Morocco: Current Issues
Alexis Arieff
Analyst in African Affairs
May 27, 2011
Congressional Research Service
7-5700
www.crs.gov
RS21579
CRS Report for Congress
P
repared for Members and Committees of Congress

Morocco: Current Issues

Summary
The United States government views Morocco as an important ally against terrorism and a free
trade partner. Congress is particularly interested in Morocco because it is a recipient of
considerable U.S. foreign assistance for counterterrorism and socioeconomic development,
including a five-year, $697.5 million Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) aid program
agreed to in 2007. Morocco is also a significant purchaser of U.S. defense articles.
King Mohammed VI retains supreme political power in Morocco, but has taken some liberalizing
steps with uncertain effects. In early March 2011, amid a series of ongoing political protests that
have coincided with demonstrations across the region, the king announced a broad reform plan,
including constitutional changes to strengthen the legislature and judiciary, and the creation of an
independent National Council Human Rights. The constitutional reforms are expected to be
drafted by a commission selected by the king, then voted on by citizens in a referendum. The
protests, which have been largely peaceful, have continued, however, with some activists
criticizing the king’s control over the reform process and calling for more radical changes to the
political system. Authorities have tolerated many of the protests, but in some cases security forces
have used violence to disperse demonstrators and have beaten prominent activists. Senior U.S.
officials have expressed strong support for the government’s reform efforts.
Morocco’s comprehensive approach to countering terrorism involves security measures,
economic reforms, control of religious outlets, education, and international cooperation. Morocco
experienced devastating terrorist attacks in 2003, and Moroccan nationals have been implicated in
attacks and plots overseas. In April 2011, after years without a domestic attack, a bomb exploded
at a popular tourist café in Marrakesh, killing 17 people, mostly Europeans. Al Qaeda in the
Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), considered the greatest regional threat, has not mounted a successful
attack in Morocco and denied responsibility for the April Marrakesh bombing. However,
individual Moroccans have joined AQIM outside of the country and the group has reportedly
attempted to use Moroccan territory as a transit point for transnational smuggling operations.
Morocco’s human rights record is uneven. A number of abuses have been documented along with
constraints on freedom of expression. At the same time, the 2004 Family Code is a landmark
initiative that could improve the socioeconomic rights of women if fully implemented. The king
has also sought to provide a public record of abuses perpetrated before he ascended the throne in
1999 and to enhance the rights of ethnic Berbers (Amazigh/Imazighen), the original inhabitants of
the region. In 2010, questions about religious freedom arose when foreign Christians were
expelled for illegal proselytizing, sparking criticism by some Members of Congress.
Morocco’s foreign policy focuses largely on France, Spain, and the United States. Morocco’s
relations with its neighbor Algeria are troubled by the unresolved dispute over the Western
Sahara, a territory south of Morocco that Morocco largely occupies and views as an integral part
of its national territory. Algeria supports the POLISARIO Front in its quest for the region’s self-
determination. Recent signals, however, indicate that Moroccan-Algerian relations may be
warming. Relations between Morocco and Israel are strained, though at the same time, 600,000
Moroccan Jews are citizens of Israel. Morocco severed diplomatic relations with Iran in 2009.
See also CRS Report RS20962, Western Sahara, by Alexis Arieff; and CRS Report RS21464,
Morocco-U.S. Free Trade Agreement, by Raymond J. Ahearn
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Contents
Recent Developments.................................................................................................................. 1
Morocco’s Protest Movement................................................................................................ 1
Reform Pledges..................................................................................................................... 3
U.S. Reactions to Moroccan Reform Proposals................................................................ 5
Marrakesh Bombing.............................................................................................................. 5
Emerging Questions .............................................................................................................. 6
Government and Politics ............................................................................................................. 7
Terrorism .................................................................................................................................... 9
Human Rights ........................................................................................................................... 11
Economy .................................................................................................................................. 14
Western Sahara ......................................................................................................................... 15
Foreign Policy........................................................................................................................... 16
Algeria................................................................................................................................ 16
Europe ................................................................................................................................ 17
Middle East......................................................................................................................... 18
Relations with the United States ................................................................................................ 19
U.S. Assistance ................................................................................................................... 21
Millennium Challenge Grant ......................................................................................... 22
Recent Congressional Actions ....................................................................................... 23

Figures
Figure 1. Map of Morocco........................................................................................................... 7

Tables
Table 1. U.S. Bilateral Foreign Assistance to Morocco .............................................................. 22
Table 2. Millennium Challenge Corporation Programs .............................................................. 22

Contacts
Author Contact Information ...................................................................................................... 24
Acknowledgments .................................................................................................................... 24

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Recent Developments
Morocco’s Protest Movement
A series of large political demonstrations have taken place in Moroccan cities since early
February, amid a regional surge in popular unrest that has been dubbed the “Arab Spring.”
Demonstrations have continued, and may have increased in size, since the king’s announcement
of broad reform plans in early March (see “Promises of Reform,” below) and subsequent pledges
in May to raise public sector salaries and the minimum wage. Analysts have debated whether the
protests represent an existential threat for the Moroccan monarchy, with most concluding that the
government’s relative respect for civil liberties and the general public’s esteem for the institutions
of the monarchy provide significant protection for the regime.1 Indeed, small numbers of people
have simultaneously demonstrated in support of the king. Labor strikes, protests over
socioeconomic grievances, and localized unrest are relatively common occurrences in Morocco,
and are usually tolerated by the authorities. At the same time, the demonstrations have revealed
significant public discontent over central aspects of the regime, as well as the monarchy’s
apparent inability, to date, to stem the unrest through political and economic concessions.2 Some
analysts have viewed recent police crackdowns on protesters as indicating a hardening in
authorities’ stance toward critics who decline to participate in regime-directed reform efforts.3
On February 20, tens of thousands of Moroccans turned out in the capital, Rabat, and other cities
in what organizers termed a “Movement for Change.” Protesters called for democratic reforms—
such as a new constitution with greater checks on the power of King Mohammed VI—but
stopped short of advocating an end to the monarchy. Some also reportedly chanted slogans
against “autocracy,” corruption, and state-owned television, which is widely viewed as biased.
Few uniformed security forces were present, according to press reports. Although the protests
were not met with the violent retribution that has been seen elsewhere in the region, limited
clashes between demonstrators and police occurred in several cities, along with looting and other
localized violence, and five people were reportedly killed in the northern town of Al Hoceima
when they were trapped in a bank that was set on fire by rioters. The government stated that 120
people were arrested and a number of public and commercial buildings destroyed.
Protests have since continued to convene at least once a week, including several large
demonstrations organized by the “February 20 Movement,” a loosely organized, youth-led
coalition that has used Facebook and other social media as organizing tools. Protests held on May
20, April 24, May 1, May 8, May 15, and May 22 have drawn thousands, and in some cases tens
of thousands, of participants. Protesters have espoused a wide range of grievances, including a
lack of balance of powers in Morocco’s political system and perceived corruption, “clientelism,”
social injustice, abuse of authority by senior government officials, control by the king over

1 See, e.g., Brian T. Edwards, “The Next To Tumble?” The Chicago Tribune, February 10, 2011.
2 The protest movement has generally refrained from direct criticism of the king, but it has called for the resignations of
several powerful figures. These include Prime Minister Fassi; Mohamed Mounir Majidi, secretary to the king; and
PAM founder Fouad Ali al Himma. Souhail Karam, “Thousands in Morocco March for Rights, End to Graft,” Reuters,
March 20, 2011; Kristen McTighe, “Moroccan Youth Demands Action, Not Words,” The New York Times, May 11,
2011.
3 Los Angeles Times blog, “MOROCCO: Protest Violence Could Escalate, Intelligence Analyst Says,” Babylon and
Beyond, May 23, 2011.
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powerful business interests, and concentration of political and economic power among the elite
(known as the makhzen) that surrounds the monarchy. Some activists have called for changes to
the royal protocol (such as prostrating before the king), previously a taboo topic, though the level
of public support for such changes is unclear.4 Others have focused on socioeconomic issues,
such as high youth unemployment and complaints over wages. On March 22, employees of the
state-owned media agency demonstrated in favor of greater editorial independence.5 Small
protests and vandalism have also reportedly occurred in the disputed territory of Western Sahara.
While February 20 Movement activists have largely focused on secular political issues, their
protest calls have been backed by the Justice and Charity Organization (JCO), a nationwide
grassroots Islamist movement that is banned but generally tolerated by the authorities.6 (The JCO
is stringently critical of the institutions of the monarchy.) On March 20, they were also joined by
the Socialist Union of Popular Forces, a political party that is part of the ruling coalition. Trade
unions formally lent their support to demonstrations for the first time on May 1 (international
labor day). The leadership of the Justice and Development Party (PJD), a moderate Islamist
opposition political party, has indicated it will not participate in the organization of protests,
though PJD members have reportedly joined some demonstrations.
Government officials initially signaled that the protests did not pose a threat to domestic stability,
and that demonstrators would be allowed to peacefully express their views. Security forces have
not opened fire on demonstrators or engaged in mass arrests (as elsewhere in the region), and
many protests have been carried out without incident. However, some gatherings have been
subject to violent police reprisals.7 Several prominent organizers and civil society activists have
reportedly been seriously wounded in these crackdowns, including February 20 Movement leader
Oussama El Khlifi, who was beaten on May 15 and may have suffered head injuries, according to
news reports.8 Police again reportedly assaulted demonstrators on May 22, and the government
accused Islamists and leftist radicals of being behind the protest movement.9 In February, officials
reportedly smeared organizers as foreign agents or other undesirables in public comments, and
state radio reportedly announced that the February 20 rallies had been canceled, in what some
interpreted as a tactic to suppress turnout.10 On February 21, King Mohammed VI expressed his
commitment to reforms while warning that he would not “cede to demagoguery.”11 The king did
not overtly reference the protest movement during his speech in March announcing broad

