Qatar: Background and U.S. Relations
Christopher M. Blanchard
Analyst in Middle Eastern Affairs
May 16, 2011
Congressional Research Service
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Qatar: Background and U.S. Relations
Summary
Qatar, a small peninsular country in the Persian Gulf, emerged as a partner of the United States in
the mid-1990s and currently serves as host to major U.S. military facilities. Qatar holds the third-
largest proven natural gas reserves in the world, and its small population enjoys the world’s
highest per capita income. The emir of Qatar, Shaykh Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani, has managed
a course of major economic growth and very limited political liberalization since replacing his
father in a bloodless palace coup in 1995. The emir has undertaken several projects to capitalize
on Qatar’s hydrocarbon resources, improve educational opportunities for Qatari citizens, and
pursue economic diversification. As part of Qatar’s liberalization experiment, the Qatari
monarchy founded Al Jazeera, the first all-news Arabic language satellite television network, in
1995. The network has proven influential and controversial since its establishment, including
during recent unrest in the Arab world. In an April 2003 referendum, Qatari voters approved a
new constitution that officially granted women the right to vote and run for national office.
Elections have been delayed for a national Advisory Council established by the new constitution,
and no target date has been set. Central Municipal Council elections are planned for May 2011.
Following joint military operations during Operation Desert Storm in 1991, Qatar and the United
States concluded a Defense Cooperation Agreement that has been subsequently expanded. In
April 2003, the U.S. Combat Air Operations Center for the Middle East moved from Prince
Sultan Airbase in Saudi Arabia to Qatar’s Al Udeid airbase south of Doha, the Qatari capital. Al
Udeid and other facilities in Qatar serve as logistics, command, and basing hubs for the U.S.
Central Command (CENTCOM) area of operations, including Iraq and Afghanistan. In spite of
serving as the host to a large U.S. military presence and supporting U.S. regional initiatives, Qatar
has remained mostly secure from terrorist attacks. Terrorist statements indicate that energy
infrastructure and U.S. military facilities in Qatar remain potential targets. U.S. officials have
described Qatar’s counterterrorism cooperation since 9/11 as significant; however, some
observers have raised questions about possible support for Al Qaeda by some Qatari citizens,
including members of Qatar’s large ruling family.
Human rights concerns persist. The 2010 State Department human rights report on Qatar notes
that basic civil liberties are restricted and states that the foreign workers who make up most of the
country’s population of 1.67 million “in many cases worked under circumstances that constituted
forced labor.” Since 2007, the State Department has reported that enacted safety and labor rights
regulations remain largely unenforced, and foreign diplomats’ visits to labor camps revealed “the
majority of unskilled foreign laborers living in cramped, dirty, and hazardous conditions, often
without running water, electricity, or adequate food.”
Qatari officials have taken an increasingly active diplomatic role in recent years, seeking to
position themselves as mediators and interlocutors in a number of regional conflicts. Qatar’s
deployment of fighter jets and transport planes to support NATO-led military operations in Libya
signaled a new assertiveness, and experts are speculating about what role Qatar may take with
regard to regional security issues in the wake of recent unrest. Qatar’s willingness to embrace
Iran, Syria, Hezbollah, and Hamas as part of its mediation and outreach initiatives has drawn
scrutiny. Unrest in Syria and Hamas-Fatah reconciliation could create challenging choices for
Qatar. The Obama Administration has not voiced public concern about Qatar’s multidirectional
foreign policy and has sought to preserve and expand military and counterterrorism cooperation
with the ambitious leaders of this wealthy, strategically located country.
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Qatar: Background and U.S. Relations
Contents
Country and Leadership Profile................................................................................................... 1
Assertive Diplomacy and Economic Clout .................................................................................. 1
Qatar’s Foreign Policy .......................................................................................................... 2
Regional Unrest, Bahrain, and Yemen ............................................................................. 2
Libya: Diplomacy, Humanitarian Support, and Military Operations ................................. 3
Israel and the Palestinians ............................................................................................... 3
Iran, Syria, and Lebanon ................................................................................................. 5
Sudan and Darfur Mediation ........................................................................................... 5
Qatar’s Economy .................................................................................................................. 6
Oil and Natural Gas ........................................................................................................ 7
U.S.-Qatar Relations and Key Issues ........................................................................................... 8
U.S. Military Cooperation and Foreign Assistance................................................................. 9
Counterterrorism................................................................................................................. 11
Recent Cooperation....................................................................................................... 11
Historic Concerns ......................................................................................................... 11
U.S.-Qatar Trade ................................................................................................................. 13
Political Reform and Elections ............................................................................................ 13
Human Rights and Social Issues.......................................................................................... 14
Human Rights and Labor Conditions............................................................................. 14
Islam and Religious Freedom ........................................................................................ 15
Al Jazeera and the Qatari Media.......................................................................................... 16
Al Jazeera ..................................................................................................................... 16
Media Freedom............................................................................................................. 17
Education............................................................................................................................ 17
Figures
Figure B-1. Map of Qatar .......................................................................................................... 21
Tables
Table 1. U.S. Foreign Assistance to Qatar FY2005-2010 and FY2011 Request .......................... 10
Appendixes
Appendix A. Qatar in Brief ....................................................................................................... 19
Appendix B. Chiefs of State and Cabinet Members of Qatar...................................................... 20
Contacts
Author Contact Information ...................................................................................................... 21
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Qatar: Background and U.S. Relations
Country and Leadership Profile
Qatar, a small peninsular state bordering Saudi Arabia in the Persian Gulf, gained independence
from the United Kingdom on September 3, 1971. It is a constitutional monarchy governed by the
Al Thani family. Of the country’s approximately 1.7 million people, only 225,000 are citizens: the
rest are foreign residents and temporary laborers.1 The Emir of Qatar, Shaykh Hamad bin Khalifa
Al Thani, has sought to increase the global profile and influence of his small, energy-rich country
since he replaced his father as emir in a palace coup in 1995. Like King Abdullah II of Jordan, he
was educated in the United Kingdom and holds degrees from Sandhurst Military Academy and
Cambridge University. He is 59 years old, and has three wives and 24 children. His second wife,
Shaykha Mohza, remains very active in Qatari public life, leading education, health, and women’s
initiatives. In 1997, the emir had kidney transplant surgery in the United States.
In practice, the emir’s personal authority as Qatar’s constitutional monarch is tempered only by
the need to maintain basic consensus within the Al Thani family and among other influential
interest groups. Qatar’s small native population of 225,000 is politically active in private but not
publicly restive, and members of the fluid expatriate population of 1.4 million have no political
rights. Shaykh Hamad appoints members of his extended family and other notables to a
governing Council of Ministers (cabinet), which is headed by his powerful cousin, Prime Minister
and Foreign Minister Hamad bin Jassim bin Jabr Al Thani.
The rule of the Qatari state is hereditary within the Al Thani family, and the constitution reflects
the previously contested principle that future successors to the throne will follow the line of the
emir’s male offspring. The emir’s fourth-oldest son, Tamim bin Hamad, is now the named
successor to the Qatari monarchy; he is 30 years old. Most experts regard the Al Thani family as
having some significant, if manageable internal rivalries. Religious conservatives have
considerable social influence, and Qatar’s military and security forces answer to the emir.
Elections for the Central Municipal Council are scheduled for May 2011, although long-planned
national Advisory Council elections remain delayed. Public debate on some issues is encouraged,
although the 2010 U.S. State Department human rights report notes Qatar’s ban on political
parties and restrictions on freedom of speech, press, assembly, association, and religion.
The emir visited Washington, DC, in April 2011 for consultations with President Obama and
congressional leaders. In the wake of the visit, U.S. Ambassador to Qatar Joseph LeBaron
referred to “a deepening of the relationship in political terms” and stated his belief that President
Obama’s consultation with Shaykh Hamad moved the U.S.-Qatari relationship “in a direction that
is qualitatively different from the past 10 years.” The Administration has not elaborated on what
new political arrangements or agreements, if any, were concluded during the emir’s visit.
Assertive Diplomacy and Economic Clout
Qatar’s strategic location, its leaders’ multifaceted foreign policy, and its explosive economic
growth contribute to the small country’s relatively large profile. Qatar’s energy export-fueled
1 As of April 30, 2010, the Qatar Statistics Authority reported that the population had reached 1.67 million people, of
which 1.27 million were male and 400,000 were female. The State Department 2010 report on human rights in Qatar
estimates that there are 225,000 Qatari citizens.
