Georgia [Republic]: Recent Developments and
U.S. Interests

Jim Nichol
Specialist in Russian and Eurasian Affairs
May 18, 2011
Congressional Research Service
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www.crs.gov
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Georgia [Republic]: Recent Developments and U.S. Interests

Summary
The small Black Sea-bordering country of Georgia gained its independence at the end of 1991
with the dissolution of the former Soviet Union. The United States had an early interest in its fate,
since the well-known former Soviet foreign minister, Eduard Shevardnadze, soon became its
leader. Democratic and economic reforms faltered during his rule, however. New prospects for
the country emerged after Shevardnadze was ousted in 2003 and the U.S.-educated Mikheil
Saakashvili was elected president. Then-U.S. President George W. Bush visited Georgia in 2005,
and praised the democratic and economic aims of the Saakashvili government while calling on it
to deepen reforms. The August 2008 Russia-Georgia conflict caused much damage to Georgia’s
economy and military, as well as contributing to hundreds of casualties and tens of thousands of
displaced persons in Georgia. The United States quickly pledged $1 billion in humanitarian and
recovery assistance for Georgia. In early 2009, the United States and Georgia signed a Strategic
Partnership Charter, which pledged U.S. support for democratization, economic development, and
security reforms in Georgia. The Obama Administration has pledged continued U.S. support to
uphold Georgia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity.
The United States has been Georgia’s largest bilateral aid donor, budgeting cumulative aid of $2.7
billion in FY1992-FY2008 (all agencies and programs). Georgia has regularly ranked among the
top world states in terms of per capita U.S. aid. U.S.-budgeted foreign assistance for Georgia in
FY2008 was $713.5 million and $359 million in FY2009 (including annual foreign operations
appropriations and tranches from the $1 billion aid pledge). Estimated aid to Georgia in FY2010
was about $171.6 million, and planned spending for FY2011 is about $90 million (country totals
for foreign assistance for FY2011 under the continuing resolution, H.R. 1473; P.L. 112-10, signed
into law on April 15, 2011, are being finalized). The Administration has requested $87.6 million
for foreign assistance for Georgia for FY2012.

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Georgia [Republic]: Recent Developments and U.S. Interests

Contents
Political Background................................................................................................................... 1
Human Rights ....................................................................................................................... 3
Economic Conditions .................................................................................................................. 4
Foreign Policy and Defense......................................................................................................... 5
The August 2008 Russia-Georgia Conflict............................................................................. 6
U.S. Relations ............................................................................................................................. 8
Contributions to Counter-Terrorism Operations in Iraq and Afghanistan .............................. 11

Figures
Figure 1. Map of Georgia .......................................................................................................... 13

Contacts
Author Contact Information ...................................................................................................... 14

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Georgia [Republic]: Recent Developments and U.S. Interests

Political Background
Georgia gained its independence at the end of
Georgia: Basic Facts
1991 with the dissolution of the former Soviet
Area and Population: 26,872 sq. mi., slightly larger than
Union. Its elected president, Zviad
West Virginia. The population is 4.62 million (The World
Gamsakhurdia, faced insurrection and fled the
Factbook, mid-2010 est.). Administrative subdivisions
include the Abkhazian and Ajarian Autonomous
country in January 1992. Coup leaders invited
Republics.
former Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard
Shevardnadze to head a ruling State Council,
GDP: $20.23 billion in 2009; per capita income is about
$4,400 (World Factbook est., purchasing power parity).
and he was elected the speaker of the
legislature in late 1992 and president under a
Political Leaders: President: Mikheil Saakashvili; Prime
new constitution in 1995. The country was
Minister: Nika Gilauri; Speaker of the Parliament: Davit
Bakradze; Defense Minister: Bacho Akhalaia; Foreign
roiled by secessionist conflict by South
Minister: Grigol Vashadze.
Ossetia and Abkhazia that resulted in cease-
Biography: Saakashvili, born in 1967, received his
fires in 1992 and 1994, respectively.
Master’s at Columbia Univ. and his Ph.D. at George
Shevardnadze was ousted in the wake of a
Washington Univ. He was elected to the legislature in
suspect legislative election in late 2003, and
1995 and 1999, where he chaired the Constitutional
coup co-leader Mikheil Saakashvili was
Committee and headed the ruling party’s faction. In
elected president in January 2004. A
2000, he became minister of justice, but resigned in late
2001, accusing the government of corruption and
November 2007 government crackdown on
forming the National Movement party bloc. In 2002-
political oppositionists led Saakashvili to step
2003, he chaired the Tbilisi city council. He was elected
down as president in the face of domestic and
president in 2004 and reelected in 2008.
international criticism to seek a mandate on
his continued rule. He was reelected president in January 2008 with 53% of the vote. Electoral
observers hosted by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) stated that
the election broadly met its standards, but that irregularities needed to be addressed. He is
constitutionally limited to two terms in office, and has stated that in accordance with the
constitution, he will not run in a planned 2013 presidential election, although he does not plan to
leave politics entirely.
In an address at the U.N. General Assembly on September 23, 2008, President Saakashvili
announced new democratization initiatives as a means to strengthen Georgia’s sovereignty and
independence and thereby prevent Russia from subverting Georgia’s statehood. After lengthy
attempts, President Saakashvili met with a few opposition leaders in April-May 2009 to discuss
setting up a constitutional commission to work out changes to the political system, and such a
commission was established in June 2009. In his March 2010 and February 2011 state of the
nation addresses, Saakashvili pledged further democratization efforts. In his 2011 speech, he
called for the creation of a “modern” Georgia that will be “a democratic European nation with the
fastest growing economy in Europe,” where Georgian citizens will be more confident, “more
educated” and “more competitive,” and not subject to subjugation by Russia.1
Local elections to 64 city councils, as well as the first popular election of Tbilisi’s mayor, were
held at the end of May 2010. The ruling NM won over 65% of the vote in the city council races,
followed by the moderate opposition Christian Democratic Alliance party bloc with about 12% of
the vote. In the Tbisili mayoral race, the NM incumbent—Gigi Ugulava—was reelected with

