Kyrgyzstan: Recent Developments and
U.S. Interests
Jim Nichol
Specialist in Russian and Eurasian Affairs
May 11, 2011
Congressional Research Service
7-5700
www.crs.gov
97-690
CRS Report for Congress
P
repared for Members and Committees of Congress
Kyrgyzstan: Recent Developments and U.S. Interests
Summary
Kyrgyzstan is a small and poor Central Asian country that gained independence in 1991 with the
breakup of the Soviet Union. The United States has been interested in helping Kyrgyzstan to
enhance its sovereignty and territorial integrity, increase democratic participation and civil
society, bolster economic reform and development, strengthen human rights, prevent weapons
proliferation, and more effectively combat transnational terrorism and trafficking in persons and
narcotics. The United States has pursued these interests throughout Central Asia, with special
strategic attention to oil-rich Kazakhstan and somewhat less to Kyrgyzstan.
The significance of Kyrgyzstan to the United States increased after the September 11, 2001,
terrorist attacks on the United States. Kyrgyzstan offered to host U.S. forces at an airbase at the
Manas international airport outside of the capital, Bishkek, and it opened in December 2001. The
U.S. military repaired and later upgraded the air field for aerial refueling, airlift and airdrop,
medical evacuation, and support for U.S. and coalition personnel and cargo transiting in and out
of Afghanistan. The Kyrgyz government threatened to close down the airbase in early 2009, but
renewed the lease on the airbase (renamed the Manas Transit Center) in June 2009 after the
United States agreed to higher lease and other payments. Current President Roza Otunbayeva has
declared that the interim government will support the continued presence of the transit center,
although some changes to the lease may be sought in the future, in recognition that ongoing
instability in Afghanistan jeopardizes Kyrgyzstan and wider regional security. In 2011, the Manas
Transit Center hosted about 850 U.S. troops and 750 contractors and a fleet of KC-135 refueling
tankers.
Cumulative U.S. budgeted assistance to Kyrgyzstan for FY1992-FY2008 was $953.5 million (all
agencies and programs). Kyrgyzstan ranks third in such aid per capita among the Soviet successor
states, indicative of U.S. government and congressional support in the early 1990s for its apparent
progress in making reforms and more recently to support anti-terrorism, border protection, and
operations in Afghanistan. After an April 2010 coup in Kyrgyzstan and ethnic violence in June
2010 in the south of the country, the United States committed about $90 million in urgent
humanitarian and other assistance in addition to appropriated foreign assistance of $53.6 million.
The Administration has requested $46.6 million in foreign aid for Kyrgyzstan for FY2012 for
democratization, security, health, education, and agricultural reform programs.
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Kyrgyzstan: Recent Developments and U.S. Interests
Contents
Political Background................................................................................................................... 1
The June 2010 Ethnic Violence ............................................................................................. 3
Reports of the Commissions of Inquiry ........................................................................... 4
Human Rights ............................................................................................................................. 5
Economic Conditions .................................................................................................................. 6
Foreign Policy and Defense......................................................................................................... 7
U.S. Relations ............................................................................................................................. 8
The U.S. Response to the April and June 2010 Events ......................................................... 10
Cooperation on Counter-Terrorism ...................................................................................... 10
The Status of the Manas Transit Center After the April 2010 Coup ................................ 11
The December 2010 Congressional Report on Fuel Contracts........................................ 12
Recent Changes in Jet Fuel Suppliers ............................................................................ 13
Figures
Figure 1. Map of Kyrgyzstan..................................................................................................... 15
Contacts
Author Contact Information ...................................................................................................... 15
Congressional Research Service
Kyrgyzstan: Recent Developments and U.S. Interests
Political Background
The Kyrgyz Republic gained its independence
at the end of 1991 with the dissolution of the
Kyrgyzstan Basic Facts
former Soviet Union. Scientist and mid-level
Area and Population: Land area is 77,415 sq. mi.;
communist party official Askar Akayev had
about the size of South Dakota. Population is 5.59 million
been elected president just before Kyrgyzstan
(The World Factbook, mid-2011 est.).
gained independence, and he was re-elected in
Ethnicity: 69.2% Kyrgyz, 14.7% Uzbek, 8.3% Russian,
1995 and 2000 in polls deemed problematic
and others (Kyrgyzstan National Statistics Committee,
2009 est.). Ethnic Uzbeks are a majority in areas of
by monitors from the Organization for
southern Kyrgyzstan. About 420,000 ethnic Kyrgyz reside
Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE).
elsewhere in the former Soviet Union and 170,000 in
In the face of growing protests by
China.
oppositionists on charges of government
Gross Domestic Product: $11.85 billion; per capita
corruption and vote fraud surrounding a
GDP is about $2,200 (The World Factbook, 2010 est.,
legislative election, he fled the country in
purchasing power parity).
March 2005. Former opposition politician
Political Leaders: President: Roza Otunbayeva; Prime
Kurmanbek Bakiyev was elected the new
Minister: Almazbek Atambayev; Foreign Minister: Ruslan
president in July 2005 in polling viewed as
Kazakbayev; Defense Minister: Maj. Gen. Abibilla
problematic by the OSCE. In 2007, Bakiyev
Kudayberdiyev.
reportedly orchestrated the holding of a
Biography: Otunbayeva was born on August 23, 1950,
referendum on a new constitution he had
in Osh, and graduated from Moscow State University. In
designed, and after the constitution was
1975, she became a kandidata (similar to Ph.D.) in
philosophy. In 1981, she was the second secretary of a
approved, similarly orchestrated a legislative
district committee of the communist party in Frunze
election that yielded a majority for a new
(now Bishkek). In the late 1980s, she served as head of
political party he had set up. In July 2009,
the Soviet delegation to UNESCO, and later as Soviet
President Bakiyev was overwhelmingly re-
ambassador to Malaysia. In 1992, she was Kyrgyzstan’s
elected with 76% of the vote in a race deemed
foreign minister and deputy prime minister, then in 1992-
1994 was ambassador to the United States and Canada.
problematic by the OSCE. In the winter of
In 1994-1997, she again was foreign minister. In 1998-
2009-2010, the population faced growing
2001, she was ambassador to the United Kingdom and in
electric power outages and large boosts in
2002-2004 was deputy head of the U.N. special mission
electricity and gas prices that many citizens
to Georgia. In late 2004, she co-founded the Ata-Jurt
blamed on corruption and mismanagement.
