Biennial Budgeting: Options, Issues, and
Previous Congressional Action
Jessica Tollestrup
Analyst on Congress and the Legislative Process
April 12, 2011
Congressional Research Service
7-5700
www.crs.gov
R41764
CRS Report for Congress
P
repared for Members and Committees of Congress
Biennial Budgeting: Options, Issues, and Previous Congressional Action
Summary
Difficulties in the timely enactment of budgetary legislation have long fueled interest in ways to
structure the congressional budget process to ease time constraints. One long-discussed reform
proposal would attempt to remedy this by changing the budget cycle from one to two years.
Biennial budgeting is a concept that may involve several variations, including two-year budget
resolutions, two-year appropriations, as well as other changes in the timing of legislation related
to revenue or spending. Typically, biennial budgeting proposals include at least the first two
aspects. Biennial budgeting proposals may focus on enacting budgetary legislation for two-year
periods or for two one-year periods. The overall time frame for a biennial budget cycle has
previously taken either a “stretch” approach, where the current budget process timetable is
extended to two full years, or a split sessions approach, where all budgetary activity is expected to
occur in a single year or session of Congress (typically the first), while consideration of non-
budgetary matters is expected to occur primarily in the other year or session.
Proponents of biennial budgeting have generally advanced three arguments—that a two-year
budget cycle would (1) reduce congressional workload by eliminating the need for annual review
of routine matters; (2) reserve the second session of each Congress for improved congressional
oversight and program review; and (3) allow better long-term planning by the agencies that spend
federal funds at the federal, state, or local level.
Critics of biennial budgeting have countered by asserting that the projected benefits would prove
to be illusory. Projecting revenues and expenditures for a two-year cycle requires forecasting as
much as 30 months in advance, which might result in less accurate forecasts and could require
Congress to choose between allowing the President greater latitude to make budgetary
adjustments in the off-years, or engaging in mid-cycle corrections to a degree that would
effectively undercut any workload reduction or intended improvements in planning. Opponents
have also pointed out that oversight through annual review of appropriations would be lost under
a biennial budget, with no guarantee that a separate oversight session would be effective.
Furthermore, they have argued that reducing the number of times that Congress considers budget
matters may only raise the stakes, which heightens the possibility for conflict and increased delay.
Biennial budgeting has a long history at the state level. The trend since World War II has been for
states to convert to an annual budget cycle; however, the most recent data available, from 2008,
indicate that 21 states operate with a two-year cycle, and some states operate with mixed cycles
that put significant portions of their budgets on a two-year cycle.
Congressional action related to biennial budgeting first occurred in 1982 with hearings on S.
2008, the Budget and Oversight Reform Act of 1981 (97th Congress). Additional action occurred
with respect to biennial budgeting during the 100th, 101st, 102nd, 103rd, 104th, 105th, 106th, 107th,
108th, and 109th Congresses. None of these proposals were ultimately enacted.
This report will be updated to reflect any changes in practice or congressional action.
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Biennial Budgeting: Options, Issues, and Previous Congressional Action
Contents
Introduction ................................................................................................................................ 1
Types of Biennial Budgeting ....................................................................................................... 3
Two-Year Budget Resolutions ............................................................................................... 4
Two-Year Appropriations ...................................................................................................... 5
Other Types of Legislation .................................................................................................... 6
General Arguments Favoring and Opposing Biennial Budgeting.................................................. 8
Arguments Made by Proponents of Biennial Budgeting......................................................... 8
Arguments Made by Opponents of Biennial Budgeting ....................................................... 10
Biennial Budgeting in the States................................................................................................ 11
Congressional Action on Biennial Budgeting............................................................................. 13
97th Congress ...................................................................................................................... 14
100th Congress .................................................................................................................... 15
101st Congress ..................................................................................................................... 15
102nd Congress.................................................................................................................... 15
103rd Congress .................................................................................................................... 15
105th Congress .................................................................................................................... 16
106th Congress .................................................................................................................... 16
107th Congress .................................................................................................................... 16
108th Congress .................................................................................................................... 17
109th Congress .................................................................................................................... 17
Tables
Table 1. Last Regular Appropriations Act Date of Enactment, FY1996-FY2010 .......................... 2
Table 2. States with Annual and Biennial Budgets (2008) .......................................................... 12
Contacts
Author Contact Information ...................................................................................................... 17
Acknowledgments .................................................................................................................... 17
Congressional Research Service
Biennial Budgeting: Options, Issues, and Previous Congressional Action
Introduction
One of the main congressional concerns related to the budget process in recent years has been the
amount of time it requires. The current process, which provides for consideration of various
budget questions in the form of a concurrent resolution on the budget, reconciliation measures,
tax measures, public debt measures, authorizations, regular appropriations, continuing
appropriations, and supplemental appropriations, has been faulted as repetitive and inefficient.1
This, in turn, has fueled interest in the idea that the congressional budget process could be better
structured to promote a more efficient use of Congress’s limited time.
Despite the perceived or actual permanence of much federal spending, the process of formulating,
enacting, and executing the federal budget has remained characteristically annual. This annual
budget cycle poses both an opportunity and a dilemma for Congress—although the annual review
of spending legislation can afford Congress the opportunity to maximize its influence concerning
the funding and operation of various programs and policies, many Members have expressed
concern with the high percentage of the congressional workload that is devoted to budgetary
matters.2
The annual completion of the budget cycle is dependent on the timely enactment of budgetary
legislation. Consideration of certain types of budgetary legislation is often closely linked to the
consideration of other types, so that delays in consideration of one measure may have an impact
on the timing of all subsequent budgetary legislation. In recent years, final action on
appropriations measures has occurred an average of 94 days after the start of the fiscal year on
October 1 (see Table 1). The result has been frustration with the budget process and a desire to
reduce the number or frequency of budget measures that need to be considered.3
The budget process has also been criticized as being unnecessarily repetitive, with some questions
being debated in various forms several times each year. Defense policy, for example, may be
debated in terms of priority within the overall budget in the budget resolution, in terms of policy
in an authorization measure, and in terms of funding levels on an appropriations bill, only to have
it all repeated the following year. Rather than promote efficient consideration, critics contend, this
repetition has contributed to the complexity of the budget process, as well as to inefficiency and
delay.4
1 For general information on the congressional budget process, see CRS Report 98-721, Introduction to the Federal
Budget Process, coordinated by Bill Heniff Jr.