1 “Georgian President Delivers State-of-Nation Address to Parliament,” Open Source Center Feature, February 16,
2011.
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Georgia [Republic]: Recent Developments and U.S. Interests

about 55% of the vote, followed by the moderate opposition Alliance for Georgia leader Irakli
Alasania with about 19%. In the Tbilisi city council race, 39 of 50 seats were won by NM
candidates, the Alliance for Georgia (a bloc consisting of Our Georgia-Free Democrats, the
Republican Party, the New Rights Party, and Georgia’s Way) won 5 seats, the Christian
Democratic Alliance won 3 seats, the radical opposition National Council (a bloc consisting of
the Conservative Party, the Party of People, and the Movement for Fair Georgia) won 2 seats, and
the moderate opposition Industry Will Save Georgia Party won 1 seat.
The election was widely viewed as a rehearsal for the planned 2012 legislative election and 2013
presidential election, and as such appeared to be a mandate for the NM and a legitimization of the
moderate opposition, according to some observers. Some observers suggest that Ugulava may be
the likely candidate backed by NM in the 2013 presidential election. The boycott of the election
by much of the radical opposition—including Nino Burjanadze’s party Democratic Movement-
United Georgia, Levan Gachechiladze’s Defend Georgia, and Irakli Okruashvili’s For a United
Georgia—appeared to marginalize them in the public’s eyes, according to some observers. The
inability of the opposition to unite harmed their electoral chances, these observers argued.
Perhaps illustrative of this problem, the Alliance for Georgia party bloc disbanded in June 2010.2
Monitors from the OSCE reported that the local elections “marked evident progress towards
meeting OSCE and Council of Europe [democratization] commitments,” but that “significant
shortcomings” remained, including apparent ballot-box stuffing and multiple voting, vote-
counting and tabulation problems, the use of administrative resources for favored candidates, and
deficiencies in the legal framework and its implementation. Assistant Secretary of State Philip
Crowley repeated the findings of the OSCE that the local elections showed progress in
democratization, but that “significant shortcomings need to be addressed.”3
In May 2010, the constitutional commission (mentioned above) agreed on amendments to slightly
reduce the power of the president and increase the powers of the legislature and prime minister. In
October 2010, the Georgian legislature approved the constitutional changes. Most of the changes
will not come into effect until after the next presidential election, scheduled for early 2013. Under
the changes, the party that has the largest number of seats in the legislature will nominate the
candidate for prime minister. This nominee will select ministers and draft a program, and upon
approval by the legislature, the president will appoint the prime minister. The changes also call
for regional governors to be appointed by the prime minister rather than the president, as is
currently the case. Some suggestions by the Venice Commission, an advisory body of the Council
of Europe, were not enacted. The Commission had raised concerns that the proposed presidential
powers were still substantial relative to those of the prime minister and legislature, and that
clashes between the president and prime minister might emerge on foreign policy and other
matters. The Venice Commission suggested that a more powerful legislature might appoint the
prime minister, be able to remove the prime minister with a simple majority vote (rather than 60%
of the vote), and approve changes to the cabinet. A citizen’s group likewise complained that the
legislature’s powers remained weak and criticized the retention of gubernatorial appointments.
Some opposition parties allege that the constitutional changes are designed to permit Saakashvili

