Iraq: Politics, Governance, and Human Rights
Kenneth Katzman
Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs
May 18, 2011
Congressional Research Service
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Iraq: Politics, Governance, and Human Rights

Summary
Iraq’s political system is increasingly characterized by peaceful competition and formation of
cross-sectarian alliances. However, ethnic and sectarian political and sometimes violent infighting
continues, often involving the questionable use of key levers of power and legal institutions. This
infighting—and the belief that holding political power may mean the difference between life and
death for the various political communities—significantly delayed agreement on a new
government that was to be selected following the March 7, 2010, national elections for the
Council of Representatives (COR, parliament). With U.S. diplomatic help, on November 10,
2010, major ethnic and sectarian factions agreed on a framework for a new government, breaking
the long deadlock. The agreement, under which Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki is serving a second
term, was implemented when a broad-based cabinet was confirmed on December 21, 2010.
The participation of all major factions in the new government was considered stabilizing
politically and created some political momentum to act on key outstanding legislation crucial to
attracting foreign investment, such as national hydrocarbon laws. The new government took
action on some long-stalled initiatives, including year-long tensions over Kurdish exports of oil.
However, the lack of a broader and sustained focus on governance, or on improving key services,
such as electricity, created popular frustration that manifested as protests since February 2011.
The demonstrations were partly inspired by the wave of unrest that has broken out in many other
Middle Eastern countries, but were not centered on overthrowing the regime or wholesale
political change. Some force has been used to suppress them, but the main effect has been to
renew tensions among and within major factions rather than to prompt new attempts to improve
government performance.
Among ongoing schisms, Sunni Arabs fear that Maliki and his Shiite allies seek to monopolize
power. The Kurds are wary that Maliki will not honor pledges to resolve Kurd-Arab territorial
and financial disputes. There are significant tensions between Sunni Arabs and the Kurds over
territory and governance in parts of northern Iraq, particularly Nineveh Province. Some Iraqi
communities, including Christians, are not necessarily at odds with the government but they have
been targeted by insurgent attacks in late 2010 and early 2011.
These splits cloud the approaching completion of a U.S. military withdrawal from Iraq at the end
of 2011, in keeping with a 2008 U.S.-Iraq Security Agreement. With the formal end of the U.S.
combat mission on August 31, 2010, U.S. forces have dropped to 47,000, from a 2008 high of
170,000. Continuing high profile attacks, although sporadic and relatively infrequent, have
caused some experts to question whether security will deteriorate to the point where Iraq becomes
a “failed state” after 2011, unless Iraq requests the continued presence of U.S. forces after that
time. Such a potential request has been the focus of several high-level U.S. visits to Iraq since
March and April 2011, during which senior U.S. officials have expressed concerns about the
ability of Iraqi forces to secure Iraq and its borders if all U.S. troops were to depart. If all U.S.
troops leave at the end of 2011, some question the ability of the U.S. State Department to secure
its facilities and personnel and to carry out its mission on its own.
There are also continuing concerns over Iranian influence over Iraq as U.S. forces depart. Iran’s
main protégé in Iraq, Moqtada Al Sadr, has returned to Iraq as of the beginning of 2011, and
argues against a continued U.S. military presence beyond 2011. Sadr also appears to be using the
deficiencies of the Maliki government as a way to bolster his faction’s position and potentially to
justify reactivating his armed Mahdi Army militia.
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Contents
Overview of the Political Transition/First Elections ..................................................................... 1
Initial Transition and Construction of the Political System..................................................... 1
January 30, 2005, Elections for an Interim Government......................................................... 1
Permanent Constitution ......................................................................................................... 2
December 15, 2005, Elections ............................................................................................... 3
Post-2005 Elections and Steps Toward Reconciliation ................................................................. 3
The Strengthening of Maliki and the Iraqi Government: 2008-2009....................................... 4
Attempts to Decentralize Governance: January 31, 2009, Provincial Elections................. 5
The March 7, 2010, Elections: Coalitions and Political Infighting.......................................... 7
Election Law Dispute and Final Provisions ..................................................................... 9
Election Parameters ...................................................................................................... 10
Flashpoint: Disqualification of Some Prominent Sunnis ................................................ 11
Election and Results...................................................................................................... 12
Post-Election Government............................................................................................. 13
Political Agreement Reached......................................................................................... 14
New Government Formed ............................................................................................. 15
Unresolved Political Schisms .............................................................................................. 16
Sunni Community ......................................................................................................... 16
KRG-Central Government Disputes/Combined Security Mechanism............................. 17
The Sadr Faction and Its Position .................................................................................. 19
Related Governance Issues........................................................................................................ 20
2011 Unrest ........................................................................................................................ 20
Government Response and Prospects ............................................................................ 21
General Human Rights Issues.............................................................................................. 22
Media and Free Expression ........................................................................................... 22
Labor Rights ................................................................................................................. 22
Situation of the Christian Religious Minority ................................................................ 23
Corruption .................................................................................................................... 23
Mass Graves ................................................................................................................. 23
Camp Ashraf................................................................................................................. 24
Regional Dimension.................................................................................................................. 24
Implications for the Wind Down of the U.S. Military Mission ................................................... 25
Other Elections Possible...................................................................................................... 28

Tables
Table 1. Major Coalitions for 2010 National Elections................................................................. 9
Table 2. March 2010 COR Election: Final, Certified Results by Province .................................. 27
Table 3. U.S. Assistance to Iraq: FY2003-FY2012 Request ....................................................... 29
Table 4. Recent Democracy Assistance to Iraq........................................................................... 30
Table 5. January 31, 2009, Provincial Election Results (Major Slates) ....................................... 31
Table 6. Election Results (January and December 2005) ............................................................ 32
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Table 7. Assessments of the Benchmarks................................................................................... 33

Contacts
Author Contact Information ...................................................................................................... 35

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Overview of the Political Transition/First Elections
Iraq has completed a formal political transition from the dictatorship of Saddam Hussein to a
plural polity that encompasses varying sects and ideological and political factions. That transition
has been accomplished through a series of elections that began in 2005, after a one-year
occupation period and a subsequent seven-month interim period of Iraqi self-governance.
However, disputes over the relative claim of each community on power and economic resources
permeate almost every issue in Iraq, including security, elections, economic decision making, and
foreign policy. The constant infighting over these issues has contributed to popular frustration
over the lack of focus on improving governance and delivery of services.
Initial Transition and Construction of the Political System
After the fall of Saddam Hussein’s regime in April 2003, the United States set up an occupation
structure, reportedly based on concerns that immediate sovereignty would favor major factions
and not produce democracy. In May 2003, President Bush, reportedly seeking strong leadership in
Iraq, named Ambassador L. Paul Bremer to head a “Coalition Provisional Authority” (CPA),
which was recognized by the United Nations as an occupation authority. Bremer discontinued a
tentative political transition process and instead appointed (July 13, 2003) a non-sovereign Iraqi
advisory body, the 25-member “Iraq Governing Council” (IGC). During that year, U.S. and Iraqi
negotiators, advised by a wide range of international officials and experts, drafted a “Transitional
Administrative Law” (TAL, interim constitution), which became effective on March 4, 2004.
After about one year of occupation, the United States, following a major debate between the CPA
and various Iraqi factions over the modalities and rapidity of a resumption of Iraqi sovereignty,
handed sovereignty to an appointed Iraqi interim government on June 28, 2004. That date was
two days ahead of the TAL-specified date of June 30, 2004, for the handing over of Iraqi
sovereignty and the end of the occupation period, which also laid out the elections roadmap
discussed below. The interim government was headed by a prime minister, Iyad al-Allawi, leader
of the Iraq National Accord, a secular, non-sectarian faction but whose supporters are mostly
Sunni Arabs. Allawi is a Shiite Muslim but many INA leaders were Sunnis, and some of them
were formerly members of the Baath Party. The president of this interim government was Ghazi
al-Yawar, a Sunni tribal figure.
January 30, 2005, Elections for an Interim Government
A series of elections in 2005 produced the full-term government structure that is in place today. In
accordance with the dates specified in the TAL, the first post-Saddam election was held on
January 30, 2005. The voting was for a 275-seat transitional National Assembly (which formed an
executive), four-year term provincial councils in all 18 provinces and a Kurdistan regional
assembly (111 seats). The election for the transitional Assembly was conducted according to the
“proportional representation/closed list” election system, in which voters chose among “political
entities” (a party, a coalition of parties, or persons). A total of 111 entities were on the national
ballot, of which nine were multi-party coalitions.
Still restive over their displacement from power in the 2003 U.S. invasion, Sunni Arabs (20% of
the overall population) boycotted, winning only 17 Assembly seats, and only one seat on the 51-
seat Baghdad provincial council. That council was dominated (28 seats) by representatives of the
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Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI), then led by Abd al-Aziz al-Hakim. (In August 2003,
when Abd al-Aziz’s brother, Mohammad Baqr al-Hakim, was assassinated in a bombing outside a
Najaf mosque, Abd al-Aziz succeeded his brother as ISCI leader. After Abd al-Aziz al-Hakim’s
death from lung cancer in August 2009, his son Ammar, born in 1971, succeeded him.)
Radical Shiite cleric Moqtada Al Sadr, whose armed faction (the militia operated under the name
Mahdi Army) was then at odds with U.S. forces, also boycotted, leaving his faction poorly
represented on provincial councils in the Shiite south and in Baghdad. The resulting transitional
government placed Shiites and Kurds in the highest positions—Patriotic Union of Kurdistan
(PUK) leader Jalal Talabani was president and Da’wa (Shiite party) leader Ibrahim al-Jafari was
prime minister. Sunnis were Assembly speaker, deputy president, a deputy prime minister, and six
ministers, including defense.
Permanent Constitution
The elected Assembly was to draft a permanent constitution by August 15, 2005, to be put to a
referendum by October 15, 2005, subject to veto by a two-thirds majority of voters in any three
provinces. On May 10, 2005, a 55-member drafting committee was appointed, but with only two
Sunni Arabs (15 Sunnis were later added as full members and 10 as advisors). In August 2005,
the talks produced a draft, providing for
• a December 31, 2007, deadline to hold a referendum on whether Kirkuk (Tamim
province) would join the Kurdish region (Article 140);
• designation of Islam as “a main source” of legislation;1
• a 25% electoral goal for women (Article 47);
• families choosing which courts to use for family issues (Article 41); making only
primary education mandatory (Article 34);
• having Islamic law experts and civil law judges on the federal supreme court
(Article 89).
Many women opposed the two latter provisions as giving too much discretion to male family
members. It made all orders of the U.S.-led occupation authority (Coalition Provisional Authority,
CPA) applicable until amended (Article 126), and established a “Federation Council” (Article
62), a second chamber with size and powers to be determined in future law (not adopted to date).
The major disputes—never fully resolved—centered on regional versus centralized power. The
draft permitted two or more provinces together to form new autonomous “regions”—reaffirmed
in passage of an October 2006 law on formation of regions. Article 117 allows “regions” to
organize internal security forces, legitimizing the fielding of the Kurds’ peshmerga militia
(allowed by the TAL). Article 109 requires the central government to distribute oil and gas
revenues from “current fields” in proportion to population, and gave regions a role in allocating
revenues from new energy discoveries. Disputes over these concepts continue to hold up passage
of national hydrocarbons legislation. Sunnis dominate areas of Iraq that have few proven oil or
gas deposits, and favor centralized control of oil revenues, whereas the Kurds want to maintain
maximum control of their own burgeoning energy sector.

