Haiti’s National Elections: Issues and
Concerns
Maureen Taft-Morales
Specialist in Latin American Affairs
May 11, 2011
Congressional Research Service
7-5700
www.crs.gov
R41689
CRS Report for Congress
P
repared for Members and Committees of Congress
Haiti’s National Elections: Issues and Concerns
Summary
In proximity to the United States, and with such a chronically unstable political environment and
fragile economy, Haiti has been a constant policy issue for the United States. Congress views the
stability of the nation with great concern and commitment to improving conditions there. Both
Congress and the international community have invested significant resources in the political,
economic, and social development of Haiti, and will be closely monitoring the election process as
a prelude to the next steps in Haiti’s development. For the past 25 years, Haiti has been making
the transition from a legacy of authoritarian rule to a democratic government. Elections are a part
of that process. In the short term, elections have usually been a source of increased political
tensions and instability in Haiti. In the long term, elected governments in Haiti have contributed
to the gradual strengthening of government capacity and transparency.
Haiti is currently approaching the end of its latest election cycle. Like many of the previous
elections, the current process has been riddled with political tensions, allegations of irregularities,
and violence. The first round of voting for president and the legislature was held on November
28, 2010. That vote was marred by opposition charges of fraud, reports of irregularities, and low
voter turnout. When the electoral council’s preliminary results showed that out-going President
Rene Préval’s little-known protégé, and governing party candidate, Jude Celestin, had edged out a
popular musician for a spot in the runoff elections by less than one percent, three days of violent
protests ensued. Tensions rose as people waited to see which candidates would proceed to the
second round, whether Préval would continue in office beyond the constitutional expiration of his
term, or if some sort of provisional government would have to be established.
The Haitian government asked the Organization of American States (OAS) for help and delayed
releasing final results, which were due out December 20, 2010, to give the OAS team of
international elections experts enough time to investigate and verify the process. The team gave
President Préval a report with its recommendations on January 13, 2011. The Haitian Provisional
Electoral Council (CEP) released the final results of the first round of voting on February 3,
sending Mirlande Manigat, a constitutional lawyer and university administrator, and Michel
“Sweet Micky” Martelly, a popular singer, to the run-off race. The governing party’s candidate
was eliminated from the race by a narrow margin.
After months of dispute, the second round of elections took place on March 20, 2011. The OAS
electoral observation mission reported that the second round was more organized and peaceful
than the first, and that incidents of ballot stuffing and voter intimidation were isolated. When final
results were announced on April 16, controversy again erupted, this time over legislative races.
The OAS/CARICOM mission demanded that the results for 19 legislative districts be annulled,
after the CEP’s final tallies changed the outcome in favor of the ruling Inite party. The outcome
of the presidential race was not challenged, and Michel Martelly is set to be sworn into office
May 14.
The United States is providing $14 million in election support through the U.S. Agency for
International Development (USAID). The Obama Administration considers Haiti its top priority
in the Latin American and Caribbean region.
This report provides an overview of the controversies surrounding the first round of voting in late
2010, and concerns related to the second and final round of the elections. In addition to ongoing
issues regarding the legitimacy of the March 20 elections, other questions have raised concerns
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Haiti’s National Elections: Issues and Concerns
within the international community and Congress. These include the destabilizing presence of
former dictator Jean-Claude “Baby Doc” Duvalier, and former President Jean-Bertrand Aristide,
and the newly elected government’s ability to handle the complex post-earthquake reconstruction
process and its relationship with the donor community.
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Haiti’s National Elections: Issues and Concerns
Contents
Introduction ................................................................................................................................ 1
Background to the Current Elections ........................................................................................... 1
The Presidential Race............................................................................................................ 3
The First Round of Voting ............................................................................................... 3
The Final Round of Voting .............................................................................................. 6
The Legislative Race............................................................................................................. 8
The Final Round of Voting: Amid Controversy an Incomplete Legislature is Sworn In .......... 8
Local Elections ..................................................................................................................... 8
Issues and Concerns regarding Elections and Post-Election Governance...................................... 9
Short-term Issues .................................................................................................................. 9
Election monitoring ........................................................................................................ 9
Concerns about the Electoral Process ............................................................................ 10
The Provisional Electoral Council ................................................................................. 11
Legitimacy.................................................................................................................... 12
Long-term Issues................................................................................................................. 12
Reconstruction and the Management of Foreign Assistance ........................................... 12
Security and Human Rights........................................................................................... 13
Stability and the Return of Former Leaders ................................................................... 14
Outlook..................................................................................................................................... 15
Appendixes
Appendix. U.S. Elections Assistance ......................................................................................... 16
Contacts
Author Contact Information ...................................................................................................... 17
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Haiti’s National Elections: Issues and Concerns
Introduction
Congress views the stability of Haiti with great concern and commitment to improving conditions
there. Both Congress and the international community have invested significant resources in the
political, economic, and social development of Haiti, and closely monitored the conduct of the
2010-2011 elections as a prelude to the next steps in Haiti’s development.
Haiti has been struggling to build and strengthen democratic institutions for 25 years, ever since
massive popular protests and international pressure forced dictator Jean-Claude Duvalier to
abandon his rule and flee the country in 1986. Known as “Baby Doc,” Duvalier came to power in
1971, succeeding his father, Francois “Papa Doc” Duvalier, who had ruled since 1957. Their 29-
year dictatorship was marked by repression and corruption. Hoping to reverse almost 200 years of
mostly violent and authoritarian rule, Haitians overwhelmingly approved a new constitution
creating a democratic government in 1987. De facto military rule, coups and thwarted attempts at
democratic elections continued until a provisional civilian government conducted what was
widely heralded as Haiti’s first free and fair elections in 1990, in which Jean-Bertrand Aristide, a
former Catholic priest, was elected President. In the short term, elections have usually been a
source of increased political tensions and instability in Haiti.
In the long term, elections in Haiti have contributed to the slow strengthening of government
capacity and transparency. Elected governments have developed long-term development plans
resulting in international technical and financial assistance. They have developed national budgets
and made them public. The number of employees in bloated state enterprises has been reduced.
