Bosnia: Current Issues and U.S. Policy
Steven Woehrel
Specialist in European Affairs
May 2, 2011
Congressional Research Service
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Bosnia: Current Issues and U.S. Policy

Summary
In recent years, many analysts have expressed concern that the international community’s efforts
over the past 15 years to stabilize Bosnia are failing. Milorad Dodik, President of the Republika
Srpska (RS), one of the two semi-autonomous “entities” within Bosnia, has obstructed efforts to
make Bosnia’s central government more effective. He has repeatedly asserted the RS’s right to
secede from Bosnia, although he has so far refrained from trying to make this threat a reality. A
RS referendum, scheduled for June 2011, aimed at attacking the legitimacy of a central
government-level court, may lead to a confrontation with the international community. Ethnic
Croat leaders in Bosnia have called for the creation of a third, Croat “entity,” threatening a further
fragmentation of the country. After two major Croat parties were excluded from the government
of the Federation (the other autonomous “entity” in Bosnia), they refused to recognize its
legitimacy and formed their own assembly. Bosnia has failed to form a central government, more
than six months after October 2010 elections.
The Office of the High Representative (OHR), chosen by leading countries and international
institutions, oversees implementation of the Dayton Peace Accords, which ended the 1992-1995
war in Bosnia. It has the power to fire Bosnian officials and impose laws, if need be, to enforce
the Dayton Accords. However, the international community has proved unwilling in recent years
to back the High Representative in using these powers boldly, fearing a backlash among Bosnian
Serb leaders. As a result, OHR has become increasingly ineffective, according to many observers.
The international community has vowed to close OHR after Bosnia meets a series of five
objectives and two conditions, ending direct international oversight. However, the failure of
Bosnia to achieve these objectives and conditions has led the European Union to consider plans to
enhance its role, while leaving OHR to more limited tasks. The EU’s main inducement to enlist
the cooperation of Bosnian leaders—the prospect of eventual EU membership—has so far proved
insufficient. The prospect of NATO membership has also had little effect. In April 2010, NATO
foreign ministers agreed to permit Bosnia to join the Membership Action Plan (MAP) program, a
key stepping-stone to membership for NATO. However, the ministers stressed that NATO will not
accept Bosnia’s Annual National Plan under the program until the entities agree to the registration
of defense installations as the property of the central government. Dodik has rejected doing so for
installations on RS territory.
Some observers are concerned that the combination of internal tensions within Bosnia and a
declining international role could perhaps lead to violence and the destabilization of the region as
a whole. This could be more likely if the RS tried to secede from Bosnia. However, there are
factors acting against conflict, including the lack of support for war among Bosnians, the
reduction in the level of weaponry in the country since the war, and, the fact that neighboring
Serbia and Croatia would not see a conflict as being in their interest, given their desire for EU
membership.
According to the USAID “Greenbook,” the United States provided just over $2 billion in aid to
Bosnia between FY 1993 and FY 2009. However, the U.S. role in the country has declined in
recent years as the EU role has increased. The Obama Administration has stressed the importance
of maintaining a close partnership with the EU in dealing with Bosnia. Like the EU, the United
States has urged Bosnian politicians to agree to constitutional and other reforms to make Bosnia’s
central government institutions more effective, so that the country can become a better candidate
for eventual NATO and EU membership.
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Bosnia: Current Issues and U.S. Policy

Contents
Background ................................................................................................................................ 1
Current Situation......................................................................................................................... 3
Political Situation.................................................................................................................. 3
Negotiations on Forming a New Central Government...................................................... 4
Economic Situation............................................................................................................... 6
International Role in Bosnia ........................................................................................................ 7
U.S. Policy............................................................................................................................ 9
Policy Concerns .................................................................................................................. 11

Figures
Figure 1. Map of Bosnia and Herzegovina................................................................................. 13

Contacts
Author Contact Information ...................................................................................................... 14