1 http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/10/12/AR2005101201450.html.
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With contentious provisions unresolved, Sunnis registered in large numbers (70%-85%) to try to
defeat the constitution, prompting a U.S.-mediated agreement (October 11, 2005) providing for a
panel to propose amendments within four months after a post-December 15 election government
took office (Article 137), to be voted on within another two months (under the same rules as the
October 15 referendum). The Sunni provinces of Anbar and Salahuddin (which includes
Saddam’s home town of Tikrit) had a 97% and 82% “no” vote, respectively, but the constitution
was adopted because Nineveh province only voted 55% “no,” missing the threshold for a “no”
vote by a two-thirds majority in three provinces.
December 15, 2005, Elections
The December 15, 2005, elections were for a full-term (four-year) national government (also in
line with the schedule laid out in the TAL). Under the voting mechanism used for that election,
each province contributed a predetermined number of seats to a “Council of Representatives”
(COR)—a formula adopted to attract Sunni participation. Of the 275-seat body, 230 seats were
allocated this way, with 45 “compensatory” seats for entities that would have won additional seats
had the constituency been the whole nation. There were 361 political “entities,” including 19
multi-party coalitions, competing in a “closed list” voting system (in which party leaders choose
the persons who will actually sit in the Assembly). As shown in Table 5, voters chose lists
representing their sects and regions, and the Shiites and Kurds again emerged dominant. The
COR was inaugurated on March 16, 2006, but political infighting caused the Shiite bloc “United
Iraqi Alliance” to replace Jafari with another Da’wa figure, Nuri Kamal al-Maliki, as prime
minister.
On April 22, 2006, the COR approved Talabani to continue as president. His two deputies were
Adel Abd al-Mahdi (incumbent) of the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI) and Tariq al-
Hashimi, leader of the broad Sunni-based coalition called the Accord Front (“Tawafuq”—within
which Hashimi leads the Iraqi Islamic Party). Another Accord figure, the hardline Mahmoud
Mashhadani (National Dialogue Council party), became COR speaker. Maliki won COR approval
of a 37-member cabinet (including two deputy prime ministers) on May 20, 2006. Three key slots
(Defense, Interior, and National Security) were not filled permanently until June 2006, due to
infighting. Of the 37 posts, there were 19 Shiites; nine Sunnis; eight Kurds; and one Christian.
Four were women.
Post-2005 Elections and Steps Toward Reconciliation
The 2005 elections were, at the time, considered successful by the Bush Administration but did
not resolve the Sunni-Arab grievances over their diminished positions in the power structure.
Some argue that the elections in 2005 worsened the violence by exposing the new-found
subordination of the Sunni Arabs. The Sunni-led insurgency accelerated in the two subsequent
years, in turn prompting the empowerment of Shiite militia factions to counter the insurgency.
The sectarian violence was so serious that many experts, by the end of 2006, were considering the
U.S. mission as failing.
In August 2006, the Administration and Iraq agreed on a series of “benchmarks” that, if adopted
and implemented, might achieve political reconciliation. Under Section 1314 of a FY2007
supplemental appropriation (P.L. 110-28), “progress” on 18 political and security benchmarks—
as assessed in Administration reports due by July 15, 2007, and then September 15, 2007—was
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required for the United States to provide $1.5 billion in Economic Support Funds (ESF) to Iraq.
President Bush used the waiver provision. The law also mandated an assessment by the GAO, by
September 1, 2007, of the degree to which the benchmarks have been met, as well as an outside
assessment of the Iraqi security forces (ISF).
In early 2007, the United States began a “surge” of about 30,000 additional U.S. forces (bringing
U.S. troop levels to about 170,000 at the height of the surge) intended to blunt insurgent
momentum and take advantage of growing Sunni Arab rejection of extremist groups. As 2008
progressed, citing the achievement of many of the major legislative benchmarks and a dramatic
drop in sectarian violence that was attributed to surge—the Bush Administration asserted that
political reconciliation was advancing. However, U.S. officials maintained that the extent and
durability of reconciliation would depend on the degree of implementation of adopted laws, on
further compromises among ethnic groups, and on continued attenuated levels of violence. For
Iraq’s performance on the benchmarks, see Table 7.
The Strengthening of Maliki and the Iraqi Government: 2008-2009
The passage of Iraqi laws in 2008 considered crucial to reconciliation, the continued reductions in
violence accomplished by the U.S. surge, and the continued turn of many Sunni militants away
from violence, enhanced Maliki’s political position. A March 2008 offensive ordered by Maliki
against the Sadr faction and other militants in Basra and environs (“Operation Charge of the
Knights”) pacified the city and caused many Sunnis and Kurds to see Maliki as less sectarian.
This contributed to a decision in July 2008 by the Accord Front to end its one-year boycott of the
cabinet. Other cabinet vacancies were filled with independents, and Maliki’s position was
secured. (Earlier, in 2007 the Accord Front, the Sadr faction, and the bloc of former Prime
Minister Iyad al-Allawi pulled out of the cabinet, leaving it with 13 vacant seats, out of 37 cabinet
slots.)
Although Maliki’s growing strength increased the Bush and then Obama Administration’s
optimism for continued stability, Maliki’s strength caused concern among Maliki’s erstwhile
political allies. They saw him as creating or restructuring security organs to report to his office
rather than the Defense or Interior ministries. Through his Office of the Commander-in-Chief, he
took direct command of the National Counter-Terrorism Force (about 10,000 personnel) as well
as the Baghdad Brigade, responsible for security in the capital. In 2008, the Kurds were highly
critical of his formation of government-run “tribal support councils” in northern Iraq, which the
Kurds see as an effort to prevent them from gaining control of disputed territories that they want
to integrate into their Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG). Other support councils were
created in southern Iraq. As a later example, in February 2010, Maliki’s government reportedly
directed the Iraqi Army’s Fourth Division to cordon a provincial council building in Tikrit to
influence the resolution of a dispute over the Salahuddin provincial council’s ousting of the
former governor of the province.2

2 Myers, Steven Lee and Anthony Shadid. “Maliki Faulted On Using Army in Iraqi Politics.” New York Times,
February 11, 2010.
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Attempts to Decentralize Governance: January 31, 2009, Provincial Elections
The January 31, 2009, provincial elections represented an opportunity for Maliki’s opponents to
try to ensure that neither he, nor any future prime minister, could centralize power to the extent
witnessed under Saddam Hussein’s rule. In addition to the checks and balances established in the
central government, a 2008 “provincial powers law” was intended to decentralize Iraq by setting
up powerful provincial councils that decide on local allocation of resources. The provincial
councils in Iraq choose each province’s governor and governing administrations—in contrast to
Afghanistan, where provincial governors are appointed by the president. Some central
government funds are given directly to provincial administrations for their use, although most
Iraqi funds are allocated centrally.
ISCI, which had already been distancing itself from its erstwhile ally, Maliki’s Da’wa Party, ran
under a separate slate in the provincial elections—thus splitting up the formerly powerful UIA.
Ideologically, ISCI favors more power for the provinces and less for the central government;
Maliki prefers centralization.
The provincial elections had originally been planned for October 1, 2008, but were delayed when
Kurdish restiveness over integrating Kirkuk and other disputed territories into the KRG caused a
presidential council veto of the July 22, 2008, election law needed to hold these elections. That
draft provided for equal division of power in Kirkuk (among Kurds, Arabs, and Turkomans) until
its status is finally resolved, a proposal strongly opposed by the Kurds. On September 24, 2008,
the COR passed a final election law, providing for the elections by January 31, 2009, and putting
off provincial elections in Kirkuk and the three KRG provinces.3
In the elections, about 14,500 candidates vied for the 440 provincial council seats in the 14 Arab-
dominated provinces of Iraq. About 4,000 of the candidates were women. The average number of
council seats per province was about 30,4 down from a set number of 41 seats per province
(except Baghdad) in the 2005-2009 councils. The Baghdad provincial council has 57 seats. This
yielded an average of more than 30 candidates per council seat. However, the reduction in
number of seats also meant that many incumbents were not reelected.
The provincial elections were conducted on an “open list” basis—voters were able to vote for a
party slate, or for an individual candidate (although they also had to vote for that candidate’s
slate). This procedure encouraged voting for slates and strengthened the ability of political parties
to choose who on their slate will occupy seats allotted for that party. This election system was
widely assessed to favor larger, well-organized parties, because smaller parties might not meet the
vote threshold to obtain any seats on the council in their province.5 This was seen as likely to set
back the hopes of some Iraqis that the elections would weaken the Islamist parties, both Sunni
and Shiite, that have dominated post-Saddam politics.
About 17 million Iraqis (any Iraqi 18 years of age or older) were eligible for the vote, which was
run by the Iraqi Higher Election Commission (IHEC). Pre-election-related violence was minimal,

3 The election law also stripped out provisions in the vetoed version to allot 13 total reserved seats, spanning six
provinces, to minorities. An October 2008 amendment restored six reserved seats for minorities: Christian seats in
Baghdad, Nineveh, and Basra; one seat for Yazidis in Nineveh; one seat for Shabaks in Nineveh; and one seat for the
Sabean sect in Baghdad.
4 Each provincial council has 25 seats plus one seat per each 200,000 residents over 500,000.
5 The threshold for winning a seat is the total number of valid votes divided by the number of seats up for election.
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although five candidates and several election/political workers were killed. There were virtually
no major violent incidents on election day. Turnout was about 51%, somewhat lower than some
expected. Some voters complained of being turned away at polling places because their names
were not on file. Other voters had been displaced by sectarian violence in prior years and were
unable to vote in their new areas of habitation.
The vote totals were finalized on February 19, 2009, and were certified on March 29, 2009.
Within 15 days of that (by April 13, 2009) the provincial councils began to convene under the
auspices of the incumbent provincial governor, and to elect a provincial council chairperson and
deputy chairperson. Within another 30 days after that (by May 12, 2009) the provincial councils
selected (by absolute majority) a provincial governor and deputy governors. The term of the
provincial councils is four years from the date of their first convention.
Outcomes
Some concerns of Maliki’s opponents—and of those who favor decentralized power—were
realized when his allies in his “State of Law Coalition” were clear winners of the provincial
elections. His Shiite opponents (his former allies) all ran separate slates and fared generally
poorly. With 28 out of the 57 total seats, the Maliki slate gained control of the Baghdad provincial
council, displacing ISCI. Da’wa also emerged very strong in most of the Shiite provinces of the
south, including Basra, where it won an outright majority (20 out of 35 seats).
Although Maliki’s coalition fared well, the subsequent efforts to form provincial administrations
demonstrated that he still needed to strike bargains with rival factions, including Sadr, ISCI, and
even the Sunni list of Saleh al-Mutlaq (National Dialogue Front) that contains many ex-Baathists.
The provincial administrations that took shape are discussed in Table 5. Aside from the victory of
Maliki’s slate, the unexpected strength of secular parties, such as that of former Prime Minister
Iyad al-Allawi, corroborated the view that voters favored slates committed to Iraqi nationalism
and strong central government.
The apparent big loser in the elections was ISCI, which had been favored because it is well
organized and well funded. ISCI did not win outright in Najaf province, which it previously
dominated and which, because of Najaf’s revered status in Shiism, is considered a center of
political gravity in southern Iraq. It won seven seats there, the same number that was won by the
Maliki slate. ISCI won only 3 seats on the Baghdad province council, down from the 28 it held
previously, and only 5 in Basra. Some observers believe that the poor showing for ISCI was a
product not only of its call for devolving power out of Baghdad, but also because of its perceived
close ties to Iran, which some Iraqis believed was exercising undue influence on Iraqi politics.
Others say ISCI was perceived as interested in political and economic gain for its supporters.
The Sadr faction, represented mainly in the “Independent Liberals Trend” list, did not come close
to winning outright control of any councils, although it won enough seats in several southern
provinces to, through deal-making, gain senior positions in a few southern provinces. The
showing of the Sadrists was viewed as reflecting voter disillusionment with parties that continue
to field militias—which many Iraqis blame for much of the violence that plagued Iraq after the
fall of Saddam Hussein.
Another important trend noted in the 2009 provincial elections was the increasing Sunni entry
into the political process. Participating in the provincial elections were Sunni tribal leaders
(“Awakening Councils”) who had recruited the “Sons of Iraq” fighters and who were widely
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credited for turning Iraqi Sunnis against Al Qaeda-linked extremists in Iraq. These Sunni tribalists
had largely stayed out of the December 2005 elections because their attention was focused
primarily on the severe violence in the Sunni provinces, particularly Anbar. These tribal figures
were, at the time of the December 2005 election, still intimidated by Al Qaeda in Iraq, which
urged Sunnis to stay completely out of the political process. However, in the 2009 provincial
elections, as the violence ebbed, these Sunni tribalists offered election slates and showed strength
at the expense of the established Sunni parties, particularly the Iraqi Islamic Party (IIP) and the
National Dialogue Council. The main “Iraq Awakening” tribal slate came in first in Anbar
Province. The tribalists benefitted from the decline of the IIP and other mostly urban Sunni
parties, including the National Dialogue Council.
In Diyala Province, hotly contested among Shiite and Sunni Arab and Kurdish slates, the
provincial version of the (Sunni Arab) Accord Front edged out the Kurds for first place, and
subsequently allied with the Kurds and with ISCI to set up the provincial administration. There
continues to be substantial friction between Sunni and Shiite Arabs in that province, in part
because Sunni militants drove out many Shiites from the province at the height of the civil
conflict during 2005-2007.
The March 7, 2010, Elections: Coalitions and Political Infighting
After his slate’s strong showing in the January 2009 provincial elections, Maliki became the
immediate favorite to retain his position in the March 7, 2010, COR elections. The elected COR
chooses the full-term government, as discussed above. With many perceiving Maliki as the likely
winner for another term, Maliki was able to include some political competitors in some provinces,
including those dominated by Sunni Arabs and Sunni tribalists, into his State of Law coalition
that would compete in the national elections for a new COR. However, Sunnis were not in high
positions on his slate, and his slate was still perceived as primarily Shiite.
Maliki derived further political benefit from the U.S. implementation of the U.S.-Iraq “Security
Agreement” (SA, sometimes referred to as the Status of Forces Agreement, or SOFA), and
broader Strategic Framework Agreement. The latter agreement spells out long-term U.S.-Iraq
engagement on political, cultural, educational, and economic issues. The agreements were ratified
by the COR on November 27, 2008, over Sadrist opposition. The pacts took effect January 1,
2009, with the SA setting a timetable of December 31, 2011, for a complete U.S. troop
withdrawal. President Obama, on February 27, 2009, outlined a U.S. troop drawdown plan that
comports with the major provisions of the agreement. The President’s plan provided for a
drawdown of U.S. combat brigades by the end of August 2010—a benchmark which was met—
with a residual force of 50,000 primarily for training the Iraq Security Forces, to remain until the
end of 2011.
An interim benchmark in the SA was the June 30, 2009, withdrawal of U.S. combat troops from
Iraq’s cities. This was strictly implemented by U.S. forces, to the point where U.S. forces pulled
out of locations in the restive Mosul area and from Sadr City, where General Raymond Odierno
(then top U.S. commander in Iraq) felt U.S. forces should stay. Maliki hailed this interim
milestone as a “victory” and declared it a national holiday.
However, as 2009 progressed, Maliki’s image as protector of law and order was tarnished by
several high-profile attacks from mid-2009 to the eve of the election. Realizing the potential for
security lapses to reduce his chances to remain prime minister, Maliki ordered several ISF
commanders questioned for lapses in connection with the major bombings in Baghdad on August
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20, 2009, in which almost 100 Iraqis were killed and the buildings housing the Ministry of
Finance and of Foreign Affairs were heavily damaged. Makeshift alternate Ministry of Finance
buildings were attacked again on December 7, 2009. After this latter bombing, which also
resulted in the parliament’s insistence that it hear Maliki’s explanation of his responses, Maliki
replaced the commander of the Baghdad Brigade. He also attempted to place substantial blame
for the lapses on Interior Minister Jawad Bolani, who was heading a rival slate in the elections.
(See Table 1 on major slates in the election.) Some believe that insurgents conducted these and
other attacks with the intent of weakening Maliki’s image as a strong leader, while others saw
these incidents as insurgent effort to reignite civil war.
Politically, sensing Maliki’s weakness and a more open competition for prime minister, Shiite
unity broke down and a rival Shiite slate took shape as a competitor to Maliki’s State of Law. The
“Iraqi National Alliance (INA)” was composed of ISCI, Sadr, and other Shiite figures. The INA
coalition believed that each of its component factions would draw support from their individual
constituencies to produce an election majority or clear plurality. Sistani remained completely
neutral in the election, endorsing no slate, but calling on all Iraqis to participate.
To Sunni Arabs, the outwardly cross-sectarian Iraq National Movement (“Iraqiyya”) of former
transitional Prime Minister Iyad al-Allawi had strong appeal. There was an openly Sunni slate,
leaning Islamist, called the Accordance slate (“Tawaffuq”) led by IIP figures, but it was not
expected to fare well compared to Allawi’s less sectarian bloc. Some Sunni figures were recruited
to join Shiite slates.