4 Mustapha Ajbaili, “Moroccans Call for Reform of ‘Demeaning’ Royal Protocol,” Al Arabiya, April 14, 2011.
5 Agence France Presse (AFP), “Morocco Official Agency Reporters Seek Independence,” March 22, 2011.
6 In early February, the Justice and Charity organization reportedly called for “radical democratic change” in Morocco,
after expressing support for protests in other Middle East and North African countries. Its youth wing, in particular, has
reportedly participated in organizing demonstrations. Akhbar al-Youm al-Maghrebiya online, “Politicians, Analysts
Disagree Over Likelihood of Protests Reaching Morocco,” February 7, 2011, via U.S. government Open Source Center
(OSC).
7 Human Rights Watch stated after the March 20 rally that “the decision on whether to allow or repress the
demonstrators seems to rest more with political decisions by authorities than with the behavior of the demonstrators”
(“Morocco: Thousands Demonstrate Peacefully,” March 21, 2011).
8 Adam Tanner and Souhail Karam, “Many Wounded as Moroccan Police Beat Protesters,” May 22, 2011.
9 Reuters, “Morocco Says Islamists, Leftists Stirring Protests,” May 23, 2011.
10 Marc Champion, “Turmoil in the Middle East: Morocco Joins In, Defying Predictions,” The Wall Street Journal
Europe
, February 21, 2011; Steven Erlanger, “In Morocco, Fears of Chaos Temper Calls for Change,” The New York
Times
, February 21, 2011.
11 Le Monde, “Au Maroc, le Roi Mohamed VI Affiche sa Fermeté Après les Manifestations en Faveur de Réformes
Politiques,” February 23, 2011; CRS translation from French.
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reforms, and has striven to appear as though reforms are being initiated organically and not in
response to pressure from the public.
Protesters, including Islamists, have also called for the release of hundreds (perhaps thousands) of
individuals who were jailed in security sweeps that followed the 2003 terrorist bombings in
Casablanca. Human rights advocates contend that many of the arrests and subsequent convictions
were carried out without due process. Protesters have simultaneously decried terrorism,
particularly in the aftermath of the April 14, 2011, bombing in Marrakesh (see below).
On April 14, the king ordered the release of over 90 detainees, mostly hard-line Islamists, many
of whom were held on terrorism-related accusations. Nearly 100 more detainees had their
sentences reduced. Those released include Cheikh Mohamed Fizazi, a Salafist leader who was
convicted of preaching radical Islamist doctrine and meeting the perpetrators of the 2003
Casablanca bomb attacks (he has since espoused a more moderate rhetoric); Moustapha
Moatassim, leader of an Islamist movement that was banned by the government in 2008; and
Abdelhafiz Esriti, a correspondent of Hezbollah’s TV station, Al Manar. They also included a
handful of human rights activists, along with three prominent Western Sahara independence
activists who were arrested in 2009.
Protest leaders, rights activists, and figures in Morocco’s Salafist community continue to call for
further releases or reviews of cases. On May 15, security forces violently dispersed a protest
gathering in Rabat in front of a site that activists allege is a secret government detention center
where terrorist suspects have been held incommunicado and sometimes tortured.12 Several
demonstrators were badly injured. The next day, hundreds of Salafist inmates at a formal prison
near Rabat launched a two-day violent uprising, citing alleged torture, unfair trials, and arbitrary
treatment as grievances.13 Security forces put down the unrest, but at least 50 officers were
injured along with dozens of detainees, according to news reports. The rioting followed a Salafist
Jihadist media message released in late April that expressed solidarity with Islamist prisoners in
Morocco and called for their release.14
Reform Pledges
On March 9, King Mohammed VI gave a nationally televised speech in which he outlined a series
of broad reforms to Morocco’s political system. The central focus is a proposed revision of the
1996 constitution along seven, at times vaguely worded, principles:15
1. To enshrine Berber (Amazigh) rights in the constitution;
2. To guarantee the rule of law, human rights, and political freedoms by codifying
the recommendations of Morocco’s 2006 Equity and Reconciliation Commission;
3. To increase judicial independence and promote equality before the law;

12 The location is in Témara, a Rabat suburb that is reportedly home to the headquarters of Morocco’s domestic
intelligence agency. See Human Rights Watch, Morocco: “Stop Looking for Your Son, October 25, 2010.
13 Souhail Karam, “Five Guards Taken Hostage in Morocco Jail Unrest,” Reuters, May 17, 2011.
14 OSC Report GMP20110424113009, “Jihadist Establishment Sends Message: ‘To Our Brothers in the Moroccan
Prisons,’” April 24, 2011.
15 OSC Report GMP20110309950058, “Moroccan King Announces Constitutional Reforms in National Address,” Al-
Aoula Television in Arabic, March 9, 2011.
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4. To expand the legislature’s authority and “scope of action,” with a Prime Minister
chosen from the party that wins the most seats in parliament and confirmed by
legislators (instead of selected by the king);
5. To strengthen the role of political parties, including opposition parties in
parliament, and civil society;
6. To strengthen “mechanisms for encouraging morality in public life” (a presumed
reference to anti-corruption efforts); and
7. To codify institutions concerned with good governance, human rights, and the
protection of individual freedoms.
Several of these elements are already ostensibly in the constitution, including equality of citizens
before the law (Art. 5), freedom of opinion and association (Art. 9), and judicial independence
from the executive and legislative branches (Art. 80), suggesting that the challenge may center
more around implementation than codification.
The king appointed a commission to draft proposals for constitutional revisions, which are
expected to be submitted by June and then to be voted on by citizens in a referendum. The king,
in his speech, also proposed steps to ensure greater decentralization of power and to promote
women’s participation in politics. Subsequent additional reform pledges have centered around
improving economic regulations and the public procurement process for greater transparency, and
expanding press freedom through changes to the press law.
The March 9 speech was heralded by the major political parties, international observers, and
some Moroccan democracy advocates as a first step toward key internal reforms. The leader of
the opposition PJD, for example, welcomed the speech as a “powerful” sign that the king had
“reacted positively to the demands made by the parties and young people.”16 At the same time,
some domestic critics contend that the proposals are too little, too late, and have rejected the
composition of the constitutional commission, which was selected by the king and includes
several figures reputed to be close to the monarchy.17 Chaired by Abdelatif Menouni, a jurist, the
commission is supposed to work with political parties, trade unions, and civil society groups to
draw up proposals. The February 20 Movement has declined to provide input, contending that the
monarchy retains too much control over the process, and has called for further protests.
Several days before the March 9 speech, the king announced the creation of a National Human
Rights Council, which authorities said would be more independent than previous government-
backed human rights bodies. Officials have indicated that it will also have a mandate to
investigate human rights issues in the Western Sahara, where advocacy groups and some
diplomats have long called for independent (international) human rights monitoring. The
Council’s membership nevertheless appears to reflect strong government influence, though its
choice of activities has yet to be seen. Members include the Ministers of Justice, the Interior, and
Foreign Affairs, along with two trade unionists, a human rights-focused legal scholar, a political
scientist who serves as director of Morocco’s National Observatory for the Rights of the Child, a
professor of trade and finance, a magistrate and former Justice Ministry official, and a historian

16 AFP, “Morocco King Vows Sweeping Reforms,” March 9, 2011.
17 Le Monde, “Au Maroc, les Promesses de Réformes du Roi n’Ont Pas Désamorcé la Contestation,” March 15, 2011;
Karim Boukhari, "Between Hope and Doubt," Telquel, May 16, 2011, via OSC Doc. GMP20110516291001.
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who is an official at the Ministry of Islamic Affairs.18 The king appointed Driss al Yazami, a
human rights scholar who has been based in France and previously served as an official envoy to
the Moroccan diaspora, as president.
U.S. Reactions to Moroccan Reform Proposals
The United States’ close bilateral relationship with Morocco and reliance on King Mohammed
VI’s support on regional security and counterterrorism issues underlie U.S. statements expressing
both strong support for the monarchy and encouragement of significant political reforms. In late
February, amid the start of Morocco’s protest movement, U.S. Under Secretary of State for
Political Affairs, William J. Burns, visited Morocco, where he stated that “the partnership
between the United States, Morocco and the Moroccan people is a very high priority for President
Obama and Secretary Clinton,” and that “it’s never been more important than at this moment.”
The Under Secretary further praised Morocco’s “strong record of efforts under the leadership of
King Mohammed” and stated that “the United States will continue to do everything that we can to
support that effort.”19
The Obama Administration has been strongly supportive of the king’s reform proposals,
characterizing them as serious and significant and calling for their speedy implementation. In a
statement welcoming the king’s March 9 speech, the State Department referred to Morocco as “a
key strategic partner” and stated that “we stand ready to work with the government and the people
of Morocco to realize their democratic aspirations.”20 In subsequent testimony to Congress,
Under Secretary Burns cited Morocco (along with Jordan) as “countries working to stay ahead of
the wave of popular protests” by announcing “significant reform initiatives.”21 In a joint
appearance with Moroccan Foreign Minister Taieb Fassi Fihri on March 23, Secretary of State
Hillary Rodham Clinton stated that “Morocco is well-positioned to lead in this area [democratic
reforms in the Middle East] because it is on the road to achieving democratic change.” She added
that the king’s reform plans “hold great promise” as “a comprehensive approach.” With regard to
the newly created human rights council, Clinton described it as “an excellent idea,” adding, “We
obviously want to see it come into effect, we want to see it in action… we think it will serve a
very important purpose.”22 In May, the State Department released a written statement that “we
urge continuing and rapid implementation of these crucial reforms” and reiterated the
characterization of Morocco as “a strategic partner.”23
Marrakesh Bombing
On April 28, 2011, a bomb exploded at a popular tourist café in Marrakesh, killing 17 people,
most of them European nationals, and wounding two dozen others. It was the deadliest terrorist
attack on Moroccan soil since the 2003 suicide bombings in Casablanca, which killed 45. On