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GDP growth and small population have catapulted the country to the top of the global per capita
GDP rankings, with a 2010 U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) estimate of $145,300, the
highest in the world. Extending northward from the central Arabian Peninsula into the Persian
Gulf, Qatar hosts the forward headquarters of U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) at the Al
Udeid air base outside of the capital city, Doha. The Emir has maintained close strategic relations
with the United States as a balance to the influence of powerful neighbors in Saudi Arabia and
Iran. Qatar and Iran share the large North Field/South Pars natural gas deposit, providing a basis
for economic coordination and shared security interests with Tehran. Qatar’s relatively ambiguous
approach to some regional issues of U.S. concern and its willingness to maintain steady relations
with Iran, Syria, and Hamas have generated some criticism among U.S. observers, including
some Members of Congress in recent years. The Emir has prioritized efforts to raise Qatar’s
global profile, most recently by outbidding the United States and others to secure the right to host
the FIFA World Cup (soccer) in 2022.
Qatar’s Foreign Policy
Qatar’s approach to regional affairs is best described as a multi-directional balancing act. To the
chagrin of Saudi Arabia and other regional powers, Qatar has sought to mediate regional conflicts
and political disputes by engaging a wide range of parties in Yemen, Lebanon, Sudan, and Gaza,
some of whom are hostile to the United States. Qatari leaders have responded boldly to recent
political unrest in the region, while increasing Sunni-Shiite and Arab-Iranian tensions in the Gulf
region have led Qatar to close ranks with its Sunni Arab allies in the Gulf Cooperation Council
(GCC). Qatari leaders have embraced political change in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, and Yemen,
while offering support to their traditional rivals in Bahrain’s ruling Al Khalifa family. The emir
also has taken a measured approach to unrest in Syria, in light of his ongoing engagement with
the Al Asad government on Lebanon and Israeli-Palestinian issues. While some regional voices
clearly resent Qatar’s assertive diplomacy, the Qatari government’s agility in the face of
uncertainty and the soft power of its government-supported Al Jazeera satellite television network
have made Qatar a key player during the unfolding “Arab Spring.” Some critics assert that despite
Qatar’s active foreign policy, its regional diplomacy has actually yielded few results with the
exception of the 2008 Doha agreement that ended Lebanon’s 18-month long political crisis.
Regional Unrest, Bahrain, and Yemen
In general, Qatar has taken an open, flexible approach to recent regional unrest, highlighting its
own modest reform efforts to date as broadly reflective of popular demands for effective,
transparent government. Thus far, the emir has avoided much regional or domestic criticism of
the centralized political system he presides over. Bahrain and Saudi Arabia remain exceptions to
Qatar’s embrace of “change,” and Qatar has offered unspecified security support to Bahrain
alongside military and police forces from Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE).
Some activists have criticized Al Jazeera for the tone and limited scope of its coverage of
political debate and unrest in Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and Syria, in contrast to the network’s
enthusiastic coverage of unrest and debate in Egypt, Libya, Tunisia, and Yemen. In a bid for a
formal regional leadership role, Qatar has nominated Qatari-national and former Gulf
Cooperation Council (GCC) Secretary General Abdulrahman al Attiyah2 to lead the Arab League
after May 2011, when long-time Arab League chairman Amr Moussa plans to step down.
2 Al Attiyah was replaced by Abdel Latif Zayati.
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With regard to Yemen, whatever good faith Qatar had accumulated from recent efforts to
negotiate a resolution to the conflict between President Ali Abdullah Saleh’s government and
northern Al Houthi rebels has now evaporated. Yemeni officials roundly rejected Prime Minister
and Foreign Minister Shaykh Hamad bin Jassim’s public statement that the GCC member states
hoped “to conclude an agreement with the Yemeni president to step down.”3 Although the GCC’s
April 10 call for a transfer of power and political negotiations in Yemen confirmed this position,
President Saleh continues to accuse Qatar of attempting to undermine Yemeni sovereignty and
reduce Saudi influence.4 Yemen recalled its ambassador from Doha, and, in late April, Saleh
rejected Qatari officials’ presence at the signing of a GCC-negotiated agreement with the Yemeni
opposition “because [Qatar] has conspired against Yemen.”
Libya: Diplomacy, Humanitarian Support, and Military Operations
Qatar’s policy toward the conflict in Libya showcases the trends described above. Some Qatari
officials have pointedly criticized a perceived lack of regional leadership on the part of Saudi
Arabia and Egypt,5 and Shaykh Hamad has linked the need for international intervention to the
inability and/or unwillingness of Arab governments and the Arab League to act as the Libyan
crisis escalated. Qatar was the first Arab state to formally recognize the Libyan opposition Interim
Transitional National Council (TNC) and is one of two Arab governments contributing military
aircraft to coalition operations to enforce U.N. Security Council Resolution 1973. Qatari C-17
aircraft and Mirage fighter jets are supporting the coalition air operations. Qatar also has offered a
variety of humanitarian and material support to the Libyan opposition, agreeing to market oil on
behalf of the TNC and deposit proceeds in an escrow account. To date, oil shipments and several
refined product shipments have departed from opposition-held ports, although limited stockpiles
may delay further shipments. Qatar is hosting opposition television channels that are now
broadcasting via satellite from Doha under the auspices of Al Jazeera. On April 13, Qatar hosted
the first meeting of the Libya Contact Group, including senior officials from the United States,
the United Nations, the European Union, the African Union and key governments. Some
unconfirmed reports suggest that Qatar has supplied defensive weaponry to some opposition
forces. Qatar pledged $400-500 million to support the temporary financial mechanism planned
for the TNC at the second Contact Group meeting on May 5, 2011 in Rome, Italy.
Israel and the Palestinians
Although Qatar and Israel do not have formal diplomatic ties, Qatar has supported the Arab
League position backing indirect negotiations between the Palestinian Authority and Israel. In
3 Qatar News Agency (QNA, Doha), “GCC Countries Hope to Conclude Agreement With Yemeni President to Step
Down,” April 7, 2011.
4 An April 10 GCC Foreign Ministers meeting in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia called for President Saleh to transfer power to
his vice president and for the formation of a national unity government with the power to form economic, military, and
political committees tasked with developing a constitution and holding elections. GCC Secretariat, Press Release:
Ministerial Council, Thirty-second Session, April 10, 2011.
5 Qatari Air Force Chief of Staff General Mubarak al Khayanin said, “Certain countries like Saudi Arabia and Egypt
haven't taken leadership for the last three years. So we wanted to step up and express ourselves, and see if others will
follow.” Jamey Keaten and Adam Schreck, “Tiny Qatar flexes muscles in no-fly Libya campaign,” Associated Press,
March 28, 2011.
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April 2011, Emir Hamad bin Khalifa said during a visit to the White House that “the most
important issue for us in the region is that Palestine-Israeli conflict and how to find a way to
establish a Palestinian state.” He signaled his support for President Obama’s goal of “supporting
the existence of two states peacefully living side by side.” Qatari leaders also have criticized
recent Israeli decisions on settlements and Jerusalem that they feel undermine prospects for a
two-state solution. Qatar has been in the forefront of Arab-Israeli talks on expanding economic
ties during periods of progress in the peace process. However, Qatar’s position regarding the Arab
boycott of Israel is governed by the September 1994 decision by the GCC to terminate
enforcement of the indirect boycotts, while maintaining, at least in theory, the primary boycott.