The government carried out the fiscal management and transparency reforms necessary to qualify
for debt relief from multilateral and some bilateral creditors under the Enhanced Heavily Indebted
Poor Countries Initiative in 2009. Human rights violations have been drastically reduced. Despite
controversy over some aspects of the 2006 elections, Préval was accepted as the legitimate head
of state by Haitians and the world community, and oversaw a period of economic growth and
relative internal political stability before a devastating earthquake struck the nation in January
2010.
There is still much to be accomplished. Some parts of the government are not fully independent,
the judicial system is weak, and corruption and political violence still threaten the nation’s
stability. Haitian governance capacities, already limited, were considerably diminished by the
earthquake. Poverty is massive and deep, and there is extreme economic disparity between a
small privileged class and the majority of the population.
The United States and other members of the international community continue to support efforts
to hold free and fair elections in Haiti in the belief that in the long run they will contribute to
improved governance and, eventually, improved services to Haitian citizens and greater stability
which will allow for increased development. Congress has given bipartisan support to this policy
approach.
Background to the Current Elections
The road to democratic development has been bumpy, and the international community became
increasingly involved in trying to keep Haiti on that road. Aristide was overthrown in a military
coup eight months after he was inaugurated. For three years, the coup leaders resisted
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international demands that Aristide be restored to office. Only when faced with a U.S. military
intervention did the regime relent. Aristide returned in 1994 under the protection of some 20,000
U.S. troops, who transferred responsibility to a United Nations mission in 1995. With U.S.
assistance, President Aristide disbanded the army and began to train a professional civilian police
force. In 1996 Haitians saw their first transfer of power between two democratically elected
presidents when Aristide was succeeded by Rene Préval.
Subsequent elections held under Presidents Aristide and Préval, both of whom served two non-
consecutive terms1, were marred by alleged irregularities, low voter turnout, and opposition
boycotts. Some election conflicts left Haiti without a fully functioning government, as when most
of the legislators’ terms expired in 1999 without elections being held to replace them. President
Préval then ruled by decree for the remaining two years of his first term. The international
community, including an OAS mission, tried in vain for several years to mediate negotiations
between the Aristide government and the opposition over the elections in which Aristide was
reelected in 2000. Tension and political violence continued throughout Aristide’s second term,
culminating in his flight into exile in 2004, after the refusal of the opposition to negotiate, an
armed rebellion, and loss of international support. There were numerous allegations that Aristide
was involved in drug trafficking and other corrupt activities. An interim civilian government was
formed and oversaw elections in 2006 in which Préval, after a dispute over the vote calculation,
was elected to a new term.
Since the earthquake that ravaged the Haitian capital of Port-au-Prince and surrounding areas on
January 12, 2010, political stability has been especially uncertain, due to the loss of many
political figures and government officials, massive damage to government infrastructure, and
mounting frustrations at what is widely perceived as slow progress in reconstruction and
distribution of over $9 billion in pledged international assistance. An outbreak of cholera has
further complicated the situation.
At stake in the recent election process were the offices of President, the entire 99-member
Chamber of Deputies, and 11 of 30 Senators. The newly elected officials will be responsible for
directing reconstruction efforts. Many observers therefore believe that it was especially important
that these elections be conducted fairly, so that the new government be accepted as legitimate by
both the Haitian public and international donors, including the United States, who are providing
technical and financial support to the election process. The UN Stabilization Mission for Haiti
(MINUSTAH) is providing security and technical support.
Parliamentary elections had originally been scheduled for February 28, 2010, but were postponed
because of the earthquake. The terms of all of the Chamber of Deputies and of one-third of the
Senate expired on May 10, 2010. Because elections were not held before then, the legislature
ceased to function as a whole. Normally, the legislature must approve federal procurement
contracts and authorize spending. Before it adjourned, however, the legislature passed a State of
Emergency law in April 2010 giving the executive branch those and other broad powers for 18
months, to October 2011. The date mandated in the constitution for any president’s inauguration
is February 7 (the anniversary of Duvalier’s flight into exile). Because of the delays caused by the
earthquake, and the difficulty of organizing elections following such a disaster, the legislature
also authorized the extension of Préval’s term to May 14, if necessary.
1 Jean Bertrand Aristide served as President in Haiti from February through September 1991; 1994-1996; and 2001-
2004. Rene Préval has served as President from 1996-2001; and 2006-2011 (term extended until May 14).
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The President, Senators, and Deputies are elected to serve five-year terms. The constitution limits
presidents to two non-consecutive terms. There are no term limits for the legislature, although
turnover for its members has been high. The first round of both the presidential and legislative
elections took place on November 28, 2010. According to the Haitian constitution, if no candidate
receives an absolute majority of the vote, a runoff vote between the top two candidates is held for
presidential and Chamber of Deputy seats. For Senate seats, candidates who lack an absolute
majority but have at least 20% more votes than the next candidate are declared the winner.
The Presidential Race
President Préval is completing his second non-consecutive term, the maximum allowed by the
Haitian constitution. Nineteen candidates vied to succeed him in the first round. Like most
previous elections in Haiti, this one centered around personalities more than parties or issues. A
group of Haitian journalists, the Public Policy Intervention Group, with the support of the
National Democratic Institute and the Commission on Presidential Debates, tried to encourage
more substantive discussions among the presidential candidates by holding a series of debates
that were broadcast nationwide. All 19 presidential candidates participated.
The first round produced contested results and politically motivated violence. After the Haitian
government accepted the recommendations of international observers, the dispute was resolved
and the vote went to a second round. Michel Martelly was declared the winner and is scheduled
to be inaugurated on May 14.
The First Round of Voting
The top three candidates, according to polls before the first round, were Mirlande Manigat, Jude
Celestin, and Michel “Sweet Micky” Martelly.2
Manigat is a Vice Rector and professor of constitutional law at the private Université Quisqueya
in Port-au-Prince. She is a former Senator and First Lady—her husband Leslie Manigat was
elected in 1988 in elections held under a military regime, and overthrown four months later.
