Considerations for a Catastrophic Declaration: 
Issues and Analysis 
Bruce R. Lindsay 
Analyst in Emergency Management Policy 
Francis X. McCarthy 
Analyst in Emergency Management Policy 
June 21, 2011 
Congressional Research Service
7-5700 
www.crs.gov 
R41884 
CRS Report for Congress
P
  repared for Members and Committees of Congress        
Considerations for a Catastrophic Declaration: Issues and Analysis 
 
Summary 
The Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (the Stafford Act) is the 
principal authority governing federal emergency and disaster response in the United States. The 
act authorizes the President to issue three categories of declaration: (1) major disaster, 
(2) emergency, or (3) fire assistance declarations in response to incidents that overwhelm the 
resources of state and local governments. Once a declaration is issued, a wide range of federal 
disaster assistance becomes available to eligible individuals and households, public entities, and 
certain nonprofit organizations. Disaster assistance authorized by the Stafford Act is appropriated 
by Congress and provided through the Disaster Relief Fund.  
Emergency declarations supplement and promote coordination of local and state efforts such as 
evacuations and protection of public assets. They may also be declared prior to the impact of an 
incident to protect property, public health and safety and lessen or avert the threat of a major 
disaster or catastrophe. Major disaster declarations are issued after an incident and constitute 
broader authority to help states and localities, as well as families and individuals, recover from 
the damage caused by the event. Fire assistance declarations provide grants to state and localities 
to manage fires that threaten to cause major disasters. 
Recently there has been discussion that the Stafford Act should be amended to include a fourth 
category, generally called a “catastrophic declaration.” If approved, catastrophic declarations 
could be invoked for high-profile, large-scale incidents that threaten the lives of many people, 
create tremendous damage, and pose significant challenges to timely recovery efforts. 
This report examines concerns expressed by policymakers and experts that current Stafford Act 
declarations are inadequate to respond to, and recover from, highly destructive events, and 
presents the arguments for and against amending the act to add a catastrophic declaration 
amendment. This report also includes data analyses of past and potential disasters to determine 
what incidents might be deemed as catastrophic, and explores alternative policy options that 
might obviate the need for catastrophic declarations.  
This report will be updated as events warrant. 
 
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Considerations for a Catastrophic Declaration: Issues and Analysis 
 
Contents 
Introduction ................................................................................................................................ 1 
Overview of Stafford Act Declarations ........................................................................................ 2 
Fire Management Assistance Grant Program Declarations ..................................................... 2 
Emergency Declarations........................................................................................................ 3 
Major Disaster Declarations .................................................................................................. 3 
Proposed Catastrophic Declaration..............................................................................................4 
Potential Uses and Benefits of a Catastrophic Declaration ........................................................... 5 
Prior to an Incident................................................................................................................ 5 
During an Incident ................................................................................................................ 6 
After an Incident ................................................................................................................... 7 
Analysis of Congressional Action After the Incident .................................................................... 8 
Analysis of Catastrophic Events Past and Future ......................................................................... 9 
Previous Incidents with Extraordinary Damages.................................................................. 11 
Previous Incidents by VSL and Damage Costs .................................................................... 13 
Disasters Past and Future .................................................................................................... 15 
Summary of Analysis and Policy Implications..................................................................... 15 
Caveats and Methodology ................................................................................................... 16 
Summary of Potential Implications............................................................................................ 17 
Potential Benefits of a Catastrophic Declaration .................................................................. 17 
Potential Drawbacks of a Catastrophic Declaration.............................................................. 17 
Further Considerations .............................................................................................................. 17 
Potential Alternatives to a Catastrophic Declaration............................................................. 19 
 
Figures 
Figure 1. Previous Large-Scale Disasters by Damage Estimate, through 2008............................ 12 
Figure 2. Previous Large-Scale Disasters by Combined VSL and Damage Estimates, 
Through 2008 ........................................................................................................................ 14 
 
Tables 
Table 1. Emergency Supplemental Funding for Large Disasters................................................... 8 
Table 2. Previous and Potential Catastrophic Incidents, Through 2008....................................... 10 
Table 3. Prior Large-Scale Disasters by Damage Estimate, through 2008................................... 11 
Table 4. Previous Large-Scale Disasters by Combined VSL and Damage Estimates................... 13 
 
Appendixes 
Appendix. Sources .................................................................................................................... 21 
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Considerations for a Catastrophic Declaration: Issues and Analysis 
 
 
Contacts 
Author Contact Information ...................................................................................................... 23 
Acknowledgments .................................................................................................................... 23 
 
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Considerations for a Catastrophic Declaration: Issues and Analysis 
 
Introduction 
Numerous studies issued by policy experts, congressional committees, the White House, federal 
offices of Inspector General, and the Government Accountability Office (GAO), among others, 
have concluded that the government response to Hurricane Katrina was subject to a variety of 
deficiencies that occurred at all levels of government.1 Such deficiencies include questionable 
leadership decisions and capabilities, organizational failures, overwhelmed preparation and 
communication systems, and inadequate statutory authorities. Additionally, oversight and 
investigations into Gulf Coast recovery efforts has led some to conclude that federal recovery 
assistance has been overly bureaucratic and untimely.2 Others have argued that the disaster 
declaration process “does not provide the necessary framework to manage the challenges posed 
by 21st century catastrophic threats.”3 
These conclusions have led to a number of reforms in federal emergency management laws and 
policies. For example, one proposed reform currently being contemplated by policymakers is an 
amendment to the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (hereinafter 
the Stafford Act)4 that would add a new category of disaster declaration known as a “catastrophic 
declaration” for events characterized by extraordinary devastation.5 Proponents of such a measure 
would argue that adding a catastrophic declaration provision could streamline response and 
recovery processes and/or possibly increase the amount of federal assistance provided to states 
and localities after large-scale disasters. Opponents, on the other hand, would argue that 
implementing a catastrophic declaration is not necessary and may create confusion for emergency 
managers and officials. States, they say, might be enticed to request a catastrophic declaration 
rather than a major disaster, if catastrophic declarations trigger an increased federal share of the 
assistance. 
This report examines concerns expressed by policymakers and experts that current Stafford Act 
declarations are inadequate to respond to, and recover from, highly destructive events, and 
presents the arguments for and against amending the act to add a catastrophic declaration 
amendment. These arguments are framed by data analyses of past and potential disasters that 
                                                
1 For example see Richard T. Sylves, “President Bush and Hurricane Katrina: A Presidential Leadership Study ,” 
Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, volume 604 (March 2006), pp. 26-56, U.S. Congress, 
Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, Hurricane Katrina: A Nation Still Unprepared, 
109th Cong., 2nd sess., S.Rept. 109-322 (Washington: GPO, 2006); U.S. Congress, House Select Bipartisan Committee 
to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina, A Failure of Initiative: Final Report of the House 
Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina, 109th Cong., 2nd 
sess., H.Rept. 109-377 (Washington: GPO, 2006), and the White House Homeland Security Council, The Federal 
Response to Hurricane Katrina: Lessons Learned (Washington: February 23, 2006). 
2 For example, see U.S. Congress, House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, Subcommittee on Economic 
Development, Public Buildings and Emergency Management, Post Katrina: What it Takes to Cut the Bureaucracy and 
Assure a More Rapid Response After a Catastrophic Disaster, Opening Statement of Representative Diaz-Balart, 110th 
Cong., 1st sess., July 27, 2009.  
3 Frances Townsend, The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina: Lessons Learned, The White House, Washington 
DC, February 23, 2006, p. 52, http://library.stmarytx.edu/acadlib/edocs/katrinawh.pdf. 
4 P.L. 93-288, 42 U.S.C. 5721 et seq. 
5 Historic events that might qualify for a catastrophic declaration are the 1906 San Francisco earthquake and fire, the 
terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, and Hurricane Katrina. A catastrophic declaration might be used for a nuclear 
bomb explosion, a tsunami hitting a highly populated area, or an immense and destructive earthquake, among others. 
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Considerations for a Catastrophic Declaration: Issues and Analysis 
 