An Israeli trade office in Doha was shuttered by the Qatari government in response to the January
2009 Gaza war and has not been reopened.
In recent years, some observers have viewed Qatar’s diplomatic approach as supportive of Hamas
and indirectly supportive of Iran and Syria, although Qatari officials view their approach as
supporting a consistent policy of engagement with all sides in the interests of peace. In October
2006, the Qatari government launched an ultimately unsuccessful round of shuttle diplomacy
aimed at resolving differences between Palestinian factions and securing the release of kidnaped
Israeli soldier Gilad Shalit by his Hamas captors.6 Qatar offered $50 million in financial support
to the then-Hamas-led Palestinian Authority government and has hosted Hamas officials for
numerous talks and consultations since January 2006. Israel’s then-Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni
declined a Qatari invitation to participate in an October 2006 democracy conference in Doha
because of the presence of Hamas representatives, but an Israeli delegation participated in the
conference, led by lower-ranking Foreign Ministry officials.7 Israeli Deputy Prime Minister
Shimon Peres visited Qatar in February 2007 and declined the emir’s reported suggestion that
Israel negotiate directly with Hamas.8
Qatar continues to engage with Palestinian political leaders and has facilitated dialogue between
Fatah and Hamas. The announcement of a Fatah-Hamas unity agreement in May 2011 renews
questions about future engagement by regional states with Hamas leaders and individuals who
may participate in a future Palestinian Authority government. Some observers have speculated
that unrest in Syria could lead Hamas political and military leaders to seek alternate locations for
their offices, possibly including Doha. Hamas political leader Khaled Meshaal and other Hamas
leaders visited Doha in April and December 2010 and met with Emir Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani
and Prime Minister Shaykh Hamad bin Jassem bin Jabr Al Thani. In the past, Senator John Kerry
has voiced specific concerns about alleged Qatari government and private support to Hamas,
arguing in April 2009 that “Qatar ... can’t continue to be an American ally on Monday that sends
money to Hamas on Tuesday.”9 In August 2009, Qatar offered $10 million in cash payments via
the Hamas Administration in Gaza to support thousands of unemployed Palestinians, including
fishermen facing difficulty in relation to Israel’s blockade of Gaza’s coastal waters. It remains
unclear whether Qatar would agree to host Hamas leaders if they decided to relocate from
Damascus.
6 Daily Star (Beirut), “Qatari Mediation Fails to Bridge Hamas-Fatah Gap,” October 11, 2006.
7 Agence France Presse, “Livni Shuns Qatar Conference, but Israel There,” October 29, 2006.
8 Danna Harman, “Tiny Qatar Vies for Big Regional Role,” Christian Science Monitor, February 6, 2007.
9 US Fed News, “Sen. Kerry Speaks on Middle East to Brookings Institute,” April 2, 2009.
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Iran, Syria, and Lebanon
Qatar has pursued a policy of engagement with Iran in recent years, based on the countries’
shared energy reserves and Qatar’s calculation that any regional conflict involving Iran could
invite attacks on U.S. forces and installations based in Qatar. Qatari and Iranian officials signed a
defense and security cooperation agreement in February 2010, and, in April 2010, Qatari military
officers reportedly were invited to observe Iranian military drills in the Persian Gulf. In February
2010, Qatari Prime Minister Hamad bin Jassem Al Thani reportedly encouraged the United States
to engage directly with Iran in order to resolve the ongoing dispute over Iran’s nuclear program.10
In 2009, Shaykh Hamad bin Jassim characterized Iran’s election dispute as “an internal matter”
and stated, “we must respect the right of each state to solve its own problems.”11 Neither he or the
emir have publicly reconciled that view with Qatar’s active approach to the unfolding unrest in
the Arab world. Qatar’s national news service has confirmed that two Iranian fishing vessels were
detained in Qatari waters recently, but has stated that “reports about the seizure ...of two Iranian
boats loaded with weapons are inaccurate.”
Qatari diplomacy in the Levant over the last five years reportedly has been perceived by other
Arab states in general, and by Saudi Arabia in particular, as a challenge to traditional patterns of
regional leadership. In 2008, the Arab League and the Qatari government facilitated negotiations
between rival Lebanese factions resulting in the “Doha Agreement” that guided the 2009
parliamentary elections. The emir has consulted with Lebanese officials during recent
negotiations to form a new cabinet after the collapse of the Al Hariri government. Qatari
engagement with Syria and Iran and its support for unity government arrangements in Lebanon
that include Hezbollah and its allies have led some U.S. observers to place Qatar in the so-called
“axis of resistance” vis-à-vis the United States, its Arab allies, and Israel.
Sudan and Darfur Mediation
Sudanese President Omar Hassan al Bashir visited Doha in February 2010 to sign a ceasefire
agreement with Darfur’s Justice and Equality Movement (JEM).12 The agreement marked an
important milestone in nearly two years of Qatari effort as the leader of the Arab League’s
mediation group for the conflict in Darfur. In spite of the ceasefire agreement, further progress in
the Sudan-JEM talks has been lacking. President Bashir visited Doha again in March 2011, in the
run-up to a Doha stakeholders conference in late April 2011 for the government of Sudan, Darfuri
rebel groups, Sudanese organizations, and international parties. The government of Sudan
appeared to undermine the Qatar-sponsored negotiations by issuing a decree announcing that a
referendum will be held in the three states that now make up the Darfur region on their future
administrative status, as called for by the 2006 Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA). Current Darfur
rebel groups that reject the DPA are seeking to determine the region’s status through Qatar-
backed negotiations with the Khartoum government. They oppose Khartoum’s unilateral move
10 OSC Report GMP20100215135001, Mobin Pandit, “Talk Directly to Iran, US Told. Doha: Qatar Yesterday Urged
the United States to Talk Directly to Iran on the Nuclear Issue,” The Peninsula (Doha), February 15, 2010.
11 OSC Report GMP20090624615003, “Qatari Premier Discusses Qatar's Mediations, Ties with Egypt, Israel, Al-
Jazirah,” June 24, 2009.
12 President Bashir’s 2010 visit was his second to Qatar since the issuance of an international warrant for his arrest by
the International Criminal Court (ICC). Qatar has rejected the ICC decision and warrant, considering it disruptive to its
efforts and those of others to mediate a peace agreement between the government of Sudan and a number of rebel
groups in Darfur.
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and seek continued talks. The Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) suspended its participation
in the Doha process pending clarification and rejected draft agreements presented at the April
2011 meeting in Doha.13 The Liberation and Justice Movement (LJM) participated in the talks
and welcomed the draft agreement documents, while dismissing the Sudanese government’s
referendum plans. Some observers regard Khartoum’s referendum announcement as an attempt to
undermine plans for a unified regional government in Darfur as part of any peace agreement. As
of early May 2011, talks were ongoing in Doha regarding draft agreements.
Qatar’s Economy
Qatar has backed its diplomatic approach up with its increasing financial resources and economic
influence during a period of “unparalleled prosperity.” 14 Oil and natural gas export proceeds
provide over half of the government’s revenue, and private sector growth has been robust in
recent years, while slowing slightly from 2008 to present. The International Monetary Fund
(IMF) estimates that overall Qatari GDP growth reached 16% in 2010, and projects that growth
may reach 20% in 2011 and remain strong for the medium term.15 Qatar based its recently
approved 2011-2012 budget and expected surplus of over $6 billion on an assumed oil price of
$55 per barrel—near half the current global market price. The IMF estimates Qatar’s 2011
surplus will be $16.4 billion and predicts fiscal surpluses will continue through at least 2015. The
Emir’s government is investing surplus revenue abroad for future generations and investing in
domestic infrastructure, housing, and health sector improvements. Qatari press outlets feature
limited criticism of domestic budget transparency, spending priorities, foreign contractors, and
government efficiency.
Many regional economic experts are arguing that although the global credit crunch and resulting
recession significantly lowered the value of many Qatari real estate and local stock holdings, the
experience may turn out to have been a net positive for economies like Qatar’s, where rapidly
expanding real estate sectors and inflows of speculative capital had driven inflation rates into the
double digits (15% in 2008) and local banks were not exercising good management practices over
their lending portfolios. In describing Qatar’s response to the losses facing its banking sector, the
Middle East Economic Digest described Qatar as having “probably the most interventionist
government in the region.” Qatar has invested close to $6 billion to purchase several types of
asset holdings from its domestic banks in an effort to ensure that the banks continue lending. The
IMF praised the Qatari bailout program in its February 2010 Article IV staff report.
Some observers have raised questions about the long-term ability of Qatar to attract private sector
investment and produce employment opportunities once the current phase of large state-supported
infrastructure investment is complete. By all accounts, Qatari officials remain confident in their
economic prospects and appear to have used the recent downturn as an opportunity to assess
13 JEM spokesman Gibreel Adam Bilal said, “The presidential decree related to the referendum on Darfur
administrative [status] paralyzed completely the negotiating process in Doha. We, in JEM, do not see any interest to
keep talking with the government if the status of Darfur will no longer be decided here.” OSC Report
AFP20110406577009, “Rebel JEM Suspends Talks With Sudan Over Decree on Darfur Administrative Status,” Sudan
Tribune Online (Paris), April 5, 2011.