Mirlande Manigat describes herself and her Rassemblement des Democrates Nationaux (RDNP ,
Assembly of Progressive National Democrats) party as center-left, or as “capitalist with a human
face,” in the tradition of Brazil’s moderate leftist President Lula da Silva.3 Some other analysts
regard her as more of a conservative.
Jude Celestin, a technocrat, was little known before Préval chose him to run as his successor on
the ticket of the Inite (Unity) party created by the President. As Director of the National
Equipment Center, Celestin oversaw the construction of hundreds of miles of roads that made
remote villages and farmlands accessible. He was reportedly described by many as an extremely
focused workaholic. Questions had arisen about his background: he claimed an engineering
degree from the Swiss Ecole Polytechnique de Lausanne, which reportedly has no records of his
attendance or graduation, and he has four properties in Florida in foreclosure.
2 It is important to note that polls have been historically unreliable in Haiti.
3 Time, “The Woman Who Would be Haiti’s New President,” November 15, 2010.
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Polling at a distant third was Michel Martelly, a famous Haitian kompa dance musician, known
for his bawdy performances, and popular with young voters. He acknowledges his political
inexperience, but said he would seek expert international advice to guide him in developing
foreign investments and tourism to stimulate the economy. Martelly, also a businessman, has
personal financial issues. He defaulted on over $1 million in loans and had three properties in
Florida go into foreclosure, raising questions about his financial management skills.4
Of the 16 remaining candidates, eight were former government officials. Most prominent among
them were: Jacques-Edouard Alexis, prime minister under Préval who was dismissed in 2008 by
the legislature following violent protests over high food and cost-of-living prices; Yvon Neptune,
prime minister under former President Jean-Bertrand Aristide; and Leslie Voltaire, an urban
planner who has served as Minister of Education, and of Haitians Living Abroad, as Chief of
Staff to Aristide, advisor to Préval, and a coordinator for the government’s reconstruction
planning.
Both international and domestic election observers said that November’s election day was
“marred by disorganization, dysfunction, various types of irregularities, ballot stuffing and
incidents of intimidation, vandalism of polling stations and violence.”5 These problems were
reported throughout the country, but were most prevalent in the capital of Port-au-Prince.
According to the OAS observation team,
More subversive of the process was the toxic atmosphere created by the allegations of
“massive fraud”. The JEOM [OAS /Caribbean Community Joint Election Observation
Mission]observed instances where even before the voting started, any inconvenience or small
problem led to the immediate cry of fraud. Such conduct continued during the day.6
The Joint Election Observation Mission concluded that the irregularities, “serious as they were,”
did not necessarily invalidate the electoral process. Several Haitian civil society groups and
election observation groups presented their reports to the OAS mission; although they gave a
“scathing indictment of the shortcomings, irregularities and fraud that tarnished” the elections,
they did not call for the elections to be cancelled.7 (See “Election Monitoring” below for further
information on the observation process.)
Some critics, including some Members of Congress, called for the elections to be annulled and
new elections to be held, and criticized the OAS electoral mission for having a pro-government
bias.8 Some critics continued to charge that former President Aristide’s Lavalas party had been
excluded from the current elections, although according to the Provisional Electoral Council
4 Frances Robles, "Haiti candidate Martelly lost three S. Florida properties to foreclosure," Miami Herald, March 7,
2011.
5 Organization of American States, Report of the OAS-Caricom Joint Electoral Observation Mission on the First Round
of the Presidential and Legislative Elections of 28 November 2010 in Haiti, February 2011, p. 4.
6 Organization of American States, OAS-CARICOM Joint Electoral Observation Mission on Haiti's Presidential and
Legislative Elections of 28 November 2010, press release E-461-10, November 29, 2010,
http://www.oas.org/en/media_center/press_release.asp?sCodigo=E-461/10.
7 Organization of American States, Report of …February 2011, op. cit, p. 7.
8 See, for example, Congressional Black Caucus Task Force on Foreign Policy and International Affairs, “Statement on
Haiti Elections and OAS Report,” press release, February 1, 2011, as reprinted by Center for Economic and Policy
Research, http://www.cepr.net/index.php/blogs/relief-and-reconstruction-watch/congressional-black-caucus-statement-
on-elections. See also James Morrell, “Haiti-Elections: Send this mission packing,” AlterPresse, January 5, 2011; some
of the “facts” in this article are, by the author’s own account, “incomplete” and “unconfirmed.”
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(CEP), the Haitian government body responsible for organizing the elections, and the OAS, no
Lavalas faction submitted the document required to register its legislative candidates as the ones
authorized to represent the Lavalas party. Furthermore, no faction of Lavalas submitted any
candidate for the presidential elections. Many former Lavalas members ran under other parties’
banners.
Contested Results And An Impasse
On December 7, 2010, the CEP announced preliminary results. Voter turnout was a historically
low 22.8% of registered voters. The reported tally for President was 31.37% of votes cast for
Mirlande Manigat, 22.48% for Jude Celestin, and 21.84% for Michel Martelly. Although it
appeared that all but one legislative race would need to proceed to a second round as well, the
most controversy surrounded the presidential results. The U.S. Embassy stated that it was
“concerned” by official preliminary results that were “inconsistent with the published results” of
various domestic and international observers.9 The CEP’s announcement was followed by three
days of violent protests, with Martelly supporters charging that fraud had put Celestin ahead, and
that their candidate should have placed second. Tensions continued, as various actors called for
action across a range of options, including but not limited to, accepting the preliminary results,
sending the top three candidates to a run-off (although the constitution calls for only the top two
candidates to proceed), holding new elections, or re-counting the ballots.
Investigations And Revised Results
Negotiations between the OAS and the Haitian government ensued, resulting in the OAS sending
a team of election experts to Haiti on December 30, 2010, to verify the results of the presidential
election. The team conducted a statistical analysis of a national random sample of the vote count,
finding that as voter participation rates rose above the national average of about 23%, so also rose
the probability of serious irregularities.10 The expert mission then reviewed the result sheets from
all polling places where participation rate was 50% or higher and a single candidate garnered 150
votes or more, and from all polling places where the participation rate was greater than 100%.