2 Christofer Berglund, “Georgia’s Local Elections: Revitalizing the Rose Revolution?” CACI Analyst, June 9, 2010;
CEDR, May 31, 2010, Doc. No. CEP-46023; Open Source Feature, May 19, 2010, Doc. No. FEA-5119; May 31, 2010,
Doc. No. FEA-5598.
3 OSCE, Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, Georgia Municipal Elections, 30 May 2010:
OSCE/ODIHR Election Observation Mission Report,
September 13, 2010. U.S. Department of State. Daily Press
Briefing
, June 2, 2010.
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to serve as prime minister after his term as president ends, and have called for a new
constitutional amendment to ban a former president from subsequently serving as prime minister.
The ruling National Movement Party and several opposition parties launched talks on reforming
the electoral code in November 2010. Several opposition parties have called for a change to the
current system—under which 75 legislative seats are filled by proportional (party list) voting and
75 are filled by majoritarian (first past the post) voting—to create larger multi-seat electoral
districts where proportional voting might permit more opposition parties to get enough votes to
gain seats. Discussions also include changing the size of the legislature. Some of these proposals
had been raised by the opposition the previous year during consideration of constitutional
changes. The ruling National Movement Party has counter-proposed that the number of seats
filled through majoritarian voting should be increased by dividing some electoral districts with
large populations. In the past, the National Movement Party has won most of the majoritarian
seats. Talks reached an impasse in early March 2011. U.S. Ambassador to Georgia John Bass has
urged that discussions on electoral reforms be continued.
The radical opposition, particularly those parties allied in the People’s Assembly (led by former
legislative speaker Nino Burjanadze and former border guards’ chief Badri Bitsadze) and the
Georgian Party (founded in October 2010 and led by former public defender Sozar Subari, exiled
former defense minister Irakli Okruashvili, and 2008 presidential candidate and businessman
Levan Gachechiladze) are planning new demonstrations to force the government to resign and to
trigger new presidential and legislative elections. The Georgian Party held a rally outside the U.S.
Embassy on May 16, 2011, to protest alleged U.S. support for the Saakashvili government.
In mid-May 2011, the legislature voted to form a public commission to discuss moving all
legislative activities to a new complex being constructed in Kutaisi, Georgia’s second largest city,
about 124 miles west of Tbilisi. Under a constitutional change made in 2009, some legislative
activities were to be moved to Kutaisi in 2012, but the new proposal calls for all activities to be
conducted in Kutaisi.
Human Rights
According to the State Department’s Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2010,
significant human rights achievements included the implementation of a new Criminal Procedure
Code with increased protections for the rights of the accused, the strengthening of the Public
Defender’s (Ombudsman’s) Office, and the construction of new prisons meeting international
standards. In contrast to the previous year, there were no reports that policemen planted drugs or
weapons on persons to arrest or charge them in criminal cases. However, there continued to be
reports of arbitrary arrests and detentions and the employment of torture and other excessive force
with limited accountability. Many Georgians continued to view the judiciary as dependent on the
executive branch and deferential to the prosecution, especially given the very low acquittal rate in
criminal cases. Jury trials have not yet begun. There were allegations by some opposition parties
that their members were subject to government surveillance and job loss. They also alleged that
their members were selectively targeted for prosecution by law enforcement and that the courts
tended to rule against them, and that the government continued to hold political prisoners and
detainees.
Individuals were generally free to criticize the government without reprisal, although there were
some reports of curbs on media freedom. Opposition figures and representatives of the
government regularly appeared on the same television shows, thereby providing a plurality of
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views. However, some NGOs and journalists accused political parties and government officials of
seeking to influence media programming through their connections with media owners and by
directing advertising. Although print media frequently criticized government officials, there were
reports of direct physical attacks, harassment, and intimidation of journalists by government
officials. Some NGOs reported that a climate of widespread impunity for attacks and harassment
of human rights activists had a chilling effect on their ability to operate. Some NGOs reported
that police continued to conduct searches and monitor telephone conversations without first
obtaining court orders.4
Economic Conditions
Georgia’s economy suffered in 2008-2009 from the after-effects of the world economic downturn
and the Russia-Georgia conflict, but began to recover in 2010. The Economist Intelligence Unit
(EIU) estimates that Georgia’s gross domestic product (GDP) contracted 3.8% in 2009, but
resumed growth in 2010 of 6.1%. The EIU projects that GDP will grow by 4.3% in 2011. The
EIU estimates that inflation will increase slightly from 7.1% in 2010 (much of the rise was late in
the year) to 8.4% in 2011. Consumers are facing rising food prices and farmers are confronting
high seed and fuel prices.5
Economic activities include agriculture, mining, and a small industrial sector. Civil conflict and
poverty have spurred the emigration of about one-fifth (1 million) of the population since 1991. A
large percentage of the working population has migrated for work in Russia or elsewhere. After
being reduced as a result of the world economic downturn, the contribution of migrant worker
remittances abroad to GDP increased in 2010-2011, as economic growth returned to Russia and
other host countries. Georgia is a member of the World Trade Organization. In 2010, Georgia
exported $1.58 billion in goods and imported $5.1 billion. Turkey, Azerbaijan, and Ukraine were
Georgia’s main trade partners. Georgia’s main exports during 2010 were ferrous metals,
automobiles (through reselling rather than production), ferrous scrap, and gold and copper
production. U.S. exports to Georgia were $300 million during 2010 (slightly less than those of the
previous year) and U.S. imports from Georgia were $193 million (nearly three times those of the
previous year).6 Georgia’s State Statistics Department has reported that total foreign direct
investment in Georgia was $553 million in 2010, and that the largest investors were the
Netherlands ($143 million), the United States ($108 million) and Russia ($51 million). This level
of foreign direct investment remains below that of the pre-2008 conflict period, and eventually
could harm economic growth, according to the International Monetary Fund.
Georgia is a transit state for a pipeline completed in mid-2006 carrying 1 million barrels per day
of Azerbaijani oil to the Turkish port of Ceyhan (the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan or BTC pipeline).
Another pipeline completed in early 2007 initially carries 2.2 billion cubic meters of Azerbaijani
natural gas to Georgia and Turkey, lessening their dependence on Russia as a supplier. In
addition, a pipeline transits Georgia to Armenia that carries Russian gas. Georgia receives some
gas through this pipeline, including some gas in lieu of transit fees. The United States has backed