14 In February 2010, the Middle East Economic Digest judged that “Qatar is enjoying a period of unparalleled
prosperity.” Middle East Economic Digest, “Qatar’s peaking energy market,” February 12, 2010.
15 IMF, Qatar: 2010 Article IV Consultation—Staff Report, IMF Country Report No. 11/64, March 9, 2011.
Hydrocarbon sector growth is estimated at 29.5% for 2011, non-hydrocarbon growth is estimated at 9.5%.
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lessons learned during the country’s recent boom, to reconsider planned projects, and, where
possible, to take advantage of lower input costs by delaying project start dates or renegotiating
contracts. Managing the infrastructure and service needs created by the influx of laborers to the
county remains the immediate challenge. In the short run, Qatari authorities are focused on
completing a series of energy projects and expanding water, health, and electricity infrastructure
to meet the needs of the population.
Oil and Natural Gas
With proven oil reserves of 25.4 billion barrels, Qatar has far less oil than the major Persian Gulf
producers, such as Kuwait (96.5 billion barrels), Iraq (112 billion barrels), and Saudi Arabia (252
billion barrels). However, Qatar has the third largest gas reserves in the world, an estimated 896
trillion cubic feet (Tcf).16 Qatar Petroleum (QP), the state-owned oil company, increased its crude
oil output from 593,000 barrels per day (b/d) in 1999 to approximately 824,000 b/d after an
OPEC-coordinated production cut in December 2008.17 As of January 2011, the U.S. Energy
Information Administration estimated Qatari crude oil production was 850,000 b/d. However,
with oil reserves likely to be exhausted before 2026 at current production rates, Qatar has rapidly
moved to exploit its vast natural gas reserves. Japan, South Korea, and Singapore are the leading
importers of oil from Qatar.
As part of a long-term development strategy, Qatar has tapped international financial markets and
invited foreign investment in recent years in order to finance the expansion of its gas extraction
and liquified natural gas (LNG) production facilities.18 The Export-Import Bank of the United
States has provided over $1 billion in loan guarantees to support the development of Qatar’s gas
production facilities in cooperation with a range of U.S., European, and Asian companies, banks,
and export credit agencies.19
Qatar has expanded its yearly LNG output from 4.5 million tons annually in 2002 to 43 million
tons in 2009, and is now the world’s largest exporter of LNG.20 By 2012, the final pending LNG
projects are scheduled to be complete, bringing annual output capacity to 78 million tons.
Although Qatar’s LNG industry has low capital costs due to government investment, it has high
operational costs, which has required Qatar to develop economies of scale in order to be more
competitive with established LNG exporters such as Indonesia and Nigeria.21 The large natural
gas production and shipping facilities at the coastal city of Ras Laffan in northern Qatar serve as
the main site for the country’s gas development projects, with several independent gas production
16 Qatar’s supply of natural gas doubled in 2002, when surveyors discovered new gas deposits in Qatar’s North Field.
17 Economist Intelligence Unit, “Qatar has cut oil production in line with OPEC's decision,” December 8, 2008.
18 Qatar’s government has a 60%-70% stake in two joint partnerships with foreign firms, including ExxonMobil (USA),
TotalFinaElf (France), KoGas (South Korea), and Matsui (Japan). In February 2005, Qatar Petroleum signed a $7
billion agreement with Shell and a $12 billion agreement with ExxonMobil to export natural gas to the United States
and Europe.
19 For example, since 1996, the Export Import Bank has provided loan guarantees to support the export of U.S.
equipment and services for the construction of facilities at Ras Laffan, including most recently, the construction of
natural gas liquefaction plants and facilities associated with the QatarGas II and III projects. See Export Import Bank of
the United States, “Ex-Im Bank $930 Million Guarantee Supports U.S. Exports to Build LNG Plant in Qatar,”
November 18, 2004; and Export Import Bank of the United States, “Ex-Im Bank Finances QatarGas 3 Liquid Natural
Gas Complex, December 15, 2005.
20 Middle East Economic Digest, “Doha continues to shine,” October 30, 2009.
21 Meeting with Qatar Petroleum, Qatar Gas, and Ras Gas executives, Ras Laffan, Qatar, January 2005.
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and conversion “trains” linked to corresponding fields and contracted export markets. Long-term
contracts at fixed prices have ensured that Qatar has earned steady returns from its exports even
in light of the global economic downturn. Qatar participates in and hosts the headquarters of the
Gas Exporting Countries Forum, an assembly of major gas exporting countries that some have
described as a potential natural gas OPEC.22
Qatar has signed several agreements with U.S. energy companies (ConocoPhillips and
ExxonMobil) and other international companies to develop facilities to export LNG to the United
States, the United Kingdom, Spain, Italy, South Korea, Taiwan, and India. Under Project Dolphin,
Qatar has begun exporting natural gas via an underwater pipeline to the United Arab Emirates,
although objections from Saudi Arabia have limited progress in other areas. Qatari government
officials reported that natural gas revenues exceeded oil income for the first time in 2008. Qatar
also is in the midst of gas-to-liquids (GTL) projects and aims to become the largest GTL producer
in the world.23 In February 2007, Qatar Petroleum and ExxonMobil announced that a planned
joint-GTL production facility project would be cancelled in the wake of rising cost projections.
Other GTL plans are proceeding.
U.S.-Qatar Relations and Key Issues
A U.S. embassy opened in Doha in 1973, but U.S. relations with Qatar did not blossom until after
the 1991 Persian Gulf war. In the late 1980s, the United States and Qatar engaged in a prolonged
diplomatic dispute regarding Qatar’s black market procurement of U.S.-made Stinger anti-aircraft
missiles.24 The dispute froze planned economic and military cooperation, and Congress approved
a ban on arms sales to Qatar (Section 566(d), P.L. 100-461) until the months leading up to the
1991 Gulf War, when Qatar allowed coalition forces to operate from Qatari territory and agreed to
destroy the missiles in question.25 In January 1991, Qatari armored forces helped coalition troops
repel an Iraqi attack on the Saudi Arabian town of Kafji, on the coastal road leading south from
Kuwait into Saudi Arabia’s oil-rich Eastern Province.26 In June 1992, Qatar signed a defense
cooperation agreement with the United States, opening a period of close coordination in military
affairs that has continued to the present.
22 In February 2010, GECF Secretary General Leonid Bokhanovsky told Qatar’s Gulf Times, “Naturally, the positive
experience of OPEC was taken into consideration in the process of development of the GECF organizational structure,
though characteristic properties of oil and gas necessitate different angles of approach.” Specifically, Bokhanovsky
highlighted the transportation and storage requirements of natural gas and the corresponding use of long-term supply
and delivery contracts as key differences influencing the approach of GECF members.
23 For more information on GTL and Qatar’s GTL projects, see U.S. Energy Information Administration, Qatar
Country Analysis Brief, January 2011. Available at: http://www.eia.doe.gov/countries/cab.cfm?fips=QA.
24 Qatar defended its procurement of the missiles in protest of the sale of similar missiles by the United States to
Bahrain, with which Qatar had an unresolved border dispute until 2001. Elaine Sciolino, “Qatar Rejects U.S. Demand
For Return of Illicit Stingers,” New York Times, June 28, 1988; Patrick E. Tyler, “U.S. Drawn Into Gulf Dispute - Stray
Stingers Tied To Qatar-Bahrain Tiff,” Washington Post, October 6, 1988.
25 The ban was formally repealed by the Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations
Act of 1991 (Section 568(b), P.L. 101-513). The conference report on H.R. 5114, Foreign Operations, Export
Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 1991 (H.Rept. 101-968) inserted Senate language (Amendment
No. 144) that repealed the ban based on information provided by the Secretary of Defense “that it is in the national
interest to reestablish United States-Qatari security relations because of their support for United States troops in the
Middle East.”
26 Thomas Ferraro, “Allies Retake Saudi City,” United Press International, January 31, 1991; and Joseph Albright,
“Marines Take Credit for Khafji Victory,” Atlanta Journal and Constitution, February 3, 1991.