Using criteria established in Haitian electoral law, the expert mission recommended that votes
from some of these polling places be excluded from the final tally. Some votes for all the
candidates were excluded because of irregularities; the top three candidates had by far the most
votes excluded. The revised tally reversed the second and third place candidates, giving Martelly
22.2%, and Celestin 21.9% of the vote, still less than one percent difference between the two.
Manigat remained in first place with 31.6% of the vote.
Although the expert mission said that, “By any measure, these were problematic elections,” it
ruled out the option of conducting a new national election. Because the irregularities most
affected the top three candidates, the mission concluded that “a new election would involve more
contests and candidacies than the evidence warranted.” The mission made recommendations for
improving the process in the second round, including improving poll worker training, creating a
9 Embassy of the United States, Dept. of State, "Statement by the Embassy of the United States Following the
Publication of Results of the November 28 National Elections by the CEP," press release, December 7, 2010,
http://haiti.usembassy.gov/press-releases-2012/untitled6.html.
10 Information and quotes in this section on the expert mission’s findings are from: Organization of American States,
Expert Verification Mission of the Vote Tabulation of the November 28, 2010 Presidential Election in the Republic of
Haiti, Final Report, Port-au-Prince, Haiti, January 13, 2011.
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more transparent and consistent verification process at the central vote tabulation center, and
replacing poll workers at locations where irregularities occurred.
The expert verification mission submitted its report to President Préval on January 13, 2011.
Préval was reported to be displeased with some of the team’s methodology, what was seen as its
usurping of the CEP’s role, and that the report had been leaked. Some advocacy groups and other
critics also objected to their methodology.11 Other long-time Haiti observers said that there was
“no reason to question its impartiality and seriousness of purpose.”12
Worried that Préval would insist on his candidate advancing to the second round, the United
States and other major donors applied pressure on the Préval Administration to accept the OAS
recommendations. The State Department revoked some Haitian officials’ visas, and warned it
might review U.S. aid to Haiti if the recommendations were ignored. Secretary of State Hillary
Clinton traveled to Haiti January 30, saying that the U.S. was not about to cut off aid, but she
pressed President Préval to accept the OAS recommendations. Préval sent the report to the CEP
on January 18 for implementation. The CEP said that it would implement the technical
recommendations for improving the second round, and take the recommendation regarding the
second and third place candidates into consideration as it resumed the dispute resolution phase of
the electoral process that had been suspended during the verification process. Tension continued
as observers wondered whether the CEP would accept or reject the OAS recommendations.
A second OAS team of legal experts accompanied the CEP’s disputes and challenges phase and
the adjudication of complaints. Concluding that phase, the CEP released the final presidential and
legislative election results on February 3, accepting that Mirlande Manigat and Michel Martelly
would proceed to the second round of presidential elections. The public response was calm. The
candidates resumed campaigning on February 17.
The Final Round of Voting
The final round of voting for president and the legislature was held on March 20, 2011. Mirlande
Manigat was still the frontrunner in early March, although a poll by Haiti’s private sector showed
Michel Martelly pulling ahead by March 9.13 Haitian-born hip-hop musician Wyclef Jean, who
was ruled ineligible to run for president himself because he did not meet Haitian residency
requirements, threw his support behind Martelly.
Political tensions had initially decreased following the announcement of the second-round
presidential candidates. On March 8, however, three men putting up posters in support of Manigat
were found dead, showing signs of mutilation, suggesting that political tensions could still erupt
at any moment.
11 See, for example, Mark Weisbrot and Jake Johnston, Analysis of the OAS Mission’s Draft Report on Haiti’s Election,
Center for Economic and Policy Research, Issue Brief, January 2011,
http://www.cepr.net/documents/publications/haiti-oas-analysis-2011-01.pdf.
12 Editorial, "Haiti's decision," Miami Herald, February 3, 2011.
13 Mateos, March 4, 2011, op.cit.; and Jacqueline Charles, “Manigat, Martelly kept to script in rare debate for Haiti
presidency; Haiti presidential candidates offered little clarity on policies Wednesday in a televised presidential debate,”
Miami Herald, March 9, 2011.
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Asked what her priorities were, Mirlande Manigat echoed a common feeling that “everything is a
priority.”14 She went on to say that her immediate priorities would be solving the cholera problem
and addressing the situation of displaced Haitians living in camps. In terms of long-term
development, she said that education is key as a tool for development and for reducing frustration
among Haiti’s youth. She also said that Haiti’s “very unacceptable” social inequalities required
profound changes to reduce social volatility. Opponents disparage her age (she is 70) and criticize
her for being more comfortable speaking in French than Creole and for being removed from
Haiti’s impoverished masses. In her later campaign stops, she addressed Haitian crowds and press
in Creole, and appeared in a Port-au-Prince slum.15
Michel Martelly, age 50, also emphasizes education, along with agricultural production and the
importance of family. He said his campaign was “to bring joy, to bring music, to bring love, to
bring peace, prosperity, development and change in every corner of the country of Haiti.”16
Critics raised concern about his lack of education (he does not have a college degree) and lack of
political or institutional management experience, and his personal financial problems. Martelly,
who often performs in outlandish costumes, was trying to shift his image, and started wearing
three-piece suits. He also hired a Spanish public relations firm to handle his campaign.
The OAS-CARICOM electoral observation mission reported that the second round of elections
were “quite an improvement in many ways on the first round,” characterizing them as more
peaceful and better organized.17 The mission acknowledged that were still problems and some
violence, but said that the Provisional Electoral Council had taken effective measures to correct
problems, and the Haitian National Police had coordinated more closely with MINUSTAH and
taken more actions to prevent violent disruptions of the process.
Preliminary results were expected by March 31, but the CEP said it delayed their release until
April 4 because of irregularities. Final results were announced April 16. Martelly received almost
68% of the votes cast to Manigat’s 32%. The presidential election results were accepted without
dispute, unlike the legislative results (see below for more details).