might be considered as “catastrophic.” The report also explores alternative policy options that 
might obviate the need for catastrophic declarations. 
Overview of Stafford Act Declarations 
The Stafford Act is the principal authority governing federal assistance for emergencies and 
disasters in the United States.6 The act authorizes the President to issue declarations that trigger 
federal assistance programs to help states respond to and recover from natural and human-caused 
incidents.7 While the Stafford Act authorizes assistance from numerous federal agencies, the 
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) is the primary federal agency responsible for 
coordinating the federal response as well as response activities provided by other agencies and 
nongovernmental entities.8  
Two organizing principles guide the declaration process. First is the preservation of the 
governor’s discretion to request federal assistance. Second is the President’s discretion to decide 
to issue or deny the request for federal assistance.  
The President cannot issue either an emergency or a major disaster declaration without a 
gubernatorial request. The only exception to this rule is the authority given to the President to 
declare an emergency when the President “determines that an emergency exists for which the 
primary responsibility for response rests with the United States because the emergency involves a 
subject area for which, under the Constitution or laws of the United States, the United States can 
exercise exclusive or preeminent responsibility and authority.”9 The Stafford Act stipulates 
several procedural actions a governor must take prior to requesting federal disaster assistance. 
The governor cannot request a declaration unless he or she determines the event has overwhelmed 
the state’s resources to such an extent that federal resources are needed. 
The Stafford Act authorizes three types of presidential declarations—the proposal for a 
catastrophic declaration would add a fourth type of declaration. The three currently authorized by 
the Stafford Act include (1) Fire Management Assistance Grant Program declarations (FMAGP), 
(2) emergency declarations, and (3) major disaster declarations. 
Fire Management Assistance Grant Program Declarations 
While the President has the sole authority to issue an emergency or major disaster declaration, the 
determination to issue a FMAGP declaration can be rendered either by the President or FEMA.10 
A FMAGP declaration authorizes various forms of federal assistance, such as equipment, 
                                                
6 For further analysis on the Stafford Act see CRS Report RL33053, Federal Stafford Act Disaster Assistance: 
Presidential Declarations, Eligible Activities, and Funding, by Francis X. McCarthy. 
7 For more information on emergency and disaster declarations see CRS Report RL34146, FEMA’s Disaster 
Declaration Process: A Primer, by Francis X. McCarthy. 
8 For example, the Red Cross. In some cases FEMA will assign services from other federal agencies. These are called 
“Mission Assignments.” 
9 P.L. 93-288, 42 U.S.C. Sec. 5191(b). Examples of these declarations include the April 19, 1995 bombing of the 
Alfred P. Murrah Building in Oklahoma City, and the September 11, 2001 attack on the Pentagon. 
10 44 CFR 204.24. 
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Considerations for a Catastrophic Declaration: Issues and Analysis 
 
personnel, and grants to any state or local government for the control, management and mitigation 
of any fire on public or private forest land or grassland that might become a major disaster.11  
Emergency Declarations 
The Stafford Act defines an emergency broadly as 
any occasion or instance for which, in the determination of the President, federal assistance 
is needed to supplement State and local efforts and capabilities to save lives and to protect 
property and public health and safety, or to lessen or avert the threat of a catastrophe in any 
part of the United States.12 
Emergency declarations authorize activities that can help states and communities carry out 
essential services as well as activities that might reduce the threat of future damage. Emergency 
declarations, however, do not provide assistance for repairs and replacement of public 
infrastructure or nonprofit facilities.13 Emergency declarations may be declared before an incident 
occurs to save lives and prevent loss. For example, emergency declarations have been declared 
prior to a hurricane making landfall to help state and local governments take steps (evacuation 
assistance, placement of response resources, etc.) that might lessen the impact of the storm and 
prevent a major disaster from occurring.14  
Major Disaster Declarations 
While emergencies are defined broadly, the Stafford Act defines a major disaster narrowly as: 
any natural catastrophe (including any hurricane, tornado, storm, high water, wind-driven 
water, tidal wave, tsunami, earthquake, volcanic eruption, landslide, mudslide, snowstorm, or 
drought), or, regardless of cause, any fire, flood, or explosion, in any part of the United 
States, which in the determination of the President causes damage of sufficient severity and 
magnitude to warrant major disaster assistance under this chapter to supplement the efforts 
and available resources of states, local governments, and disaster relief organizations in 
alleviating the damage, loss, hardship, or suffering caused thereby.15 
The definition for a major disaster is more precise than an emergency declaration, and the range 
of assistance available to state and local governments, private, nonprofit organizations, and 
families and individuals is much broader. Under a major disaster declaration, state and local 
governments and certain nonprofit organizations are eligible (if so designated) for assistance for 
the repair or restoration of public infrastructure such as roads and buildings. A major disaster 
declaration may also include additional programs beyond temporary housing such as disaster 
                                                
11 P.L. 93-288, 42 U.S.C. Sec. 5187(a). 
12 P.L. 93-288, 42 U.S.C. Sec. 5122(1). 
13 For additional information on the differences between major disaster and emergency declarations, see CRS Report 
RL33053, Federal Stafford Act Disaster Assistance: Presidential Declarations, Eligible Activities, and Funding, by 
Francis X. McCarthy. 
14 Recent examples of pre-event declarations include emergency declarations prior to Hurricanes Katrina, Rita, and 
Gustav making landfall (emergency declarations 3212, 3260, and 3290 respectively). 
15 P.L. 93-288, 42 U.S.C. Sec. 5122(2). 
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Considerations for a Catastrophic Declaration: Issues and Analysis 
 
unemployment assistance and crisis counseling. A major disaster declaration may also include 
recovery programs such as community disaster loans. 
Proposed Catastrophic Declaration 
If amended, the Stafford Act might provide a declaration for what might be classified as a “mega-
disaster” or “catastrophic disaster.” It is unclear, however, what differentiates a disaster from a 
catastrophe. Moss and Shelhamer, two policy scholars who have written on the subject, state that 
catastrophic incidents 
by definition, tend to occur in large metropolitan regions due to the concentration of people 
and infrastructure. For example, a category 5 hurricane striking an undeveloped coast will 
generate less damage than a category 3 hurricane hitting a major city. Recent catastrophes 
include the 1989 Loma Prieta Earthquake (San Francisco), the 1994 Northridge Earthquake 
(Los Angeles), Hurricane Hugo (1989), Hurricane Andrew (1992), Hurricanes Katrina and 
Rita (2005), the Midwest Floods of 1993, and the September 11 attacks of 2001.16 
The authors then recommend amending Section 102 of the Stafford Act with the language used to 
define a catastrophic incident in the Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act of 2006 
(Title VI of the Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2007—hereinafter the 
Post-Katrina Act).17 The Post-Katrina Act defines a catastrophic incident broadly as 
any natural disaster, act of terrorism, or other man-made disaster that results in extraordinary 
levels of casualties or damage or disruption severely affecting the population (including mass 
evacuations), infrastructure, environment, economy, national morale, or government 
functions in an area.18 
The above definition was used in the Post-Katrina Act for the purposes of improving planning 
documents by defining the scope of events that should be considered by the Catastrophic Incident 
Annex of the National Response Framework (NRF).19 The definition was not used in the context 
of actual declared disasters nor was it intended to replace the definition of a major disaster in the 
Stafford Act.  
The main difference between a catastrophic incident as defined in the Post-Katrina Act and the 
definition of a major disaster in the Stafford Act is that the former focuses on the event’s scope, 
impact, and severity. In general, a catastrophic incident would carry far-reaching consequences 
beyond a state’s borders and have national implications including the economy, infrastructure, 
and even national psyche. In contrast, the major disaster definition generally focuses more on 
categorizing causes that potentially overwhelm states and localities. 
                                                