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The United States promptly recognized the assumption of power by Shaykh Hamad in June 1995
and has welcomed Qatar’s defense cooperation, as well as its political, economic, and educational
reform efforts. Today, Qatari-U.S. relations remain cordial and close. Qatari-U.S. defense
relations have expanded over the last 15 years to include cooperative defense exercises,
equipment pre-positioning, and base access agreements. U.S. concerns regarding alleged material
support for terrorist groups by some Qataris, including members of the royal family, have been
balanced over time by Qatar’s counterterrorism efforts and its broader, long-term commitment to
host and support U.S. military forces being used in ongoing operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.
Qatari officials are quick to point out their commitment to the general goal of regional peace and
their support for U.S. military operations, even as they maintain a conservative approach to the
Arab-Israeli conflict. In June 2009, U.S. Ambassador to Qatar Joseph LeBaron explained Qatar’s
policy in the following terms: “I think of it as Qatar occupying a space in the middle of the
ideological spectrum in the Islamic world, with the goal of having doors open to it across that
ideological spectrum. They have the resources to accomplish that vision, and that’s rare.”27 By all
accounts, Qatar’s balancing strategy toward its relationship with the United States and regional
powers such as Iran and Saudi Arabia is likely to persist, which may continue to place Doha and
Washington on opposing sides of some important issues even amid close cooperation on others.
The U.S. has provided limited counterterrorism assistance to Qatar to support the development of
its domestic security forces (see Table 1 below), and the Export-Import Bank has provided over
$2 billion in loan guarantees to support various natural gas development projects in Qatar since
1996. The Obama Administration has phased out limited U.S. foreign assistance and continues to
request military construction funds for facilities in Qatar. Since September 2005, Qatar has
donated $100 million to victims of Hurricane Katrina in the U.S. Gulf states.
U.S. Military Cooperation and Foreign Assistance
With its small territory and narrow population base, Qatar relies to a large degree on external
cooperation and support for its security. With a personnel strength of 11,800, Qatar’s armed
forces are the second-smallest in the Middle East.28 France has provided approximately 80% of
Qatar’s arms inventory. Since the 1991 Gulf war, Qatar has pursued a limited program of force
modernization. To date, however, it has not purchased significant U.S. weapons systems, although
the Qatari government may be considering the purchase of U.S. air and missile defense systems
in line with regional trends. The U.S. military has deployed Patriot anti-ballistic missile defense
systems to some publicly unnamed Gulf countries, ostensibly to defend against potential missile
attacks from Iran.
Qatar invested over $1 billion to construct the Al Udeid air base south of Doha during the 1990s;
it did not have an air force of its own at the time. The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers also
awarded over $100 million dollars in Military Construction Air Force (MCAF) contracts for the
construction of U.S. storage, housing, service, command, and communication facilities. Qatar’s
financing and construction of some of the state-of-the-art air force base at Al Udeid and its
granting of permission for the construction of U.S.-funded facilities facilitated gradually deeper
cooperation with U.S. military forces.
27 Carrie Sheffield, “Tiny nation, global clout,” Washington Times, June 24, 2009.
28 Bahrain, with an estimated 11,000-member force, has the smallest.
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The Al Udeid airbase now serves as a logistics, command, and basing hub for U.S. operations in
Afghanistan and Iraq. Nearby Camp As Sayliyah houses significant U.S. military equipment pre-
positioning and command facilities for the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) area of
operations.29 Both Qatar and the United States have invested in the construction and expansion of
these facilities since the mid-1990s, and they form the main hub of the CENTCOM air and
ground logistical network in the AOR. As a result of ongoing operations in Iraq and Afghanistan,
U.S. and partner nation facilities in Qatar and elsewhere have received higher use in recent years
and may require further investment to meet current and potential future needs.
Table 1. U.S. Foreign Assistance to Qatar FY2005-2010 and FY2011 Request
($ thousands)
Account
FY2005
FY2006
FY2007
FY2008
FY2009
FY2010
FY2011
Estimate
Request
IMETa -
-
-
-
-
10 10
NADR-
1,379 788 1,120c 268c - - -
ATAb
NADR-
- 118 - - -
CTF
Source: U.S. Department of State, Congressional Budget Justifications for Foreign Operations, FY2007-FY2011.
a. Qatar did not participate in the IMET program prior to FY2010. The Bush Administration requested the
provision of nominal IMET assistance because Qatari participation in the IMET program would make Qatar
eligible to purchase other U.S. training at a reduced cost. The Obama Administration continued this request
for FY2010. Section 21(c) of P.L.90-629, the Arms Export Control Act (AECA) as amended, states that
IMET recipient countries are eligible to purchase non-IMET training at reduced cost. Section 108(a) of P.L.
99-83 amended the AECA to provide this reduced cost benefit to IMET recipients. The U.S. Defense
Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) implements the authority provided in P.L. 99-83 to apply a lower
cost to U.S. military training purchased by Qatar and other IMET recipient countries through the Foreign
Military Sales (FMS) program. At present, the "incremental rates" applied to the FMS training purchases of
IMET recipient countries are calculated according to the terms outlined in Department of Defense Financial
Management Regulation (FMR), Volume 15, Chapter 7 (Sections 0711 and 0712).
b. Through the end of FY2006, over $3.3 million in Nonproliferation, Anti-terrorism, De-mining and Related
Programs - Anti-terrorism Assistance (NADR - ATA) has been provided to train over 500 Qatari security
officers and officials since FY1987.
c. Aid al ocation amounts released by the State Department did not distinguish between NADR sub-accounts.
From FY2003 to FY2007, Congress appropriated and authorized $126 million for U.S. military
construction activities in Qatar. The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008
(P.L. 110-181) authorized $81.7 million in FY2008 spending to build new Air Force and Special
Operations facilities in Qatar. The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009 (P.L.
110-417) authorizes $69.6 million in FY2009 spending to build new Air Force and Special
Operations facilities. The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010 (P.L. 111-84)
authorizes $117 million in FY2010 spending to build new Air Force recreational, dormitory, and
other facilities at Al Udeid. The Administration’s FY2011 military construction request for Qatar
29 According to the U.S. Department of Defense, “Qatar continues to host the Combined Air Operations Center, which
provides airpower command and control for Afghanistan. Qatar also hosts USCENTCOM’s forward headquarters,
which has a crucial command and control responsibility for Afghanistan.” U.S. Department of Defense, Report on
Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan, (P.L. 110-181), April 2010, p. 85.
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was $64.3 million, for Air Force facilities and a National Security Agency warehouse. The
FY2012 request includes $37 million to continue the dormitory and recreation facility project.
The Administration also requested $10,000 in International Military Education and Training
(IMET) assistance funds for Qatar in FY2010, and requested an additional $10,000 for FY2011.
The nominal amount of IMET assistance has the administrative effect of making Qatar eligible to
purchase other U.S. military training at a reduced cost level that is available only to IMET
recipients.
Counterterrorism
Recent Cooperation
The U.S. State Department has characterized Qatar’s counterterrorism support since September
11, 2001, as “significant,”30 but noted in its August 2010 report on terrorism issues that U.S.
officials “continued to strive for increased cooperation – and particularly information sharing”
with their Qatari counterparts.31 Qatar’s Combating Terrorism Law, passed in March 2004,
established definitions of terrorism and terrorist financing and broadened the government’s power
to detect and prevent terrorist threats and to investigate and prosecute terrorists and their
supporters. Qatar also established the Qatar Authority for Charitable Activities (QACA) in March
2004 to monitor the activities of all Qatari domestic and international charitable organizations,
including prominent organizations such as the Qatar Charitable Society and the Shaykh Eid bin
Mohammed Al Thani Charitable Association. All international financial charity transfers and
project verification fall within the jurisdiction of the new QACA.32 However, Article 24 of the
law establishing the authority allows the emir to grant an exemption from QACA oversight to any
organization at any time. Qatar’s central bank operates a financial intelligence unit (FIU) which
monitors activity in Qatar’s banking system and serves as a liaison office to similar units in the
United States and around the world.33
Historic Concerns
According to the 9/11 Commission Report and former U.S. government officials, royal family
member and current Qatari Interior Minister Shaykh Abdullah bin Khalid Al Thani provided safe
harbor and assistance to Al Qaeda leaders during the 1990s, including the suspected mastermind
of the September 11 hijacking plot, Khalid Shaykh Mohammed.34 Former U.S. officials and
30 U.S. State Department - Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, Country Reports on Terrorism, 2004, April
27, 2005.