2 This workload is illustrated by the number of budget related roll call votes, as shown in Norman J. Ornstein, Thomas
E. Mann, and Michael J. Malbin, Vital Statistics on Congress: 2008 (Washington: Brookings Institute Press, 2008),
chap. 7, p. 141.
3 For more on this perspective, see, Rudolph G. Penner and Alan J. Abramson, Broken Purse Strings (Washington: The
Urban Institute Press, 1988), p. 110.
4 For more on this perspective, see Prepared Statement of Senator Pete Domenici, in U.S. Congress, Senate Committee
on Governmental Affairs, Subcommittee on Financial Management and Accountability, S. 1434—Biennial Budgeting
Act of 1995, hearing, 104th Cong., 2nd sess., July 24, 1996, S.Hrg. 104-638 (Washington, DC: GPO, 1996).
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Table 1. Last Regular Appropriations Act Date of Enactment, FY1996-FY2010
Fiscal Year
Public Law
Date of Enactment
Days Late
FY1996
P.L. 104-134
April 26, 1996
209
FY1997
P.L. 104-208
September 30, 1996
0
FY1998
P.L. 105-118
P.L. 105-119
November 26, 1997
57
FY1999
P.L. 105-277
October 21, 1998
21
FY2000
P.L. 106-113
November 29, 1999
60
FY2001
P.L. 106-553
P.L. 106-554
December 21, 2000
82
P.L. 107-115
FY2002
P.L. 107-116
January 10, 2002
102
P.L. 107-117
FY2003
P.L. 108-7
February 20, 2003
143
FY2004
P.L. 108-199
January 23, 2004
115
FY2005
P.L. 108-447
December 8, 2004
69
FY2006
P.L. 109-149
December 30, 2005
91
FY2007
P.L. 110-5
February 15, 2007
138
FY2008
P.L. 110-161
December 26, 2007
87
FY2009
P.L. 111-8
March 11, 2009
162
FY2010
P.L. 111-118
December 19, 2009
80
Source: Compiled by CRS with data from the Legislative Information System of the U.S. Congress.
A number of possible reforms, such as automatic continuing resolutions, joint budget resolutions,
or merging the authorization and appropriations processes, have been advanced, at least in part, in
the hope that they could make the budget process operate in a more timely fashion. For example,
advocates of an automatic continuing resolution have argued that it could reduce deadline
pressures in the appropriations process;5 those in favor of a joint budget resolution suggest that it
would promote early agreement on budget priorities between Congress and the President;6 and
some argue that a merged authorization-appropriations process could reduce the volume of
legislation that needs to be considered in any given session of Congress.7 As a result, some see
these and other proposed reforms as offering the potential to make the timely enactment of budget
legislation more likely.
5 For more on this perspective, see the testimony of Martha Phillips, Concord Coalition, U.S. Congress, Senate
Committee on the Budget and Committee on Governmental Affairs, To Consider Budget Process Reform, joint hearing,
106th Cong., 1st sess., S.Hrg. 106-24 (Washington, DC: GPO 1999), p. 63; Brian M. Riedl, “Backgrounder: 10
Elements of Comprehensive Budget Process Reform,” The Heritage Foundation, no. 1943, June 15, 2006, p. 7.
6 For more on this perspective, see Penner and Abramson, Broken Purse Strings, pp. 113-114.
7 See, for example, Testimony of Tim Roemer, in U.S. Congress, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence,
Congressional Oversight of Intelligence Activities, hearing, 110th Cong., 1st sess., November 13, 2007, S.Hrg. 110-794
(Washington, DC: GPO, 2007).
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Another possible approach to addressing this concern is to change the budget cycle from one year
to two years, also known as “biennial budgeting.” Because budgeting for the federal government
encompasses a number of types of measures, biennial budgeting can have several meanings.
Biennial budgeting can involve two-year budget resolutions, two-year appropriations, as well as
other changes in the timing of legislation related to revenue or spending. Typically, biennial
budgeting proposals have included at least the first two aspects. Biennial budgeting proposals
may focus on enacting budgetary legislation for two-year periods or for two one-year periods. In
addition, biennial budget proposals typically require that executive branch planning and
performance reviews be revised so that they be based on a two-year cycle.
This report provides background on options, issues, and previous congressional action related to
biennial budgeting.
Types of Biennial Budgeting
Biennial budgeting as a concept has many permutations, and may include a requirement for two-
year budget resolutions, two-year appropriations, and also affect the timing of consideration for
other types of legislation related to revenue and spending.
The overall time frame contained in previous biennial budgeting proposals has typically taken
either a “stretch” or “split sessions” approach. The stretch approach would extend the current
budget process timetable to two full years.8 Advocates of this approach often argue that it allows
for less hurried and more thorough consideration of budgetary legislation. In contrast, the split
sessions approach is based on the expectation that all budgetary legislation would be considered
in a single year or session of Congress (typically the first), while consideration of non-budgetary
matters would occur primarily in the other year or session.9 Advocates of this approach often
assert that limiting the time frame during which Congress may consider budgetary matters to
every other year or session will encourage greater levels of agency and program oversight during
the other.10
Biennial budgeting proposals have also varied with respect to the time frame for appropriations.
“Biennial appropriations” may refer to all appropriations being enacted for a two-year period, all
appropriations being enacted for two succeeding one-year periods in a single measure, or even a
system under which some appropriations are enacted for either a two-year period or two one-year
periods in each year of the biennium.
Because of the variety of approaches discussed above, biennial budgeting may have different
meanings for different people. This section provides an overview of the options and selected
issues related to two-year budget resolutions, two-year appropriations acts, and other possible
changes in the timing of other types of legislation that might be associated with biennial
budgeting. It is important to note, however, that this section does not discuss all possible
outcomes and there is likely to be variance in what would occur if biennial budgeting were
adopted, depending on the context and framework that was implemented. Whether these
8 See, for example, S. 211 and H.R. 114 (112th Cong.).
9 See, for example, S. 286 and H.R. 22 (100th Cong.).
10 For a more extensive discussion of the differences between these approaches, see U.S. Congressional Budget Office,
Biennial Budgeting, February 1988, pp. 1-2.
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Biennial Budgeting: Options, Issues, and Previous Congressional Action
implications are viewed positively or negatively, depends on the observer’s assessment of the
probable consequences of switching to a biennial budget, as well as the normative value placed
on those consequences.