4 U.S. Department of State, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2010, April 8, 2011.
5 Georgia: Country Report, Economist Intelligence Unit, March 2011; Molly Corso,” Georgia: Inflation Pushing
Farmers into Debt Trap,” Eurasianet, March 24, 2011.
6 U.S. Census Bureau, Foreign Trade Statistics, Trade in Goods (Imports, Exports and Trade Balance) with Georgia, at
http://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/balance/c4633.html#2010.
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Georgian ownership of this pipeline and MCC has provided funds for upgrading the pipeline.
Every year since 2005, Russia’s state-owned Gazprom gas firm has announced increases in the
price of gas shipped to Georgia. Azerbaijan provides some gas supplies to Georgia, easing
Tbilisi’s dependence on Gazprom.
Talks are being held between Georgia and Russia on addressing Georgia’s economic concerns as
a condition for the country’s agreement to support Russia’s admission into the World Trade
Organization (WTO). Reportedly, Georgia is pressing for government or international monitors as
customs checkpoints between the breakaway regions and Russia.
In his February 2011 state of the nation address, President Saakashvili called for major economic
progress over the next five years, including the doubling of agricultural production and exports,
the halving of unemployment, and the boosting of salaries by 50%. He also called for boosting
tourism and building seventeen new hydro-electric power plants. In May 2011, he again called for
accelerating economic growth during an awards ceremony for Georgian businesses.
Foreign Policy and Defense
Among its neighbors, Georgia has developed close ties with Azerbaijan and maintains good
relations with Armenia. Georgia has an ongoing interest in ties with about 1 million Georgians
residing in Turkey and about 50,000 Georgians in Iran. Ties with Russia have sharply deteriorated
during Saakashvili’s presidency. After the August 2008 Russia-Georgia conflict, Georgia broke
off diplomatic relations with Russia and withdrew as a member of the Russia-dominated
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). Georgia is a member of the European Union’s
(EU’s) Eastern Partnership program of enhanced economic ties, and hopes to negotiate a free-
trade agreement with the EU. President Saakashvili has set a goal for Georgia to eventually
become an EU member.
Georgia’s military is the smallest among those of the South Caucasus states. Its ground forces, air
force, and national guard numbered 20,655 at the beginning of 2011. There were also 5,400
border guards and 6,300 Interior (police) Ministry troops. Most of the ground forces and air force
personnel are on contracts and a minority are conscripted. A small coast guard—largely
decimated during the Russia-Georgia conflict—was incorporated into the border guards in 2009.7
According to the Georgian defense ministry, 160 military personnel were killed during the
Russia-Georgia conflict.8 In March 2010, Defense Minister Akhalaia released a Minister’s Vision
2010
—a document providing guidance until a new national security concept, threat assessment,
and strategic defense review are drawn up reflecting the lessons of the August 2008 conflict—that
calls for enhancing defense capabilities for territorial defense, ensuring NATO interoperability of
the armed forces, and increasing military management and military training. A draft national
security concept that is being discussed by the legislature has warned that Georgia faces a high
threat of renewed aggression from Russia, and that Russia’s goals are “to derail Georgia’s Euro-
Atlantic aspirations and to forcibly return Georgia back to the Russian orbit.” The concept argues,

7 The Military Balance, International Institute of Strategic Studies, March 7, 2011.
8 Central Eurasia: Daily Report (hereafter CEDR), Open Source Center, September 2, 2008, Doc. No. CEP-950366.
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however, that “international support expressed toward Georgia is a significant factor deterring
this risk.”9
Marking the shift toward more security ties with the West, Georgia withdrew from the CIS
Collective Security Treaty in 1999. Georgia assumed full control from Russia over guarding its
sea and land borders in 1999. Georgia joined NATO’s Partnership for Peace in 1994 and has
hosted PFP exercises annually since 2001. NATO signed an Individual Partnership Action Plan
(IPAP) with Georgia in October 2004 to deepen cooperation and launched an “intensified
dialogue” with Georgia in September 2006 on reforms necessary for possible NATO membership.
A NATO Membership Action Plan (MAP) for Georgia was a matter of contention at the April
2008 NATO Summit. Although Georgia was not offered a MAP, the Alliance pledged that
Georgia would eventually become a member of NATO. After the Russia-Georgia conflict, a
NATO-Georgia Council was set up to further systematize NATO reform guidance. At the meeting
of the NATO-Georgia Council in April 2011 in Berlin, the foreign ministers issued a joint
statement that welcomed the opening of the NATO liaison office in Tbilisi in October 2010 and
the steady progress Georgia has shown in implementing its annual national program of
cooperation with NATO, but called for more progress in democratization, including electoral
reforms.10
The August 2008 Russia-Georgia Conflict
Simmering tensions between Georgia and its breakaway regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia
erupted on the evening of August 7, 2008. Georgia claims that South Ossetian forces did not
respond to a cease-fire appeal to end mutual shelling of villages but intensified their shelling,
“forcing” Georgia to send troops into South Ossetia that soon controlled the regional capital of
Tskhinvali. The Russian military soon pushed Georgian forces out of South Ossetia, repeated this
action in Abkhazia, and launched air strikes throughout Georgia. On August 15, the Georgian
government accepted a French-brokered 6-point cease-fire that left Russian forces in control of
the two regions, and two weeks later, Russia recognized their independence. On August 26,
Russia recognized the independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. In September 2008, Russia,
Georgia, and the breakaway regions signed follow-on cease-fire accords that called for bolstering
the number of international monitors of the cease-fire, setting up an international conference on
ensuring security and stability in the region, resettling refugees and displaced persons, and
working out a peace settlement. The European Union has deployed 320 cease-fire monitors. The
international conference has held several meetings in Geneva, Switzerland, but so far has agreed
only to some incident notification measures that have successfully reduced some tensions.
Georgia, the United States, and others have argued that in violation of the cease-fire accords,
Russia has maintained troops in some areas instead of pulling them out, has not reduced the
number of its troops in the regions to pre-conflict levels, and has forced out OSCE and U.N.
observers from the regions. Russia has established military bases in each of the regions and a
naval base in Abkhazia and has deployed up to 1,800 troops and over 1,000 border troops in each
of the regions.