(Fatherland) Party. She was prominent in the opposition
which ousted former President Askar Akayev in 2005. In
December 2007, she was elected to the legislature on
After two days of large-scale unrest in the
the list of the Social Democratic Party, and in 2009-2010
capital of Bishkek and other cities that
served as the head of the party faction in the legislature.
appeared to be linked to rising utility prices
On April 7, 2010, she was chosen by opposition leaders
and government repression, opposition
to head the interim government after President
Kurmanbek Bakiyev was ousted.
politicians ousted the Bakiyev administration
on April 8, 2010, and declared an interim
government pending a new presidential election in six months.1 Roza Otunbayeva, a former
foreign minister and ambassador to the United States, was declared the acting prime minister.
1 Some analysts argue that the 2005 and 2010 unrest was orchestrated by competing elite and inter-related criminal
interests. Scott Radnitz, Weapons of the Wealthy: Predatory Regimes and Elite-Led Protests in Central Asia (New
York: Cornell University Press, 2010); Pavel Dyatlenko, “Kyrgyzstan: Protests on Demand, Marginalized Groups
Serve as Rent-a-Mob Demonstrators Whenever the Country is Convulsed by Unrest,” Report News: Central Asia, War
and Peace Reporting, Issue 626, August 24, 2010. Some analysts argue that Russian policies, including media criticism
of the Bakiyev regime and the imposition of fuel tariffs, contributed to Bakiyev’s ouster. See Bruce Pannier, “Russia’s
(continued...)
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Bakiyev initially fled to his native region in southern Kyrgyzstan but was given refuge in Belarus
on April 19. The interim leadership formed a commission on May 4 to draft a new constitution to
establish a system of governance with greater balance between the legislative and executive
branches.2
Deep-seated tensions between ethnic Kyrgyz and ethnic Uzbeks in southern Kyrgyzstan erupted
on June 10-14, 2010 (see below). Despite the violence, the interim government felt strongly that
the country’s stability would be enhanced by going ahead with a June 27, 2010, referendum on
the draft constitution. According to the government, the turnout was 72% and over 90% approved
the draft constitution. A limited OSCE observer mission reported that vote-counting procedures
seemed problematic in the polling stations visited.3 Although at least some ethnic Uzbeks felt that
the draft constitution failed to protect or enhance their interests, voting was reported to be largely
supportive of the draft constitution, although turnout was lower. Under the law implementing the
new constitution, Otunbayeva was designated the president, although it also was stipulated that
she cannot run when presidential elections are held at the end of 2011. She was sworn in as
president on July 3, 2010.
On October 10, 2010, 29 political parties competed in an election of the 120-seat unicameral
legislature, the Jogorku Kengesh. OSCE monitors reported that the election “constituted a further
consolidation of the democratic process and brought the country closer to meeting its
international commitments on democratic elections.” The OSCE monitors stated, however, that
vote-counting was poorly organized and that tabulation procedures were not followed properly in
half of the polling stations visited and in one-third of territorial electoral commissions.4 Five
parties were determined to have overcome a 5% vote hurdle and a regional vote hurdle to gain
seats. The Ata Jurt Party, linked to former Bakiyev officials and to ultranationalists, received the
largest percentage of 1.7 million votes, 8.5%, and 28 seats; the Social-Democratic Party (SDP;
Otunbayeva’s party) won 7.8% of the vote and 26 seats; the opposition Ar Namys won 7.6% of
the vote and 25 seats; the centrist opposition Respublika won 6.9% of the vote and 23 seats; and
the pro-government Ata Mekan won 5.5% of the vote and 18 seats. Over 60% of 1.7 million votes
went to parties that did not pass the vote hurdles to gain seats. Since no one party obtained over
one-half of the legislative seats, they negotiated on forming a ruling coalition.
President Obama hailed the election as demonstrating “important and positive attributes of a
genuine democracy.” Secretary Clinton praised the reported “free, fair, and legitimate” election,
and argued that “countries with a much longer history of elections have not achieved the high
quality of election that was held here in Kyrgyzstan.” Assistant Secretary of State Robert Blake
claimed that U.S. assistance and election monitoring had facilitated the holding of the
“democratic” election.5
(...continued)
Star on Rise Again in Kyrgyzstan,” RFE/RL, April 9, 2011.
2 CRS Report R41178, The April 2010 Coup in Kyrgyzstan and its Aftermath: Context and Implications for U.S.
Interests, by Jim Nichol.
3 OSCE. Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights. The Kyrgyz Republic Constitutional Referendum, 27
June 2010: OSCE/ODIHR Limited Referendum Observation Mission Report, June 27, 2010.
4 OSCE, Kyrgyz Republic: Parliamentary Elections, 10 October 2010, Statement of Preliminary Findings and
Conclusions, October 11, 2010; Final Report, December 20, 2010.
5 The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Statement by President Obama on the Parliamentary Elections in
Kyrgyzstan, October 11, 2010; U.S. Department of State, Remarks With President Otunbayeva After Their Meeting,
(continued...)
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Respublika and Ata Meken clash on their attitudes toward Russia, with Ata Meken considered
anti-Russian while all other winning parties hold expectations that Russia will help Kyrgyzstan
economically. Russian media strongly criticized Ata Meken during the election campaign,
reportedly reducing the party’s appeal to voters. Some observers raised concerns that Ata Jurt
Party co-head Kamchibek Tashiyev called during the campaign for recreating a strong
presidential form of rule in contravention of the new constitution and for closing the Manas
Transit Center. However, more recently he has averred that the future of the Manas Transit Center
will depend on consultations with U.S. and Russian officials. Ar-Namys head Feliks Kulov also
has called for such consultations. This stance appears to provide a veto to Russia on the issue of
the continued presence of the Manas Transit Center, according to some observers.6
After one failed attempt to form a government, President Otunbayeva asked Respublika to form a
coalition, and on December 17, 2010, it announced a coalition with the SDP and the Ata Jurt
Party, controlling 77 seats out of 120. The coalition nominated SDP official Almazbek Atambayev
as prime minister and he was approved by 92 votes by the legislature. Ata Jurt official Akhmatbek
Keldibekov was approved as speaker, In a speech to the legislators and other public comments,
Atambayev pledged to solidify a “strategic partnership” with Russia, since the two countries have
a “common history,” and to seek to join the Russia-Kazakh-Belarus customs union (see below).