31 U.S. State Department - Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, Country Reports on Terrorism, 2009,
August 5, 2010.
32 Author interview with QACA Chairman Abdul Aziz bin Abdul Rahman bin Hasan Al Thani, Doha, Qatar, April
2005.
33 Meeting with QCB Governor Abdallah bin Khalid Al Attiyah, Doha, Qatar, April 2005.
34 According to the 9/11 Commission Report, Khalid Shaykh Mohammed provided financial support to a co-
conspirator in the 1993 World Trade Center bombing while living in Qatar and later moved his family to Qatar at
Shaykh Abdallah bin Khalid Al Thani’s suggestion. The Report also states that Mohammed “claims that Sheikh
Abdallah was not a member, financier, or supporter of al Qaeda,” and that Mohammed admitted “that Abdallah
underwrote a 1995 trip [Mohammed] took to join the Bosnia jihad.” Final Report of the National Commission on
Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (The 9/11 Commission Report), pp. 73, 147-8, 488-9. The Emir named
(continued...)
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leaked U.S. government reports state that the late Osama Bin Laden also visited Doha twice
during the mid-1990s as a guest of Shaykh Abdullah bin Khalid, who then served as Qatar’s
minister for religious endowments and Islamic affairs, and, later, as minister of state for internal
affairs. During a January 1996 visit to Doha, Bin Laden reportedly “discussed the successful
movement of explosives into Saudi Arabia, and operations targeted against U.S. and U.K.
interests in Dammam, Dharan, and Khobar, using clandestine Al Qaeda cells in Saudi Arabia.”35
According to other accounts, Shaykh Abdullah bin Khalid welcomed dozens of so-called “Afghan
Arab” veterans of the anti-Soviet conflict in Afghanistan to Qatar in the early 1990s and operated
a farm where some of those individuals lived and worked over a period of several years.36
In January 1996, FBI officials narrowly missed an opportunity to capture Khalid Shaykh
Mohammed in Qatar, where he held a government job at Qatar’s Ministry of Electricity and
Water. Mohammed had been targeted for arrest in connection with an investigation of his
nephew—1993 World Trade Center bombing mastermind Ramzi Yousef.37 The FBI dispatched a
team to arrest Mohammed, but he fled Qatar before he could be detained. Some former U.S.
officials have since stated their belief that a high-ranking member of the Qatari government
alerted Mohammed to the impending raid, allowing him to flee the country.38
Any discussions by U.S. officials with the government of Qatar regarding these allegations have
not been made public. U.S. security officials working to ensure the safety and security of U.S.
facilities, citizens, and assets in Qatar have reported that their relationships with Ministry of
Interior officials, including serving Minister of State for Interior Affairs Shaykh Abdullah bin
Nasir bin Khalifah Al Thani, are positive and cooperative. The emir reappointed Shaykh Abdullah
bin Khalid as minister of interior in April 2007 and did not alter his status in a 2008 expansion of
the cabinet or in a 2009 cabinet reshuffle.
(...continued)
Shaykh Abdullah bin Khalid Al Thani to the post of Minister of Interior in January 2001, a post he continues to hold.
His deputy, Minister of State for Interior Affairs Abdallah bin Nasir bin Khalifa Al Thani, currently serves as the
official ministry liaison to foreign governments, including the United States. James Risen and David Johnston, “Qaeda
Aide Slipped Away Long Before September 11 Attack,” New York Times, March 8, 2003; Josh Meyer and John Goetz,
“Qatar’s Security Chief Suspected of Having Ties to Al Qaeda,” Los Angeles Times, March 28, 2003.
35 Memorandum from the Department of Defense to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence partially reprinted in
Steven F. Hayes, “Case Closed,” Weekly Standard, November 24, 2003. Pentagon spokesmen responded to the
publication of the excerpts from the memorandum in the Hayes article by indicating that the memorandum was a
collection of intelligence data from various sources which did not constitute a finished intelligence product. It is unclear
if Bin Laden’s reported visit was related to preparations for the June 1996 attack on the Khobar Towers military
barracks in Saudi Arabia that killed 19 U.S. servicemen. Press reporting from the late 1990s cites a former U.S.
intelligence official as indicating that the “Qatari individual” who hosted Bin Laden was Abdullah Bin Khalid Al
Thani. See James Risen and Benjamin Weiser, “U.S. Officials Say Aid for Terrorists Came Through Two Persian Gulf
Nations,” New York Times, July 8, 1999.
36 James Risen and Benjamin Weiser, “U.S. Officials Say Aid for Terrorists Came Through Two Persian Gulf
Nations,” New York Times, July 8, 1999. James Risen and David Johnston, “Qaeda Aide Slipped Away Long Before
Sept. 11 Attack,” New York Times, March 8, 2003; Josh Meyer and John Goetz, “Qatar’s Security Chief Suspected of
Having Ties to Al Qaeda,” Los Angeles Times, March 28, 2003.
37 According to the 9/11 Commission Report (p. 147), Khalid Shaykh Mohammed “engaged in extensive international
travel during his tenure [at the Ministry of Electricity and Water]... much of it in furtherance of terrorist activity.”
38 “The U.S. Attorney obtained an indictment against KSM in January 1996, but an official in the government of Qatar
probably warned him about it... In January 1996, well aware that U.S. authorities were chasing him, he left Qatar for
good and fled to Afghanistan.” 9/11 Commission Report, p. 73. The Report provides the following citation:
“Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, July 23, 2003.”
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U.S.-Qatar Trade
According to the U.S. Census Bureau, U.S. exports to Qatar amounted to $3.2 billion in 2010,
consisting mainly of machinery and transport equipment. U.S. imports from Qatar, mainly fuel
and fertilizers, totaled $464.3 million during 2010. On April 6, 2011, Qatar Airways signed a $1.4
billion contract with Boeing for five 777 airplanes. ExxonMobil and an affiliate of Qatar
Petroleum cooperated in the construction of a large LNG terminal (known as Golden Pass) on the
Texas coast that was damaged by Hurricane Ike and received its first shipment of Qatari LNG in
October 2010.39 According to the 2011 U.S. Investment Climate Statement for Qatar, “Qatar has
not entered into a bilateral investment, trade, or taxation treaty with the U.S. However, Qatar and
the U.S. did sign a Trade and Investment Framework Agreement (TIFA) in April 2004.”
Political Reform and Elections
Shaykh Hamad and his advisers have embarked on a limited political reform program designed to
gradually make Qatar’s government more participatory and accountable. Although a series of
national elections have been held (see below), the government continues to maintain strict limits
on freedoms of assembly and association; a series of new laws allow for individuals to organize
political demonstrations and public gatherings, but organizers must obtain a permit from the
government, and Qatari authorities may impose restrictions on the topics of discussion. Political
parties are not allowed in Qatar, and all private professional and cultural associations must
register with the state and are monitored.
Qatari authorities have allowed a series of national elections as components of the country’s
gradual transition toward greater democratic participation. The elections also have provided a
“trial and error” setting for the creation and improvement of Qatar’s national electoral
infrastructure. In April 1998, 3,700 business community leaders participated in an election for a
national Chamber of Commerce, selecting 17 members from a slate of 41 candidates. In a March
1999 Central Municipal Council election, 248 candidates (including six women) competed for 29
seats, and all adult Qatari citizens, with the exception of members of the police and armed forces,
were allowed to vote and run for office. The election marked the first time a Persian Gulf country
had enfranchised all of its male and female citizens in a nationwide election.40
In April 2003, national elections for the Municipal Council’s new term resulted in the first
electoral victory for a Qatari female candidate, Shaykha Yousef Al Jiffri, an appointed officer at
the Education Ministry who ran unopposed.41 The latest round of elections was held in April
2007, and voter turnout was higher than in previous elections. Authorities announced that 51% of
28,000 eligible Qatari voters cast ballots—nearly 90% of the country’s population of 1.7 million
are ineligible to vote because they are foreign nationals.42
Over 34,000 voters are registered to vote in elections scheduled for May 10, 2011. Although the
Municipal Council functions primarily in an advisory role to the Ministry of Municipal and
Agricultural Affairs, some observers view it as a stepping-stone to the wider political
39 The Peninsula (Doha), “Golden Pass LNG Terminal to receive first Qatar shipment by Oct,” April 1, 2010.
40 All six female candidates were defeated in the 1999 election.
41 “Qatar Elects First Woman to Council Doha,” Gulf News, April 8, 2003.