9 “Draft of Georgia’s New National Security Concept,” Civil Georgia, March 3, 2011.
10 NATO, Joint Statement at the Meeting of the NATO-Georgia Commission at the Level of Foreign Ministers in
Berlin, Germany
, April 15, 2011.
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The EU and World Bank convened a donors’ conference in Brussels on October 22, 2008, to
garner international funds for Georgia’s rebuilding. Thirty-eight countries and fifteen
international organizations pledged approximately $4.5 billion in aid to Georgia for the 2008-
2010 period. The amount pledged was higher than the basic needs outlined in a Joint Needs
Assessment report presented to the conference, indicating the high level of international concern
over Georgia’s fate.11 The pledges are addressed to meet urgent social needs related to internally
displaced people, as well as damaged infrastructure; budgetary shortfalls; loans, equity, and
guarantees to the banking sector; and core investments in transportation, energy, and municipal
infrastructure that will boost economic growth and employment. The United States pledged the
largest amount—$1 billion—for these efforts.
On September 30, 2009, a special EU fact-finding mission led by Swiss diplomat Heidi Tagliavini
released a report on the origins and outcome of the August 2008 Russia-Georgia conflict. On the
one hand, the mission concluded that “open hostilities began with a large-scale Georgian military
operation against the town of Tskhinvali [in South Ossetia] and the surrounding areas, launched in
the night of 7 to 8 August 2008. Operations started with a massive Georgian artillery attack.” The
mission also argued that the artillery attack was not justifiable under international law. However,
it also argued that the artillery attack “was only the culminating point of a long period of
increasing tensions, provocations and incidents” by the parties to the conflict. On the other hand,
the mission suggested that “much of the Russian military action went far beyond the reasonable
limits of defense,” and that such “action outside South Ossetia was essentially conducted in
violation of international law.” In Abkhazia, actions by Russian-supported militias in the upper
Kodori Valley “constituted an illegal use of force ... not justified under international law.” The
mission likewise asserted that actions by South Ossetian militias “against ethnic Georgians inside
and outside South Ossetia, must be considered as having violated International humanitarian law
and in many cases also human rights law.”12 Commenting on the release of the report, a U.S. State
Department spokesman stated that “we recognize that all sides made mistakes and
miscalculations through the conflict last year. But our focus is on the future.”13
The International Crisis Group (ICG), a non-governmental organization, estimated in June 2010
that there may be fewer than 30,000 people residing in South Ossetia, and that the population
continues to decline (a 1989 census, taken before the beginning of conflict, reported a regional
population of 98,500). The ICG suggests that the region is increasingly less able to govern or
sustain itself economically, so it must rely on Russian aid and thousands of Russian construction
and government workers, troops, and border guards that are deployed there.14
In July 2010, Georgia unveiled an “action plan” to peacefully encourage the breakaway regions to
reintegrate with Georgia. The action plan was praised by the United States and others in the
international community as illustrating Georgia’s “strategic patience” in peacefully engaging with
the breakaway regions. The action plan called for a humanitarian commission to be established in
Tbilisi and the breakaway region, for status-neutral travel documents to be issued to individuals
in the breakaway regions that would facilitate international travel, and an economic zone and
other subsidies. The breakaway regions have rejected the plan, and critics have questioned

11 The World Bank, Georgia: Summary of Joint Needs Assessment Findings Prepared for the Donors’ Conference of
October 22, 2008 in Brussels
, n.d.
12 Report of the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on the Conflict in Georgia, Vol. 3.
13 U.S. Department of State, Daily Press Briefing, September 30, 2009.
14 South Ossetia: The Burden of Recognition, International Crisis Group, June 7, 2010.
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whether Georgia’s and international donors’ assistance could outmatch Russia’s subsidies to the
regions.
In November 2010, President Saakashvili proclaimed in a speech to the European Parliament that
Georgia would “never use force to restore its territorial integrity and sovereignty, and only resort
to peaceful means in its quest for de-occupation and reunification.” He subsequently sent written
statements pledging the non-use of force to international organizations and Russia. Although
Russia had long called for Georgia to reiterate such a pledge (the ceasefire agreements had
contained such a pledge), Russia rejected making such a pledge to Georgia and has continued to
call for Georgia to sign bilateral pledges with South Ossetia and Abkhazia.15
At the December 1-2, 2010, summit meeting of the OSCE, the United States and Russia clashed
over the principle of Georgia’s territorial integrity. The United States called for reestablishing an
OSCE Mission in Georgia that would have a mandate that included the breakaway areas, but
Russia refused. Language in the final declaration recognizing territorial integrity as a core
principle of the OSCE was deleted.
In early March 2011, Assistant Secretary of State Philip Gordon reiterated the U.S. position that
Georgia’s territory is “occupied” by Russian troops. He explained that “we don’t know what else
to call it. We respect Georgia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. We believe that Russia used
disproportionate force and remains present in what we consider to be sovereign Georgia. So it’s
not meant to be a particular provocation, it’s just a description of what we think the situation is
and we’ve very active in the Geneva talks and bilaterally with Russia to try to bring about an end
to what we consider to be a military occupation.”16 The day after Gordon’s statement, the South
Ossetian emissary to the Geneva conference denounced the use of the term “occupation” to
describe Russia’s role, and called for a discussion of the term by international lawyers at the next
Geneva meeting scheduled for June 2011.
On March 15, 2011, OSCE Chairman-in-Office Audronius Azubalis called for Russia to respond
to President Saakashvili’s nonuse-of-force pledge by making a pledge to Georgia not to use force
against it.
U.S. Relations
Signed in January 2009, the U.S.-Georgia Charter on Strategic Partnership reflects strong U.S.
support for Georgia’s continued sovereignty and independence. In the security realm, “the United
States and Georgia intend to expand the scope of their ongoing defense and security cooperation
programs to defeat [threats to global peace and stability] and to promote peace and stability.”
Such cooperation will “increase Georgian capabilities and ... strengthen Georgia’s candidacy for
NATO membership.” In the economic realm, the two countries “intend to pursue an Enhanced
Bilateral Investment Treaty, to expand Georgian access to the General System of Preferences, and
to explore the possibility of a Free-Trade Agreement.” Energy security goals include “increasing
Georgia’s energy production, enhanc[ing] energy efficiency, and increas[ing] the physical security
of energy transit through Georgia to European markets.” In the realm of democratization, the two
countries “pledge cooperation to bolster independent media, freedom of expression, and access to

