Algeria: Current Issues
Alexis Arieff
Analyst in African Affairs
April 13, 2011
Congressional Research Service
7-5700
www.crs.gov
RS21532
CRS Report for Congress
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repared for Members and Committees of Congress
Algeria: Current Issues
Summary
U.S.-Algerian ties have grown as the United States has increasingly viewed the government of
Algeria as an important partner in the fight against Al Qaeda-linked groups in North Africa. The
Algerian economy is largely based on hydrocarbons, and the country is a significant source of
natural gas for the United States and Europe. Congress appropriates and oversees small amounts
of bilateral development assistance, and Algerian security forces benefit from U.S. security
assistance and participation in bilateral and regional military cooperation programs.
Algeria’s relative stability, always tenuous, has most recently been challenged by a series of riots,
strikes, and demonstrations since early January 2011. The unrest has been motivated by economic
distress (such as high food prices, unemployment, and housing shortages), as well as longstanding
political grievances. The example of neighboring Tunisia’s “Jasmine Revolution” and the ripple
effects of political change in Egypt may contribute to opposition activism, although the counter-
example of violent repression in Libya and Bahrain may also dampen enthusiasm. The
government has reacted both by attempting to assuage the public through political and economic
concessions and by using the security forces to prevent and break up demonstrations. Across the
region, other authoritarian governments have adopted similar approaches with varying results.
Algeria’s political system is dominated by a strong presidency and security apparatus. The
military is the heir to Algeria’s long struggle for independence from France, and has remained the
most significant political force since independence in 1962. Following Algeria’s bloody civil war
in the 1990s, the military backed Abdelaziz Bouteflika for the presidency in 1999. He was
reelected for a third term in April 2009 and has no clear successor. The 74-year-old president is
widely rumored to be in poor health. The voice of the military has been muted publicly since
Bouteflika was first selected, but may be heard during a future presidential succession. Low voter
turnout in the May 2007 parliamentary election may have reflected general lack of public faith in
the political system in general and the weak legislature in particular. High official turnout figures
for the 2009 presidential election were disputed by rival candidates.
Domestic terrorism perpetrated by violent Islamists remains Algeria’s principal security
challenge. Algerian terrorists also operate across the southern border in the Sahel and are linked
to terrorism abroad. The U.S. State Department lists two Algerian groups as Foreign Terrorist
Organizations. The more notorious and active is Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM),
which pledged allegiance to Al Qaeda in 2006 and may increasingly be described as a criminal-
terrorist mutation. Algeria, as the dominant economic and military power in the region, has
attempted to take the lead in developing a regional approach to counterterrorism in the Sahel. The
legacy of Algeria’s anti-colonial independence struggle contributes to Algerian leaders’ desire to
prevent direct foreign counterterrorism intervention, their residual skepticism of French
intentions, and their positions on regional affairs, including a non-interventionist stance toward
Libya’s conflict. See also CRS Report R41070, Al Qaeda and Affiliates: Historical Perspective,
Global Presence, and Implications for U.S. Policy, coordinated by John Rollins.
President Bouteflika’s tenure has produced an energized foreign policy. Strains in ties with
neighboring Morocco continue, due mainly to the unresolved status of the Western Sahara, but
also to a rivalry for regional power. Relations with former colonial power France remain complex
and volatile. See also CRS Report RS20962, Western Sahara, by Alexis Arieff.
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Contents
Recent Developments: Political Unrest........................................................................................ 1
Issues for U.S. Policy ............................................................................................................ 3
Background ................................................................................................................................ 4
Government and Politics ............................................................................................................. 5
Terrorism.................................................................................................................................... 7
Counterterrorism......................................................................................................................... 9
Human Rights ........................................................................................................................... 11
The Economy............................................................................................................................ 12
Foreign Affairs ......................................................................................................................... 15
Morocco ............................................................................................................................. 15
France................................................................................................................................. 16
European Union .................................................................................................................. 16
U.S. Relations ........................................................................................................................... 17
U.S. Investment and Energy Issues...................................................................................... 19
U.S. Assistance ................................................................................................................... 20
Figures
Figure 1. Map of Algeria and Its Neighbors................................................................................. 5
Tables
Table 1. U.S. Bilateral Foreign Assistance to Algeria (State Department and USAID) ............... 21
Contacts
Author Contact Information ...................................................................................................... 21
Acknowledgments .................................................................................................................... 21
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Recent Developments: Political Unrest
Algerian citizens have carried out a series of riots, strikes, and protests since early January 2011.
These initially focused on high food prices, but turned more overtly political in late January and
February, with demonstrators calling for political reforms and using slogans that directly
reference the recent uprising in neighboring Tunisia—dubbed the “Jasmine Revolution”—that
unseated Tunisian President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali.1 At least five Algerians have reportedly
died of self-immolation, a phenomenon that has echoed across the region after a frustrated
Tunisian street vendor helped touch off the demonstrations there by setting himself on fire.
Urban riots and other civil disturbances, often led by unemployed youth, are common in Algeria
and are sometimes tolerated by the authorities. Still, the Algerian government is taking a
defensive stance toward the recent unrest, despite official denials of potential “contagion” from
Tunisia, Egypt, and elsewhere in the region.2 The government has responded by attempting to
address economic grievances—lowering the prices of key food commodities and promising new
initiatives to provide land, youth employment, and housing—while seeking to preclude large
protest gatherings through preemptive police deployments.3 Economic subsidies are a frequent
tactic in Algeria, where oil and gas revenues provide resources for policies that some view as
designed to buy off dissenters. The government also has taken limited steps to assuage political
opponents, notably by repealing Algeria’s “state of emergency” on February 24 and relaxing
some controls on state media. The state of emergency had been in place since the start of the civil
war in 1992 and enabled a range of restrictions on civil liberties. Other substantial restrictions,
contained elsewhere in law and decrees, remain in place. Authorities have promised additional
political reforms, with few explicit details on content or timing.
Although government officials have portrayed protests as motivated by socio-economic, not
political, grievances, the protests have been accompanied by unusually critical, pro-reform
statements by some individuals closely associated with the regime or with Algeria’s
independence struggle.4 In March, one of the political parties in the presidential alliance—the
moderately Islamist Movement for a Peaceful Society (MSP)—called for a substantial revision of
the constitution to provide for a parliamentary regime, the separation of powers, a two-term limit
on the presidency, and greater civil liberties.5 The other two parties in the presidential alliance,
the National Liberation Front (FLN) and the National Democratic Rally (RND), have also
expressed support for a constitutional revision.6 It is unclear what impact gradual, regime-led
reforms might have on unrest.
1 See CRS Report RS21666, Political Transition in Tunisia, by Alexis Arieff.
2 Agence France Presse (AFP), “Algeria Sees No ‘Domino Effect’ From Egypt, Tunisia Protests,” February 20, 2011.
3 A decree issued in June 2001prohibited public gathering in Algiers indefinitely; see Human Rights Watch, “Algeria:
End Public Assembly Ban in Algiers,” March 20, 2011.
4 Such figures include Zohra Drif Bitat, a vice-president of the upper house of parliament who was appointed by
Bouteflika; Abdelhamid Mehri, a former head of the FLN; and Ahmed Benbitour, Bouteflika’s former prime minister.
See, e.g., Reuters, “Algeria Establishment Figure Joins Calls for Change,” February 7, 2011; AFP, “Algérie: Les Partis
de l’Alliance Présidentielle Condamnent ‘l’Ingérence Etrangère,’” February 16, 2011; Reuters, “One of Algeria’s
Founding Fathers Urges Reform,” February 16, 2011; Elaine Ganley, “Algeria Sitting in Circle of Fire but Keeps Lid
on Social Unrest—For Now,” March 2, 2011.
5 AFP, “Algérie: Un Parti de l’Alliance Présidentielle pour une Révision ‘Globale’ de la Constitution,” March 11, 2011.
6 Ennahar website, “The Promised Reforms Are Expected,” April 11, 2011.
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On February 12 and February 19, thousands of protesters gathered in Algiers and other urban
centers under the banner of a newly formed umbrella group of small opposition parties, civil
society groups, and non-official trade unions, the National Coordination for Change and
Democracy (CNCD). They were met with tens of thousands of riot police; security forces
reportedly blocked off segments of the city and restricted population movements to and from
Algiers. CNCD demands included “greater democracy,” the lifting of the 1992 state of
emergency, the freeing of individuals detained during previous protests and riots, a loosening of
state controls over the media, increased employment opportunities, and “social justice.”7
However, the coalition’s internal cohesion and potential to draw mass support were uncertain
from the start. It soon split into two factions, one composed of political party activists and the
other of civil society groups. CNCD leaders have continued to organize protest rallies in Algiers
every Saturday; however, these have attracted only small groups and have been hampered by the
security forces. Protesters have reportedly been arrested and beaten by police, and some have
clashed with pro-government demonstrators. Still, security forces have so far shown greater
restraint than in some countries in the region, and have not opened fire on crowds.