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Table 1. Major Coalitions for 2010 National Elections
State of Law Coalition
Led by Maliki and his Da’wa Party. Includes Anbar Salvation Front of Shaykh
Hatim al-Dulaymi, which is Sunni, and the Independent Arab Movement of Abd
(slate no. 337)
al-Mutlaq al-Jabbouri. Appealed to Shiite sectarianism during the campaign by
backing the exclusion of candidates with links to outlawed Baath Party. Was
favored in the 2010 election due to strong showing in 2009 provincial elections.
Iraqi National Alliance
Formed in August 2009, was initial y considered the most formidable chal enger
to Maliki’s slate. Consists mainly of his erstwhile Shiite opponents and is
(slate no. 316)
perceived as somewhat more Islamist than the other slates. Includes ISCI, the
Sadrist movement, the Fadilah Party, the Iraqi National Congress of Ahmad
Chalabi, and the National Reform Movement (Da’wa faction) of former Prime
Minister Ibrahim al-Jafari. Possible Prime ministerial candidate from this bloc was
deputy President Adel Abd al-Mahdi, a moderate well respected by U.S. officials.
However, some observers say Chalabi—the key architect of the effort to
exclude candidates with Baathist ties—wanted to replace Maliki. This slate was
considered close to Ayatollah Sistani, but did not receive his formal
endorsement.
Iraqi National Movement
Formed in October 2009. Led by former Prime Minister Iyad al-Al awi (Iraq
National Accord) who is Shi te but his faction appeals to Sunnis, and Sunni leader
(“Iraqiyya”—slate no. 333)
Saleh al-Mutlaq (ex-Baathist who leads Iraq Front for National Dialogue). Backed
by Iraqi Islamic Party leader and Deputy President Tariq Al-Hashimi as well as
other powerful Sunnis, including Usama al-Nujaifi and Rafi al-Issawi. However,
Justice and Accountability Commission (formerly the De-Baathification
Commission) disqualified Mutlaq and another senior candidate on this slate,
Dhafir al Ani, for supporting the outlawed Baath Party. An appeals court affirmed
their disqualification (decision legislatively reversed after the election).
Kurdistan Alliance
Competed again in 2010 as a joint KDP-PUK Kurdish list. However, Kurdish
solidarity was shaken by July 25, 2009, Kurdistan elections in which a breakaway
(slate no. 372)
PUK faction called Change (Gorran) did unexpectedly well. Gorran ran its own
separate list for the March 2010 elections. However, PUK’s ebbing strength in
the north did not jeopardize Talabani’s continuation as president, although Sunnis
sought that position.
Unity Alliance of Iraq
Led by Interior Minister Jawad Bolani, a moderate Shiite who has a reputation for
political independence. Bolani has not previously been affiliated with the large
(slate no. 348)
Shiite parties such as ISCI and Dawa, and was only briefly affiliated with the
Sadrist faction (which has been strong in Bolani’s home town of Amarah, in
southeastern Iraq). Considered a non-sectarian slate, this list Included Sunni
tribal faction led by Shaykh Ahmad Abu Risha, brother of slain leader of the Sunni
Awakening movement in Anbar. The list included first post-Saddam defense
minister Sadun al-Dulaymi.
Iraqi Accordance
A coalition of Sunni parties, including breakaway factions of the Iraqi Islamic Party
(IIP). Led by Ayad al-Samarrai, speaker of the COR. Viewed as a weak
(slate no. 338)
competitor for Sunni votes against Al awi slate.
Sources: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace; various press.
Election Law Dispute and Final Provisions
While coalitions formed to challenge Maliki, disputes emerged over the ground rules for the
election. The holding of the elections required passage of an election law setting out the rules and
parameters of the election. Under the Iraqi constitution, the elections were to be held by January
31, 2010, in order to allow 45 days before the March 15, 2010, expiry of the current COR’s term.
Iraq’s election officials had ideally wanted a 90-day time frame between the election law passage
and the election date, in order to facilitate the voter registration process.
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Because the provisions of the election law (covering such issues as voter eligibility, whether to
allot quota seats to certain constituencies, the size of the next COR) have the potential to shape
the election outcome, the major Iraqi communities were divided over its substance. These
differences caused the COR to miss almost every self-imposed deadline to pass it. One dispute
was over the election system, with many COR members leaning toward a closed list system
(which gives the slates the power to determine who occupies actual COR seats after the election),
despite a call by Grand Ayatollah Sistani for an open list vote (which allows voters to also vote
for candidates as well as coalition slates). Each province served as a single constituency and a
fixed number of seats for each province (see Table 2, which includes number of COR seats per
province).
There was also a dispute over how to apply the election in disputed Tamim (Kirkuk) province,
where Kurds feared that the election law drafts would cause Kurds to be underrepresented. The
version of the election law passed by the COR on November 8, 2009 (141 out of 195 COR
deputies voting), called for using 2009 food ration lists as representative of voter registration. The
Kurds had sought this provision, facing down the insistence of many COR deputies to use 2005
voter lists, which presumably would contain fewer Kurds. A compromise in that version of the
law allowed for a process to review, for one year, complaints about fraudulent registration, thus
easing Sunni and Shiite Arab fears about an excessive Kurdish vote in Kirkuk.
However, this version guaranteed only a small quota of seats for Iraqis living abroad or who are
displaced—and Sunnis believed they would therefore be undercounted because it was mainly
Sunnis who had fled Iraq. On this basis, one of Iraq’s deputy presidents, Tariq al Hashimi, a Sunni
Arab, vetoed the law. The veto, on November 18, sent the law back to the COR. A new version
was adopted on November 23, but it was viewed as even less favorable to Sunni Arabs than the
first version, because it eliminated any reserved seats for Iraqis in exile. Hashimi again threatened
a veto, which he was required to exercise within 10 days. As that deadline was about to lapse, the
major factions, reportedly at the urging of U.S. and other diplomats, adopted a new law
(December 6, 2009).
Election Parameters
The compromise version, not vetoed by any member of the presidency council, provided for
• Expansion of the size of the COR to 325 total seats. Of these, 310 were allocated
by province, with the constituency sizes ranging from Baghdad’s 68 seats to
Muthanna’s seven. The COR size, in the absence of a recent census, was based
on taking 2005 population figures and adding 2.8% per year growth.6 (A new
census was scheduled to begin on October 24, 2010, although on October 2,
2010, Prime Minister Maliki postponed the census until at least December 2010.
The move presumably was intended to allow time for a full-term government to
be put in place, which would oversee the census. The census has not begun, as of
May 2011.)

6 Analysis of Iraq expert Reidar Visser. “The Hashemi Veto.” http://gulfanalysis.wordpress.com/2009/11/18/the-
hashemi-veto/.
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• The remaining 15 seats were to be minority reserved seats (8) and “compensatory
seats” (7)—seats allocated from “leftover” votes; votes for parties and slates that
did not meet a minimum threshold to achieve any seats outright.
• No separate electoral constituency for Iraqis in exile, so Iraqis in exile had their
votes counted in the provinces where these voters originated.
• An open list election system.
• An election date set for March 7, 2010.
Flashpoint: Disqualification of Some Prominent Sunnis
The electoral process since the end of 2005 has been at least partly intended to bring Sunni Arabs
ever further into the political structure and to turn them away from violence and insurgency.
Sunnis boycotted the January 2005 parliamentary and provincial elections and were, as a result,
poorly represented in all governing bodies. Sunni slates, consisting mainly of urban, educated
Sunnis, did participate in the December 2005 parliamentary elections. This represented an
apparent calculation that it would not serve Sunni interests to remain permanently alienated from
the political process.
The Sunni commitment to the political process appeared in some jeopardy in the context of a
major dispute over candidate eligibility for the March 2010 elections. Although a Sunni boycott
of the elections did not materialize, there was a Sunni Arab perception that the election might be
unfair because of this dispute. The acute phase of this political crisis began in January 2010 when
the Justice and Accountability Commission (the successor to the “De-Baathification
Commission” that worked since the fall of Saddam to purge former Baathists from government)
invalidated the candidacies of 499 individuals (out of 6,500 candidates running), spanning many
different slates, including Maliki’s State of Law list. The Justice and Accountability Commission
(JAC) is headed by Ali al-Lami, a Shiite who had been in U.S. military custody during 2005-2006
for alleged assistance to Iranian agents active in Iraq. He is perceived as answerable to or heavily
influenced by Ahmad Chalabi, who had headed the De-Baathification Commission. Both were
part of the Iraqi National Alliance slate and both are Shiites, leading many to believe that the
disqualifications represented an attempt to exclude prominent Sunnis from the vote.
The JAC argued that the disqualifications were based on law and careful evaluation of candidate
backgrounds and not based on sect, because many of the candidates disqualified were Shiites. The
IHEC reviewed and backed the invalidations on January 14, 2010; disqualified candidates had
three days to file an appeal in court. Apparently due in part to entreaties from the U.S. Embassy,
Vice President Joseph Biden (during a visit to Iraq on January 22, 2010) and partner embassies in
Iraq—all of which feared a return to instability—the appeals court at first ruled that disqualified
candidates could run in the election and clear up questions of Baathist affiliation afterwards.
However, reported pressure by Maliki and other Shiites caused the court to reverse itself on
February 12, 2010, and to disqualify 145 candidates. Twenty-six candidates were reinstated. The
remaining approximately 300 disqualified candidates had already been replaced by other
candidates on their respective slates. The slate most affected by the disqualifications was
Iraqiyya, because two of its leading candidates, National Dialogue Front party leader Saleh al-
Mutlaq and Dhafir al-Ani, both Sunnis, were barred from running.
The Iraqiyya slate did not, as a whole, call for a broad boycott—nor did Mutlaq himself call for a
boycott. Mutlaq was replaced as a candidate by his brother. The slate campaigned vigorously, and
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many Sunnis seemed to react by recommitting to a high turnout among their community, in order
to achieve political results through the election process. Even the JAC’s disqualification of an
additional 55 mostly Iraqiyya candidates the night before the election did not prompt a boycott.
The crisis appeared to prompt the February 16, 2010, comments by General Ray Odierno, then
the top U.S. commander in Iraq (who was replaced as of September 1, 2010, by his deputy,
General Lloyd Austin), that Iran was working through Chalabi and al-Lami to undermine the
legitimacy of the elections. General Odierno specifically asserted that Chalabi was in close
contact with an Iraqi, COR member Jamal al-Ibrahimi, who is an ally of Iranian General Qasem
Soleimani, who commands the Qods Force unit of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps
(IRGC).7 Chalabi’s successful efforts to turn the election into a campaign centered on excluding
ex-Baathists—which Sunnis view as a codeword for their sect—has caused particular alarm
among experts.
Election and Results
About 85 total coalitions were accredited for the March 7, 2010, election. There were about 6,170
total candidates running on all these slates and, as noted, Iraqis were able to vote for individual
candidates as well as overall slates. The major blocs are depicted in Table 1. All blocs offered
voters gifts and favors at pre-election rallies, and all available press reports indicate that
campaigning was vibrant and vigorous. Total turnout was about 62%, according to the IHEC.
Turnout was slightly lower in Baghdad because of the multiple insurgent bombings that took
place there just as voting was starting.
The final count was announced on March 26, 2010, by the IHEC. As noted in Table 2, Iraqiyya
won a plurality of seats, winning a narrow two-seat margin over Maliki’s State of Law slate. The
Iraqi constitution (Article 73) mandates that the COR “bloc with the largest number” of members
gets the first opportunity to form a government. On that basis, Allawi, leader of the Iraqiyya slate,
demanded the first opportunity to form a government. However, on March 28, 2010, Iraq’s
Supreme Court issued a preliminary ruling that any group that forms after the election could be
deemed to meet that requirement, laying the groundwork for Allawi to be denied the right to the
first opportunity to form a government.
The vote was to have been certified by April 22, 2010, but factional wrangling delayed this
certification. On March 21, 2010, before the count was final, Prime Minister Maliki issued a
statement, referring to his role as armed forces commander-in-chief, demanding the IHEC
respond to requests from various blocs for a manual recount of all votes. The IHEC responded
that any recount decisions are under its purview and that a comprehensive recount would take an
extended period of time. Several international observers, including U.N. Special Representative
for Iraq Ad Melkert, indicated that there was no cause, at that point, to suggest widespread fraud.
However, in response to an appeal by Maliki’s faction, on April 19, 2010, an Iraqi court ordered a
recount of votes in Baghdad Province. The recount in the province, which has 68 elected seats,
was completed on May 15, 2010, and did not result in an alteration of seat totals. This followed a
few days after the major factions agreed to put aside any JAC disqualifications of winning
candidates. With the seat count holding, the way was set for Iraq’s Supreme Court to certify the
results.