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Background
Before the breakup of Yugoslavia in
Bosnia at a Glance
1991, Bosnia and Herzegovina was
Area: 51, 209 sq. km. (slightly smaller than West Virginia)
one of Yugoslavia’s six republics. It
Population: 4.6 million (July 2009 est.)
had an ethnically mixed population.
The rise of hard-line nationalism in
Ethnic Composition: 48% Bosniak (Muslims of Slavic origin), 37.1%
Serbia under Slobodan Milosevic
Serb, 14.3% Croat, Others 0.6% (2000)
and a similar movement in Croatia
Gross Domestic Product: $16.96 billion (current exchange rates,
led by Franjo Tudjman in the late
2009 est.)
1980s and early 1990s posed a grave
Political Leaders:
threat to Bosnia-Herzegovina’s
Bosnian central government
unity. Bosnia’s own republic
government was split among
collective Presidency: Nebojsa Radmanovic (Serb), Bakir Izetbegovic
(Bosniak), Zeljko Komsic (Croat)
Bosniak (Slavic Muslim), Croat, and
Serb nationalists. The secession of
Acting Chairman of the Council of Ministers: Nikola Spiric (Serb)
Slovenia and Croatia in June 1991
Republika Srpska (largely Serb entity)
upset the delicate balance of power
President: Milorad Dodik
within Yugoslavia. Milosevic
conceded Slovenia’s independence
Prime Minister: Aleksandar Dzombic
after a few days, but Croatia’s
Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina (largely Bosniak and Croat entity)
secession touched off a conflict
President: Zivko Budimir (Croat)
between Croat forces and Serb
irregulars supported by the Serb-
Prime Minister: Nermin Niksic (Bosniak)
dominated Yugoslav Army. Bosnian
Source: CIA World Factbook.
Serb nationalists demanded that
Bosnia remain part of a Serbian-dominated Yugoslavia. Bosnian Croat nationalists threatened to
secede if Bosnia remained in Yugoslavia.
Bosnian President Alija Izetbegovic, a Bosniak, worried about the possible spread of the conflict
to Bosnia and tried to find a compromise solution. However, these efforts were made very
difficult by the Milosevic and Tudjman regimes, both of which had designs on Bosnian territory.
In addition, Izetbegovic’s hand was forced by the European Community (EC) decision in
December 1991 to grant diplomatic recognition to any of the former Yugoslav republics that
requested it, provided that the republics held a referendum on independence and agreed to respect
minority rights, the borders of neighboring republics, and other conditions. Izetbegovic and other
Bosniaks felt they could not remain in a Milosevic-dominated rump Yugoslavia and had to seek
independence and EC recognition, even given the grave threat such a move posed to peace in the
republic. Bosnian Serb leaders warned that international recognition of Bosnia-Herzegovina
would lead to civil war.
In March 1992, most Bosniaks and Croats voted for independence in a referendum, while most
Serbs boycotted the vote. In April 1992, shortly before recognition of Bosnia by the European
Community and the United States, Serbian paramilitary forces and the Yugoslav Army launched
attacks throughout the republic. They quickly seized more than two-thirds of the republic’s
territory and besieged the capital of Sarajevo. At least 97,000 people were killed in the war.1

1 Associated Press wire service dispatch, June 21, 2007. This estimate is based on a detailed database of war dead and
(continued...)
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Approximately 2.3 million people were driven from their homes, creating the greatest flow of
refugees in Europe since World War II. Serbian forces attacked Bosniak and Croat civilians in
order to drive them from ethnically mixed areas that they wanted to claim. Croats and Bosniaks
were initially allied against the Serbs, but fighting between Croats and Bosniaks broke out in
ethnically mixed areas in 1993-1994, resulting in “ethnic cleansing” by both sides. Bosniak forces
also engaged in ethnic cleansing against Serbs in some areas. In addition to the inter-ethnic
bitterness it created and the damage it caused to Bosnia’s economy, the war also greatly
strengthened organized crime groups and their links with government officials, an important
stumbling block to Bosnia’s postwar recovery.
The war came to an end in 1995, after NATO conducted a series of air strikes against Bosnian
Serb positions in late August and early September. The strikes were in response to a Bosnian Serb
refusal to withdraw its artillery from around Sarajevo after an artillery attack on a Sarajevo
marketplace caused many civilian deaths. Bosniak and Bosnian Croat forces, now better equipped
and trained than ever before, simultaneously launched an offensive against reeling Bosnian Serb
forces, inflicting sharp defeats on them. The Bosnian Serbs agreed to a cease-fire in October
1995. Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic, Croatian President Franjo Tudjman, Bosnian
President Alija Izetbegovic, as well as representatives of the Bosnian Serbs and Croats, met at the
Wright-Patterson Air Force base in Dayton, Ohio in November 1995 to negotiate a peace
agreement mediated by the United States, the EU, and Russia. On November 21, 1995, the
presidents of Serbia-Montenegro, Croatia, and Bosnia-Herzegovina, as well as Bosniak, Croat,
and Serb leaders in Bosnia, initialed a peace agreement. The final agreement was signed by the
parties at a peace conference in Paris on December 14.
Under the Dayton Peace Accords, Bosnia-Herzegovina remains an internationally recognized
state within its pre-war borders. Internally, it consists of two semi-autonomous “entities”: the
(largely Bosniak and Croat) Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the (Bosnian Serb-dominated)
Republika Srpska (RS). Under the accords, the Bosnian Federation received roughly 51% of the
territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina, while the Republika Srpska received about 49%.
Each of the entities has its own parliament and government with wide-ranging powers. Each
entity may establish “special parallel relationships with neighboring states consistent with the
sovereignty and territorial integrity” of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Most powers are vested in the
entities; the central government has responsibility for foreign policy, foreign trade and customs
policy, monetary policy and a few other areas. Decisions of the central government and
parliament are nominally taken by a majority, but any of the three main ethnic groups can block a
decision if it views it as against its vital interests. The Federation is further divided into ten
cantons, each of which has control of policy in areas such as policing and education.
A U.N.-appointed Office of the High Representative (OHR), created by the Dayton accords,
oversees civilian peace implementation efforts. The High Representative is supported by the
Peace Implementation Council (PIC), a broad umbrella group of 55 countries and agencies. As
the PIC’s size and composition makes it unwieldy for decision-making, the PIC provides ongoing
political guidance to OHR mostly through a Steering Board composed of key countries and