16 Mitchell L. Moss and Charles Shellhamer, The Stafford Act and Priorities for Reform, The Center for Catastrophe 
Preparedness & Response, New York University, p. 14. 
17 P.L. 109-295, Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2007. 120 STAT. 1395-1463. 
18 6 U.S.C. 701(4). 
19 The NRF is the United States’ core emergency and disaster response document. The Catastrophic Incident Annex is a 
companion document explicating response activities in the event of a catastrophic incident such as a large hurricane. 
For further analysis on the NRF, see CRS Report RL34758, The National Response Framework: Overview and 
Possible Issues for Congress, by Bruce R. Lindsay. 
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Supporters of catastrophic declarations argue that while “routine disasters” can be managed 
through major disaster declarations, large-scale, destructive incidents warrant their own type of 
declaration because they pose unique challenges inadequately addressed by major disaster 
declarations. Examples of such challenges may include 
•  The President can declare an emergency without a gubernatorial request, if he 
considers the event to be primarily a federal responsibility, but must wait for a 
gubernatorial request for most emergencies and all major disasters.20 The wait for 
a request could delay the federal response, or federal assistance, or both. 
•  The response and recovery efforts associated with large-scale disasters involve 
multiple federal agencies that require higher levels of leadership to resolve 
potential inter-agency conflicts, and effectively coordinate and manage response 
and recovery efforts. 
•  Current response and recovery procedures for major disasters are too 
cumbersome for large-scale disasters because the procedures are too rigid and 
inefficient to provide assistance at an accelerated rate. 
•  Some argue that federal assistance is needed more quickly after large-scale, 
destructive incidents than routine disasters—the disbursal of assistance provided 
through a major disaster declaration is too slow to meet recovery needs. 
•  Due to the enormous amount of destruction and the economic impacts caused by 
large-scale disasters, many states and localities are unable to pay their portion of 
the cost-share.  
The following section describes how a catastrophic declaration might address these challenges. 
Potential Uses and Benefits of a 
Catastrophic Declaration 
A catastrophic declaration may be used to trigger certain mechanisms before, during, and after a 
catastrophe. Policymakers might also elect to apply a catastrophic declaration to one or more 
phases of the incident.  
Prior to an Incident 
The Catastrophic Incident Annex of the NRF states federal resources and assets may be deployed 
prior to a catastrophic incident in anticipation of a request from state, tribal, and local 
governments that an imminent disaster appears to threaten human health and safety.21 Such 
activities may include the placing of resources to reduce the impact of the incident and improve 
response capabilities, pre-positioning of emergency and disaster employees and supplies, 
monitoring the status of the situation, communicating with state emergency officials on potential 
                                                
20 44 CFR 206.35(d). 
21 Federal Emergency Management Agency, Catastrophic Incident Annex, Washington DC, November 2008, p. 2, 
http://www.fema.gov/pdf/emergency/nrf/nrf_CatastrophicIncidentAnnex.pdf. 
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assistance requirements, and deploying teams and resources to maximize the speed and 
effectiveness of the anticipated federal response.  
As mentioned previously, under certain conditions the Stafford Act authorizes federal support in 
the absence of a gubernatorial request to “save lives, prevent human suffering, or mitigate severe 
damage.” If Congress chose to create a catastrophic declaration, it might elect to amend Section 
402 to provide the President with similar authority so as to trigger federal activities such the ones 
described above. Additionally, the amendment could be designed to signal the immediate 
deployment of federal strike teams and surge capacity forces.22 Alternatively, some may argue the 
Stafford Act could be amended to authorize the aforementioned precautionary measures for major 
disasters without a catastrophic declaration. 
During an Incident 
The NRF provides the guiding principles for a unified response by assigning roles and 
responsibilities to all levels of government, nongovernmental organizations, the private sector, 
communities, and communities to all types of hazards regardless of their origin. The unified 
response is executed through supporting documents known as annexes: Emergency Support 
Functions (ESF) Annexes and Incident Annexes.23  
ESFs group federal agencies by their resource and function related to a particular incident. For 
example, all federal agencies that play a role in the response and recovery of an oil spill are listed 
in ESF #10. The ESF’s function is to designate lead and supporting federal agencies responsible 
for incident response and recovery.  
Similar to an ESF, Incident Annexes group agencies by matching their resources and functions to 
a particular incident. Incident Annexes also designate lead and support agencies. For example, 
federal agencies responsible for response and recovery from a biological attack are listed in the 
Biological Incident Annex. Incident Annexes differ from an ESF, however, because the incidents 
they address have been deemed to require specialized response and recovery activities specific to 
the incident. 
Response and recovery efforts carried out under each ESF and Incident Annex are executed 
through various operational plans. Proponents would argue that a catastrophic declaration could 
be used to trigger streamlined procedures within these operational plans. They may further argue 
that catastrophic incidents create tremendous uncertainty and that bureaucratic protocols 
exacerbate this uncertainty and hinder efforts aimed at a timely response. Thus, streamlining 
procedures might provide flexibility to operational plans and promote autonomous decision-
making.  
                                                
22 P.L. 109-295, Sec. 602, 120 STAT. 1395(15). The Post-Katrina Act defines surge capacity as “the ability to rapidly 
and substantially increase the provision of search and rescue capabilities, food, water, medicine, shelter and housing, 
medical care, evacuation capacity, staffing (including disaster assistance employees), and other resources necessary to 
save lives and protect property during a catastrophic incident.” 
23 There are 15 ESFs and seven Incident Annexes. See http://www.fema.gov/emergency/nrf/mainindex.htm. For further 
analysis on the NRF Annexes, see CRS Report RL34758, The National Response Framework: Overview and Possible 
Issues for Congress, by Bruce R. Lindsay. 
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On the other hand, some may argue that, while intuitively appealing, providing additional 
flexibility during a catastrophic declaration might produce a chaotic federal response because 
operational plans among federal agencies are tightly coupled with each other. Deviation in 
response by one agency could have negative rippling effects that could hinder the response of 
other agencies. 
After an Incident 
A catastrophic declaration could be used to automatically alter aspects of recovery polices and 
regulations. Such a declaration could have triggers that would cause a change in the percentage of 
federal resources as well as adjusting the delivery system of traditional disaster relief programs. 
The following recovery strategies might be included in the event of a catastrophic declaration.  
•  The catastrophic declaration could automatically increase the federal cost-share 
to lessen the economic impact states and localities incur from catastrophic 
incidents. The Stafford Act provides that the federal share for the repair, 
restoration, and replacement of damaged facilities “shall be not less than 75%.”24 
A catastrophic declaration could be used to automatically increase the federal 
share to 90% or perhaps 100%. Moreover, the 72-hour window of 100% funding 
for immediate federal aid could be extended for a longer period. Early knowledge 
of such adjustments may accelerate state and local activity because 
foreknowledge of the adjustment provides states and localities with an assurance 
of fiscal relief which would then encourage them to act quickly to accomplish 
necessary repairs and begin comprehensive recovery planning. However, these 
adjustments can add significantly to the overall cost of the disaster.25 
•  A catastrophic declaration could trigger a number of changes to recovery 
programs that could speed assistance and provide increased flexibility. Some of 
these changes could include the delivery of block grants to states to handle 
immediate needs and begin infrastructure repairs. An alternative would be for a 
catastrophic event to (1) switch on “gap funding” which provides timely front-
end funding to states and localities to cover initial efforts; (2) make straight-time 
force26 account labor (for disaster work) by state and local governments eligible 
for reimbursement; (3) automatically increase funding caps for the Community 
Disaster Loan (CDL) program;27 and (4) provide clear authority and resources to 
FEMA and its federal partners for long-term recovery efforts in partnership with 
state and local governments. 
•  Once declared, catastrophic declarations could trigger certain congressional rules 
that might prevent potential deadlock over the passage of disaster relief funds for 
disaster-stricken communities. 
                                                