7 Gertz, Bill. “Inside the Ring.” Washington Times, February 18, 2010.
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The final certification came on June 1, 2010, and the following timelines were to apply.
• Fifteen days after certification (by June 15), the new COR was to be seated and
to elect a COR speaker and deputy speaker. (The deadline to convene was met,
although, as noted, the COR did not elect a leadership team and did not meet
again until November 11, 2010.)
• After electing a speaker, but with no deadline, the COR is to choose a president
(by a two-thirds vote). (According to Article 138 of the Iraqi constitution, after
this election, Iraq is to have a president and at least one vice president—the
“presidency council” concept was an interim measure that expired at the end of
the first full-term government.)
• Within another 15 days, the largest COR bloc is tapped by the president to form a
government. (The selection of a president occurred on November 11, 2010, and
Maliki was formally tapped to form a cabinet on November 25, 2010.)
• Within another 30 days (by December 25), the prime minister-designate (Maliki)
is to present a cabinet to the COR for confirmation (by majority vote).
Post-Election Government
In accordance with timelines established in the Constitution, the newly elected COR did convene
on June 15, 2010. However, the session ended after only 18 minutes and, because of the political
deadlock, it did not elect a COR leadership team. Under Article 52 of the Constitution, the “eldest
member” of the COR (Kurdish legislator Fouad Massoum) became acting COR speaker. During
the period when no new government was formed, the COR remained inactive, with most COR
members in their home provinces, but still collecting their $10,000 per month salaries. The
resentment over this contributed to the popular unrest in February 2011.
Allawi’s chances of successfully forming a government appeared to suffer a substantial setback in
May 2010 when Maliki’s slate and the rival Shiite INA bloc agreed to an alliance called the
“National Alliance.” However, the alliance was not able to agree to a prime minister selectee,
with the Sadr faction and ISCI opposing Maliki. With no agreement, the COR aborted its second
meeting scheduled for July 27, 2010. On August 3, 2010, this putative alliance splintered.
The various factions made little progress through August 2010, as Maliki insisted he remain
prime minister for another term. Some observers believe that bilateral meetings among bloc
leaders would not resolve the impasse and that only a broad meeting of the four major COR
blocs—Maliki’s bloc, the INA, Allawi’s Iraqiyya, and the Kurdistan Alliance—and discussing all
outstanding issues that face Iraq—would result in an agreement on a government. With the
factional disputes unresolved, Maliki remained prime minister in a caretaker role. Some observers
assert that he continued to govern as a caretaker, having had little incentive to see a new
government formed.
With the end of the U.S. combat mission on August 31, 2010, approaching, the United States
reportedly stepped up its involvement in political talks. Some discussions were held between
Maliki and Allawi’s bloc on a U.S.-proposed formulas under which Allawi, in return for
supporting Maliki, would head a new council that would have broad powers to rival those of the
prime minister. Alternate proposals had Allawi being given the presidency, although the Kurds
refused to cede that post to another community, fearing loss of leverage on other demands. The
Kurds’ insistence was despite the fact that there would not be a “presidency council” with an
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executive veto in the next government—the transitional provision for that power expired after the
first four-year government ended. An expectation that the August 10-September 11, 2010,
Ramadan period would enable the blocs to reach an agreement was not met.
On October 1, 2010, Iraq became a country with the distinction of having gone longer than any
other country without an agreed government following an election. Part of the difficulty forming
a government was the close result, and the dramatic implications of gaining or retaining power in
Iraq, where politics is often seen as a “winner take all” proposition. Others blamed Allawi for the
impasse, claiming that he was insisting on a large, powerful role for himself even though he could
not assemble enough COR votes to achieve a majority there.
Political Agreement Reached
On October 1, 2010, Maliki, possibly due to Iranian intervention, received the backing of most of
the 40 COR deputies of Shiite cleric Moqtada Al Sadr, bringing Maliki within striking distance of
obtaining the necessary votes to obtain another term as prime minister. The United States
reportedly was alarmed at the prospect that Maliki might be able to form a government primarily
on the strength of Sadr’s backing, but, in early November 2010, the United States, Allawi, and
many of the Sunni Arab regional states acquiesced to a second Maliki term. The key question that
remained was whether Maliki, and Iraq’s Kurds—who held the swing vote that could determine
the next government—would agree to form a broad based government that meets the demands of
Iraqiyya for substantial Sunni Arab inclusion. Illustrating the degree to which the Kurds
reclaimed their former role of “kingmakers,” Maliki, Allawi, and other Iraqi leaders met in the
capital of the Kurdistan Regional Government-administered region in Irbil on November 8, 2010,
to continue to negotiate on a new government. (Sadr did not attend the meeting in Irbil, but
ISCI/Iraq National Alliance slate leader Ammar Al Hakim did.)
On November 10, 2010, with reported direct intervention by President Obama, Allawi agreed to
support Maliki and Talabani to remain in their offices for another term, and for Iraqiyya to join
the new government. In exchange, an Iraqiyya figure reportedly would become COR Speaker,
another (perhaps Allawi himself) would chair the enhanced oversight body discussed above,
though renamed the “National Council for Strategic Policies,”8 and Iraqiyya would obtain several
major cabinet posts. Some observers praised the agreement as helpful to U.S. policy because an
agreement was signed among major factions, in Baghdad, with Masoud Barzani and U.S.
Ambassador to Iraq James Jeffries attending. The agreement did not specify concessions to the
Sadr faction, a development that observers viewed as a setback to Iran.
The November 11, 2010, COR session that would implement the agreement was held, and
Iraqiyya figure Usama al-Nujaifi was elected COR speaker, as agreed. However, Allawi and most
of his bloc walked out after three hours over the refusal of the other blocs to readmit the three
Iraqiyya members who had been disqualified from running for the COR by the JAC (see above on
the disqualification crisis). The walkout raised U.S. and other fears that the agreement might
immediately unravel, but the remaining COR members were sufficient for a quorum and Talabani
was re-elected president after two rounds of voting. Fears were calmed on November 13, 2010,
when most of Allawi’s bloc attended the COR session and continued to implement the settlement
agreement; Allawi himself did not attend. On November 25, 2010, Talabani formally tapped

8 Fadel, Leila and Karen DeYoung. “Iraqi Leaders Crack Political Deadlock.” Washington Post, November 11, 2010.
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Maliki as the prime minister-designate, giving him 30 days (until December 25) to name and
achieve majority COR confirmation for a new cabinet.
New Government Formed9
The stage was set for a new cabinet to be announced after December 19, when Allawi reaffirmed
his intent to join the government. Allawi’s assurance came the same day that the COR voted (with
barely a quorum achieved after a Shiite walkout of the vote) to reinstate to politics the three
senior members of his bloc, including Saleh al-Mutlaq, who had been barred from the March
2010 election by the Justice and Accountability Commission prior to the March election. (Mutlaq
was subsequently named one of the three deputy prime ministers.)
On December 21, 2010, in advance of the December 25, 2010, deadline, Maliki presented a
cabinet to the COR (42 seats, including the posts of prime minister, three deputy prime ministers,
and 38 ministries and ministers of state) receiving broad approval. No permanent appointments
were named for seven ministries. Still, the government formed was inclusive of all major
factions. Among major outcomes were the following.
• As for the State of Law list, Maliki remained prime minister, and retained for
himself the Defense, Interior, and National Security posts pending permanent
nominees for those positions. The faction holds seven other cabinet posts, in
addition to the post of first deputy president (Khudair Al Khuzai of the Da’wa
Party) and deputy prime minister for energy issues (Hussein Shahristani,
previously the oil minister). Maliki continues to holds the security posts—an
issue that has caused written recriminations between him and Allawi in April and
May 2011 and which threatens to potentially unravel the delicate governing
consensus.
• For Iraqiyya, in addition to Mutlaq becoming a deputy prime minister, Tariq al-
Hashimi remains a deputy president (the second deputy).10 The bloc also obtained
nine ministerial posts, of which a senior Iraqiyya figure, Rafi al-Issawi
(previously a deputy prime minister), is finance minister.
• For the Iraqi National Alliance, a senior figure, Adel Abdul Mahdi, remained one
of the three deputy presidents. The alliance also obtained 13 cabinet positions,
parceled out among its various factions. An INA technocrat Abd al Karim Luaibi,
was appointed oil minister. A Fadilah party member, Bushra Saleh, is a minister
of state without portfolio and was the only woman in the cabinet until the
February 13, 2011, naming of Ibtihal Al Zaidy as minister of state for women’s
affairs (although she is not from the INA). Another Fadila activist was named
minister of justice.
• Of the 13 INA cabinet seats, Sadr faction members head eight ministries,
including Housing, Labor and Social Affairs, Ministry of Planning (Ali Abd al-
Nabi, appointed in April 2011), and Tourism and Antiquities. A Sadrist also is one
of two deputy COR speakers. However, these positions are relatively junior