Voter turnout was even lower than the first round’s 22.8%, however, so the 716,989 votes cast for
Martelly constitute only 15% of the 4.7 million registered voters. Both previous presidents were
elected with stronger mandates. Aristide received over 1 million votes in 1990, and Préval
received almost 1 million votes in 1995, when the pool of registered voters was only 3.5
million.18
Martelly is set to be sworn into office on May 14.
14 Trenton Daniel, "Professor, first lady and ( maybe) president," Miami Herald, February 13, 2011.
15 Jacqueline Charles, "Campaign opens for Haiti's presidential runoff," Miami Herald, February 21, 2011.
16 Jacqueline Charles, Feb. 21, 2011, op.cit.
17 Organization of American States, “Press statement on the second round of presidential and legislative elections in
Haiti,” press release E-580/11, March 21, 2011.
18 "Martelly has the X factor," Latin American Weekly Report, Latin American Newsletters, April 7, 2011, p. 2.
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The Legislative Race19
The legislative offices up for election included the entire 99-member Chamber of Deputies, and
11 of 30 Senate seats.
While some critics charged that fraud had been used to advance Inite legislative candidates, the
OAS election expert mission’s mandate was only to examine the presidential results, not the
legislative ones. The CEP handled legislative disputes and challenges and the adjudication of
complaints, and was accompanied during this phase by the second OAS team of legal experts.
The legal expert mission “observed with satisfaction” that legislative candidates submitted a large
number of complaints, “demonstrating that grievances can be effectively addressed by rule of the
law procedures.”20
In the Senate, four races were determined by the first round, seating three Inite and one Altenativ
candidate. Seven contests proceeded to a second round, with seven Inite candidates facing
candidates from three other parties. In the Chamber of Deputies, Préval’s party won or proceeded
to runoffs in 68 of the 99 races.
The Final Round of Voting: Amid Controversy an Incomplete
Legislature is Sworn In
The results of the second round of voting for legislative seats were contentious. Charges of fraud
led to violent demonstrations across the country and resulting in the deaths of at least two people,
including the director of a hospital that was set on fire. The outcomes of 19 districts changed
from the initial returns to the final results released by the CEP. In each case, the change favored
candidates associated with President Préval’s Inite party. The OAS-CARICOM observation
mission demanded that all 19 results be annulled. Although it appeared that most, if not all, of the
outcomes of the contested races would revert to the initial results, the official results were not
clear as of May 11.
The winners of the other legislative races were sworn in and convened on April 25. The
legislature considered constitutional reforms that had been passed under the previous legislature.
Constitutional amendments passed by two consecutive legislatures go into effect when the next
president takes office. Both chambers approved an amendment allowing dual citizenship.
Local Elections
Local elections for municipal councils, town delegates, and other posts are due to be held as well.
USAID’s post-disaster election assessment suggested they be held in mid-2011. So far there is no
date scheduled to hold them.
19 Official results from Conseil Electoral Provisoire, at http://cephaiti2010.org/. Translated by author.
20 Organization of American States, Report of …February 2011, op. cit, p. 8.
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Issues and Concerns regarding Elections and Post-
Election Governance
The concerns over this particular election cycle in Haiti are shared by the international donor
community, Congress, and the Obama Administration. Each group is deeply concerned about the
political stability of the government, its ability to move forward with a clearly defined plan for
the reconstruction and development of post-earthquake Haitian society, and the effectiveness of
the foreign aid each provides. In the long term, elections in Haiti have led to the slow
strengthening of government capacity and transparency. In the short term, elections have usually
been a source of increased political tensions and instability.
Short-term Issues
Election monitoring
The Organization of American States (OAS) /Caribbean Community (CARICOM) Joint Election
Observation Mission is the only major international monitor of the current election process. The
mission has had long-term observers on the ground since August 3, 2010. By November 19, 2010,
it had 68 observers dispersed across Haiti’s 10 departments (political subdivisions).21 It deployed
more observers the week leading up to and on the November 28 election day, when there were
118 observers. The joint mission has been observing the various phases of the electoral process,
and will continue to do so until the official results of the second round elections are published.
The mission has met regularly with the Provisional Electoral Council, making suggestions based
on its observations. It has also met with political parties, passing on their concerns to the CEP as
well. Some people believed there should have been more long-term international observers, but
donors thought that given the difficulty in logistics posed by post-earthquake conditions, and
Haiti’s relatively small size, the single, smaller mission would suffice.
The OAS plans to have about 200 observers for the March 20 elections, and to conduct a quick
parallel vote count. Part of the reason it was unable to conduct a quick count during the first
round was that observers were called back early from the field due to security concerns.
Some observers criticized the mission for not questioning the validity of the elections earlier in
the process. Others criticized the mission for being both part of the process, through its technical
assistance to the office providing identity cards, and judge of that same process.
Other smaller organizations and diplomatic missions, including the U.S. and Canadian embassies,
and about 6,000 nonpartisan domestic election observers monitored voting on election day across
the country during the first round. These groups plan to observe the March 20th round as well.
21 Organization of American States, The Joint Mission OAS/CARICOM in Haiti provides an update after more than
three months of activity, November 19, 2010, http://wwww.reliefweb.int/rw/rwb.nsf/db900SID/VDUX-
8BCRQE?OpenDocument.
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Concerns about the Electoral Process
The OAS/CARICOM observation mission has expressed ongoing concerns about security. Some
opposition candidates alleged during the first round of voting that candidates and supporters of
the ruling Inite party distributed weapons. The OAS mission asked those making accusations to
present evidence so that investigations could be carried out.22 In November the OAS/CARICOM
election monitoring team expressed concern about election-related violence, and asked candidates
to “carry out their campaigning in a calm atmosphere and to display tolerance, friendliness and
mutual respect.”23 Even at this late date, observers worry that the eruption of violence or political
unrest—such as could be caused by the return of Aristide, for example—could be a possible cause
for postponement. If either candidate contests the outcome of the election, violence could erupt
after the elections.