(...continued)
missing developed by the Research and Documentation Center Sarajevo. The RDC estimated that the real figure could
be increased by about another 10,000, as research continues. Some earlier estimates for the dead and missing, for which
the methodological bases were unclear, were over 200,000.
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institutions, including the United States, Russia, France, Germany, Britain, Italy, Canada, Japan,
Turkey, and the EU Commission and Presidency.
At a December 1997 PIC conference in Bonn, Germany, the international community granted the
High Representative powers (known as the “Bonn powers”) to fire and take other actions against
local leaders and parties as well as to impose legislation in order to implement the peace
agreement and more generally bring unity and reform to Bosnia. The High Representative also
holds the post of the European Union’s Special Representative in Bosnia. A peacekeeping force,
at first NATO-led, but led by the EU since 2004, implements the military aspects of the accord.2
Since 1997, the United States and other Western countries have pressed local leaders in Bosnia to
build the effectiveness and governing capacity of the Bosnian central government. The United
States and the EU have maintained that the Dayton institutions have proved to be too
cumbersome to provide for the country’s long-term stability, prosperity, and ability to integrate
into Euro-Atlantic institutions. Some successes have been scored in this area, including merging
the armed forces and intelligence services of the two entities, and creating central government
institutions such as border and customs services, and a state prosecutors’ office and ministry of
justice. However, even these achievements have required pressure on local leaders or even direct
imposition of changes by the High Representative. International efforts have had the support of
Bosniak politicians, but usually have faced strong resistance from Serbian ones, as well as from
some Croat leaders.
The state consolidation process suffered a serious setback in April 2006, from which it has not
recovered. A constitutional reform package pushed by the United States and EU was defeated in
the Bosnian parliament by a narrow margin. The relatively modest proposal would have replaced
the three-member collective central government presidency with a single presidency, increased
the powers of the Prime Minister, and strengthened the central Bosnian parliament. The electoral
campaign in the run-up to Bosnia’s October 2006 general elections was notable for its nationalist
tone, making reform efforts more difficult. Bosnian leaders made an effort to restart constitutional
reform in late 2008 and early 2009, but it did not produce an agreement. Another round of
constitutional reform talks, brokered by the United States and the European Union, took place in
October and November 2009 at the Bosnian army base at Butmir, near the capital, Sarajevo. No
agreement was reached at these talks, either. After the failure of the Butmir talks, constitutional
reform remained on the back burner as campaigning got underway for Bosnia’s October 2010
general elections.
Current Situation
Political Situation
Bosnia is currently in a familiar situation—political deadlock. Over six months have passed since
Bosnia held general elections on October 3, 2010, and no new central government has been
formed. The situation does not appear to augur well for the country’s ability in the near future to
enact reforms needed to advance its integration into Euro-Atlantic institutions.

