Interagency Collaborative Arrangements and
Activities: Types, Rationales, Considerations
Frederick M. Kaiser
Specialist in American National Government
May 17, 2011
Congressional Research Service
7-5700
www.crs.gov
R41803
CRS Report for Congress
P
repared for Members and Committees of Congress
Interagency Collaborative Arrangements and Activities
Summary
Interagency collaboration among federal agencies with overlapping jurisdictions and shared
responsibilities is not a new phenomenon. Attempts to foster cooperation among agencies, reduce
their number in particular policy areas, or clarify the division of labor among them date to the
early days of the republic. Such arrangements are increasing in the contemporary era in number,
prominence, and proposals across virtually all policy areas. The reasons for the current upsurge
are the growth in government responsibilities, cross-cutting programs, and their complexity;
certain crises which showed severe limitations of existing structures; and heightened pressure to
reduce the size of federal programs and expenditures.
Recent congressional action reflects these considerations. In 2010, Congress directed the
Government Accountability Office (GAO) (P.L. 111-139, 124 Stat. 29) to
conduct routine investigations to identify programs, agencies, offices, and initiatives with
duplicative goals and activities within Departments and governmentwide and report annually
to Congress on the findings, including the cost of such duplication.
GAO identified 34 such programs. The GPRA Modernization Act of 2010 (P.L. 111-352)
provides that the Office of Management and Budget’s government-wide priority goals include
“outcome-oriented goals covering a limited number of crosscutting policy areas.” Legislative
initiatives in the 112th Congress have also advanced across-the-board reviews (e.g., H.R. 155) or
recognize shared jurisdictions and responsibilities among agencies. And House Rules for the 112th
Congress call on its standing committees to include proposals in their oversight plans to eliminate
“programs that are inefficient, duplicative, outdated, or more appropriately administered by State
or local governments.” President Barack Obama has taken similar stands regarding overlapping
programs—in his 2011 State of the Union Address, subsequent memoranda, and recent budget
requests—and the executive has continued ongoing arrangements or added new ones.
The broad concept of interagency collaboration contains at least six types of various activities and
arrangements: collaboration (an exchange among relatively equal entities or peers, separate from
collaboration’s broad use), coordination, mergers, integration, networks, and partnerships. These
categories often overlap with, supplement, or reinforce one another; and several different types
may occur in the same organizational structure and endeavor. Complicating matters, the different
types are not defined in public laws or executive directives, even though required in some.
Because of this and other reasons, the terms have sometimes lacked consistency and precision,
have been used interchangeably, or have been applied to more than one category.
Nonetheless, working definitions can be developed for the different types. All of these are
surrounded by a number of rationales, intended to enhance collaboration, improve coordination,
or clarify responsibilities and jurisdictions among agencies. The underlying objectives and
expectations range from reducing policy fragmentation and mitigating competition among
agencies, to enhancing efficiency and effectiveness, changing organizational and administrative
cultures, and streamlining and improving congressional and executive oversight. Despite these
appeals, concerns and questions have arisen over some of the rationales and their underlying
assumptions as well as determining the success or failure of interagency efforts. This report—
which will be updated as conditions dictate—examines the burgeoning field of interagency
collaboration and presents a bibliography at the end, highlighting the broad subject as well as
specific areas.
Congressional Research Service
Interagency Collaborative Arrangements and Activities
Contents
Introduction ................................................................................................................................ 1
Various Types and Understandings of Collaboration .................................................................... 2
Broad Interpretation of Collaboration .................................................................................... 2
Different Types of Interagency Collaboration ........................................................................ 3
Distinguishing Between Collaboration and Coordination....................................................... 6
Examples of Collaboration .............................................................................................. 7
Examples of Coordination............................................................................................... 8
Qualifications on the Distinction Between Collaboration and Coordination ................... 11
Background of Relevant Efforts and Concerns .......................................................................... 12
Heritage and Antecedents .................................................................................................... 12
Contemporary Developments .............................................................................................. 13
Rationales for Interagency Collaboration................................................................................... 14
End or Reduce Policy Fragmentation .................................................................................. 16
Improve Effectiveness in Policy Formulation and Implementation....................................... 17
Make Agencies Aware of Different Perspectives and Orientations........................................ 17
Mitigate Conflict Among Agencies...................................................................................... 17
Increase Agency Productivity .............................................................................................. 17
Enhance Efficiency, Reduce Redundancy, and Cut Costs ..................................................... 17
Heighten the Attention to and Priorities for Cross-Cutting Programs.................................... 18
Change Organizational Cultures .......................................................................................... 18
Change Bureaucratic and Administrative Cultures and Methods of Operation...................... 18
Streamline and Improve Congressional and Executive Oversight ......................................... 19
Concerns and Questions about the Rationales ............................................................................ 21
Difficulties in Assessing the Success of Interagency Collaboration ............................................ 23
Factors Affecting the Adoption, Evolution, and Impact of Collaborative Arrangements.............. 24
Conclusions and Observations................................................................................................... 26
Selective Bibliography on Interagency Collaboration ................................................................ 28
Overarching Studies on Interagency Arrangements.............................................................. 28
Homeland Security Interagency Structure............................................................................ 30
National Security Interagency Structure .............................................................................. 31
Security Clearance Process Interagency Structure................................................................ 32
Miscellaneous Studies on Interagency Collaboration ........................................................... 33
Contacts
Author Contact Information ...................................................................................................... 34
Acknowledgements................................................................................................................... 34
Congressional Research Service
Interagency Collaborative Arrangements and Activities
Introduction
Interagency coordinative arrangements and activities—called for in public laws, executive orders,
and administrative directives—appear to be growing in number, prominence, and proposals
throughout virtually all individual policy areas and across-the-board. Underlying this growth are
several developments: the increase in governmental responsibilities, cross-cutting programs, and
their complexity; the inadequate preparation for and response to severe crises (in particular, the
9/11 terrorist attacks and the 2005 Gulf Coast hurricanes); and heightened pressure to reduce or
consolidate federal programs and expenditures.
This report examines formal interagency collaborative arrangements and activities, which are
intended to enhance joint efforts and cooperation among independent federal agencies with
shared responsibilities and overlapping jurisdictions.1 The study examines the following:
• various types and understandings of collaborative activities and arrangements, as
well as related concepts of interagency coordination, integration, mergers and
reorganizations, networking, and partnerships;
• background of relevant efforts;
• rationales for interagency collaboration and the problems these are designed to
address;
• concerns and questions about the rationales;
• difficulties in assessing interagency collaboration success or failure; and
• factors affecting the adoption, evolution, and impact of collaborative activities
and arrangements.
This Congressional Research Service (CRS) study builds on and supplements an extensive
collection of materials, covering various aspects of interagency collaboration, current and past,
which are cited in the bibliography at the end of the report. That compilation identifies analyses
of different subject and policy areas as well as different types of arrangements used among
agencies. The relevant studies—both current and historical—come from congressional
committees, CRS, executive branch entities, Government Accountability Office (GAO),
governmental commissions, professional associations, and scholars.
1 This review examines neither informal collaborative arrangements (those operating without formal authorization,
such as a public law, executive order, administrative directive, or memorandum of agreement) nor intra-agency
endeavors (those falling exclusively within a department or agency). Both of these have significantly different
parameters and arrangements to develop and enforce collaborative ventures compared to formal cross-agency
arrangements. Informal arrangements, even if large in number and relatively stable over time, still lack officially fixed
memberships and responsibilities; informal ventures, moreover, are difficult to identify and describe authoritatively.
Intra-agency arrangements also differ importantly from interagency ones, in large part because the authority and
resources held by the head of an agency over his or her own domain are more comprehensive and substantial than those
held by the head of one entity over other independent entities engaging in collaborative enterprises.
Congressional Research Service
1
Interagency Collaborative Arrangements and Activities
Various Types and Understandings of Collaboration
Interagency collaboration—as a way to enhance cooperation among agencies with shared
responsibilities and overlapping jurisdictions—has been used in at least two different ways: to
mean a distinct type of activity and arrangement, or broadly to cover one or more other related
types (coordination, networking, integration, mergers, and partnerships).2
Broad Interpretation of Collaboration
Representative of this latter view, the Government Accountability Office has adopted an
encompassing characterization of collaboration for certain of its reviews:
For the purposes of this report we use the term “collaboration” broadly to include
interagency activities that others have variously defined as “cooperation,” “coordination,”
“integration,” or “networking.” We have done so because there are no commonly accepted
definitions of these terms and we are unable to make definitive distinctions between these
different types of interagency activities.3
GAO later added to this by defining “‘collaboration’ … as any joint activity by two or more
organizations that is intended to produce more public value than could be produced when the
organizations act alone.”4 This broad interpretation—which approaches the generic
“cooperation”—led to the discovery of hundreds of examples of collaborative activities, even
within a specialized area.5 Other studies have estimated similar totals.6
2 For example, one public administration analyst has adapted collaboration to replace what had traditionally been
considered public-private partnerships, because the latter have “become hopelessly ambiguous…. [As its replacement,
collaboration] refers to joint efforts by public and private actors, each wielding a degree of discretion, to advance a goal
that is conventionally considered governmental.” (John D. Donahue, “The Race: Can Collaboration Outrun Rivalry
between American Business and Government?” Public Administration Review, vol. 70, Supplement 1, December 2010,
p. S151.) This extension of collaboration, however, departs from more limited understandings of collaboration, even if
vague. And this replacement would not necessarily make the concept of public-private partnerships—or their functional
equivalent—clearer or more specific, instead it would blend them under a broadened notion of collaboration.
3 GAO, Results-Oriented Government: Practices That Can Help Enhance and Sustain Collaboration Among Federal
Agencies, GAO-06-15, p. 1, note 2 and, for further explanation, pp. 6-7.
4 Ibid., p. 6. In so doing, GAO adopted language from Eugene Bardach, Getting Agencies to Work Together: The
Practice and Theory of Managerial Craftsmanship (Brookings Institution: Washington, DC, 1998), p. 8.
5 For example, in 2010, GAO found that more than 200 activities met its criteria for identifying ones that were
important to improving interagency collaboration in the national security arena. GAO, National Security: An Overview
of Professional Development Activities Intended to Improve Interagency Collaboration, GAO-10-108, 2010, pp. 3-4.
Despite the large and increasing number of interagency devices and efforts, they may still be absent in certain areas,
including some critical ones. GAO, based on its survey of national security strategy and related matters, concluded that
a lack of collaboration in some matters “hindered national security efforts.” GAO, Interagency Collaboration: Key
Issues for Congressional Oversight of National Security Strategies, Organizations, Workforce, and Information
Sharing, GAO-09-904SP, 2009, p. 1.
6 Along this line, a 2002 CRS study identified seven distinct types or categories of coordinative devices, ones in which
there was a lead agency or official guiding or directing an operation or project. These ranged from presidentially
chaired councils, like the National Security Council; to a single official with some express powers over other agencies;
to transfers of authority, personnel, and resources among agencies. Such transfers include interagency partnerships,
field working groups, joint task forces, and joint operational centers (e.g., for intelligence or law enforcement
purposes). All totaled, these interagency coordinative devices were projected to reach the hundreds, because of the
large number of federal agencies involved in cross-cutting programs, in formal interagency devices, and in interagency
(continued...)
Congressional Research Service
2
Interagency Collaborative Arrangements and Activities
Different Types of Interagency Collaboration
At least six different types of collaborative arrangements and activities can be identified. Even
though lacking agreed-upon, hard-and-fast, detailed definitions of these, generalized operational
understandings or working definitions can be developed for the principal interagency activities
and arrangements, separate from collaboration as a broadly encompassing concept. Designed to
ensure or enhance cooperation among agencies with overlapping jurisdictions and shared
responsibilities, these are
1. collaboration, an arrangement which relies, to a substantial degree, on voluntary
or discretionary participation among the members, who are relatively equal or at
least have parity in such an activity and arrangement;
2. coordination, an arrangement in which a lead agency or officer directs an
operation, project, or program among one or more other agencies;
3. merger, an arrangement which merges or transfers all or parts of different
agencies or their authorities, jurisdictions, personnel, and resources on a
permanent basis to another organization, either a new or existing department,
agency, bureau, office, or other entity;7
4. integration, an arrangement which brings together relevant parts of agencies on
either a long-term or a temporary ad hoc basis, to carry out a particular operation,
project, program, or policy; these endeavors, unlike mergers, involve non-
permanent transfers of personnel, resources, or authority among relevant
agencies;8
5. networks, an arrangement which involves the federal government and all or
several other levels of government: federal, state, local, tribal, or, in some cases,
foreign countries;9 and
(...continued)
agreements, especially covering narrowly focused, ad hoc, and recurrent joint enterprises. CRS Report RL31357,
Federal Interagency Coordinative Mechanisms: Varied Types and Numerous Devices, by Frederick M. Kaiser.
