
Does It?” Latin American Weekly Report, May 5, 2011
46 “Acuerdo para la Reconciliación Nacional y la Consolidación del Sistema Democrático en la República de
Honduras,” La Tribuna (Honduras), May 23, 2011.
47 Noé Leiva, “Zelayistas Forman ‘Frente Amplio’ para Elecciones de 2013,” Agence France Presse, June 26, 2011.
48 Todd Gordon and Jeffrey R. Webber, “The Different Logics within the Honduran Resistance: An Interview with
Bertha Cáceres,” Upside Down World, June 27, 2011.
49 “Liberales en Resistencia se Quedan en el PL,” La Tribuna (Honduras), June 28, 2011; “Honduras: Liberales en
Resistencia Prefieren PL,” El Heraldo (Honduras), June 29, 2011.
50 Universidad Centroamericana José Simeón Cañas, Instituto Universitario de Opinion Publica (IUDOP), Los
Hondureños y Hondureñas Opinan Sobre la Situación Política y Evalúan el Primer Año de Gestión de Porfirio Lobo,
Boletín de Prensa, Año XXV, No.1, San Salvador, January 19, 2011.
51 “Empatados a 35% Nacionalistas y Liberales,” La Prensa (Honduras), June 28, 2011.
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Human Rights
Another key challenge for the Lobo government is curtailing the increase in human rights
violations that has occurred since the forced expulsion of President Zelaya. In March 2010, the
U.S. State Department released its 2009 human rights report on Honduras. The report details
numerous human rights violations that occurred in the aftermath of the ouster, including
“unlawful killings by members of the police and government agents,” “arbitrary and summary
killings committed by vigilantes and former members of the security forces,” and “arbitrary
detention and disproportionate use of force by security forces.”52
Similar human rights abuses appear to have continued since President Lobo’s January 2010
inauguration. Following a May 2010 visit to Honduras, the Inter-American Commission on
Human Rights (IACHR) expressed deep concern over murders of, and threats against, journalists,
political activists, and human rights defenders, as well as the absence of effective investigations
into these crimes. The IACHR also expressed concerns that the dismissal of judges opposed to
Zelaya’s ouster was politicizing the justice system, and that Lobo’s appointment of several high-
ranking military officers accused of participating in Zelaya’s removal to positions in the
government was remilitarizing society.53 Although the Lobo Administration has taken some steps
to improve the human rights situation—such as providing the Human Rights Unit in the Attorney
General’s Office an independent budget for the first time and creating a new Ministry of Justice
and Human Rights—Honduran and international human rights organizations assert that the
Honduran government has made little progress, especially with regard to bringing human rights
violators to justice.54 According to a December 2010 Human Rights Watch report, at least 18
journalists, political activists, and human rights defenders were killed in Honduras in 2010.55
Press Freedom and the Killing of Journalists
International human rights observers have been particularly concerned about declining press
freedom in Honduras as media outlets and journalists have been the subjects of attacks. In the
aftermath of Zelaya’s forced removal in June 2009, human rights organizations strongly criticized
the Micheletti government for its attacks on press freedom, including government intimidation of
journalists and media outlets and the temporary shutdown and interruptions of radio and
television broadcasts. Press rights groups maintain that media workers were often targeted and
foreign journalists were expelled. The IACHR issued a report in December 2009 asserting that
there were serious violations of freedom of expression under Micheletti. The report maintained
that the media became extremely polarized during the year, with those journalists and media
supportive of the new Micheletti government subject to attacks by those who opposed Zelaya’s
ouster, and those perceived as encouraging support for resistance to the government subject to
severe restrictions by state actions and attacks by private citizens.
Threats to press freedom have continued under the Lobo Administration. As noted above, the
IACHR reported in May 2010 that it received information about threats and attacks directed
52 See the full text of the report at http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2009/wha/136117.htm.
53 IACHR “IACHR Publishes Observations on Follow-up Visit to Honduras,” Press Release No. 59/10, June 7, 2010.
54 Thelma Mejía, “Latin America: Honduras has Much to Explain in Human Rights Exam,” Inter Press Service,
November 3, 2010.
55 Human Rights Watch, After the Coup: Ongoing Violence, Intimidation, and Impunity in Honduras, New York,
December 2010.
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against journalists to intimidate and impede their journalistic work.56 In 2010, at least 10
journalists were murdered in Honduras, making the country among the most dangerous in the
world for the media.57 According to a July 2010 report by the independent, nonprofit Committee
to Protect Journalists, there is no evidence to “confirm a political conspiracy or coordinated effort
behind the killings.” Nonetheless, the report asserts that “the murders occurred in a politically
charged atmosphere of violence and lawlessness” and “the government’s ongoing failure to
successfully investigate crimes against journalists and other social critics—whether by intention,
impotence, or incompetence—has created a climate of pervasive impunity.”58
Press rights groups have repeatedly urged President Lobo to combat the crime wave against
journalists. The IACHR and the Office of the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression have
called on the Honduran government to take all necessary measures to prevent these murders,
protect at-risk journalists, and make progress in investigating the crimes.59 The Inter American
Press Association recommended that the Lobo Administration request international technical
assistance, establish special prosecutors’ offices, and adopt a number of legal, judicial, and penal
reforms.60 Honduran officials have asserted that there is nothing to indicate that journalists are
being attacked because of their work, and that the murdered journalists were most likely the
victims of the widespread, random crime that has plagued Honduras in recent years.61
Nevertheless, the Honduran government has requested assistance from the United States, Spain,
and Colombia in investigating alleged human rights violations, including the killing of
journalists.62 The United States has sent advisors from the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI),
and U.S. officials have indicated they are open to providing additional assistance if needed.63
International Recognition
Following the ouster of President Zelaya, Honduras was diplomatically isolated by the
international community. Although trade continued with the exception of a 48-hour blockade by
some Central American countries, the Micheletti government was not recognized by a single
nation. On July 4, 2009, in accordance with Article 21 of the Inter-American Democratic Charter,
the member states of the OAS unanimously voted to suspend Honduras from the organization for
an unconstitutional interruption of the democratic order.64 Honduras also lost the support of the
international financial institutions, which withheld access to loans and other transfers.