2 For the text of the Dayton accords, see the OHR website at http://www.ohr.int.
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In the vote for the central government collective presidency, Haris Silajdzic, the outgoing
Bosniak representative, was defeated in his reelection bid. Silajdzic called for a strong central
government and the abolition of the country’s two semi-autonomous entities. Silajdzic’s
replacement is Bakir Izetbegovic from the Party of Democratic Action (SDA in Bosniak).
Although he is less confrontational than Silajdzic, he is unlikely to agree to wholesale
concessions to a hard-line Serbian stance.
The two other presidency members won reelection. The Serbian member of the central
government presidency, Nebojsa Radmanovic, is a supporter of Milorad Dodik, the paramount
leader among Bosnian Serbs. The Croat member of the presidency, Zeljko Komsic, is from the
multi-ethnic, but predominantly Bosniak, Social Democratic Party (SDP). However, as he was
elected within the Federation with key support from Bosniak voters, he may not be seen by many
Bosnian Croats as the main representative of their community. That role may be taken by Dragan
Cavic, leader of the Croatian Democratic Community (HDZ, in Croatian) and Bozo Ljubic of the
HDZ 1990 party. They have called for the creation of a new, Croat entity within Bosnia, to join
the two current entities. The United States and the EU have opposed such a step, viewing it as
further weakening Bosnia’s already fragile institutional structure.
Dodik, formerly RS Prime Minister, easily won election as President of the Republika Srpska. His
party, the Alliance of Independent Social Democrats (SNSD, in Serbian), also secured a majority
in the Republika Srpska parliament. During the campaign, Dodik said that Bosnia was being kept
alive artificially by foreigners, that a functioning Bosnia was a “mirage,” and that alternatives
such as peaceful dissolution of the country should be discussed.3 Dodik has also demanded that
OHR be withdrawn from Bosnia as soon as possible, without preconditions. He has called for
reversing many of the achievements of state consolidation efforts conducted under OHR’s
guidance, including establishment the Bosnia and Herzegovina Court and prosecutor’s office.
After the election, Dodik reached agreement with Serbian opposition parties in the Republika
Srpska parliament that constitutional reform packages brokered by the international community in
2006 and 2008-2009 cannot serve as a starting point for possible future negotiations.
Some observers believe that Dodik’s strategy within Bosnia has been to obstruct the functioning
of Bosnian institutions so much that the Bosniaks, Croats, and the international community will
eventually agree to let the Republika Srpska become independent. Dodik also expressed support
for the partition of Kosovo, perhaps seeing it as a model for Bosnia.
Negotiations on Forming a New Central Government
Negotiations between the main parties on forming a new central government have made little
progress so far. Dodik has refused to permit his party to form a central government with the
Social Democratic Party, led by Zlatko Lagumdzija, despite the fact that the SDP won the most
seats in the elections. Both leaders opposed the 2008-2009 constitutional reform effort brokered
by the United States and EU—Dodik because it went too far toward centralization and
Lagumdzija because it did not go far enough.
Dodik also insists on the principle of rotation of offices among the main ethnic groups. He is
demanding the foreign ministry for his own party, replacing the current incumbent Sven Alkalaj.
Dodik has also said that a representative from a Croat party should take over as Chairman of the

3 Bosnian Serb SNRA news agency dispatch, March 22, 2010, from the Open Source Center.
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Council of Ministers. For its part, the SDP has put forward Lagumdzija as its candidate for this
post.
Another problem is a quarrel between Lagumdzija and the HDZ and HDZ 1990, the two largest
Croat parties, over how many government posts the two parties should receive in the central
government and in the Federation, which failed to form a new government for five months. This
issue is just the latest in a long-term crisis facing the Federation. Infighting between Bosniak and
Croat leaders in the Federation and the complicated division of powers and bureaucratic overlap
between the Federation government and the ten canton governments within the Federation has
created a dysfunctional situation that has hindered the Federation’s economic development and
threatens the fiscal collapse of Bosnia as a whole. A report by the International Crisis Group
suggests that constitutional reform at the Federation level would not only improve the dire
situation in the Federation itself, but provide momentum for reform at the central government
level.4
On March 17, 2011, the Federation parliament approved a new Federation government, led by the
SDP. It includes small Croatian parties, but not the HDZ and the HDZ 1990. These two parties
claimed the government was formed illegally. They asked the Central Election Commission
(CEC) for a ruling on the issue. The Commission ruled that the government was illegal, but the
High Representative annulled the decision of the CEC, allowing the new government to continue
working.
In addition to concerns about its legality, the HDZ and HDZ 1990 do not see the government as
legitimate. They claim it does not represent Croat interests, since they, having received the most
Croat votes in the election, are not participants. The HDZ and HDZ 1990 established a “Croat
National Assembly” of municipalities and cantons with a Croatian majority. Such an organization
could become a parallel government, further weakening Bosnia’s cohesion. Croat leaders deny
that this is the case, but say they will practice civil disobedience toward the government while
staying within the law. Dodik has backed the HDZ and HDZ 1990’s efforts, perhaps hoping that
the conflict will do further damage to Bosnia’s unity. The crisis in the Federation is also making
the formation of a new central government even more difficult.
In any case, even if a new central government emerges to replace the current caretaker
government, it may not be any more effective, in part because it will have to be composed of
disparate political forces with incompatible political programs. Another factor that will likely
inhibit the effectiveness of the government is the fact that the impact of a parliamentary majority
in the Bosnian political system has less significance than in other systems, as representatives of
an ethnic group, even if in a minority, can veto any decision that it feels does not accord with
their interests.
Opinion polls in Bosnia show a broad-based disgust with the Bosnian political class, including
their squabbling over government posts (and the privileges and opportunities for corruption that
come with them), while the country continues to suffer serious problems with unemployment and
poverty. In a poll done for the National Democratic Institute in August 2010, 87% of the citizens
said the country was moving in the wrong direction, with only 12% saying their lives had