Anti-government protesters continue to be highly internally divided. In March, the Front for
Socialist Forces (FFS), an opposition party that has distanced itself from the CNCD, called for
“peaceful struggle” to change Algeria’s political system. The party held its own protest rally in
Algiers on March 5, which was reportedly attended by 3,000 people.8 In mid-March, yet another
protest movement, the National Alliance for Change (ANC), was founded by veteran politician
and former Prime Minister Ahmed Benbitour. Recent months have also seen frequent labor
strikes, as well as protests and sit-ins by the unemployed, the urban poor, students, teachers,
doctors, journalists, state employees, oil and gas workers, and others across the country.
Protesters include thousands of “communal guards,” state-sponsored defense groups who fought
alongside the gendarmerie during the civil war, who have claimed pay raises and benefits.9 The
political opposition appears to have been unable to draw these disparate groups to its cause.
Despite genuine popular frustrations with the government, Algeria’s political protest movement
has remained limited to date, and the potential for a mass popular uprising to overturn the status
quo is uncertain. Several factors may weigh in favor of political continuity. Key among them is
the role played by Algeria’s military, which is seen as the ultimate arbiter of domestic politics and
backed the political rise of President Bouteflika. Algeria’s political system is also relatively more
open, and the domestic press is subject to relatively fewer controls, than in several countries in
the region. The involvement of opposition political parties in the protest movement appears to
have worked against its popularity, as many people reportedly distrust them. At the same time,
there are many potential vectors for instability. This is in part due to Algeria’s turbulent history of
civil conflict and to the security threat posed by Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), which
seeks to overturn the current Algerian regime and has carried out a number of attacks within the
country. Anger over corruption, unemployment, and urban housing shortages is widespread.
Ethnic and regional identities remain strong, and some groups have opposed the government,
especially ethnic Berber communities (also known as Amazigh), which are concentrated in the
mountainous Kabylie region, in the northeast.10 Reports of divisions within the politico-military
7 Le Temps d’Algérie, “La CNCD Demande Aujourd’hui l’Autorisation: Marche du 12 Février à Alger,” February 1,
2011.
8 Benoit Faucon, “Algeria’s Opposition Joins a Protest Wave,” The Wall Street Journal, March 5, 2011.
9 AFP, “Thousands of Police Rally in Algeria,” March 7, 2011.
10 See International Crisis Group, Algeria: Unrest and Impasse in Kabylia, Middle East/North Africa Report N°15,
(continued...)
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elite, while difficult to substantiate, have repeatedly surfaced over the past 18 months. Although
the “dark decade” of the 1990s was characterized by high levels of violence, some observers
contend that vivid memories of that time period have rendered many Algerians adverse to
perceived insecurity and therefore prone to reject widespread anti-government mobilization.
Issues for U.S. Policy
The United States has tried to balance appreciation for Algeria’s cooperation in counterterrorism
with encouragement of greater democratization (see “U.S. Relations” below). This balance has
taken on a new importance in light of recent regional unrest. Algeria is viewed as an important
partner in countering Al Qaeda-linked groups, and plays an increasingly significant role in the
African Union (AU), which the United States seeks to empower in regional security and conflict
resolution. A bilateral “contact group” on counterterrorism cooperation was launched in March
2011, which the U.S. Embassy in Algiers termed “a historic moment for the development of
bilateral security cooperation.”11 At the same time, the State Department continues to document a
wide range of human rights problems, including restrictions on freedom of assembly, expression,
and association; official impunity; and limited judicial independence (“Human Rights,” below).
The Obama Administration has reacted cautiously to recent anti-government protests in Algeria,
calling for restraint on the part of the security forces and greater political reforms while
emphasizing strong support for the Algerian government. A State Department spokesman said on
February 14 that “there is greater respect for the rights of the citizens” in Algeria than in other
Middle Eastern countries where the Administration has been more strongly critical of government
repression.12 President Obama subsequently commended Algeria’s decision to lift the 1992 state
of emergency law as “a positive sign that the Government of Algeria is listening to the concerns
and responding to the aspirations of its people,” and added that “we look forward to additional
steps by the government that enable the Algerian people to fully exercise their universal rights,
including freedom of expression, association and assembly.”13
After meeting with President Bouteflika and other senior officials in Algiers on February 24,
Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs William J. Burns noted that across the region,
“people are continuing to seek freedom and opportunity and dignity” but added that “the pursuit
of those aspirations will take different shapes in different societies. How best to address them is a
choice that people and leaderships in those societies will have to choose. As friends, we simply
encourage that those aspirations be addressed early and openly and peacefully and seriously.”14 In
a television interview in mid-March, during an official visit to neighboring Tunisia, Secretary of
State Hillary Clinton called for additional political reforms in Algeria, including “greater space”
for political speech and opposition activity.”15 Outgoing U.S. Ambassador David D. Pearce
repeated these calls in late March, adding that Algeria “is not immunized against change.”16
(...continued)
June 2003.
11 U.S. Embassy Algiers, “Bilateral Counterterrorism Contact Group Launched,” March 2011.
12 Philip J. Crowley, State Department Daily Press Briefing, February 14, 2011.
13 The White House, “Press Statement by the President on Algeria Lifting Its State of Emergency,” February 24, 2011.
14 U.S. Embassy Algiers, “Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs in Algeria,” February 25, 2011.
15 El Watan, “Hillary Clinton Demande ‘Un Plus Grand Espace’ Pour l’Opposition,” March 18, 2011.
16 L’Expression, “Ultime Conférence de Presse de l’Ambassadeur des Etats-Unis, David Pearce—‘l’Algérie N’Est Pas
(continued...)
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U.S. policy challenges in Algeria in some ways resemble those faced elsewhere in the region.
However, because of the limited nature of U.S. assistance (see Table 1) and Algeria’s famous
resistance to outside pressure, the U.S. government may find that it lacks well-developed levers
of influence needed to successfully encourage political reform.
Background
Algerians fought a protracted independence war
Algeria at a Glance
against the French between 1954 and 1962. The
Population: 34.6 million (2010 est.)
guerilla conflict was notable for its brutal tactics:
GDP growth rate: 4.1% (2010 est.)
the pro-independence National Liberation Front
(FLN) carried out urban terrorist attacks while the
GDP total and per capita: $254.7 billion,
$7,400 (purchasing power parity, 2010 est.)
French military engaged in torture and other
abuses. After an independence referendum on July
Inflation rate: 5.7% (2009 est.)
1, 1962, the FLN became the national ruling party,
Unemployment: 9.9%* (2010 est.)
and it remained politically dominant until the late
Poverty rate: 12.1% (2000)
1980s. The anti-colonial struggle remains a key
foundation of Algeria’s political identity. Algeria
Life expectancy: 74 years
was a leader in the Non-Aligned Movement during
Exports: petroleum, gas, petroleum products
the Cold War, and although Algeria engaged in
Imports: capital goods, food, consumer goods
military cooperation with the Soviet Union during
Major trading partners: France, United States,
that period, it never allowed foreign bases on its
Italy, China, Spain, Germany, Turkey, Canada
soil and strongly defended its independent status.
(2009)
Source: CIA, The World Factbook, 2011;
In 1965, Houari Boumediène seized power through
International Monetary Fund, February 2011.
a military coup and served as revolutionary council
chairman and president until his death in 1978.
* Note: The unemployment rate for young Algerians is
often estimated at 25% to 50% or higher.
Another military figure, Chadli Bendjedid,
succeeded Boumediène. The 1980s saw the rise of
Islamist ideology, starting on university campuses and eventually escalating into the most
significant political challenge to the FLN since independence. In October 1988, mass protests and
riots erupted, revealing widespread discontent with the FLN’s leadership and altering the political
landscape. The government attempted to outflank Islamists, passing restrictions on women’s
socioeconomic rights, but it also initiated a process of rapid political and economic
liberalization.17 In 1989, a new constitution (the country’s third) was adopted by referendum that
enabled greater political pluralism and paved the way for multiparty competition, while also
introducing explicit language about the Islamic nature of the Algerian state and society.
The same year, the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) was formed as a broad coalition of Islamist
groups. The government recognized the FIS as a legal political party and allowed it to compete in
local elections in 1990, in which it won over 50% of votes cast. In the first round of parliamentary
elections held in December 1991, the FIS again did well, and was expected to win a majority of
seats in a second round scheduled for early 1992. Before that round could be held, however, the
(...continued)
Immunisée Contre le Changement,’” March 26, 2011; CRS translation.
17 See John Ruedy, Modern Algeria: The Origins and Development of a Nation, Indiana University Press: 2005 (1992).
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army intervened in January 1992, forcing Bendjedid to resign and canceling the election results.