7 Most prominent among mergers and reorganizations, in part designed to improve interagency collaboration and
coordination, are the establishments of the Department of Homeland Security in 2002 and the Department of Defense,
then named the National Military Establishment, in 1947 (both are discussed further below). Other examples are
independent agencies—such as the Environmental Protection Agency—some of which were in part created to improve
collaboration. In addition to such traditional governmental agencies and departments are various organizational
hybrids, which can be used to enhance collaboration. These range from public and quasi-public corporations to
government-sponsored enterprises, research and development centers, agency-related nonprofits, and various other
instrumentalities. For an overview, see CRS Report RL30533, The Quasi Government: Hybrid Organizations with Both
Government and Private Sector Legal Characteristics, by Kevin R. Kosar; Lester M. Salamon, ed., The Tools of
Governance: A Guide to Organizational Design (Oxford University Press: New York, 2002); and Thomas H. Stanton
and Benjamin Ginsberg, eds., Making Government Manageable: Executive Organization and Management in the
Twenty-First Century (Johns Hopkins University Press: Baltimore, 2004).
8 Numerous integrative arrangements exist. Many of these are short-term, ad hoc joint field operations which, for
instance, frequently arise in law enforcement, while others exist on a long-term basis, as with interagency centers for
intelligence gathering, analysis, and dissemination.
9 The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), for example, engages all levels of governments throughout
the United States when putting the National Response Framework into operation. See FEMA, National Response
Framework. Networks, along with public-private partnerships, are also prominent in medical care services, particularly
Medicaid and Medicare.
Congressional Research Service
3
Interagency Collaborative Arrangements and Activities
6. partnerships, an arrangement which features public-private partnerships, with
the public sector entities extending from the federal government to state, local, or
tribal governments, as well as, in some cases, foreign governments; and with the
private sector involving different types of entities: non-governmental
organizations (NGOs), not-for-profit organizations, for-profit companies and
firms, government-sponsored enterprises, and government-chartered
corporations.10
These different types may overlap with one another, may exist in the same organizational
structure, or may even be required in the same authorization (but without express definitions,
distinctions, elaboration, or specification). Such endeavors can result in hybrids, in which several
types of activities and arrangements exist in the same organizational structure.11 Many of the
examples cited herein combine different activities and arrangements (rather than a single type),
which are difficult, if not impossible in some instances, to separate.12
10 A variety of partnerships arise when a private sector entity supplements or replaces a government agency in carrying
out a governmental activity or service. These can manifest “indirect government” or “third-party government,” not only
through contracts and outsourcing with private parties but also through voluntary efforts by some. Such efforts provide
a wide range of public goods and services, including grants, loans, vouchers, insurance, tax collection, and security for
persons and facilities. See The Quasi Government, by Kosar; Salamon, ed., The Tools of Government; Stanton and
Ginsberg, eds., Making Government Manageable; “Spotlight on Contracting Out and Privatization,” Public
Administration Review, vol. 69, July/August 2009, pp. 668-726; and Jill Nicholson-Crotty, “Nonprofit Organizations,
Bureaucratic Agencies, and Policy: Exploring the Determinants of Administrative Advocacy,” American Review of
Public Administration, vol. 41, January 2011, pp. 61-74.
One long-lasting public-private partnership involves the American National Red Cross, with roles tied to the military
services and currently to the Federal Emergency Management Agency. The American Red Cross is a statutorily
chartered independent corporation, with express duties and functions in law, one of which is to assist the United States
government in disaster relief operations. 36 U.S.C. secs. 300101-300102; 10 U.S.C. sec. 2602; 22 U.S.C. sec. 2601
note; and 42 U.S.C. secs. 5152-5153. See also CRS Report RL33910, The Charter of the American National Red
Cross: Current Issues and Proposed Changes, by Kevin R. Kosar. Another partnership, which also includes
integration, is connected with the Office of Protected Resources (OPR) in the National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration (NOAA). OPR partners with, among others, the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service,
Department of Agriculture; U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, Department of the Interior; Marine Mammal Commission;
World Wildlife Fund; and the Department of State’s Bureau of Oceans, Environment and Science to support scientific,
technological, and environmental initiatives in member countries of the Central American Free Trade Agreement.
NOAA, OPR, Partnerships, available at http://www.nmfs.noaa.gov/opr/about/partnerships.htm.
11 A public-private partnership, for instance, might also involve a coordinative process, in which the participants are
directed by a lead agency or official. Or a single enterprise might contain both coordination and collaboration
requirements. As an illustration, one public law calls upon State Councils on Developmental Disabilities to promote
both forms of cooperation: “The Council may support and conduct activities to promote interagency collaboration and
coordination to better serve, support, assist, or advocate for individuals with developmental disabilities and their
families.” 42 U.S.C.S. sec. 15025. Another enactment—the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009—also
adopts both concepts in the same provision, “requiring whether there are appropriate mechanisms for interagency
collaboration relating to covered funds, including coordinating and collaborating to the extent practicable with the
Inspectors General Council on Integrity and Efficiency.” P.L. 111-5; 123 Stat. 115. On such (often inseparable)
combinations of different interagency activities, see Government Accountability Office, Results-Oriented Government:
Practices That Can Help Enhance and Sustain Collaboration Among Federal Agencies, GAO-06-15, 2005, note 2, p. 1,
and, for further discussion, pp. 6-7. Federal Interagency Coordinative Mechanisms, by Kaiser, reviews different federal
interagency devices, which might incorporate more than one arrangement or set of activities.
12 An illustration of a convergence of different types is one featuring a network but also involving other activities,
including collaboration, coordination, and integration. Networking in field operations under combat conditions—an
especially demanding site and setting—has been recounted by (retired) Army General Stanley A. McChrystal, who had
commanded the U.S. Joint Special Operations Task Force (JSOTF) in Iraq from 2003-2008. Stanley A. McChrystal
(Retired General), “It Takes a Network: The New Frontline of Modern Warfare,” Foreign Policy, March/April 2011,
pp. 1-6. The JSOTF started with a small group (composed of 15 military personnel and one intelligence analyst) but
(continued...)
Congressional Research Service
4
Interagency Collaborative Arrangements and Activities
Besides the multiple activities which can be involved in a single collaborative enterprise, other
factors influence its interpretation and use, both of which vary. This condition arises, in part,
because there are no commonly accepted definitions of the concepts as used in the public sector
and there is no precise definition of any in law or executive order that applies across-the-board.13
Complicating the absence of agreed-upon precise definitions, different interpretations—and
terminology—for each concept may be based on traditions of their use among and within
agencies, or over time. The understanding and use of these various concepts, for example, might
differ meaningfully between the military and civilian sectors of government, given their different
responsibilities, heritages, authority structures, organizational frameworks, and autonomy among
the components. Moreover, the importance and frequency of use of a type of arrangement, as well
as its purpose, are likely to differ among (and even within) individual agencies. This, in turn,
could lead to different interpretations and resulting names. Public-private partnerships, for
instance, might be more prolific and prominent in some domestic health care programs or
international aid projects—or certainly different—than in military field operations.
Time is also a likely factor in the understandings taken on by these six concepts, because terms
and their use and meaning change over different periods. The interpretations and implications of
collaboration as it was used 60 or more years ago, for instance, might well differ from today’s
use. In addition, certain concepts, such as partnerships and networks, might have changed from an
earlier period when fewer such arrangements existed or when their use in federal policy
implementation differed.14 Furthermore, the criteria adopted to identify various cooperative
arrangements can vary or be extremely broad.
In other words, the terminology has been used on occasion inconsistently, imprecisely,
interchangeably, or without differentiation among the activities.
(...continued)
was changed, when the original arrangement was found to be inadequate. The task force initially coordinated with the
military forces and civilian (particularly intelligence) agencies on the base. But General McChrystal found that
operational security procedures and cultural habits limited true synergey of their efforts against
AQI [al Qaeda]…. [He consequently determined that] a true network starts with robust
communications collectivity, but also leverages physical and cultural proximity, shared purpose,
established decision-making processes, personal relationships, and trust…. This insight allowed us
to move closer to building a true network by connecting everyone who had a role—no matter how
small, geographically dispersed, or organizationally diverse they might have been—in a successful
counterterrorism operation …. [Based on this experience, McChrystal identified the] shared basic
attributes that define an effective network. Decisions were decentralized and cut laterally across the
organization. Traditional institutional boundaries fell away and diverse cultures meshed. The
network expanded to include more groups, including unconventional actors. It valued competency
above all else—including rank.
Ibid., pp. 3-5.
13 A CRS search of Lexis-Nexis (conducted by Julia Taylor, January 14, 2011), for example, found 21 statutory
adoptions of “interagency collaboration.” None of these, however, provided a definition of the concept, when searching
for the phrases “interagency collaboration means” and “interagency collaboration is defined as.”
14 Along this line, some studies have separated different types of cooperative enterprises in order to examine possible
transformations. See Mark A. Abramson, et al., “Increasing Collaboration,” Four Trends Transforming Government,
IBM Center for the Business of Government, 2003, pp. 14-15, available at http://www.businessofgovernment.org. In
this study, the authors used information and analyses from the IBM Center for the Business of Government to analyze
change over time. They reported that the “Center has also been tracking the evolution of the use of partnerships and
networks as a new approach for how government works in diverse policy arenas—an approach that is very different
from how government traditionally worked in the 20th century.” Ibid., p. 14.
Congressional Research Service
5
Interagency Collaborative Arrangements and Activities
Distinguishing Between Collaboration and Coordination
Despite a reliance on an encompassing view of collaboration, a distinction has been made
between it and coordination, a concept suggesting that a lead agency or official has formal
authority over the process, product, and participants. According to one analysis,
It is useful to distinguish coordination from collaboration of multiple organizations.
Interagency coordination might be defined as a specific form of collaboration that applies to
particular cases and operations. By contrast to collaboration when multiple agencies may
perceive mutual benefit in working together, coordination often is more of a top-down
exercise. It takes place when a leader with authority over multiple organizations directs them
to collaborate to achieve a specified joint purpose.15
This distinction can be developed further, although it need not be absolute or applicable in all
collaborative and coordinative arrangements. Ideally, in this view, collaboration (but not
coordination) recognizes a degree of voluntarism among the participants; even though required to
become members of a collaborative arrangement, their actual participation could vary, based on
their own determinations and not on directives from a lead authority. This situation reflects parity,
if not equality, among them, producing a horizontal cooperative arrangement among peers. Under
this interpretation, there could still be a degree of consolidated authority inside a collaborative
enterprise; but it would not be as comprehensive, detailed, substantial, or formalized as it would
among coordinative counterparts. A downside of a true collaboration enterprise—because there is
no lead officer or agency in charge—is that some members might not participate adequately or at
all, even to the point of jeopardizing the interagency enterprise.16
By comparison to collaboration, an interagency coordinative arrangement, in principle, situates a
lead official or agency with formal authority to instruct, direct, or order other members. This
setting produces a hierarchical structure. An agency or official is in charge and is responsible for
the process, product, and other participants, who are not the equal of the lead in this enterprise.
Following this distinction, several examples demonstrate differences between collaboration and
coordination. These examples also illustrate a wide range and level of either or both such
arrangements. Such distinctions are manifested in high-level council responsibilities, department-
to-department operational agreements, and agency head directives to other entities, as well as
regularized and frequent interactions among a variety of participants.
15 See Thomas H. Stanton, Improving Collaboration by Federal Agencies: An Essential Priority for the Next
Administration, (National Academy of Public Administration: Washington, DC, 2007), p. 3, who provides a fuller
discussion of the differences (pp. 3-5); and Bardach, Getting Agencies to Work Together, p. 8.
16 GAO found, for example, that one member of a tri-agency committee (set up to oversee and guide the Polar-Orbiting
Environmental Satellite Program) failed to attend its meetings and sometimes contradicted the panel’s decisions. The
GAO review also determined that “it is extremely difficult for the Committee to navigate three agencies’ competing
requirements and priorities. Until these shortfalls are addressed, the Committee will remain ineffective.” GAO, Polar-
Orbiting Environmental Satellites: With Costs Increasing and Data Continuity at Risk, Improvements Needed to Tri-
agency Decision Making, Report GAO-09-564, June 17, 2009, Highlights. A subsequent GAO review reported that the
joint program was disbanded, with DOD and NOAA undertaking separate acquisition projects. GAO, Environmental
Satellites: Planning Required to Mitigate Near-term Risks and Ensure Long-term Continuity, Report GAO-10-858T,
June 29, 2010, Summary.
Congressional Research Service
6
Interagency Collaborative Arrangements and Activities
Examples of Collaboration
A 2010 memorandum of agreement (MOA) between the Department of Defense (DOD) and the
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) regarding cybersecurity reflects some of collaboration’s
main characteristics:
The purpose of this Agreement is to set forth terms by which DHS and DoD will provide
personnel, equipment, and facilities in order to increase interdepartmental collaboration in
strategic planning for the Nation’s cybersecurity, mutual support for cybersecurity
capabilities development, and synchronization of current operational mission activities.
Implementing this Agreement will focus national cybersecurity efforts, increasing the overall
capacity and capabilities of both DHS’s homeland security and DoD’s national security
missions…. DoD and DHS agree to collaborate to improve the synchronization and mutual
support of their respective efforts in support of U.S. cybersecurity. Departmental
relationships identified in this Agreement are intended to improve the efficiency and
effectiveness of requirements formulation, and requests for products, services, technical
assistance, coordination, and performance assessment for cybersecurity missions executed
across a variety of DoD and DHS elements.17
The MOA recognizes a common agreement of two departments, spelling out each one’s specific
responsibilities, obligations, and benefits (for the participants themselves as well as the program).