15 Civil Georgia, November 23, 2010.
16 U.S. Embassy, Bratislava, Slovakia, Assistant Secretary of State for Europe Phil Gordon in Bratislava: The U.S.
Relationship With Central Europe Under the Obama Administration
, March 3, 2011.
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objective news and information,” and to further strengthen the rule of law. The United States
pledged to train judges, prosecutors, defense lawyers, and police officers.17
The first meeting of the U.S.-Georgia Strategic Partnership Commission was held on June 22,
2009, in Washington, DC, led by Deputy Secretary of State James Steinberg and Georgian
Foreign Minister Grigol Vashadze. The Security Working Group also met, co-headed on the U.S.
side by Assistant Secretary of State Philip Gordon and Assistant Secretary of Defense Alexander
Vershbow, and headed on the Georgian side by Deputy Foreign Minister Giga Bokeria. Other
working groups on the economy, democracy, and people-to-people exchanges held initial
meetings over the next few months.18
The second plenary meeting of the U.S.-Georgia Strategic Partnership Commission was held on
October 6, 2010, in Washington, DC. Meeting with Prime Minister Nikoloz Gilauri, Secretary
Clinton stated that “the United States will not waver in its support for Georgia’s sovereignty and
territorial integrity. That support is a core principle of our Charter on Strategic Partnership, and it
is fundamental to our bilateral relationship. The United States remains committed to Georgia’s
aspirations for membership in NATO…. We continue to call on Russia to end its occupation of
Georgian territory, withdraw its forces, and abide by its other commitments under the 2008
ceasefire agreements…. As part of our commitment to enhancing Georgia’s future as a prosperous
and secure member of the Western family of nations, we will continue to work with you to
strengthen Georgian democracy.”19 Prime Minister Gilauri indicated that Georgia was requesting
more educational, security, and economic assistance, including to bolster energy infrastructure. In
mid-March 2011, Deputy Assistant Secretaries of State Spencer Boyer and Alina Romanowski
and Deputy Assistant USAID Administrator Jonathan Hale hosted the fourth meeting of the
people-to-people working group to discuss educational, cultural, medical, and scientific
cooperation and exchanges. In late April 2011, Deputy Assistant Secretaries of State Tina
Kaidanow and Kathleen Fitzpatrick visited Georgia to participate in a meeting of the democracy
working group, and met with opposition politicians and members of civil society. Kaidanow
reportedly praised Georgia’s democratization efforts but stated that more remained to be done
regarding judicial and electoral reforms, and called for the stalled talks on electoral reforms to
resume with wider involvement by civil society.20
The United States has been Georgia’s largest bilateral aid donor, budgeting cumulative aid of $2.7
billion in FY1992-FY2008 (all agencies and programs). Georgia has regularly ranked among the
top world states in terms of per capita U.S. aid. U.S.-budgeted foreign assistance for Georgia in
FY2008 was $713.5 million and in FY2009 was $359 million (including annual foreign
operations appropriations and tranches from the $1,005.5 million aid pledge). Estimated spending
for FY2010 was about $171.6 million, and planned spending for FY2011 is about $90 million
(country totals for foreign assistance for FY2011 under the continuing resolution, H.R. 1473; P.L.
112-10, signed into law on April 15, 2011, are being finalized). The Administration has requested
$87.6 million for foreign assistance for Georgia for FY2012.21 The Millennium Challenge

17 U.S. Department of State, U.S.-Georgia Charter on Strategic Partnership, January 9, 2009.
18 U.S. Department of State, Fact Sheet: U.S. - Georgia Charter on Strategic Partnership, October 6, 2010.
19 U.S. Department of State, Remarks at the U.S.-Georgia Charter on Strategic Partnership Omnibus Meeting, October
6, 2010.
20 The Messenger, April 28, 2011; Civil Georgia, April 28, 2011.
21 U.S. Department of State, Congressional Budget Justification for Foreign Operations, Annex: Regional Perspectives,
FY2012
, March 2011.
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Georgia [Republic]: Recent Developments and U.S. Interests