Two-Year Budget Resolutions
Since the enactment of the Congressional Budget Act in 1974 (P.L. 93-344; 88 Stat. 297), the
budget process has centered around the concurrent resolution on the budget, which sets aggregate
budget policies and functional priorities for Congress.11 The budget resolution is used to
coordinate the various budgetary actions that are to be taken during a session of Congress.
Proposals to convert the budget process to a two-year cycle have typically involved a process
centered around a two-year budget resolution.
Although the budget process is characteristically annual, there are a number of aspects of the
Budget Act that encourage Congress to look beyond a single fiscal year. In particular, Section
301(a) currently requires that the budget resolution include binding figures for the upcoming
fiscal year, plus planning levels for at least each of the four ensuing fiscal years. In recent years,
budget resolutions have often included planning levels beyond the minimum number required by
the Budget Act. For example, the budget resolution for FY2004 (H.Con.Res. 95, 108th Congress)
included planning levels through FY2013. The Budget Act also provides for the enforcement of
the five-year totals for revenues and direct spending, and allows multi-year reconciliation
instructions. In addition, the Senate’s Pay-As-You-Go point of order (Section 201(a) of
S.Con.Res. 21, 110th Congress, the FY2008 budget resolution) prohibits the consideration of
revenue or direct spending legislation that would increase or cause an on-budget deficit over a
six-year period and an 11-year period, each beginning with the current year.12 The Cut-As-You-
Go rule in the House (Rule XXI, Clause 10) also provides a point of order against the
consideration of legislation that would have the net effect of increasing mandatory spending over
the same two time periods.
It is possible that Congress might benefit from only needing to adopt the broad outlines of fiscal
policy every two years. As Joseph White of the Brookings Institution stated in testimony before
the Joint Committee on the Organization of Congress in 1993, “Annual fights about priorities
between the same Congress and President do nobody any good.”13 In addition, Congress was
unable to adopt a budget resolution for FY1999, FY2003, FY2005, FY2007, and FY2011, and
has therefore had to use some other means to coordinate and enforce budgetary actions in those
years.14 Based upon this recent experience, it could be argued that it is not necessary to adopt a
budget resolution every year, and that a two-year budget resolution would better reflect current
practice.
It is also possible, however, that budget resolutions have served a useful purpose by providing
Congress with the opportunity to participate in setting fiscal policy, and that the inability to adopt
11 For further information on the budget resolution, see CRS Report 98-512, Formulation and Content of the Budget
Resolution and CRS Report 98-511, Consideration of the Budget Resolution, both by Bill Heniff Jr.
12 For more on the Senate PAYGO point of order, see CRS Report RL31943, Budget Enforcement Procedures: Senate
Pay-As-You-Go (PAYGO) Rule, by Bill Heniff Jr.
13 U.S. Congress, Joint Committee on the Organization of Congress, Budget Process: Testimony of Hon. Anthony
Beilenson and a Panel of Experts, 103rd Cong., 1st sess., Mar. 23, 1993 (Washington,: GPO, 1993), p. 82.
14 See CRS Report RL31443, The “Deeming Resolution”: A Budget Enforcement Tool, by Megan Suzanne Lynch.
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a budget resolution has been a portent of further budgetary battles throughout the year, rather than
an indication that there is still agreement within Congress on the policies that were adopted in the
previous year. In addition, although fiscal policy can be set for two-year periods, it is potentially
subject to considerable uncertainty.15 If the adoption of a biennial budget resolution were to fully
eliminate the opportunity currently provided by the budget resolution each year to either alter or
confirm current policy, it might serve to further weaken the latter stages of the process.
Two-Year Appropriations
One of the significant changes that might be made by a biennial budgeting proposal would be a
two-year cycle for appropriations.16 Under the split sessions approach, all regular appropriations
measures would be considered in the first year of each Congress and could be provided either for
a single two-year fiscal period or for two one-year periods. In either case, Congress would not
need to act on appropriations during the second year of each Congress, except for emergency and
other supplemental appropriations as needed. The stretch approach would opt instead for a
process that would increase the duration of the current budget cycle so that, while the
appropriations process could begin in the first session of a Congress, the fiscal biennium would
not begin until October 1 of the second year. This would give Congress and the President a period
of 20 months, rather than the current eight months, to negotiate appropriations details. Under such
proposals, Congress would not need to act on appropriations in the off-year, except for emergency
or supplemental appropriations.
Most biennial budget proposals include two-year appropriations because, supporters contend, a
biennial budget resolution would not, in of itself, present sufficient certainty for long-term
planning by agencies, significant savings in congressional workload, or enough additional time
for oversight.17 If regular appropriations were to be confined to the first fiscal year of the
biennium, a possible benefit might be that additional programmatic review and oversight could
occur during the year in which routine appropriations had already been provided. The extent to
which this benefit would translate, however, into greater time for the consideration of non-
budgetary legislation and additional oversight would be dependent on a number of factors,
including the extent to which emergency and other supplemental appropriations actions were
necessary in the off-year.18
Current practice already includes a number of the devices proposed as part of a biennial
budgeting system. For example, appropriations acts can provide for both budget authority that
becomes available in future fiscal years (“advance appropriations”) and budget authority
available for periods of longer than a single fiscal year (multi-year or “no-year” appropriations).19
15 For a discussion of challenges related to long-term budgeting, see CRS Report R41516, Adopting a Long-Term
Budget Focus: Challenges and Proposals, by Megan Suzanne Lynch, Marc Labonte, and Mindy R. Levit.
16 For general information on the appropriations process, see CRS Report 97-684, The Congressional Appropriations
Process: An Introduction, by Sandy Streeter.
17 Testimony of Alice M. Rivlin, in U.S. Congress, House Committee on Government Operations, Subcommittee on
Legislation and National Security, Reform of the Federal Budget Process, hearing, 100th Cong., 1st sess., March 12,
April 2, and 30, H. 401-43, (Washington, DC: GPO, 1987).
18 Observers disagree as to the extent to which off-year appropriations might be necessary within a biennial budgeting
cycle. For more on this debate, see Robert Greenstein and James Horney, “Biennial Budgeting: Do the Drawbacks
Outweigh the Advantages?,” Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, June 16, 2006 and David Kendall and Jim
Kessler, “Biennial Budgeting: Better Value for Taxpayers,” Third Way, September 2010.
19 For further information on the future provision of budget authority, see CRS Report RS20441, Advance
(continued...)