Angered by rumors that UN troops may have introduced cholera to Haiti, Haitians attacked UN
soldiers in late 2010. Any further attacks against UN troops could be particularly problematic, as
MINUSTAH is responsible for providing security for the election process, as well as
transportation of ballots and other election material. There are 9,000 MINUSTAH security
personnel, and 3,500 Haitian National Police (PNH) providing security. As of March 7, UN
officials said a review of and changes in security were still underway in preparation for the
second round.24 An early assessment of the elections issued a reminder that MINUSTAH’s
mandate is mostly to observe and support the PNH, not to handle situations directly.25
After the first-round elections, the U.S. State Department issued a new travel warning strongly
urging U.S. citizens to avoid non-essential travel to Haiti in part because of “continued high
crime, the cholera outbreak, frequent disturbances in Port-au-Prince and in provincial cities, and
limited police protection” and because “travel within Haiti is hazardous.”26 Since the first-round
elections, there have been violent protests resulting in deaths. Once the final results were
announced, the atmosphere was calmer. Nonetheless, the situation remains volatile.
Observers of the electoral process also voice concern about the level of voter participation
because it will affect the legitimacy of the election’s results. In April and June 2009, voter turnout
for partial Senate elections was a meager 11% of the electorate. Turnout is usually much higher
for presidential elections, however, and the observation mission viewed active campaigning and
large numbers of voters going to verification centers as signs that turnout would be healthy.
Although turnout was higher than in 2009, it was only about 22% in the first round of the current
election process. Some observers wonder if fear of cholera and of violent protests might have
suppressed voter turnout, and worry that they could do so again in the second round.
22 [Ambassador Colin Granderson], “Presentation made to the Extraordinary Meeting of the Group of Friends of Haiti:
Update on Elections and Perspectives on Reconstruction Efforts,” OAS General Services Building, Washington, DC,
Oct. 27, 2010.
23 "The OAS/CARICOM Joint Election Observation Mission in Haiti calls on Political Actors to Conduct Campaigning
in Atmosphere of Tolerance and Friendliness," States News Service, November 11, 2010.
24 Jacqueline Charles, "In Haiti, officials promise fixes ahead of March runoff election," Miami Herald, March 7, 2011.
25 Sophie Lagueny and Rudolf Derose, Post-Disaster Assessment on the Feasibility of Organizing Free and Fair
Elections in Haiti, USAID, produced by the International Foundation for Electoral Systems, April 2010, p.iv.
26 U.S. Dept. of State, “Travel Warning, Haiti” issued Dec. 9, 2010,
http://travel.state.gov/travel/cis_pa_tw/tw/tw_4632.html.
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In the joint observation mission’s November 11 statement, it repeated its concern over the use of
state resources during the current campaign season. The mission appealed “to the political parties
to adhere to the provisions aimed at guaranteeing the fairness of the election race,” and said that
the “state authorities must...ensure that agents of the state are not involved in activities related to
campaigning.”27
The OAS/CARICOM mission’s October report expressed concern about several technical aspects
of the electoral process. The distribution of voter identification cards seemed to be the greatest
issue. About 400,000 new cards were printed but distribution was slow. About 4.7 million people
have registered to vote, an estimated 95% of the adult population. The report estimated that about
6% of those listed in the voter registry are deceased. This was attributed mostly to the listing of
people who died during the earthquake, for most of whom there are no death certificates, which
are needed to remove someone’s name from the registry. The report noted that safeguards such as
photos on the electoral list, the need for a voter identification card, and indelible ink indicating
votes had been cast, had been put in place to prevent multiple voting. Registering the internally
displaced appears not to have been as big a problem as some thought it would be, as not that
many internally displaced requested replacement identity cards. The majority of displaced people
in temporary camps appear to live near their former residences and polling stations, so that few
additional polling places for them were needed, according to U.S. officials familiar with election
preparations.
The Provisional Electoral Council
Negative perceptions regarding the Provisional Electoral Council are widespread and contributed
to questions regarding the elections’ credibility both before and after the December vote. In late
2009, President Préval cut ties to the Lespwa movement that elected him in 2006, and formed a
new movement, Inite. Opposition groups accused the presidentially appointed electoral council of
bias in favor of the President’s new movement. The electoral council disqualified without
explanation about 15 rival political groups, which included members of Lespwa who did not join
Préval’s new party.
An assessment of the feasibility of organizing elections after the earthquake stated that the
operational branch of the CEP was technically capable of organizing elections, but warned that
the lack of credibility of the council as a whole posed a major problem. The report recommended
replacing the commission, but the Preval administration chose not to do so.28 The
OAS/CARICOM mission’s October report acknowledged that “the widespread mistrust of the
CEP is perhaps by far the major obstacle to the credibility and legitimacy of the elections.”
But the mission suggests that the CEP may be being blamed for some of the shortcomings of
previous CEPs and of the Préval administration as well. For example, the previous CEP caused
controversy by barring former President Jean-Bertrand Aristide's Fanmi Lavalas party from
participating in legislative elections in April 2009 for mostly technical reasons. Part of the
problem was that three rival factions within Lavalas submitted separate lists of candidates. The
council rejected all three lists because none of the factions had documents signed by the party's
head, Aristide. Aristide lives in exile in South Africa. Although technically correct, some
observers felt the decision had a politically motivated element, to prevent the once powerful
27 States News Service, op.cit.
28 Sophie Lagueny and Rudolf Derose, op.cit., pp. 12-13.
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Lavalas from gaining more seats in the National Assembly. No faction ever produced the required
document, however, and so remained ineligible to register legislative candidates. Fanmi Lavalas
did not try to register a presidential candidate with the current CEP for the 2010 elections.29
The observation mission’s October report notes that the current CEP has been responsive to
criticism, improving the transparency of its actions, and communicating more openly with the
public, political parties, and civil society organizations. The CEP began to implement some of the
improvements recommended by the OAS and other observer missions as soon as they were
received following the first round. About 500 poll workers and supervisors at voting centers
where fraud and irregularities were high have been fired; education requirements for poll workers
have been raised to a 12th grade equivalent; and officials are still trying to clean up the voter
lists.30
Following the second round, the OAS/CARICOM mission reported that the CEP’s efforts had
“positive results,” and that problems related to the electoral registers and voters finding their
polling place “were far less prevalent” than they had been in the first round.31 The mission said
that incidents of ballot stuffing and voter intimidation were isolated. The mission’s impression of
voter turnout was that it was slightly higher than in the first round, but less than had been
anticipated because of the number of voter requests for information during the get-out-the-vote
campaign.