42 Dow Jones, “Qatari Officials Pleased With Voter Turnout In Municipal Poll,” April 2, 2007.
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liberalization implied by the creation of the Advisory Council in the new constitution. Similarly,
the national elections for the Municipal Council are seen by Qatari officials as test cases for
future Advisory Council elections.
The constitution states that national legislative authority will reside in the hands of a 45-member
Advisory Council (Majlis Al Shura), two-thirds of which will be directly elected and one-third
appointed by the emir from among ministers or others.43 The emir appoints all of the members of
the current Advisory Council; members serve four-year terms at the emir’s discretion. A special
electoral law for new Advisory Council elections was passed in May 2008 after concerns about
voter franchise extension were resolved.44 Although national elections for the new Advisory
Council have been delayed and a target date has not been set, administrative preparations
reportedly continue, and women will have the right to vote in the elections and to run for office.
The Advisory Council would have oversight authority over the Council of Ministers and would be
able to propose legislation and review budgets. The constitution also empowers the Advisory
Council to issue motions of no-confidence against government ministers; no-confidence motions
must be approved by two-thirds of the Advisory Council. Council members will serve four-year
terms.
In the interim, the term of the current Advisory Council has been extended through 2011. Some
observers doubt that the Qatari leadership intends to fully implement the changes implied in the
2003 constitution because democratic decision making could disrupt existing patronage
relationships that ensure the support of rival social and royal family factions for the monarchy.45
It is unclear how the recent regional unrest will affect Qatari citizens views of municipal or
potential advisory council elections, or how the unrest will shape Qatari leaders calculations
about the necessity of holding elections and instituting changes outlined in the 2003 constitution.
Human Rights and Social Issues
Human Rights and Labor Conditions
The U.S. State Department Country Report on Human Rights for 2010 states that Qatar’s
government “placed restrictions on civil liberties, including freedoms of speech, press (including
the Internet), assembly, association, and religion.”46 The report also states that “there were
prolonged detentions in overcrowded and harsh facilities, often ending in deportation.” According
to the report, the rights of non-citizens are at times abused, particularly among domestic servants
43 Prior to the establishment of a partially elected national assembly, Qatar had a fully appointed, 35-member advisory
council that could only make recommendations to the Council of Ministers. Qatar’s old Provisional Constitution
provided for a modified electoral procedure in choosing members of the Council and a three-year term; nevertheless,
the Council remained appointive in practice, and terms of the Council members were extended in three or four-year
increments since 1975.
44 Reportedly some members of the Al Thani family sought to restrict voting rights to so-called “native” Qataris whose
families have lived in Qatar since 1930 or before. The 2007 U.S. Department of State Human Rights report for Qatar
estimated that an electorate with that criteria could be “less than 50,000.” Under a compromise, post-1930 naturalized
citizens who have been citizens for ten years will have voting rights and will be eligible to run for office if their fathers
were born in Qatar. Economist Intelligence Unit, “Advisory Council approves new electoral law,” June 1, 2008.
45 Mehran Kamrava, “Royal Factionalism and Political Liberalization in Qatar,” Middle East Journal, Volume 63,
Issue 3, July 1, 2009.
46 U.S. State Department, 2010 Country Report on Human Rights Practices in Qatar, April 8, 2011. Available at:
http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2010/nea/154471.htm.
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from the Philippines and Southeast Asia. As in other Gulf countries, expatriate laborers are
vulnerable to exploitation by employers who capitalize on their fear of deportation. Citizenship is
withheld from foreign workers, who outnumber native Qataris in the labor force by an estimated
ratio of nearly seven to one.47
In December 2004, Qatar announced that it was banning the use of children as camel jockeys, a
practice long decried by the international community. Qatar remained a Tier 2 Watch List country
in the U.S. State Department 2010 Trafficking in Persons Report.48 According to the report, as of
June 2010, “the government did not show evidence of overall progress in prosecuting and
punishing trafficking offenders and identifying victims of trafficking.” A draft law anti-trafficking
law reportedly was in the final stages of consideration as of April 2011, in line with long-standing
Qatari pledges that have been noted in consecutive U.S. reports on trafficking in persons.
In May 2004, the emir issued a new labor law, which gives Qatari nationals the right to form
associations with legal status and allows workers to strike. The legislation also bans employing
youth under the age of 16, sets the working day at eight hours, and grants women equal rights
with men, in addition to a paid 50-day maternity leave. Some observers have criticized the new
legislation for not extending legal protections to Qatar’s large foreign workforce. Critics charge
that the labor law places additional restrictions on guest workers by prohibiting non-citizens from
forming labor unions and restricting their ability to bargain collectively and to strike. Law
Number 7 of 2007 established a labor court to hear the grievances of foreign laborers.
The 2010 State Department human rights report concludes that “authorities severely restricted
worker rights, especially for foreign laborers and domestic servants.” The report also states that
“circumstances that constituted forced labor” are evident in the construction and domestic labor
sectors. Since 2007, the annual State Department reports have cited foreign diplomats’ visits to
labor camps as having revealed “the majority of unskilled foreign laborers living in cramped,
dirty, and hazardous conditions, often without running water, electricity, or adequate food.”
Islam and Religious Freedom49
Islam is the official religion of the state of Qatar. Conditional freedom of worship is protected
under the constitution, although proselytizing by non-Muslims is illegal. Qatar, like Saudi Arabia,
officially adheres to the Wahhabi version of Sunni Islam; however, in contrast with Saudi Arabia,
Wahhabi social tenets are not publicly enforced or strictly adhered to in many public settings.50
Qatar hosts a number of conservative Islamic clerics, including Dr. Yusuf Al Qaradawi, a
controversial figure whose views on the conditional legitimacy of suicide bombing and whose
outspoken critiques of Israel, the United States, and terrorism have made him a target of criticism
from a wide range of observers. Qaradawi returned to Egypt briefly after the fall of former
President Hosni Mubarak in February 2011, and he has been outspoken in his advice to Egyptians
and his criticism of other governments during the recent unrest. During the summer 2006 Israel-
47 The new Qatari constitution does not address the rights of foreign guest workers.
48 U.S. State Department 2010 Trafficking in Persons Report on Qatar available at
http://www.state.gov/g/tip/rls/tiprpt/2010/index.htm. Released on June 14, 2010.
49 U.S. State Department 2009 International Religious Freedom Report on Qatar available at
http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/irf/2009/127356.htm. Released on October 26, 2009.
50 For more on Sunni Islam and Wahhabism, see CRS Report RS21745, Islam: Sunnis and Shiites; and CRS Report
RS21695, The Islamic Traditions of Wahhabism and Salafiyya, both by Christopher M. Blanchard.
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Hezbollah war and 2008-2009 Israel-Hamas war, Qaradawi publicly argued that Muslims should
support the activities of Hezbollah and Hamas as legitimate resistance activities, based on
Quranic injunctions to defend Muslim territory invaded by outsiders.51 Qaradawi hosts a popular
weekly call-in television show on Al Jazeera and frequently delivers sermons in Qatari mosques.
Qaradawi has worked with a charitable umbrella organization known as the Union of Good that
coordinates the delivery of relief and assistance to Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza Strip.
In November 2008, the U.S. Department of the Treasury designated the Union of Good as a
financial supporter of terrorism pursuant to Executive Order 13224. According to the Treasury,
“The Union of Good acts as a broker for Hamas by facilitating financial transfers between a web
of charitable organizations--including several organizations previously designated under E.O.
13224 for providing support to Hamas--and Hamas-controlled organizations in the West Bank and
Gaza.”52
According to State Department reports on international religious freedom, Qatar has officially
recognized the Catholic, Anglican, Greek and other Eastern Orthodox, Coptic, and Indian
Christian churches, and permits private worship for other denominations and religions. In
November 2005, the emir donated a plot of land for the construction of a $7 million Anglican
church; construction began in April 2006.53 A new Roman Catholic church opened in March 2008
and others remain under construction. Qatar established diplomatic ties with the Holy See in
November 2002. Qatar does not ban alcohol, which is available in licensed premises such as the
bars of major hotels and clubs.