Neither department, however, is given direct authority over the other in meeting these specified
requirements or in accomplishing its goals; instead, the MOA relies upon each one to meet its
commitments.
Another collaborative arrangement involves the Homeland Security Council. Created by the
Homeland Security Act of 2002, the council is composed of the President, Vice President,
Secretary of Homeland Security, Attorney General, Secretary of Defense, and such other
individuals as may be designated by the President.18 Its functions—largely advisory, based on
exchanges among the members—are
to advise the President on homeland security matters. (1) assess the objectives,
commitments, and risks of the United States in the interest of homeland security and to make
resulting recommendations to the President; (2) oversee and review homeland security
policies of the Federal Government and to make recommendations to the President; and (3)
perform such other functions as the President may direct.19
An example of a collaborative arrangement also appears in legislation establishing an interagency
committee to enhance certain vocational rehabilitation services research and training. The
committee, as a whole, was called on to
promote interagency collaboration and joint research activities relating to assistive
technology research and research that incorporates the principles of universal design at the
17 Department of Defense and Department of Homeland Security, Memorandum of Agreement Between the Department
of Homeland Security and the Department of Defense Regarding Cybersecurity, Sections 3 and 4, p. 1, October 13,
2010, available at http:www.dhs.gov/ynews/releases/pr_1286984200944.shtm, which provides the link to the MOA.
The MOA further spells out the responsibilities of the departments, creates special positions for relevant joint
operations, and calls upon the deputy secretaries and other officials of both departments to oversee the activities.
18 P.L. 107-296, Title X; 116 Stat. 2258-2259. See citations in the bibliography on Homeland Security Interagency
Structure and Restructuring.
19 DOD and DHS, Memorandum of Agreement, p. 1.
Congressional Research Service
7
Interagency Collaborative Arrangements and Activities
Federal level, and reduce unnecessary duplication of effort regarding these types of research
within the Federal Government.20
A further illustration occurs in a statutory provision for grants to states for programs dealing with
child abuse and neglect prevention and treatment programs. It authorizes grants “supporting and
enhancing interagency collaboration between the child protection system and the juvenile justice
system for improved delivery of services and treatment.”21
A final example of collaboration (along with networking and partnerships) involves an
information-technology enterprise under the Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA),
named “Forge.mil” after its website. It involves a “private project collaboration [which] provides
teams that require greater access control with their own secure, private, web-based collaborative
software development environment offered as an on-demand fee for service capability.”22 It is
designed “to enable rapid development and deployment of new products and services on the
Global Information Grid.”23 In so doing, Forge.mil—which also reaches out to private sector
contractors, who hold appropriate security clearances—provides a platform where “DoD
employees can collaborate on open source and DoD community source software.”24 In support of
“net-centric operations and warfare, Forge.mil will enable cross-program sharing of software,
system components, and services [and] promote early and continuous collaboration among all
stakeholders (e.g., developers, material providers, testers, operators, and users) throughout the
development life-cycle.”25
Examples of Coordination
By comparison to this notion of collaboration, interagency coordination has been used to
recognize a directed operation or activity, in which a lead agency or official has authority over
other participants.
An example of this is the Secret Service’s lead status in National Special Security Events
(NSSEs), high-profile, large-scale events requiring an especially high level of security.26 The
Presidential Threat Protection Act of 2000, building on an earlier presidential directive, reads,
When directed by the President, the United States Secret Service is authorized to participate,
under the direction of the Secretary of the Treasury [now Homeland Security], in the
planning, coordination, and implementation of security operations at special events of
national significance, as determined by the President.27
20 29 U.S.C. sec. 763.
21 42 U.S.C. sec. 5106a.
22 Forge.mil: Transforming the Way DoD Innovates IT, p. 1, available at http://www.disa.mil/forge. See also Carolyn
Duffy Marsan, “Collaborating in the Cloud,” Government Executive, vol. 43, February 2011, pp. 33-36.
23 Forge.mil: Transforming, p. 1.
24 Forge.mil Community, p. 1, available at http://forge.mil/Community.html.
25 Forge.mil FAQ, p. 1, available at http://forge.mil/Faqs.html.
26 P.L. 106-544, 114 Stat. 2716.
27 Ibid. The language of the law simply authorizes the Secret Service “to participate” in certain activities, including
coordination. But its undisputed lead role in practice exceeds what might appear to be a limited one on paper. The
functions and duties at NSSEs—extending to presidential inaugurations, national political party nominating
conventions, and major international summits held in the United States—cover physical security as well as
(continued...)
Congressional Research Service
8
Interagency Collaborative Arrangements and Activities
The same enactment also grants the Attorney General specific cross-agency powers for
apprehending fugitives, including the establishment of permanent interagency task forces under
the direction of the U.S. Marshals Service. The law prescribes that
the Attorney General shall, upon consultation with appropriate Department of Justice and
Department of the Treasury law enforcement components, establish permanent Fugitive
Apprehension Task Forces consisting of Federal, State, and local law enforcement
authorities in designated regions of the United States, to be directed and coordinated by the
United States Marshals Service, for the purpose of locating and apprehending fugitives.28
Another illustration is manifested in a revamped program for the Chesapeake Bay’s protection
and restoration, with enhanced overarching authority residing in the Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA).29 President Obama’s executive order setting up the relevant interagency
arrangement reads,
A Federal Leadership Committee (Committee) for the Chesapeake Bay is established to
oversee the development and coordination of programs and activities, including data
management and reporting, of agencies participating in protection and restoration of the
Chesapeake Bay. The Committee shall manage the development of strategies and program
plans for the watershed and ecosystems of the Chesapeake and oversee their implementation.
The Committee shall be chaired by the Administrator of the Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA), or the Administrator’s designee.30
A final coordinative example is the most far-reaching: it centers on the Director of National
Intelligence (DNI), who has been granted extensive and substantial authority over the U.S.
intelligence community, consisting of 16 departments and agencies. Established by the
(...continued)
consequence management and involve other federal, state, and local governmental entities under the Secret Service’s
direction. In summarizing one of those efforts—security at the Nuclear Security Summit held in Washington, DC on
April 9, 2010—the department wrote, “When an event is designated as an NSSE, the United States Secret Service
assumes its mandated role as the lead agency for the design and implementation of the operational security plan.”
Department of Homeland Security, The Nuclear Security Summit (DHS: Washington, DC, 2010), p. 1, available at
http://www.dhs.gov/journal/theblog/labels/secret%20service.html. The statement also identified 23 other federal and
local governmental entities which participated. Ibid. For further description of what NSSEs encompass, who
participates, and in what capacity, see U.S. Secret Service, Office of Legislative Affairs, National Special Security
Events: Meeting the Counter-Terrorism Challenge (USSS: Washington, DC, 2006), p. 1, and National Special Security
Events Fact Sheet, (USSS: Washington, DC, 2003); as well as CRS Report RS22754, National Special Security Events,
by Shawn Reese, and CRS Report R41189, Homeland Security Department: FY2011 Appropriations, coordinated by
Jennifer E. Lake.
28 P.L. 106-544, 114 Stat. 2718-2719.
29 Chesapeake Bay Protection and Restoration, Executive Order 13508, issued by President Barack Obama, May 12,
2009, 74 FR 23099-23104, May 15, 2009.
30 Ibid., p. 23099. EPA is the overall lead agency. It has authority to approve or disapprove plans issued by the six other
federal members on the committee (i.e., the Departments of Agriculture, Commerce, Defense, Homeland Security,
Interior, and Transportation) and to keep the plans’ implementation on track down the line. Each of the other
departments on the committee is given subsidiary areas of responsibility, as with the Department of Agriculture for
agriculture practices to protect the Bay. In addition to the federal agencies, the overall program involves the six nearby
states and District of Columbia, the Chesapeake Bay Commission (a tri-state legislative body), and various
participating citizen advisory groups. For further information on this and other clean water organizational
arrangements, see EPA, Guidance for Federal Land Management in the Chesapeake Bay, May 12, 2010, and The
Chesapeake Bay Program, available at http://www/epa.gov/region03/Chesapeake/indx/htm.; and CRS Report R41594,
Water Quality Issues in the 112th Congress: Oversight and Implementation, by Claudia Copeland.
Congressional Research Service
9
Interagency Collaborative Arrangements and Activities
Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004,31 the DNI—a principal part of “the
most comprehensive reform of the U.S. intelligence community since it was created”—is “to
serve as head of the of the intelligence community (IC) and principal adviser to the President on
intelligence matters related to the national security and to oversee and direct the implementation
of the National Intelligence Program.”32 The DNI was established as an independent entity
outside the Executive Office of the President and apart from any other agency (unlike the
predecessor Director of Central Intelligence, who also headed the Central Intelligence Agency).
The Director of National Intelligence has certain budgetary, spending, and personnel powers that
give him authority and leverage over the collective intelligence community as well as over
individual components. Along with this, the DNI has been granted express statutory authority to
direct and coordinate IC operations and activities, powers that are arguably unrivaled by any
current or past interagency coordinative arrangement. Among other things, the Director of
National Intelligence shall
• provide guidance for the development of the National Intelligence Program
annual budget for each element of the intelligence community;
• ensure the effective execution of the annual budget for intelligence and
intelligence-related activities;
• be responsible for managing appropriations for the National Implementation
Program by directing the allotment or allocation of such appropriations through
the heads of the relevant departments and agencies;
• monitor the implementation and execution of the National Intelligence Program
by the heads of the elements of the intelligence community;
• establish objectives, priorities, and guidance for the intelligence community to
ensure the timely and effective collection, processing, analysis, and
dissemination of national intelligence;
• determine requirements and priorities for, and manage and direct the tasking of,
collection, analysis, production, and dissemination of national intelligence by
elements of the intelligence community;
• oversee the National Counterterrorism Center (and the DNI may establish other
intelligence centers);
• prescribe, in consultation with relevant agency and department heads, personnel
policies and programs applicable to the intelligence community that encourage
and facilitate assignments and details to national intelligence centers and between
elements of the intelligence community;
31 P.L. 108-458; 118 Stat. 3643-3365.
32 CRS Report R41295, Intelligence Reform After Five Years: The Role of the Director of National Intelligence (DNI),
by Richard A. Best Jr.. See also Office of the Director of National Intelligence, Reforming Intelligence: The Passage of
the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act (ODNI: Washington, DC, 2008); and James R. Clapper, Director
of National Intelligence, Open Hearing on the Worldwide Threat Assessment, House Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence, hearing, 112th Cong., 1st sess. February 10, 2011.
Congressional Research Service
10
Interagency Collaborative Arrangements and Activities
• make service in more than one element of the intelligence community a condition
of promotion to such positions within the intelligence community as the Director
shall specify;
• ensure the effective management of intelligence community personnel who are
responsible for intelligence community-wide matters;
• ensure the elimination of waste and unnecessary duplication within the
intelligence community;
• perform such other functions as the President may direct;
• have principal authority to ensure maximum availability of and access to
intelligence information within the intelligence community consistent with
national security requirements;
• protect intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure; and
• subject to the direction of the President, establish uniform standards and
procedures for the grant of access to sensitive compartmented information of
employees (direct and contract) of any federal agency or department and ensure
the consistent implementation of those standards and procedures throughout such
agencies and departments.33
Qualifications on the Distinction Between Collaboration and Coordination
Distinguishing between collaboration and coordination on paper, however, is complicated in
practice. A collaborative effort—where centralized authority is absent and participants are
relatively equal—might still find that some participants, following the cliché, “are more equal
than others.” Along this line, a single agency or officer may take the initiative in setting priorities,
formulating plans, guiding activities or operations, and, in effect, determining the agenda for the
entire collaborative enterprise. Or some of the participants may defer to or be co-opted by others,
particularly if the others are perceived as more well-versed or experienced in an area or more
powerful.
By comparison, a coordinative effort—despite the formal powers given an officer or agency to
lead and direct a project—might not result in adequate compliance among the participants. The
lead official (at least in his or her view) might not have sufficient authority and resources to carry
out the mandate or expectations setting up the coordinative enterprise. Alternatively, a substantial
amount of collaboration might occur within a formal coordinative arrangement. A lead officer, for
instance, might consult meaningfully with other participants in determining broad policies and
processes, as well as specific assignments and duties. In fact, such determinations might be made
by some or all of the participants, not just the lead officer, even when the coordinative enterprise
is still at the planning stage. Or the consultation among the members might result in the lead
officer, at least in some situations, ratifying decisions made by the collective membership.