4 International Crisis Group, Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina—A Parallel Crisis, September 28, 2010, at
http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/europe/balkans/bosnia-herzegovina/209-federation-of-bosnia-and-herzegovina-
a-parallel-crisis.aspx
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improved in the past four years.5 Yet the October 2010 elections resulted in many of the same
ethnically based parties and leaders being returned to power, and no viable nonnationalist
alternative taking hold. This paradox is explained by some observers by the nature of the Dayton
system and the election laws, which favor ethnically based politics. Other experts also point to
reflexive fear and distrust of the other ethnic groups, a lingering effect of the war.
Economic Situation
Bosnia’s economic growth has been hampered by Bosnia’s cumbersome governing structure,
excessively large and expensive government bureaucracies, and long-standing problems with
organized crime and corruption. Bosnia’s public sector amounts to nearly 50% of the country’s
GDP. Observers have noted that the Republika Srpska has moved more quickly on economic
reforms and has enjoyed high economic growth than the Federation, due to a less cumbersome
governing structure in the RS. The Federation has also been plagued by infighting among
politicians that has delayed some privatization projects and driven away foreign investors. In
contrast, Dodik’s hegemony has simplified matters in the RS, while at the same time allegedly
fostering high-level corruption.
Nevertheless, despite these problems, living standards improved in Bosnia before the global
economic crisis; real wages increased by 44% between 2000 and 2007. Real GDP increased by
30% in the same period, and by 5.4% in 2008. The global economic crisis caused a drop in real
GDP of 3.1% in 2009. Since then, Bosnia’s economy has begun a slow recovery. The Economist
Intelligence Unit estimates that real GDP rose by 0.8% in 2010. Bosnia may have been affected
less by the crisis than other eastern European countries because it is less heavily indebted than
many of them. The fact that its currency, the convertible mark, is tightly linked to the Euro
through a currency board system may help Bosnia to weather global financial shocks.6
Nevertheless, living standards remain low for many Bosnians and unemployment remains a
severe problem. Official statistics put the unemployment rate at 43.3%. Other measures, which
take into account employment in the unofficial, “gray” economy put it at 24.3%
In May 2009, the International Monetary Fund offered Bosnia a $1.6 billion loan over three years.
The IMF has sought budget cuts in the RS and Federation, including trimming the cost of
government bureaucracy and veterans benefits. Implementation of these plans has been more
difficult in the Federation, where a weaker and more divided government has had trouble
standing up to the powerful veterans’ lobby.7 The IMF loans are crucial not only for their own
sake, but also because loans from the World Bank and budgetary support from the EU are also
conditioned on meeting IMF conditions.

5 See http://www.ndi.org/files/NDI_Bosnia_Poll_Report_August_2010.pdf
6 Milan Cuc, “Bosnia and Herzegovina: On the Road to EU Accession,” IMF Survey, December 2008, 199; Economist
Intelligence Unit Country Report: Bosnia and Hercegovina, February 2009; Oxford Analytica, “Bosnia: Politicians
Ignore First Signs of Downturn,” November 6, 2008.
7 Economist Intelligence Unit Country Report: Bosnia and Herzegovina, March 2011.
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International Role in Bosnia
There has been a debate about the future role of the international community in Bosnia. The
Peace Implementation Council (PIC) has appeared eager to end the direct international oversight
of Bosnia through the OHR. This may partly be due to “political fatigue” after having played
such a prominent role in the country for over 14 years. Since 2007, the High Representative has
been reluctant to use his wide-ranging Bonn powers to impose legislation and fire obstructionist
officials, due to a lack of political support for such actions by leading countries in the PIC. Since
March 2009, Valentin Inzko, formerly Austria’s ambassador to Slovenia, has been the High
Representative.
The international community’s desire to move away from direct oversight may be designed to
encourage Bosnian leaders to take greater responsibility for their country. Direct international
tutelage will have to be eliminated if the country is to join NATO and the EU, the members of
which are all fully sovereign states. The PIC has agreed to close OHR after five objectives have
been met. These include a decision on ownership of state property, a decision on defense
property; implementing the Brcko Final Award (which made the town of Brcko a self-governing
unit within Bosnia); ensuring fiscal sustainability; and entrenching the rule of law. The PIC and
OHR have demanded specific action and legislation from the central and entity levels to meet
these objectives. Two additional conditions were also set: the signing of a Stabilization and
Association Agreement with the EU (already accomplished) and a positive assessment of the
situation in Bosnia by the PIC.
The EU is considering a plan proposed by EU foreign policy head Catherine Ashton and EU
Enlargement Commissioner Stefan Fuele to separate the functions of the OHR from those of the
European Union Special Representative (EUSR). The EU delegation in Bosnia, which currently
mainly oversees EU aid projects, would also take over the political role of the EUSR. OHR would
be left with a few specific tasks to perform directly arising from the Dayton Peace Agreement.
The EU Delegation would focus on encouraging Bosnia to make the reforms needed for EU
integration. The head of the EU delegation would not have the powers to veto legislation and
remove local officials that OHR has had (but now rarely uses), but will have to persuade local
leaders to cooperate using other tools, such as aid and the prospect of EU membership.8
The EU has added another possible means of persuasion for EU officials faced with intransigence
by Bosnian leaders. In March 2011, the EU Council approved a decision on imposing a ban on
travel to EU countries and asset freezes on persons who actions threaten Bosnia’s sovereignty and
territorial integrity, threaten the security situation in Bosnia, or undermine the Dayton Peace
Accords. The Council would decide to put a person on the list based on the recommendation of a
member state or that of the EU foreign policy chief.
The RS leadership has wrangled with OHR and the international community on the OHR’s Bonn
powers. On May 14, 2009, the RS parliament passed a resolution which said that the parliament
will review all powers transferred from the RS to the central government at the direction of OHR
since the Dayton Peace Accord was signed in 1995. The resolution said that the RS should launch
legal challenges to have the powers returned to the RS. The resolution also called for the High