The FIS was banned and many of its leaders imprisoned.
As channels for political competition were shuttered, the thwarted Islamist movement fractured,
with some factions turning to violence. A decade of civil war between security forces and Islamist
insurgents ensued, which resulted in an as many as 200,000 deaths. The conflict was
characterized by high levels of civilian atrocities, including massacres, murders, and extrajudicial
executions. While insurgents were responsible for or inspired much of the violence, questions
remain about the government’s culpability in violence during the conflict. The government also
restricted freedom of the press, assembly, and movement. Relative stability was restored by the
early 2000s, aided by the introduction of an amnesty for former militants.
Figure 1. Map of Algeria and Its Neighbors
Source: CRS.
Government and Politics
The president has long dominated the domestic political system in Algeria, generally with strong
backing from the military. In 1999, former Foreign Minister Abdelaziz Bouteflika, a civilian with
vital military support, won the presidential election after all other candidates withdrew, charging
fraud. In April 2004, he was reelected with 83.5% of the vote in a multiparty contest during
which the military was officially neutral. International observers hailed that election as progress
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toward democratization even though the bureaucracy and judiciary had manipulated the political
process to favor Bouteflika in the pre-election period. Many saw Bouteflika’s victory as an
accurate reflection of the popular will and an endorsement of his effort to decrease violence and
for continued political stability.18 Since 2005, there have been persistent rumors about the state of
the 74-year-old president’s health, spurred in part by his intermittent absences from public view,
but no strong concern that he lacks a clear successor. Most analysts expect the military will again
play a determining role in the choice of Bouteflika’s replacement.
In November 2008, a joint session of parliament adopted constitutional amendments that, among
other provisions, abolished presidential term limits and allowed Bouteflika to run for a third term.
A huge salary increase for legislators may have contributed to the amendments’ passage. Some
critics had argued that the constitutional changes required a national referendum, but the
Constitutional Court disagreed. On April 9, 2009, as expected, Bouteflika won another term as
president with more than 90.24% of the vote over five challengers, none of whom was seen as
having a remote chance of ending his leadership. The Interior Ministry claimed a 74% voter
turnout. Once again, the president’s rivals alleged fraud and added claims that the authorities had
inflated turnout figures. Some attributed the military’s acquiescence this time to their inability to
find an alternative to Bouteflika.19
Algerians refer to Le Pouvoir (the powers-that-be) to designate opaque politico-military elite
structures that are widely perceived as driving events and major political decisions—as opposed
to “le gouvernement” (the government), elected representatives and administrators who are
viewed as having little significant power.20 A series of anti-corruption inquiries since 2009,
including an investigation of the state energy company, SONATRACH, and another into a $12
billion, 927-kilometer east-west highway project, have been viewed by some analysts as revealing
latent divisions within the security establishment, and could signal potential fracture points if
national protests place increasing pressure on the government.21 (See “The Economy,” below.)
The president heads the Council of Ministers (cabinet) and the High Security Council, and
appoints the prime minister. On June 23, 2008, Bouteflika named National Democratic Rally
(RND) leader Ahmed Ouyahia, who had served as prime minister from 1995 to 1999 and from
2003 to 2006, and who is known to be close to the military, to the post again. After his re-election
in 2009, Bouteflika reconfirmed Ouyahia as prime minister. Ouyahia is considered a possible
successor to Bouteflika. Media reports suggest that Bouteflika’s younger brother, Said, also may
have presidential ambitions. Speculation about Bouteflika’s successor intermittently surfaces
along with the rumors about the president’s health.
The bicameral, multiparty parliament is weak. The president appoints the prime minister as well
as one-third of the upper house of parliament, known as the Council of the Nation. (The
remaining two-thirds are selected by indirect vote.) Although either the president or one of the
parliamentary chambers may initiate legislation, it cannot be passed into law without being
brought before both chambers, which requires the support of the presidency. The 380-seat
National People’s Assembly was last elected on May 17, 2007, with a voter turnout of 36.5%—
18 Marwane Ben Yahmed, “Les Raisons D’Un Plebiscite,” Jeune Afrique Intelligent, No. 2258, 8-14 April 2004.
19 Africa Research Bulletin, April 1-30, 2009, p. 19732, citing Africa Confidential.
20 See, e.g., George Joffé, “Political Dynamics in North Africa,” International Affairs, vol. 85, no. 5 (Sept 2009).
21 See, e.g., Africa-Asia Confidential, “Algeria: Chinese Companies Named in Anti-Corruption Probe,” March 16,
2010; Reuters, “Interview—Algeria Corruption Case ‘Part of Political Struggle,’” February 8, 2010.
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the lowest ever, reflecting lack of popular faith in the political system and common knowledge
that the legislature has little power. Parties in the governing coalition placed at the top: the
National Liberation Front (FLN) won 23% of the vote and 136 seats; the RND 10.3%, 61 seats;
and the moderately Islamist Movement for a Peaceful Society (MSP) 9.6%, 51 seats; 18 other
parties and 33 independents also won seats. The Council of the Nation has 144 seats, of which the
FLN has 29, RND 12, and MSP 3; independents and presidential appointees comprise the
remainder. The next parliamentary election is scheduled for 2012.
Terrorism
Up to 200,000 lives were lost during Algeria’s civil war between 1992 and 2000, most
attributable to terrorist acts by Islamist groups and others to killings by state security services
pursuing ostensible counterterrorism missions (see “Counterterrorism,” below). The security
situation has markedly improved since then, but domestic terrorism has not been eliminated. The
U.S. State Department designates two Algerian groups as Foreign Terrorist Organizations
(FTOs).22 The Armed Islamic Group (GIA) was most active from 1991 to 2001 and last attacked
in 2006. Former GIA members have accepted the government amnesty or joined other groups.
The Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC) split from GIA in 1998, declared its
allegiance to Al Qaeda in 2003 and, after Abdelmalik Droukdel (aka Abu Musab Abdulwadood)
became “emir” (leader), united with it officially on September 11, 2006, taking the name Al
Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM or Al Qaeda in the Lands of the Islamic Maghreb,
AQLIM). AQIM seeks to replace the Algerian regime with an Islamic state and calls for jihad
against the United States, France, and Spain.23
The practical meaning of the union with Al Qaeda is uncertain, and links between AQIM and Al
Qaeda leaders in Pakistan/Afghanistan may be nominal but mutually beneficial.24 Adopting the
famous name may have enhanced AQIM’s legitimacy among extremists and facilitated
recruitment, while enabling Al Qaeda to burnish its international credentials. Since “uniting” with
Al Qaeda, AQIM’s rhetoric against the West and governments in the region and its calls for jihad
against the United States, France, and Spain have increased. AQIM’s cohesiveness is questioned
as it may be operating as relatively autonomous and/or rival groups and has experienced
defections. The U.S. State Department estimates AQIM’s strength at under 1,000 in Algeria, with
a smaller number in the Sahel to the south; other sources provide lower estimates.25
After Droukdel became leader, AQIM increased its attacks against the Algerian government and
security forces, and against foreign workers in the country.26 In 2007, it shifted tactics to more
frequent, “Iraqi style,” suicide attacks, with simultaneous bombings of the Government Palace
(the prime and interior ministries) and a suburban police station on April 11, 2007, and of the
Constitutional Council and the U.N. headquarters on December 11, among other attacks. In
22 U.S. State Department, Country Reports on Terrorism, 2009, released August 5, 2010, at http://www.state.gov/s/ct/
rls/crt/2009/index.htm.
23 See CRS Report R41070, Al Qaeda and Affiliates: Historical Perspective, Global Presence, and Implications for
U.S. Policy, coordinated by John Rollins; note text-box on “Jihad, Al Qaeda, and other Violent Islamist Groups,” p. 4.
24 Yaroslav Trofimov, “Islamic Rebels Gain in the Sahara,” Wall Street Journal, August 18, 2009.
25 State Department, Country Reports on Terrorism, op. cit.
26 An Algerian court sentenced Droukdel in absentia to life imprisonment for his membership in a terrorist organization
and involvement in kidnappings.
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addition, an AQIM suicide bomber unsuccessfully attempted to assassinate President Bouteflika
on September 6, 2007. All of these attacks resulted in many civilian casualties. After a relative
lull, AQIM again targeted security forces in the summer of 2008. That August, suicide bombers
perpetrated a particularly bloody assault on a police academy, resulting in more than 40 deaths.