Along with these qualifications, some examples reveal ambiguity between collaboration or
coordination, especially when practiced by entities given the same informal title. Cases in point
are the so-called “czars,” a frequently used (but misleading) name covering different types of
33 P.L. 108-458, 118 Stat. 3644-3651.
Congressional Research Service
11
Interagency Collaborative Arrangements and Activities
government officials. The common characterization of “czar,” which exaggerates their influence,
fails in some cases to distinguish between two categories of presidential appointees who engage
in coordinative vis-à-vis collaborative roles.34 One category consists of appointees who are
confirmed by the Senate and have statutory authority to coordinate, that is, to conduct and direct
interagency activities and operations. The Director of National Intelligence and the Director of
the Office of National Drug Abuse Policy are primary examples. A second category consists of
appointees who are not Senate-confirmed and who lack specific statutory authority to direct
interagency efforts. Officially, they are confined to collaborative roles. Nonetheless, they might
still wield power across agency lines—and engage in real coordination among agencies—under
certain situations and circumstances. Key among these, for instance, are the support given them
by the President and their leadership role in crisis situations or major policy initiatives. A prime
illustration of such a position was the Director of the Office of Homeland Security, created by
executive order in 2001, in the immediate aftermath of 9/11.35
Background of Relevant Efforts and Concerns
Heritage and Antecedents
Interagency collaboration and other types of formal cooperative ventures have a long and varied
heritage. Throughout much of the history of the U.S. government, efforts to enhance cooperation
among agencies and to strive for a proper division of labor among agencies have been
undertaken. Historical and contemporary examples of shared responsibilities and overlapping
jurisdictions, leading to interagency collaborations, abound.36 These differ, however, along
several dimensions: major or minor; long-term or short-term; involving many entities or just a
few; successful in accomplishing their purpose or unsuccessful; and operating under different
rationales and restrictions.
An early example was the federal government’s response to the Whiskey Rebellion or
Insurrection in 1794. In this precedent-setting case, President George Washington, accompanied
by Secretary of the Treasury Alexander Hamilton, led a militia force (of nearly 13,000 troops) to
rescue several Treasury agents and safeguard others as well as to enforce the excise tax on liquor.
34 For coverage of these distinguishable types of presidential appointees, see CRS Report R40856, The Debate Over
Selected Presidential Assistants and Advisors: Appointment, Accountability, and Congressional Oversight, by Barbara
L. Schwemle et al..
35 This post preceded the establishment by public law of the Department of Homeland Security and its Secretary. See
the sources in the bibliography under Homeland Security Interagency Structure and Restructuring.
36 For sources on historical examples, see, among others, Lewis Meriam and Laurance F. Schmeckebier,
Reorganization of the National Government: What Does It Involve (Brookings Institution: Washington, DC, 1937);
U.S. Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, Border Management Reorganization and Drug Interdiction
[Prepared by the Congressional Research Service], S. Prt. 100-111, 100th Cong., 2nd sess. (GPO: Washington, DC,
1988); U.S. Senate Select Committee to Investigate the Executive Agencies of the Government with a View to
Coordination, Preliminary Report, S. Rept. 75-1275, 75th Cong., 1st sess., (GPO: Washington, DC, 1937); and Leonard
D. White [four-volume series on the administrative history of the federal government], The Federalists: A Study in
Administrative History (Greenwood Press: Westport, CT, 1978); The Jacksonians: A Study in Administrative History,
1829-1861 (Macmillan Press: New York, 1954); The Jeffersonians: A Study in Administrative History, 1801-1829
(Macmillan Press: New York, 1951); and The Republican Era, 1869-1901, A Study in Administrative History
(Macmillan Press: New York, 1958).
Congressional Research Service
12
Interagency Collaborative Arrangements and Activities
Sometime later, in the 1840s, the management of Indian reservations was shared between the
Indian Bureau (also referred to as the Office of Indian Affairs) and the Department of War.
Secret Service protection of the President—when the assignment for it began in 1894 and was
regularized in the aftermath of President William McKinley’s assassination in 1901—relied
additionally, in certain situations, on the military, Coast Guard, National Guard, and the U.S. Post
Office Department as well as state and local law enforcement. These initial arrangements were
coordinated by the President’s secretary (who performed a wide range of duties for the chief
executive at the time, when there was no official chief of staff). In the early 1900s, Secret Service
detectives, as they were then called, from the Department of the Treasury were loaned to conduct
investigations to other departments; these included the Interior, which was engaged in a massive
land fraud investigation at the time, and Justice, before it had established its own (Federal)
Bureau of Investigation in 1908 (consisting mostly, incidentally, of former Secret Service
personnel).
Enforcement of Prohibition and the Volstead Act in the 1920s and early 1930s involved a number
of federal agencies (along with multiple state and local authorities), extending from the Revenue
Cutter Service, a precursor to the Customs Service, to the Coast Guard and the Prohibition Unit in
Treasury. Throughout much of the 20th century and into the current day, controlling U.S.
borders—primarily to halt illegal immigration and smuggling of contraband, especially illicit
drugs—has also involved many agencies. These entities—some of which have been abolished,
transferred, merged, or reorganized during this lengthy period—include the Coast Guard;
Customs Service; Immigration and Naturalization Service; Immigration and Customs
Enforcement Bureau; Bureau of Narcotics; Drug Enforcement Administration; Office of National
Drug Control Policy; Federal Bureau of Investigation; and various elements of the intelligence
community, National Guard, and military services (in selective assignments and duties).
Expanded or changed responsibilities in international relations and national defense in the
aftermath of World War II, propelled by the early phase of the Cold War, launched perhaps the
most massive reorganization in the history of the federal government. The National Security Act
of 1947 established the National Security Council with interagency collaborative responsibilities;
Director of Central Intelligence with some interagency coordinative authority, who also headed
the new Central Intelligence Agency; Department of Defense (initially titled the National Military
Establishment), which merged the new Department of the Air Force with the pre-existing
Departments of the Army and Navy; and the Joint Chiefs of Staff with a consultative and
collaborative role.37
Contemporary Developments
More contemporary examples of interagency collaboration have extended to an increasing
number and variety of policy and subject areas.38 One is security at National Special Security
Events. NSSEs, which are relatively few occurring in any one year, are high-profile, large-scale
events, such as presidential nominating conventions and international organizational meetings
held in the United States. Beginning in the latter 1990s, as already mentioned, these efforts have
37 61 Stat. 496 et seq.
38 For contemporary examples, see the many sources in the bibliography covering recent developments.
Congressional Research Service
13
Interagency Collaborative Arrangements and Activities
been led by the Secret Service and involve a number of federal, state, and local governmental
units as well as private sector organizations.
Enhanced coordination of homeland security functions arose in the aftermath of the terrorist
attacks on September 11, 2001, on the World Trade Center and Pentagon, followed the next
month by anthrax powder being sent through the mails to government and news media offices.
The homeland security arrangement initially relied on a then-new Office of Homeland Security
and Homeland Security Council, created by executive order, and later, on the Department of
Homeland Security and a Homeland Security Council, established by public law. In addition,
significant changes in the intelligence community arose in the aftermath of 9/11 and the
subsequent military involvement in Afghanistan and Iraq. Prominent among the changes was the
establishment, in 2004, of the new post of Director of National Intelligence, with coordinative
powers over 16 intelligence community components (already described). Another contemporary
illustration, here dealing with environmental protection and conservation, is the revamped
Chesapeake Bay Protection and Restoration program (discussed above). It is designed to create
new shared federal leadership of the program, with an augmented coordination mandate and
authority for the Environmental Protection Agency over a number of federal, state, and local
governmental entities.39
Federal medical care programs have also relied on interagency mechanisms. For example, dental
care for children from low-income families relies on a network of federal and state organizations
in combination with public-private partnerships.40
In sum, these collaborative efforts extend beyond national security or homeland security—albeit,
the most visible issue areas—to other varied policies and programs. Among these are protecting
the environment; conserving natural resources; preparing for and responding to natural disasters
and pandemics; restructuring the domestic financial sector; determining the safety and
effectiveness of medications; regulating various consumer goods; implementing medical and
social welfare programs; and granting security clearances. Along with these are the many
interagency law enforcement endeavors, including apprehending fugitives, as well as detecting,
preventing, and investigating credit card fraud, identity theft, trafficking in people, and illicit drug
possession, use, sale, distribution, and production.
Rationales for Interagency Collaboration
These various collaborative arrangements and activities have advanced in the contemporary era
for a number of reasons.41 Four major ones are:
39 Executive Order 13508, Chesapeake Bay Protection and Restoration, issued by President Barack H. Obama, May
12, 2009, 74 FR 23099-23104, May 15, 2009.
40 The coverage and capabilities of the entities involved, often relying on volunteers, however, have been found to be
insufficient to meet the needs of eligible children; one response has been a call for increases in “allied providers” in the
private sector (i.e., dental therapists and hygienist). Pew Center for the States, It Takes a Team: How New Dental
Providers Can Benefit Patients and Practices (Pew Charitable Trust: Washington, DC, 2010). Background on the
program is provided in CRS Report R40184, Medicaid and Dental Care for Children, by Elicia J. Herz.
41 In addition to the recommendations illustrated above and examined in the sources cited in the bibliography are
several legislative initiatives. The Government Reform Act of 2011 (H.R. 155, 112th Cong., 1st sess.) would create a
national commission “to establish a timely, independent, and fair process for realigning or closing outdated, ineffective,
or inefficient Executive agencies.” In so doing, the commission would examine the current configuration of executive
(continued...)
Congressional Research Service
14
Interagency Collaborative Arrangements and Activities
• the growth and changing nature of governmental responsibilities;
• political and economic pressures to reduce the size and scope of these
responsibilities and to cut federal expenditures;
• increases in the number, scale, complexity, and diversity of cross-cutting
programs, with attendant increases in overlapping jurisdictions and shared
responsibilities among agencies; and
• the urgency and importance—in several notable cases (e.g., the September 11,
2001, terrorist attacks and the 2005 Gulf Coast hurricanes)—of restructuring the
government’s response to crisis situations.
These developments have led to clarion calls for improved collaboration, coordination, or
clarification of functions and duties—along with other ways to enhance cooperation—among
agencies with shared responsibilities and overlapping jurisdictions. Rationales for interagency
collaboration are multiple in number and dimensions. Some of the rationales lend themselves to
subcategories, differ in importance and currency, or overlap with and reinforce others.
Moreover, the rationales not only embody policy-oriented benefits by a collective—for example,
a product or service that is more effective and efficient than it would be otherwise—but also can
bring about possible advantages or benefits for individual participants. Agencies engaged in
collaborative efforts, for instance, might find mutual or reciprocal benefits for themselves or
might gain support for certain vested interests. These possible advantages might accrue directly or
indirectly (e.g., to increase their own capabilities, improve their own products and services, or
learn about different operational practices). Another by-product might be that collaborating on
one project results in a quid pro quo among the participants. Yet another might be building
compatible and reinforcing relationships over the long term with other participants.
Some selective rationales for interagency collaboration—and the problems to be addressed—
follow.
(...continued)
agencies and departments and investigate their duties and responsibilities; it would also review agency operational
jurisdictions to determine whether areas of overlap exist and whether the mission of any agency has become obsolete;
finally, the commission would make recommendations for reducing waste in executive agencies, submitting to the
President and Congress a proposed reorganization plan which would provide for the realignment or closure of
executive agencies to reduce duplication of services and increase productivity. Another bill (H.R. 606, 112th Cong., 1st
sess.) would “establish a commission to provide for the abolishment of Federal programs for which a public need does
not exist, to periodically review the efficiency and public need for Federal programs, and for other purposes.” Press
coverage includes Alan K. Ota, “GOP Differs on Creation of Panel To Address Government Waste,” Congressional
Quarterly, March 1, 2011, available at http://www.cq.com/doc/news-3821763?print=true; and Robert Brodsky,
“Lawmakers agree on getting rid of overlapping programs, Government Executive, March 3, 2011, and
“Reorganization: Lots of ideas, no details yet,” Government Executive, January 26, 2011. A specialized directive is
included in the House-approved version of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2011 (sec. 404, H.R. 754,
112th Cong., 1st sess.) It provides: “Not later than December 31, 2011, the Director of National Intelligence shall
submit to Congress a report containing any recommendations the Director considers appropriate for consolidating
elements of the intelligence community.”
Congressional Research Service
15
Interagency Collaborative Arrangements and Activities
End or Reduce Policy Fragmentation
Without interagency collaboration, policymaking and its implementation are likely to be
fragmented and divided among agencies with overlapping jurisdictions and shared or related
responsibilities. Possible results of this condition, which collaboration could minimize, are
uncertainty over existing and future roles and responsibilities of individual agencies, lack of a
clear and common direction, or an ignorance of other agencies’ responsibilities and activities in
the same realm. Agencies operating alone, moreover, might be given contradictory tasks, compete
with one another, or even work at cross-purposes. Fragmented jurisdiction among multiple
congressional committees has also been seen as reinforcing the same condition in the executive,
resulting in uncoordinated responsibilities, mandates, and policy implementation.42 Interagency
collaboration could help to reduce such fragmentation (in both branches), by encouraging a
realignment of committee jurisdictions, at least for certain programs, projects, or operations.
(Competing viewpoints, however, might be raised against more far-reaching consolidations of
jurisdictions of congressional committees as well as of executive agencies.43)
42 Harsh criticisms of such fragmentation in homeland security and national security came from several sources in
2010. The Commission on Weapons of Mass Destruction, in its report on the World at Risk, concluded that
congressional oversight remains dysfunctional. The existing committee structure does not allow for
effective oversight of crosscutting national security threats…. Congress should reform its oversight
both structurally and substantively to better address intelligence, homeland security, and
crosscutting national security issues.