56 Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Honduras: Human Rights and the Coup D'état, Organization of
American States, OEA/Ser.L/V/II. Doc. 55, December 30, 2009; Inter-American Commission on Human Rights,
“IACHR Concerned About Human Rights Violations in Honduras,” Press Release, No. 54/10, May 19, 2010.
57 “Honduras: HRN Radio Reporter Killed,” EFE News Service, December 28, 2010.
58 Committee to Protect Journalists, “Journalist Murders Spotlight Honduran Government Failures,” July 27, 2010.
59 Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, “Office of the Special Rapporteur Expresses Concern Over New
Attacks Against Journalists and Media in Honduras,” September 20, 2010.
60 Inter American Press Association, “IAPA Makes Recommendations to President Porfirio Lobo to Combat Violence
Against Journalists,” Press Release, April 27, 2010.
61 Committee to Protect Journalists, “Journalist Murders Spotlight Honduran Government Failures,” July 27, 2010.
62 “Honduras Pide Ayuda a Colombia, España, y EEUU en Investigación Sobre DDHH,” Agence France Presse,
January 27, 2011.
63 “EEUU Prestará Toda la Ayuda Necesaria a Honduras en DDHH (Funcionaria),” Agence France Presse, June 5,
2011.
64 Organization of American States, Resolution on the Suspension of the Right of Honduras to Participate in the OAS,
OEA/Ser.P, AG/Res/2 (XXXVII-E/09), Washington, DC, July 4, 2009.
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As a result of the November 2009 election and Lobo’s reconciliation attempts upon taking office,
much of the international community—including the United States, the European Union, most
Central American nations, and the international financial institutions—quickly recognized the
Lobo Administration. Many South American nations, however, expressed concerns that restoring
formal relations with Honduras would set a dangerous precedent in the region since Zelaya was
never returned to office. They excluded Honduras from regional gatherings and refused to lift the
country’s suspension from the OAS.65 Moreover, they indicated that recognition would be
dependent on conditions on the ground, including the ability of former President Zelaya to return
home peacefully.66
On June 1, 2011, four days after Zelaya returned from exile, Honduras was finally able to rejoin
the OAS. Noting the importance of the “Accord for National Reconciliation and the
Consolidation of the Democratic System in Honduras” negotiated between Lobo and Zelaya, the
OAS member states voted 32-1 to lift the suspension.67 Nearly all of the countries that had
previously refused to do so also began to restore official ties with Honduras. Ecuador, which was
the only country to vote against lifting the suspension, refuses to restore diplomatic relations “so
long as those serving in the Honduran government participated in the coup outright and remain in
complete impunity.”68
Economic and Social Conditions
Background
The Honduran economy has experienced significant changes since the 1990s. Traditional
agricultural exports of coffee and bananas are still important, but nontraditional sectors, such as
shrimp farming and the maquiladora, or export-processing industry, have grown significantly. In
1998, Honduras was devastated by Hurricane Mitch, which killed more than 5,000 people and
caused billions of dollars in damage. The gross domestic product declined by 1.4% in 1999, and
the country felt the effects of the storm for several years, with roads and bridges washed out, the
agricultural sector hard hit, and scores of orphaned children, many of whom joined criminal
gangs. Spurred on by substantial U.S. foreign assistance, however, the economy rebounded.
Between 2000 and 2008, the country experienced average growth of over 5%.69 Honduras is now
classified by the World Bank as a lower middle income developing economy, with a per capita
income of $1,800 (2009).70
65 “Honduras: Honduras Cleaves Latin America,” Latin American Regional Report: Caribbean & Central America,
May 2010.
66 “Insulza Dice que Reintegro de Honduras a OEA está Atado a Exilio de Zelaya,” Agence France Presse, February
11, 2011.
67 Organization of American States, Participation of Honduras in the Organization of American States, OEA/Ser.P,
AG/Res.1 (XLI-E/11), Washington, DC, June 1, 2011.
68 “Ecuador President Won’t Restore Ties with Honduras,” Agence France Presse, June 2, 2011.
69 “Honduras: Country Data,” Economist Intelligence Unit, February 2011.
70 World Bank, “World Development Indicators,” February 2010, available at http://data.worldbank.org/data-
catalog/world-development-indicators.
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Over the past decade, Honduras has benefited from several debt-reduction programs. In 2005,
Honduras signed a three-year poverty reduction and growth facility agreement with the
International Monetary Fund (IMF), making the country eligible for about $1 billion in debt relief
under the IMF and World Bank’s Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative.71 The
agreement imposed fiscal and monetary targets on the government, and required Honduras to
maintain firm macroeconomic discipline and develop a comprehensive poverty reduction
strategy. In 2006, the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) implemented a debt forgiveness
program for its poorest members. Honduras benefitted from a reduction of $1.4 billion in foreign
debt, freeing government resources to finance poverty alleviation.72 Largely as a result of these
programs, Honduras’ net public debt declined from nearly 46% of gross domestic product (GDP)
in 2005 to about 19.1% in 2007.73 Honduran debt has been climbing again in recent years,
however, as increased domestic spending and decreased government revenue have contributed to
growing fiscal deficits.
Despite experiencing relatively strong growth and benefitting from debt reduction programs,
Honduras continues to face significant development challenges. The country remains one of the
most impoverished nations in Latin America. According to the most recent household census
conducted by the Honduran National Statistics Institute, 60% of Honduras’ 8 million citizens live
under the poverty line—defined as being unable to acquire the basic basket of household goods.74
Likewise, Honduras has an infant mortality rate of 27 per 1,000; chronic malnutrition for one out
of four children under five years of age; and a significant HIV/AIDS crisis, with an adult
infection rate of 1.5% of the population. The Garifuna community (descendants of freed black
slaves and indigenous Caribs from St. Vincent) concentrated in northern coastal areas has been
especially hard hit by the HIV/AIDS epidemic. The World Bank maintains that development
indicators have improved over the past decade because of increased public spending on health
and education, but further progress is uncertain. It notes that the country remains vulnerable to
external shocks, including declines in prices for agricultural exports and natural disasters such as
hurricanes and droughts.75
Crises and Recovery
The global financial crisis and domestic political crisis took a significant toll on the Honduran
economy. Honduras was already experiencing significant declines in remittances, tourism, and
export earnings as a result of the financial crisis prior to President Zelaya’s expulsion from the
country.76 The ouster exacerbated these economic problems, as the international community,
71 For more information on the HIPC Initiative, see CRS Report RL33073, Debt Relief for Heavily Indebted Poor
Countries: Issues for Congress, by Martin A. Weiss.