9 The following information is taken from Iraqi news accounts presented in http://www.opensource.gov.
10 Some sources say that Hashimi and another figure, Adel Abdul Mahdi, may not have received permanent
appointments to these second and third deputy presidential posts.
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within the cabinet and appeared to represent less influence for the Sadrists than
was anticipated when Sadr threw his backing to Maliki in October. Still, the Sadr
faction receive some compensatory influence in support for one of its members
becoming governor of Maysan Province.
• The Kurdistan Alliance received major posts. Talabani stayed president; and the
third deputy prime minister is Kurdish figure (PUK faction) Rows Shaways, who
has served in various central and KRG positions since the fall of Saddam. Arif
Tayfour is second deputy COR speaker. Alliance members have six other cabinet
seats, including longtime Kurdish (KDP) stalwart Hoshyar Zebari remaining in
position. He has been foreign minister since the transition governments that
followed the fall of Saddam. Khairallah Hassan Babakir, was named trade
minister in the February 13, 2011, “second wave” of ministerial appointments.
• An element of continued uncertainty has been the “National Council for Strategic
Policies.” Some proposals call for the council to include the prime minister,
president, their deputies, and a representative of all major blocs—and for
decisions of the council to be binding on Maliki if they achieve support of 80%
of the council members. However, the powers have not been voted on by the
COR, and Allawi is considered unlikely to chair the body unless it is given
significant authorities.
Unresolved Political Schisms
Ambassador to Iraq Jim Jeffries testified before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on
February 1, 2011, describing the Iraqi government as a success for U.S. foreign policy because it
is inclusive and “focused on power sharing.” However, continuing schisms exist among the
various Iraqi communities and factions, and all of Iraq’s ethnic communities and sects remain
suspicious of the others’ longer-term intentions.
Sunni Community
The earlier disqualification crisis—and the denial to Allawi of the ability to try to form a
government after his bloc won the most seats—leaves unanswered questions about the long-term
loyalty of Sunni Arabs to the central government. Separate from the government formation
process, Sunni Arabs resented the slow pace with which the Maliki government implemented its
pledge to fully integrate the “Sons of Iraq” fighters into the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF). At the
peak, there were about 100,000 (80% are Sunni Arab) of these fighters nationwide cooperating
with U.S. forces against Al Qaeda in Iraq and other militants. As of January 2011, about half of
them (about 50,000) had been integrated into the ISF or given civilian government jobs. There
have been reports that some Sons of Iraq have been dropped from payrolls, harassed, arrested, or
sidelined—indications that the Maliki government might want to strangle the program. However,
Ambassador Jeffries testified on February 1, 2011, that no payment difficulties existed as of that
time, and no U.S. official has since amended or altered that assertion.
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KRG-Central Government Disputes/Combined Security Mechanism11
The COR elections and cabinet formation were not expected to—and did not—heal KRG-central
government disputes. KRG President Masoud Barzani visited Washington, DC, in January 2010
and, according to participants in his meetings, discussed with senior officials ways in which the
Kurds would cooperate with Iraq’s Arabs after the election. That was widely interpreted as an
Administration admonition not to establish territorial-related preconditions to join a governing
coalition after the elections. However, KRG Prime Minister Barham Salih said on June 15, 2010,
that Kurdish leaders sought guarantees from Iraq’s Arab leaders that, as a condition of providing
Kurdish votes for any new governing coalition, 19 specific demands (retaining the presidency for
one of their own was one such demand) would be addressed. Although receiving from Maliki
only vague assurances on their key demands, the main Kurdish factions eventually threw their
weight behind Maliki to continue as prime minister, as discussed above.
KRG-central government differences had been aggravated by the 2009 provincial elections
because Sunni Arabs wrested control of the Nineveh (Mosul) provincial council from the Kurds,
who won control of that council in the 2005 election because of the broad Sunni Arab boycott of
that election. A Sunni list (al-Hadba’a) won a clear plurality of the Nineveh vote and subsequently
took control of the provincial administration there. Al-Hadba’a is composed of hardline Sunni
Arabs who openly oppose Kurdish encroachment in the province and who are committed to the
“Arab and Islamic identity” of the province. A member of the faction, Atheel al-Nufaiji, is the
governor (brother of 2010-2014 COR speaker Usama al-Nujaifi), and, even before the popular
unrest that broke out in Iraq as of February 2011, the Kurds had been preventing his visitation of
areas of Nineveh where the Kurds’ peshmerga militia operates.
Additional friction was created in the context of the KRG’s parliamentary and presidential
elections on July 25, 2009. The KRG leadership had been planning, during that vote, to conduct a
referendum on a separate KRG constitution. However, the central government asserted that a
KRG constitution would conflict with the publicly adopted national constitution, and that the
KRG draft constitution, adopted by the Kurdish parliament on June 23, 2009, claimed Kurdish
control over disputed territories and oil resources. The KRG did not hold the referendum.
Combined Security Mechanism at Kurd-Arab Frontier
In part to prevent outright violence, in August 2009 then-top U.S. commander in Iraq General
Odierno developed an unprecedented plan to partner U.S. forces with peshmerga units and with
ISF units in the province to build confidence between the two forces and reassure Kurdish, Arab,
Turkomen, and other province residents. Implementation of this “combined security mechanism”
(CSM) began in January 2010 and U.S. officials said on August 16, 2010, that the joint (ISF-U.S-
Kurdish) patrols, maintenance of checkpoints and training would continue until the U.S. pullout
at the end of 2011. Fifteen joint checkpoints were established, but, as of October 2010, the United
States had ceased participating at four of them, in concert with the U.S. change of mission to a
non-combat role (Operation New Dawn) on September 1, 2010.
As noted by Ambassador Jeffries and top U.S. commander in Iraq General Lloyd Austin on
February 1, 2011, it is possible that a United Nations force, or even NATO, might take over this

11 For more information on Kurd-Baghdad disputes, see CRS Report RS22079, The Kurds in Post-Saddam Iraq, by
Kenneth Katzman.
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mediating and confidence-building role thereafter, although it is not clear that this idea is
supported by the Iraqi factions involved. There is also speculation that some U.S. forces might be
asked to remain after 2011 to continue the CSM, although doing so would require an Iraqi request
and an amendment to the U.S.-Iraq Security Agreement. Other ideas advanced by the U.N.
Assistance Mission—Iraq (UNAMI) say that civilians (Iraqi or international) could take over the
mediating role now played by U.S. troops in the CSM.
Broader Territorial Issues (“Disputed Internal Boundaries”)
The CSM is not a substitute for a broader settlement of the various territorial disputes between the
Kurds and Iraq’s Arabs—the most emotional of which is the Kurdish insistence that Tamim
Province (which includes oil-rich Kirkuk) be formally affiliated to the KRG. There was to be a
referendum on the affiliation of the province by December 31, 2007—in accordance with Article
140 of the Constitution- but the Kurds have agreed to repeated delays in order to avoid
jeopardizing overall progress in Iraq. Nor has the national census that is pivotal to any such
referendum been conducted; it has repeatedly been postponed. Attempting to resolve these long-
standing disputes is another issue within the mandate of UNAMI, and consultations with all
parties are ongoing, according to UNAMI head Ad Melkert in February 2011.12
The three Kurdish-controlled provinces and the disputed province of Kirkuk did not hold
provincial elections with the rest of Iraq on January 31, 2009. Elections had been rescheduled for
November 2010 but were not held. However, the Property Claims Commission that is
adjudicating claims from the Saddam regime’s forced resettlement of Arabs into the KRG region
is functioning and about 10,000 Iraqi Arabs have relocated back to their original provinces as of
the end of 2010.
KRG Oil Exports
Another issue remains over the ability of the Kurds to export oil that is discovered and extracted
in the KRG region. Oil exports from the KRG have been suspended since late 2009 over central
government opposition to proposed mechanisms for paying the international investors who are
performing the extraction and exportation. However, Ambassador Jeffries testified on February 1,
2011, that, as a consequence of the formation of a government and greater factional harmony, a
compromise had been reached that would allow the KRG energy exports to resume, and
exportation of about 100,000 barrels of crude oil per day has resumed from the KRG fields as of
March 1, 2011.
Intra-Kurdish Divisions
Further complicating the political landscape are widening divisions within the Kurdish
community. The KRG elections also, to some extent, shuffled the political landscape. A
breakaway faction of President Talabani’s PUK, called “Change” (“Gorran”), won an
unexpectedly high 25 seats (out of 111) in the Kurdistan national assembly, embarrassing the
PUK and weakening it relative to the KDP. KRG President Masoud Barzani, leader of the KDP,
easily won reelection against weak opposition. Gorran ran its own list in the March 2010
elections and constituted a significant challenge to the Kurdistan Alliance in Sulaymaniyah

12 Meeting with congressional staff, February 24, 2011.
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Province, according to election results. As a result, of the 57 COR seats held by Kurds, 14 are
held by parties other than the Kurdistan Alliance. Gorran has 8, the Kurdistan Islamic Union has
4, and the Islamic Group of Kurdistan has 2.
These divisions may also be playing a role in the popular demonstrations that have occurred in
Sulaymaniyah since February 2011. The demonstrations reflect frustration over jobs and services
but possibly also over the monopolization of power in the KRG by the Barzani and Talabani
clans. Some of these have been suppressed by peshmerga.
The Sadr Faction and Its Position
As noted above, Sadr was part of the anti-Maliki Shiite coalition Iraqi National Alliance for the
March 2010 national elections. Sadr sees himself as the main representative for Iraq’s Shiites,
causing an inherent rivalry with Maliki and other more mainstream Shiite leaders in Iraq. On
October 17, 2009, the Sadr movement held a “primary” election to determine who would fill the
329 total candidate slots that will be fielded by the Sadr movement in the elections (as part of the
broader Iraqi National Alliance bloc discussed above). About 800 total candidates competed.
After the election, the Sadr faction was extensively involved in bargaining over composition of
the government and he initially insisted that Maliki should be replaced by another Shiite.
However, the shift by the faction in late September 2010 was decisive in Maliki’s success in
achieving another term. In return, as discussed above, Sadrists were given several seats in the
cabinet and a Sadrist governor was later installed in Maysan Province, which includes the Sadrist
stronghold of Amarah.
The faction was energized when its leader, Moqtada Al Sadr, returned to Iraq on January 5, 2011.
Since his return, he has given several speeches that, among other themes, insist on full
implementation of a planned U.S. withdrawal by the end of 2011. Sadr’s position on this is so
firm that, in an April 9, 2011, statement, he threatened to reactivate his Mahdi Army militia if
U.S. forces remain in Iraq beyond the December 31, 2011, deadline. This threat might cover pre-
existing plans to bolster his clout through armed activity—since early 2010 there have been
repeated reports and assessments that the Sadrist and offshoot Shiite militias—for now still
disarmed—may be planning to reactivate. Sadr also has issued statements opposing the awarding
of Iraqi energy contracts to American firms. However, in a May 13, 2011, sermon in Najaf, Sadr
indicated he might withdraw this threat if there were a strong consensus among the other blocs
that U.S. troops should stay.13
While Sadr has long sought to highlight Maliki’s failures to bolster his own influence, the Sadr
faction’s extensive participation in the post-2010 government complicates the Sadrist efforts to
paint governmental failures as purely the fault of Maliki and other elites. Some U.S. officials say
they believe the faction may have instigated some of the unrest to discredit Maliki. In addition,
the Sadr faction is said to be using its fundraising ability to develop charity and employment
networks that rival or displace those of the central government—employing a political model
similar to that of Hizballah in Lebanon.14

13 Davis, Aaron. “Shiite Infighting May Be Key to U.S. Extension in Iraq.” Washington Post, May 15, 2011.
14 Healy, Jack. “Cleric’s Anti-U.S. Forces Poised for Gains in Iraq.” New York Times, December 20, 2010.
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Related Governance Issues
The formation of the government in December 2010 raised hopes that Iraq was well on its way to
permanent stability, the strengthening of democracy and institution-building, and a turning of
Iraqi official attention toward basic governance and economic issues. U.S. officials, as testified by
Ambassador Jeffries on February 1, 2011, saw signs that the factional comity evidenced in the
new government would enable the COR to move quickly on long-stalled initiatives. In terms of
immediate Iraqi legislative business, the COR turned to and was able, by the end of February
2011, to adopt a calendar year 2011 budget. The draft $67 billion budget was submitted to the
COR on December 18, and was subsequently adopted. Ambassador Jeffries pointed to other signs
of progress, including resolving the dispute over the de-Baathification issue. In February 2011,
other observers reported progress toward enactment of the national hydrocarbon laws that are
needed to encourage foreign investment in Iraq’s relatively undeveloped energy sector.
On the other hand, some note that efforts to rein in official corruption are failing because no
comprehensive anti-corruption law has been passed. Also not passed are laws addressing the
environment, other elections, consumer protections, intellectual property rights, building codes,
and a new national flag.
Many factions continued to remain wary of Prime Minister Maliki’s long-term intentions. Some
Iraqi suspicions of a lack of commitment to governing transparency were reinforced by Maliki’s
request that Iraq’s Supreme Court rule that several independent commissions—including the
Independent Higher Election Commission and the anti-corruption commission—be supervised by
the cabinet. The court ruled in Maliki’s favor on January 23, 2011, although the court also said in
its ruling that the institutions must remain free of political interference.15
2011 Unrest
Iraq’s government, although flawed, is the product of democratic choices. Therefore, many
experts were surprised when protests that have ousted leaders in Egypt and Tunisia—and nearly
toppled Libyan leader Muammar Qadhafi—spread to Iraq. Small protests began in several
provinces on February 6, 2011, and later expanded to numerous provinces including Baghdad,
Maysan, Sulaymaniyah, Basra, Anbar, Nineveh, Kirkuk, and Diwayniyah provinces. Protests,
although small compared to those witnessed in other Middle Eastern countries during the period,
resulted in 20 deaths alone on the February 25, 2011, “Day of Rage” demonstrations called by
activists.
The spread of unrest into Iraq suggested to many that Iraqis have been frustrated by what they
perceive as a nearly exclusive focus of the major factions on politics rather than governing or
improving services. Many protesters expressed particular outrage at the still severe shortages of
electricity in Iraq, as well as to the lack of job opportunities and to perceived elite corruption.
Iraqis who cannot afford their own generators (or to share a generator with a few others), can
count on only two hours of power per day.
Politically, the protests affected all factions. The demonstrations caused the resignations of
provincial governors in Wasit and Basra provinces and of several municipal leaders in Anbar