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The extent to which making these practices mandatory for all programs would result in the more
timely enactment of appropriations, however, is dependent upon the type of appropriations that
are the cause of conflict and delays in the budget process.20 If routine appropriations are the
cause, then it is possible that making these decisions less often would be a beneficial change. If
the rise of unforeseen and contentious issues is responsible, then widening the above practices to
mandate their use for all programs every other year is unlikely to result in any significant
improvement in the process.
One effect of either the stretch or split sessions biennial budgeting approaches would be that
regular appropriations bills would be enacted only every other year. Congress has previously
attempted to limit the amount of executive branch discretion over the execution phase of the
budget process by including earmarks and other types of provisos within the text or joint
explanatory statement accompanying regular appropriations bills. A decrease in the frequency of
this type of legislation, consequently, would appear to reduce the number of vehicles available to
Congress, and thus have a direct impact on its ability to influence executive branch budget
execution in this manner.
Other Types of Legislation
Biennial budget proposals also might explicitly address the timing of other types of legislation—
such as authorizations of appropriations, supplemental or emergency appropriations,
reconciliation, entitlements, revenue, or other non-budgetary policy measures—within a biennial
budgeting time frame.
Many biennial budgeting proposals require that all types of authorizations be enacted for periods
of at least two fiscal years. Under current practice, however, many authorizations of
appropriations are already enacted for multi-year periods. The main exceptions to this are the
Department of Defense and Intelligence authorizations of appropriations, which are considered
annually, so the impact of such a requirement on other policy issues is unclear. Most proposals
also divide action so that all types of authorizations would normally be scheduled to be
considered in the second year of each Congress, separate from consideration of the budget
resolution and regular appropriations measures. A previous concern regarding a multi-year
authorization requirement is that, unless supported by biennial appropriations, they may lack the
degree of certainty required to achieve the promised benefits of long-range planning.21 One
proposed benefit of multi-year authorizations is that both types of authorizations could be in place
before the appropriations process begins, providing for smoother working relationship between
authorizers and appropriators.22
(...continued)
Appropriations, Forward Funding, and Advance Funding, by Sandy Streeter.
20 Testimony of Director, Congressional Budget Office, Dan L. Crippen, in U.S. Congress, House Committee on Rules,
Biennial Budgeting: A Tool for Promoting Fiscal Management and Oversight, hearing, 106th Cong., 2nd sess., February
16, March 10 and 16, H.Hrg.106-681, (Washington, DC: GPO, 2000).
21 For further information on the relationship of authorizations and appropriations, see CRS Report RS20371, Overview
of the Authorization-Appropriations Process, by Bill Heniff Jr.
22 Rep. William H. Natcher, chairman of the House Appropriations Committee, testified in 1993 that requiring multi-
year authorizations to be enacted the year before appropriations measures would serve the Congress well. U.S.
Congress, Joint Committee on the Organization of Congress, Budget Process: Testimony of Hon. William H. Natcher,
hearing, 103rd Cong., 1st sess., March 11, 1993 (Washington: GPO, 1993), p. 5.
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Although the requirement for multi-year authorizations within biennial budgeting would only
affect some programs, such a system could have major repercussions for those specific issue
areas. For example, Congress has operated under the presumption that the Defense and
Intelligence authorizations are sensitive to a variety of foreign policy issues and, consequently,
that these issues need to be addressed every year. An attempt to experiment with two-year
authorizations for the Department of Defense in the 1980s proved unsuccessful. This failure has
sometimes been partly attributed to the fact that the experiment was not part of a comprehensive
move to biennial budgeting and was not supported by two-year appropriations, but another
contributing factor was that it was overtaken by other budgetary decisions. The deficit reduction
concerns that led to a late 1987 budget summit between Congress and President Reagan also
effectively required the second year of the two-year authorization to be amended extensively.
Given this experience, support for two-year defense authorizations waned.23
The proposed division between the consideration of authorizations and appropriations for split
session approaches could serve to augment the separation of money and policy decisions
currently embodied in House and Senate rules. It also could clarify the different functions that
authorizations and appropriations serve, but that some Members feel have been blurred or
weakened in recent decades.24 It is possible, however, that the result could instead be an erosion
of the separation between authorizations and appropriations. Because there might not be any
opportunity to consider authorizing legislation in the first year of a Congress, Members might feel
it necessary to use appropriations bills as legislative vehicles to revise policy questions
immediately through appropriations bills, rather than wait for the second authorization/oversight
session.25
The extent to which supplemental or emergency appropriations might be available during various
portions of the biennium depends on both the type of biennial budgeting that was enacted and the
types of appropriations that would be allowed (or not explicitly prohibited) under a particular
framework. Under a split session timetable, decisions on appropriations are typically confined to
the first year in the biennium, with the goal being that the second year will be focused on
programmatic decisions and oversight. Whether the separation were to be enforced under a
particular biennial budget framework would determine the extent to which supplemental
appropriations might also be confined to the first year of the biennium, or another alternative
timetable. It is also possible that a stretch model might limit the time frame in which
appropriations decisions can be adjusted, for example, to the period after the budget resolution
was adopted.26
23 David C. Morrison, “Two at a Time,” National Journal, vol. 21, no. 35 (September 2, 1989), p. 2172; and Robert J.
Art, “The Pentagon: The Case for Biennial Budgeting,” Political Science Quarterly, vol. 104, no. 2 (summer 1989), pp.
193-214.
24 As illustrated by testimony on budget process reform on several occasions in recent years. One example is the
extensive testimony before the Joint Committee on the Organization of Congress in 1992.
25 Testimony of Deputy Director, Congressional Budget Office, James L. Blum, in U.S. Congress, Senate Committee
on Governmental Affairs, Subcommittee on Financial Management and Accountability, S. 1434—Biennial Budgeting
Act of 1995, hearing, 104th Cong., 2nd sess., July 24, 1996, S.Hrg. 104-638 (Washington, DC: GPO, 1996).
26 For a discussion of this possibility, see U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, Proposed Budget
Reforms: A Critical Analysis, committee print, 100th Cong., 2nd sess., April 1988, S.Prt. 100-98 (Washington: GPO,
1988), pp. 22-23.