18 Website of the National Human Rights Council, at http://www.ccdh.org.ma/spip.php?rubrique20&lang=en.
19 U.S. Embassy in Morocco, “Under Secretary Burns’ Statement at the Moroccan MFA,” February 27, 2011.
20 State Department, “State Department on Announcement by King Mohammed VI of Morocco,” March 10, 2011.
21 Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing, U.S. Policy and Uprisings in the Middle East, March 17, 2011,
transcript via Congressional Quarterly (CQ).
22 State Department, Hillary Rodham Clinton, “Remarks with Moroccan Foreign Minister Taieb Fassi Fihri,” March
23, 2011.
23 State Department, Office of the Spokesman, “Transition and Reform in Morocco,” May 19, 2011.
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May 17, seven suspects were charged with carrying out the attack and belonging to an
unspecified “banned religious group.” The primary suspect, Adil al Othmani, is accused of
placing explosives in the cafe to be detonated by remote trigger. Authorities have described the
suspects as Salafist ideologues and Al Qaeda sympathizers, and allege that Othmani (whose
nationality is unclear) was previously expelled from Libya and Portugal, without indicating
evidence of current operational contacts or coordination with Al Qaeda leaders.24 Al Qaeda in the
Islamic Maghreb, a regional Al Qaeda affiliate, released a rare statement denying responsibility
for the attack. According to Morocco’s Interior Ministry, U.S. and European experts provided
assistance with investigations.25
Moroccan citizens have organized demonstrations near the site of the attack to condemn terrorism
as well as previous government counterterrorism actions that, they contend, were repressive.
Some Muslim leaders and human rights advocates have praised the government for its handling
of the aftermath of the attack, noting that unlike in 2003, when security forces carried out mass
arrests and detentions, at times allegedly without due process, this time authorities have shown
relative restraint by leading a targeted probe focused on the suspected perpetrators.26
Emerging Questions
Recent events in Morocco raise a number of questions for U.S. policy. These include:
• What will promised legal and constitutional reforms look like, and what concrete
steps will be taken to implement them? What is the timeline and process for
implementation? Will reforms radically change Morocco’s system of
government, the balance of power between branches of government, or the
government’s role in the domestic economy?
• To what extent do protest groups such as the February 20 Movement represent
public opinion in Morocco? To what extent are they politically organized and
united around a political platform that extends beyond criticism of the status quo?
Which of the many grievances expressed by protesters are most important to the
population at large? Are large demonstrations likely to continue, and under what
circumstances? Will protest leaders engage in the government-led reform
process, and what steps might the government take to encourage them to do so?
If not, will protest leaders’ refusal to participate undermine the legitimacy of the
reforms, and potentially lead to greater unrest or violence?
• What issues will the newly created National Human Rights Council focus on?
How critical will it be vis-à-vis government policies, and will it investigate
sensitive topics such as detention practices? Is it a credible substitute for
international human rights monitoring in the Western Sahara, which has not been
permitted by Moroccan authorities?

24 AFP, “Marrakesh Bomb Suspect was Expelled from Libya: Minister,” May 6, 2011.
25 The State Department released a statement offering “our full assistance to the Moroccan government as it works to
investigate this attack and bring those accountable to justice” (“Secretary Clinton: Terrorist Attack in Marrakesh,
Morocco,” April 28, 2011).
26 Caroline Taix, “Maroc: Pas d’Arrestations ‘Aveugles’ Après l’Attentat, Se Félicitent des Islamistes,” AFP, May 4,
2011.
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• How will the king’s recent decision to pardon or commute the sentences of
Islamist detainees affect the environment for violent extremism in Morocco? Will
reforms extend to counterterrorism laws and practices?
• How might U.S.-Moroccan relations be affected by political upheaval and change
across the region? What benchmarks will be considered by the United States in
evaluating the progress of Moroccan reforms?
Government and Politics
Figure 1. Map of Morocco


Source: Map resources, adapted by CRS.
The Moroccan royal dynasty has ruled the country since 1649. Morocco’s monarchy was one of
the first governments to recognize the independence of the United States of America. The
reigning king, Mohammed VI, ascended to the throne in 1999, following his father, King Hassan
II, who died at age 70. King Mohammed VI remains the pre-eminent state authority in Morocco’s
political system, though he has said he is committed to building a democracy, and in March 2011
announced a broad reform program (see “Recent Developments,” above). The king chairs the
Council of State that endorses all legislation before it goes to parliament, appoints the prime
minister and ministers of foreign affairs, interior, defense, and Islamic affairs, and approves other
ministers. He sets the agenda of parliament in an annual Speech from the Throne, dissolves
parliament, calls elections, and rules by decree. The king also has a “shadow government” of
royal advisors and is head of the military. Reforms depend on the king’s will, and he has
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undertaken several major liberalizing initiatives. The king also is said to be tied to significant
economic enterprises in the country.
The bicameral legislature consists of a 270-seat upper house, the Chamber of Counselors, whose
members are indirectly elected to nine-year terms, and a 325-seat lower house, the Chamber of
Representatives, whose members are directly elected to five-year terms. Thirty seats (about 10%)
in the lower house are reserved for women (candidates for these seats are elected from a separate
women’s list) and, under a rule that took effect in 2009, women are guaranteed 12% of the seats
in local elections.
The five-party governing coalition is led by the Istiqlal (Independence) Party (PI), the former
leader in the anti-colonial movement (France and Spain occupied Morocco) and the party of the
prime minister, Abbas al Fassi. The other coalition members, which often hold divergent policy
views and compete for influence, are the left-leaning Socialist Union of Popular Forces (USFP),
which was the main opposition force under King Hassan II; the centrist National Rally of
Independents (RNI); the Popular Movement (MP); and the Progress and Socialism Party (PPS).
The moderate Islamist and well-organized Justice and Development Party (PJD), also known as
Al Misbah (the beacon), is considered the main opposition party that has remained outside the
government and does not have ties to the monarchy.
The September 2002 election for the Chamber of Representatives, the weak lower house, was
deemed to be relatively free and fair by international observers, and to have increased women’s
political participation. The September 2007 election also met international standards, but only
37% of the voters turned out and 19% of those cast blank ballots, reflecting widespread
disillusionment with the political process and popular understanding of the powerlessness of the
legislature. The Istiqlal Party placed first, and Abbas al Fassi was appointed prime minister and
formed a coalition government with a 34-member cabinet, including an unprecedented five
women ministers. The PJD had been widely expected to win the election; it placed second and
charged irregularities, but accepted the legitimacy of the outcome. Some 23 parties and blocs,
plus independents, are represented in the current legislature.
In August 2008, Fouad Ali al Himma established the Party for Authenticity and Modernity
(PAM). Al Himma is a former classmate of King Mohammed VI and former deputy interior
minister. He was elected to parliament as an independent in 2007 and became chairman of its
Committee on Foreign, Defense, and Islamic Affairs. Al Himma has not assumed the leadership
of PAM; he is deputy leader, but is considered the party’s de facto head. PAM has sought
alliances with parties known to be recipients of royal patronage and won over many deputies who
defected from other parties. Thus, although the party only ostensibly holds three seats in
parliament (the three deputies, formerly independent, formed the PAM after their election in
2007), it controls a large bloc in parliament. PAM’s ideology is incoherent, but its goals
reportedly are to “rationalize” the political landscape by diminishing the number of parties,
encourage more participation in politics, and challenge or marginalize the PJD.27 In May 2009,
PAM pulled out of the coalition government. The MP joined the government and provided some
stability as did some new appointments.