8 International Crisis Group, Bosnia: Europe’s Time to Act,” January 11, 2011, at
http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/europe/balkans/bosnia-herzegovina.aspx
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Representative to stop using his Bonn powers. On June 20, Inzko used his Bonn powers to annul
the RS parliament resolution. Dodik and the RS government remained unrepentant after the
decision, casting doubt on its real value.
In another battle over OHR’s role in December 2009, Inzko extended the role of international
judges and prosecutors trying war crimes cases for another three years, after the Bosnian state
parliament failed to pass legislation extending their stay. Inzko said that international judges and
prosecutors dealing with organization crime and corruption could remain only in an advisory
capacity. Nevertheless, the RS parliament passed legislation rejecting the decision.
In April 2011, the Republika Srpska parliament, acting on the proposal of President Dodik, voted
to call a referendum on the Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Bosnia and Herzegovina
Prosecutor’s Office, in an another effort to undermine the legitimacy of these central-level
institutions. The referendum may be held in June 2011. Press reports claim that the EU could
impose a visa ban and an asset freeze on Dodik if he moves forward with the referendum.
The EU-led peacekeeping force in Bosnia, dubbed EUFOR Althea, has a current strength of about
1,600 troops. Its role is to maintain a safe and secure environment in Bosnia, as well as to assist
Bosnia to reform its security sector. Some EU countries have called for a sharp reduction in
EUFOR, perhaps in part due to the strains they face in deploying forces to Afghanistan and
elsewhere. Press reports claimed that the EU foreign ministers backed away from reducing
EUFOR in early 2010, concerned about the negative political signal a withdrawal could give to
intransigent Bosnian political leaders. However, some countries have already reduced their forces
without waiting for a formal decision; Britain and France already have fewer than 10 personnel
each in EUFOR.
As direct control declines, the international community expects to continue to encourage reform
in Bosnia by providing aid, advice, and the eventual prospect of joining NATO and the EU. In
November 2006, NATO leaders invited Bosnia to join its Partnership for Peace (PFP) program,
which provides Bosnia with assistance in improving its armed forces and making them
interoperable with NATO. At their April 2008 summit in Bucharest, the Allies agreed to upgrade
its relationship with Bosnia by launching an Intensified Dialogue.
In April 2010, NATO foreign ministers agreed to permit Bosnia to join the Membership Action
Plan (MAP) program, a key stepping-stone to membership for NATO aspirants. However, the
ministers stressed that NATO will not accept Bosnia’s Annual National Plan under the program
until the entities agree to the registration of defense installations as the property of the central
government. Dodik has rejected doing so for installations on RS territory. As part of its effort to
receive a MAP, the Bosnian presidency agreed in April 2010 to send a peacekeeping contingent to
the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan. Bosnia currently
has 45 troops in ISAF serving as part of a Danish contingent in the conflict-prone Helmond
region
In June 2008, Bosnia signed a Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA) with the European
Union. The SAA offers Bosnia increased aid and advice and recognizes it as a potential
membership candidate. In 2011, Bosnia is slated to receive 108.1 million Euro ($160.5 million) in
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EU aid under the Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance (IPA). Aid under IPA is expected to
increase to 110.2 million Euro ($165 million) in 2012.9
It is unclear whether these incentives are strong enough for Bosnian leaders to change their
policies. The November 2010 report by the European Commission on Bosnia’s efforts to become
an EU membership candidate was sharply critical, noting that Bosnia had made “limited”
progress in fulfilling the political criteria for membership and “little further progress” in creating
a functioning market economy.10 However, Bosnian leaders have shown some capacity to respond
to narrowly focused conditions in order to receive benefits in the short term that are highly
coveted by their populations. In November 2010, the EU announced that citizens of Bosnia would
be able to travel visa-free to the EU. The EU granted this right after Bosnian leaders undertook
steps to tighten border management and migration policies.
In early 2011, German Chancellor Angela Merkel summoned leaders of the main parties in
Bosnia to talks in Berlin on the formation of a new central government, as well as a possible
agreement on a package of constitutional reform and other measures. One issue reportedly under
discussion was a change in the Bosnian constitution to comply with a ruling of the European
Court of Human Rights that said that the constitution violates the European Convention on
Human Rights because it restricts eligibility for Bosnia’s collective presidency and membership
in the House of Peoples (one of the two houses of the Bosnian parliament) to members of the
three major ethnic groups. Another issue was the passage of legislation to confirm the powers
already transferred to the central government in the fifteen years since the Dayton accords.
Finally, Germany is pushing for a “European clause” for the constitution. The clause would
reportedly bar an ethnic group from vetoing legislation needed for the country’s EU integration.
So far, the German efforts have not produced results.
U.S. Policy
The United States has strongly supported Bosnia’s integration into Euro-Atlantic institutions.
However, the U.S. role in the country has declined in recent years. There have been no U.S.
peacekeeping troops in Bosnia since 2004, when a NATO-led peacekeeping force was replaced
by the current EU-led force. Some observers have claimed that the U.S. political role in Bosnia
has also declined, particularly since the failure of constitutional reforms in 2006, despite strong
U.S. pressure on the Bosnian parties at the time. The Obama Administration has touted the close
working relationship it has maintained with the EU on Bosnia as a key success of its policy.
The United States provided large amounts of aid to Bosnia. According to the USAID
“Greenbook,” the United States provided just over $2 billion in aid to Bosnia between FY 1993
and FY 2009. Aid levels were high in the years immediately after the 1992-1995 war, when the
country was rebuilding. However, aid totals gradually declined thereafter, and current US aid to
Bosnia is relatively modest.
According to the FY 2012 Congressional Budget Justification for Foreign Operations, in FY 2010
Bosnia received $42.84 million in U.S. aid, including $36 million in aid for political and