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Reconciliation legislation is a type of legislation intended to bring existing revenue and spending
law into conformity with the policies in the budget resolution.27 For such legislation to be in
order, reconciliation instructions must first be adopted in the budget resolution. As a result, under
a biennial budget resolution, the possibility of enacting reconciliation legislation would typically
only exist once every two years, unless the rules governing reconciliation contained in the
Congressional Budget Act were modified to allow for such legislation under an alternative
mechanism or time frame. Some observers perceive this implication as an argument against
biennial budgeting.28
Although biennial budget proposals have not typically addressed restricting other types of
legislation, such as entitlements and revenue, to a particular time frame within the biennium,
some observers have suggested that this also might be preferable. For example, under a split
session approach, legislation affecting revenue or spending might be limited to the first year or
session of Congress when other decisions regarding budgetary legislation are made.29
General Arguments Favoring and Opposing
Biennial Budgeting
Aside from issues concerning how particular aspects of biennial budgeting might work in
practice, a number of arguments have been made for and against its overall utility, some of which
are discussed below. These arguments are primarily drawn from congressional hearings, analyses
of biennial budgeting by governmental committees and commissions, as well as scholarly articles
and reports issued by think tanks analyzing various budget process reform proposals. Note that
some of these arguments are based upon the potential implications discussed in the previous
section. While these arguments are not an exhaustive list of all reasons why biennial budgeting
proposals have been supported or opposed, and their applicability is heavily dependent upon the
type of biennial budgeting being considered, they are representative of the debate that has
developed over the past 30 years.
Arguments Made by Proponents of Biennial Budgeting
Supporters of biennial budgeting have generally advanced three arguments—that a two-year
budget cycle would (1) reduce congressional workload by eliminating the need for annual
consideration of routine or repetitious matters; (2) allow Congress to reserve time to promote
improved oversight and program review; and (3) allow better long-term planning by the agencies
that spend federal funds, at the federal, state, or local level.
27 For further information on reconciliation, see CRS Report 98-814, Budget Reconciliation Legislation: Development
and Consideration, by Bill Heniff Jr.
28 See, for example, Prepared Statement of Congressman Nick Smith, in U.S. Congress, House Committee on Rules,
Biennial Budgeting: A Tool for Promoting Fiscal Management and Oversight, hearing, 106th Cong., 2nd sess., February
16, March 10 and 16, H.Hrg.106-681 (Washington, DC: GPO, 2000).
29 See, for example, Testimony of Director, Congressional Budget Office, Dan L. Crippen, in U.S. Congress, House
Committee on Rules, Biennial Budgeting: A Tool for Promoting Fiscal Management and Oversight, hearing, 106th
Cong., 2nd sess., February 16, March 10 and 16, H.Hrg.106-681 (Washington, DC: GPO, 2000).
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Advocates have asserted that reducing the number of times that Congress must consider budget
questions would reduce the percentage of congressional time consumed by the process and would
allow more time for Congress to conduct agency and program oversight.30 By effectively dividing
each Congress into a budget year and an authorization/oversight year, a two-year cycle might
reduce competition for Members’ time and attention, and allow for more effective use of
authorizations to establish policy. Congress would not have to resort to appropriating in the
absence of a current authorization as often, because the authorizations would not be crowded out
of the congressional schedule by appropriations questions.31 Another anticipated benefit has been
that executive branch agencies, relieved of the need to develop and defend budget proposals as
frequently, could better manage federal programs.32
Another argument that has often been made by proponents of biennial budgeting is that it might
increase certainty about the level of future funding, thus allowing better long-range planning by
federal agencies and by state and local governments. The Reagan, George H. W. Bush, Clinton,
and George W. Bush Administrations all have previously expressed support for biennial
budgeting.33 The 1993 report of the National Performance Review (the Gore Commission) noted,
“Considerable time could be saved—and used more effectively—in both the executive and
legislative branches of government if budgets and appropriations were moved to a biennial
cycle.”34 The Clinton Administration’s final budget submission in 2000 reiterated its support for
biennial budgeting.35 The George W. Bush Administration also included support for biennial
budgeting (as well as other budget process reforms) in the President’s annual budget submission
to Congress. The FY2004 Budget request stated that “a biennial budget would allow lawmakers
to devote more time every other year to ensuring that taxpayers’ money is spent wisely and
efficiently. In addition, Government agencies would receive more stable funding, which would
facilitate longer range planning and improved fiscal management.”36
Supporters have also pointed to the multi-year nature of the budget summit agreements between
Congress and the President both as evidence of the efficacy of multi-year budgeting and as a
major factor in recent years for promoting more efficient consideration of budgetary legislation.
Notably, the 1987 agreement between Congress and the Reagan Administration, the 1990
agreement with the Bush Administration, and the 1993 and 1997 agreements with the Clinton
Administration were all built around the projected future impact of a budget plan. Subsequent
budget resolutions, and budget implementing legislation, generally adhered to those agreements.
30 See, for example, Prepared Statement of Senator Pete Domenici, in U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on
Governmental Affairs, Subcommittee on Financial Management and Accountability, S. 1434—Biennial Budgeting Act
of 1995, hearing, 104th Cong., 2nd sess., July 24, 1996, S.Hrg. 104-638 (Washington, DC: GPO, 1996).
31 See, for example, Prepared Statement of Senator Wendell H. Ford, in U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on
Governmental Affairs, Subcommittee on Financial Management and Accountability, S. 1434—Biennial Budgeting Act
of 1995, hearing, 104th Cong., 2nd sess., July 24, 1996, S.Hrg. 104-638 (Washington, DC: GPO, 1996).
32 See, for example, U.S. Office of the Vice President, Creating a Government That Works Better and Costs Less:
Mission-Driven, Results-Oriented Budgeting, accompanying report of the National Performance Review (Washington:
GPO, 1993).
33 As of the date of this report, the Obama Administration has not taken a position on biennial budgeting.
34 Vice President, Creating a Government That Works Better and Costs Less: Mission-Driven, Results-Oriented
Budgeting, p. 59.
35 U.S. Office of Management and Budget, Budget of the United States Government, Fiscal Year 2001, Analytical
Perspectives (Washington: GPO, 2000), p. 287.
36 U.S. Office of Management and Budget, Budget of the United States Government, Fiscal Year 2004, Analytical
Perspectives (Washington: GPO, 2003), p. 318.