27 James Liddell, “Morocco: Modern Politics or Politics of Modernity?” Arab Reform Bulletin, Carnegie Endowment
for International Peace, December 2008.
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Some politicians initially feared that PAM was a nascent state party similar to those in Egypt and
Tunisia that might be used to dominate politics.28 Few were surprised by PAM’s first place finish
with 21.6% of the vote in elections for seats on municipal councils on June 12, 2009, when PJD
took sixth place. PAM also placed first in the October 2, 2009 elections for one-third of the 270
seats in the Chamber of Counselors, the upper house. PAM offered a sharp contrast to other
parties, which are led by much older men who view women with suspicion and probably put them
on electoral lists mainly to meet official quotas, and reach out to voters only before elections. In
reaction to the PAM’s momentum, the PJD and the USFP formed an unusual alliance to run some
local councils. However, PAM’s influence has since appeared to subside amid reports of internal
divisions and strong opposition voiced by protesters since February 2011. Al Himma offered to
resign on May 17, but his resignation was reportedly rejected by PAM’s national bureau.29
The Islamist Al Adl wal Ihsan (Justice and Charity Organization/JCO), led by Cheikh Abdessalem
Yassine, is officially banned as a political movement but is the largest grassroots organization in
the country. It eschews violence and is considered more closely attuned to constituents than the
main political parties. JCO called for a boycott of the 2007 national election, arguing that
participation was pointless without constitutional reform aimed at diminishing the role of the
monarchy. It often conveys its views in street demonstrations, for example, against the Family
Code, in support of the Palestinians and against Israel, etc. The authorities periodically arrest JCO
members and break up the group’s meetings. JCO leaders have been supportive of the protest
movement that began in February 2011.
Terrorism
The monarchy long asserted that its claimed descent from the Prophet Mohammed was a shield
against Islamist militancy. This belief was shattered after September 11, 2001, as expatriate
Moroccans have been implicated in terrorism abroad, and Morocco has suffered from terrorism at
home. Morocco has tried to distance itself from its expatriates, blaming their experiences in exile
for their radicalization.30 Numerous small, isolated, tactically limited, extremist cells, which
adhere to the Salafiya Jihadiya (Reformist Holy War/“Jihadist”) ideology, are viewed as the main
threat to Morocco’s domestic security.31
In February 2003, Osama Bin Laden listed Morocco among the “oppressive, unjust, apostate
ruling governments,” which he characterized as “enslaved by America” and, therefore, “most
eligible for liberation.”32 To some observers, this fatwa or religious edict appeared to trigger

28 Socialist Union of Popular Forces politician Idriss Lashgar, quoted in Africa Research Bulletin, October 1-21, 2008,
p. 17714.
29 Le Nouvel Observateur, “Maroc: Le PAM Rejette la Demande de Démission d’El Himma,” May 17, 2011.
30 Noteworthy developments abroad include the trial of two Moroccans in German courts for aiding the 9/11 terrorists
and the revelation that a Moroccan imam was “the spiritual father of the Hamburg cell” that helped execute the 9/11
attacks. A French-Moroccan, Zacarias Moussaoui, was tried in the United States as the 20th hijacker for 9/11. In
addition, 18 Moroccans allegedly linked to Al Qaeda in Afghanistan were detained at the U.S. Naval Station in
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba; several reportedly remain there. Returnees have been convicted in Moroccan courts.
31 Such cells perpetrated their major attacks in 2002, with the murders of locals who had committed “impure acts” such
as drinking alcohol. In 2003, Moroccan courts convicted a jihadist spiritual leader, who had fought in Afghanistan and
praised the 9/11 attacks and Al Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden, of inciting violence against Westerners.
32 “Moroccans Say Al Qaeda Masterminded and Financed Casablanca Suicide Bombings,” New York Times, May 23,
2003.
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attacks in Morocco on May 16, 2003, in which 12 suicide bombers identified as Salafiya Jihadiya
adherents linked to the Moroccan Islamic Combatant Group (GICM) and Al Qaeda attacked five
Western and Jewish targets in Casablanca, killing themselves and 33 others and injuring more
than 100. A large GICM network was implicated in the March 2004 Madrid train bombings, for
which two Moroccans were convicted in Spain. (A Moroccan court convicted one of their
accomplices.) Moroccans suspected of GICM affiliation were arrested in several European
countries. In 2005, the U.S. State Department designated GICM as a Foreign Terrorist
Organization (FTO), but the Department stated as of mid-2010 that “much of the GICM’s
leadership in Morocco and Europe has been killed, imprisoned, or are awaiting trial.”33 The
Moroccan government convicted the group’s alleged leader in absentia for his role in the
Casablanca attacks, but he remains free in exile in the United Kingdom, which found insufficient
evidence against him.34
Moroccan and European authorities continue to disrupt cells that they say are linked to Al Qaeda
in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM, also known as Al Qaeda in the Lands of the Islamic Maghreb or
AQLIM), formerly the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC), a group originating in
Algeria with regional ambitions.35 AQIM has not perpetrated a successful terrorist attack in
Morocco, where its threat has stemmed mainly from the potential transfer of operational
capabilities to inexperienced radicals and from its active efforts to recruit and incite Moroccans.
In November 2010, however, Moroccan authorities seized 34 Moroccans and hundreds of pounds
of cocaine that they allegedly were transporting from Algeria and Mauritania through Morocco.
Those apprehended were linked to AQIM, which, analysts contend, benefits financially from
trans-Saharan cocaine trafficking and other regional criminal activities. In addition, Moroccans
reportedly have joined AQIM at camps in Algeria and elsewhere outside of the country.
In April 2007, two suicide attacks occurred near the U.S. Consulate and the American Language
Center in Casablanca; the bombers killed only themselves. In September 2009, Moroccan security
services arrested 24 suspects who allegedly were linked to a terrorist network linked to Al Qaeda
that specialized in recruiting volunteers for Iraq, Somalia, and Afghanistan. Moroccans have
fought alongside insurgents in Iraq.
Morocco is cooperating with U.S. and European agencies to counter terrorism at home and
abroad. The U.S. State Department recognized that in 2009:
The Moroccan government pursued a comprehensive counterterrorism approach that,
building on popular rejection of terrorism, emphasized neutralizing existing terrorist cells
through traditional intelligence work and preemptive security measures. Morocco
aggressively targeted and dismantled terrorist cells within the Kingdom by leveraging
intelligence collection, police work, and collaboration with regional and other international
partners. These efforts resulted in the disruption of several terrorist groups.36
To counter radical Islamism, Morocco also has exerted greater control over religious leaders and
councils, created new theological councils, retrained imams, deployed supervisors to oversee their

33 U.S. State Department, Country Reports on Terrorism 2009, released on August 5, 2010,
http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/cret/2009/index.htm.
34 Olivier Guitta, “Alive and Well and Living in London,” Weekly Standard, May 7, 2007.
35 See CRS Report R41070, Al Qaeda and Affiliates: Historical Perspective, Global Presence, and Implications for
U.S. Policy
, coordinated by John Rollins.
36 Country Reports on Terrorism, op. cit.
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sermons, closed unregulated mosques, retrained and rehabilitated some individuals convicted of
terror-related crimes to correct their understanding of Islam, and launched radio and television
stations and a website to transmit “Moroccan religious values” of tolerance. In 2005, the king
launched a $1.2 billion National Initiative for Human Development to redress socioeconomic
conditions that extremists exploit for recruitment. Observers have questioned its effectiveness.
Morocco’s counterterrorism efforts have emphasized international cooperation, particularly with
the United States and European governments. However, Algeria has taken the lead in promoting
regional cooperation to counter terrorism and has excluded Morocco from those endeavors due to
ongoing differences over the Western Sahara issue (see “Western Sahara,” below ). Nonetheless,
Rabat shares the view of its neighbors and the United States that Al Qaeda in the Islamic
Maghreb (AQIM) is the main threat to the region. Morocco has worked with its southern
neighbor, Mauritania, about improving coordination on that subject as well as combating drug
smuggling and illegal immigration, and also has reached out to Senegal.
Human Rights
The U.S. State Department described the human rights situation in Morocco in 2010 in the
following way:
Citizens did not have the right to change the constitutional provisions establishing the
country's monarchical form of government or those designating Islam the state religion.
There were reports of torture and other abuses by various branches of the security forces.
Prison conditions remained below international standards. Reports of arbitrary arrests,
incommunicado detentions, and police and security force impunity continued. Politics, as
well as corruption and inefficiency, influenced the judiciary, which was not fully
independent. The government restricted press freedoms. Corruption was a serious problem in
all branches of government. Child labor, particularly in the unregulated informal sector, and
trafficking in persons remained problems.37
Freedom House’s Freedom in the World 2010 survey concludes that Morocco is a “partly free”
country, and also noted a downward trend owing to “increased concentration of power in the
hands of political elites aligned with the monarchy.”38
Nonetheless, the king has undertaken several initiatives that are marked advances in selected
areas of human rights practices. Most notably, the parliament enacted revolutionary changes to
the Family Code, or Moudawana, in January 2004, making polygamy rare by requiring
permission of a judge and the man’s first wife, raising the legal age for marriage for girls to 18,
and simplifying divorce procedures for women, among other changes to improve the status of
women. However, family court judges have not applied the law strictly and women continue to
suffer from inequality and violence.39 The king also created an Equity and Reconciliation
Commission to provide an historical record of abuses before 1999, to account for the
“disappeared,” and to compensate victims. In 2001, he launched a dialogue on Berber culture, and