24 P.L. 93-288, 42 U.S.C. Sec. 5170b, Sec. 5172, and Sec. 5173. 
25 For additional information on the cost-share issue see CRS Report R41101, FEMA Disaster Cost-Shares: Evolution 
and Analysis, by Francis X. McCarthy. 
26 Straight-time force would provide the state funds to pay all labor costs, rather than only overtime costs. See C.F.R. 
Title 44—Emergency Management and Assistance. 
27 Currently capped at $5 million per community. See 44 C.F.R. 360.361(b). That cap was removed for Special Katrina 
loans. 
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On the other hand, it could be argued that the Stafford Act could be amended to make these 
changes part of a major disaster declaration. 
Analysis of Congressional Action After the Incident 
Part of the argument for a catastrophic declaration is that it could provide immediate financial 
assistance on a broader scale without having to await congressional approval for additional 
federal assistance through a supplemental appropriation. An examination of the record, however, 
demonstrates that congressional action on emergency supplemental funding in the wake of large 
disasters has grown more rapid in recent years (see Table 1).  
Table 1. Emergency Supplemental Funding for Large Disasters 
Event 
Date of Declaration 
Congressional Action 
Days 
Hurricane Katrina 
August 29, 2005 
September 2, 2005 
3 
Hurricane Isabel 
September 18, 2003 
September 30, 2003 
12 
9/11 Terrorist Attacks 
September 11, 2001 
September 18, 2001 
7 
Nisqual y Earthquake 
March 1, 2001 
July 24, 2001 
114 
Hurricane Floyd 
September 16, 1999 
October 20, 1999 
34 
Northridge Earthquake 
January 17, 1994 
February 12, 1994 
26 
Midwest Floods 
June 11, 1993 
August 12, 1993 
62 
Hurricane Andrew 
August 23, 1992 
September 23, 1992 
31 
Hurricane Hugo 
September 20, 1989 
September, 29, 1989 
9 
Source: CRS Report R40708, Disaster Relief Funding and Emergency Supplemental Appropriations, by Bruce R. 
Lindsay and Justin Murray. 
Note: Table 1 reflects the number of days it took to enact the first supplemental appropriation. Some incidents 
(such as Hurricane Katrina) received more than one supplemental appropriation for disaster relief.  
It could be argued that Congress has acted expeditiously. On average, Congress has passed 
supplemental appropriations for disaster assistance within 33 days of the disaster declaration. It 
can also be argued that while resources may be provided relatively quickly for routine disasters, 
catastrophic incidents require an accelerated timeframe to provide adequate assistance. In 
addition, the results of this analysis indicate that Congress has been responsive to the largest and 
most devastating incidents. In some cases, disaster assistance was enacted within one week of the 
declaration. Moreover, while it took longer than 30 days to enact some supplemental 
appropriations, the incidents for which the funding was enacted generally had fewer damages 
than the larger, more expensive disasters. 
The reaction to the devastation caused by the 2005 hurricane season resulted in historic amounts 
of disaster response and recovery funding. Along with the amount of resources provided by 
Congress, it could be argued that the Stafford Act is a very flexible instrument that provides broad 
authority for various forms of assistance. The reluctance or inability of some to administer these 
authorities in the past does not eliminate their existence or the possible help that can be derived 
from those broad authorities under any disaster declaration. Authorities such as Section 402 of 
Stafford for “General Federal Assistance” and Section 403 for “Essential Assistance” provide 
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FEMA the discretion to use various forms of federal help or to supplement state help to achieve 
disaster response and recovery goals.28 
Analysis of Catastrophic Events Past and Future 
This section analyzes incidents that might be deemed as catastrophic to help frame a debate 
concerning the need and desirability of amending the Stafford Act to include a catastrophic 
declaration. Because catastrophic incidents are generally characterized as events that cause 
extraordinary damage, or loss of life (or both), the following analysis is based on data from past, 
large-scale incidents that have occurred in the United States, as well as data derived from studies 
that predict damage levels and loss of life for large-scale disasters that could happen in the future 
(see Table 2). 29 
This report incorporates a method known as the value of statistical life (VSL) to assign a 
monetary value to each fatality caused by the given incident.30 VSL helps compare incidents with 
many fatalities and little damage (such as the Chicago Heat Wave of 1995) to incidents that 
caused significant damages, but had few, or no, fatalities (such as the Love Canal incident in 
1978). 
This section of the report is divided into four subsections that rank incidents according to the 
following: (1) previous large-scale disasters by estimated damage costs; (2) previous large-scale 
disasters by estimated damage and VSL costs; (3) previous large-scale disasters and potential 
incidents by damage costs; and (4) previous large-scale disasters and potential incidents by 
estimated damage and VSL costs.  
The percentiles used for this analysis are derived by multiplying the costliest incident in the 
subsection by a given percentile.31 It should be noted that the data used for this analysis are 
subject to variations and limitations (see “Caveats and Methodology”).  
 
                                                
28 42 U.S.C. 5170a and 5170b. 
29 The 1919 Influenza Pandemic is included in Table 2 but is not included the analysis because the incident skews the 
results. See “Caveats and Methodology”. 
30 As part of an economic analysis required by Executive Order 12866, the issuing agencies often place the monetary 
value on expected health benefits by determining the number of “statistical lives” that the rules are expected to extend 
or save, and then multiplying that number by an estimated “value of a statistical life.” For further analysis on how 
agencies monetize statistical lives see CRS Report R41140, How Agencies Monetize “Statistical Lives” Expected to Be 
Saved By Regulations, by Curtis W. Copeland. 
31 For example, in terms of damages alone, the 1871 Chicago Fire was the costliest disaster in the United States ($168 
billion). Thus, to determine the 90th percentile the following formula was used: $168,000,000,000 x 0.90 = 
$151,200,000,000. The formula for the 80th percentile was: $168,000,000,000 x 0.80 = $134,400,000,000, and so on. 
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Table 2. Previous and Potential Catastrophic Incidents, Through 2008 
(2010 dollars) 
Value of Statistical Life 
Combined VSL and
Disaster Fatalities 
(VSL) Damage 
Estimate  Damage Estimate 
1871 Chicago Fire 
300 
180,000,000,000 
168,000,000,000 
348,000,000,000 
1900 Galveston Hurricane 
9,000 
5,400,000,000,000 
700,000,000 
5,400,700,000,000 
1906 San Francisco Earthquake 
3,000 
1,800,000,000,000 
9,579,792,048 
1,809,579,792,048 
1919 Influenza Pandemic 
675,000 
405,000,000,000,000 
 0 
405,000,000,000,000 
1929 Great Mississippi Flood 
1,000 
600,000,000,000 
2,899,905,508 
602,899,905,508 
1964 Alaska Earthquake/Tsunami 
131 
78,600,000,000 
311,000,000 
78,911,000,000 
1969 Hurricane Camille 256 
153,600,000,000 1,421,000,000 155,021,000,000 
1965 Hurricane Betsy 
81 
48,600,000,000 
1,400,000,000 
50,000,000,000 
1974 Xenia (Easter) Tornado Outbreak 
330 
198,000,000,000 
1,000,000,000 
199,000,000,000 
1978 Love Canal  
0 
0 
400,000,000 
400,000,000 
1980 Mount St. Helens 
57 
34,200,000,000 
1,000,000,000 
35,200,000,000 
1989 Loma Prieta Earthquake 
63 
37,800,000,000 
10,000,000,000 
47,800,000,000 
1992 Hurricane Andrew 
23 
13,800,000,000 
27,000,000,000 
40,800,000,000 
1995 Chicago Heat Wave 
525 
315,000,000,000 
0 
315,000,000,000 
1989 Hurricane Hugo 
57 
34,200,000,000 
7,000,000,000 
41,200,000,000 
1994 Northridge Earthquake 
60 
36,000,000,000 
20,000,000,000 
56,000,000,000 
2001 September 11th Terrorist Attacks 
2,978 
1,786,800,000,000 
42,600,000,000 
1,829,400,000,000 
2005 Hurricane Katrina 
1,833 
1,099,800,000,000 
148,000,000,000 
1,247,800,000,000 
2008 Hurricane Ike 
20 
12,000,000,000 
19,300,000,000 
31,300,000,000 
ARkStorma 1,000 
600,000,000,000 
400,000,000,000 
1,000,000,000,000 
New Madrid Earthquakeb 85,000 
51,000,000,000,000 
120,000,000,000 
51,120,000,000,000 
Southern San Andreas Fault Earthquakeb 1,800 
1,080,000,000,000 
200,000,000,000 
1,280,000,000,000 
Source: Data derived from supplemental appropriations and government studies and reports. See the Appendix for a full list of the sources used for this table. 
a.  ARkStorm is a hypothetical flood disaster that could occur (see footnote 35).  
b.  Denotes a hypothetical earthquake that could occur (see Appendix).  
CRS-10 
Considerations for a Catastrophic Declaration: Issues and Analysis 
 