Since 2009, AQIM has operated more outside of Algiers and other large cities where security
forces have made it difficult to operate, and it has continued to focus on the Berber region of
Kabylie, in northeastern Algeria, where the security presence was reduced after civil unrest in
2005. In line with Droukdel’s regional ambitions and because of difficulties experienced in the
north, the group’s operations also have moved into the Sahelian countries of Mauritania, Niger,
and Mali, with aspirations to spread as far south as Nigeria.27 Activities along the Malian border
have manifestly increased and AQIM reportedly has agreements with tribes in northern Mali,
sometimes sealed by marriage and/or financial compensation. The U.S. State Department
nonetheless continues to consider the potential terrorist threat to Embassy personnel in Algiers
“sufficiently serious to require them to live and work under significant security restrictions,” and
the Algerian government requires Embassy personnel to “seek permission to travel to the Casbah
[old city] within Algiers or outside the province of Algiers and to have a security escort.”28
In May 2009, AQIM claimed responsibility for executing a British hostage in Mali and, in June, it
shot a U.S. aid worker while attempting to kidnap him in Nouakchott, Mauritania. Also in June,
terrorists killed 24 gendarmes (paramilitary police) in an ambush about 218 miles east of Algiers.
In July, they ambushed a military convoy in Tipaza Province, 90 miles west of Algiers; at least 14
soldiers were killed.29 In August, AQIM attacked the French Embassy in Nouakchott. In
November, an AQIM cell kidnapped three Spanish relief workers in Mauritania and
unsuccessfully attempted to kidnap U.S. embassy employees in Niger. In June 2010, a suicide
bomber attacked a police barracks 60 miles east of Algiers, killing at least nine. In July 2010,
AQIM claimed responsibility for attacking a police convoy near the border with Mali, killing 11
gendarmes and seizing weapons. AQIM was linked to the kidnapping of an Italian tourist in
southeastern Algeria in February 2011.
Algerian officials have expressed concern that AQIM could take advantage of civil conflict in
neighboring Libya to seize territory or sophisticated weapons systems. Algerian soldiers have
deployed to the Libyan border, where they say they have killed several armed militants in recent
months.30
The AQIM organizational structure is hazy. Droukdel may be the spiritual leader or ideologue of
the group who sets broad directions, but Mokhtar Belmokhtar and Yahia Djouadi have gained
27 See Jean-Pierre Filiu, “Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb: Algerian Challenge or Global Threat?” Carnegie Papers,
No. 104, October 2009, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
28 State Department Travel Warning on Algeria, March 16, 2011.
29 Some attributed the second ambush to the Protectors of Salafi Call, which reportedly had split from the GSPC and,
therefore, is not considered part of AQIM. Others attributed the attack to a different regional command of AQIM or
suggested that AQIM is encroaching on the Protectors’ territory. “Algerian Army Launches ‘Large Scale’ Operations
an Al-Qaidah Maghreb,” El-Khabar website, August 2, 2009, BBC Monitoring Middle East, “Five Regions Reportedly
Designated for ‘Terrorist Deployment’ in Algeria, El-Khabar website, August 5, 2009, BBC Monitoring Middle East,
“Retreating of the Salafi Call Protectors,” Echourouk el Youmi website, August 17, 2009, BBC Monitoring Newsfile.
30 Reuters, “Security Official: Al-Qaeda Exploiting Libya Unrest to Acquire Weapons,” April 4, 2011; Reuters, “Al
Qaeda Bolstering Presence in Libya, Algeria Says,” April 6, 2011; Al-Hayat, “Algeria Deploys Troops to Monitor
Libyan Desert, Prevent Infiltration,” March 12, 2011; BBC Monitoring, “Counterterrorism Digest: 27-28 March 2011,”
and “Counterterrorism Digest: 4-5 April 2011.”
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public prominence as (perhaps rival) leaders of AQIM regional commands or “emirates” in the
Sahel who oversee operations. Alternatively, they may be independent of Droukdel. Abdelhamid
Abu Zaid (aka Abid Hammadou) is associated with Djouadi and reportedly is heavily engaged in
money-making criminal activities. AQIM raises funds by kidnapping31 for ransoms and by
trafficking in arms, drugs, vehicles, cigarettes, and persons across that vast region. The Algerian
military claims that AQIM provides protection in return for cash for convoys smuggling drugs
from South America, across the Sahara, to Europe.32 All of these activities have led some to
describe it as a “hybrid terrorist-criminal organization” or a “criminal organization with an
attachment to Al Qaeda.”33 AQIM reportedly gets some small-scale funding from cells in
Europe.34 AQIM communicates with potential recruits via sophisticated internet videos.
Algeria is a major source of transnational terrorists, and one batch of seized Al Qaeda records
suggested that Algeria was one of the largest suppliers of anti-coalition fighters in Iraq.35 Some
Algerians were captured in Afghanistan and, at one time, 26 were held at the U.S. Naval Base at
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba; most have been repatriated. The Bush and Obama Administrations
sought assurances from Algiers that repatriated detainees would not pose a future danger and
would be treated fairly. Several were tried after their return and acquitted for lack of evidence.
Algerians have been arrested on suspicion of belonging to or supporting AQIM in France, Spain,
Italy, Germany, and Britain. In 2010, there have been unconfirmed reports of Algerians fighting
with Islamist terrorist groups in Yemen and Somalia. In addition, several major international
terrorist plots have involved Algerians. In December 1999, Ahmed Ressam, an Algerian trained
in Afghanistan, was arrested after attempting to enter the United States from Canada; he was
convicted for the so-called Millennium Plot to carry out bomb attacks in Los Angeles. His
associates and other Algerians in Canada were linked to the GIA and Al Qaeda. In January 2003,
six Algerians were arrested in a London apartment with traces of ricin, a deadly poison. In
October 2009, two French brothers of Algerian origin, one a worker at the European Organization
for Nuclear Research (CERN) in Geneva, were arrested in France after intelligence agencies
came to suspect them of “criminal activities related to a terror group,” that is, AQIM.36
Counterterrorism
After President Bouteflika took office, he sought to add peaceful means to the government’s
tactics to counter terrorism. In September 1999, a national referendum approved the “Civil
Concord,” an amnesty for those who had fought the government. In September 2005, another
referendum approved the Charter for Peace and National Reconciliation, including an amnesty for
all except murderers, rapists, and bombers, exemption for security forces from prosecution for
31 AQIM reportedly mostly purchases Western hostages from local criminal gangs and tribes in the Sahel. Center for
Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), Middle East Program, The Dynamics of North African Terrorism,
Conference Report, March 2010.
32 “Algeria Says Al Qaeda Guards Sahara Drug Smugglers,” Times of Oman, February 23, 2010.
33 CSIS 2010, op. cit.
34 See also, Michael Jonson and Christian Nils Larson, “Illegal Tender: Funding Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb,”
Janes Intelligence Review, October 2008.
35 Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, Harmony Project, “Al-Qaida’s Foreign Fighters in Iraq: A First Look at
the Sinjar Records,” January 2008.
36 Emily Andrews, “Big Bang Scientist Admits Plotting Al Qaeda Atrocity,” Daily Mail, October 12, 2009.
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crimes of the 1990s, and compensation for families of victims of violence and the disappeared.
Critics charge that it has resulted in the freeing of recidivist terrorists or that it failed to provide
accountability for the disappeared and for truth-telling about the role of the security forces. A
presidential commission determined that excesses of unsupervised security forces were
responsible for the disappearances of 6,146 civilians from 1992 to 2000 and recommended
compensation. Organizations representing victims’ families claim up to 20,000 disappeared. The
government has extended the amnesty period indefinitely and has controversially extended it to
some former GSPC leaders.
In 2008, the government began to recruit 100,000 new police and gendarme officers to reinforce
borders, augment security at airports, and increase the security presence in major cities. As noted
above, it has been mostly successful in impeding terrorist operations in cities. In addition, the
government deployed thousands of troops to Saharan provinces along Algeria’s borders with
Mali, Niger, and Mauritania to combat AQIM. The Algerian army continues to conduct targeted
counterterrorism operations and searches in areas surrounding Algiers.37
Algeria is the region’s dominant economic and military power and it has promoted a regional
approach in which it is the lead actor to counter terrorism. It recognizes the immensity of the
Sahara Desert-Sahel territory and believes that intra-regional cooperation is needed to fight
AQIM. In line with its anti-colonial creed, Algiers is wary of a potential foreign direct
counterterrorism role and seeks to prevent foreign, non-African (i.e., French and U.S.)
involvement/interference/intervention in the region. It fears that AQIM’s propensity to kidnap
Westerners for ransom might provoke direct foreign intervention and that Algeria’s weaker
neighbors might be vulnerable to outside influence, especially if exercised by France—their
former colonial ruler. In addition, Algiers seeks to impede AQIM’s ability to extract large
ransoms from Western governments and, thereby, to build up a treasury to pay more recruits and
buy more arms. While it opposes a foreign presence, Algiers welcomes other outside support for
counterterrorism operations.