He also called for close relations with the United States, and pledged not to challenge the U.S.-
Kyrgyz accord on the Manas Transit Center. In early May 2011, the Ar-Namys faction began talks
on joining the ruling coalition. A presidential election is scheduled for October 2011.
The June 2010 Ethnic Violence
Deep-seated tensions between ethnic Kyrgyz and ethnic Uzbeks in southern Kyrgyzstan erupted
on June 10-13, 2010. Grievances included perceptions among some ethnic Kyrgyz in the south
that ethnic Uzbeks controlled commerce, views of some ethnic Uzbeks that they were excluded
from the political process, and views among many Bakiyev supporters in the south that ethnic
Uzbeks were supporting their opponents. Allegedly, fighting began between rival ethnic-based
gangs at a casino in the city of Osh on the night of June 10-11 and quickly escalated, fuelled by
rumors of rapes and other atrocities committed by each side.7 The fighting over the next few days
resulted in at least 470 deaths and nearly 2,000 injuries. About three-quarters of those killed
reportedly were ethnic Uzbeks, while injuries were more evenly distributed between the two
ethnic groups. The violence also resulted in a wave of over 400,000 refugees and IDPs, mostly
ethnic Uzbeks, and the destruction of nearly 3,000 homes and businesses in Osh and Jalal-Abad,
mostly those belonging to ethnic Uzbeks. Otunbayeva appealed to Russia for troops to help end
the fighting, but the CSTO, meeting in emergency session, agreed to only provide humanitarian
(...continued)
Hillary Rodham Clinton, Secretary of State, December 2, 2010; U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Foreign
Relations, Subcommittee on Asia, the Pacific, and the Global Environment, Hearing on the Emerging Importance of the
U.S.-Central Asia Partnership, Testimony of Robert O. Blake, Jr., Assistant Secretary, Bureau of South and Central
Asian Affairs, November 17 2010.
6 David Trilling, “Kyrgyzstan: Q&A with Ata-Jurt Leader Kamchybek Tashiev,” Eurasianet, October 13, 2010; CEDR,
November 17, 2010, Doc. No. CEP-950185.
7 The Pogroms in Kyrgyzstan, International Crisis Group, August 23, 2010. See also OSCE, Report of the Independent
International Commission of Inquiry into the Events in Southern Kyrgyzstan in June 2010, May 2, 2011. Previous
Kyrgyz-Uzbek ethnic violence had occurred in Osh city and region in June 1990, reportedly resulting in over 300
deaths and nearly 500 injuries. Soviet troops were deployed to quell the violence, and remained in the region for six
months. The violence helped repudiate the communist leadership, leading to Askar Akayev’s rise to power.
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assistance. Although critical of the Kyrgyz government, Uzbekistan did not intervene militarily or
permit its citizens to enter Kyrgyzstan to join in the fighting. After some hesitation, the Uzbek
government permitted about 111,000 ethnic Uzbeks to settle in temporary camps in Uzbekistan.
Virtually all had returned to Kyrgyzstan by the end of June.8
An OSCE informal foreign ministers’ meeting in July 2010 endorsed sending a 52-member police
advisory group for an initial period of four months to help facilitate peace in southern
Kyrgyzstan.9 Resistance from some groups in Kyrgyzstan to the proposed unarmed police
advisors prevented the deployment of the group, and in November 2010 the OSCE Permanent
Council changed the mandate to a “Community Security Initiative” (CSI) of mixed local and
international police advisors to serve until the end of 2011. The first CSI advisors were deployed
in late December 2010. Three police officers from the United States participate in the CSI.
International donors meeting in Bishkek in late July 2010 pledged $1.1 billion in grants and loans
to help Kyrgyzstan recover from the June violence. The United States pledged $48.6 million in
addition to FY2010 appropriated foreign assistance and FY2011 requested aid (see below).
Analyst Martha Olcott has warned that the pledged aid will not be enough to meet the yawning
economic challenges of rebuilding and development faced by the government in the coming year,
so that the Kyrgyz people will need to adjust to a hopefully temporary period of greater
austerity.10
The Otunbayeva government suffered a serious political blow in August 2010 when it allegedly
failed in an attempt to oust the rebellious mayor of Osh, Melis Myrzakmatov. He had been
appointed by former President Bakiyev and retained the support of Bakiyev’s local supporters
after the president’s ouster. An ultranationalist, he was implicated in the violence against ethnic
Uzbeks in June and subsequent harassment. He reportedly is lobbying to replace the governor of
Osh region, who was appointed by Otunbayeva. In May 2011, he denounced the findings of the
OSCE Commission of Inquiry (see below), blaming “separatists” among the “Uzbek diaspora,”
members of the Otunbayeva government, and foreign interests for the June 2010 ethnic unrest.
Reports of the Commissions of Inquiry
On January 10, 2011, a Kyrgyz commission issued its findings on the causes of the June 2010
violence in southern Kyrgyzstan between ethnic Kyrgyz and ethnic Uzbeks. The report largely
blamed ethnic Uzbek “extremists” and some supporters of former Kyrgyz President Kurmanbek
Bakiyev for fomenting the violence. The report also blamed interim government officials of
ineptness in dealing with the escalating ethnic tensions. The commission called for the
government to give an award to Uzbekistan’s President Islam Karimov for his efforts to
temporarily shelter ethnic Uzbeks fleeing the fighting.
On May 2, 2011, an international commission formed under the leadership of Kimmo Kiljunen,
the Special Representative for Central Asia of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly, released its
8 UNHCR. Final Report on UNHCR Emergency Operations in the Republic of Uzbekistan, July 23, 2010.
9 OSCE. Press Release. OSCE and Kyrgyzstan Agree on Principles for OSCE Police Advisory Group, July 16, 2010;
OSCE Chairperson Says Presence of Police Advisory Group in Kyrgyzstan will Facilitate Strengthening Trust,
Stability and Order in Country, July 22, 2010.
10 Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe. Hearing on Instability in Kyrgyzstan: The International
Response. Testimony of Martha Brill Olcott, July 27, 2010.