72 “Honduras: Country Report,” Economist Intelligence Unit, April 2007; Nestor Ikeda, “Inter-American Development
Bank Forgives Debt of 5 Nations,” Associated Press, March 17, 2007.
73 “Honduras: Country Report,” Economist Intelligence Unit, November 2010.
74 “Honduras: Poverty Drives Lobo’s Calls for Constitutional Change,” Latin American Economy & Business, October
2010.
75 U.N. Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean, “Social Panorama of Latin America,” 2009;
World Bank, “Honduras Country Brief,” April 22, 2010; World Food Programme, “Country Programme – Honduras,”
2008. Also see CRS Report RL32713, Afro-Latinos in Latin America and Considerations for U.S. Policy, by Clare
Ribando Seelke and June S. Beittel.
76 “Honduras: Struggling,” Latin American Economy & Business, October 2009; “Honduras Economy: Political Crisis
Takes its Toll,” Economist Intelligence Unit, October 27, 2009.
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which had been expected to finance 20% of the country’s budget, imposed a series of economic
sanctions on Honduras.77 International financial institutions withheld access to some $485 million
in loans and other transfers, the European Union and United States terminated $126 million in
aid, and Venezuela—which provided 50% of Honduras’ petroleum imports in 2008—stopped
supplying the country with subsidized oil.78 Domestic opponents of the ouster placed additional
pressure on the economy, engaging in strikes, transportation blockades, and other measures
designed to paralyze economic activity.79 Curfews implemented by the Micheletti government to
suppress demonstrations by the political opposition further inhibited economic activity as workers
were unable to reach their places of employment. The Truth and Reconciliation Commission
estimates that the total economic cost of the political crisis was $1.09 billion.80 Overall, the
Honduran economy contracted by 2.1% in 2009.81
Since taking office, President Lobo has pushed for reforms designed to restore macroeconomic
stability, strengthen public finances, and encourage sustained economic growth. The Honduran
National Congress has approved several of Lobo’s proposals, including an energy reform
intended to better target subsidies to the poor, and a comprehensive tax reform expected to
generate additional revenue equivalent to 2.5% of GDP. The National Congress also approved a
measure de-indexing teachers’ wages from changes in the minimum wage in an effort to slow the
growth of expenditure on public sector salaries, which absorb 73% of all government revenue.82
To attract foreign direct investment, the Honduran National Congress has approved a law on
public-private partnerships, a temporary employment scheme, and the creation of special
development areas, or “charter cities.”83
Lobo’s fiscal reforms have been criticized by business groups and public sector workers,
however, they have been supported by the international financial institutions that are currently
providing Honduras with much needed development financing. In October and November 2010,
the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), and the
World Bank approved a combined $322.5 million in financial support for Honduras. The funds
are to be used in support of the Lobo Administration’s efforts to improve the country’s long-term
fiscal balance and implement the reforms necessary to achieve the country’s poverty reduction
and growth objectives.84 The Honduran economy has begun to slowly recover from the 2009
77 Keny López de Carballo, “Honduras No Puede Prescindir de Créditos,” La Prensa Grafica (El Salvador), July 9,
2009.
78 Robin Emmott, “Aid Freeze in Post-Coup Honduras Hurting Poor,” Reuters, November 12, 2009; “Honduras Can’t
Touch IMF Resources—IMF” Reuters, September 9, 2009; “Unión Europea Suspende Ayuda Financiera a Honduras,”
Reuters, July 20, 2009; “Senior State Department Officials Hold Background News Teleconference on Honduras,” CQ
Newsmaker Transcripts, September 3, 2009; “Venezuela Halts Oil Deliveries to Honduras,” EFE News Service, July 8,
2009; “Negociación Solo es para que Zelaya Enfrente la Justicia,” El Heraldo (Honduras), July 7, 2009.
79 “Manifestantes Aseguran que Hoy Paralizan el País,” El Tiempo (Honduras), July 23, 2009.
80 Comisión de la Verdad y la Reconciliación (CVR), Para que los Hechos No se Repitan: Informe de la Comisión de
la Verdad y la Reconciliación, San José, Costa Rica, July 2011, http://www.cvr.hn/home/noticias/hojas-de-prensa/para-
que-los-hechos-no-se-repitan-informe-de-la-comision-de-la-verdad-y-la-reconciliacion-cvr/.
81 “Honduras: Country Report,” Economist Intelligence Unit, January 2011.
82 “Honduras: Country Report,” Economist Intelligence Unit, December 2010; International Monetary Fund,
Honduras: Letter of Intent, Memorandum of Economic and Financial Policies, and Technical Memorandum of
Understanding, September 10, 2010.
83 “Country Watch: Honduras,” Economist Intelligence Unit, June 13, 2011.
84 “Tracking Trends: Honduras IMF Loan,” Latin News Weekly Report, October 14, 2010; “BID y BM Conceden
Préstamos por más de USD 120 Millones a Honduras,” Agence France Presse, November 10, 2010.
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financial and political crises. GDP grew by 2.8% in 2010 and is expected to grow by 3.8% in
2011.85 Unemployment remains a challenge, however, as over 16% of Hondurans lack formal
jobs.86
Issues in U.S.-Honduran Relations
The United States has had close relations with Honduras over many years. The bilateral
relationship became especially close in the 1980s when Honduras returned to democratic rule and
became the lynchpin for U.S. policy in Central America. At that time, the country became a
staging area for U.S.-supported excursions into Nicaragua by the Contra forces attempting to
overthrow the leftist Sandinista government. Economic linkages also intensified in the 1980s
after Honduras became a beneficiary of the Caribbean Basin Initiative, which provided duty-free
importation of Honduran goods into the United States. Bilateral economic ties have further
expanded since the entrance into force of the Dominican Republic-Central America-United States
Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA-DR) in 2006.