37 State Department, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices - 2010, Morocco, April 8, 2011, accessible at
http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2010/nea/154468.htm.
38 See http://www.freedomhouse.org.
39 “Morocco: New Law, Same Old Men,” Inter Press News Service, July 31, 2009, see also Steven Erlanger and Souad
Mekhennet, “Law Empowering Women Leaves Many Behind,” International Herald Tribune, August 20, 2009.
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the government has since authorized the teaching of Berber dialects, issued a textbook in Berber,
and launched a state-funded Tamazigh (Berber dialect) TV channel.40
Rights advocates have criticized restrictions on freedom of expression, as has the European
Union. Although press freedom is more widely upheld than in some countries in the region, direct
criticism of the monarchy or the government’s stance on the Western Sahara is not tolerated, and
self-censorship is reportedly widespread. The Committee to Protect Journalists, which has
criticized what it views as Moroccan backsliding on press freedom in recent years, has
documented a number of criminal prosecutions of critical journalists on charges ostensibly
unrelated to journalism, but which, the organization contends, are “meant to silence a critical
voice.”41 In 2010, two prominent private newspapers were forced to close following years of
court battles and an alleged government campaign to enforce an advertizing boycott.42 Human
Rights Watch has reported that critical coverage of the Western Sahara issue, including by foreign
correspondents, frequently leads to the revocation or denial of press credentials.43
After the May 2003 terrorist attacks in Casablanca, parliament passed broad antiterrorism laws to
define terrorist crimes and establish procedures for tracking terrorist finances. Human rights
activists expressed concern about their legislative restrictions on the press, detention without
charge, and reduced requirements for the death penalty. Other observers questioned whether
elements in the regime were using the threat of Islamist terror to roll back reforms. Some worried
that detentions could create radicals who would eventually be released into society.44 A 2010
Human Rights Watch report contended that a “pattern of abuse” under counterterrorism laws
included extrajudicial detentions, allegedly by intelligence agents in unacknowledged detention
facilities; torture and ill-treatment of detainees; and coerced confessions. Moroccan authorities
rejected the report’s primary allegations and refuted the details of cases cited in it.45
The Moroccan Penal Code prohibits proselytizing to Muslims and the government expels foreign
Christians or declares them persona non grata for violation of the law, without prosecuting them
or affording them due process. Some U.S. Christian groups have criticized enforcement of the
law, such as in March 2010, when the government expelled 16 foreign Christian volunteers,
including some Americans, who had run a charity center/orphanage in Ifrane, in the Atlas
Mountains, for some 10 years. Other similar expulsions also have taken place, and some of those
targeted have alleged that an unprecedented number of deportations have been occurring in recent
years.46 The U.S. State Department reports that approximately 150 Christian foreign residents
from 19 countries were expelled in 2009.47

40 The Berbers inhabited much of North Africa before Arab Muslims invaded in the 8th century CE.
41 Rima Marrouch, “Morocco Pardons Journalist to Create Smokescreen,” Committee to Protect Journalists, June 2010.
42 Committee to Protect Journalists, “Attacks on the Press 2010: Morocco,” at http://www.cpj.org/2011/02/attacks-on-
the-press-2010-morocco.php.
43 Human Rights Watch, “Morocco: Restore Accreditation to Al Jazeera; Sahara Conflict Coverage Key Factor in
Effort to Silence Selected Media,” April 5, 2011.
44 Jill Carroll, “Morocco’s Harder Line on Security Challenges Reforms,” Christian Science Monitor, April 9, 2007.
45 Human Rights Watch, “Morocco: End Abuses in Counterterrorism Arrests,” October 25, 2010.
46 “Morocco Expels Christian Missionaries,” Global Post, March 12, 2010.
47 See U.S. State Department, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, International Religious Freedom
Report 2010
, Released November 17, 2010, accessible at http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/irf/2010/148834.htm.
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Problems with human rights practices in Morocco also are linked to the Western Sahara issue, as
seen in the case of Aminatou Haidar, an advocate for Sahraoui self-determination.48 When she
returned from receiving a human rights prize in the United States in November 2009, Haidar
wrote “Western Sahara” as her address on customs forms to re-enter the Moroccan-administered
Western Sahara city of Laayoune (alt: El Ayoun or Al Ayun), but the authorities rejected the
forms, claimed that she had thereby renounced her citizenship, confiscated her passport, and
expelled her to the Spanish Canary Islands. Haidar then went on a highly publicized 32-day
hunger strike. After reported pressure from the United States, Haidar was allowed into Laayoune
in what Moroccan authorities described as “a humanitarian gesture.”49 Over the years, Morocco
has imprisoned other Sahraoui activists for alleged association with the POLISARIO Front
actions which have attracted criticism from international human rights groups that has been less
sensational than the Haidar case. The Moroccan’s government sensitivity concerning the Western
Sahara issue also has prompted it to treat journalists reporting or commenting on the issue harshly
and to suspend the activities of domestic and foreign media outlets accused of “irresponsible”
conduct. The government terms their offenses threats to the country’s territorial integrity. Finally,
there has been international condemnation of the excessively forceful way in which Moroccan
security forces dismantled a Sahraoui protest camp near Laayoune in November 2010, resulting
in deaths, injuries, and arrests. The exact number of casualties is unknown due to Morocco’s
control of information from the region.
The U.S. State Department judges Morocco to be a Tier 2 country with regard to trafficking in
persons as it is “a source, destination, and transit country for men, women, and children who are
subjected to trafficking in persons, specifically forced labor and forced prostitution.” The
government “does not comply with the minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking;
however, it is making significant efforts to do so.”50

48 See “Western Sahara” below and CRS Report RS20962, Western Sahara, by Alexis Arieff.
49 “Saharan Activist’s Return to Morocco “Humanitarian” – Spokesman,” MAP News Agency (Rabat) December 19,
2009, BBC Monitoring Middle East.
50 U.S. State Department, Trafficking in Persons Report 2010, released June 14, 2010, accessible at
http://www.state.gov/g/tip/rls/tiprpt/2010/142760.htm.
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Economy
Large portions of Morocco’s gross domestic
product (19.2%) and labor force (44.6%)
Morocco’s Economy: Basic Facts
continue to depend on agriculture and are
Population: 31.6 million (July 2010 est.)
vulnerable to rainfall fluctuations.51 Through
Gross Domestic Product growth: 4.2% (2010 est.)
internal and Western Saharan mines, Morocco
Gross Domestic Product per capita (purchasing
controls 75% of the world phosphate market
power parity): $4,900 (2010 est.)
and is the world’s leading exporter of
Inflation: 2.5% (2009 est.)
phosphates, which are used in fertilizers. The
phosphate industry and much of the economy
Unemployment: 9.8% (official, 2010 est.)
are dominated by the royal family and the so-
Exports: clothing, electronic components, inorganic
called “500 families” who control large, multi-
chemicals, transistors, crude minerals, fertilizers
sectoral holding companies and are close to
(including phosphates), petroleum products, fruit, and
the monarchy.
vegetables
Imports: crude petroleum, textile fabric,
Services and tourism are considered growth
telecommunications equipment, wheat, gas and electricity
sectors, with tourism and remittances from
Major Trading Partners: France, Spain, Italy, China,
abroad providing foreign exchange.
Germany, United States, Saudi Arabia
Remittances from an estimated 3 million
Source: CIA, The World Factbook, May 2011.
expatriates, mainly in France, Spain, Italy, and
Belgium, account for about 9% of gross
domestic product (GDP).52 The public sector remains large, although there is a successful, if
erratic, privatization program. Foreign direct investment has grown despite the impediments of
excessive red tape and corruption.53 Still, the royal family’s intervention in the economy has been
criticized by some analysts. The royal investment fund, known as SNI, for example, reportedly
controls significant domestic financial, insurance, construction, and commodity interests.54
Economic growth and reforms have been insufficient to reduce unemployment, especially for the
young, and poverty. These factors drive Moroccans abroad and may provide a breeding ground
for radicalization. The current government’s goals include achieving 6% GDP growth rate,
creating 250,000 new jobs, and building 150,000 housing units a year until 2013. While perhaps
overambitious, these targets reflect the government’s intent to combat poverty, unemployment,
and terrorism. The government’s plans have been affected by the global financial crisis/recession,
which has resulted in thousands of job losses in textiles and automotives, as well as in decreases
in tourist spending, expatriate remittances, and exports, especially phosphates.
Although the global financial crisis had a limited impact on Morocco, as its financial system has
limited exposure to international markets, the resulting global recession had a negative impact on