Corporation (MCC) is closing out a 2006-2011 $395 million agreement (termed a “compact”)
with Georgia that the MCC regards as highly successful in resurfacing roads, rehabilitating the
north-south gas pipeline, rebuilding water supplies, and providing agricultural assistance (much
of the MCC spending was in addition to above-mentioned aid). Georgia has been deemed eligible
for a new MCC compact.
At a press conference after meeting with Russian President Dmitriy Medvedev on July 6, 2009—
part of the U.S. “reset” of relations with Russia—President Obama reported that he had
“reiterated my firm belief that Georgia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity must be respected.”22
In Georgia, many officials and others viewed the meeting positively as lessening the chances of
renewed Russia-Georgia conflict and as a reaffirmation of the U.S. commitment to Georgia.
Perhaps to further reassure Georgians, Vice President Joseph Biden visited Georgia in late July
2009 to emphasize the continued U.S. commitment to its sovereignty and independence.
President Obama reaffirmed the U.S. commitment to uphold Georgia’s sovereignty and territorial
integrity when he met with President Saakashvili at the nuclear summit in Washington, DC, in
April 2010 and on January 14, 2011 (with Vice President Biden), but President Obama reportedly
did not meet with President Saakashvili during the latter’s week-long mid-March 2011 U.S. visit
(President Saakashvili did meet with Members of Congress; see below).
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton paid a six-hour visit to Georgia on July 5, 2010, during her
regional tour. She urged Georgians not to focus on the past, possibly referring to the Russia-
Georgia conflict, but to be “focused on what you can do today and tomorrow to improve your
lives and the lives of your family and the lives of your fellow citizens by building your
democracy and opening your economy and providing more justice and social inclusion, that, to
me, is the great mission of Georgia.” While stating that the United States continued to call for
Russia to pull back its troops to their positions on August 6, 2008 (in line with the 6-point cease-
fire agreement), she also “strongly urged” Georgia to “not be baited or provoked into any action
that would give any excuse to the Russians to take any further aggressive movements.”23 Vice
President Biden revisited Georgia on July 23, 2010—as in 2009, just after a U.S.-Russia
summit—to reassure Georgia of U.S. interest in its fate. He urged Georgia to continue to develop
democratic institutions and free markets, including as the best means to attract the people of the
breakaway areas to reintegrate with the rest of Georgia. He called for further democratization,
including constitutional changes to create a balance of power between the legislative and
executive branches of government.
Some observers have called for a reevaluation of some aspects of U.S. support for Georgia. These
critics have argued that many U.S. policymakers have been captivated by Saakashvili’s
charismatic personality and pledges to democratize and have tended to overlook his bellicosity.
They have warned that U.S. acceptance of Georgian troops for coalition operations in
Afghanistan must not lead to U.S. defense commitments to Georgia, and a few have suggested
that the United States should not unquestionably back Georgia’s territorial integrity, but should
rather encourage reconciliation and the consideration of options short of the near-term
reintegration of the regions into Georgia. Other observers have called for a more robust U.S. and
NATO effort to resupply Georgia with defensive weaponry so that it might deter or resist Russian

22 The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Press Conference by President Obama and President Medvedev of
Russia
, July 6, 2009.
23 U.S. Department of State, Remarks by Secretary Clinton: Joint Press Availability With Georgian President
Saakashvili
, July 5, 2010; Remarks at a Town Hall With Georgian Women Leaders; July 5, 2010.
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Georgia [Republic]: Recent Developments and U.S. Interests

aggression. At the same time, most observers advise against extending diplomatic recognition to
breakaway regions without an international consensus.24
Contributions to Counter-Terrorism Operations in Iraq and
Afghanistan

The former president of Georgia, Eduard Shevardnadze, immediately condemned the attacks on
the United States on September 11, 2001, and offered “airspace and territory” for U.S. coalition
operations in Afghanistan. Georgia was among the countries in 2003 that openly pledged to
support the U.S.-led Operation Iraqi Freedom. In August 2003, Georgia dispatched 69 troops to
Iraq, boosted them to over 850 in March 2005, and increased them to 2,000 by September 2007,
making it among the top contributors of troops. Georgian troops served under U.S. command.
Many provided security in the “Green Zone” in Baghdad, the town of Baqubah northeast of
Baghdad, and in Wasit Governorate, along the Iranian border. Most of the troops pulled out in
August 2008 in connection with the Russia-Georgia conflict, and the rest pulled out by the end of
November 2008.
Georgia contributed about 50 troops during Afghan elections in late 2004–early 2005. On
November 16, 2009, Georgia sent 173 troops for training in Germany before their scheduled
deployment at the end of March 2010 to support the International Security Assistance Force
(ISAF) in Afghanistan. These troops have been boosted to 925 as of mid-2010. About 200 troops
serve with French forces and the rest with U.S. Marines and Afghan troops in Helmand and
Nimruz Provinces. In early 2011, the Georgian legislature approved sending artillery trainers for
the Afghan military.
Among U.S. security programs in Georgia, a $64 million Georgia Train and Equip Program
(GTEP) began in 2002. U.S. troops provided training to 200 officers, some 2,000 soldiers, and a
small number of Interior (police) Ministry troops and border guards. According to the U.S.
Defense Department, the GTEP aimed to help Georgia “to resist pressure to allow the Russian
military to pursue Chechen rebels” into Georgia, help it combat terrorists inside the country, and
block those trying to infiltrate Georgia. Small arms, communications and medical gear, and
uniforms were provided. The program ended in 2004 but a follow-on Sustainment and Stability
Operations Program (SSOP) was launched in FY2006, funded at $60 million. SSOP provided
training for 2,000 troops, in part to support U.S.-led coalition operations, along with advisory
assistance for defense reforms and maintenance for previously supplied helicopters. SSOP was
continued in FY2007 at $28 million and FY2008 at $71 million. Prior to the August 2008 Russia-
Georgia conflict, the Defense Department planned to budget approximately $35 million for
training for new troop deployments to Iraq (however, Georgia pulled its troops out of Iraq in the
wake of the Russia-Georgia conflict).25 Congress provided $50 million in FY2008 and $50
million in FY2009 under the (now expired) authority of Section 1207 of the National Defense