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report of findings regarding the June 2010 violence. The commission concluded that the Kyrgyz
provisional government failed to adequately provide security and leadership to stifle rising
tensions and incidents in May or to minimize the effects of the June ethnic violence. The
commission criticized Gen. Ismail Isakov, who assumed command over security in Osh region,
for not using the 2,000-man military force under his command to prevent or stop the bulk of the
violence in Osh city, and raised concerns that security forces were directly or indirectly complicit
in the violence (according to the commission, most police, military, and other security personnel
are ethnic Kyrgyz). The commission also criticized the Commandant of Jalal-Abad, Kubatbek
Baybolov (who is currently Kyrgyzstan’s prosecutor general), of laxity in quelling violence and
failing to ensure that crimes associated with the violence are properly investigated and
prosecuted. The commission called for the Kyrgyz government to condemn ultra-nationalism and
proclaim that the state is multi-national, promote gender equality, provide special rights for
Uzbek language use in the south, train security forces to uphold human rights and not subvert
state interests through parochial loyalties, impartially investigate and prosecute those responsible
for the violence, establish a truth and reconciliation commission, and provide reparations.11 The
Kyrgyz government has rejected the finding that security forces were complicit in the violence,
continued to blame the former Bakiyev regime and Islamic extremists for fomenting the clashes,
and stated that ethnic Uzbeks share substantial blame for committing human rights abuses.
Some observers have raised concerns that what they view as inadequate efforts by the Kyrgyz
government to foster ethnic reconciliation could result in new ethnic unrest. Among such
concerns, the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), a terrorist group currently based in
Afghanistan and Pakistan, reportedly has vowed actions against the Kyrgyz government for its
alleged abuses against ethnic Uzbeks in southern Kyrgyzstan. President Otunbayeva and other
observers have warned that some ethnic Uzbek youth in the south are being recruited by the
IMU.12
Human Rights
According to the U.S. State Department’s Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2010,
some human rights conditions appeared to improve after the ouster of former President Bakiyev
in April 2010. However, some human rights problems continued after the change in government,
and the June 2010 unrest resulted in deaths, injuries, and other human rights abuses. Cases of
arbitrary killings, torture, and abuse by law enforcement and security officials continued during
the year. At times police beat detainees to extract confessions, filed false charges to arrest
persons, and solicited bribes in exchange for their release. The executive branch at times
interfered with judicial independence and the public widely viewed the judiciary as corrupt. The
government has not implemented a 2007 law allowing jury trials in the cities of Bishkek and Osh.
Many ethnic Uzbeks accused of violence against ethnic Kyrgyz in June received trials that fell
significantly short of legal standards, according to the State Department. Reported failures of the
legal system included torture and other coercion against ethnic Uzbeks to induce confessions,
11 OSCE, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry into the Events in Southern Kyrgyzstan in
June 2010, May 2, 2011.
12 Neil Melvin, Promoting a Stable and Multiethnic Kyrgyzstan: Overcoming the Causes and Legacies of Violence,
Open Society Foundations, March 7, 2011; .Bruce Pannier, “The Growing Threat of Militants in a Corner of Central
Asia,” RFE/RL, April 23, 2011; “Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan Says It Has New Leader and Can Attack Targets in
Central Asia,” Report News: Central Asia, Issue 631, Institute of War and Peace Reporting, October 13, 2010.
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lack of access to defense attorneys, threats by friends and family members of victims against
defense attorneys and judges, and convictions lacking substantial evidence of guilt or in spite of
exculpatory evidence. Freedom of the media and expression were generally respected by the new
government, but there were some reports of harassment of opposition media and journalists or
those reporting on developments in the south. All independent Uzbek-language media in the south
stopped operating after the June 2010 violence. The new government freely registered domestic
NGOs and lifted the ban imposed by the former Bakiyev government on the activities of the
Norwegian Helsinki Committee. Corruption remained endemic at all levels of society, and child
labor remained a widespread problem.13
Economic Conditions
According to Kyrgyzstan’s National Statistics Commission, the country’s gross domestic product
(GDP) contracted 1.2% in 2010, after a slowdown in GDP growth the previous year associated
with the global economic downturn. The Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU), a private firm, has
reported that the drop in GDP in 2010 was mainly attributable to a decline in agriculture and
construction, and to restrictions on cross-border trade and transport that Uzbekistan and
Kazakhstan imposed on Kyrgyzstan after the April-June 2010 events. Increased revenues from
gold mining and from remittances from migrant workers somewhat cushioned the contraction of
GDP. Since the beginning of 2011, the economy has benefitted from Russia’s repeal of its
surcharges on fuel exports, imposed on Kyrgyzstan in early 2010. Despite this repeal, increasing
food prices have contributed to a rise in inflation.
Gold production has been the most significant industrial source of GDP and export earnings.
Agriculture also accounts for a major portion of GDP and employs one-half of the workforce.
Cotton, tobacco, wool, and meat are major agricultural products. Up to one-third of the labor
force works in Russia or other countries and their remittances are major contributions to GDP.
Over 40% of the population lives below the poverty line. Organized crime and corruption stifle
economic growth and private foreign investment. Kyrgyzstan leads Central Asia in the
privatization of farms, industries, housing, and retail outlets. Kyrgyzstan has surplus hydroelectric
energy, rare earth mineral reserves, and tourism potential that could boost its development. U.S.
support contributed to Kyrgyzstan’s admission into the World Trade Organization (WTO) in late
1998. In April 2011, Kyrgyz Prime Minister Atambayev proclaimed that Kyrgyzstan would join
the Russia-Kazakhstan-Belarus customs union, even though such membership could complicate
Bishkek’s trade ties with other WTO members because of incompatible trade regulations and
tariffs between the customs union and the WTO. Atambayev’s call for joining the customs union
has been opposed by some other members of the government.
In December 2008, the IMF approved an 18-month Exogenous Shocks Facility loan of SDR 66.6
million to help Kyrgyzstan manage the impact of the global economic downturn. In September
2010, the IMF approved a disbursement of $33 million under the IMF’s Rapid Credit Facility
13 U.S. Department of State. Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2010, April 8, 2011, 2011. According to
the report by the OSCE Commission of Inquiry (see above), about 80% of over 5,000 criminal cases related to the June
2010 violence have been against ethnic Uzbeks. See Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry
into the Events in Southern Kyrgyzstan in June 2010, May 2, 2011. In January 2011, the U.S. Embassy in Bishkek
raised concerns about judicial irregularities involving one case against ethnic Uzbeks and about torture allegations. See
“U.S. Embassy Concerned About Fairness of Askarov Supreme Court Hearing,” Press Release, January 31, 2011; and
“U.S. Embassy Concerned About Allegations of Torture of Detainees in Kyrgyzstan,” Press Release, January 13, 2011.