In July 2009, the leaders of Algeria, Libya, and Mali agreed to work in concert against AQIM. In
August, the military chiefs of Algeria, Libya, Niger, Mali, and Mauritania met in the southern
Algerian town of Tamanrasset and agreed to cooperate more to counter terrorism and related
crime and developed the so-called “Tamanrasset Plan.” In April 2010, following this framework,
they began to set up a joint command center for security and military coordination in
Tamanrasset; Libya is not participating, while Burkina Faso is observing. Probably due to
strained bilateral ties (see “Foreign Affairs” below) and because Algiers argues that the security
of the Sahel does not concern Morocco, it has not invited its western neighbor to participate in
regional counterterrorism efforts—despite AQIM’s reported attempts to use Moroccan territory as
a route to smuggle drugs to Europe. Participating governments established several coordinating
committees, assigned countries specific missions, and reportedly agreed to increase the number of
security forces, gendarmes, and soldiers deployed for counterterrorism in the Sahel from 25,000
(15,000 of whom were Algerian) to 75,000. Algeria already had increased its forces in the region
to 25,000.38 Algeria is providing arms, ammunition, vehicles, fuel, and training to Mali, Niger,
37 Midi-Libre, “Boumerdes: Two Blockhouses Destroyed,” March 29, 2011, via Open Source Center (OSC);
L’Expression, “Bejaia: Military Offensive Near El Kseur,” March 30, 2011, via OSC; Le Courrier d’Algérie, “Algerian
Army Launches Antiterror Operations in Three Tizi Ouzou Regions,” April 7, 2011, via OSC.
38 “Anti-Terrorism Troops in the Sahel Increased from 25,000 to 75,000,” El-Khabar website, April 24, 2010, BBC
Monitoring Middle East.
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and Mauritania and attempting to mount joint operations with their forces. Several additional
high-level counterterrorism meetings have been held.
The sometimes dissonant relations among the neighbors and their dependence on France have
limited implementation of Algeria’s regional approach and the Tamanrasset Plan in practice. This
was apparent in July 2010, when French and Mauritanian forces carried out an unsuccessful raid
into Mali, without Mali’s permission, to rescue a Frenchman reportedly held by Abu Zaid’s
group. The effort failed and AQIM later announced that it had executed the hostage. In August,
Mali, reportedly acting for Spain, negotiated with AQIM and secured the release of two Spanish
hostages in exchange for two AQIM members and perhaps a ransom as well.39 Mali thereby
angered its neighbors, including Algeria, who oppose the payment of ransoms. Algeria does not
seem able to compete with European power, influence, and assistance to Sahelian governments.
On occasion, Algiers has condemned its neighbors for releasing terrorists as ransom for hostages
kidnapped by AQIM. Algeria recalled its ambassador from Mali in February 2010 after its
government, under considerable pressure from Paris, released four terrorists in exchange for a
French hostage—an alleged aid worker who was later found to be an intelligence officer. Shortly
thereafter, President Bouteflika postponed a visit to France and Algiers refused to schedule a visit
by France’s then-Foreign Minister Bernard Kouchner to Algeria.
Human Rights
A state of emergency declared in 1992 at the outset of the conflict between the Algerian security
forces and Islamist terrorists was lifted in February 2011. The state of emergency granted
authorities extraordinary powers, such as the ability to detain suspects without charge and to
restrict public meetings and demonstrations. Various restrictions on freedom of assembly and
association nevertheless remain in effect, including a ban on protests in Algiers and other
provisions that human rights advocates contend place significant constraints on civil liberties.40
The government also continues to detain former Islamist militants who were previously held in
“administrative detention” under emergency provisions, but under different orders.41 The military
also continues to play a role in domestic law enforcement and crowd-control.
According to the latest edition of the U.S. State Department’s annual Country Report on Human
Rights Practices, human rights problems in Algeria include failure to account for persons who
disappeared in detention in the 1990s, official impunity, overuse of pretrial detention, poor prison
conditions, corruption, and a lack of judicial independence. Reports of torture and “arbitrary
killings” occur, but are fewer than in previous years. The report also noted problems with
security-based restrictions on movement, lack of government transparency, discrimination and
violence against women, and restrictions on workers rights.42 Algerian officials have criticized
and disputed aspects of these U.S. reports.
39 “Algerian Paper Says Mali Violating Regional Anti-terrorism Agreements,” Echourouk El Youmi website, August
19, 2010, BBC Monitoring Middle East, August 20, 2010.
40 Human Rights Watch, “Algeria: Restore Civil Liberties,” April 6, 2011.
41 AFP, “Algeria’s Ex-Islamist Leader Moved to ‘Safe Place,’” March 9, 2011.
42 U.S. Department of State, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices - 2010, Algeria, April 8, 2011, at
http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2010/nea/154458.htm.
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The State Department’s International Religious Freedoms Report, 2010 noted that “the status of
respect for religious freedom by the government improved marginally during the reporting
period.”43 However, it also stated that “the government’s National Commission for Non-Muslim
Religious Services did not establish an administrative means for non-Muslim religious groups to
register with the government as required by law,” and that “government officials also publicly
criticized evangelism and emphasized the dominant role of Islam in society.” Nonetheless, the
report recognized that “there were some positive changes in the government’s treatment of
religious minorities.” The government “ceased prosecutions of members of minority religious
groups; paid increasing attention to Christian groups’ concerns, including organizing a
symposium on religious worship; officially recognized the first official representative of the
Jewish community in the country; and allowed for the reopening of 25 synagogues. However, the
government reportedly did not approve any other requests for registration by non-Muslim
religious associations, including Christian” requests.
The Department’s Trafficking in Persons Report places Algeria on the Tier 2 Watch List with
regard to human trafficking because it “does not fully comply with the minimum standards for the
elimination of trafficking; however, it is making significant efforts to do so.” In January 2009, the
government approved legislation that criminalizes trafficking in persons for the purposes of labor
and sexual exploitation. According to the State Department, it later “helped formulate a training
program for police, judges, and prosecutors on its counter-trafficking law. Despite these efforts,
the government did not show overall progress in punishing trafficking crimes and protecting
trafficking victims.”44
The Berbers (Amazigh), natives of North Africa from before the seventh century Arab Muslim
invasions, are a group with specific human rights concerns. They seek language and cultural
rights and an end to government discrimination and neglect. In April 2001 (“Black Spring”), the
death of a Berber youth in custody sparked riots in which security forces killed 126 people. The
government agreed to compensate the victims and recognize Tamazight, a Berber language, as a
national language, but not an official language. Berber activists want official language status, but
President Bouteflika and others have opposed this change. In January 2005, the government
agreed to rehabilitate protesters and remove security forces from Berber areas, and established a
joint committee to follow up. Berber areas are in the mountainous Kabylie region, which, with the
withdrawal of security forces, has become a focus for AQIM activity.
The Economy
Hydrocarbons (oil and gas) are the engine of the Algerian economy, providing about 65% of
public revenues, 26% of the gross domestic product (GDP), and 98% of export earnings.45 In the
past decade, high oil prices boosted foreign monetary reserves and economic growth, fueled a
construction boom, eased unemployment somewhat, and produced early repayment of foreign
43 U.S. State Department, International Religious Freedom Report–2010, November 17, 2010, at http://www.state.gov/
g/drl/rls/irf/2010/148812.htm.
44 U.S. State Department, Trafficking in Persons Report, June 14, 2010, at http://www.state.govg/tip/rls/tiprpt/2010/
142759.htm.
45 CRS calculations based on International Monetary Fund (IMF) figures for 2009, in IMF, Algeria: 2010 Article IV
Consultation—Staff Report; Public Information Notice on the Executive Board Discussion; and Statement by the
Executive Director for Algeria, February 2011.
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debt. In 2009, however, the global recession resulted in a significant decline in hydrocarbon
exports and a concomitant drop in revenues. An International Monetary Fund (IMF) evaluation in
December 2010 concluded that the government’s expansionary fiscal policies (including
investment in public infrastructure) had nonetheless enabled Algeria to weather the crisis well. At
the same time, the IMF noted that Algeria remains “highly dependent on fluctuations of
hydrocarbon prices and on public expenditure,” and suggested that further structural reforms
remain necessary to “strengthen and develop the financial sector, enhance the business climate
and competitiveness, promote private investment and support economic diversification.”46 The
IMF has also stated that “containing” state expenditures—including subsidy programs—“will be
necessary to ensure long-term fiscal sustainability.”47 In an April 2011 press briefing, IMF
Managing Director Dominique Strauss-Kahn stated that “2011 should be a rather good year for
Algeria, specially because of the high prices of oil and gas,” but added that “the large part of the
resources have to be used [for] infrastructure, long-term investment, and also another part which
has to do with improving the business environment, likely to attract foreign investment.”48
In October 2008, Finance Minister Karim Djoudi asserted that the global financial crisis would
not affect Algeria because it is not present in international banking, has sharply reduced its
national debt, relies increasingly on domestic financing to fund development, and has rejected
total convertibility of the dinar (the national currency). However, critics pointed out as
weaknesses the absence of a modern financial market, an undeveloped stock exchange, an
underdeveloped banking system, and a failure to integrate in the world economy.49 Some
observers suggest that a continuing tide of illegal young Algerian immigrants to Europe is
evidence of the failure of the economy to serve the people before, during, and now after the
global crisis has begun to subside.