Relations between the United States and Honduras were strained in 2009 because of the country’s
political crisis. Following Zelaya’s ouster, the United States cut off almost all contact with the
Honduran government. It suspended some foreign assistance, minimized cooperation with the
Honduran military, and revoked the visas of members and supporters of the Micheletti
government, which assumed power following Zelaya’s removal.87 Micheletti reacted angrily to
U.S. policy toward his government, declaring, “it isn’t possible for anyone, no matter how
powerful they are, to come over here and tell us what we have to do.”88
Relations have improved considerably since the inauguration of President Lobo, whose efforts to
foster national reconciliation and solidify democratic processes in Honduras led the United States
to restore foreign assistance and resume cooperation on other issues. Current U.S. policy
objectives in Honduras include (1) improving the human-rights climate, especially regarding
allegations that journalists and other individuals have been targeted for their political views; (2)
combating high levels of corruption, crime, and drug-trafficking; and (3) promoting and
implementing social and economic reforms to boost growth and reduce poverty and inequality
levels that are among the highest in the hemisphere.89 To advance these policy objectives, the
United States provides Honduras with substantial amounts of foreign assistance, maintains
significant military and economic ties, and engages on transnational issues such as migration,
crime, narcotics trafficking, trafficking in persons, and port security.
85 “Honduras: Country Report,” Economist Intelligence Unit, June 2011.
86 “Honduras: President Lobo Wrestles with Intractables,” Latin American Economy & Business, June 2011.
87 “Senior Administration Officials Hold State Department Background Briefing via Teleconference on Honduras,” CQ
Newsmaker Transcripts, June 28, 2009; U.S. Department of State, Office of the Spokesman, “Termination of
Assistance and Other Measures Affecting the De Facto Regime in Honduras,” September 3, 2009; U.S. Department of
State, Office of the Spokesman, “Revocation of Diplomatic Visas,” July 28, 2009.
88 Carlos Salinas, “Honduran De Facto Leader Vows to Cling to Power Over US Objections,” El País (Spain), August
5, 2009.
89 Testimony of Craig Kelly, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere Affairs, U.S.
Department of State, before the House Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere, March 18, 2010.
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Foreign Assistance
The United States has provided considerable amounts of foreign assistance to Honduras over the
past three decades. In the 1980s, the United States provided about $1.6 billion in economic and
military aid as the country struggled amid the region’s civil conflicts. In the 1990s, U.S.
assistance to Honduras began to wane as regional conflicts subsided and competing foreign
assistance needs grew in other parts of the world. Hurricane Mitch changed that trend as the
United States provided almost $300 million in assistance to help the country recover from the
1998 storm. As a result of the influx of aid, total U.S. assistance to Honduras for the 1990s
amounted to around $1 billion. With Hurricane Mitch funds expended by the end of 2001, U.S.
foreign aid levels to Honduras again began to decline.
Recent foreign aid funding to Honduras amounted to $40.5 million in FY2008, $40.2 million in
FY2009, and $50.2 million in FY2010. The Obama Administration requested $67.9 million for
Honduras in FY2011; however, country-specific funding levels, as appropriated through the
Department of Defense and Full-Year Continuing Appropriations Act, 2011 (P.L. 112-10) are not
yet available. For FY2012, the Obama Administration has requested nearly $68 million in foreign
aid for Honduras, including $55 million in Development Assistance (DA), $11 million in Global
Health and Child Survival assistance (GHCS), and $1 million in Foreign Military Financing
(FMF). (See Table 1 below.) U.S. assistance supports a variety of projects designed to enhance
security, strengthen democracy, improve education and health systems, conserve the environment,
and build trade capacity. Most assistance to the country is managed by the U.S. Agency for
International Development (USAID) and the State Department.
Table 1. U.S. Bilateral Assistance to Honduras, FY2008-FY2012
(U.S. $ in thousands)
Account
FY2008 FY2009 FY2010 FY2011(req)a FY2012(req)
Development Assistance (DA)
15,149
21,382
37,491
53,934
55,266
Global Health and Child Survival (GHCS)
12,035 11,750 11,000
11,000
10,000
(USAID)
Global Health and Child Survival (GHCS)
1,000 1,000 1,000
1,000
1,000
(State)
Food for Peace Title II (P.L. 480)
10,150
5,771
0
0
0
International Narcotics & Law Enforcement
744 0 0
0
0
(INCLE)
International Military Education and Training
936 329 700
700
700
(IMET)
Foreign Military Financing (FMF)
496
0
0
1,300
1,000
Total 40,510
40,232
50,191
67,934
67,966
Sources: U.S. Department of State, Congressional Budget Justification for Foreign Operations, Fiscal Year 2012, April
11, 2011; U.S. Department of State, Congressional Budget Justification for Foreign Operations, Fiscal Year 2010, May
28, 2009.
Notes: Global Health and Child Survival (USAID) was formerly called “Child Survival and Health,” but was re-
labeled with the FY2010 budget request. Likewise, Global Health and Child Survival (State) was formerly called
“Global HIV/AIDS Initiative,” but was re-labeled with the FY2010 budget request.
a. Although the Department of Defense and Ful -Year Continuing Appropriations Act, 2011 (P.L. 112-10) was
signed into law on April 15, 2011, country-specific funding levels are not yet available.