U.S. Commission on the Prevention of Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferation and Terrorism (WMD
Commission), World at Risk: Report (WMD U.S. Commission: Washington, DC, 2010), available at
http://www.prevenion.gov/report.
Also in 2010, as a follow-up to the 9/11 Commission Report, co-chairs Thomas Kean and Lee Hamilton observed that
in homeland security matters, the
enduring fractured and overlapping committee jurisdictions on both sides of the Hill have left
oversight in an unsatisfactory state …. The jurisdictional melee among scores of Congressional
committees has led to conflicting and contradictory tasks and mandates for DHS. Without taking
serious action, we fear this unworkable system could make the country less safe.
Thomas H. Kean and Lee H. Hamilton (co-chairs), Bipartisan Policy Center, National Security Preparedness Group,
U.S. Senate Committee on Commerce, The State of Aviation Security, testimony at hearings, 111th Cong., 2nd sess.,
January 20, 2010, p. 8, available at http://bipartisanpolicy.org/library/testimony/congressman-lee-hamilton-and-
governor-tom-kean.
For further coverage of support for consolidating homeland security jurisdiction in each chamber—which, by some
counts, reached 88 congressional committees and subcommittees—see Rob Margetta, “Post-Election Might Be Only
Chance to Streamline DHS Oversight,” CQ Homeland Security News, September 20, 2010.
43 In homeland security matters, one opposing viewpoint which helps to explain the shared jurisdictions is that various
DHS entities have responsibilities outside or tangential to homeland security per se. These include, for example, the
Secret Service’s for anti-counterfeiting, financial fraud, and identity theft. Other responsibilities extend to the Coast
Guard’s for environmental regulation, protection, and responding to natural disasters, in both the United States and
abroad (e.g., Haiti in the aftermath of the 2010 earthquake), as well as for boating safety and combating piracy. Added
to this is the Immigration and Customs Enforcement for combating illegal broadcasting of copyrighted live sporting
events on the Internet abroad. These and other responsibilities result in various DHS entities falling under the
jurisdiction of several congressional committees, not just those panels with jurisdiction over DHS proper.
A second viewpoint, which helps to explain the shared jurisdiction among congressional panels, is that responsibility
for some aspects of homeland security resides in agencies outside DHS. Instead, homeland security extends to parts of
the armed services; the National Guard; the Department of Justice, including the FBI, DEA, and Criminal Justice
Division; Department of State operations and programs with a connection to homeland security; the Office of National
Drug Control Policy; and the intelligence community, among other entities. Because these other agencies are not part
of the Department of Homeland Security, DHS officials are also called upon to meet with or testify before a variety of
congressional committees which have shared or overlapping jurisdictions. Among others, these include the House and
(continued...)
Congressional Research Service
16
Interagency Collaborative Arrangements and Activities
Improve Effectiveness in Policy Formulation and Implementation
Improving effectiveness in policy formulation and implementation could result from collaborative
efforts by bringing a variety of experiences, expertise, and capabilities to bear on a problem area
along with possible additional resources. Agencies operating jointly on a program, moreover, are
more likely to be alert to its overall demands and requirements than if operating individually.
Make Agencies Aware of Different Perspectives and Orientations
Following this same line of reasoning, agencies in collaborative efforts—versus ones operating
alone—could be made aware of different perspectives in dealing with common problems. The
different perspectives might focus on a single policy or might encompass a broad program. In
either event, an agency might see benefits from different vantage points and viewpoints, in effect,
expanding its horizons and adding to the ways it approaches policy formulation and
implementation.
Mitigate Conflict Among Agencies
Interagency conflict—often characterized as “turf battles”—occurs for a variety of reasons.
Among others are competition over subject and policy areas, missions and strategies,
jurisdictions, funding and resources, and status, as well as personal rivalries among officials. A
result of these is a failure of or limitation on interagency cooperation. A formalized interagency
collaborative process—requiring agencies to work together on a project or program—might
overcome or at least mitigate such conflicts.
Increase Agency Productivity
Enhancing the productivity of agencies might occur through interagency collaborative efforts, by
making each participant aware of other ways of conducting operations and activities. An agency
operating in isolation would not necessarily be aware of its own inadequacies in implementing
policies, let alone ways to overcome these.
Enhance Efficiency, Reduce Redundancy, and Cut Costs
Increasing the efficiency of public policy implementation and, as a corollary, lowering costs could
occur by reducing or eliminating redundancy and duplication of effort, in which two or more
agencies carry out similar or identical tasks. In such cases, each affected agency might be paying
for services, supplies, equipment, facilities, and personnel that could otherwise be shared among
(...continued)
Senate Committees on Armed Services, Foreign Affairs/Relations, the Judiciary, and Intelligence, along with
appropriate Appropriations subcommittees. These congressional panels and others have reason to look into the
relationship between homeland security responsibilities in DHS with related ones in different agencies and
departments. Transferring all of these jurisdictions to DHS or to one or two congressional committees would, arguably,
harm the integration and coordination of these policies and agencies with their counterparts located elsewhere and
would amass an unprecedented, broadly encompassing jurisdictional alignment into a single executive agency or
congressional committee.
Congressional Research Service
17
Interagency Collaborative Arrangements and Activities
several. Recognizing this redundancy could also lead to a reduction in each agency’s participation
in a program—increasing economy and efficiency—without necessarily reducing the program’s
overall effectiveness. By interacting with other agencies, moreover, each participant might
become aware of various other cost-saving techniques and “best practices” in managing their
organization and operations.
Heighten the Attention to and Priorities for Cross-Cutting
Programs
When agencies operate in relative isolation, they might not be fully aware of their involvement in
the growing number, importance, and complexity of programs that overlap with other agencies’
jurisdictions and responsibilities. Recognizing this overlap, collaborative enterprises heighten the
attention of the participants to such cross-cutting programs and could promote these as priorities.
Change Organizational Cultures
Agency-centered organizational cultures view their own operations, responsibilities, and priorities
through a single prism. Such a myopic view discourages working with other agencies, adopting
other orientations, and adapting to new demands and duties. Changing organizational cultures
from ones that are agency-centered to ones that are interagency-oriented could result from and
lead to more collaborative endeavors. The lessons of such experiences, even in a single field,
might transfer to other policy areas and efforts. Increases in information-sharing, for instance,
could result from interagency collaboration, leading to more information being shared, more
relevant and directed information being transmitted to the right consumers, and more information
being sent quickly in real time, that is, when it is needed.
Change Bureaucratic and Administrative Cultures and Methods of
Operation
The bureaucratic and administrative cultures of an organization help to determine the way it
operates internally. This includes setting the criteria and standards for hiring and promoting
personnel; providing incentives to engage in certain operations, assignments, and duties; and
evaluating the productivity of offices and bureaus as well as personnel. Without collaborative
efforts, agencies might hold on to cultures that rely heavily on traditional methods of operation,
including ones that do not favor or support interagency efforts. In addition, learning how other
agencies operate could provide a different orientation and focus for both employees and
management. Transformations into cultures that recognize and support joint efforts might
encourage a redesigning of incentives and rewards for interagency efforts; complementary and
common training and educational programs; creation of long-term joint enterprises or an increase
in temporary, ad hoc exercises and operations; and development of other compatible processes
and reciprocity in certain exchanges (of information and personnel, for instance).
Congressional Research Service
18
Interagency Collaborative Arrangements and Activities
Streamline and Improve Congressional and Executive Oversight
Congressional and executive oversight of programs and projects—the review, monitoring, and
supervision of policy implementation—might be hampered by piecemeal approaches resulting
from agencies operating alone rather than in concert with others.44 A constricted view among
overseers focuses on only a part or parts of a program, based on individual agency jurisdictions,
authorizations, and funding, rather than looking at the whole or a combination of agencies and
activities. (See also the related rationale “End or Reduce Policy Fragmentation,” above.)
Collaborative arrangements lend themselves to a more comprehensive oversight perspective,
because of the cross-agency responsibilities which cover a number of entities involved in an
enterprise. As an outgrowth, it is possible that congressional panels and executive entities (such as
the Office of Management and Budget, National Security Council staff working groups, or
various presidential advisors in relevant areas) could review interagency collaborations as
collectives rather than in parts. Such oversight efforts, in league with other developments, have
been seen as encouraging and sustaining improvements in policy implementation as well as
identifying duplicative programs.45 Extending this line, the House Rules for the 112th Congress
contain a new provision regarding possible duplicative programs. It requires that standing
committees, when developing their oversight plans for that Congress, “include proposals to cut or
eliminate programs, including mandatory spending programs, that are inefficient, duplicative,
outdated, or more appropriately administered by State or local governments.”46
44 For analysis and further citations to congressional oversight, see, among others, CRS Report R41079, Congressional
Oversight: An Overview, by Walter J. Oleszek; CRS Report RL30240, Congressional Oversight Manual, by Frederick
M. Kaiser, Walter J. Oleszek, and Todd B. Tatelman; CRS Report R41337, Independent Evaluators of Federal
Programs: Approaches, Devices, and Examples, by Frederick M. Kaiser and Clinton T. Brass; CRS Report RL32525,
Congressional Oversight of Intelligence: Current Structure and Alternatives, by Frederick M. Kaiser; and CRS Report
R40602, The Department of Homeland Security Intelligence Enterprise: Operational Overview and Oversight
Challenges for Congress, by Mark A. Randol.
45 Improvements in DOD’s personnel security clearance program illustrate the positive impact of congressional and
executive oversight in support of interagency arrangements. The changes include a joint task force and an interagency
performance accountability council, chaired by the OMB deputy director for management, with the DNI as the security
executive agent, and the director of OPM as the suitability executive agent. Recognizing the measurable improvements,
the Government Accountability Office removed DOD’s program from the 30 others in the office’s biennial High-Risk
List, in 2011 (where it had been targeted since 2005). The removal occurred
because of the agency’s progress in timeliness and the development of tools and metrics to assess
quality, as well as its commitment to sustaining progress. Importantly, continued congressional
oversight and the committed leadership of the Suitability and Security Clearance Performance
Accountability Council (Performance Accountability Council)—which is responsible for
overseeing security clearance reform efforts—have greatly contributed to the progress of DOD and
the governmentwide security clearance reform.
GAO, High-Risk Series: An Update, GAO-11-278, February 2011, pp. 3-4. Among other reasons, the report recognized
the regular congressional hearings on security clearance reform and executive branch initiatives, all of which served to
monitor, review, and supervise the toughened mandates in the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of
2004. Ibid., pp. 4-7. For further coverage, see also U.S. Senate Subcommittee on Government Management, the Federal
Workforce, and the District of Columbia, Security Clearance Reform: Setting a Course for Sustainability, hearing,
111th Cong., 2nd sess., November 16, 2010, along with the other citations under “Security Clearance Process” in the
bibliography.
46 Rule X, clause(2)(d)(1), Rules of the House, 112th Congress, amended by H.Res. 5, sec. 2, 112th Cong., 1st sess. The
subsequent plans are available in U.S. House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Oversight Plans for
All House Committees with Accompanying Recommendations, H.Rept. 112-48, 112th Cong., 1st sess. (2011).
Congressional Research Service
19
Interagency Collaborative Arrangements and Activities
Independent oversight units—such as GAO, which has a 2010 statutory mandate to identify
duplicative programs annually,47 independent evaluators,48 and inspectors general,49as well as
specially created boards and commissions50—already possess some authority to review
interagency operations. Reflecting this, for example, is a charge in the Inspector General Reform
Act of 2008; it directs the Council of the Inspectors General for Integrity and Efficiency (CIGIE)
to develop and coordinate interagency and interentity audits, investigations, inspections, and
evaluation programs and projects.51
In addition, relevant provisions in the Government Performance and Results Act (GPRA) can be
used for such interagency oversight endeavors.52
Another concern arising from fragmented congressional oversight is that agency officials are
spread thin and are possibly confronted with competing policy demands and priorities. Officials
testify before multiple congressional committees and subcommittees, meet with many Members
and staff, comply with numerous reporting requirements, and respond to multiple requests for
information and data. Collaborative ventures could reduce such duplication of effort, freeing up
agency officials for other purposes, and could reduce the cross-pressures on agencies that might
result in working at cross-purposes. Finally, such collaborative arrangements could regularize and
47 P.L. 111-139, sec. 21, 124 Stat. 29. The first report appeared in early 2011: GAO, Opportunities to Reduce Potential
Duplication in Government Programs, Save Tax Dollars, and Enhance Revenue, GAO-11-318SP (March 2011).