Previous Incidents with Extraordinary Damages 
This subsection ranks some of the costliest incidents to ever occur in the United States in the past 
140 years (Table 3). Assuming catastrophic incidents are the most expensive events, then the 
following conclusions could be drawn: If the 90th percentile ($151 billion or more in damages) of 
incidents are catastrophic, then only the 1871 Chicago Fire would qualify as a catastrophic 
incident. If the 80th percentile ($134 billion or more in damages) of incidents are catastrophic, 
only the 1871 Chicago Fire and Hurricane Katrina would qualify as catastrophic incidents. These 
would remain constant until the 20th percentile ($34 billion or more in damages), which would 
then include the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks.  
Table 3. Prior Large-Scale Disasters by Damage Estimate, through 2008  
(2010 dollars) 
Disaster Damage 
Estimate 
Rank 
1871 Chicago Fire 
168,000,000,000 
1 
↑ 90th Percentile (≥ $151 billion) ↑ 
2005 Hurricane Katrina 
148,000,000,000 
2 
↑ 80th Percentile (≥ $134 billion) ↑ 
2001 September 11th Terrorist Attacks 
42,600,000,000 
3 
 ↑ 20th Percentile (≥ $34 billion) ↑ 
1992 Hurricane Andrew 
27,000,000,000 
4 
1994 Northridge Earthquake 
20,000,000,000 
5 
2008 Hurricane Ike 
19,300,000,000 
6 
1989 Loma Prieta Earthquake 
10,000,000,000 
7 
1906 San Francisco Earthquake 
9,579,792,048 
8 
1989 Hurricane Hugo 
7,000,000,000 
9 
1929 Great Mississippi Flood 
2,899,905,508 
10 
1969 Hurricane Camille 1,421,000,000 11 
1965 Hurricane Betsy 
1,400,000,000 
12 
1974 Xenia (Easter) Tornado Outbreak 
1,000,000,000 
13 
1980 Mount St. Helens 
1,000,000,000 
14 
1900 Galveston Hurricane 
700,000,000 
15 
1978 Love Canal  
400,000,000 
16 
1964 Alaska Earthquake/Tsunami 
311,000,000 
17 
Source: Data derived from supplemental appropriations and government studies and reports. See Appendix. 
sources for a ful  list of the sources used for this table. 
Methodology: $168,000,000,000 x 0.90 = $151,200,000,000, $168,000,000,000 x 0.80 = $134,400,000,000, and 
$168,000,000,000 x 0.20 = $33,600,000,000. Some figures have been rounded. 
Figure 1 presents the same data in chronological order. Again, assuming catastrophic incidents 
are the most expensive events, then the following conclusions could be drawn: over 130 years has 
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Considerations for a Catastrophic Declaration: Issues and Analysis 
 
elapsed between the most expensive incident (the 1871 Chicago Fire) and the second and third 
most expensive incidents (Hurricane Katrina, and the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, 
respectively). However, many of the most expensive disasters have occurred in more recent 
times. In the last 30 years, at least six incidents that had damages of $10 billion or more have 
occurred, and in the last 16 years, at least five incidents that had damages of $19 billion or more 
have occurred. 
Figure 1. Previous Large-Scale Disasters by Damage Estimate, through 2008  
(2010 dollars) 
 
Source: Data derived from supplemental appropriations and government studies and reports. See the 
Appendix for a full list of the sources used for this figure. 
Methodology: See methodological description in Table 3. 
Given the number of large-scale disasters occurring in the last 30 years, one might conclude that 
large-scale disasters are occurring more frequently—which might support an argument for a 
catastrophic declaration. A counterargument, on the other hand, is that in terms of damage costs, 
only Hurricane Katrina truly qualifies as a catastrophic event when compared to other, recent 
incidents. It might be further argued that while many of the most expensive disasters have 
occurred in recent years, the increased costs associated with such incidents are a function of 
variables that are not necessarily related to the magnitude of the incidents (such as increased 
federal expenditures for assistance and recovery projects, the replacement of expensive 
infrastructure, and the development of previously uninhabited areas). Consequently, opponents of 
a catastrophic declaration might conclude that damage costs are not a suitable determinant for 
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Considerations for a Catastrophic Declaration: Issues and Analysis 
 
assessing the need for the new declaration because it fails to address the response and recovery 
issues previously discussed in this report. 
Previous Incidents by VSL and Damage Costs 
Table 4 lists the same incidents presented in Table 2 ranked according to combined VSL and 
damage costs. Assuming that catastrophic incidents are incidents with the highest combined VSL 
and damage costs, then the following conclusions could be drawn: If the 90th percentile ($4.9 
trillion or more) of incidents are catastrophic, then only the 1900 Galveston Hurricane would 
qualify as a catastrophic incident. This event would remain singular until the 30 percentile ($1.6 
trillion or more) in which the September 11th terrorist attacks and the 1906 San Francisco 
Earthquake and Fire would qualify as catastrophic. Hurricane Katrina would be deemed 
catastrophic if the 20th percentile of incidents qualify as a catastrophic event ($1 trillion or more). 
Table 4. Previous Large-Scale Disasters by Combined VSL and Damage Estimates  
(2010 dollars) 
Combined VSL and
Disaster 
Damage Estimate 
Rank 
1900 Galveston Hurricane 
5,400,700,000,000 
1 
↑ 90th Percentile (≥ $4.9 trillion) ↑ 
2001 September 11th Terrorist Attacks 
1,829,400,000,000 
2 
1906 San Francisco Earthquake 
1,809,579,792,048 
3 
↑ 30th Percentile (≥ $1.6 trillion) ↑ 
2005 Hurricane Katrina 
1,247,800,000,000 
4 
↑ 20th Percentile (≥ $1 trillion) ↑ 
1929 Great Mississippi Flood 
600,252,713,730 
5 
1871 Chicago Fire 
348,000,000,000 
6 
1995 Chicago Heat Wave 
315,000,000,000 
7 
1974 Xenia (Easter) Tornado Outbreak 
199,400,000,000 
8 
1969 Hurricane Camille 155,021,000,000 9 
1964 Alaska Earthquake/Tsunami 
78,911,000,000 
10 
1994 Northridge Earthquake 
56,000,000,000 
11 
1965 Hurricane Betsy 
50,000,000,000 
12 
1989 Loma Prieta Earthquake 
47,800,000,000 
13 
1989 Hurricane Hugo 
41,200,000,000 
14 
1992 Hurricane Andrew 
40,800,000,000 
15 
1980 Mount St. Helens 
35,200,000,000 
16 
1978 Love Canal  
400,000,000 
17 
Source: Data derived from supplemental appropriations and government studies and reports. See the 
Appendix for a full list of the sources used for this table. 
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Considerations for a Catastrophic Declaration: Issues and Analysis 
 