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Honduras receives some foreign assistance beyond the bilateral funds listed above. The Peace
Corps, which has been active in the country since 1963, provides nearly 180 volunteers to work
on projects related to HIV/AIDS prevention and child survival; protected area management; water
and sanitation; and business, municipal and youth development. The Millennium Challenge
Corporation (MCC) provided Honduras with $205 million90 for a five-year economic growth
compact that was completed in September 2010. The compact had two components: a rural
development project to provide farmers with skills to grow and market new crops, and a
transportation project to improve roads and highways to link farmers and other businesses to ports
and major production centers in Honduras.91 USAID’s Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance
(OFDA) provides assistance in response to natural disasters. USAID/OFDA provided Honduras
with $150,000 to respond to flooding and other damage during the 2010 hurricane season.92
Honduras also receives assistance under the Central America Regional Security Initiative
(CARSI, formerly known as Mérida-Central America), a package of counternarcotics and
anticrime assistance for the region.93 From FY2008-FY2010, Congress appropriated $260 for
CARSI, a portion of which was intended for Honduras. For FY2012, the Obama Administration
has requested $100 million for CARSI.
Military Cooperation
The United States maintains a troop presence of about 600 military personnel known as Joint
Task Force (JTF) Bravo at Soto Cano Air Base. JTF Bravo was first established in 1983 with
about 1,200 troops who were involved in military training exercises and in supporting U.S.
counterinsurgency and intelligence operations in the region. In the aftermath of Hurricane Mitch
in 1998, U.S. troops provided extensive assistance in the relief and reconstruction effort. Today,
U.S. troops in Honduras support such activities as disaster relief, medical and humanitarian
assistance, counternarcotics operations, and search and rescue operations that benefit Honduras
and other Central American countries. Regional exercises and deployments involving active duty
and reserve components also provide training opportunities for thousands of U.S. troops.
The June 28, 2009, ouster of President Manuel Zelaya led some to reassess the state of U.S.-
Honduran military cooperation. As a result of the Honduran military’s role in Zelaya’s removal,
the United States suspended joint military activities as well as some military assistance to the
country.94 The events in Honduras also led some analysts to question the effectiveness of U.S.
foreign military training programs. They argued that such programs have not obtained their
desired outcomes given that General Romeo Vasquez Velasquez, who had received U.S. training,
led the effort to remove President Zelaya, and the Honduran military reportedly cut off contact
90 The compact was originally for $215 million, but the final $10 million was terminated as a result of the 2009 political
crisis.
91 Millennium Challenge Corporation, “Honduras Overview,” available at http://www.mcc.gov/countries/honduras/
index.php.
92 USAID, Latin America and the Caribbean—Hurricane Season and Floods, Fact Sheet #6, FY2011, November 9,
2010.
93 For more information, see CRS Report R41731, Central America Regional Security Initiative: Background and
Policy Issues for Congress, by Peter J. Meyer and Clare Ribando Seelke.
94 John J. Kruzel, “U.S. Limits Contact with Honduran Military,” American Forces Press Service, July 2, 2009; U.S.
Department of State, Office of the Spokesman, “U.S. Assistance to Honduras,” July 7, 2009.
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with the United States prior to the ouster.95 Nevertheless, U.S.-Honduran military cooperation
resumed following the election of President Lobo, with the United States restoring aid and
training efforts.96 The United States also resumed funding the construction of a Honduran naval
base on the island of Guanaja, which—together with a naval base constructed in Caratasca in
2009—is designed to enhance Honduras’ capacity to detect and interdict illicit drug shipments.97
Trade and Investment
U.S. trade and investment linkages with Honduras have increased greatly since the early 1980s.
In 1984, Honduras became one of the first beneficiaries of the Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI), a
unilateral U.S. preferential trade arrangement providing duty-free importation for many goods
from the region. In the late 1980s, Honduras benefitted from production-sharing arrangements
with U.S. apparel companies for duty-free entry into the United States of certain apparel products
assembled in Honduras. As a result, maquiladoras or export-assembly companies flourished,
most concentrated in the north coast region. The passage of the Caribbean Basin Trade
Partnership Act in 2000, which provided Caribbean Basin nations with North America Free Trade
Agreement (NAFTA)-like preferential tariff treatment, further boosted the maquila sector. Trade
relations expanded most recently as a result of the Dominican Republic-Central America-United
States Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA-DR), which has significantly liberalized trade in goods and
services since entering into force with Honduras in April 2006.98
Total trade between the United States and Honduras has increased 15% since the implementation
of CAFTA-DR, with U.S. exports to Honduras growing by 25% and U.S. imports from Honduras
growing by 6%. Total two-way trade amounted to $8.5 billion in 2010, $4.6 billion in U.S.
exports to Honduras and $3.9 billion in U.S. imports from Honduras. Similar to previous trade
arrangements, CAFTA-DR has provided substantial benefits to the maquila sector. Knit and
woven apparel (assembled products from the maquila sector) account for the greatest share of
U.S. imports from Honduras. Likewise, apparel inputs, such as yarns and fabrics, account for a
substantial portion of U.S. exports to Honduras. Other major U.S. exports to Honduras include oil
and machinery.99
U.S. foreign direct investment in Honduras has also increased since the implementation of
CAFTA-DR. Total U.S. foreign direct investment amounted to $844 million in 2009, up 7% from
$787 million in 2006.100 The most significant U.S. investments are in the maquila, manufacturing,
tourism, agriculture, telecommunications, and energy sectors. According to the U.S. State
Department, relatively low labor costs, proximity to the U.S. market, and Central America’s
largest port (Puerto Cortés) make Honduras attractive to investors. On the other hand, high levels
of crime, a weak judicial system, corruption, low levels of educational attainment, and poor
95 See, for example, Adam Isacson, “When Your Aid Recipients Stop Taking Your Calls,” Center for International
Policy, June 28, 2008, http://www.cipcol.org/?p=949.
96 “Honduras: Ties with US Return to Normal,” Latin News Weekly Report, April 22, 2010.
97 “Central America: Behind the Growing Presence of the US,” Latin American Security & Strategic Review, July 2010.
98 For more information on CAFTA-DR, see CRS Report RL31870, The Dominican Republic-Central America-United
States Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA-DR), by J. F. Hornbeck.
99 U.S. Department of Commerce data, as presented by Global Trade Atlas, April 2011.
100 U.S. Department of Commerce, “U.S. Direct Investment Abroad Tables,” Survey of Current Business, September
2010.