Al Jazeera and the Qatari Media
Al Jazeera
Shaykh Hamad helped establish the Al Jazeera satellite television news network in 1996 with a
$140 million grant. Since then, the Qatari government has provided most of the channel’s
funding, as advertising revenue reportedly does not support the entirety of Al Jazeera’s annual
operating expenses. In the past, Qatari government officials and Al Jazeera executives have
argued that the station’s inability to attract sufficient advertising revenue was a function of the
channel’s controversial status across the Middle East. These officials and executives alleged that
other Arab governments exerted pressure on companies based in or operating in their countries to
refrain from advertising on Al Jazeera, because the channel was providing coverage of internal
political, social, and economic developments that may have been unflattering to ruling regimes or
less biased or censored than traditional government-run media outlets.54
51 “Islamic Cleric Al-Qaradawi Supports Hizballah, HAMAS,” Al-Jazirah Television (Doha), OSC Document
GMP20060730638004, July 30, 2006. Qaradawi is regarded as conservative by many Muslims, although his declared
views on the legitimacy of “struggle” and “martyrdom operations” against “occupation forces” have made him
controversial to some in the Islamic world as well as many in the United States and Israel. He has been criticized by
violent Islamic groups for his condemnations of terrorist attacks on civilians.
52 For more on the Union of Good, see http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/hp1267.htm.
53 Michael Theodoulou, “Muslim State to Build first Christian Church for 1,400 Years,” The Times (London)
November 2, 2005.
54 Author meeting at Al Jazeera headquarters, January 2005.
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As Al Jazeera became more widely accepted in the region and stepped back its criticism of some
regional governments, these concerns became less relevant. The proliferation of similar satellite
news channels in the region also has increased competition and created outlets for other views.
Some parties may continue to disagree with what they perceive to be Al Jazeera’s editorial
position on controversial subjects like Iran, Iraq, and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Since its
founding, Al Jazeera has devoted considerably less of its air time to coverage of Qatari affairs
than to coverage of the internal affairs of other Arab states. Al Jazeera launched an international
English language satellite channel in 2006 that now broadcasts in the United States. It has won
praise from some media observers for its coverage of international affairs, including conflicts and
issues often overlooked by other media outlets. Others have criticized the international English
channel as carrying the same alleged biases reflected in the programming of its Arabic language
affiliate. Al Jazeera’s coverage of the 2011 uprisings in various Arab countries has drawn
considerable attention, both from those observers who note the impact that televised images have
had on demonstrations and government responses and those observers who question whether Al
Jazeera’s editorial decisions reflect a specific political agenda that may or may not be shared by
its state sponsors in the Qatari government.
Media Freedom
Although the Qatari government lifted formal censorship of the Qatari media by decree in 1995,
the U.S. Department of State reports that journalists tend to exercise a degree of self-censorship,
particularly with regard to the emir and his immediate family.55 Internet service in Qatar is
monitored for pornography and other material considered insulting to Islam. In January 2008,
Qatar signed an agreement with Reporters Without Borders to create the Doha Media Freedom
Center, an organization intended to spread “the culture of freedom of the press and media and in
defending the press and media people who are subjected to harassment, detention and ill-
treatment because of their professional activity.”56 Its director, former Reporters Without Borders
head Robert Menard, resigned in a public spat with Qatari leaders in June 2009 after he claimed
that the Center “has been suffocated,” and alleged that “some Qatari officials never wanted an
independent Center, free to speak out without concern for politics or diplomacy, free to criticize
even Qatar.”57 Qatari observers alleged mismanagement by Menard and criticized him as having
pursued an agenda that jeopardized Qatar’s diplomatic relationships. The Center remains active,
and in early April 2011, a Dutch journalist named Jen Keulen was named its new Director-
General.
Education
Qatar has invested heavily in improving the educational opportunities available to its citizens in
recent years. The investment is designed to support the emir’s program of “Qatarization,” which
seeks to prepare the next generation of Qatari citizens to assume leadership roles in the country’s
economy and political and military institutions. Prominent Qatari women have taken a leading
role in a number of education reform programs,58 and, in 2002, Shaykha Mohza Bint Nasser Al
55 U.S. State Department, 2010 Country Report on Human Rights Practices in Qatar, April 8, 2011. Available at:
http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2010/nea/154471.htm.
56 Qatar News Agency, “Deal on media freedom signed,” January 4, 2008.
57 Agence France Presse, “French head of Qatar media watchdog quits,” June 23, 2009.
58 On May 5, 2003, Shaykh Hamad appointed Shaykha Bint Ahmed al Mahmoud, daughter of the Minister of State for
(continued...)
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Missned, the emir’s second wife, helped launch Qatar’s Education City, a state-of-the-art campus
complex in Doha. Shaykha Mohza serves as the chairperson of the Qatar Foundation, which
directs Education City’s activities.59 Education City and its university programs sit at the top of a
diverse Qatari public and private education system, which serves both Qatari citizens, resident
expatriates, and visiting students from around the world. Qatari citizens receive tuition support
for participation in primary, secondary, and university education, and the Qatari government
offers significant financial support to many institutions to facilitate their establishment and
operation.
Education City houses the Qatar Academy, which offers a pre-kindergarten through high school
program, and a number of university programs, which offer degrees from several U.S. partner-
universities such as Weill Cornell Medical College, Georgetown University’s Edmund A. Walsh
School of Foreign Service, Texas A&M University, Virginia Commonwealth University,
Northwestern University, and Carnegie Mellon University. Qatar Foundation officials indicate
that the programs, while of immediate benefit to Qatari students, also are intended to serve as
centers of educational excellence for students from elsewhere in the region. The U.S.-partner
university programs are consistently ranked among the most competitive and demanding
undergraduate programs in surveys of colleges and universities in the United States. Carnegie
Mellon University inaugurated a new facility on the campus in 2009, and the Qatar Foundation
plans to complete new facilities for the Georgetown University and Northwestern University
programs within the next three years.
(...continued)
Foreign Affairs, as Minster of Education. This appointment signified the first appointment ever of a female cabinet
minister in any Gulf state. She resigned in April 2009 and was replaced by a member of her family Saad Bin Ibrahim al
Mahmoud.
59 For more on Education City and the Qatar Foundation, which oversees its activities, see the Foundation’s website,
available at http://www.qf.edu.qa/output/Page1.asp.
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Appendix A. Qatar in Brief
Area:
11,437 sq km (slightly smal er than Connecticut)
Population (April 2010):
1.67 million
Literacy:
89%
Religion (2004 Census):
77.5% Muslim, Christian 8.5%, other 14%
Ethnic Groups:
40% Arab, 18% Pakistani, 18% Indian, 10% Iranian, 14% other
GDP (2010):
$145,300 per capita (based on $122.2 billion GDP PPP)
Inflation (2010):
-4.9%
Oil Reserves (2010):
25.4 billion barrels
Gas Reserves (2009):
25.47 trillion cubic meters
Armed Forces:
11,800 active personnel, 30 main battle tanks, 18 fighter aircraft
Sources: U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, World Factbook - Qatar, May 2011; Qatar Statistics Agency, May 2010;
Armed forces data - International Institute for Strategic Studies, Military Balance 2010, February 2010.
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Appendix B. Chiefs of State and Cabinet Members
of Qatar
Emir
Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani
Heir Apparent
Tamim bin Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani
Prime Minister
Hamad bin Jassem bin Jabr Al Thani
Deputy Prime Minister
Abdal ah bin Hamad Al Attiyah
Foreign Minister
Hamad bin Jassem bin Jabr Al Thani
Energy Minister
Muhammad Salih Al Sada
Interior Minister
Abdal ah bin Khalid Al Thania
Finance Minister
Youssef Hussein Al Kamal
Ambassador to the United States
Ali Fahad Al Shahwany Al Hajri
a. Minister of State for Interior Affairs Abdal ah bin Nasser bin Khalifa Al Thani conducts the official business
of the Ministry of Interior, including serving as liaison to foreign governments and security services.
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Figure B-1. Map of Qatar
Source: U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, World Factbook, November 2009.
Author Contact Information
Christopher M. Blanchard
Analyst in Middle Eastern Affairs
cblanchard@crs.loc.gov, 7-0428
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