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By institutionalizing this arrangement, advocates of biennial budgeting posit that the success of
these agreements can be duplicated.37
Arguments Made by Opponents of Biennial Budgeting
Critics of biennial budgeting have countered with several arguments as to why some of the
projected benefits could prove to be illusory. Reducing the number of times that Congress
considers budget matters, they have suggested, may only raise the stakes, and thereby heighten
the possibility for conflict and increased delay.38 In addition, enacting a budget resolution and
spending legislation every other year could be effective in reducing congressional workload or
aiding longer-term planning only in the second year of the cycle.39 Even that benefit may not
accrue without accurate budget projections. Making accurate projections of revenues and
expenditures is always difficult. With total appropriations for FY2010 in excess of $1.9 trillion
(of which mandatory spending accounted for over one-third)40 even small errors can be
significant. Projecting revenues and expenditures for a two-year cycle requires forecasting as
much as 30 months in advance, rather than 18 under an annual budget cycle, and even 18-month
projections have previously been inaccurate. A recent example of this occurred during the
FY2006 appropriations cycle, when the budget projections for the upcoming fiscal year were
discovered to be $1.2 billion less than what would be required to provide for veterans’ health
care.41 Such issues with inaccurate forecasting, critics have argued, might be heightened by
biennial budgeting and could result in providing either too much or too little money for individual
programs. Some have feared that this would increase the need for revisions to the budget
resolution, supplemental appropriations, or other adjustments in the off-year that would
effectively undercut any intended improvements in planning.42
With only a limited ability to anticipate future conditions, critics have argued that a two-year
cycle could require Congress to choose either to allow the President greater latitude for making
budgetary adjustments in the off-years or to engage in mid-cycle corrections to a degree that
would nullify any anticipated time savings or planning advantages.43 Furthermore, they have
37 For a discussion of this issue, see Testimony of Associate Director, U.S. General Accounting Office, Susan J. Irving,
in U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, Subcommittee on Financial Management and
Accountability, S. 1434—Biennial Budgeting Act of 1995, hearing, 104th Cong., 2nd sess., July 24, 1996, S.Hrg. 104-
638 (Washington, DC: GPO, 1996).
38 See, for example, Louis Fisher, “Biennial Budgeting in the Federal Government,” Public Budgeting and Finance,
vol. 17, no. 3 (fall 1997), p. 89 and Greenstein and Horney, “Biennial Budgeting: Do the Drawbacks Outweigh the
Advantages?”
39 See, for example, Testimony of Deputy Director, Congressional Budget Office, James L. Blum, in U.S. Congress,
Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, Subcommittee on Financial Management and Accountability, S. 1434—
Biennial Budgeting Act of 1995, hearing, 104th Cong., 2nd sess., July 24, 1996, S.Hrg. 104-638 (Washington, DC: GPO,
1996).
40 U.S. Congress, House Committee on Appropriations, Report of Committee Activities, 111th Cong., 2nd sess., H.Rept.
111-700 (Washington, DC: GPO 2011), p. 5.
41 The reason for this shortfall was attributed at that time, in part, to the unexpected rise in the number of veterans
enrolling in the health care system. For further information, see Tim Starks, “Bill Targets Veteran’s Funding Shortfall,”
CQ Weekly Report, November 21, 2005, p. 3136.
42 Penner and Abramson, Broken Purse Strings, pp. 116-117 and Greenstein and Horney, “Biennial Budgeting: Do the
Drawbacks Outweigh the Advantages?”.
43 See, for example, Fisher, “Biennial Budgeting in the Federal Government,” p. 91.
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argued that annual review of appropriations requests is an important part of oversight44 that would
be lost under a biennial budget, with no guarantee that committees would take advantage of a
separate oversight session, or that oversight separate from review of funding decisions would be
as effective.45
In addition, critics have contended that the institutional incentives for supporting two-year
budgets can vary based on the expected budgetary outcome. A budget plan that would lock in an
amount for the second year of a biennium would draw relatively little support from program
advocates in a time of increasing budgets (because the program might receive more generous
funding later), and, alternately, would draw relatively little support from program cutters in times
of decreasing budgets (because the program would be somewhat insulated from possible later
cuts). In other words, these critics have asserted, an action to lock in future budgetary resources
would be likely to draw opposition when some decision makers believe that a “better” decision
may be arrived at in the future.46
In response to the possibility of duplicating the success of previous long-term budget agreements,
some opponents have argued that the lessons to be learned from successful executive-
congressional summits are somewhat more narrow. Opponents have suggested that while these
occasional summits have proved useful in the context of facilitating the following year’s budget
process, it would not be possible to institutionalize the process. Instead, some of these critics
perceive that the political and budgetary context that brings Congress and the President to the
bargaining table on a regular basis is also necessary to ensure a commitment to implementing the
outcome.47
Biennial Budgeting in the States
Perhaps because many Representatives and Senators have government experience at the state
level, state practices are often cited in deliberations on budget process reform. In particular, 21
states operate under a two-year budget cycle (see Table 2), and this experience has been cited by
many in discussing the applicability of biennial budgeting to the federal government.
However, the state experience does not provide any single answer concerning biennial
budgeting.48 Some states that operate under an annual cycle have significant portions of their
44 For a discussion of appropriations oversight, see CRS Report RL30240, Congressional Oversight Manual, by
Frederick M. Kaiser, Walter J. Oleszek, and Todd B. Tatelman.
45 See, for example, Testimony of Associate Director, U.S. General Accounting Office, Susan J. Irving, in U.S.
Congress, Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, Subcommittee on Financial Management and Accountability, S.
1434—Biennial Budgeting Act of 1995, hearing, 104th Cong., 2nd sess., July 24, 1996, S.Hrg. 104-638 (Washington,
DC: GPO, 1996).
46 See, for example, Testimony of Robert Greenstein, in U.S. Congress, House Committee on Rules, Biennial
Budgeting: A Tool for Promoting Fiscal Management and Oversight, hearing, 106th Cong., 2nd sess., February 16,
March 10 and 16, H.Hrg.106-681 (Washington, DC: GPO, 2000).
47 Prepared statement of Congressman Porter J. Goss, in U.S. Congress, House Committee on Rules, Biennial
Budgeting: A Tool for Promoting Fiscal Management and Oversight, hearing, 106th Cong., 2nd sess., February 16,
March 10 and 16, H.Hrg.106-681 (Washington, DC: GPO, 2000).
48 This has been concluded by the Government Accountability Office in a number of studies on biennial budgeting and
the states. See, for example, U.S. Government Accountability Office, Biennial Budgeting: Three States’ Experiences,
GAO-01-132, October 2000, p. 6.
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budget enacted on a two-year cycle. For example, Missouri enacts its operating budget on an
annual cycle, but its capital budget on a biennial cycle,49 whereas Kansas budgets for some
regulatory agencies two years at a time within the overall context of an annual budget.