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infrastructure hamper investment.101 Additionally, some observers have raised questions about the
investment climate in Honduras as a result of several cases where U.S.-owned companies have
been driven out of business as a result of anticompetitive practices or have been expropriated
without compensation.102 On June 15, 2011, a bill (H.R. 2200, Rohrabacher) was introduced to
limit U.S. assistance to Honduras unless the President certifies that the Government of Honduras
has settled all outstanding expropriation claims brought by U.S. companies.
Despite the increases in trade and investment, some analysts have expressed concerns about the
implementation of CAFTA-DR. Labor rights provisions have been of particular concern to many
in the United States. According to the U.S. State Department, Honduran labor laws are generally
satisfactory, however, the government frequently fails to enforce them. In the past year, “union
leaders were subjected to violence and threats,” “employers commonly threatened to close
unionized factories and harassed or dismissed workers seeking to unionize,” and “factory
management in export-processing zones required compulsory overtime, with some factories
enforcing this requirement by locking workers inside.”103 Honduran officials, on the other hand,
have expressed concerns about the potential loss of agricultural jobs in the corn, rice, beef, pork,
and poultry sectors as the country further opens its market to U.S. agricultural products.104
Migration Issues
Temporary Protected Status
In the aftermath of Hurricane Mitch in 1998, the United States provided temporary protected
status (TPS) to eligible Hondurans who may otherwise have been deported from the United
States. Originally slated to expire in July 2000, TPS status has now been extended nine times. The
most recent TPS extension came on May 5, 2010, when the Secretary of Homeland Security
announced that the United States would continue to provide TPS for an additional 18 months,
expiring on January 5, 2012 (prior to this extension, TPS would have expired July 5, 2010).
According to a Federal Register notice on the most recent extension, the Secretary of Homeland
Security maintained that the extension was warranted because there continues to be a substantial,
but temporary, disruption of living conditions in Honduras resulting from Hurricane Mitch, and
the country remains temporarily unable to adequately handle the return of its nationals.105
Homeland Security estimates that TPS covers an estimated 66,000 Hondurans residing in the
United States.106
101 U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Economic, Energy and Business Affairs, 2011 Investment Climate Statement -
Honduras, March 2011.
102 U.S. Congress, House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere, Next Steps for
Honduras, 111th Cong., 2nd sess., March 18, 2010, Serial No. 111-94 (Washington: GPO, 2010).
103 U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, 2010 Country Reports on Human Rights
Practices – Honduras, April 8, 2011.
104 Kathleen Schalch, "Hondurans Brace for Pros, Cons of CAFTA," National Public Radio (NPR), May 19, 2005.
105 For more details, see 75 Federal Register 24734-24737, May 5, 2010.
106 “18-Month Extension of Temporary Protected Status for Honduras, Questions and Answers,” States News Service,
May 5, 2010. See CRS Report RS20844, Temporary Protected Status: Current Immigration Policy and Issues, by Ruth
Ellen Wasem and Karma Ester.
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Remittances
Remittances from migrant workers abroad—87% of whom live in the United States—are the
largest single source of foreign exchange for Honduras. Between 2002 and 2008, remittances to
Honduras more than tripled to $2.7 billion, the equivalent of 20% of GDP. Although remittances
declined by over 8% in 2009, they partially recovered in 2010 to $2.53 billion. The recent decline
in remittances is at least partially due to the global financial crisis and U.S. recession, which have
left many Honduran immigrants in the United States unemployed. Most remittances from
Hondurans abroad are sent to immediate family members, such as parents and children, to
supplement their wages.107
In September 2010, Secretary of State Clinton signed a Memorandum of Understanding with
President Lobo regarding the Building Remittance Investment for Development Growth and
Entrepreneurship (BRIDGE) Initiative. Under the Initiative, the United States will work with
Honduras to develop and support partnerships with Honduran financial institutions in hopes of
maximizing the development impact of remittance flows. The identified financial institutions will
be able to leverage the remittances they receive to obtain lower-cost, longer-term financing in
international capital markets to fund investments in infrastructure, public works, and commercial
development.108
Deportations109
Deportations to Honduras have increased significantly over the past decade. Approximately
25,600 Hondurans were deported from the United States in FY2010, making Honduras one of the
top recipients of deportees on a per capita basis.110 Increasing deportations from the United States
have been accompanied by similar increases in deportations from Mexico, a transit country for
Central American migrants bound for the United States. Honduran policymakers are concerned
about their country’s ability to absorb the large volume of deportees, as it is often difficult for
those returning to the country to find gainful employment. Individuals who do not speak Spanish,
who are tattooed, who have criminal records, and/or who lack familial support face additional
difficulties re-integrating into Honduran society. In addition to these social problems, leaders are
concerned that remittances may start to fall if the current high rates of deportations continue.111
Some analysts contend that increasing U.S. deportations of individuals with criminal records has
exacerbated the gang problem in Honduras and other Central American countries. By the mid-
1990s, the civil conflicts in Central America had ended and the United States began deporting
unauthorized immigrants, many with criminal convictions, back to the region. Between 2000 and
107 “Honduras: Moderate Inflation,” Latin American Economy & Business, February 2011; “Honduras: Country
Report,” Economist Intelligence Unit, November 2010; “Roundtable Discussion: Outlook for Remittances to Latin
America in 2010,” Inter American Dialogue, April 12, 2010; “Latin America: Remittances Slide,” Economist
Intelligence Unit, January 26, 2009; “Country Profile: Honduras,” Economist Intelligence Unit, 2008.
108 Department of State, Office of the Spokesman, “U.S. BRIDGE Initiative Commitments with El Salvador and
Honduras,” September 22, 2010.
109 Clare Ribando Seelke, Specialist in Latin American Affairs, contributed information to this section.
110 Information provided to CRS by the Department of Homeland Security, Immigration and Customs Enforcement,
Office of Congressional Relations.
111 Pamela Constable, “Deportees’ Bittersweet Homecoming; Migration is Boon, Bane for Honduras,” Washington
Post, June 27, 2007.