Methodology: $5,400,700,000,000 x 0.90 = $4,860,630,000,000, $5,400,700,000,000 x 0.30 = 
$1,620,210,000,000, and $5,400,700,000,000 x 0.20 = $1,080,140,000,000. Some figures have been rounded. 
Figure 2 presents the data from Table 4 in chronological order. Using the above VSL and damage 
cost assumptions from above to examine large-scale incidents over the past 140 years, the 
analysis suggests that approximately 100 years has elapsed between the highest ranked disaster 
(the 1900 Galveston Hurricane) and the second highest ranked disaster (the September 11, 2001 
terrorist attacks).  
Figure 2. Previous Large-Scale Disasters by Combined VSL and Damage Estimates, 
Through 2008 
(2010 dollars) 
 
Source: Data derived from supplemental appropriations and government studies and reports. See the 
Appendix for a full list of the sources used for this figure. 
Methodology: See the methodological description in Table 4. 
Additionally, whereas this analysis on damage costs alone might indicate that the “worst” 
disasters have occurred within the last 30 years, some might conclude that combining VSL with 
damage costs tends to support the opposite conclusion—that the worst disasters occurred around 
the turn of the century. Based on the latter conclusion, some may question the need for 
catastrophic declarations for contemporary incidents. On the other hand, others may argue that 
recent incidents should still be taken into consideration when evaluating the need for catastrophic 
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Considerations for a Catastrophic Declaration: Issues and Analysis 
 
declarations. This is because two of the four highest ranked disasters have occurred within the last 
ten years. 
Disasters Past and Future  
When the analysis is extended to capture all of the incidents in Table 2,32 the inclusion of 
potential disasters changes the order of percentile rankings. However, the number of incidents 
meeting certain catastrophic thresholds remains low.  
In terms of damage costs alone, if one assumes catastrophic incidents are the most expensive 
events, then the following conclusions could be drawn: If the 90th percentile ($360 billion or 
more) of incidents are catastrophic, then only the hypothetical “ARkStorm” would qualify as a 
catastrophic incident. This event would remain singular until the 50th percentile ($200 billion or 
more) in which the hypothetical Southern San Andreas Fault Earthquake would also qualify as 
catastrophic. If the catastrophic incident threshold includes incidents in the 40th percentile ($160 
billion or more) or higher, then the 1871 Chicago Fire would be included as catastrophic. 33 
When the highest combined VSL and damage costs are included, the following conclusions could 
be drawn: If the 90th percentile ($460 trillion or more) of incidents are catastrophic, then only the 
New Madrid Earthquake scenario would qualify as a catastrophic incident. This event would 
remain singular until the 10th percentile ($51.1 trillion or more), in which the 1900 Galveston 
Hurricane would be included as catastrophic.34 
Summary of Analysis and Policy Implications 
Upon reviewing the results of the comparative analysis of destructive incidents, it could be 
argued that highly destructive events occur too rarely to warrant a catastrophic declaration. Using 
the 90th percentile as a benchmark, only one event in the last 140 years would be catastrophic and 
only four would qualify if the 80th percentile is used as a benchmark. Similar conclusions might 
be drawn on the comparative analysis of combined VSL and damage estimate costs—specifically, 
that high-impact events are too infrequent to merit the addition of a new declaration category—
only one incident in the last 100 years meets the 90th percentile threshold. Additionally, the 
threshold would have to be adjusted to the 20th percentile to include more than one incident. 
Critics of the additional declaration might further argue that VSL is a poor determinant for a 
catastrophic declaration because federal assistance is predominately tied to recovery projects 
rather than victim or survivor compensation. 
With regard to recent disaster activity, proponents who support the addition of a catastrophic 
declaration could argue that, in terms of damage estimates, three of the top four incidents have 
occurred within the last 40 years. In terms of combined VSL and damage estimate costs, two of 
the top four incidents have occurred within the last 40 years. To some, this may be taken as an 
                                                
32 Excluding the 1919 Influenza Pandemic as an outlier.  
33 Methodology: $400,000,000,000 x 0.90 = $360,000,000,000, $400,000,000,000 x 0.50 = $200,000,000,000, and 
$400,000,000,000 x 0.40 = $160,000,000,000. 
34 Methodology: $51,120,000,000,000 x 0.90 = $460,080,000,000, and $51,120,000,000,000 x 0.10 = 
$51,120,000,000. The 1919 Influenza Pandemic is included in Table 2 but is not included in the analyses because the 
incident skewed the results. See “Caveats and Methodology.” 
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Considerations for a Catastrophic Declaration: Issues and Analysis 
 
indication that catastrophic incidents are increasing in frequency. They may also argue that future 
disasters might be more destructive due to increases in population, development, and 
infrastructure. Thus, they might argue the scope of this analysis should be limited to more recent 
incidents. Proponents who support the addition of a catastrophic declaration could also argue that 
the analysis fails to take into account potential future incidents. 
While opponents of a catastrophic declaration might conclude that this analysis demonstrates that 
catastrophic incidents are too rare to warrant a new type of declaration, supporters might make 
the claim that the damage and VSL costs portrayed in this analysis would have been reduced if 
carried out according to the provisions provided under a catastrophic declaration. 
Caveats and Methodology 
The data sources for the above analyses have been assembled from multiple governmental 
sources and are listed in the Appendix. As mentioned previously, the data on fatalities and 
damages from these sources are subject to variation and should not be viewed as definitive. 
Additionally, many studies report death tolls in ranges for various incidents. For the purposes of 
this report, the average number between the range was used as a fatality figure. The hypothetical 
scenarios used for the analyses do not represent the universe of possible incidents—such as a 
nuclear detonation, an asteroid incident, or another influenza pandemic.  
There were also some reporting anomalies. The United States Geological Survey (USGS) 
ARkStorm scenario study did not provide a fatality estimate.35 For the purposes of this report, the 
number of fatalities from the 1929 Mississippi flood was used because reporting no deaths 
produced outlying figures that skewed the data results. Similarly, the 1919 Influenza Pandemic 
was eliminated from the analyses because the number of fatalities (675,000) produced an outlying 
figure that skewed the data results. 
The comparative analysis spans over a century and the incident computations reported in the 
analyses do not reflect increases in development, infrastructure, and populations that would have 
made earlier incidents more costly were they to occur in this period of time. The computations in 
this report do not reflect current mitigation and response mechanisms that might have decreased 
the impacts of previous events had they been available.  
VSL computations vary among federal agencies from roughly $5 million to $10 million per 
individual. While FEMA does not use a VSL computation, the Department of Homeland Security 
(DHS) uses a VSL of $6 million per individual for certain attack scenarios. The VSL value used 
by DHS was used for this report. 
As mentioned previously, damage costs are not the sole determinant for disaster declarations. The 
purpose of these analyses is to develop a model to determine which incidents could be deemed as 
catastrophic based on damages and VSL costs. Other considerations, such as potential economic 
or social impacts of the incidents are not reflected in the analyses. Statistically reliable forecasts 
of the occurrence of future events based on this data could not be completed due to insufficient 
data points.  
                                                