Conversely, some states with biennial cycles do a significant portion of their budgeting on an
annual basis. For example, Arizona law requires that most state agencies be funded on a biennial
cycle, but also requires some to be funded annually, whereas Virginia enacts a biennial budget
that is routinely amended during the session when the budget is being executed. Minnesota
considers both its operating and capital budgets on two-year cycles, but in different years. As a
result, supporting examples can be found both for and against adopting a two-year cycle at the
federal level.50
Table 2. States with Annual and Biennial Budgets (2008)
Annual Budget with
Annual Budget with
Biennial Budget with
Biennial Budget with
Annual Legislative
Biennial Legislative
Annual Legislative
Biennial Legislative
Sessions
Sessions
Sessions
Sessions
Alabama
California Arizona
Arkansas
Alaska
Connecticut
Maine
Colorado
Hawaii
Montana
Delaware
Indianac
Nevada
Florida
Kentucky
North Dakotac
Georgia
Minnesotac
North Carolinac
Idaho
Nebraska
Oregonc
Illinois
New Hampshirec
Texasc
Iowa
Ohio
Wisconsin
Kansasa
Virginia
Louisiana
Washingtonc
Maryland
Wyomingc
Massachusetts
Michigan
Mississippi
Missourib
New Jersey
New Mexico
New York
Oklahoma
Pennsylvania
Rhode Island
South Carolina
South Dakota
Tennessee
Utah
Vermont
West Virginia
Source: National Association of State Budget Officers, Budget Processes in the States, Summer 2008, pp.5-8.
a. In Kansas, 20 agencies are on a biennial cycle; the rest are on an annual cycle.
b. In Missouri, the operating budget is on an annual basis; the capital budget is on a biennial cycle.
c. These states enact consolidated two-year budgets; al other states with biennial budgets enact two annual
budgets simultaneously.
49 An operating budgeting accounts for day-to-day government expenditures and is typically funded with current
revenues such as taxes and short-term debt (less than one-year maturity). A capital budget accounts for capital
expenditures that are funded by a mix of long-term debt and current revenues.
50 Ronald K. Snell, “Annual vs. Biennial Budgeting: No Clear Winner,” Spectrum, vol. 68 (winter 1995), p. 23.
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One argument of opponents of a two-year cycle has been that the trend among states has been to
shift from biennial to annual budget cycles, particularly in those states with larger populations.
This trend, opponents have suggested, demonstrates that biennial budgeting represents a way of
budgeting less applicable to modern circumstances. In support of this, they have pointed out that,
while 44 states operated with biennial budget cycles in 1940, this was because most state
legislatures at that time tended to meet every other year.51 As of 2008, with the prevalence of
annual sessions, 29 states use annual cycles, including eight of the 10 most populous states.52
However, not all states have made changes in favor of annual budgeting. At least four states
(Hawaii in 1967, Nebraska in 1987, Connecticut in 1991, and Arizona in 1999) have switched to
biennial budgeting after extended periods in which they used an annual cycle, while several
others (Indiana, Minnesota, and Wisconsin) returned to biennial cycles after brief experiments
with annual budgets.
As discussed above, one of the main arguments made by opponents of biennial budgeting has
been that it would inevitably lead to greater authority for the President. Again the experience at
the state level is inconclusive. Both annual and biennial budget cycles have been coupled with
varying degrees of executive branch discretion and authority. For example, Arkansas, with a
biennial budget, has far stricter limits on the governor’s authority to transfer funds or cut
spending unilaterally than does South Carolina, with an annual budget.53
The natural tension between the desire for longer planning horizons and the increasing inaccuracy
of budget projections when stretched over longer periods has not been solved at the state level.
This is because the same basic system of funding stability and incremental budget changes that
characterizes federal budgeting also operates in the state context. Few state programs are subject
to sweeping changes in any given year, regardless of the budget cycle. This might suggest that
both the assertions of a need for a longer budget cycle to ensure better planning and fears related
to the inadequacy of long-term forecasts of budgetary needs might be overstated.
Congressional Action on Biennial Budgeting
Almost from the time the Congressional Budget Act was enacted in 1974, budget process reform
has been a topic of congressional interest and biennial budgeting has been discussed at least since
the 95th Congress (1977-1978).54 Hearings on the subject of budget process reform have often
included testimony concerning biennial budgeting. In addition, on several occasions, both House
and Senate committees have conducted hearings specifically on the topic of biennial budgeting.55
51 Ronald K. Snell, “Annual and Biennial Budgeting: The Experience of State Governments,” National Conference of
State Legislatures, January 2010.
52 California, Florida, Georgia, Michigan, New Jersey, New York, and Pennsylvania all operate with annual cycles,
whereas Ohio and Texas operate with biennial cycles.
53 Snell, “Annual vs. Biennial Budgeting: No Clear Winner,” p. 23.
54 For a more detailed discussion of earlier consideration of biennial budgeting, see U.S. Congress, Senate Committee
on Rules and Administration, Improving the Operation of the Legislative Branch of the Federal Government, and for
Other Purposes, report to accompany S. 1824, 103rd Cong., 2nd sess., S.Rept. 103-297 (Washington: GPO, 1994), pp.
10-14.
55 Printed hearings specifically addressing the issue of biennial budgeting include U.S. Congress, House Committee on
Government Operations, The Vice President’s National Performance Review—Recommending A Biennial Budget
Process, hearings, 103rd Cong., 1st sess., October 7, 1993 (Washington: GPO, 1994); and U.S. Congress, Senate
Committee on Governmental Affairs, S. 261—Biennial Budgeting and Appropriations Act, hearings, 105th Cong., 1st
(continued...)
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Congressional interest in biennial budgeting has also been demonstrated by survey findings56 and
by the level of cosponsorship of biennial budgeting proposals.57
Biennial budgeting has also been considered by a number of federal committees and commissions
organized to study possible procedural or structural reforms to Congress, the budget process, or
both. In addition to the Gore Commission, the National Economic Commission,58 and the Study
Group on Senate Practices and Procedures (also known as the Pearson-Ribicoff Commission)
recommended a form of biennial budgeting.59 In 1993, both the Senate and House members of the
Joint Committee on the Organization of Congress included proposals for a two-year budget cycle
in recommendations to their respective chambers (S.Rept. 103-215, vol. 1, and H.Rept. 103-413,
vol. 1).