15 Parker, Ned and Salar Jaff. “Electoral Ruling Riles Maliki’s Rivals.” Los Angeles Times, January 23, 2011.
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Province. The governor of Nineveh, discussed above, survived a political challenge there even
though Maliki (backed by the Kurds who distrust governor Nujaifi) reportedly sought to use the
unrest to oust this political rival from that post. Jafar Al Sadr, who obtained the second most votes
in the March 2010 elections on Maliki’s list (after Maliki himself), resigned from the COR on
February 17, 2011, to protest what he sees as elite interest in politics over governing. The use of
force was also at odds with statements by Grand Ayatollah Sistani supporting the right to
peacefully protest; a Sistani representative reportedly even attended the February 25 Day of Rage
demonstrations. Moqtada Al Sadr also supported peaceful demonstrations, although its
assumption of some of the service-related ministries has complicated the efforts of his faction to
absolve itself for responsibility for governmental failures to provide services.
Unrest in the KRG region appears to reflect deep frustrations and has been more consistent and
intense than in the rest of Iraq. The unrest in Sulaymaniyah resulted in the deaths of at least three
protestors at the hands of peshmerga and Kurdish intelligence (Asayesh), and is said to rattle the
top Kurdish leaders who fear the KRG’s image as an oasis of stability and prosperity in Iraq is
being clouded. Demonstrations in Sulaymaniyah on February 17, also revived long-standing but
suppressed tensions between the PUK and the KDP as the KDP retaliated for protester attacks on
some of its offices.
Both major Kurdish parties have used the unrest to advance pan-Kurdish issues rather than
combat each other. After the February 17 clashes discussed above, the two parties ordered
peshmerga forces into disputed Kirkuk ostensibly to protect demonstrators from Sunni Arab
insurgents, although Sunni Arabs saw the move as an attempt to stake the Kurdish claim to
Kirkuk through armed force. The governor and provincial council chairs of Kirkuk resigned on
March 15, 2011, and a member of the Turkmen minority that is numerous in Kirkuk is expected
to become the new council chair. The new governor is, like his predecessor, a Kurd. Most, but not
all, peshmerga had withdrawn from Kirkuk as of April 1, 2011.
Government Response and Prospects
The government has sought to defuse the unrest in Iraq, with mixed success to date. In early
February 2011, Maliki announced a voluntary cut in his salary (from about $350,000 per year to
about half that) and indicated he would not seek a third term when his current term expires in
2014. On February 27, 2011, he announced that his new cabinet would have “100 days” to prove
their effectiveness or face replacement. That was later clarified to imply a six-month period of
evaluation. His indications that he will not seek a third term might reassure some Iraqi leaders
who fear that he might try to stay in office indefinitely and build a regime resembling the
authoritarian structures of Saddam Hussein.
Other government actions appear intended to assert long-standing positions. For example, in
response to the unrest, 12 out of 28 members of the Najaf provincial council petitioned to convert
the province to a “region,” as provided for in the constitution. Although the petition meets the
constitutional requirement (one-third of a provincial council filing a petition) to start that process,
it is not clear that a referendum will achieve a popular majority in the province to accomplish that
transition.
Another component of the response was to appoint several technocrats to permanently fill cabinet
slots in ministries that deliver services to the public. In a wave of appointments on February 13,
2011, an Iraqiyya technocrat, Radd Shallah, was appointed minister of electricity and Power. In
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addition, Municipality and Public Works minister Adel Mohder was named, as were appointments
to be ministers of state for tribal affairs, civilian community affairs, and national reconciliation.
Protests throughout Iraq have continued subsequently but have been scattered throughout the
country and have not built in size or scope as has happened in other Middle Eastern countries.
Many Iraqis reportedly are expressing resentment that the governing factions’ response has been
focused more on pinning blame on political opponents than on addressing the underlying
grievances. However, most experts agree that the protesters, although to some extent inspired by
the uprisings throughout the Middle East, do not have the similar objective of toppling Iraq’s
leadership because Iraq’s government is the product of democratic processes.
General Human Rights Issues
U.S. and international officials say they expect the 2010-2014 government to make further
progress establishing rule of law and adherence to international standards of human rights. The
State Department’s report on human rights for 2010 released April 8, 2011, largely repeated the
previous year’s characterizations of Iraq’s human rights record as follows: “Extremist violence,
coupled with weak government performance in upholding the rule of law, resulted in widespread
and severe human rights abuses.”16 The State Department report cited a wide range of human
rights problems committed by Iraqi government security and law enforcement personnel,
including some unlawful killings; torture and other cruel punishments; poor conditions in prison
facilities; denial of fair public trials; arbitrary arrest; arbitrary interference with privacy and
home; limits on freedoms of speech, assembly, and association due to sectarianism and extremist
threats; lack of protection of stateless persons; wide scale governmental corruption; human
trafficking; and limited exercise of labor rights.
Media and Free Expression
While State Department and other reports attribute most of Iraq’s human rights difficulties to the
security situation and factional infighting, apparent curbs on free expression appear independent
of such factors. The State Department human rights report for 2010 noted numerous laws that
restrict press freedoms, and instances in which officials have beaten or intimidated journalists
who try to do their work. In some past cases, Maliki has sued publications that have written
articles alleging corruption or nepotism on his part.
Labor Rights
A 1987 (Saddam era) labor code remains in effect. Although Iraqis are legally allowed to join
unions, the labor code virtually rules out independent union activity. Unions have no legal power
to negotiate with employers or protect workers’ rights through collective bargaining. However,
some of the February 2011 street demonstrations protesting lack of services have included
demands for more worker rights.

16 http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2010/nea/154462.htm.
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Situation of the Christian Religious Minority
In regard to human rights, a major concern is the safety and security of Iraq’s Christian
population, which is concentrated in northern Iraq as well as in Baghdad. Attacks on members of
the community appear to occur in spates. In the run-up to the January 2009 provincial elections,
about 1,000 Christian families reportedly fled the province in October 2008, although Iraqi
officials report that most families returned by December 2008. The issue faded in 2009 but then
resurfaced late in that year when about 10,000 Christians in northern Iraq, fearing bombings and
intimidation, fled the areas near Kirkuk during October-December 2009. On October 31, 2010, a
major attack on Christians occurred when a church in Baghdad was besieged by militants and as
many as 60 worshippers were killed. The siege shook the faith of the Christian community in
their security. Several other attacks appearing to target Iraqi Christians have taken place since.
Partly as a result, Christian celebrations of Christmas 2010 were said to be subdued—following
three years in which Christians had felt confident enough to celebrate that holiday more openly.
Some Iraqi Christians blame all the various attacks on them on Al Qaeda in Iraq, which is still
somewhat strong in Nineveh Province and which associates Christians with the United States.
Some human rights groups allege that it is the Kurds who are committing abuses against
Christians and other minorities in the Nineveh Plain, close to the KRG-controlled region. Kurdish
leaders deny the allegations, and the State Department human rights report for 2010 says the
KRG has permitted Christians fleeing violence in Baghdad to relocate into KRG-controlled areas.
The FY2008 consolidated appropriation earmarked $10 million in ESF from previous
appropriations to assist the Nineveh Plain Christians. A supplemental appropriation for 2008 and
2009 (P.L. 110-252) earmarked another $10 million for this purpose. The Consolidated
Appropriations Act of 2010 (P.L. 111-117) made a similar provision for FY2010.
Before the 2010-2011 rounds of violence against Christians, about 400,000 Christians had left
Iraq since the fall of Saddam Hussein—a large proportion of the approximately 1 million
Christian population that was there during Saddam’s time. Christian priests have been kidnapped
and killed; the body of Chaldean Catholic archbishop Faraj Rahho was discovered in Mosul on
March 13, 2008, two weeks after his reported kidnapping. An attack on the Yazidis in August
2007, which killed about 500 persons, appeared to reflect the precarious situation for Iraqi
minorities. Even at the height of the U.S. military presence in Iraq, U.S. forces did not
specifically protect Christian sites at all times, partly because Christian leaders do not want to
appear closely allied with the United States.
Corruption
The State Department human rights report for 2010 contains substantial detail on the relative lack
of progress in curbing official corruption. The report discusses political and other factors that
have caused anti-corruption institutions, such as the Commission on Integrity, to be regularly
thwarted or hampered in attempts to investigate and prosecute corruption. The COR has its own
Integrity Committee that oversees the executive branch and the governmental anti-corruption
bodies.
Mass Graves
As is noted in the State Department report on human rights for 2010, the Iraqi government
continues to uncover mass graves of victims of the Saddam regime. This effort is under the
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authority of the Human Rights Ministry. On April 15, 2011, a mass grave of more than 800 bodies
became the latest such discovery. The largest to date was a mass grave in Mahawil, near Hilla,
that contained 3,000 bodies; the grave was discovered in 2003, shortly after the fall of the regime.
Camp Ashraf
The Iraqi government treatment of the population of Camp Ashraf, a camp in which over 3,000
Iranian oppositionists have resided, is an indicator of the government performance on human
rights. The residents of the camp accuse the government of repression and of scheming to expel
the residents or extradite them to Iran, where they might face prosecution or death. An Iraqi
military redeployment at the camp on April 8, 2011, resulted in major violence against camp
residents in which 35 of them were killed. This issue is discussed in substantially greater detail in
CRS Report RL32048, Iran: U.S. Concerns and Policy Responses, by Kenneth Katzman.
Regional Dimension
For Iraq’s neighbors as well as for the United States, the stakes in the outcome of the political
process in Iraq have been high. First and foremost, according to most experts, the United States
sought to prevent the emergence of a governing coalition that left Sunni Arabs disillusioned, or
which bolstered the influence of the most pro-Iranian factions such as that of Sadr. The key U.S.
objectives were met, in large part because of the inclusion of senior Iraqiyya figures in high
positions and the lower-than-expected profile of Sadrists in the new cabinet.
However, the sense of ethno-sectarian reconciliation produced by the government that has been
formed could be subject to reversal over the longer term. Iran reportedly was a key broker of the
decision by the Sadrists to support Maliki, raising the potential for Iran to continue to support
Sadrist interests and influence over time. In addition, Iran’s influence was increased by Sadr’s
return to Iraq as of January 2011, and Sadrist involvement in the protests may have contributed to
the 2011 unrest. Still, the broad view within the U.S. government remains that the Iraqi people
reject Iranian influence or direction and tend to vote against Iraqi leaders who are too tightly
linked to Iran. That view may be tested by whether the most pro-Iranian factions, such as that of
Sadr, succeed in preventing any extension of the U.S.-Iraq Security Agreement (see below).
The United States also appeared to benefit from the formation of a government that seems able to
integrate with all of Iraq’s neighbors, including Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Turkey. However, the
long-term degree of regional acceptance for the new government might depend on the extent to
which Iyad al-Allawi and his Iraqiyya bloc continue to participate in government and have
influence over decisions. Allawi had been favored for prime minister by the Sunni-dominated
regional neighbors such as Saudi Arabia and even by Syria, which is mostly Sunni but allied with
Iran. Syria hosted numerous meetings among faction leaders, although no agreement was reached
among them under Syrian sponsorship.
As a possible indication of greater acceptance of the Iraqi government by Sunni regional states,
Kuwait’s prime minister visited Iraq on January 12, 2011. Maliki subsequently visited Kuwait on
February 16, 2011. These key exchanges took place after the U.N. Security Council on December
15, 2010, passed three resolutions (1956, 1957, and 1958) that had the net effect of lifting most
Saddam-era sanctions on Iraq, although the U.N.-run reparations payments process remains intact
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(and which deducts 5% from Iraq’s total oil revenues). On the other hand, Saudi Arabia has not,
to date, opened its embassy in Baghdad, a move the United States has long urged.
Implications for the Wind Down of the
U.S. Military Mission