48 Independent Evaluators of Federal Programs, by Kaiser and Brass.
49 The overwhelming majority of the more than 70 statutory IGs fall under the Inspector General Act of 1978, as
amended (5 U.S.C. Appendix). Ten operate under their own statutes. There are five in the Legislative Branch, three
special IGs associated with particular programs (Troubled Asset Relief Program, Afghanistan Reconstruction, and Iraq
Reconstruction), the IG in the Central Intelligence Agency, and a new Inspector General of the Intelligence Community
(Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010; P.L. 111-259, sec. 405), who has cross-agency jurisdiction. IGs
also belong to several statutory collectives that support interagency oversight: the Council of the Inspectors General for
Integrity and Efficiency, an Intelligence Community Inspectors General Forum, and a Council of Inspectors General on
Financial Oversight. The Defense Department has its own administratively established council, operating under the
DOD inspector general and consisting of other internal IGs and investigative and auditing units. For further coverage,
see Congressional Oversight Manual, pp. 84-94
50 For example, the Recovery Accountability and Transparency Board—composed of inspectors general from 12
departments and agencies (and chaired by another IG, selected by the President)—was established to oversee Recovery
Act funds to prevent waste, fraud, and abuse and to foster transparency on Recovery Act spending. American Recovery
and Reinvestment Act (P.L. 111-5, sec. 1521). As another illustration, the Commission on Wartime Contracting was
created to focus on contracting in Afghanistan and Iraq. National Defense Authorization Act of 2008 (P.L. 110-181,
sec. 841).
51 Specifically, CIGIE, operating under P.L. 110-409; 122 Stat. 4307, is to
develop plans for coordinated, Governmentwide activities that address these [certain] problems and
promote economy and efficiency in Federal programs and operations, including interagency and
interentity audit, investigation, inspection, and evaluation programs and projects to deal efficiently
and effectively with those problems concerning waste and fraud that exceed the capability or
jurisdiction of an individual agency or entity.
52 The original 1993 enactment (P.L. 103-62) was amended by the GPRA Modernization Act of 2010 (P.L. 111-352).
GPRA requires agencies to develop mission statements, five-year strategic plans, annual plans implementing these, and
a follow-up annual assessment. The amended version also calls for a federal government performance plan and priority
goals, under the direction of OMB; the government-wide priority goals are to include “outcome-oriented goals covering
a limited number of crosscutting policy areas; and goals for management improvements needed across the Federal
Government” (P.L. 111-352, sec. 5). See GAO, Government Performance: GPRA Modernization Act Provides
Opportunities to Help Address Fiscal, Performance, and Management Challenges (statement by Gene L. Dodaro,
Comptroller General, to the Senate Committee on the Budget), GAO-11-366T; and John M. Kamensky, “Congress
Overhauls Results Act, Wants Results,” PA Times, March/April 2011.
Congressional Research Service
20
Interagency Collaborative Arrangements and Activities
reinforce working arrangements among relevant agencies and with principal congressional
overseers.
Concerns and Questions about the Rationales
Rationales are positive and promotional. Concerns and questions, however, might arise over
whether performance can match the promise. Individual rationales, for instance, might rest on
assumptions that are presented as givens rather than on assumptions that are explicitly defended.
Along with this, some rationales—such as improving effectiveness, efficiency, and economy—
might not be compatible goals in all cases. For instance, start-up costs and possible downtime for
personnel transferred to a new interagency arrangement (designed to improve effectiveness) could
result in higher initial expenditures for the new arrangement vis-à-vis the existing non-
collaborative approach. Another reason for possible higher expenditures of a collaborative
venture over a non-collaborative one could involve added funding for the former. Its promoters
might expect that a joint venture would use additional funding more productively as a collective
than if it were dispersed among independent units operating separately. This could improve
effectiveness and productivity but would cost more.
Moreover, interagency arrangements designed to improve performance in one area might hinder it
in another. An interagency arrangement added for one purpose might take away from some of the
participants’ other responsibilities, mandates, and priorities. That is because interagency
arrangements are not without cost to the participants in terms of funding, resources, personnel,
and attention. Transfer of these to an interagency effort would remove them from the participants’
other responsibilities and functions, unless off-setting developments occurred: new resources
were added, the collaborative workloads were shared equitably, or the interagency arrangement
resulted in increased efficiency and economy for the participants.
Other concerns might arise over particular types of arrangements or their operation. First of all,
private sector organizations involved in public-private partnerships might not be equal to the
challenge, because they might lack the capacity, capability, resources, and range of services
needed.53 As another matter, some partnerships, at least in certain arenas, have resulted in the
government agency being “captured” by the private industry it is supposed to be regulating; this
can occur, in some cases, because the government regulators are dependent on the private
companies for data, information, and self-regulation to a degree.54 Public-private partnerships
might also be transformed into “iron triangles,” “cozy little triangles,” or “subgovernments.”55
53 For instance, GAO found that, in 2008, certain voluntary organizations that had roles in responding to catastrophic
events were not only “diverse in their focus and response structures” but also, at the time, under-prepared: “the
projected need for mass care services would far exceed the capabilities of these voluntary organizations without
government or other assistance.” GAO, Voluntary Organizations: FEMA Should More Fully Assess Organizations’
Mass Care Capabilities and Update the Red Cross Role in Catastrophic Events, GAO-08-823. Highlights.
54 See John M. Kamensky, “Regulatory Partnerships: Good or Bad?”, The Business of Government, Fall/Winter 2010,
p. 63, which uses the 2010 Gulf of Mexico oil-rig explosion and subsequent oil spill as an example. For background
and context on the developments—including the conversion of the Minerals Management Service (MMS) into the
Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, Regulation, and Enforcement (BOEMRE)—see CRS Report R41265, The 2010
Oil Spill: MMS/BOEMRE and NEPA, by Kristina Alexander.
55 For an analysis of and further citations for these developments, which have a long history, see Theodore J. Lowi,
Arenas of Power (Paradigm Publishers: Boulder, CO, 2009), Part I, Arenas of Power, and Part III, The Bureaucracy
and Arenas of Power.
Congressional Research Service
21
Interagency Collaborative Arrangements and Activities
These terms refer to alliances of private entities and public agencies, sometimes supported by
congressional panels, that develop mutually reinforcing relationships; these, in turn, can dominate
a policy area, often without adequate outside checks and controls. Public-private partnerships
might also lead to so-called “shadow government.” This (negative) characterization is applied to a
structure in which a government agency no longer possesses the necessary capacity to carry out
certain functions and duties, because its capabilities have been ceded to the private sector through
extensive outsourcing. (By comparison, others view private sector involvement as not only a vital
ally but also a vitalizing force in implementing public policy.)56
A separate concern is that the management and oversight of contractors and others in public-
private partnerships might prove difficult or beyond the capabilities of the contracting
organizations.57 This could occur because of deficiencies and flaws in how well a federal agency
or private company manages and oversees contracts. The executive, importantly, might not
possess sufficient expertise, experience, or resources to oversee private sector operations
effectively; and, consequently, the government might rely on the private sector to do so. This
could result in a low priority for and commitment to adequate management and oversight; a lack
of neutrality, objectivity, and impartiality; (the appearance of) a conflict of interest; and waste,
fraud, and abuse.58
56 The use of private sector entities to implement public policy—and the charge of “shadow government”—have
generated contrasting interpretations and impressions about the scale, scope, extent, and impact of such arrangements.
See, for example, Steven Goldsmith and Donald F. Kettl, eds., Unlocking the Power of Networks: Keys to High-
Performance Government, (Brookings: Washington, DC, 2009); Daniel Guttman, The Shadow Government: The
Government’s Multi-Billion Dollar Giveaway of Its Decision-Making Powers to Private Management Consultants,
“Experts,” and Think Tanks (Pantheon Books: New York, 1976); Jennifer R. Wolch, The Shadow State: Government
and Voluntary Sector in Transition (Foundation Center: New York, 1990); “Focus on Seminal Nonprofit Management
Issues,” Public Administration Review, vol. 71, January-February 2011, pp. 45-86; and Project on Government
Oversight (POGO), “Curb the Costs of Shadow Government,” POGO’s Reform Agenda: A Good Government Guide
for the 112th Congress (POGO: Washington, DC, January 25, 2011), pp. 2 and 9-11.
57 For examples of these concerns, see GAO, Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services: Deficiencies in Contract
Management Internal Control Are Pervasive, GAO-10-69, October 2009; and Information Security: Actions Needed to
Better Manage, Protect, and Sustain Improvements to Los Alamos National Laboratories Classified Computer
Network, GAO-10-28, October 2009. See also U.S. Senate Ad Hoc Subcommittee on Contracting Oversight, series of
hearings in the 111th and 112th Congresses, available at http://hsgac.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?FuseAction=
Subcommittees.ContractingOversight; Commission on Wartime Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan, hearings and
reports, particularly At what risk?: Correcting over-reliance on contractors in contingency operations, February 24,
2011, available at http://wartimecontracting.gov/indx.php/about; and Glenn James Voelz (Major, U.S. Army),
Managing the Private Spies: The Use of Commercial Augmentation for Intelligence Operations (Joint Military
Intelligence College: Washington, DC, 2006).
58 Misconduct, including illegal activities, is not a new phenomenon in contracting to carry out government services. It
is particularly prone to occur in crisis situations—such as natural disasters and wars—when the government’s resources
are overextended and dedicated to responding to the crisis, rather than to overseeing its operation, a much lower
priority. In these situations, moreover, the government may rely increasingly on inspectors and overseers from the
private sector or even on self-inspection. A prominent illustration of such developments occurred during World War II,
when the Truman Committee found extensive war-profiteering. See, among many other sources, U.S. Senate Special
Committee to Investigate the National Defense Program, Interim Report, S. Rept. 77-480, 77th Cong., 2nd sess. (GPO:
Washington, DC, 1942). Other investigations, also tied into a WW II program, identified long-term, broad-scale fraud
in a Federal Housing Administration (FHA) mortgage insurance program. It was initially designed to provide housing
for workers close to manufacturing plants during the war and was later extended to help returning veterans find
adequate housing. Despite its success in constructing new housing, builders and financiers, sometimes with the
collusion of federal inspectors, estimated the building costs much higher than was justified when determining the
mortgage amount; subsequent mortgage defaults paved the way for windfall profits. U.S. Senate Committee on
Banking and Currency, FHA Investigation: Report Pursuant to S. Res. 229, S. Rept. 84-1, 84th Cong., 1st sess. (GPO:
Washington, DC, 1955).
Congressional Research Service
22
Interagency Collaborative Arrangements and Activities
Problems might also arise because of certain restrictions on government access to relevant
information, data, and personnel of the private contractors. Another limitation on effective
oversight of such partnerships arises for two reasons: (1) the multiple levels and sources of
contracting—sometimes reaching three or four deep and covering many individual operators—
and (2) the bundling of contracts, in which offerings for a number of different purposes are
combined in a single letting. Both of these complexities complicate audits, evaluations, and
investigations, making it difficult to determine clearly responsibility for a project or program and
its effectiveness.
Furthermore, (inordinately) high expectations for a collaborative effort might be overly
ambitious, thereby undervaluing any improvements, in the view of some observers. In addition,
some collaborative efforts might lack the capacity and capability to fulfill even modest
expectations. Extending this line of reasoning, one public administrator and policy analyst viewed
effective interagency coordination as not just elusive but, to some degree, illusory, as a search for
the “Philosopher’s Stone.”59
Finally, it is not always certain that an interagency collaborative arrangement is more effective or
efficient than what it replaced. At least in some cases, it is difficult to assess and compare the
success or failure of such enterprises.
Difficulties in Assessing the Success of Interagency
Collaboration
Several difficulties arise in attempting to assess accurately and reliably the success of interagency
collaborative arrangements, their initiation, evolution, and impact. As background, first of all,
there appear to be no systematic, comprehensive, long-term, current analyses or comparisons of
such arrangements to assess how well these met their purposes and rationales.60 Nonetheless, two
studies—a distant one commissioned by a Senate select committee in 193761 and a recent one
required by Congress and assigned to GAO in 201062—provide information, data, and
59 The philosopher’s stone refers to an imaginary or mythical substance that changes base metal into gold. Harold
Seidman, “Coordination: The Search for the Philosopher’s Stone,” Politics, Position, and Power: The Dynamics of
Federal Organization, 5th ed., (Oxford University Press: New York, 1998), pp. 142-157.
60 As recognized before, GAO, various governmental commissions, congressional panels, professional associations,
think tanks, and public administration analysts have examined specific types and aspects of interagency collaborative
arrangements or have looked at them in a short time period or in particular setting and context (e.g., a policy, program,
or project). But these studies, with only a few exceptions, have not extended to comparative analyses on a broad scale,
over a lengthy period of time, or among different arrangements.
61 Senate Select Committee to Investigate Executive Agencies with a View to Coordination, Preliminary Report
(1937). This seminal study by the Brookings Institution remains unique, it appears, in the extent of its coverage (i.e.,
government-wide) and detail about each agency and jurisdictional overlap. There have been a number of prominent
reorganization commissions with extensive coverage, since the beginning of the 20th century; these include the Keep
Commission (1905-1909), Brownlow Committee (1936-1937), the two Hoover Commissions (1947-1949 and 1953-
1955), President’s Reorganization Project (1977-1979), and National Performance Review (1993-1997)/National
Partnership for Reinventing Government (1997-2000). But their studies tended not to examine interagency overlap and
possible duplication across the various collaborative arrangements; instead, they concentrated on traditional
reorganizations, transfers, and mergers or, in the last case, “reinventing government.” For a summary of each, see CRS
Report RL31446, Reorganizing the Executive Branch in the 20th Century: Landmark Commissions, by Ronald C. Moe;
and Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, Border Management and Reorganization (1988).