51 CIA, The World Factbook, November 24, 2010.
52 World Bank, “Migration and Remittances in Morocco,” at
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTPROSPECTS/Resources/334934-1181678518183/Morocco.pdf.
53 The U.S. State Department reported that in 2010 “corruption was a serious problem in all branches of government.”
U.S. Department of State, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices - 2010, Morocco, April 8, 2011. Morocco is
ranked 85 out of 178 countries on the Transparency International, Corruption Perceptions Index 2010, available at
http://www.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/cpi/2010.
54 The National, “Moroccans March for Freedom, and Against the Royal Grip on the Country’s Economy,” March 28,
2011.
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Moroccan exports, tourism receipts, remittances, and foreign direct investment. Still, a surge in
cereal crop yields in 2009 helped produce economic growth. The International Monetary Fund
(IMF) praised the government’s response to the crisis, while calling for further reforms to
improve the business environment and increase productivity.55
In February 2010, the government unveiled a $206 million state-guaranteed public-private sector
fund to increase the competitiveness of key industrial sectors by financing credits, banking
services, and real estate costs. Targeted sectors include automobiles, technologies, aeronautics,
services, and telecommunications. The fund hopes to create up to 220,000 jobs and boost overall
development.
Oil imports (largely from Saudi Arabia, Iran, Iraq, and Nigeria) supply 97% of the country’s
energy needs, and price increases have therefore had detrimental effects on the economy.
Morocco has adopted a proactive approach to finding renewable energy sources with the goal of
producing 42% of the country’s electrical capacity from them by 2020. In November 2009, the
government announced plans to invest more than $9 billion to install 2,000 megawatts of solar
power. It also expressed interest in an ambitious European plan, called Desertec, to draw solar
power from the Sahara. In June 2010, the king inaugurated a $300 million wind/165 turbine farm
off Tangiers to generate 140 megawatts of energy when completed. Morocco’s reported plans to
pursue a domestic nuclear energy program have not advanced beyond the consideration and
planning phase.
Western Sahara56
The dispute between Morocco and the independence-seeking Popular Front for the Liberation of
Saqiat al-Hamra and Rio de Oro (POLISARIO) over the former Spanish colony south of Morocco
remains unresolved. Morocco occupies 80% of the Western Sahara, considers the region its three
southern provinces, will only accept a solution that guarantees it sovereignty over “the whole of
its territories,” and will only negotiate on that basis. A U.N. peacekeeping mission, originally
designed to oversee a referendum on independence, has monitored a ceasefire between Morocco
and the POLISARIO since 1991. In October 2001, Morocco authorized French and U.S. oil
companies to explore off the Saharan coast, and the prospect of discoveries, as yet unrealized,
may have hardened Morocco’s resolve to retain the region.
The king submitted an autonomy plan for the region to the U.N. in April 2007, which asserts
Moroccan sovereignty, and Moroccan and POLISARIO negotiators continue to meet for informal
talks under U.N. auspices.57 In line with his autonomy initiative, King Mohammed VI has
pursued policies of decentralization or regionalization that he says are intended to empower
residents of his Saharan provinces. On April 10, 2007, then-Undersecretary of State Nicholas
Burns stated that the United States considers the Moroccan autonomy plan for the Western Sahara
“serious and credible.” Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton indicated in 2009 that U.S.
policy on the issue was unchanged, and the United States continues to call on Morocco and
Algeria to engage in unconditional negotiations. In a joint appearance with Moroccan Foreign
Minister Fassi Fihri in March 2011, Clinton stated that the United States views the Moroccan

55 IMF, Morocco: 2009 Article IV Consultation—Staff Report, March 2010.
56 See also CRS Report RS20962, Western Sahara, by Alexis Arieff.
57 For text of plan, see http://www.map.ma/eng/sections/politics/sahara_issue__full_t/view.
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autonomy plan as “serious, realistic, and credible—a potential approach to satisfy the aspirations
of the people in the Western Sahara to run their own affairs in peace and dignity.” She also
reiterated U.S. support for the U.N.-backed talks aimed at “resolving this issue.”58
The current Personal Envoy of the U.N. Secretary General for the Western Sahara, former U.S.
Ambassador Christopher Ross, was appointed in January 2009. He has tried to obtain greater
support from interested countries, such as France, made several trips to the region for
consultations. Ross continues to convene informal talks between the parties (the latest round was
held in early 2011), but he has not reported any progress on core issues. Neither Morocco nor the
POLISARIO has shown interest in a compromise. Morocco believes that its autonomy initiative
is itself a compromise.
As noted above, Morocco’s policy on the Western Sahara issue has been accompanied by or
enforced with human rights abuses both in Morocco and in the Western Sahara. (See “Human
Rights,” above.) Rights advocates and some diplomats have long called for the inclusion of an
independent international human rights monitoring element in MINURSO’s mandate. Such
efforts have not gained traction at the U.N. Security Council, where France (a veto-capable
permanent member) has supported Moroccan objections. Still, MINURSO’s latest mandate
renewal by the Security Council, in April 2011, included language stressing “the importance of
improving the human rights situation in Western Sahara and the Tindouf camps [refugee camps
administered by the POLISARIO], and encouraging the parties to work with the international
community to develop and implement independent and credible measures to ensure full respect
for human rights.” The Security Council also welcomed “the establishment of a National Council
on Human Rights in Morocco and the proposed component regarding Western Sahara.”59
Foreign Policy
Algeria
Morocco and Algeria are the largest countries in North Africa and are neighbors, but they had
different colonial experiences and emerged as rivals with distinctly different forms of
government. Algeria achieved its independence via a bloody revolution and emerged as a republic
with military or military-influenced governments. Morocco is a centuries-old monarchy that made
a more peaceful transition from French control. Shortly after Algeria became independent,
Morocco laid claim to some Algerian territory, and they went to war for about five months in
1963-1964. The border was not demarcated until 1972.
The Western Sahara is now the main impediment to improving their bilateral relations and to
reviving the Arab Maghreb Union (UMA), a loose organization of Morocco, Tunisia, Algeria,
Mauritania, and Libya. Morocco refuses to compromise on the Western Sahara issue for the sake
of bilateral relations or the UMA. Algeria hosts and backs the POLISARIO. In July 2004, the
king abolished visa requirements for Algerians entering Morocco; in April 2006, Algerian
President Abdelaziz Bouteflika reciprocated the gesture. Since 2008, Morocco has repeatedly

58 State Department, Hillary Rodham Clinton, “Remarks with Moroccan Foreign Minister Taieb Fassi Fihri,” March
23, 2011.
59 U.N. Security Council Resolution 1979 (2011), April 27, 2011.
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requested that Algeria reopen their land border, which has been closed since 1994, but Algeria
refuses to do so on the grounds that it would be detrimental to its national security and benefit
Morocco more than Algeria.
In April 2011, signs of a thaw between the two countries briefly emerged. Algeria’s President
Bouteflika stated in a public address on April 17 that “there is no problem between Morocco and
Algeria,” adding that “the problem of the Western Sahara is a U.N. problem. Morocco is a
neighbor and friend.” In a media interview the same month, Algerian Foreign Minister Mourad
Medelci suggested that Algeria would consider opening the border.60 However, prospects for
concrete steps toward improved bilateral relations are unclear. In May, the Algerian embassy in
Washington accused Moroccan authorities of paying lobbyists to plant stories of Algerian and
POLISARIO mercenaries lending support to Libya’s Muammar Qadhafi, rumors of which have
circulated in the international press.61 Algeria and the POLISARIO deny the allegations.
Europe
Morocco’s Association Agreement with the European Union (EU) came into force on March 1,
2000, and is supposed to lead to a free trade agreement by 2012. In October 2008, Morocco
became the first southern Mediterranean country to be granted “advanced status relations” by the
EU, which further opened EU markets for Moroccan products. Morocco participates in the EU’s
Euro-Mediterranean Partnership and its Neighborhood Policy Plan and receives considerable EU
aid—€190 million ($265 million ) annually. The EU and Morocco also have bilateral economic
accords, such as a lucrative fisheries agreement that includes the coastline of disputed Western
Sahara. In March 2010, Morocco and the EU held their first summit, which Prime Minister Abbas
al Fassi, EU President Herman Van Rompuy, and European Commission President Jose Manuel
Barroso, among others, attended. Illegal immigration of Moroccans and of Sub-Saharan Africans
transiting Morocco to Europe and drug (cannabis and, more recently, cocaine) trafficking have
caused friction in Moroccan-European relations. High unemployment drives Moroccan youths to
Europe and EU-funded programs to shift farmers in the underdeveloped Rif Mountains from
cannabis cultivation to alternative crops have not been successful.
Morocco traditionally has had good relations with France and Spain, its former colonizers.
Relations with France, Morocco’s largest trading partner, are particularly close. Paris officially
supports U.N. efforts to resolve the Western Sahara dispute and Morocco’s autonomy proposal for
the region, and blocks Security Council initiatives on the matter that Morocco rejects. In turn,
Morocco has been a strong supporter of the EU’s Union for the Mediterranean (UfM) that Paris
initiated, but that has faced obstacles due to Arab objections to Israel’s participation.
Morocco’s relations with Spain have been intermittently discordant. Spain possesses two
territorial enclaves on Morocco’s Mediterranean coast, Ceuta and Melilla, that are vestiges of