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(RCF) for macroeconomic reforms. In statements in February and April 2011, the IMF praised
stepped-up GDP growth in Kyrgyzstan, but called for increased efforts in Kyrgyzstan to combat
corruption, strengthen property rights, and attract foreign investment.14 As of December 2010,
Kyrgyzstan’s foreign debt was $2.6 billion, according to the EIU. The EIU has warned that
Kyrgyzstan’s debt servicing burden is growing, while at the same time the country’s widening
budget deficit—linked to the global economic downturn in 2008-2009 and domestic turmoil in
2010—will necessitate additional foreign loans as well as more foreign assistance.
Foreign Policy and Defense
The Kyrgyz Republic is a member of the OSCE, the Commonwealth of Independent States, and
the United Nations. Kyrgyzstan joined NATO’s Partnership for Peace (PFP) in 1994 and has
participated in several PFP exercises in the United States, Central Asia, and elsewhere.
Kyrgyzstan also is active in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, a trade and collective
security grouping formed in 2001 and consisting of China, Russia, and all the Central Asian states
except Turkmenistan.
Kyrgyzstan has generally good relations with neighboring China, Kazakhstan, and Tajikistan, but
relations with Uzbekistan have been marked by trade, border, and other disputes. China is
Kyrgyzstan’s second largest trade partner (behind Russia; many of the Chinese exports are re-
exported by Kyrgyzstan to other Central Asian countries) and is an investor in some Kyrgyz
industry and transport projects. China is working on a road from its Xinjiang Province to Osh,
Kyrgyzstan and talks are underway on building a railway from Xinjiang through Kyrgyzstan to
Uzbekistan. At times, Kyrgyz ultranationalists have attacked ethnic Chinese traders and others in
Kyrgyzstan. Tension between Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan escalated in mid-2005 when
Kyrgyzstan permitted U.N. emissaries to evacuate about 450 Uzbek refugees who had crossed the
border to flee fighting in the Uzbek city of Andijon. Uzbek officials maintained that Kyrgyzstan
had served as a base of operations for “terrorists” (including citizens of Kyrgyzstan) who invaded
and attacked Andijon and as a safe haven after the “terrorists” fled. In late May 2009, Uzbekistan
blamed Kyrgyzstan for lax border controls that allegedly enabled terrorists to slip into Uzbekistan
to carry out attacks. Kyrgyzstan praised Uzbekistan’s treatment of refugees after the June 2010
ethnic violence. Uzbekistan has strongly opposed Kyrgyzstan’s plans to build hydro-electric
power plants on the Naryn River, claiming that they will restrict water flows into Uzbekistan.
Kyrgyzstan’s Kambarata-2 plant became operational at the end of August 2010, but the larger
Kambarata-1 plant remains unfinished.
Kyrgyzstan signed the Commonwealth of Independent States’ (CIS) Collective Security Treaty
(CST) in 1992 and 1999, which calls for mutual consultations on military support in case of
outside aggression. Several hundred Russian border troops (most reportedly were Kyrgyz
citizens) guarded the Chinese border until 1999, when Russia handed over control to Kyrgyzstan.
However, some Russian military facilities remain under a 15-year accord signed in 1997. Talks on
renewing the basing accord reportedly are underway. Reportedly, Russian compensation for
basing privileges is not in cash but in training and equipment for Kyrgyz troops. Russia further
ramped up its security presence in September 2003 with the signing of an agreement with
Kyrgyzstan for use of the Soviet-era Kant airfield near the capital of Bishkek and other facilities.
14 IMF, “Statement at the Conclusion of an IMF Staff Mission to the Kyrgyz Republic,” Press Release, No. 11/38,
February 11, 2011; Program Note: Kyrgyz Republic, April 11, 2011.
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Although the purpose of the Kant airbase purportedly is to combat regional terrorism and defend
CIS borders, it also appears aimed at countering U.S. and NATO influence. In August 2009, then-
President Bakiyev and President Medvedev signed a memorandum of intent to set up a new
battalion-strength Russian military base in southern Kyrgyzstan. Uzbekistan denounced this plan
as adding to instability in the region and Russia stated in March 2010 that it did not plan to open
such a base. Nonetheless, there are reports that some Russian troops were deployed in Osh region
in the wake of the June 2010 ethnic violence and that the basing plan is still being considered.
U.S.-Kyrgyz talks on assisting Kyrgyzstan in setting up a military training facility in the south of
the country appeared delayed by Bakiyev’s ouster, but in March 2011, President Otunbayeva
urged that the facility be constructed to assist in combating terrorism.
Kyrgyzstan’s armed forces number about 10,900 active ground and air force troops. Paramilitary
forces include 5,000 border guards, 3,500 police troops and 1,000 National Guard troops. Less
than a dozen Kyrgyz troops serve in OSCE or U.N. observer forces.15 Most troops are ethnic
Kyrgyz conscripts, though some officers are Russians. About one-third of the armed forces are
female. Most Kyrgyz officers receive training in Russia and the Russian language remains the
language of command. A four-year military reform plan unveiled in late 2008 called for
disbanding some military units, forming rapid reaction forces (“mobile troops”), stationing some
of these forces in southern Kyrgyzstan, reducing the number of defense officials and officers, and
raising the number and wages of contract soldiers. These plans were mostly unrealized at the time
of Bakiyev’s ouster. According to the OSCE Commission of Inquiry (see above) and others, some
troops in southern Kyrgyzstan appeared implicated in sniper attacks and other violence against
ethnic Uzbeks in June 2010.