A 2005 hydrocarbon law diminished the monopoly of the state energy company, SONATRACH,
opening the sector for private and foreign investment. A 2006 law, however, required
international companies to give SONATRACH a 51% stake in new oil, gas, and related transport
projects. Further restrictive foreign investment rules were enacted the Complementary Finance
Law (CFL) of 2009, which enacted restrictions on imports and foreign investment. These
measures require 51% Algerian ownership of new foreign investment, 30% Algerian ownership
of foreign import companies, and use of letters of credit for the payment of import bills. Further,
the 2010 CFL, effective as of September 2010, requires foreign bidders who win construction
contracts to invest in a joint venture with a local partner.50 Such changes have prompted foreign
investors, including U.S. businesses and government, to appeal for greater stability of laws in
Algeria, and may have contributed to a reported slowing of foreign investment in exploration and
production.51 (See “U.S. Investment and Energy Issues,” below.)
46 IMF, Algeria: Staff Report for the 2010 Article IV Consultation, December 23, 2010.
47 IMF, Algeria: 2010 Article IV Consultation, op. cit.
48 IMF, “Transcript of a Group Interview with Managing Director Dominique Strauss-Kahn and Middle East
Journalists,” April 6, 2011.
49 William Maclean, “Algeria Shielded from Financial Turmoil,” Reuters, October 5, 2009.
50 State Department, Bureau of Economic, Energy and Business Affairs, “2011 Investment Climate Statement—
Algeria,” March 2011.
51 Samuel Ciszuk, “Abysmal Licensing Round Result in Algeria Confirms Energy Sector Malaise,” IHS Global Insight,
March 18, 2011; Africa Energy Intelligence, “Oil Companies Steer Clear of Algeria Due to Windfall Tax, Few Bid for
Licenses,” March 23, 2011.
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In January 2010, nearly the entirety of SONATRACH’s senior management were removed from
their posts as a result of an official investigation into alleged corruption in the awarding of
contracts. Charges were brought against several executives, including the CEO, Mohamed
Meziane, and a number of government officials. The government provided few public comments
on the investigation, and some analysts viewed it as opaque and potentially politically
motivated.52 The shakeup had little visible impact on production and did not significantly disrupt
the company’s operations. However, it appeared to contribute to the president’s decision to
replace then-Minister of Energy and Mines Chakib Khelil, formerly a powerful figure, in May
2010. In November, SONATRACH published new anti-corruption guidelines for staff, partner
companies, and contractors.
Algeria has several pipelines supplying gas to Europe and plans for more. In July 2009, Algeria,
Niger, and Nigeria agreed to build an ambitious $10 billion Trans-Saharan pipeline to ship natural
gas to Europe. The aim of the project is to facilitate the economic development of the transit
countries and provide Europe with another source of energy security. Other new projects include
the TransMed pipeline to transport Algerian gas via Tunisia to Italy and the Galsi pipeline to
transport gas directly from Algeria to Italy. Algeria also is expanding its exploration and drilling.
The government is directing some of its hydrocarbon revenues for development. A $140 billion,
five-year plan that ended in 2009 invested in infrastructure, highways, ports, airports, and water
resources. Another $286 billion, five-year plan for the period 2010-2014 now follows. The plans
are intended to generate diversified growth and employment, which the government has been
hard-pressed to achieve thus far.
Despite the country’s considerable oil and gas income and investments, there are chronic
socioeconomic problems: high unemployment and underemployment; inadequate housing, health
services, and education; decaying infrastructure; great inequality of income distribution; and
government corruption.53 These conditions have sparked social protests in several areas of the
country. In August 2009, Chinese workers clashed with Algerians in Algiers. The incident was
attributed in part to unemployed Algerians’ resentment of the estimated 50,000 Chinese working
on development projects. There have been no subsequent reports of similar incidents. (China has
been awarded approximately $20 billion in contracts under the new development plan and has
surged to become second only to France as a supplier of imports to Algeria.54 It has yet to become
a major recipient of Algerian oil exports, but it is actively prospecting new fields.)
Algeria has applied to join the World Trade Organization, but has many problems to overcome
first. Among them is central control of the economy that is only easing slowly, with a very
selective privatization program. The government argues that its conditions for foreign investment
are needed to encourage domestic companies.
52 Reuters, “Interview—Algeria Corruption Case ‘Part of Political Struggle,’” February 8, 2010.
53 Algeria is placed 105 out of 178 countries assessed on Transparency International’s 2010 Corruption Perceptions
Index, at http://www.transparency.org.
54 Alfred de Montesquiou, “China Builds Up Support in Algeria; The Chinese are Aiding a Construction Boom in the
North African Nation, Eager to Earn Good Will and Oil,” Los Angeles Times, January 24, 2010; and Africa Research
Bulletin, July 16-August 15, 2009, p. 18335.
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Foreign Affairs
After independence in 1962, Algeria was in the forefront of Third World politics, especially the
Non-Aligned Movement, and very active in the Arab world and Africa. It was considerably less
active in the 1990s, when it was preoccupied by domestic violence. Since Bouteflika became
president, Algeria has reemerged as a regional actor, especially in Africa. It has provided airlift
support for U.N. peacekeepers in Darfur and for African Union peacekeepers in Somalia. In
February 2010, President Bouteflika also promised to contribute 1,700 soldiers to the African
Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). (At the time of writing, Algerian soldiers had yet to
deploy under AMISOM.)
Morocco
Algeria and Morocco are neighbors, but they had different colonial experiences and emerged with
distinctly different forms of government and a rivalry. Algeria achieved its independence via a
bloody revolution and emerged as a republic with military or military-influenced governments.
Morocco, on the other hand, is a centuries-old monarchy that made a more peaceful transition
from French control. Shortly after Algeria became independent, Morocco laid claim to some
Algerian territory, and they went to war for about five months in 1963-1964. The border was not
demarcated until 1972.
Algeria’s current relations with Morocco are particularly strained because Algeria supports and
hosts the Popular Front for the Liberation of Saqiat al-Hamra and Rio de Oro (POLISARIO),
which seeks independence for the former Spanish Sahara, known as the Western Sahara.55
Thousands of Sahrawi (as the people of Western Sahara are known) occupy several refugee
camps in the Tindouf area of southwestern Algeria. The camps are under the purview of the
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), but are run by the POLISARIO.
Morocco claims and largely occupies the Western Sahara. Algeria considers the problem of the
Western Sahara to be one of decolonization requiring resolution by the U.N., and it maintains that
it is not a party to the conflict. Algiers viewed with favor the direct, unconditional talks between
the POLISARIO and Morocco that began in June 2007 in response to a U.N. Security Council
call. However, no progress resulted from those talks. The U.N. Secretary General’s Personal
Envoy Christopher Ross has held renewed, albeit “informal,” direct talks since December 2010,
but has not disclosed any progress; he was quoted in the press as stating that “Each party
continues to reject the other as a sole basis for future negotiations.”56 The parties continue to
reiterate uncompromising positions and do not inspire optimism for achieving a settlement.
Algeria had said that it would like to improve bilateral relations with Morocco by excluding the
Western Sahara issue from that equation. Yet, Algiers refuses to reopen the border with Morocco,
which it closed 15 years ago in retaliation for Moroccan accusations that Algerians were involved
in terror attacks in Marrakesh. Algiers maintains that smuggling, drug-trafficking, and illegal
immigration need to be dealt with before it opens the border and that an opening would endanger
Algeria’s security.57 It also believes that Morocco has more to gain in trade and tourism than
55 See CRS Report RS20962, Western Sahara, by Alexis Arieff.
56 Gala Riani, “Morocco and Polisario Front Hold Western Sahara Talks Without Breakthrough,” Global Insight,
January 24, 2011.
57 “Zerhouni Responds to Call by Rabat, Algeria not in Hurry to Open Border,” El-Khabar, March 23, 2008, BBC
(continued...)
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Algeria if the border were reopened. Algerians note that Morocco continues to levy accusations
against Algeria on the Western Sahara issue at the same time that it seeks benefits from Algeria.