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2004, an estimated 20,000 criminals were sent back to Central America, many of whom had spent
time in prisons in the United States for drug and/or gang-related offenses. Some observers
contend that gang-deportees have “exported” a Los Angeles gang culture to Central America, and
that they have recruited new members from among the local populations.112 Although a recent
United Nations study found little conclusive evidence to support their claims, the media and
many Central American officials have attributed a large proportion of the rise in violent crime in
the region to gangs, particularly gang-deportees from the United States.113
U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) does not provide receiving countries with the
complete criminal records or gang affiliations of deportees, however, it may provide them with
some information regarding deportees’ criminal histories and gang affiliations when specifying
why the deportees were removed from the United States. Likewise, receiving countries may
contact the FBI to request criminal history checks on particular criminal deportees once they have
arrived. Over 40% of the Hondurans deported from the United States in FY2010 were removed
on criminal grounds.114
Crime, Violence, and Drug Trafficking115
Honduras, along with neighboring El Salvador and Guatemala, has become fertile ground for
gangs and drug trafficking organizations. Fueled by poverty, unemployment, leftover weapons
from the conflicts of the 1980s, and the U.S. deportation of criminals to the region, gangs such as
Mara Salvatrucha (MS-13) and the 18th Street Gang (M-18) have firmly established themselves in
the region. Although estimates of the number of gang members vary widely, the U.N. Office on
Drugs and Crime (UNODC) has suggested that there are some 36,000 in Honduras.116 At the
same time, Mexican Drug Trafficking Organizations (DTOs) have taken control of Central
American trafficking corridors to transport cocaine and other narcotics from the Andean region of
South America to the United States.
This confluence of gangs and DTOs has led to increasing rates of crime and violence. According
to Vanderbilt University’s 2010 Americas Barometer, 14% of Honduran citizens reported that
they had been the victim of a crime within the past year.117 The surge in violent crime has been
particularly worrisome. In December 2009, Honduras’ top counternarcotics official was
ambushed and killed in the capital by gunmen on motorcycles. In September 2010, 18 men
working in a shoe factory in San Pedro Sula were apparently massacred by members of a
Mexican DTO. And in January 2011, eight people were killed and three were injured when
gunmen opened fire on a public bus.118 Honduras’ murder rate was already among the highest in
112 Ana Arana, “How the Street Gangs Took Central America,” Foreign Affairs, May/June 2005.
113 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), Crime and Development in Central America: Caught in the
Crossfire, May 2007.
114 Information Provided to CRS by the Department of Homeland Security, Immigration and Customs Enforcement,
Office of Congressional Relations.
115 For more information see CRS Report R41731, Central America Regional Security Initiative: Background and
Policy Issues for Congress, by Peter J. Meyer and Clare Ribando Seelke and CRS Report RL34112, Gangs in Central
America, by Clare Ribando Seelke.
116 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), Crime and Development in Central America: Caught in the
Crossfire, May 2007.
117 “65% Satisfecho con Democracia,” La Prensa (Honduras), November 23, 2010.
118 U.S. Department of State, Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, “International Narcotics
(continued...)
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the world in 2008 at 57.9 per 100,000 inhabitants. Nevertheless, it increased to 66.8 per 100,000
in 2009 and reportedly reached 77 per 100,000 in 2010.119 Many have assumed that gangs are
responsible for the increasing number of homicides; however, some recent studies have shown
that the highest murder rates are not in large cities—where gangs are primarily located—but in
more remote areas along strategic drug trafficking corridors. Although there have been some
indications that DTOs are using gangs as hired assassins in Honduras, connections between the
DTOs and gangs remain largely anecdotal and unsubstantiated.120
Honduran Security Efforts
Recent Honduran presidents have implemented varying anti-crime strategies; however, none of
them have achieved much success. During his term, President Ricardo Maduro (2002-2006)
increased the number of police officers and signed legislation that made maras (street gangs)
illegal and gang membership punishable with 12 years in prison. Although the crackdown won
popular support and initially reduced crime, its success was short-lived. Following his election,
President Zelaya (2006-2009) replaced the previous administration’s zero-tolerance policy with
dialogue and other outreach techniques designed to persuade gang members to reintegrate into
society.121 Failure to achieve concrete results, however, led the Zelaya Administration to shift its
emphasis toward more traditional anti-gang law enforcement operations. Zelaya increased the
number of police and military troops in the streets and conducted raids against suspected
criminals. Nonetheless, crime and violence in Honduras continued unabated (as reflected in the
statistics cited above).122
President Lobo has pledged to crack down on crime and violence, and although he has backed
away from his 2005 proposal to reinstate the death penalty, he still favors a hard-line approach.
Since taking office, Lobo has deployed army troops into the streets to assist in policing and won
legislative approval for several criminal justice reforms. In November 2010, the Honduran
National Congress approved a new anti-terrorism law that is designed to strengthen control over
land, sea, and air borders, and allow authorities to better control cash flows into the country.123
The Congress approved another legal reform in March 2011, which lengthened prison terms.124 In
June 2011, Lobo won congressional approval for a tax package designed to raise $79 million
(...continued)
Control Strategy Report,” March 2010; “Gang Massacre Appalls Honduras,” Latin News Daily, September 8, 2010,
“Bus Massacre in Honduras,” Latin News Daily, January 7, 2011.
119 This is four times the average homicide rate in Latin America of 18 per 100,000 inhabitants. “Honduras Report
Signals Rising Violence,” Latin News Daily, February 22, 2009; “Honduras has Highest Murder Rate in Central
America,” EFE News Service, March 30, 2010; “Honduras Posts Startling Homicide Rate,” Latin News Daily, January
18, 2011.
120 Steven S. Dudley, Drug Trafficking Organizations in Central America: Transportistas, Mexican Cartels and Maras,
Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, May 2010.
121 “Honduran Government Reaches Out to Rehabilitate Gangs,” ACAN-EFE, January 30, 2006.
122 Marion Barbel, “Homicide Rate Confirms Honduras as One of Region’s Most Violent Nations,” Global Insight
Daily Analysis, September 11, 2008.
123 “Honduras Denounces Internal Armed Groups,” Latin News Daily, November 24, 2010.
124 Noé Leiva, “Gobierno de Honduras Ordena Desplegar a Militares para Combatir el Crimen,” Reuters, March 1,
2011.