U.S. Relations
President Otunbayeva met with President Obama during her March 2011 visit. Reportedly,
President Obama praised Kyrgyzstan’s support for the Manas Transit Center, reported that the
United States was improving the transparency of its financial arrangements regarding the Transit
Center, and pledged that the Transit Center would work to maximize its benefits to the Kyrgyz
people. He also praised Kyrgyzstan’s democratization efforts and reaffirmed U.S. support for
those efforts. While in Washington, D.C., President Otunbayeva received the International
Women of Courage Award from Secretary of State Hillary Clinton in recognition of her
leadership and democratization efforts.16
After attending the international donors’ conference in Kyrgyzstan in July 2010, Daniel
Rosenblum, the State Department Coordinator for U.S. Assistance for Europe and Eurasia, stated
that the United States had four priorities in its cooperation with Kyrgyzstan over the next two
years. The most urgent priorities, he stated, were meeting the needs of the Kyrgyz people for food
and shelter, particularly this winter, and ensuring their security. Principles that should regulate the
provision of aid include that people not be involuntarily resettled, and that people in need be
treated equally, regardless of ethnicity. In terms of security, he called for police and troops to
carry out their duties in a professional and accountable way and for all communities, regardless of
ethnicity, to be protected equally by law enforcement agencies. The third priority, he stated, was
15 The Military Balance, International Institute for Strategic Studies, March 7, 2011.
16 U.S. Department of State, Interview: Robert O. Blake, Jr., Assistant Secretary, Bureau of South and Central Asian
Affairs, March 11, 2011.
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supporting ethnic reconciliation, including an international investigation of the events of June
2010. The fourth priority was economic recovery, including infrastructure rebuilding and trade
facilitation.17
Assistant Secretary of State Robert Blake has added that a fifth priority is assistance for
democratization. In testimony to Congress in March 2011, he stated that “helping Kyrgyzstan
consolidate its successful transition last year to a parliamentary democracy remains a top priority
for the United States…. We continue to monitor the potential for renewed ethnic violence, as
tensions remain following violence in the south last June. In our interactions with the new
government, we continue to encourage accountability, equal access to justice, respect for human
rights and ethnic reconciliation.” He also emphasized that the “Manas Transit Center represents
an important contribution by the Kyrgyz Republic to our efforts in Afghanistan.”18
Cumulative U.S. budgeted foreign aid to Kyrgyzstan for FY1992-FY2008 was $953.5 million
(FREEDOM Support Act and agency funds), with Kyrgyzstan ranking third in such aid per capita
among the Soviet successor states. Foreign aid was $53.8 million in FY2009, $53.6 million in
FY2010, and a similar amount in FY2011 (country totals for foreign assistance under the
continuing resolution, H.R. 1473; P.L. 112-10, signed into law on April 15, 2011, are being
finalized). The Administration has requested $46.6 million for FY2012 (these amounts include
foreign assistance provided in the Aid for Europe, Eurasia, and Central Asia Account and other
“Function 150” aid, not including Defense and Energy Department or Millennium Challenge
funds). In addition to this aid, the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC)---created in 2004 to
provide U.S. aid to countries with promising development records---announced in late 2005 that
Kyrgyzstan was eligible to apply for assistance as a country on the “threshold” of meeting the
criteria for full-scale development aid. In March 2008, the MCC signed an agreement with
Kyrgyzstan to provide $16 million over the next two years to help it combat corruption and
bolster judicial reform. The program was completed in FY2010.
For FY2012, the Administration has requested $46.625 million for foreign assistance to
Kyrgyzstan (U.S. Defense Department support for the Manas Transit Center is another major
element of spending; see below). The largest share of requested funds is planned for bolstering
economic growth, mainly in the agricultural sector by improving irrigation and land use and
supporting agribusiness. Other economic programs planned include support for microfinance and
for improving electricity production and distribution, including exports. Democratization and
security are other major priorities in the Administration request. In the democracy area, support is
planned for the legislature to boost its outreach to civil society and its role in national decision-
making. Other aid is planned to boost inter-ethnic reconciliation, support human rights advocacy,
train defense lawyers and prosecutors, combat corruption, and engage youth on democratic and
free market issues. In the security area, efforts are planned to improve the hiring and promotion
practices of police departments, combat human trafficking, train personnel in counter-terrorism,
retrain former weapons scientists, and boost border security by providing training, modular
shelters, and communications equipment.19
17 U.S. Embassy, Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, Press Conference by Daniel Rosenblum, Coordinator, U.S. Assistance for
Europe and Eurasia, July 28, 2010.
18 U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on Europe and Eurasia, Hearing:
Overview of U.S. Relations with Europe and Eurasia, Testimony of Robert O. Blake, Jr., Assistant Secretary, Bureau of
South and Central Asian Affairs, March 10, 2011.
19 U.S. Department of State. Congressional Budget Justification for Foreign Operations FY2012: Annex, Regional
(continued...)
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The U.S. Response to the April and June 2010 Events
Faced with rising instability in Kyrgyzstan, in January 2010 the U.S. Departments of State,
Defense, and others launched an interagency assessment of aid needs. Following the April 2010
coup, the State Department deployed added personnel from the Office for Reconstruction and
Stabilization to Kyrgyzstan, and some of these personnel were dispatched to assess the situation
following the violence in the south in June 2010.20 U.S. Ambassador to Kyrgyzstan Tatiana
Gfoeller declared that both these events were disasters due to the humanitarian consequences of
the civil and ethnic unrest. The Administration reprogrammed existing annually appropriated
assistance for Kyrgyzstan to meet urgent needs following these events, and in addition boosted
assistance by about $90 million in FY2010.
To look at some of the programs, USAID’s Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance provided
$9.7 million to NGOs and U.N. organizations for shelter, water, sanitation, and hygiene, relief
coordination, protection (providing child-friendly places of refuge and psychological counseling
for victims of gender-based violence), and healthcare. USAID’s Office of Food for Peace
provided $10 million in emergency food assistance, and the Department of Agriculture’s Foreign
Agricultural Service provided $3.2 million through the Food for Education and Child Nutrition
program. The State Department’s Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration provided $1.1
million to the U.N. Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights to monitor human rights,
and $6.5 million to the U.N. Office of the High Commission for Refugees for shelter, logistics,
relief commodities, and protection. The Defense Department provided logistics and relief
commodities for the Osh region. The State Department’s Bureau for Democracy, Conflict, and
Humanitarian Assistance (DCHA), Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor (DRL),
Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL), and the embassy provided
over $5 million to support the holding of the October 2010 legislative election and to facilitate
other democratization and human rights efforts.21
Cooperation on Counter-Terrorism
In 1999 and again in 2000, Islamic terrorists associated with the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan
invaded Kyrgyzstan’s southern borders and were repelled only after fierce fighting. These
experiences may have prompted Kyrgyzstan’s approval almost immediately after the September
11, 2001, attacks on the United States of a U.S. request to use Kyrgyz airspace for counter-
terrorist operations in Afghanistan. The U.S. military repaired and upgraded the air field at the
Manas international airport near Bishkek, and it became operational in December 2001.