9 Bosnia and Herzegovina: Financial Assistance, at the EU Commission website,
http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/potential-candidates/bosnia_and_herzegovina/financial-assistance/index_en.htm
10 For more on the Commission report, see
http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key_documents/2010/package/conclusions_bosnia_en.pdf
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economic reform in the Aid to Europe, Eurasia, and Central Asia (AEECA) account; $4 million in
Foreign Military Financing (FMF); $0.99 million in International Military Education and
Training (IMET) funds; and $1.85 million in the Nonproliferation, Antiterrorism, Demining, and
Related (NADR) account. FY 2011 aid for Bosnia is expected to roughly equal FY 2010 levels.
The Administration’s FY 2012 foreign aid request includes $50.25 million in aid to Bosnia,
including $39 million in AEECA funding; $5 million in FMF; $ 1 million in IMET aid, and $5.25
million from the NADR account.
U.S. aid has focused on strengthening state-level institutions in Bosnia. The United States
provides assistance to Bosnia’s state-level police organizations to fight organized crime and
terrorism. U.S. aid also is aimed at improving the functioning of Bosnia’s judiciary; improving its
border controls; and creating a better legal and regulatory environment for economic growth and
investment. The objective of U.S. military aid is to unify Bosnia’s military more effectively and
improve its capabilities so that it may become interoperable with NATO.
Vice President Joseph Biden visited Bosnia, Serbia, and Kosovo on May 19-21, 2009. In a speech
on May 19 to the Bosnian parliament he warned that the “sharp and dangerous rise in nationalist
rhetoric” that has occurred in Bosnia since 2006 must stop. He warned that Bosnia faced a future
of poverty and possibly even violence if it did not abandon this path.
Biden appeared to tacitly underscore continued U.S. support for the framework of the Dayton
Peace Accords by saying Bosnia could integrate into Euro-Atlantic institutions as a state “with
two vibrant entities.” However, he said that Bosnia needed a functioning central government that
controls the national army, prevails where there is a conflict between central and local laws, has
an electoral system that does not exclude any group, has the power to raise revenue, and has the
authority to negotiate with the EU and other states to implement its obligations. Biden warned
that the United States would not support the closure of OHR until the five objectives and two
conditions were met.11
In October 2010, Secretary of State Clinton visited Sarajevo. During a “town hall” meeting with
students and civil society representatives, Clinton said Bosnia should take action on key issues,
including “bolstering your commitment to a sovereign state, one that delivers results for all of its
citizens by passing reforms that will improve key services, attract more foreign investment, make
government more effective and accountable. These reforms are needed for their own sake, but
they are also needed if your country is to fulfill the goal of becoming part of the European Union
and NATO.”12
In March 2011, Deputy Secretary of State Steinberg and Assistant Secretary of State Philip
Gordon visited Bosnia in order to urge Bosnian leaders to form a new government quickly.
Steinberg also met with European Union Managing Director for Europe and Central Asia
Miroslav Lajcak In a statement by a State Department spokesman on March 8, the Administration
aid it was “deeply concerned” over the failure to form governments at the Federation and central
government level. It called on Bosnian leaders to build “broad-based” coalition governments so
that the country can undertake reforms needed for the country’s Euro-Atlantic integration. The