62 GAO, Opportunities to Reduce Potential Duplication in Government Programs, Save Tax Dollars, and Enhance
(continued...)
Congressional Research Service
23
Interagency Collaborative Arrangements and Activities
frameworks of analysis regarding interagency collaborative activities and arrangements (or their
absence) across multiple policy and program areas.
To provide reliable comprehensive, systematic assessments, analyses could examine one type of
interagency arrangement over time or across different settings and policy areas; compare different
types in one or more areas; or, perhaps most importantly, compare a new interagency collective
arrangement with a dispersed and decentralized structure it replaced. None of these would be easy
or inexpensive to accomplish.
Reliable assessments of success and its counterpoint (failure), moreover, are hampered for several
reasons. A fundamental one is how success is defined and determined in particular cases,
including the setting of appropriate and reasonable criteria and standards for measuring it.
Because there are different types of collaborative ventures—established for different purposes
and with different powers—each might require different criteria and standards. Along with this,
the perceived success at the end of a project or throughout an ongoing enterprise is in part
determined by the expectations and objectives for the collaboration at its beginning (as noted
above).
Accompanying this, the success of a collaborative enterprise is not necessarily an absolute.
Instead, it might be partial: meeting certain standards but not others; meeting some sooner than
others; or meeting some expectations but not others. Different estimations of success could also
depend on who is conducting the evaluation—agency officials or a separate body, such as GAO,
an independent evaluator, or an office of inspector general—and what qualifications they
possesses.
Finally, a variety of other conditions and factors (discussed further below) influence the
establishment, operation, and performance of an interagency arrangement. For instance, a major
interagency conservation effort could be aided or damaged by significant changes in the
environment, which might be difficult to control for in any assessment. As another illustration,
assessments of public-private partnerships engaged in “welfare-to-workfare” programs would
have to take into account various other conditions which could affect their impact. These include,
among others, the skills, training, and experience of the unemployed; the state of the overall job
market, which influences competition for employment opportunities; the availability of
appropriate-level jobs; and the accessibility of support services, such as public transportation and
day-care, if needed.
Factors Affecting the Adoption, Evolution, and
Impact of Collaborative Arrangements
Collaborative arrangements differ in structure, organization, authorities, purposes, size, scope,
scale, life-span, and expectations. One scholar recognized tensions and competitions—including
(...continued)
Review, GAO-11-318SP, March 2011. The objectives of GAO’s study—the first annual report based on a new statutory
requirement (P.L. 111-139, sec. 21; 124 Stat. 29 (2010))—as it relates to interagency matters, are to “identify federal
programs or functional areas where unnecessary duplication, overlap, or fragmentation exists, the actions needed to
address such conditions, and the potential financial and other benefits of doing so.” Ibid. p. 1.
Congressional Research Service
24
Interagency Collaborative Arrangements and Activities
political and organizational ones—surrounding agencies and other parties in initiating and
maintaining interagency collaborative efforts.63 Such rivalries led to conflict among the involved
agencies and related congressional committees. These also led, in some cases, to conflicts
between agencies, on the one hand, and various entities in the Executive Office of the President
(if these are involved), on the other, and to conflicts between the executive and legislative
branches.
A number and variety of factors engender or endanger collaborative arrangements—whether
these are initiated, maintained, transformed, or abolished—and determine their strengths and
weaknesses. These factors—both formal and informal, tangible and intangible—extend across
three basic levels: systemic, structural and institutional, and individual. Included are:
• transformations in governmental responsibilities and broad-scale, wide-ranging
public policies;
• significant changes in the political and governmental environment surrounding a
(potential) collaborative effort, including the substance and direction of the
policy area, electoral developments, officials in government, and organizational
characteristics of the agencies involved;
• the urgency, scope, scale, and complexity of the problem being addressed;
• expectations of what is to be accomplished and determining how extensive and
demanding these expectations are, for the project and for the participants;
• extent of a merger, realignment, or reorganization;
• selection of which agencies or parts thereof are to be incorporated, in what
capacity, and to what extent and degree;
• location of a new structure that merges or integrates different agencies;
• selection of a lead agency or officer in coordinative arrangements;
• powers and resources available to a lead officer in a cross-agency arrangement,
including those which already exist across-the-board, which apply to a specific
project or program, or which are anticipated;
• autonomy of the individual components;
• organizational cultures within the agencies;
• bureaucratic and administrative cultures within the agencies;
• competition of a collaborative enterprise with other missions, mandates,
responsibilities, strategic plans, and policy priorities among and within the
participating agencies;
• jurisdictional rivalries or “turf battles” among the agencies;
• support for interagency collaboration versus support for agency autonomy, from
power-brokers both inside and outside of government;
63 Allen Schick, “The Coordination Option,” Federal Reorganization: What Have We Learned? in Peter Szanton, ed.
(Chatham House Publishers: Chatham, NJ, 1981), pp. 85-113.
Congressional Research Service
25
Interagency Collaborative Arrangements and Activities
• regularity, frequency, intensity, and direction of oversight by Congress and the
executive;
• incentives for and benefits of participation (mutual and reciprocal among
agencies, agency-centered, or individual);
• disincentives and costs of participation;
• level and type of involvement, with policy and process formulation at one end of
the spectrum and field operations at the other end;
• capacity, capabilities, heritage, experience, and expertise of the agencies involved
in a joint venture;
• leadership skills and practices of the participants; and
• confidence in the professionalism, competency, and integrity of the participants.
Conclusions and Observations
In 1937—following the first phase of the New Deal expansion of government responsibilities and
the earlier (largely unsuccessful) multi-agency effort to enforce Prohibition and the Volstead
Act—the Senate created a Select Committee to Investigate the Executive Agencies of the
Government with a View to Coordination.64 The panel commissioned a study by the Brookings
Institution, whose extensive and detailed report concluded that “to prevent duplication and, what
is worse, working at cross purposes, it is essential that coordinating mechanisms be established
and maintained.”65
This conclusion and other complementary ones resonate in the contemporary era. In 2011,
President Barack Obama, expanding on his State of the Union address, emphasized that
We live and do business in the information age, but the organization of the Federal
Government has not kept pace. Government agencies have grown without overall strategic
planning and duplicative programs have sprung up, making it harder for each to reach its
goals…. In areas as varied as surface transportation to job training, public health, and
education, I have proposed to consolidate scores of programs into more focused, effective,
and streamlined initiatives.66
64 Senate Select Committee to Investigate the Executive Agencies of the Government with a View to
Coordination, Investigation of Executive Agencies of the Government: Preliminary Report (GPO:
Washington, DC, 1937), p. III. The select committee’s charge was
to make a full and complete study of all the activities of the departments, bureaus, boards,
commissions, independent agencies, and all other agencies of the executive branch of the
Government, with a view to determining whether the activities of any such agency conflict with or
overlap the activities of any other such agency and whether, in the interest of simplification,
efficiency, and economy, any such agencies should be coordinated with other agencies or abolished
or the personnel thereof reduced.
65 Ibid., p. 40. The seminal Brookings study reached 1,229 pages and an estimated 500,000 words.
66 President Barack H. Obama, Presidential Memorandum—Government Reform for Competitiveness and Innovation,
White House, March 11, 2011, p. 1. The President has assigned to “the Nation’s first Chief Performance Officer, who
also serves as Deputy Director for Management of the Office of Management and Budget…. the responsibility of
leading the effort to create a plan to for the restructuring and streamlining of the executive branch of the Federal
Government.” Ibid. Previously, President Obama had “asked his Administration to go line-by-line through the Budget
(continued...)
Congressional Research Service
26
Interagency Collaborative Arrangements and Activities
Legislative initiatives have also called for overarching studies and advanced recommendations,
both broad and selective.67 The House of Representatives added a section to its Rules for the 112th
Congress, to require committees, during the development of their oversight plans, to “include
proposals to cut or eliminate programs, including spending programs, that are inefficient,
duplicative, outdated, or more appropriately administered by State or local governments.”68
Previously, in 2010, Congress directed the Government Accountability Office to look into a
similar phenomenon annually: to identify “areas of potential duplication, overlap, and
fragmentation, which, if effectively addressed, could provide financial and other benefits.”69 The
first GAO report found
34 areas where agencies, offices, or initiatives have similar or overlapping objectives or
provide similar services to the same populations; or where government missions are
fragmented across multiple agencies or programs. These areas span a range of government
missions…. Within and among these missions, this report touches on hundreds of federal
programs, affecting virtually all major federal departments and agencies…. Reducing or
eliminating duplication, overlap, or fragmentation could potentially save billions of tax
dollars annually and help agencies provide more efficient and effective services.70
As these legislative and executive reviews reflect, the concerns raised decades ago have been
heightened in the contemporary era, because of the further growth in government responsibilities,
cross-cutting programs, and complexities in public policies. Added to this are certain crises which
demonstrated the inadequacies of existing structures and arrangements, along with increased
pressures to reduce federal programs and budgets. One response has been support for new,
expanded, or improved interagency collaborative arrangements. Today’s objectives underlying
this refine and add to the earlier goals of preventing duplication and cross-purposes. Current
rationales extend to a number and variety of objectives. These include reducing policy
fragmentation, improving effectiveness, increasing economy and efficiency, mitigating conflict
and competition among agencies, enhancing agency productivity, developing an awareness of
different perspectives and orientations, changing organizational and administrative cultures, and
streamlining and improving executive and congressional oversight.
Different types of interagency activities and arrangements are available to help bring about joint
efforts and cooperation among separate federal agencies with shared responsibilities and
overlapping jurisdictions. Six principal types—each given a working understanding and
illustrated with examples here—are collaboration, coordination, integration, mergers, networking,
and public-private partnerships.
(...continued)
to indentify programs that are outdated, ineffective, or duplicative. In both of his previous budgets, the President
identified more than 120 terminations, reductions, and savings, totaling approximately $20 billion in each year.” Office
of Management and Budget, Fiscal Year 2012 Terminations, Reductions, and Savings: Budget of the U.S. Government,
2011, p. 1.
67 For other congressional initiatives, see sources in footnote 41 above and GAO, Opportunities to Reduce Potential
Duplication in Government Programs.
68 U.S. House of Representatives, Rules for the 112th Congress (sec. 2, H.Res. 5, 112th Cong., 1st sess.), amending
clause 2(d)(1) of Rule X.
69 GAO, Opportunities to Reduce Potential Duplication in Government Programs, p. 5.
70 Ibid., p. 1.
Congressional Research Service
27
Interagency Collaborative Arrangements and Activities
Using these concepts with clarity, consistency, and consensus, however, can meet a number of
obstacles. First of all, there is no agreed-upon straightforward, precise definition of them in the
media, academic studies, statutes, or executive directives, where different types might be called
for but without detailed descriptions or directions. And their applications and understandings—
along with their use in combination or as hybrids—are subject to a number of influences,
including the setting, time, and heritages among diverse governmental organizations.
Consequently, the terms have sometimes been employed interchangeably, inconsistently, or
ambiguously.
Despite the large and increasing adoption and promotion of interagency arrangements, questions
arise over their rationales and underlying assumptions. It is not always certain how successful
some of the interagency arrangements are, either among or within the different types or over time.
Part of the reason for this is the difficulty of conducting valid and reliable assessments of
interagency arrangements. This hurdle is made higher in attempts to compare one interagency
arrangement to another, to a predecessor non-collaborative experience, or even to the same
arrangement over time, because of changing conditions and intervening developments.
Accompanying the difficulties in evaluating interagency collaborative arrangements are the
numerous factors that influence them. These include their political environment and policy
context, as well as the resources, independence, authority, membership, leadership, and
operational experience of the agencies involved. Such factors are analytically distinct on paper
but are hard to account for separately in practice.
Selective Bibliography on Interagency
Collaboration71
Overarching Studies on Interagency Arrangements
Abramson, Mark A., et al. “Increasing Collaboration.” Four Trends Transforming Government.
IBM Center for the Business of Government. 2003. pp. 14-15. Available at
http://www.businessofgovernment.org.
Bardach, Eugene. Getting Agencies to Work Together: The Practice and Theory of Managerial
Craftsmanship. Brookings Institution: Washington, DC, 1998.
Congressional Research Service. CRS Report RL31357, Federal Interagency Coordinative
Mechanisms: Varied Types and Numerous Devices, by Frederick M. Kaiser.
Garrison, David (Counselor to the Deputy Secretary, U.S. Department of Health and Human
Services). Interagency Collaborations: Are There Best Practices Or Just Good Practice? A
Report to the President’s Management Council Via the National Partnership for Reinventing
Government. January 18, 2001.
71 Jared Nagel (KSG/CRS) contributed to this bibliography.
Congressional Research Service
28
Interagency Collaborative Arrangements and Activities
Government Accountability Office. Managing For Results: Barriers to Interagency
Coordination. March 2000. GAO/GGD-00-106.
_____. Opportunities to Reduce Potential Duplication in Government Programs, Save Tax
Dollars, and Enhance Revenue. March 2011.GAO-11-318SP.