According to the U.S. Air Force, the Manas airbase serves as the “premier air mobility hub
supporting military operations in Afghanistan.” Missions include support for personnel and cargo
transiting in and out of the theater, aerial refueling, airlift and airdrop, and medical evacuation. In
May 2010, about 55,000 troops passed through Manas, en route to or out of Afghanistan, a
(...continued)
Perspectives, March 2011.
20 U.S. Department of State, Claire Sneed, “U.S. Stabilization Capabilities: Lessons Learned from Kyrgyzstan,”
Dipnote, October 04, 2010.
21 USAID, Bureau for Democracy, Conflict, and Humanitarian Assistance, Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance,
Kyrgyzstan: Complex Emergency, Fact Sheet No. 2, May 3, 2011; U.S. Department of State, Office of the Coordinator
of Assistance to Europe and Eurasia, private communication, May 10, 2011.
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substantial increase over the average number of troops transiting per month in 2009. There are
reportedly about 850 U.S. troops and 750 contractors serving at the transit center.22
On February 3, 2009, President Bakiyev announced during a visit to Moscow that he intended to
close the Manas airbase. Many observers speculated that the decision was spurred by Russia,
which offered Bakiyev a $300 million loan for economic development and a $150 million grant
for budget stabilization in the wake of the world economic downturn. Russia also stated that it
would write off most of a $180 million debt. The United States was notified on February 19,
2009, that under the terms of the status of forces agreement it had 180 days to vacate the airbase.
The Defense Department announced on June 24, 2009, that an agreement of “mutual benefit” had
been concluded with the Kyrgyz government.23 According to then-Kyrgyz Foreign Minister
Kadyrbek Sarbayev, the government decided to conclude the annually renewable
“intergovernmental agreement with the United States on cooperation and the formation of a
transit center at Manas airport,” because of growing alarm about “the worrying situation in
Afghanistan and Pakistan.” A yearly rent payment for use of land and facilities at the Manas
airport was increased from $17.4 million to $60 million per year, and the United States reportedly
pledged more than $36 million for infrastructure improvements and $30 million for air traffic
control system upgrades for the airport. Sarbayev also stated that the United States had pledged
$20 million dollars for a U.S.-Kyrgyz Joint Development Fund for economic projects, $21
million for counter-narcotics efforts, and $10 million for counter-terrorism efforts.24 All except
the increased rent had already been appropriated or requested. The agreement also reportedly
included stricter host-country conditions on U.S. military personnel. One Kyrgyz legislator
claimed that the agreement was not a volte-face for Kyrgyzstan because Russia and other Central
Asian states had signed agreements with NATO to permit the transit of supplies to Afghanistan.25
The Status of the Manas Transit Center After the April 2010 Coup
Initially after the April 2010 ouster of then-President Bakiyev, some officials in the interim
government stated or implied that the conditions of the lease would be examined. Interim acting
Prime Minister Roza Otunbayeva announced on April 13, 2010, however, that the lease on the
transit center would be “automatically” renewed for one year.
As part of efforts to be more open about the operations of the transit center to allay some Kyrgyz
popular misconceptions, the U.S. Embassy in Bishkek has reported that in FY2009, the United
States provided $107.6 million in direct, indirect, and charitable expenses in connection with the
Manas Transit Center, and $131.5 million in FY2010.
Of the FY2010 funds:
22 Staff Sgt. Carolyn Viss, “LRS breaks 2 of their own records,” 376th Air Expeditionary Wing Public Affairs, April 5,
2010; Biography: Colonel Dwight C. Sones, Commander, 376th Air Expeditionary Wing, Transit Center at Manas, June
2010, at http://www.manas.afcent.af.mil/library/biographies/bio.asp?id=13615.
23 U.S. Department of Defense. DoD News Briefing, June 24, 2009. See also U.S. Department of State. Daily Press
Briefing, June 25, 2009.
24 Tolkun Namatbayeva, “Kyrgyzstan Allows U.S. to Keep Using Base,” Agence France Presse, June 23, 2009.
25 See also CRS Report R40564, Kyrgyzstan and the Status of the U.S. Manas Airbase: Context and Implications, by
Jim Nichol.
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• $60 million was a lease payment
• $25 million was landing, parking, utility, and other fees for use of the Manas
International Airport
• $33.5 million was for local contracts (including furniture and sports equipment
purchases, construction, road repair, and custodial services)
• $2.3 million was for “programmatic humanitarian assistance”
• $1.2 million was for other local spending.
For FY2011, as of April 2011, the U.S. Embassy in Bishkek reported that $77.1 million had been
provided to Kyrgyzstan for the Manas Transit Center. In addition to this spending, $230 million
was paid in FY2009 and about $370 million in FY2010 for jet fuel.26
In January 2011, Kyrgyz security forces killed or apprehended nearly two dozen alleged members
of Jaishul Mahdi (Army of the Righteous Ruler), a primarily ethnic Kyrgyz terrorist group.
Besides reportedly bombing a synagogue in September 2010 and a sports hall in November 2010,
the group allegedly had planned to bomb the Manas Transit Center, according to the chairman of
Kyrgyzstan’s National Security Committee, Keneshbek Duishebaev.
The December 2010 Congressional Report on Fuel Contracts
In December 2010, the majority staff of the Subcommittee for National Security and Foreign
Affairs of the House Oversight Committee released a report on contracts awarded by the Defense
Department’s Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) to the privately owned Red Star and its sister
Mina firms for the supply of jet fuel for the Manas Transit Center.27 The report stressed that many
citizens of Kyrgyzstan, and even current Kyrgyz President Roza Otunbayeva, supposed that
former Kyrgyz Presidents Askar Akayev and Bakiyev and their families had benefitted from the
contracts in a corrupt fashion. Perceptions of corruption regarding the fuel contracts, according to
the report, were significant factors in the overthrow of the presidents and in growing tensions
between the United States and Kyrgyzstan. The Subcommittee reported evidence from the FBI
that the Akayev family was corruptly involved in fuel supplies to the Manas Transit Center, but
the subcommittee found no direct evidence of illicit involvement by the Bakiyev family. President
Otunbayeva had called for transparency in the fuel contracts in a speech at the U.N. General
Assembly in September 2010 and during an associated meeting with President Barack Obama.