As mentioned above, after the CEP announced results for the legislative elections, the
OAS/CARICOM mission demanded that the results for 19 districts be annulled, after the final
tallies changed the outcome in favor of the ruling Inite party.
Legitimacy
An immediate concern for all involved was that the elections, carried out with $14 million in U.S.
assistance, not exhibit the same level of irregularities, fraud and violence as the last round, and
are sufficiently free and fair to produce a government considered legitimate in the eyes of the
Haitian public and the international community. It appears that the second round election day
passed that test. The ability of the Haitian authorities to carry out the rest of the election process
in an acceptable manner is a key test that could determine the political tone in Haiti for the next
several years. The CEP’s calculation of legislative election results has once again called their
integrity into question. It remains to be seen how well they resolve the dispute over the 19
contested legislative seats.
Long-term Issues
Reconstruction and the Management of Foreign Assistance
In the longer term, the United States and the international community are concerned about the
ability of whichever government is elected to manage the billions of dollars of international aid.
29 [Ambassador Colin Granderson], op. cit., p. 4; and International Crisis Group, "Haiti: The Stakes of the Post-Quake
Elections," Latin America/Caribbean Report No. 35, October 27, 2010, pp. 3-4.
30 Jacqueline Charles, March 7, 2011, op. cit.
31 Organization of American States, press release March 21, 2011, op.cit.
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Both candidates have expressed nationalistic views, leading to concerns about whether they will
continue to work within the current framework of the Interim Haitian Recovery Commission
(IHRC). The IHRC, formed in late 2010, was designed to last 18 months, at which time the
commission would become the Haitian-run Haitian Development Authority. While there has been
criticism that the IHRC is not approving and distributing aid effectively, there is also widespread
concern that the Haitian government is not ready to assume full control of the process either. The
government’s nascent institutions, which had limited capacity before the earthquake, were set
back severely by the earthquake’s destruction. Gross mismanagement of funds by the next Haitian
administration could prompt donors to impose conditions, reconsider further funding of
programs, or return to directing aid solely through non-governmental organizations. Both
candidates have pledged to make Haiti less dependent on foreign assistance, but are not clear on
how they would do so.
There are also concerns about the effect either candidate will have on relations with the United
States and with other major donors and international organizations. Donors worry about whether
either candidate will try to change dramatically current development and recovery plans. Both
candidates have been vague on specific policy plans. If they want to be assured of continued
donor assistance, they will face difficulty straying far from the current strategy, which was agreed
upon by the Haitian government and international donors at the April 2010 donors conference,
and upon which foreign assistance programs are based.
Security and Human Rights
Political violence continued to erupt throughout the electoral process. The U.S. and other
international donors support reform and capacity building in the Haitian National Police as a
means to continuing to improve citizen security.
In terms of security proposals, Manigat at first proposed strengthening the Haitian National Police
and Martelly proposed recreating the Haitian army,32 which overthrew Aristide shortly after he
became Haiti’s first elected president, and was disbanded by Aristide after he was restored to
office by the international community. At a debate before the second round of voting, both
candidates supported establishing a national security force as a way of creating jobs. Martelly
said the military should replace MINUSTAH, while Manigat said that MINUSTAH could be
phased out eventually, but that it would not be a priority.33 The proposal to reconstitute the
Haitian army raises alarm not only about diverting funds from current development and
reconstruction programs, but also about respect for human rights. The army was an instrument of
state repression under the Duvalier regime, along with the Duvaliers’ secret police, the Tontons
Macoutes, and under the de facto military regimes that followed Duvalier’s and Aristide’s ousters.
Both security forces committed gross violations of human rights over decades.
Both candidates in the final round had some association with de facto military regimes. As noted
earlier, Manigat’s husband, Leslie Manigat, was elected president in 1988 in elections run by the
military. His term lasted less than six months, however: when Manigat tried to introduce reform
and reduce corruption, the military overthrew him.
32 "Michel Martelly," New York Times, March 7, 2011.
33 LatinNews Daily, "Martelly and Manigat square off in Haiti," Latin American Newsletters, March 10, 2011.
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Martelly was “once a favorite of the thugs who worked on behalf of the hated Duvalier family
dictatorship,” according to the Washington Post, and was “closely identified with sympathizers of
the 1991 military coup that ousted Pres[ident] Jean-Bertrand Aristide,” according to the Miami
Herald.34 One of his advisors, Gervais Charles, is currently Jean-Claude Duvalier’s lawyer.
Stability and the Return of Former Leaders
In addition to electoral political tensions, another destabilizing factor is the reappearance on the
scene of two of Haiti’s most divisive leaders. Jean-Claude “Baby Doc” Duvalier returned
unexpectedly from 25 years in exile on January 16, 2011. Two days later, the Haitian government
formally charged him with corruption and embezzlement. Private citizens have filed charges of
human rights violations against Duvalier for abuses they allege they suffered under his regime.
Former President Jean-Bertrand Aristide, in exile since his government collapsed in the face of
political conflict in 2001, then said that he would also like to return, and the Haitian government
issued him a new passport. The Obama Administration cautioned that Aristide’s return before the
elections would be an “unfortunate distraction.”35 Aristide returned to Haiti two days before the
second round elections. He was reportedly greeted by thousands of supporters. Upon landing, he
made a speech in which he complained that Lavalas was not represented in the elections, and
seemed to make vague references to both presidential candidates, but did not directly support
either one. He then kept a low profile through election day. Préval has long said Aristide was free
to return, but that he should be prepared to face corruption and other charges as well. Both
Duvalier and Aristide are seen as highly polarizing figures able to stir up unrest.