These continuing splits within Iraq—and continuing high profile attacks by insurgent groups—
cloud the approaching completion of a U.S. military withdrawal from Iraq at the end of 2011, in
keeping with a November 2008 U.S.-Iraq Security Agreement, which took effect on January 1,
2009. With the formal end of the U.S. combat mission on August 31, 2010, U.S. forces have
dropped to 47,000, from a 2008 high of 170,000. Retaining substantial U.S. troops in Iraq beyond
2011 would require the renegotiation of the U.S.-Iraq “Security Agreement,” which entered into
force on January 1, 2009.
Continuing high profile attacks, although sporadic, have caused some experts to question whether
security will deteriorate to the point where Iraq becomes a “failed state” after 2011, unless Iraq
requests the continued presence of U.S. forces after that time. For example, a suicide bombing at
an Iraqi Army recruiting station in Baghdad in August 2010 killed nearly 60 Iraqis; the Islamic
State of Iraq, an umbrella group that includes Al Qaeda in Iraq, claimed responsibility. A wave of
approximately 15 bombings across Baghdad on the night of November 2, 2010, killed at least 60
Iraqis and shook confidence in the ability of the government to protect the population. A series of
major bombings, causing numerous casualties, took place in Tikrit, Diyala province, Karbala, and
other places in January 2011. Motives and suspects of most of the continuing violence include not
only Al Qaeda in Iraq but also Shiite militia forces seeking to assassinate any Sunnis who have
political power.
While praising the dramatic progress of the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) over the past two years,
U.S. officials appear to lack confidence in the ability of the ISF to secure Iraq on their own. Some
believe that the reduction in U.S. leverage and influence in Iraq already under way will allow rifts
among major ethnic and sectarian communities to widen to the point where Iraq could still
become a “failed state” after 2011, unless some U.S. troops remain after that time. Others believe
that the popular unrest in 2011 has widened those splits. Still others note that U.S. troops are
required beyond 2011 to ensure that the Kurd-Arab tensions in northern Iraq do not cause
conflict—the deployment of Kurdish peshmerga to Kirkuk in March 2011 did not become violent
because U.S. troops interceded between them and the Sunni Arabs in the province.
The purpose of several high-level U.S. visits to Iraq in March and April 2011 has been to urge the
Iraqis to consider making such a request. On April 22, 2011, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, Admiral Mike Mullen, on a visit to Iraq, said U.S. logistical and operational considerations
required that an Iraqi request for U.S. troops to remain in Iraq beyond 2011 come within a few
weeks of his visit.17 Prime Minister Maliki told visiting Speaker of the House John Boehner,
during his April 16, 2011, visit to Baghdad, that Iraqi forces were capable of securing Iraq after
2011, but that Iraq would welcome U.S. training and arms after that time.18

17 Schmidt, Michael and Tim Arango. “Iraq Must Decide Within Weeks If U.S. Troops Will Stay Past 2011, Top
Official Says.” New York Times, April 23, 2011.
18 Prashant Rao. “Maliki Tells US’ Boehner Iraqi Troops Are Ready.” Agence France Presse, April 16, 2011.
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Subsequent to Boehner visit, Maliki appeared to lay the groundwork for a possible extension of
the U.S. presence. He stated that a request for U.S. troops might be made if there were a
“consensus” among political blocs, which he defined as not necessarily unanimity but at least
70% concurrence.19 This statement appeared to be an effort to isolate the Sadr faction, which has
been the most vocal opponent of a continuing U.S. presence. Sadr’s position on this is so firm
that, in an April 9, 2011, statement, he threatened to reactivate his Mahdi Army militia if U.S.
forces remain in Iraq beyond the December 31, 2011, deadline,20 although he appeared to
backtrack somewhat on that threat in May 13, 2011, sermon in Najaf. Since early 2010 there have
been repeated reports and assessments that the Sadrist and offshoot Shiite militias—for now still
disarmed—may be planning to reactivate. Al Sadr also has issued statements opposing the
awarding of Iraqi energy contracts to American firms.
If an Iraqi request is made, it is not clear what the size of any extended presence might be;
however, experts on Iraq have had informal discussions in 2011 on this issue and a figure of about
15,000 U.S. troops appears to receive substantial discussion.21 If Iraq does not request an
extension of the SA, it is possible that there will be a decision not to retain large numbers of U.S.
forces, but only to establish a large (up to 1,000 person) military liaison office (Office of Military
Cooperation) engaged mostly in training and assisting Iraq in the use of U.S. arms sold to Iraq,
such as combat aircraft. That office would be under the authority of the U.S. Ambassador. It is not
clear whether such an arrangement would require formal amendment of the security agreement.
Whether or not some U.S. troops remain after 2011, the State Department will transition to the
lead U.S. agency in Iraq, with all attendant responsibilities. There is a vibrant U.S. debate over
whether the State Department, using security contractors, will be able to fully secure its personnel
in Iraq if all U.S. forces were to depart. A staff report of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee,
released January 31, 2011, expresses substantial skepticism.22 No matter the outcome of that
debate, State Department officers will continue to promote Iraqi political reconciliation and
peaceful dispute resolution, as well as economic ties, cultural ties, educational ties, and broader
relations under the Strategic Framework Agreement. Table 4 provides information on U.S.
assistance to promote Iraqi democracy and peaceful political competition and consensus building.
If Iraq’s major factions have permanently shifted away from supporting violence and toward
peaceful political competition, some might argue that U.S. funding has contributed to that
transition. Others might argue that the change was caused by numerous factors, such as the
improvement of security and rejection of foreign terrorist influence, and that it is virtually
impossible to assess the contribution made by U.S. assistance.

19 Aaron Davis. “Maliki Seeking Consensus on Troops.” Washington Post, May 12, 2011.
20 “Iraqi Cleric Vows to Reactivate Militia If U.S. Forces Stay.” Voice of American News, April 9, 2011.
21 Author conversations with Iraq experts in Washington, DC, 2011.
22 Senate Foreign Relations Committee. “Iraq: The Transition From a Military Mission to A Civilian-Led Effort.” S.Prt.
112-3. January 31, 2011.
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Table 2. March 2010 COR Election: Final, Certified Results by Province
Elected Seats in
Province
COR
Results
Baghdad
68
Maliki: 26 seats; Iraqiyya: 24 seats; INA: 17 seats; minority
reserved: 2 seats
Nineveh (Mosul)
31
Iraqiiya: 20; Kurdistan Alliance: 8; INA: 1; Accordance: 1; Unity
(Bolani): 1; minority reserved: 3
Qadisiyah
11
Maliki: 4; INA: 5; Iraqiyya: 2
Muthanna
7
Maliki: 4; INA: 3
Dohuk
10
Kurdistan Alliance: 9; other Kurdish lists: 1; minority reserved:
1
Basra
24
Maliki: 14 ; INA: 7; Iraqiyya: 3
Anbar
14
Iraqiyya: 11; Unity (Bolani): 1; Accordance: 2
Karbala
10
Maliki: 6; INA: 3; Iraqiyya: 1
Wasit
11
Maliki: 5; INA: 4; Iraqiyya: 2
Dhi Qar
18
Maliki: 8; INA: 9; Iraqiyya: 1
Sulaymaniyah
17
Kurdistan Alliance: 8; other Kurds: 9
Kirkuk (Tamim)
12
Iraqiyya: 6; Kurdistan Alliance: 6
Babil
16
Maliki: 8; INA: 5; Iraqiyya: 3
Irbil
14
Kurdistan Alliance: 10; other Kurds: 4
Najaf
12
Maliki: 7; INA: 5
Diyala
13
Iraqiyya: 8; INA: 3; Maliki: 1; Kurdistan Alliance: 1
Salahuddin
12
Iraqiyya: 8; Unity (Bolani): 2; Accordance: 2
Maysan
10
Maliki: 4; INA: 6
Total Seats
325
Iraqiyya: 89 + 2 compensatory = 91
(310 elected + 8
Maliki: 87 + 2 compensatory = 89
minority reserved + 7
compensatory)
INA: 68 + 2 compensatory = 70 (of which about 40 are Sadrist)
Kurdistan Alliance: 42 +1 compensatory = 43
Unity (Bolani): 4
Accordance: 6
other Kurdish: 14
minority reserved: 8
Source: Iraqi Higher Election Commission, March 26, 2010.
Notes: Seat totals are approximate and their exact al ocation may be subject to varying interpretations of Iraqi
law. Total seat numbers include likely al ocations of compensatory seats. Total seats do not add to 325 total
seats in the COR due to some uncertainties in allocations.

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Other Elections Possible
There had been speculation that the March COR elections would be held concurrently with a
referendum on the U.S.-Iraq Security Agreement. The referendum was to be held by July 31,
2009, but the United States, which views the referendum as unnecessary, supported a delay. In
mid-October 2009, Iraqi parliamentarians quietly shelved the referendum vote by failing to act on
legislation to hold the referendum and focusing instead on the broader election law needed for the
National Assembly elections.23
District and sub-district elections were previously slated for July 31, 2009, as well. However,
those are delayed, and the United Nations Secretary General Ban Ki Moon said in a report on
U.N. operations in Iraq, released August 3, 2009, that these elections would likely be held later in
2010, after the National Assembly elections. No date for these elections has been announced.
There could also be a vote on amendments to Iraq’s 2005 constitution if and when the major
factions agree to finalize the recommendations of the constitutional review commission (CRC).
There have been no recent major developments reported that would indicate if and when such a
referendum might be ready.
As noted above, there is discussion of provincial elections in the Kurdish region, which were not
held during the January 2009 provincial elections in the other areas of Iraq, and were not held in
the March 7, 2010, nationwide vote. Nor were they held in November 2010, as was scheduled,
and no date is set. There could be a vote on a Kirkuk referendum, if a negotiated settlement is
reached.
Some Iraqis believe that the 2011 unrest has created a need for new nationwide provincial
elections. However, existing provincial councils mostly maintain that doing so would be contrary
to the constitution, which allows a four-year term to the councils elected in 2009.


23 Sly, Liz. “Iraqi Push Fades For Referendum on U.S. Troop Pullout.” Los Angeles Times, October 16, 2009.
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Table 3. U.S. Assistance to Iraq: FY2003-FY2012 Request
(appropriations/allocations in millions of $)
Total
FY
FY
FY
FY
FY
FY
FY
FY
FY
FY2003-
FY2012
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009 2010
2011 FY2011
Req.
IRRF
2,475
18,389 —
10.0 — — — — —
20,874
––
ESF


— 1,535.4 1,676.8 429.0 541.5 382.5
? 4,565
325.7
Democracy
Fund
— — — —
250.0
75.0 — — — 325.0
––
IFTA
(Treasury
Dept.
Asst.)
— — — 13.0 2.8 — — — — 15.8
––
NADR


— 3.6
— 18.4 20.4 35.5 30.3
? 108.2
––
Refugee
Accounts
(MRA and
ERMA)
39.6
.1

— 78.3 277.8 260.0 300.0
955.8
––
IDA
21.8
— 7.1
.3 45.0 85.0 50.8 42.0 — 252.0
––
Other
USAID
Funds 469.9 — — — —
23.8 — — — 493.7
––
INCLE


— — 91.4 170.0 85.0 20.0 702.0
? 1,068
1,000.0
Foreign
Military
Financing –– –– –– –– –– –– –– –– ––
––
1,000.0
IMET

1.2


1.1

2.0
2.0
?
6.3
2.0
DOD - ISF
Fund

— 5,391 3,007 5,542 3,000 1,000 1,000 1,500 20,440

DOD -
Iraq Army
51.2 —
210.0
— — — — — — 261.2

DOD -
CERP
— 140 718 708 750 996 339
263 70 3,984

DOD - Oil
Repair
802 — — — — — — — — 802

DOD -
Business
Support
— — — — 50.0
50.0
74.0 — — 174.0

Total

3,859 18,548 6,329 5,365 8,584 5,042 2,322 2,721 1,570 54,325 2,327
Sources: State Department FY2012 Foreign Operations Congressional Budget Justification; SIGIR Report to
Congress, April 30, 2011; and CRS calculations.
Notes: Table prepared by Curt Tarnoff, Specialist in Foreign Affairs, on May 5, 2011. FY2011 amount is
appropriation/al ocation figure available to date. Most 150 account al ocations are expected in June 2011;
humanitarian and other aid figures become available during course of year. This table does not contain agency
operational costs, including CPA, State Department, and PRTs, except where these are embedded in the larger
reconstruction accounts. Estimated operational costs to date are an additional $5.7 billion. IG oversight costs
estimated at $322 million. IMET=International Military Education and Training; IRRF=Iraq Relief and
Reconstruction Fund; INCLE=International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Fund; ISF=Iraq Security Force;
NADR=Nonproliferation, Anti-Terrorism, Demining and Related: ESF=Economic Support Fund;
IDA=International Disaster Assistance.