According to the report’s findings, DLA did not know who owned Red Star or Mina until late
2010, did not claim to care whether contract funds were being misappropriated by Akayev’s
family, did not know that Russia’s state-owned Gazprom gas firm had an ownership interest in a
subsidiary of the firms, and did not claim to know that the firms were using false certifications to
obtain fuel from Russia. On the latter issue, Red Star and Mina had repeatedly informed DLA of
the false certifications scheme, according to emails and other documents. In a 2006 Red Star
26 U.S. Embassy, Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan. Transit Center at Manas: Recent U.S. Contributions to the Kyrgyz Government
and Economy, at http://bishkek.usembassy.gov/tc_recent_contributions.html; Transit Center Jet Fuel Contracts 2009-
2011, at http://bishkek.usembassy.gov/fuel_contracts.html.
27 U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Subcommittee on National
Security and Foreign Affairs, Mystery at Manas: Strategic Blind Spots in the Department of Defense’s Fuel Contracts
in Kyrgyzstan, Report of the Majority Staff, December 2010.
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proposal for a fuel contract, for instance, the firm spelled out that it was participating in a scheme
to circumvent supposed Russian restrictions on fuel exports for military uses, and warned DLA
that opening up the contracting process to other bidders might expose this scheme and lead to a
fuel cut-off by Russia. The 2006 contract was subsequently awarded to Red Star without
competition. A 2009 contract to Mina also was awarded without competition on “national
security” grounds. The Subcommittee argued that the use of such a scheme to obtain fuel and
DLA’s apparent lack of reaction to the scheme opened the United States to excessive strategic
vulnerability, since a sudden fuel cutoff by Russia could jeopardize U.S. military operations in
Afghanistan.
Red Star and Mina reported that the Russian government knew that Gazprom was the source of
jet fuel for the Manas Transit Center. The firms claimed, however, that they still had to falsely
certify that the aviation fuel was being used for civilian purposes so that Russian authorities could
claim that their ban on aviation fuel exports for military uses was not being circumvented. After
then-President Putin apparently decided in early 2009 that the U.S. airbase at Manas should be
closed and offered assistance to Kyrgyzstan as a seeming quid pro quo, Gazprom initiated a
slowdown in fuel shipments, according to the report. Although Kyrgyzstan’s then-President
Bakiyev had pledged to Putin that he would close the airbase, in mid-2009 Bakiyev instead
redesignated it as the “Manas Transit Center” and permitted it to continue operations. Russia then
“discovered” that Gazprom’s fuel shipments were being used by the airbase, imposed a high
export tariff on all fuel exports to Kyrgyzstan on April 1, 2010, and later cut off all fuel shipments
to Kyrgyzstan through Mina and Red Star.
The report also criticized the State Department and the U.S. Embassy in Bishkek for ignoring the
ramifications of the fuel contracts on U.S.-Kyrgyz relations. Even after Secretary of State Hillary
Clinton became engaged with the issue during her December 2010 visit to Kyrgyzstan (see
below), the embassy reportedly asserted that issues involving the fuel contract were beyond its
concern, according to the report.
Among the recommendations on improving the transparency and due diligence of fuel contracts
for the Manas Transit Center, the Subcommittee called for an interagency analysis of the U.S.
military’s “extraordinary reliance on Mina and Red Star for jet fuel” and on the risks associated
with increased Russian influence over the fuel supply chain supporting U.S. operations in
Afghanistan. The Subcommittee also stated that “ability to perform and financial viability are
necessary but not sufficient objects of due diligence. Business history, litigation exposure,
insurance posture, affiliated companies, and ownership are also important for U.S. contacting
authorities to understand in order to make competent judgments about contractors.” Knowledge
of ownership, for instance, is needed to satisfy a Federal Acquisition Regulations requirement that
principals be checked against sanctions lists, it stated.
Recent Changes in Jet Fuel Suppliers
In November 2010, DLA awarded Mina a contract to continue supplying up to 240 million
gallons of fuel to the Manas Transit Center in 2011. Russia was listed in contract information as
the main source of supply, but other countries reportedly also provide some fuel. An amendment
to the contract, later highlighted by Secretary Clinton during her December 2010 visit to
Kyrgyzstan, provides for the possible addition of a second supplier firm for between 20 and 50%
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of the fuel. 28 A U.S.-Kyrgyz inter-governmental agreement was signed in February 2011
amending the 2009 lease agreement to permit the non-competitive acquisition of jet fuel by the
United States from a Kyrgyz-designated firm. Shortly after the agreement was signed, Russia and
Kyrgyzstan agreed to form a joint venture, Gazpromneft-Aero-Kyrgyzstan (GAK), to supply fuel
to the Manas air base. Russia has 51% of the shares in GAK and Kyrgyzstan has 49%. Also in
February 2011, some Kyrgyz legislators advocated for imposing taxes on jet fuel used by the
Manas Transit Center, but U.S. and Kyrgyz authorities reminded the legislators that the June 2009
lease agreement calls for no taxes or fees to be imposed on fuel deliveries.
The Kyrgyz government continues to call for Mina to be excluded as a fuel supplier on the
grounds that it was involved with the previous Bakiyev government, an allegation that continues
to be denied by the Mina Corporation. In May 2011, the Defense Logistics Agency issued a pre-
solicitation notice for competition for the extension of the November 2010 jet fuel contract,
which would provide for Mina, GAK, and other firms to compete to supply 208 million gallons of
jet fuel to the Manas Transit Center in 2012. Reportedly, GAK has begun to supply some jet fuel
for Kyrgyz civil aviation, but has not yet provided jet fuel to the Manas Transit Center.
28 U.S. Department of Defense, Press Release, November 4, 2010.
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Figure 1. Map of Kyrgyzstan
Author Contact Information
Jim Nichol
Specialist in Russian and Eurasian Affairs
jnichol@crs.loc.gov, 7-2289
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