France
Algeria and France, its former colonizer, have complex, unpredictable relations. France is
Algeria’s major trading partner. About 4 million Algerians and individuals of Algerian descent
live in France, but France has decreased visas for Algerians out of fear of terrorism and
absorption difficulties. Under Bouteflika, French-Algerian relations initially warmed
considerably. However, a planned treaty of friendship fizzled when France rejected Algeria’s
demand for an apology for the crimes of colonization. President Nicolas Sarkozy refuses to
apologize, but acknowledges that colonialism was “profoundly unjust.” He seeks to deepen
bilateral business and trade ties, advance civilian nuclear energy cooperation, and promote the
European Union’s Union for the Mediterranean (UfM), a community of states bordering the sea.
France’s inclusion of Algerians on a list of persons subject to “meticulous inspection” for security
purposes at French airports was protested by Algiers. An Algerian official later described UfM as
a “Trojan horse for the normalization with Israel” and said that Algeria is not interested in it “if
its aim is to normalize relations with the Zionist regime.”58
AQIM has kidnapped several French citizens in the Sahel, and the group declared war on
President Sarkozy after the failed French attempt to free a hostage in July 2010 resulted in several
AQIM casualties. Algeria criticized the July action, and France’s then-Foreign Minister Kouchner
did not visit Algeria when he subsequently tried to get increased Sahelian cooperation with Paris
to fight terrorism. President Sarkozy has declared that France is at war with AQIM and has made
fighting the group one of his highest priorities, dispatching military and intelligence forces and
equipment to the Sahel. He also said that France would no longer pay ransoms.59 If the French
government follows through on this pledge and consults Algiers about countering terrorism, then
bilateral relations and counterterrorism efforts may benefit. However, France has economic and
other interests (i.e., uranium mines) in the Sahel and may, on occasion, seek to further them
unilaterally, without consulting Algiers. Nonetheless, by October 2010, the perception of a
common AQIM threat appeared to be fostering an improvement in bilateral relations, as Algerian
Foreign Minister Mourad Medelci described them as “turning a new corner” and “strategic.”60
European Union
With France’s support, Algeria signed an association agreement with the European Union (EU) in
2001 and has participated in the Europe-Mediterranean Partnership (MEDA) since 1995. In
March 2009, Algeria enacted a law making it a crime to leave “the national territory in an illegal
manner” in order to address EU concerns about illegal immigration as well as to stop human
(...continued)
Monitoring Middle East, “Algerian President Advised by Military to Keep Border with Morocco Closed,” Al-Quds al-
Arabi website, August 1, 2009, via BBC Monitoring Middle East, August 3, 2009.
58 Minister of State and special representative of the President Abdelaziz Belkhadem, quoted in El-Khabar website,
June 18, 2010, via BBC Monitoring Middle East.
59 Charles Bremner, “Sarkozy Wages Desert War on Terror,” The Times (London), September 21, 2010.
60 “Algerian Minister Discusses French Ties,” El-Khabar website, October 22, 2010, via BBC Monitoring Middle East.
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trafficking. At the same time, Algeria wants Europe to assist with development in order to strike
at the causes of emigration.
U.S. Relations
U.S.-Algerian ties date from a Treaty of Peace and Friendship in 1775. Algerians have fond
memories of President Kennedy’s support for their independence from France.61 Relations
suffered later due to Cold War ideological differences, as Algeria was a socialist republic with
close ties to the Soviet Union. They have been re-energized over the past decade, and Bouteflika
met with President George W. Bush several times. Bouteflika attended the June 2004 Group of
Eight (G-8) summit in Sea Island, Georgia.
The U.S.-Algeria relationship is highly focused on security cooperation and counterterrorism;
Algeria receives limited bilateral aid (see “U.S. Assistance,” below). U.S. policy has tried to
balance appreciation for Algeria’s cooperation in counterterrorism with encouragement of
democratization, and U.S. officials have paired recent calls for political reforms with statements
asserting broad support for the Algerian government and for U.S.-Algerian ties.
A bilateral “contact group” on counterterrorism cooperation was launched in March 2011; the
U.S. Embassy in Algiers stated that the launch was “a historic moment for the development of
bilateral security cooperation” and welcomed “Algeria’s unfailing commitment to the fight
against terrorism and organized crime.”62 In 2005, the United States and Algeria launched a Joint
Military Dialogue to foster exchanges, training, and joint exercises. Algeria participates in the
U.S. Trans-Sahara Counter Terrorism Partnership (TSCTP), a State Department-led interagency
program that aims to improve regional governments’ capacity and coordination to counter violent
extremism, but Algeria prefers bilateral activities with the United States that recognize its
regional importance. As part of TSCTP, U.S. Special Forces train, equip, and aid national forces
in fighting the AQIM in southern Algeria and the Sahel. U.S. intelligence also is shared.63 For
their part, Algerian authorities have shared information regarding terrorists of Algerian origin
with the United States. To support Algeria’s efforts to combat terrorism, the U.S. Treasury Office
of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) has listed leaders of AQIM, including Droukdel, as Specially
Designated Global Terrorists. Algeria also participates in the NATO-Mediterranean dialogue and
in NATO naval exercises.
Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs Jeffrey Feltman made his first visit to
Algeria in October 2010 and saluted the country as “an important voice” with “a great role to play
in keeping peace in Africa.” With reference to Algeria’s sensitivities, he stated that the United
States “respects the sovereignty of the countries of the region and its commitment in the fight
against terrorism did not replace that of the countries concerned.” With regard to
counterterrorism, Feltman said, “We support Algeria’s leadership in this operation, in particular
61 As a U.S. Senator, John F. Kennedy expressed support for Algeria’s independence struggle. On July 3, 1962,
Kennedy congratulated Algerians on “the creation of a great new state [which] represents the courageous and devoted
work of the Algerian people and their leaders stretching over many years,” and likened Algeria’s war for independence
to America’s own.
62 U.S. Embassy Algiers, “Bilateral Counterterrorism Contact Group Launched,” March 2011.
63 Mhand Berkouk, U.S.–Algerian Security Cooperation and the War on Terror, Carnegie Endowment for International
Peace, June 2009.
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as regards the plan adopted at the last Tamanrasset meeting…. Our intention is not to replace the
countries of the region. We are merely worried about the stability of these countries.”64 As noted
in “Issues for U.S. Policy,” above, Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs William J. Burns
visited Algiers in February 2011; his remarks after meeting with President Bouteflika expressed
support for reform efforts while emphasizing “the high priority that the United States attaches to
our partnership with Algeria and with the Algerian people.”65
After meeting President Bouteflika in November 2009, General William E. Ward, then-head of
the U.S. African Command (AFRICOM), reportedly told the Algerians that the United States is
determined “to strengthen and improve bilateral relations and work closely with Algeria in
several areas related to our mutual interests in security cooperation,” including the fight against
violent extremism. He also acknowledged Algeria’s regional power and ambition, stating, “we
appreciate Algeria’s leadership in dealing with regional questions related to security and the fight
against terrorism.” Ward said that “terrorist and criminal activities in the Maghreb and the Sahel
region remain a threat to the entire region and beyond it…. If the countries of the region have
decided to organize themselves, it means that they are aware of the proper measure of the threat.
We share their assessment of the situation and we support their efforts to secure and stabilize the
Sahel.”66 On a visit to Algeria in July 2010, U.S. State Department Coordinator for
Counterterrorism Daniel Benjamin echoed the tribute to his hosts, saying “We appreciate
Algerian efforts in the fight against terrorism, both in North Africa and the Sahel region or
elsewhere, and we are very grateful.”67 He also reassured the Algerians that Washington did not
want to intervene directly in the Sahel, but preferred to provide technical, intelligence, and
political support to fight Al Qaeda. Benjamin and Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of
Defense for International Security Affairs Joseph McMillan later underscored that the United
States opposed paying ransoms to win the freedom of hostages as part of its “no-concessions
policy,” which is the same policy as Algeria’s.68
During a December 2009 visit to Washington to “strengthen the Algerian-U.S. partnership,”
Foreign Minister Mourad Medelci met Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton and other
officials, and commended Algerian-U.S. cooperation, especially in the military sector, which he
described as “very ambitious.” He said that the cooperation included “exchanging information
and training human resources.”69
Despite improving ties, Washington and Algiers strongly disagree about some U.S. Middle East
policies. Bouteflika condemned the use of force against Iraq and called for the early withdrawal
of foreign troops. He criticized U.S. charges against Syria for supporting terrorism and in
64 “US Assistant Secretary Discusses US-Algerian Ties, Counter-Terrorism,” Liberté website, October 22, 2010, via
BBC Monitoring Middle East.