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annually to fund security efforts, and a constitutional reform that will allow the government to
detain individuals for up to 48 hours without bringing them before a judge.125
U.S. Cooperation
Although security cooperation was temporarily disrupted by the 2009 political crisis,
communication and coordination between U.S. law enforcement and intelligence entities and
Honduras military and police elements have improved since President Lobo took office. A high-
level task force, co-chaired by President Lobo and the U.S. Ambassador, convenes quarterly to
oversee and direct coordination on security sector efforts. Through the Central America Regional
Security Initiative (CARSI)126 and other efforts, the United States supports a variety of
anticorruption, anti-gang, police training, institution building, and maritime operations programs
intended to prevent crime and improve Honduras’ counternarcotics capabilities. In 2010, joint
counternarcotics operations led to an increase in seizures of bulk cash and most illegal drugs.127
Likewise, a U.S.-vetted Honduran police unit seized a cocaine processing laboratory in March
2011, the first ever discovered in Central America.128
Despite these accomplishments, some analysts have raised serious concerns about criminal
infiltration of the Honduran government, which could impede future cooperation. A former
member of Honduras’ Council Against Drug Trafficking reportedly has estimated that 10% of the
Honduran National Congress is linked to drug traffickers.129 Recent reports also suggest that U.S.
arms sold to Honduras in the past have turned up in the hands of criminal groups in Colombia and
Mexico.130 According to the U.S. State Department, corruption continues to pose a challenge to
Honduras and institutional changes will need to be made in order for the country to successfully
expel traffickers from its territory.131
Human Trafficking
According to the State Department’s 2011 Trafficking in Persons (TIP) Report, Honduras is
primarily a source and transit country for men, women, and children trafficked for the purpose of
commercial sexual exploitation and forced labor. Many victims are recruited from rural areas with
promises of employment and later subjected to forced prostitution in urban and tourist locales
such as Tegucigalpa, San Pedro Sula, and the Bay Islands. Destination countries for trafficked
Honduran women and children include Belize, El Salvador, Guatemala, Mexico, and the United
States. There are also foreign victims of commercial sexual exploitation in Honduras, most
125 “Honduras Approves New Tax to Boost Drug Fight,” Reuters, June 23, 2011; “Pese a Advertencia de Ministerio
DDHH: Reforman la Constitución para Detener a Ciudadanos por 48 Horas,” El Tiempo (Honduras), June 23, 2011.
126 CARSI is a package of counternarcotics and anticrime assistance for Central America, for which Congress
appropriated $260 million from FY2008-2010. For more information, see CRS Report R41731, Central America
Regional Security Initiative: Background and Policy Issues for Congress, by Peter J. Meyer and Clare Ribando Seelke.
127 U.S. Department of State, Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, 2011 International
Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR), March 3, 2011.
128 “Honduras Discovers First Mexican-Made Cocaine Lab,” Reuters, March 9, 2011.
129 Tim Johnson, “Drug Gangs Muscle Into New Territory: Central America,” McClatchy Newspapers, April 21, 2011.
130 Geoffrey Ramsey, “Cable: Honduran Military Supplied Weaponry to Cartels,” InSight: Organized Crime in the
Americas, April 25, 2011.
131 U.S. Department of State, Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, International Narcotics
Control Strategy Report, March 3, 2011.
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having been trafficked from neighboring countries, including economic migrants en route to the
United States. According to a Honduran non-governmental organization, 10,000 children in
Honduras are victims of commercial sexual exploitation and some 500,000 are subject to child
labor.132
The State Department maintains that Honduras does not fully comply with the minimum
standards for the elimination of trafficking, however, it notes that the government is making
significant efforts to do so. As a result, Honduras is considered a so-called “Tier 2” country. The
2011 report recognized the Honduran government’s law enforcement actions against child sex
traffickers, the creation of a draft comprehensive anti-trafficking law, and the launch of an anti-
trafficking hotline. On the other hand, the report maintained that the Honduran government
provided minimal services for trafficking victims, that laws failed to prohibit trafficking for
forced labor, and that the number of trafficking-related convictions had decreased. The State
Department report provides a number of recommendations for Honduras. These include passing a
comprehensive anti-trafficking law that prohibits forced labor; increasing efforts to investigate
and prosecute trafficking offenses; ensuring that specialized services and shelter are available to
trafficking victims; and developing formal procedures for identifying and assisting victims.133
Port Security
Honduras and the United States have cooperated extensively on port security. For the United
States, port security emerged as an important element of homeland security in the aftermath of the
September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks. Honduras views such cooperation as important in order to
ensure the speedy export of its products to the United States, which in turn could increase U.S.
investment in the country. In March 2006, U.S. officials announced the inclusion of the largest
port in Honduras, Puerto Cortés, in the U.S. Container Security Initiative (CSI). CSI is operated
by the U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) of the Department of Homeland Security, and
uses a security regime to ensure that all containers that pose a potential risk for terrorism are
identified and inspected at foreign ports before they are placed on vessels destined for the United
States. Honduras also participates in the Department of Energy’s Megaports Initiative, which
supplies ports with equipment capable of detecting nuclear or radioactive materials, and the
Secure Freight Initiative (SFI), which deploys equipment capable of scanning containers for
radiation and information risk factors before they are allowed to depart for the United States.
Puerto Cortés was one of six ports around the world chosen to be part of the first phase of
the SFI.134
132 “Casa Alianza: En Honduras 10,000 Niños Sufren Explotación Sexual,” El Tiempo (Honduras), June 11, 2011.
133 U.S. Department of State, Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons, Trafficking in Persons Report, June
2011.
134 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “DHS and DOE Launch Secure Freight Initiative,” Press Release,
December 7, 2006, and “Secure Freight Initiative Becomes Fully Operational in United Kingdom, Pakistan, and
Honduras,” Press Release, October 12, 2007.
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Author Contact Information
Peter J. Meyer
Analyst in Latin American Affairs
pmeyer@crs.loc.gov, 7-5474
Acknowledgments
Mark P. Sullivan, Specialist in Latin American Affairs, contributed to this report.
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