It is a significant accomplishment that Haiti, long characterized by impunity for its leaders, has
brought charges against its former dictator. Duvalier is currently not allowed to leave the country,
while a judge determines whether there is sufficient evidence to proceed with a trial. Trying
Duvalier and/or Aristide, however, would be a severe strain on Haiti’s weak judicial system. The
U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights has offered to help Haitian authorities prosecute
crimes committed during Duvalier’s rule.36 U.N. Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon called on the
international community to continue to work with the Haitian government to bring about systemic
rule-of-law reform, saying that
…the return of Jean-Claude Duvalier has brought the country’s turbulent history of State-
sponsored violence to the fore. It is of vital importance that the Haitian authorities pursue all
legal and judicial avenues in this matter. The prosecution of those responsible for crimes
against their own people will deliver a clear message to the people of Haiti that there can be
no impunity. It will also be incumbent upon the incoming Administration to build on the
achievements of the Préval presidency, which put an end to State-sponsored political
violence and allowed Haitians to enjoy freedom of association and expression.37
34 Scott Wilson, "Political Notes Fill Carnival in Haiti; Music Underscores Nation's Discontent," Washington Post,
February 13, 2002; and “Haiti,” Miami Herald, September 3, 1996.
35 "Aristide return not helpful before Haiti vote says U.S.," Reuters, February 9, 2011.
36 United Nations Radio, UN offers to help Haitian authorities prosecute Duvalier, February 1, 2011,
http://www.unmultimedia.org/radio/english/detail/112772.html.
37 UN Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti, 24
March 2011, S/2011/183, available at: http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4d9448d32.html [accessed 12 May 2011],
paragraphs 81-82.
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Because the judicial system is not fully independent, the attitudes of the new president could have
a large impact on any judicial process. Michel Martelly has called for clemency for former
leaders, saying that, “If I come to power, I would like all the former presidents to become my
advisors in order to profit from their experience.”38 He also said he was “ready” to work with
officials who had served under the Duvalier regimes.39
Outlook
In proximity to the United States, and with such a chronically unstable political environment and
fragile economy, Haiti has been a constant policy issue for the United States. Congress views the
stability of the nation with great concern and commitment to improving conditions there. State
Department and USAID officials say that the Obama Administration regards Haiti as its number
one priority in the Latin America and Caribbean region.
The main priorities for U.S. policy regarding Haiti are to strengthen fragile democratic processes,
continue to improve security, and promote economic development. Other concerns include the
cost and effectiveness of U.S. aid; protecting human rights; combating narcotics, arms, and
human trafficking; addressing Haitian migration; and alleviating poverty.
Congress has monitored Haiti closely, and has established a number of conditions on assistance
over the years. Congressional priorities for assistance to Haiti have included “aggressive action to
support the Haitian National Police;”40 ensuring that elections are free and fair; developing
indigenous human rights monitoring capacity; facilitating more privatization of state-owned
enterprises; promoting a sustainable agricultural development program; and establishing an
economic development fund to encourage U.S. investment in Haiti.
Haiti’s national election process has been closely watched by the international community as well
as by Congress. Over the past decade, the United States and other international donors have been
politically, economically, and militarily involved in Haiti, investing significant resources both in
the attempt to build and strengthen Haiti’s democracy and political stability and in providing
significant amounts of development, humanitarian, and other assistance. Congress and other
bilateral donors have again provided another financial stake in Haiti’s long-term development by
providing funds for this election cycle and will continue to closely monitor the conduct of the
entire election process until the conclusion of all electoral disputes as a prelude to the next steps
in Haiti’s development.
38 Clarens Renois, "Haiti politicians hope for reconciliation," Agence France-Presse, January 21, 2011, http://www.abs-
cbnnews.com/global-filipino/world/01/21/11/haiti-politicians-hope-reconciliation
39 "Haitian candidate open to including Duvalier officials," Agence France Presse, March 2, 2011.
40 P.L. 106-113.
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Appendix. U.S. Elections Assistance
The United Nations and other international donors provided technical and financial support of the
recent elections process. The United States provided $14 million in election support through the
U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). This aid, which encompassed support for
both the first and second round voting process, included:41
• An assessment of the feasibility of organizing free and fair elections;
• Support to the Provisional Electoral Council (CEP) for election organization and
administration. This includes training for voting center staff; technical assistance
for nationwide civic and voter education campaigns; technical assistance to
improve the CEP’s ability to communicate with the public and the press; and the
establishment of a call-in information center through which voters can find out
where to vote;
• Support to a national network of nonpartisan community action groups to
organize election-related civic education and get-out-the-vote activities;
• Technical assistance to political parties to help them compete more effectively in
the 2010-2011 elections, increase the chance that they will accept election results,
and reduce the potential for political conflict. Activities include training in poll
watching, participation in candidate debates, and election dispute resolution;
• Support of domestic and international electoral observation to monitor the entire
election period, to increase the confidence and participation of voters and
political parties;
• Support for the organization of presidential debates to provide the electorate with
greater access to information about candidates and issues;
• Support for procurement of elections material, such as ballots and ballot boxes,
through a contribution to the elections trust fund managed by the United Nations
Development Program; and
• After the elections, programs to build broad national support for electoral reform,
including the establishment of an independent, permanent electoral council.
USAID expected relatively minor additional costs involved in making improvements for the
second round based on recommendations from domestic, OAS, and other observers of the first
round. These could include additional staff and training for voting centers, increasing the hours
and capabilities of the voter information center, and adding enough international observers to
conduct a parallel vote count. The USAID mission in Haiti has $0.5 million in FY2010 Economic
Support Funds available for these purposes. The UNDP and OAS sought additional funding from
other donors as well.
41 U.S. Agency for International Development, USAID Elections Support;
http://www.usaid.gov/helphaiti/elections.html.
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Author Contact Information
Maureen Taft-Morales
Specialist in Latin American Affairs
mtmorales@crs.loc.gov, 7-7659
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