11 A text of Vice President Biden’s speech can be found at the White House website at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Prepared-Remarks-Vice-President-Joe-Biden-Addresses-Parliament-of-
Bosnia-and-Herzegovina/
12 The transcript of the meeting can be found at the State Department website at
http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2010/10/149333.htm
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statement called on those parties that are blocking the sending of delegates to the Federation
House of Peoples (a key step toward forming a new Federation government) to stop doing so, and
for those who were planning to convene the House of Peoples without those delegates to refrain
from such a step. This appeal was ignored by the Bosnian parties.
Policy Concerns
The international community appears to have decided to reduce its direct role in Bosnia, and
indeed to hold out the timetable for that reduction as an incentive for the local parties in Bosnia to
make progress on key issues. This is expected to work together with the other main incentive,
Euro-Atlantic integration. However, it is unclear whether these incentives are strong enough for
Bosnian leaders (particularly Dodik) to change their policies.
One important consideration is what policy objectives the international community realistically
expects to achieve in Bosnia and its analysis of the consequences of failure. Avoiding widespread
violence or even the breakup of Bosnia would presumably be the most basic international
objective. Large-scale violence would put EUFOR in danger and likely require a U.S. and NATO
military response, at a time when forces are severely stretched due to missions in Afghanistan,
Iraq, Libya, and elsewhere. In addition, neighboring Serbia and Croatia could be pulled into such
a conflict. This could implicate NATO, as Croatia joined the Alliance in April 2009. Increased
regional instability could also revive conflict between Serbs and Albanians in Kosovo.
Those who argue that a renewed conflict is unlikely note that the political environment around
Bosnia now is completely different than it was during the 1990s. Then, nationalist regimes in
Serbia and Croatia tried to cement their support at home by expanding their countries’ borders at
Bosnia’s expense. Now, pro-Western democratic regimes in these countries appeal to their
electorates by trying to build prosperous democracies integrated with Europe. This goal would be
shattered by renewed war. Bosnia’s army is also much smaller now than during the war, with
fewer heavy weapons. Some observers assert that police forces, private security companies, and a
well-armed population could in principle provide forces for substantial levels of violence. Yet
public opinion polls seem to indicate very little support for violence in support of nationalist
causes. Most Bosnians appear more concerned about high unemployment (estimates range as
high as 40%) and low living standards.
Renewed conflict (if perhaps on a smaller and more localized scale than in the 1990s) would be
most likely to occur if the RS attempted to secede from Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Bosniaks
tried to prevent such an action by force of arms. Observers are divided on whether the current
impasse, caused in part by RS obstructionism, could eventually destabilize the country even
without a provocative act such as secession. If the United States and other international actors
conclude that such a nightmare scenario is unlikely to unfold, they may continue to follow their
current approach, even if it does not bear fruit in the short term, in part due to a lack of
alternatives and in part due to their focus on more pressing international issues.
The international community has not considered trying to broker a peaceful breakup of Bosnia.
This is despite the possibility that Bosnia’s shortcomings as a state may not be primarily due to
the inherent flaws of the Dayton accords, the alleged lack of skill of international overseers, or the
foibles of particular Bosnian politicians. Instead, it can be argued that many of the failures
ultimately stem from a more fundamental problem—the fact that at least a large minority of the
population (Bosnian Serbs and many Croats) never wanted to be part of an independent Bosnia.
International rejection of partition is in part due to strong opposition by the Bosniaks, who would
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have the most to lose in such an arrangement. A mainly Bosniak Bosnia would be a small,
landlocked country surrounded by less than sympathetic neighbors. In contrast, Bosnian Serb and
Croat nationalists would hope for support from and eventual union of territories they control with
Serbia and Croatia respectively.
The United States and other Western countries may feel that they owe the Bosniaks a lingering
moral debt, due to the perceived indecision and tardiness of the international community in
averting or ending the 1992-1995 war, in which the Bosniaks were the main victims. Perhaps at
least equally importantly, there are concerns that a partition of Bosnia could be destabilizing for
the region as a whole, given that Kosovo and Macedonia have ethno-territorial problems of their
own. Leaders in the Balkans often look to the example of others in the region as justification for
their own positions and actions.
The international community’s more ambitious goals include making central government
institutions more effective and encouraging other political and economic reforms in order to bring
Bosnia into NATO and the EU. Bosnia’s deep-rooted structural problems may prevent rapid
success in these areas in the near future, unless NATO and the EU decide to advance Bosnia’s
candidacies even in the absence of marked improvement in hopes such moves themselves would
help stabilize the country.

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Figure 1. Map of Bosnia and Herzegovina

Source: CRS.

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Author Contact Information

Steven Woehrel

Specialist in European Affairs
swoehrel@crs.loc.gov, 7-2291


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