24 Alexander Cooley and Lincoln Mitchell, “No Way to Treat Our Friends: Recasting Recent U.S.-Georgian Relations,”
The Washington Quarterly, January 2009, pp. 27-41; Lincoln Mitchell, Uncertain Democracy: U.S. Foreign Policy and
Georgia’s Rose Revolution
(Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2009); “A Georgia-Russia War Discussion
between Gordon Hahn and Johnson’s Russia List,” Russia: Other Points of View, October 17, 2008, at
http://www.russiaotherpointsofview.com; Paul Saunders, “Help Has Strings Attached,” Washington Times, December
17, 2009.
25 U.S. Senate, Committee on Armed Services, Hearing on the Georgia-Russia Crisis, Testimony of Eric S. Edelman,
Under Secretary of Defense for Policy
, September 9, 2008.
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Authorization Act for FY2006 (P.L. 109-163) for reconstruction and stabilization activities in
Georgia, of which only a small portion was defense-related (the restoration of Coast Guard
infrastructure; none was weapons-related, see below). Under Section 1206 of the Act, Congress
provided $11.5 million to Georgia in FY2008 for special forces training and $20.5 million in
FY2010.26 These latter funds were used by Marine Corps Forces Europe, under the Georgia
Deployment Program, to train troops for deployment to Afghanistan. The Georgia Deployment
Program has been involved in training four battalions (nearly 3,000 troops) for six-month
rotations in Afghanistan.27
Assistant Secretary Vershbow testified in August 2009 that the Obama Administration was
“focusing on building defense institutions, assisting defense sector reform, and building the
strategic and educational foundations that will facilitate necessary training, education, and
rational force structure design and procurement. We are assisting Georgia to move along the path
to having modern, western-oriented, NATO-interoperable armed forces capable of territorial
defense and coalition contributions.” He stressed, however, that “the United States has not
‘rearmed’ Georgia as some have claimed. There has been no lethal military assistance to Georgia
since the August [2008] conflict.”28 Although President Saakashvili seemed to indicate during
Secretary Clinton’s July 2010 visit that U.S. security cooperation with Georgia was adequate, he
stated in September 2010 that “leaving Georgia defenseless doesn’t help the situation. Georgia
cannot attack Russia, while a defenseless Georgia is a big temptation for Russia to change our
government through military means…. As part of ongoing security cooperation, we hope that the
U.S. will help us with defense-weapons capabilities.”29
Some in Congress and elsewhere have criticized this dearth of lethal security assistance to bolster
Georgia’s territorial defense capabilities.30 Although President Saakashvili seemed to indicate
during Secretary Clinton’s July 2010 visit that U.S. security cooperation with Georgia was
adequate, he stated in September 2010 that “leaving Georgia defenseless doesn’t help the
situation. Georgia cannot attack Russia, while a defenseless Georgia is a big temptation for
Russia to change our government through military means…. As part of ongoing security
cooperation, we hope that the U.S. will help us with defense-weapons capabilities.”31 On
December 12, 2010, U.S. Senator John McCain called for the Obama Administration to resume
some defensive arms transfers to Georgia, including early warning radars. Three days later,
Giorgiy Baramidze, the Georgian deputy prime minister and state minister for Euro-Atlantic
integration, also called for the United States to resume the transfer of defensive weapons to
Georgia. During his March 10-17, 2011, visit to the United States, President Saakashvili

26 CRS Report RS22871, Department of Defense “Section 1207” Security and Stabilization Assistance: Background
and Congressional Concerns, FY2006-FY2010
, by Nina M. Serafino, and CRS Report RS22855, Security Assistance
Reform: “Section 1206” Background and Issues for Congress
, by Nina M. Serafino.
27 Dan Lamothe and John Bretschneider, “Corps Plans to Continue Georgian Training Mission,” Marine Corps Times,
April 11, 2011; Sgt. Matt Lyman, “U.S. Marines Observe, Train Georgia's 33rd Light Infantry Battalion During
Georgia Deployment Program,” States News Service, February 25, 2011.
28 U.S. Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on Europe, Hearing on Georgia: One Year After the
August War. Testimony of Alexander Vershbow, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs,
August 4, 2009.
29 Jerry Guo, “Russia’s Occupation Won’t Last,” Newsweek, September 12, 2010.
30 U.S. Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Striking The Balance: U.S. Policy And Stability In Georgia, a Report
to the Committee on Foreign Relations
, S. PRT. 111–37, December 22, 2009; Joshua Kucera, “Georgia: Senate Staff
Report Stokes Unease in the Caucasus,” Eurasia Insight, January 5, 2010.
31 Jerry Guo, “Russia’s Occupation Won’t Last,” Newsweek, September 12, 2010.
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Georgia [Republic]: Recent Developments and U.S. Interests

reportedly requested U.S. transfers of defensive weapons. In late March 2011, he reportedly
stated that while some U.S. small arms transfers were “in the pipeline,” Georgia needed anti-air
and anti-tank weapons from the United States.32
During a hearing of the Senate Armed Services Committee on March 29, 2011, Senator McCain
asked whether the United States was providing defensive weapons to Georgia, and EUCOM
Commander Stavridis stated that “at this moment we are not providing them [with] what I would
term high-end military defensive weapons.” Senator McCain responded that “it is hard for me to
understand, since the Russians still occupy territory that is clearly Georgian territory and continue
to threaten Georgia, and yet we're not even giving them weapons with which to defend
themselves. It is not comprehensible.”33

Figure 1. Map of Georgia

Source: CRS.


32 Josh Rogin, “Georgian President: Russia has to Compromise if it Wants into WTO,” The Cable, Foreign Policy,
March 30, 2011, at http://thecable.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2011/03/30/
georgian_president_russia_has_to_compromise_if_it_wants_into_wto.
33 U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Services, Hearing on the U.S. European Command and U.S. Strategic
Command Budget for Fiscal Year 2012
, March 29, 2011.
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Author Contact Information

Jim Nichol

Specialist in Russian and Eurasian Affairs
jnichol@crs.loc.gov, 7-2289


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