60 El Watan, “La Politique des Petits Pas [CRS translation of quote],” April 28, 2011; and "Mourad Medelci Evoque la
Reprise des Relations avec le Maroc : ‘Il n’Est Pas Logique que les Frontières Restent Fermées,’" April 26, 2011.
61 Embassy of Algeria to the United States, “Is Morocco Seeking Regional Unity or Hegemony Over Its Neighbors?”
May 2011. Allegations of POLISARIO mercenaries fighting for Qadhafi first circulated in a Daily Telegraph (London)
report in April 2011, but were picked up in subsequent commentary by a former U.S. ambassador to Morocco who now
serves as an advisor to the Moroccan monarchy. See Con Coughlin, “Libya: Col Gaddafi ‘Has Spent £2.1m on
Mercenaries,’” Daily Telegraph, April 20, 2011; Edward M. Gabriel, “Mercenaries in Libya: Gadhafi’s Hired
Terrorists,” The Hill, May 16, 2011.
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colonialism, are claimed by Morocco, and sometimes cause bilateral tensions, as do other
territorial disputes and the Western Sahara issue. In October 2001, Morocco recalled its
ambassador from Madrid after pro-Saharan groups in Spain conducted a mock referendum on the
fate of the region. In July 2002, Spanish troops ejected Moroccan soldiers from the uninhabited
Perejel/Parsley or Leila Island off the Moroccan coast that Spain says it has controlled for
centuries. Diplomatic ties were not restored until January 2003. That July, Morocco complained
that Spain lacked neutrality on the Sahara issue when it chaired the Security Council and, in
October, Spain suspended arms sales to Morocco due to the Perejel crisis. Spanish Prime Minister
Jose Luis Rodriguez Zapatero visited Morocco in April 2004, and King Juan Carlos I visited in
January 2005; on both occasions, joint statements called for a negotiated settlement to the Sahara
issue—the Moroccan position. However, visits to Ceuta and Melilla by the Spanish prime
minister in January 2006 and monarchs in November 2007 again set back relations. The two
neighbors also have an unresolved dispute concerning territorial waters between Morocco and the
Spanish Canary Islands in the Atlantic Ocean. Morocco’s “super port” at Tangiers will pose
competition that concerns Spanish ports. Financed by Gulf countries, its construction began in
June 2009 and it is expected to achieve full capacity in 2014.
Territorial disputes, despite their drama, appear secondary to the continuing and productive
cooperation of Morocco and Spain in counterterrorism, counternarcotics, and efforts to stem
illegal immigration. Morocco notably assisted Spanish authorities in the investigation of the
March 2004 bombings in Madrid and this relationship continues. Moroccan soldiers have served
under Spanish command in the U.N. stabilization mission in Haiti and Moroccan gendarmes have
joined Spanish patrols to combat illegal immigration in the Strait of Gibraltar.
Middle East
The king chairs the Jerusalem Committee of the Organization of the Islamic Conference and
supports international efforts to achieve a two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict
resulting in a viable, contiguous, Palestinian state with Jerusalem as its capital. He recognized
President Mahmud Abbas as the legitimate leader of the Palestinian people in Abbas’s dispute
with Hamas and has urged Palestinian national unity in order to achieve their rights. In May 2011,
the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), a regional grouping that includes Saudi Arabia, Qatar,
Oman, Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates, and Kuwait, said it would consider membership for
Morocco, even though Morocco is not a Gulf state and does not have economic resources similar
to existing member states. Most analysts interpreted the GCC’s offer, which was also extended to
Jordan, as an attempt to shore up the two poorer, non-Gulf monarchies amid protests, shifting
U.S. policy, and growing Iranian influence in the region.
Morocco closed Israel’s liaison bureau in Morocco and Morocco’s office in Tel Aviv in reaction
to Israel’s conduct during the Palestinian intifadah (uprising) in 2001.The offices have not
reopened. Morocco condemned Israel’s conduct against Palestinian civilians during its December
2008/January 2009 military operation against Hamas in the Gaza Strip, and Moroccan political
groups of all stripes held some of the largest rallies in the Arab world in protest. In October 2009,
Mohammed VI called on “the international community … to exert pressure on Israel to make it
cease its oppressive practices directed against the helpless Palestinian people, and to compel it to
return forthwith to the negotiating table, comply with UN resolutions.”62 In November, Foreign

62 “King Calls for Pressure on Israel to Comply with UN Resolutions,” Maghreb Arabe Presse, October 28, 2009, Open
Source Center Document GMP20091028950071,
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Minister Taieb Fassi Fihri said that normalization of relations with Israel was not on the table
under current conditions and that Morocco continued to support that Arab Peace Initiative—
which promised Israel full normalization of relations in exchange for its withdrawal from all Arab
territories. The foreign ministry has denounced Israel’s settlement activity in east Jerusalem and
its attack on a flotilla attempting to deliver aid to the Gaza Strip in May 2010. In October 2010,
Israeli President Shimon Peres cancelled a visit to Morocco for the World Economic Forum
because he could not get a guaranteed meeting with the king. In May 2011, Morocco welcomed
President Obama’s efforts to achieve a negotiated agreement on Palestinian statehood.63
However, the king and others had maintained contacts with Israeli officials until the current
government took power in Jerusalem. In August 2005, he personally congratulated Prime
Minister Ariel Sharon on Israel’s withdrawal from the Gaza Strip. The bilateral link may be
unbreakable because some 600,000 Israelis are of Moroccan origin, and about 25,000 of them
travel to Morocco yearly. (There are about 5,000 Moroccan Jews still in Morocco.)
In March 2009, Morocco severed diplomatic relations with Iran, blaming it for “intolerable
interference in the internal affairs of the Kingdom.” The Foreign Ministry accused the Iranian
Embassy in Rabat of seeking to spread Shi’a Islam in the 99% Sunni kingdom. It also charged
Iranian officials with making unacceptable remarks following Morocco’s expression of solidarity
with Bahrain in the face of Iran’s claim to Bahrain.64 The situation rapidly deteriorated. Tehran
charged that Morocco’s decision harmed “the unity of the Islamic world” and the solidarity
needed to support the Palestinian people. Rabat rejected the allegation and argued that, “Iran is
not qualified to speak for the Islamic world.... Morocco does not need lessons from Iran or
anybody else to show solidarity with the Palestinian people.”65 Shortly after the dispute began,
King Mohammed VI acknowledged the Holocaust in a speech read in his name at a ceremony in
Paris, thereby indirectly answering Iranian President Mahmud Ahmadinejad’s Holocaust denials.
It was said that the speech was the first time an Arab leader took such a stand on the Holocaust.66
Relations with the United States
The United States and Morocco have long-term, good relations; Morocco was among the first
countries to recognize U.S. independence. Successive U.S. Administrations, of both political
parties, have viewed Morocco as a steady and close ally and as a moderate Arab state that
supports the Arab-Israeli peace process. In January 2009, King Mohammed VI congratulated
President Obama on his election and seized the opportunity “to say how satisfied I am with the
special strategic partnership between the Kingdom of Morocco and the United States of
America.”67 On April 8, 2009, after meeting Foreign Minister Fassi Fihri, Secretary of State
Clinton said, “We are so committed to our relationship and have a very high regard for the
extraordinary progress that has taken place in Morocco ... and we look forward to deepening and

63 Agence Maghreb Arabe Presse, “Morocco Welcomes US Vision for a Sovereign Palestinian State,” May 24, 2011.
64 Statement of Moroccan Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation, MAP News Agency, March 6, 2009, BBC
Monitoring Newsfile.
65 “Moroccan Government Spokesman on Reasons Behind Severing Ties with Iran,” Al-Quds al-Arabi, March 9, 2009,
BBC Monitoring Middle East.
66 Alfred de Montesquiou, “Morocco Challenges Middle East’s Holocaust Mindset,” Associated Press, July 27, 2009.
67 “King Congratulates Barack Obama on Investiture,” MAP news Agency, January 20, 2009, BBC Monitoring Middle
East.
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strengthening our relationship.”68 Senior U.S. officials continue to emphasize warm U.S.-
Moroccan relations and to characterize bilateral ties as a “strategic partnership.” Amid the
widespread political upheaval that has accompanied the 2011 “Arab Spring,” Moroccan officials
have sought to portray the United States partnership with Morocco as a key tool for furthering
U.S. policy interests in the region, and have urged the United States to deepen and broaden the
bilateral relationship.
Recently, U.S. officials have praised Morocco’s stance on NATO-led military intervention in
Libya. Morocco backs international intervention to implement U.N. Security Council Resolution
1973 and has provided humanitarian aid, though it has not participated militarily.69 In a joint
appearance with Moroccan Foreign Minister Fassi Fihri in March 2011, Secretary of State Clinton
thanked Fihri “for Morocco’s leadership at the summit in Paris [an emergency meeting of allied
and Arab leaders on March 19 which endorsed military action and the establishment of a no-fly
zone]… and for Morocco’s important role in the Arab League’s decision to call for the protection
of Libyan civilians.”70 Morocco has also reportedly tried (to date, unsuccessfully), to initiate and
mediate negotiations between rebels and the Libyan government.
Security ties have been strengthened by cooperation in the fight against terrorism. An FBI team
helped investigate the 2003 Casablanca bombings, and the FBI and CIA Directors have visited
Rabat for consultations. In 2004, President Bush designated Morocco a major non-NATO ally.
Morocco is part of NATO’s Mediterranean Dialogue, has hosted and participated in NATO
military exercises, and has joined NATO’s Operation Active Endeavor, monitoring the
Mediterranean Sea for terrorists. In addition, bilateral U.S.-Moroccan military exercises are held
regularly.
Morocco is seeking to diversify its arms sources, a program that is benefitting U.S. companies.
Foreign military sales totaled $91.8 million in FY2010 and direct commercial sales totaled $86.0
million in FY2008 (latest figures available).71 Recent purchases have included 24 F-16 aircraft, 2
T-6 training aircraft, 90 AGM-D Maverick air-to-ground missiles, 200 Abrams M1A1 tanks, and
AN/AVS 9 night vision goggles. Advanced AM 120-C7 air-to-air medium-range missiles systems
and 26 advanced M198 155 mm towed guns are on order, with delivery expected in 2011.
Morocco also acquired a Gulfstream G550 aircraft for secure royal flights.
Bilateral relations have also focused on improving trade ties. A free trade agreement (FTA) with
Morocco (P.L. 108-302, August 17, 2004) came into effect on January 1, 2006. U.S. exports to
Morocco totaled over $1.5 billion in 2008, over $1.6 billion in 2009, and over $1.9 billion in
2010. Imports from Morocco were valued at $878.7 million in 2008, fell to $468 million in 2009
(in part due to the economic recession), and rose again to $685.4 million in 2010.72