35 The ARkStorm is a hypothetical study conducted by the USGS that combines prehistoric flood history in California 
with modern flood mapping and climate-change projections to produce a hypothetical but, according to the USGS, 
plausible disaster scenario. See http://pubs.usgs.gov/of/2010/1312/ for an overview of the scenario. 
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Considerations for a Catastrophic Declaration: Issues and Analysis 
 
The data presented in this report are not definitive and should be interpreted with care before 
drawing any conclusions. 
Summary of Potential Implications 
Potential Benefits of a Catastrophic Declaration 
Depending on its design, certain benefits may be derived from using a catastrophic declaration for 
large-scale disasters, including 
•  accelerated and more robust federal assistance to states prior to an incident, 
•  the use of specialized response plans and guidelines for the federal response, 
•  the elimination or reduction of procedures and protocols that might impede 
response and recovery activities and efforts,  
•  the elimination or reduction of procedures and protocols that might delay the 
disbursal of federal assistance, and 
•  increasing the amount of federal assistance through various mechanisms to help 
states recovery more quickly and avoid economic hardship. 
Potential Drawbacks of a Catastrophic Declaration 
The potential drawbacks of a catastrophic declaration may include 
•  unclear authority and responsibility designations could confuse those responsible 
for executing the response and recovery, 
•  increased federal costs for disaster assistance due to increased declaration 
activity,  
•  increased federal costs for disaster assistance due to the increased federal cost-
share provisions included with the declaration, and 
•  increased federal involvement and responsibility for incident response. 
Further Considerations 
Some may argue that the Stafford Act’s broad definition of an emergency lacks sufficient specific 
criteria and provides the President with too much discretion to determine which incidents are 
emergencies. This, in turn, may have increased the federal role (and by extension—the amount of 
federal expenditures for disaster assistance) in emergency assistance through declaration “creep.” 
Critics assert that once an incident qualifies as an emergency, the odds are improved that a similar 
incident in the future will be declared as an emergency. The Post-Katrina Act also uses a broad 
definition to define a catastrophe. It could be argued that the addition of a broad definition of a 
catastrophe could also lead to declaration “creep” of major disasters. 
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Considerations for a Catastrophic Declaration: Issues and Analysis 
 
The use of an arithmetical formula or sliding scale based on income or population to declare a 
major disaster or an emergency is precluded by Section 320 of the Stafford Act. Amending the 
Stafford Act to include a catastrophic declaration would be presumably be subject to the same 
limitation—unless the amendment requires some form of measurable criteria to be applied. 
One method that could be used to keep assistance costs down is legislative language that allows a 
catastrophic declaration to be downgraded to a major disaster if it was determined that damages 
did not merit a catastrophic declaration. Downgrading a catastrophic declaration, however, may 
appear indecisive and create confusion. 
Another consideration involves aspects of politics more than policy. It may be difficult for the 
President to deny a request for a catastrophic declaration because the President might be seen as 
failing to properly respond to a calamitous event—even if it were declared a disaster. 
The predecessor to the NRF, the National Response Plan (NRP) contained guidelines for an 
“Incident of National Significance” which was intended as a triggering mechanism for various 
levels of response activities. It was eliminated however, because the designation caused confusion 
during the Hurricane Katrina response—primarily because the designation established a different 
leadership structure than was commonly used for “routine” disasters.36 One the one hand, a 
catastrophic declaration could be designed to trigger a chain of command structure consisting of 
higher levels of leadership and rank to address the catastrophe. On the other hand, altering the 
command structure could create conflicts and confusion because it may be unclear as to who is in 
charge of the incident. Similarly, a catastrophic declaration designed to alter the response in some 
manner could also create additional layers of bureaucracy that impede or hinder the response. 
Some may argue a catastrophic incident would not receive unique resources that are not already 
authorized and provided for a major disaster declaration. If this is the case, one might question the 
need for catastrophic declarations. 
A full federal cost-share, if included in a catastrophic declaration, might tempt states to request a 
catastrophic declaration to increase the amount of federal assistance provided for the incident. If 
that became the case, a catastrophic declaration would incentivize requests for the declaration and 
drive up the costs of federal funding for disaster relief. 
Natural disasters on a truly catastrophic scale, such as the San Francisco earthquake and fire of 
1906 and Hurricane Katrina, are infrequent, and might be called “100-year events.” If used for 
such events the declaration might not be put to use for an extended period of time. If a 
catastrophic declaration is used infrequently, it might become antiquated over time and fail to 
meet the needs of the incident. Furthermore, infrequent use of the declaration could create 
confusion because lawmakers and officials may have to become reacquainted with the declaration 
before applying its provisions. Thus, it could be argued that these incidents would be better 
handled through special legislation on an as-needed basis. 
                                                
36 For similar problems regarding the role of the Federal Coordinating Officer (FCO) and the Principal Federal Official 
(PFO), see CRS Report RL34758, The National Response Framework: Overview and Possible Issues for Congress, by 
Bruce R. Lindsay. 
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Considerations for a Catastrophic Declaration: Issues and Analysis 
 
Potential Alternatives to a Catastrophic Declaration 
Perhaps the strongest rationale for the development of a catastrophic declaration grew out of the 
Hurricane Katrina response and recovery experience which began in 2005 and now, nearly six 
years later, is still the focus of debate and the template for legislative attempts aimed at improving 
response and recovery. 
While considering the possible changes and improvements that could potentially be a part of a 
catastrophic declaration, reviewing the changes that have been made since the Katrina disaster 
could be useful. 
The Post-Katrina Act made some significant changes to the Stafford Act. Since the changes were 
not retroactive and could not be applied to the Katrina disaster, the actual program adjustments 
have not been fully tested. These changes include 
•  The authority to provide case management for disaster victims.37 This change 
provides assistance for a major disaster where large numbers of people may be 
displaced and need help in understanding the assistance that is available, and to 
connect people, particularly those with special needs, with other forms of help 
from both public and private sources. 
•  Removal of the $5,000 cap on home repairs to make a home habitable.38 
Under the Disaster Mitigation Act of 2000, home repairs were limited to $5,000 
with the remainder of work to be accomplished with a Small Business 
Administration disaster loan, assuming an applicant qualified for the loan. Since 
the Post-Katrina Act, repairs can be done for up to the maximum amount 
available under the Individuals and Households Program (IHP).39 
•  Pilot Program for Public Assistance (PA). The PA pilot program accelerated 
debris removal at the local level by permitting payment of straight time wages to 
government employees involved in debris removal work and encouraged local 
communities to have a debris removal plan in place by decreasing the state and 
local share by 5% of costs (from 25% to 20%).40 This authority expired in 2008. 
FEMA intends to develop regulations to implement provisions of the PA pilot. 
This would include a public comment period and related parts of the rule-making 
process. While FEMA considers this “a priority of the Agency” it has not yet 
determined a timeframe for publication of the proposed rule.41  
•  Pilot Program for Individual Assistance (IA). This pilot program permitted 
FEMA to make repairs on privately owned rental units to increase the available 
housing stock after a disaster event.42 Reports by FEMA indicate that this was a 
                                                