65 U.S. Embassy Algiers, “Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs in Algeria,” February 25, 2011.
66 “AFRICOM Commander Strengthens US-Algerian Cooperation in Algiers Visit,” Liberté, November 26, 2009, via
BBC Monitoring Middle East, December 14, 2009; and “Africom Commander Says No US Bases to be Set Up in
Algeria,” El Watan website, November 26, 2009, BBC Monitoring Middle East. At a press briefing in early 2011,
General Ward reiterated similar points, stating that “Algeria has a very important role in addressing this threat of Al-
Qaeda” (“U.S. Africa Command Commander Gen. William Ward Holds Briefing for the Foreign Media on ‘U.S.
Africa Command (AFRICOM)—The Commander’s Perspective,” February 18, 2011, via CQ).
67 “Algeria, ‘Leader’ and ‘Key’ Partner in Fight Against Terrorism,” Algeria Press Service, July 27, 2010.
68 “Ransoms Fuel Al-Qaeda in Northern Africa, Says US,” Daily News (Egypt), November 18, 2010; “US Assistant
Secretary Discusses Algeria Arms Deals,” El-Khabar website, November 11, 2010, BBC Monitoring Middle East.
69 “Algerian Foreign Minister Commends US Ties,” Algerian Radio, December 9, 2009, BBC Monitoring Middle East.
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Lebanon, but Algeria only abstained from voting on a U.N. Security Council resolution calling on
Syria to withdraw from Lebanon. Algeria supports the Arab Peace Initiative, which promises full
normalization of relations with Israel after it withdraws from Arab lands. It roundly criticized
Israel’s military operation against Hamas in the Gaza Strip in December 2008-January 2009.
Algeria considers the situation in the Darfur region of Sudan to be the result of ethnic conflict and
poverty—not a genocide, as U.S. officials have maintained—and is concerned about its regional
implications. In particular, Algeria objects to the International Criminal Court’s warrant for the
arrest of Sudanese President Omar al Bashir because it finds unacceptable a trial of a head of state
by an international court and because it believes the warrant impedes a political solution to the
Darfur situation.70
Although Algeria initially supported the U.N. Security Council’s authorization of a no-fly zone in
Libya in February 2011, the Foreign Ministry subsequently expressed concern over the U.S.- and
NATO-led military intervention, stating that “it is up to the Libyan people to decide on their
future.”71 Algeria has repeatedly denied claims by Libyan rebels that Algerian mercenaries have
supported forces loyal to Libyan leader Muammar al Qadhafi.72
In 2010, the Algerian government condemned the inclusion of Algeria on the list of 14
predominantly Muslim countries from which air travelers to the United States were subject to
heightened screening in the aftermath of a Nigerian’s failed attempt to bomb an airplane en route
from Amsterdam to Detroit on Christmas Day 2009. Algeria’s ambassador to Washington
complained, “This is a burden and discrimination against the citizens of Algeria who do not pose
any particular risk to the people of the United States.”73 The Algerian Foreign Ministry presented
an official protest on the issue to the U.S. Ambassador in Algiers and remonstrated repeatedly.
The U.S. Department of Homeland Security revised its procedures in April 2010 so that Algeria
and other countries are not listed, but their nationals may still be subject to more security checks.
U.S. Investment and Energy Issues
The United States was first to invest in the Algerian hydrocarbon sector after the 2005
liberalization law opened it to foreigners. About 1,100 American citizens live in Algeria, most of
whom live and work in the oil and gas fields in the south.74 Economic ties have broadened
beyond the energy sector, where most U.S. investment has been made, to financial services,
pharmaceuticals, and other industries, although U.S. investors confront many bureaucratic and
policy obstacles. Algeria receives duty-free treatment under the Generalized System of
Preferences (GSP). In June 2007, Algeria and the United States signed an agreement to cooperate
in the peaceful use of nuclear energy, but other countries, and not the United States, have built or
plan to build reactors for Algeria. In June 2010, SONATRACH provided the oil company BP
with equipment to help fight pollution caused by the Gulf of Mexico oil spill.
70 For background on the ICC’s involvement in Sudan, see CRS Report RL34665, International Criminal Court Cases
in Africa: Status and Policy Issues, coordinated by Alexis Arieff.
71 Xinhua, “Algeria Supports UN Resolution on Libya Crisis,” March 20, 2011; and CRS communications with
Algerian government representatives, March 2011.
72 AFP, “Algeria Denies Libyan Mercenary Claims,” April 10, 2011; and CRS communications with Algerian
government representatives, April 2011.
73 Eric Lipton, “Some Cry Foul as New Travel Rules Take Effect,” International Herald Tribune, January 5, 2010.
74 U.S. Department of State, “Background Note: Algeria,” updated August 2, 2010.
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The State Department’s annual Investment Climate Statement on Algeria has been strongly
critical of government policies vis-à-vis foreign investment, noting in 2011 that
U.S. firms continue to consider Algeria as an emerging export market that is expected to
grow in 2011. However, the climate for U.S. firms considering direct investments in Algeria
has worsened, particularly in the wake of a series of restrictive foreign investment rules
enacted in 2009 and 2010. Algeria’s inability to move forward with WTO accession or
modernize its banking sector has prevented significant foreign investment outside the energy
sector. These investment restrictions combined with statements by senior leaders noting the
inability of foreign investment to bring about desired growth and a focus on developing
state-owned enterprises reinforce the impression of a government that has turned toward
economic nationalism.75
U.S. Assistance
Congress appropriates and oversees little bilateral development aid for Algeria, but Algeria
benefits from military cooperation and security assistance programs. Between FY2007 and
FY2009, the Defense Department allocated at least $658,000 for military-to-military conferences
and joint combined exchange training (JCET) programs under TSCTP. Also as part of TSCTP,
the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) was allocated $2 million in FY2009 for
educational programs to counter violent extremism.76 In FY2007, Algeria benefitted from a
portion of two Defense Department-administered “Section 1206” regional programs: a $1.1
million, 7-country regional package labeled as “Partner Nation Intelligence Capability Aid,” and
a separate $5.8 million, 15-country regional maritime security package.77 The State Department’s
Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI) has administered projects in Algeria to promote
democratic governance, improved education, and an enhanced financial sector; and the U.S.
National Democratic Institute (NDI) has an ongoing program to strengthen political parties, civil
society, and the media.78
A provision included in annual appropriations legislation—most recently, Section 7086 (c) of the
FY2010 Consolidated Appropriations Act, P.L. 111-117, signed into law on December 16, 2009,
which has been carried over via subsequent continuing resolutions—prohibits certain types of
bilateral economic and security assistance “for the central government of any country that fails to
publicly disclose on an annual basis its national budget, to include income and expenditures.” The
restriction may be waived on a country-by-country basis if the Secretary of State reports to the
Committees on Appropriations that to do so is in the national interest of the United States. Deputy
Secretary of State for Management and Resources Jacob Lew signed an FY2010 budget
transparency waiver for Algeria on March 25, 2010.79
75 State Department, Bureau of Economic, Energy and Business Affairs, “2011 Investment Climate Statement—
Algeria,” March 2011.
76 Information provided to CRS by the State Department, 2010.
77 Section 1206 of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2006, as amended and regularly
extended, authorized the Defense Department to train and equip foreign military and foreign maritime security forces
for certain specific purposes. See CRS Report RS22855, Security Assistance Reform: “Section 1206” Background and
Issues for Congress, by Nina M. Serafino.
78 More information on MEPI and NDI programming is at http://mepi.state.gov/mepi/index.html and
http://www.ndi.org/algeria.
79 State Department, “Waiver of Restriction on Assistance to the Central Government of Algeria,” Executive Order
11423, as Amended, Federal Register, March 25, 2010 (Volume 75, Number 57).
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Table 1. U.S. Bilateral Foreign Assistance to Algeria
(State Department and USAID)
(thousands of dollars; historical dollars)
FY2011
FY2012
FY2008 Actual FY2009 Actual FY2010 Actual
Requesta
Request
NADR 317 500 775 550 700
INCLE 198 0 0
870
870
IMET
696 898 950 950
1,300
ESF 400 0 0 0 0
DA
0 400 710 400 0
Food Aid (P
6,816 0
6,213 0 0
.L.480)
Total, above
accounts
8,427 1,798 2,610 2,770 2,870
Source: U.S. Department of State Congressional Budget Justifications for Foreign Operations, FY2010-FY2012;
figures provided to CRS by the State Department, 2010.
Notes: NADR = Nonproliferation, Antiterrorism, Demining, and Related Programs, INCLE = International
Narcotic Control and Law Enforcement, IMET= International Military Education and Training, ESF = Economic
Support Fund, DA = Development Assistance. This table does not reflect assistance appropriated for regional
programs, nor funding administered by other agencies, such as the Defense Department.
a. Enacted funding figures for FY2011 are not available.
Author Contact Information
Alexis Arieff
Analyst in African Affairs
aarieff@crs.loc.gov, 7-2459
Acknowledgments
This is an update of a report authored by Carol Migdalovitz, now-retired CRS Specialist in Middle Eastern
Affairs.
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