68 Remarks with Moroccan Foreign Minister Dr. Taieb Fassi Fihri before their Meeting, April 8, 2009,
http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2009a/04/121509.htm.
69 See CRS Report R41725, Operation Odyssey Dawn (Libya): Background and Issues for Congress, coordinated by
Jeremiah Gertler.
70 State Department, Hillary Rodham Clinton, “Remarks with Moroccan Foreign Minister Taieb Fassi Fihri,” March
23, 2011.
71 U.S. Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA), “Morocco,” Country Information Paper, updated March 16,
2011.
72 U.S. International Trade Commission statistics, consulted May 27, 2011.
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U.S. Assistance
Morocco receives significant levels of U.S. development aid and benefits from security assistance
and cooperation programs. The United States has increased aid to Morocco to assist with
countering terrorism, democratization, fighting poverty, and the Free Trade Agreement. The
Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI), a regional democracy-promotion program, administers
some U.S. assistance funds, including programs to empower women, create jobs, improve
education, build trade union capacity, enhance fiscal and trade policies, and further judicial and
legal reform. Those directed at youth are intended to help prevent radicalization. In FY2009, $5.1
in “Section 1207” funds were allocated for a program in Morocco to teach life skills to at-risk
youth viewed as susceptible to terrorist messages.73 Morocco also benefits from assistance
administered through the U.S. Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP), an
interagency program (State Department, Defense Department, and U.S. Agency for International
Development) aimed at increasing North and West African states’ capacity to counter terrorism.
The Obama Administration has requested $43.7 million in bilateral foreign assistance for
Morocco in FY2012. Proposed aid will focus on education, economic growth, countering violent
extremism; strengthening civil society, local government, political parties, and justice sector;
improving human rights and anticorruption efforts in the criminal justice system; enhancing
counterterrorism capacities and cooperation; providing training for police and border security
agents; and military training and professionalization.74
Security assistance includes Foreign Military Financing (FMF) grants to maintain aging U.S.-
origin equipment, including aircrafts and transportation vehicles; boost maritime surveillance to
address illegal immigration, smuggling, drug trafficking, and illicit fishing; procure transport and
logistics equipment; and upgrade aerial surveillance. Morocco is one of the top twenty recipients
worldwide of International Military Education and Training (IMET) assistance, through which
senior military officers have received training in the United States. Morocco is one of the top five
recipients of Excess Defense Articles grants, and relies heavily on the program for the
procurement of trucks, tracked vehicles (tanks) and associated equipment. Morocco also benefits
from a U.S. National Guard State Partnership Program with Utah, which was established in 2003.
The State Department intends to provide training for Moroccan troops participating in multilateral
peacekeeping missions through the Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI).75 In May 2010,
nearly 1,000 U.S. military personnel from across the services and 1,000 members of the
Moroccan military participated in the latest iteration of an annual military exercise known as
African Lion. The exercise is designed to promote interoperability and mutual understanding of
military tactics, techniques and procedures.76
Morocco further benefits from assistance and grants administered by international financial
institutions that receive significant U.S. support. The World Bank, for example, has provided an

73 Until the end of FY2011, when this authority expired, Section 1207 funds were appropriated for the Department of
Defense and transferred to the State Department for “Stabilization and Security.” For more on this program, see CRS
Report RS22871, Department of Defense “Section 1207” Security and Stabilization Assistance: Background and
Congressional Concerns, FY2006-FY2010
, by Nina M. Serafino
74 State Department, FY2012 Congressional Budget Justification for Foreign Operations.
75 DSCA, “Morocco,” Country Information Paper, updated March 16, 2011.
76 U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM), “U.S. Service Members Arrive in Morocco for African Lion,” May 17, 2010.
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average of $700 million in assistance for Morocco (including aid programs focusing on
education, water, agriculture, environmental, and transportation) since 2008.77
Table 1. U.S. Bilateral Foreign Assistance to Morocco
(appropriations, thousands of dollars)
FY2011
FY2012
FY2008
FY2009
FY2010
Requesta
Request
ESF 15,374
0

3,000
3,000
0
FMF
3,625
3,655
9,000
9,000
9,000
IMET
1,713
1,916
1,789
1,900
1,900
INCLE
496
1,000
750
3,000
3,000
NADR
1,119
625
1,200
1,100
3,300
DA
4,136
18,000
19,546
24,500
26,454
Total
26,463 25,296
35,396 42,500 43,654
Source: Congressional Budget Justification for Foreign Operations, FY2010-FY2012.
Notes: (1) FMF=Foreign Military Financing, ESF=Economic Support Funds, IMET=International Military Education
and Training, INCLE=International Narcotics and Law Enforcement, NADR=Non-Proliferation, Antiterrorism,
Demining, and Related Activities, DA=Development Assistance. (2) Figures are not adjusted for inflation. (3)
Does not reflect assistance administered through regional programs, such as MEPI and TSCTP, or by U.S.
departments or agencies other than the State Department and the U.S. Agency for International Development
(USAID).
a. Actual FY2011 foreign aid al ocations by country are not yet available.
Millennium Challenge Grant
In August 2007, the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) approved a five-year, $697.5
million grant for Morocco to encourage economic growth by stimulating productivity and
increasing employment levels. At the time, it was the largest MCC grant to date.
Table 2. Millennium Challenge Corporation Programs
$ Millions
Program Amount
Fruit Tree Productivity
$300.90
Smal Scale Fisheries
$116.70
Artisan and Fez Medina
$111.87
Financial Services
$46.20
Enterprise Support
$33.50
Source: Millennium Challenge Corporation Announcement, October 12, 2007.
Note: The figures in the chart only total $609.17 million.

77 World Bank, “Robert B. Zoellick, President, World Bank Group Speech to Morocco Industry Summit, Casablanca,
Morocco,” May 5, 2011.
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Recent Congressional Actions
Some Members of Congress have, at times, sought to restrict U.S. assistance to Morocco in
connection with the Western Sahara issue, related human rights concerns, or concerns over
religious freedoms. Others are strongly supportive of the Moroccan government and its autonomy
proposal for the Western Sahara. Several Members of Congress expressed strong support for King
Mohammed VI’s announcement of reforms in March 2011.
In June 2010, the Congressional Tom Lantos Human Rights Commission held hearings on
Morocco’s expulsion of American Christians in March 2010. Representative Frank Wolf urged
suspension of Millennium funding “to a nation which blatantly disregards the rights of American
citizens residing in Morocco and forcibly expels American citizens without due process of law.”78
In an explanatory statement accompanying the FY2009 Omnibus Appropriations Act (P.L. 111-8,
March 11, 2009), appropriators directed the Secretary of State to report on “steps taken by the
Government of Morocco to protect human rights, and whether it is allowing all persons to: (1)
freely advocate their views regarding the status and future of the Western Sahara through the
exercise of their rights to peaceful expression and association; and (2) document violations of
human rights in the territory without harassment.”79 A similar reporting requirement was included
in the conference report accompanying the FY2010 Consolidated Appropriations Act (P.L. 111-
117, December 16, 2009).80 In January 2011, House Foreign Affairs Committee Chairwoman
Ileana Ros-Lehtinen temporarily placed a hold on the U.S. grant transfer to Morocco of trucks
valued at about $1.34 million, citing concerns over human rights in the Western Sahara.
Previously, the FY2008 Consolidated Appropriations Act, P.L. 110-161, December 26, 2007,
provided for the allocation of an additional $1 million in Foreign Military Financing (FMF) for
Morocco if the Secretary of State certified, among other things, that Morocco was allowing all
persons to advocate freely their views regarding the status and future of the Western Sahara
through the exercise of their rights to peaceful expression, association, and assembly and to
document violations of human rights in that territory without harassment. The original
amendment (S.Amdt. 2738), proposed by Senator Patrick Leahy and included in the Senate
version of the bill, would have allowed the appropriation of not more than $2 million in FMF for
Morocco until the Secretary of State certified that the government of Morocco had ceased to
persecute, detain, and prosecute individuals for peacefully expressing their opinions regarding the
status and future of the Western Sahara and for documenting violations of human rights, and
provided unimpeded access to internationally recognized human rights organizations, journalists,
and representatives of foreign governments to the Western Sahara.


78 Hannah Armstrong, “Christians Expelled, Morocco and US Spar over Religious Freedom,” Christian Science
Monitor
, June 17, 2010. The Senate expressed its concerns on the issue in S.Rept. 111-237, July 29, 2010, to
accompany S. 3676, State-Foreign Operations Appropriations Act, 2011. “The Committee on Appropriations directs
the Secretary of State to submit a report not later than 45 days after enactment of this act, detailing steps taken by the
Government of Morocco in the previous 12 months on human rights, including deportation of U.S. citizens in Morocco
without due process of law, and whether it is allowing all persons to advocate freely their views regarding the status
and future of the Western Sahara through the exercise of their rights to peaceful expression and association, and to
document violations of human rights in the territory without harassment.”
79 Explanatory statement submitted by the Chairman of the House Committee on Appropriations "as if it were a joint
explanatory statement of a committee of conference," February 23, 2009; Congressional Record, p. H2417.
80 H.Rept. 111-366, Congressional Record p. H14356.
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Author Contact Information

Alexis Arieff

Analyst in African Affairs
aarieff@crs.loc.gov, 7-2459


Acknowledgments
This is an update to a report authored by Carol Migdalovitz, now-retired CRS Specialist in Middle East
Affairs.

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