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Table 4. Recent Democracy Assistance to Iraq
(in millions of current $)

FY2009
FY2010 (act.)
FY2011 (req.)
FY2012 (req.)
Rule of Law and Human Rights
32.45
33.3
16.5
29.75
Good Governance
143.64
117.40
90.33
100.5
Political
Competition/Consensus-Building
41.00 52.60 30.00
16.25
Civil Society
87.53
83.6
32.5
55.5
Totals 304.62
286.9
169.33
202.0
Source: Congressional Budget Justification, March 2011.
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Table 5. January 31, 2009, Provincial Election Results (Major Slates)
Baghdad—55 regular seats, plus one
State of Law (Maliki)—38% (28 seats); Independent Liberals Trend (pro-Sadr)—9%
Sabean and one Christian set-aside
(5 seats); Accord Front (Sunni mainstream)—9% (9 seats); Iraq National (Al awi)—
seat
8.6%; Shahid Mihrab and Independent Forces (ISCI)—5.4% (3 seats) ; National
Reform list (of former P.M. Ibrahim al-Jafari)—4.3% (3 seats)
Basra—34 regular seats, plus one
State of Law—37% (20); ISCI—11.6% (5); Sadr—5% (2); Fadhila (previously
Christian seat
dominant in Basra)—3.2% (0); Allawi—3.2% (0); Jafari list—2.5% (0). Governor :
Shiltagh Abbud (Maliki list); Council chair: Jabbar Amin (Maliki list)
Nineveh—34 regular seats, plus one
Hadbaa—48.4%; Fraternal Nineveh—25.5%; IIP—6.7%; Hadbaa took control of
set aside each for Shabaks, Yazidis,
provincial council and administration. Governor is Atheel al-Nujaifi (Hadbaa).
and Christians
Najaf—28 seats
State of Law—16.2% (7); ISCI—14.8% (7); Sadr—12.2% (6); Jafari—7% (2); Al awi—
1.8% (0); Fadhila—1.6% (0). Council chairman: Maliki list
Babil—30 seats
State of Law—12.5% (8); ISCI—8.2% (5); Sadr—6.2% (3); Jafari—4.4% (3); Al awi—
3.4%; Accord Front—2.3% (3); Fadhila—1.3%. New Council chair: Kadim Majid
Tuman (Sadrist); Governor—Salman Zirkani (Maliki list)
Diyala—29 seats
Accord Front list—21.1%; Kurdistan Alliance—17.2%; Allawi—9.5%; State of Law—
6 %. New council leans heavily Accord, but allied with Kurds and ISCI.
Muthanna—26 seats
State of Law—10.9% (5); ISCI—9.3% (5); Jafari—6.3% (3); Sadr—5.5% (2); Fadhila—
3.7%.
Anbar—29 seats
Iraq Awakening (Sahawa-Sunni tribals)—18%; National Iraqi Project Gathering
(established Sunni parties, excluding IIP)—17.6%; Al awi—6.6%; Tribes of Iraq—
4.5%.
Maysan—27 seats
State of Law—17.7% (8); ISCI—14.6% (8); Sadr—7; Jafari—8.7% (4); Fadhila—3.2%;
Allawi—2.3%. New Governor: Mohammad al-Sudani (Maliki); Council chair:
Hezbollah Iraq
Dhi Qar—31 seats
State of Law—23.1% (13); pro-Sadr—14.1% (7); ISCI—11.1% (5); Jafari—7.6% (4);
Fadhila—6.1%; Allawi—2.8%. Governor—Maliki list; Council chair: Sadrist
Karbala—27 seats
List of Maj. Gen. Yusuf al-Habbubi (Saddam-era local official)—13.3% (1 seat); State
of Law—8.5% (9); Sadr—6.8% (4); ISCI—6.4% (4); Jafari—2.5% ; Fadhila—2.5%.
Salah Ad Din—28 seats
IIP-led list—14.5%; Al awi—13.9%; Sunni list without IIP—8.7%; State of Law—3.5%;
ISCI—2.9%. Council leans Accord/IIP
Qadissiyah—28 seats
State of Law—23.1% (11); ISCI—11.7% (5); Jafari—8.2% (3); Al awi—8%; Sadr—
6.7% (2); Fadhila—4.1%. New governor: Salim Husayn (Maliki list)
Wasit—28 seats
State of Law—15.3% (13); ISCI—10% (6); Sadr—6% (3); Al awi—4.6%; Fadhila—
2.7%. Governor: Shi te independent; Council chair: ISCI
Source: UNAMI translation of results issued February 2, 2009, by the Independent Higher Election Commission
of Iraq; Vissar, Reidar. The Provincial Elections: The Seat Allocation Is Official and the Coalition-Forming Process
Begins. February 19, 2009.

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Table 6. Election Results (January and December 2005)
Seats
Seats
Bloc/Party
(Jan. 05)
(Dec. 05)
United Iraqi Alliance (UIA, Shiite Islamist). 85 seats after departure of Fadilah (15 seats)
and Sadr faction (28 seats) in 2007. Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq of Abd al-Aziz al-
Hakim has 30; Da’wa Party (25 total: Maliki faction, 12, and Anizi faction, 13);
140 128
independents (30).
Kurdistan Alliance—KDP (24); PUK (22); independents (7)
75
53
Iraqis List (secular, Al awi); added Communist and other mostly Sunni parties for Dec.
40 25
vote.
Iraq Accord Front. Main Sunni bloc; not in Jan. vote. Consists of Iraqi Islamic Party (IIP,
— 44
Tariq al-Hashimi, 26 seats); National Dialogue Council of Khalaf Ulayyan (7); General
People’s Congress of Adnan al-Dulaymi (7); independents (4).
National Iraqi Dialogue Front (Sunni, led by former Baathist Saleh al-Mutlak) Not in Jan.
— 11
2005 vote.
Kurdistan Islamic Group (Islamist Kurd) (votes with Kurdistan Alliance)
2
5
Iraqi National Congress (Chalabi). Was part of UIA list in Jan. 05 vote

0
Iraqis Party (Yawar, Sunni); Part of Al awi list in Dec. vote
5

Iraqi Turkomen Front (Turkomen, Kirkuk-based, pro-Turkey)
3
1
National Independent and Elites (Jan)/Risalyun (Message, Dec) pro-Sadr
3
2
People’s Union (Communist, non-sectarian); on Allawi list in Dec. vote
2

Islamic Action (Shiite Islamist, Karbala)
2
0
National Democratic Alliance (non-sectarian, secular)
1

Rafidain National List (Assyrian Christian)
1
1
Liberation and Reconciliation Gathering (Umar al-Jabburi, Sunni, secular)
1
3
Ummah (Nation) Party. (Secular, Mithal al-Alusi, former INC activist)
0
1
Yazidi list (smal Kurdish, heterodox religious minority in northern Iraq)

1
Notes: Number of polling places: January: 5,200; December: 6,200; Eligible voters: 14 million in January election;
15 million in October referendum and December; Turnout: January: 58% (8.5 million votes)/ October: 66%
(10 million)/December: 75% (12 million).

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Table 7. Assessments of the Benchmarks
July 12,
Subsequent Actions and Assessments—May 2008 Administration report,
2007,
June 2008 GAO report, International Compact with Iraq Review in June
Admin.
GAO
Sept. 14, 2007,
2008, and U.S. Embassy Weekly Status Reports
Benchmark
Report
(Sept. 07)
Admin. Report
(and various press sources)
1. Forming Constitutional Review Committee
(S)
unmet
S
CRC filed final report in August 2008 but major issues remain unresolved and require
(CRC) and completing review
satisfactory
achievement of consensus among major faction leaders.
2. Enacting and implementing laws on De-
(U)
unmet
S
“Justice and Accountability Law” passed Jan. 12, 2008. Allows about 30,000 fourth
Baathification
unsatisfact.
ranking Baathists to regain their jobs, and 3,500 Baathists in top three party ranks
would receive pensions. Could allow for judicial prosecution of all ex-Baathists and

bars ex-Saddam security personnel from regaining jobs. As noted, De-Baathification
officials used this law to try to harm the prospects of rivals in March 2010 elections.
3. Enacting and implementing oil laws that
U
unmet
U
Framework and three implementing laws stalled over KRG-central government
ensure equitable distribution of resources
disputes; only framework law has reached COR to date. Revenue being distributed
equitably, and 2009 budget maintains 17% revenue for KRG. Kurds also getting that
share of oil exported from newly producing fields in KRG area. Some U.S.
assessments say factions closer to agreement as a result of the November 2010
formation of a broad-based government.
4. Enacting and implementing laws to form
S
partly met
S
Regions law passed October 2006, with relatively low threshold (petition by 33% of
semi-autonomous regions
provincial council members) to start process to form new regions, took effect April
2008. November 2008: petition by 2% of Basra residents submitted to IHEC (another
way to start forming a region) to convert Basra province into a single province
“region. Signatures of 8% more were required by mid-January 2009; not achieved.
March 2011: more than 33% of provincial council of Najaf has asked for a referendum
to become a province.
5. Enacting and implementing: (a) a law to
S on (a)
overall
S on (a) and (c)
Draft law stipulating powers of provincial governments adopted February 13, 2008,
establish a higher electoral commission, (b)
and U on
unmet; (a)
took effect April 2008. Implementing election law adopted September 24, 2008,
provincial elections law; (c) a law to specify
the others
met
provided for provincial elections by January 31, 2009. Those elections were held, as
authorities of provincial bodies, and (d) set a
discussed above.
date for provincial elections
6. Enacting and implementing legislation
no rating
unmet
Same as July
Law to amnesty “non-terrorists” among 25,000 Iraq-held detainees passed February
addressing amnesty for former insurgents
13, 2008. Most of these have been released. 19,000 detainees held by U.S. were
transferred to Iraqi control under Security Agreement.
7. Enacting and implementing laws on militia
no rating
unmet
Same as July
March 2008 Basra operation, discussed above, viewed as move against militias. On
disarmament
April 9, 2008, Maliki demanded all militias disband as condition for their parties to
participate in provincial elections. Law on militia demobilization stalled.
8. Establishing political, media, economic, and
S
met
met
No longer applicable; U.S. “surge” has ended and U.S. troop total in Iraq now about
CRS-33


July 12,
Subsequent Actions and Assessments—May 2008 Administration report,
2007,
June 2008 GAO report, International Compact with Iraq Review in June
Admin.
GAO
Sept. 14, 2007,
2008, and U.S. Embassy Weekly Status Reports
Benchmark
Report
(Sept. 07)
Admin. Report
(and various press sources)
services committee to support U.S. “surge”
50,000, down from about 170,000 at the 2008 height of the surge.
9. Providing three trained and ready brigades
S
partly met
S
No longer applicable. Eight brigades were assigned to assist the surge when it was in
to support U.S. surge
operation.
10. Providing Iraqi commanders with
U
unmet
S to pursue
No significant change. Still some U.S. concern over the Office of the Commander in
authorities to make decisions, without political
extremists U on
Chief (part of Maliki’s office) control over appointments to the ISF—favoring Shiites.
intervention, to pursue all extremists, including
political
Some politically motivated leaders remain in ISF. But, National Police said to include
Sunni insurgents and Shiite militias
interference
more Sunnis in command jobs and rank and file than one year ago.
11. Ensuring Iraqi Security Forces (ISF)
U
unmet
S on military, U
U.S. interpreted March 2008 Basra operation as effort by Maliki to enforce law even-
providing even-handed enforcement of law
on police
handedly. Tribal support councils not even-handed, and still widespread Iraqi public
complaints of politically-motivated administration of justice.
12. Ensuring that the surge plan in Baghdad will S
partly met
S
No longer applicable with end of surge. Ethno-sectarian violence has fallen sharply in
not provide a safe haven for any outlaw, no
Baghdad.
matter the sect
13. (a) Reducing sectarian violence and (b)
Mixed. S
unmet
same as July 12
Sectarian violence has not re-accelerated outright, although there are fears the unrest
eliminating militia control of local security
on (a); U
since February 2011 could reignite sectarian conflict. Shiite militias weak but have
on (b)
potential to reactivate operations.
14. Establishing Baghdad joint security stations
S
met
S
Over 50 joint security stations operated in Baghdad at the height of U.S. troop surge.
Closed in compliance with June 30, 2009, U.S. pul out from the cities.
15. Increasing ISF units capable of operating
U
unmet
U
ISF expected to secure Iraq by the end of 2011 under the Security Agreement, which
independently
requires U.S. troops to depart. Obama Administration officials say ISF will meet the
challenges. Iraqi Air Force not likely to be able to secure airspace by then and DOD
has approved potential sale to Iraq of F-16s and other major equipment.
16. Ensuring protection of minority parties in
S
met
S
No change. Rights of minority parties protected by Article 37 of constitution.
COR
Minorities given a minimum seat allocated in election law for march vote.
17. Allocating and spending $10 billion in 2007
S
partly met
S
About 63% of the $10 billion 2007 allocation for capital projects was spent.
capital budget for reconstruction.
18. Ensuring that Iraqi authorities not falsely
U
unmet
U
Some governmental recriminations against some ISF officers still observed.
accusing ISF members
Source: Compiled by CRS.

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Iraq: Politics, Governance, and Human Rights



Author Contact Information

Kenneth Katzman

Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs
kkatzman@crs.loc.gov, 7-7612


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