_____. Results-Oriented Government: Practices That Can Help Enhance and Sustain
Collaboration Among Federal Agencies. October 2005. GAO-06-15.
Linden, Russ. “Collaborative Intelligence.” Public Manager, vol. 39, Spring 2010. pp. 20-26.
Podesta, John, et al. A Focus on Competiveness: Restructuring Policy Making for Results. Center
for American Progress: Washington, DC, 2010. pp. 1-10.
Salamon, Lester M., ed. The Tools of Government: A Guide to the New Governance. Oxford
University Press: New York, 2002.
Schick, Allen. “The Coordination Option.” In Peter Szanton, ed. Federal Reorganization: What
Have We Learned? Chatham House Publishers: Chatham, NJ, 1981. pp. 85-113.
Seidman, Harold. “Coordination: The Search for the Philosopher’s Stone.” Politics, Position and
Power: The Dynamics of Federal Organization (Fifth Edition). Oxford University Press: New
York, 1998. pp. 142-157.
Stanton, Thomas H. Improving Collaboration by Federal Agencies: An Essential Priority for the
Next Administration. National Academy of Public Administration: Washington, DC, 2007.
Stanton, Thomas H. Moving Toward More Capable Government: A Guide to Organizational
Design. The PricewaterhouseCoopers Endowment for the Business of Government, 2002.
Available at http://www.endowment.pwcglobal.com.
Stanton, Thomas H. and Ginsberg, Benjamin, eds. Making Government Manageable: Executive
Organization and Management in the Twenty-First Century. Johns Hopkins University Press:
Baltimore, MD, 2004.
Twitchell, David G., et al. “Overcoming Challenges to Successful Interagency Collaboration”
Performance Improvement. March 2007, vol. 46, pp. 8-15.
U.S. Senate Select Committee to Investigate the Executive Agencies of the Government with a
View to Coordination [Byrd Committee]. Investigation of Executive Agencies of the
Government: Preliminary Report [prepared by the Brookings Institution]. S. Rept. 75-1275,
75th Congress, 1st sess. Washington, DC: GPO, 1937.
Wilson, James Q. Bureaucracy: What Government Agencies Do and Why They Do It. Basic
Books: New York, 1989. pp. 268-274.
Congressional Research Service
29
Interagency Collaborative Arrangements and Activities
Homeland Security Interagency Structure
Congressional Research Service. CRS Report R40602, The Department of Homeland Security
Intelligence Enterprise: Operational Overview and Oversight Challenges for Congress, by
Mark A. Randol.
_____. CRS Report RL33042, Department of Homeland Security Reorganization: The 2SR
Initiative, by Harold C. Relyea and Henry B. Hogue.
_____. CRS Report RL31148, Homeland Security: The Presidential Coordination Office, by
Harold C. Relyea.
_____. CRS Report RS22754, National Special Security Events, by Shawn Reese.
_____. CRS Report RS22840, Organizing for Homeland Security: The Homeland Security
Council Reconsidered, by Harold C. Relyea.
_____. CRS Report R41520, Securing America’s Borders: The Role of the Intelligence
Community, by Richard A. Best Jr.
Ervin, Clark Kent [former Acting Inspector General of the Department of Homeland Security].
Chapters on “The Failure of Intelligence,” “Preparing for a Catastrophic Attack,” and
“Conclusion: Closing the Vulnerability Gap.” Open Target: Where America Is Vulnerable to
Attack. Palgrave Macmillan: New York, 2006.
George, Roger and Rishikof, Harvey, eds. The National Security Enterprise: Navigating the
Labyrinth. Georgetown University Press: Washington, DC, 2011.
Federal Emergency Management Agency. National Response Framework and Strategic Plan.
2010. Both available at http://www.fema.gov/about/indx.shtm.
Kaiser, Frederick M. “Creating the Department of Homeland Security: An Old Approach to a
New Problem.” In Stanton, Thomas H., ed. Meeting the Challenge of 9/11: Blueprints for a
More Effective Government. M.E. Sharpe: Armonk, NY, 2006. pp. 93-104.
Kean, Thomas H. and Hamilton, Lee H. (co-chairs). Bipartisan Policy Center. National Security
Preparedness Group. In U.S. Senate Committee on Commerce. The State of Aviation Security,
testimony at hearings, 111th Congress, 2nd sess. January 20, 2010. Available at
http://bipartisanpolicy.org/library/testimony/congressman-lee-hamilton-and-governor-tom-
kean.
Stanton, Thomas H., Ed. Meeting the Challenge of 9/11: Blueprints for More Effective
Government. M.E. Sharpe: Armonk, NY, 2006.
U.S. Commission on the Prevention of Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferation and Terrorism.
World at Risk: Report. 2010. Available at http://www.preventionwmd.gov/reort.
U.S. National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States [9/11 Commission]. Final
Report. Washington, DC: GPO, 2004.
Congressional Research Service
30
Interagency Collaborative Arrangements and Activities
U. S. Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs. Border Management Reorganization and Drug
Interdiction (Prepared by the Congressional Research Service). S. Prt. 100-111, 100th
Congress, 2nd sess. Washington, DC: GPO, 1988. The volume includes an extensive
collection of studies and recommendations from Congress, the executive, and private sector
that date to 1912, along with three CRS analyses: Kaiser, Frederick M. “Border Management
Reorganization,” pp. 1-36; Bazan, Elizabeth B. and Fields, Lou. “Illustrative Sources of
Federal Law Enforcement Authority Related to Border Management,” pp. 37-52; and Hogan,
Harry L. “Drug Smuggling,” pp. 53-61.
National Security Interagency Structure
Congressional Research Service. CRS Report RL34565, Building an Interagency Cadre of
National Security Professionals: Proposals, Recent Experience, and Issues for Congress, by
Catherine Dale.
_____. CRS Report R41295, Intelligence Reform After Five Years: The Role of the Director of
National Intelligence (DNI), by Richard A. Best Jr.
_____. CRS Report RL30840, The National Security Council: An Organizational Assessment, by
Richard A. Best Jr..
_____. CRS Report RL34455, Organizing the U.S. Government for National Security: Overview
of the Interagency Reform Debates, by Catherine Dale, Nina M. Serafino, and Pat Towell.
Commission on Wartime Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan. At what risk?: Correcting over-
reliance on contractors in contingency operations (Second Interim Report to Congress).
February 24, 2011. Section II: Agencies do not treat contingency planning as a core function;
and Section III: Interagency organizational structures do not support contingency operations.
Available at http://www.wartimecontracting.gov (reference “Reports”).
Davis, Geoff. “Interagency Reform: The Congressional Perspective.” Military Review.
July/August 2008, vol. 88, pp. 2-5.
Defense Science Board, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology,
and Logistics, Department of Defense. Enhancing Adaptability of U.S. Military Forces.
DOD: Washington, DC, 2010.
George, Roger and Rishikof, Harvey, eds. The National Security Enterprise: Navigating the
Labyrinth. Georgetown University Press: Washington, DC, 2011.
Government Accountability Office. Interagency Collaboration: Key Issues for Congressional
Oversight of National Security Strategies, Organizations, Workforce, and Information
Sharing. GAO-09-904SP. September 2009.
_____. National Security: An Overview of Professional Development Activities Intended to
Improve Interagency Collaboration. GAO-11-108. November 2010.
_____. National Security: Key Challenges and Solutions to Strengthen Interagency Collaboration
(statement of John H. Pendleton, Director, Defense Capabilities and Management, GAO).
GAO-10-822T. June 2010.
Congressional Research Service
31
Interagency Collaborative Arrangements and Activities
Government Business Council. Can the Department of Defense Be More CollaborativeWithout
Jeopardizing Security? A Candid Survey of Federal Executives in the Department of Defense.
2010. Available at http://www.govexec.com/gbc/DoDCollaboration.
Kean, Thomas H. and Hamilton, Lee H. (co-chairs). Bipartisan Policy Center. National Security
Preparedness Group. Statement in U.S. Senate Committee on Commerce. The State of
Aviation Security, testimony at hearings, 111th Congress, 2nd sess. January 20, 2010. Available
at http://bipartisanpolicy.org/library/testimony/congressman-lee-hamilton-and-governor-tom-
kean.
Lamb, Christopher J. and Marks, Edward. Chief of Mission Authority as a Model for National
Security Integration. Center for Strategic Research, Institute for Strategic Studies, National
Defense University: Washington, DC, 2010.
McChrystal, Stanley A. (Retired General). “It Takes a Network: The New Frontline of Modern
Warfare.” Foreign Policy, March/April 2011, pp.1-6.
Meyer, David A. (Major, U.S. Army). Normalizing Executive Department Boundaries: A Timely
First Step to Improving Interagency Coordination. 2007. Available at http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-
bin/GetTRDoc?Location=U28doc=GetTRDoc.pdf&AD=ADA479422.
Office of the Director of National Intelligence [ODNI]. Reforming Intelligence: The Passage of
the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act. ODNI: Washington, DC, 2008.
Project on National Security Reform (PNSR). Forging a New Shield. PNSR: Arlington, VA,
2008; and Toward Integrating Complex National Missions: Lessons from the National
Counterterrorism Center’s Directorate of Strategic Operational Planning. PNSR: Arlington,
VA, 2010. Both available at http://pnsr.org./data/files/pnsr (search under “Major Reports”).
U.S. Commission on the Prevention of Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferation and Terrorism.
World at Risk: Report, 2010. Available at http://www.preventionwmd.gov/report.
U.S. National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States [9/11 Commission]. Final
Report. GPO: Washington, DC, 2004.
Security Clearance Process Interagency Structure
Government Accountability Office. High-Risk Series: An Update. GAO-11-278, February 2011.
pp.1-7.
_____. Personnel Security Clearances: Overall Progress Has Been Made to Reform the
Governmentwide Security Clearance Process (statement of Brenda Farrell, Director, Defense
Capabilities and Management). GAO-11-232T. December 1, 2010.
_____. Personnel Security Clearances: Progress Has Been Made to Improve Timeliness but
Continued Oversight Is Needed to Sustain Momentum. GAO-11-65. November 19, 2010.
U.S. Senate Subcommittee on Oversight of Government Management, the Federal Workforce and
the District of Columbia. Security Clearance Reform: Setting a Course for Sustainability.
Hearing, 111th Cong., 2nd sess. November 16, 2010.
Congressional Research Service
32
Interagency Collaborative Arrangements and Activities
Miscellaneous Studies on Interagency Collaboration
Congressional Research Service. CRS Report R40856, The Debate Over Selected Presidential
Assistants and Advisors: Appointment, Accountability, and Congressional Oversight, by
Barbara L. Schwemle et al.
_____. CRS Report RL31446, Reorganizing the Executive Branch in the 20th Century: Landmark
Commissions, by Ronald C. Moe.
Dean, Alan L. and Ink, Dwight. “Modernizing Federal Field Operations.” Making Government
Manageable: Executive Organization and Management in the Twenty-First Century. Thomas
H. Stanton and Benjamin Ginsberg, Eds. Johns Hopkins University Press: Baltimore, MD,
2004. pp.192-197.
Environmental Protection Agency. Guidance for Federal Land Management in the Chesapeake
Bay (May 12, 2010) and Chesapeake Bay Program (regularly updated). Both available at
http://www.epa.gov/region03/Chesapeake/indx.htm.
Goldsmith, Steven and Donald F. Kettl. Eds., Unlocking the Power of Networks: Keys to High-
Performance Government. Brookings Institution: Washington, DC, 2009.
Kamensky, John M. “Regulatory Partnerships: Good or Bad?” The Business of Government.
Fall/Winter 2010, pp. 61-64.
Meriam, Lewis and Schmeckebier, Laurance F. Reorganization of the National Government:
What Does It Involve? Brookings Institution: Washington, DC, 1939.
Page, Stephen. “Measuring Accountability for Results in Interagency Collaboratives.” Public
Administration Review. September/ October 2004, vol. 64, pp. 591-606.
“Seminal Nonprofit Management Issues.” Public Administration Review. January/February 2011,
vol. 71, pp. 45-86.
“Special Issue on the Future of Public Administration in 2020.” Public Administration Review.
December 2010, vol. 70, Supplement 1.
“Spotlight on Contracting Out and Privatization,” Public Administration Review. July/August
2009. Vol. 69, pp. 668-726.
Tang, Shui-Yan. “Individual-Level Motivations for Interagency Cooperation.” Public
Administration Review. May/June 2005, vol. 65, pp. 377-378.
White, Leonard D. [A four-volume study in the administrative history of the United States
Government]. The Federalists: A Study in Administrative History. Greenwood Press:
Westport, CT, 1978; The Jacksonians: A Study in Administrative History, 1829-1861.
Macmillan: New York, 1954; The Jeffersonians: A Study in Administrative History, 1801-
1829. Macmillan: New York, 1951; and The Republican Era, 1869-1901: A Study in
Administrative History, Macmillan: New York, 1958.
Congressional Research Service
33
Interagency Collaborative Arrangements and Activities
Author Contact Information
Frederick M. Kaiser
Specialist in American National Government
fkaiser@crs.loc.gov, 7-8682
Acknowledgements
Other CRS contributors to the research for this report are Jared Nagel and Julia Taylor.
Congressional Research Service
34