37 42 U.S.C. 5189d. 
38 P.L. 109-295, 120 Stat. 1448. 
39 Originally set at $25,000, with Consumer Price Index adjustments, the total amount available to households under 
IHP is now in the $30,000 range. SBA loans can be for up to $200,000 for the repair of primary homes. 
40 P.L. 109-295, 120 Stat. 1455. 
41 E-mail to the author from Ted Litty, Senior Policy Advisor, Response and Recovery, Federal Emergency 
Management Agency, Department of Homeland Security, May 18, 2011. 
42 P.L. 109-295, 120 Stat. 1454. 
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Considerations for a Catastrophic Declaration: Issues and Analysis 
 
successful program that decreased temporary housing costs in comparison to 
other housing alternatives. The authority for the program expired on December 
31, 2008. As with the PA Pilot, FEMA released a report two years ago on the IHP 
pilot program. The report concluded that “Analysis and recommendations on 
additional authorities will be provided at a later date.”43 FEMA now has 
determined that “through our existing authority, that we may repair multi-family 
rental housing units for use by disaster survivors. We expect to implement this 
authority in future disasters, as appropriate.”44 
Taken together, these changes to Stafford created a more flexible framework that can more easily 
be scaled up to meet the needs of extraordinary events. However, as the discussion of adding a 
catastrophic declaration attests, there is considerable debate concerning whether additional 
changes are necessary to increase FEMA’s ability to assist state and local governments and 
individuals and families affected by disasters.  
                                                
43 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Federal Emergency Management Agency, Individuals and Households Pilot 
Program, Fiscal Year 2009 Report to Congress, May 19, 2009, p. 15. 
44 E-mail to the author from Ted Litty, Senior Policy Advisor, Recovery Division, Federal Emergency Management 
Agency, Department of Homeland Security, May 18, 2011. 
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Considerations for a Catastrophic Declaration: Issues and Analysis 
 
Appendix. Sources 
1871 Chicago Fire 
Wayne Blanchard, Ph.D., Worst Disasters - Lives Lost (U.S.), Federal Emergency Management 
Agency, FEMA Emergency Management Higher Education Project, July 5, 2006. 
1900 Galveston Hurricane  
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, The Great Galveston Hurricane of 1900, 
August 30, 2007, http://celebrating200years.noaa.gov/magazine/galv_hurricane/. 
1906 San Francisco Earthquake 
Wayne Blanchard, Ph.D., Worst Disasters - Lives Lost (U.S.), Federal Emergency Management 
Agency, FEMA Emergency Management Higher Education Project, July 5, 2006. 
1919 Influenza Pandemic 
Wayne Blanchard, Ph.D., Worst Disasters - Lives Lost (U.S.), Federal Emergency Management 
Agency, FEMA Emergency Management Higher Education Project, July 5, 2006. 
1929 Great Mississippi Flood 
Hydrologic Information Center, Flood Losses: Compilation of Flood Loss Statistics, National 
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration/National Weather Service, Silver Spring, MD, February 
1, 2011. 
1964 Alaska Earthquake/Tsunami 
United States Geological Survey, 40th Anniversary of “Good Friday” Earthquake Offers New 
Opportunities for Public and Building Safety Partnerships, Reston, VA, March 26, 2004, 
http://www.usgs.gov/newsroom/article.asp?ID=106. 
1969 Hurricane Camille  
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration /National Weather Service, Hurricane Camille 
1969, Flowood, MS, August 20, 2010, http://www.srh.noaa.gov/jan/?n=
1969_08_17_hurricane_camille. 
 Edward N. Rappaport , Jose Fernandez-Partagas, and Jack Beven, The Deadliest Atlantic 
Tropical Cyclones, 1492 - Present, APPENDIX 1: Atlantic tropical cyclones causing at least 25 
deaths, April 22, 1997, http://www.nhc.noaa.gov/pastdeadlya1.html. 
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1974 Xenia (Easter) Tornado Outbreak  
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, Weather Service Commemorates Nation’s 
Worst Tornado Outbreak, March 31, 1999, http://www.publicaffairs.noaa.gov/storms/release.html. 
1978 Love Canal  
Eckardt C. Beck, The Love Canal Tragedy, Environmental Protection Agency, January 1979, 
http://www.epa.gov/history/topics/lovecanal/01.htm. 
2008 Hurricane Ike 
Robbie Berg, Tropical Cyclone Report: Hurricane Ike, National Hurricane Center, AL092008, 
May 3, 2010, p. 9, http://www.nhc.noaa.gov/pdf/TCR-AL092008_Ike_3May10.pdf. 
1980 Mount St. Helens 
Robert I. Tilling, Lyn Topinka, and Donald A. Swanson, Economic Impact of the May 18, 1980 
Eruption, United States Geological Survey, Eruptions of Mount St. Helens: Past, Present, and 
Future: USGS Special Interest Publication, 1990. 
1989 Loma Prieta Earthquake 
Robert A. Page, Peter H. Stauffer, and James W. Hendley II, Progress Toward A Safer Future 
Since the 1989 Loma Prieta Earthquake, United States Geological Survey, U.S. Geological 
Survey Fact Sheet 151-99 Online Version 1.0, 1999, http://pubs.usgs.gov/fs/1999/fs151-99/. 
1992 Hurricane Andrew 
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, Famous Hurricanes of the 20th and 21st 
Century In the United States 1900 - 2004, September 16, 2010. 
1995 Chicago Heat Wave 
Jim Angel, The 1995 Heat Wave in Chicago, Illinois, Illinois State Climatologist Office, 
Champaign, IL, http://www.isws.illinois.edu/atmos/statecli/General/1995Chicago.htm. 
1989 Hurricane Hugo 
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, Famous Hurricanes of the 20th and 21st 
Century In the United States 1900 - 2004, September 16, 2010. 
1994 Northridge Earthquake 
United States Geological Survey, Alaska and Washington Yield Largest U.S. Earthquakes ... Most 
Significant Earthquakes of ’96 Rattle China, Indonesia, February 13, 1997, http://www.usgs.gov/
newsroom/article_pf.asp?ID=975. 
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2001 September 11th Terrorist Attacks 
National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon The United States, 9/11 Commission Report, 
Notes On Chapter 9, Washington, DC, p. 552. 
2005 Hurricane Katrina 
Richard D. Knabb, Jamie R. Rhome, and Daniel P. Brown, Tropical Cyclone Report, National 
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration/National Hurricane Center, Hurricane Katrina 23-30 
August 2005, August 9, 2006, p. 11, http://www.nhc.noaa.gov/pdf/TCR-AL122005_Katrina.pdf. 
2008 Hurricane Ike 
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration/National Hurricane Center, Hurricane 
History: Ike 2008, http://www.nhc.noaa.gov/HAW2/english/history.shtml#ike. 
ARkStorm Scenario 
United States Geological Survey, Overview Of The ARkStorm Scenario, Open File Report 2010-
1312, http://pubs.usgs.gov/of/2010/1312/of2010-1312_text.pdf. 
New Madrid Earthquake 
U.S. Congress, House Committee on Science and Technology, Subcommittee on Technology and 
Innovation, The Reauthorization of the National Earthquake Hazards Reduction Program: R&D 
for Disaster Resilient Communities, Hearing, 111th Congress, June 11, 2009. 
South San Andreas Fault Earthquake 
U.S. Congress, House Committee on Science and Technology, Subcommittee on Technology and 
Innovation, The Reauthorization of the National Earthquake Hazards Reduction Program: R&D 
for Disaster Resilient Communities, Hearing, 111th Congress, June 11, 2009. 
 
Author Contact Information 
 
Bruce R. Lindsay 
  Francis X. McCarthy 
Analyst in Emergency Management Policy 
Analyst in Emergency Management Policy 
blindsay@crs.loc.gov, 7-3752 
fmccarthy@crs.loc.gov, 7-9533 
 
 
Acknowledgments 
The authors would like to acknowledge the help of Keith Bea, a retired CRS Specialist in American 
National Government. 
Congressional Research Service 
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