In recent years, House jurisdiction over budget process reform generally has been shared jointly
by the Committee on Rules and the Committee on the Budget; both have considered the issue of
biennial budgeting. In the Senate, prior to the 109th Congress, jurisdiction over the budget process
was shared jointly by the Committee on Governmental Affairs and the Committee on the Budget,
under a standing order of the Senate (first agreed to August 4, 1977, and discontinued as of
January 2005).60 Jurisdiction over the budget process is currently held by the Senate Budget
Committee.61
Congressional action related to biennial budgeting first occurred in 1982 with hearings on S.
2008, the Budget and Oversight Reform Act of 1981 (97th Congress). Additional action, outlined
below, occurred with respect to biennial budgeting during the 100th, 101st, 102nd, 103rd, 104th,
105th, 106th, 107th, 108th, and 109th Congresses. None of these proposals were ultimately enacted.
97th Congress
S. 2008, the Budget and Oversight Reform Act of 1981, was introduced on January 25, 1982.
This bill would have amended the Congressional Budget Act to provide for a biennial budget
cycle. The measure was jointly referred to the Senate Committee on the Budget and Committee
on Governmental Affairs. The Committee on the Budget held hearings on the measure on
September 14, 16, 21, and 23, 1982. S. 2008 was not reported out of committee.
(...continued)
sess., April 23, 1997 (Washington: GPO, 1997).
56 For example, 85% of Representatives and 87.5% of Senators responding to a 1987 survey indicated that they agreed
or strongly agreed with the idea of appropriating on a two-year schedule. Congress Speaks—A Survey of the 100th
Congress (Washington: Center for Responsive Politics, 1988), pp. 34.
57 For example, H.Res. 396 (106th Congress) was introduced by Representative David Dreier on November 18, 1999
with 245 cosponsors, expressing the sense of the House in favor of biennial budgeting legislation.
58 U.S. National Economic Commission, Report of the National Economic Commission (Washington: GPO, 1989), p.
11.
59 The Pearson-Ribicoff Commission recommended that Congress consider half of the regular appropriations bills each
year. For further information, see U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Rules and Administration, Report of the Study
Group on Senate Practices and Procedures, committee print, 98th Cong., 2nd sess., S. Prt. 98-242 (Washington: GPO,
1984), p. 21.
60 This order provided that if one committee reported a measure, the other had 30 days to report or be discharged from
further consideration.
61 This change was provided for under the terms of S.Res. 445 (108th Congress) and has continued in effect through the
date of this report.
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100th Congress
On May 6, 1987, during consideration of S.Con.Res. 49, the budget resolution for FY1988, an
amendment (S.Amdt. 186 to S.Amdt. 174) was offered on the floor of the Senate to express the
sense of the Congress that biennial budget process should be enacted into law that year. The
amendment was tabled, 53-45.62
S. 2478, the Biennial Budget Act of 1988, was introduced on June 7, 1988. The measure was
jointly referred to the Senate Committee on the Budget and Committee on Governmental Affairs.
The Committee on Governmental Affairs held hearings on the measure on June 7, 1988. S. 2478
was reported by the Committee on Governmental Affairs on August 25, 1988, with amendments
(S.Rept. 100-499). No further action was taken.
101st Congress
S. 29, the Biennial Budget Act, was introduced on January 25, 1989. The measure was jointly
referred to the Senate Committee on the Budget and Committee on Governmental Affairs. The
Committees on Budget and Governmental Affairs held joint hearings on the measure on October
18, 1989. S. 29 was reported by the Committee on Governmental Affairs on March 21, 1990
(S.Rept. 101-254). No further action was taken.
On May 4, 1989, during consideration of S.Con.Res. 30, the Senate budget resolution for
FY1990, an amendment (S.Amdt. 88) was offered on the floor of the Senate to express the sense
of the Senate that Congress should enact legislation to establish a biennial budget process. The
amendment was agreed to by a voice vote63 and was included in the Senate substitute amendment
to H.Con.Res. 106, the vehicle for the FY1990 budget resolution. This provision was ultimately
removed in conference (H.Rept. 101-50).
102nd Congress
H.R. 1889, the Budget Simplification and Reform Act of 1991, was introduced on April 17, 1991.
This budget process reform bill included provisions establishing a biennial budget. The measure
was jointly referred to Committee on Governmental Operations (and subsequently referred to the
Subcommittee on Legislation an National Security) and the Committee on Rules (and
subsequently referred to the Subcommittee on the Legislative Process). The Subcommittee on the
Legislative Process held hearings on the measure on September 18 and 25, 1992. H.R. 1889 was
not reported out of committee.
103rd Congress
H.R. 3801, the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1994, was introduced on February 3, 1994. This
bill included provisions establishing a biennial budget. The measure was jointly referred to the
Committees on Government Operations, House Administration, and Rules (and subsequently
referred to the Subcommittee on the Rules of the House and Subcommittee on the Legislative
62 Senate debate, Congressional Record, vol. 133, part 9 (May 6, 1987), p. 11437.
63 Senate debate, Congressional Record, vol. 135, part 6 (May 4, 1989), p. 8234.
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Process). The Committee on House Administration held hearings on the measure on June 14, 30,
and July 14, 1994. The Subcommittee on the Rules of the House held hearings on March 9, 10,
16, 24, and April 13, 1994. The Subcommittee on Legislative Process held hearings on February
25 and March 2, 1994. H.R. 3801 was not reported out of committee.
S. 1824, the companion measure to H.R. 3801, was introduced on February 3, 1994. The measure
was referred to the Committee on Rules, which held hearings on February 10, 24, March 10, 17,
and April 28 (S.Hrg. 103-488). The bill was reported with an amendment on July 1, 1994 (S.Rept.
103-297).64 No further action was taken.
105th Congress
S. 261, the Biennial Budgeting and Appropriations Act, was introduced on February 4, 1997. The
measure was jointly referred to the Committee on the Budget and Committee on Governmental
Affairs. The Committee on the Budget held a hearing on February 13, 1997. The Committee on
Governmental Affairs held a hearing on April 23, 1997 (S.Hrg. 105-138). The bill was reported
by the Committee on Governmental Affairs with an amendment in the nature of a substitute on
September 4, 1997 (S.Rept. 105-72). No further action was taken.
106th Congress
S. 92, the Biennial Budgeting and Appropriations Act, was introduced on January 19, 1999. The
measure was jointly referred to the Committee on the Budget and Committee on Governmental
Affairs. The Committees on the Budget and Governmental Affairs held a joint hearing on January
27, 1999. The bill was reported by the Committee on Governmental Affairs with an amendment
in the nature of a substitute on March 10, 1999 (S.Rept. 106-12). No further action was taken.
S. 93, the Budget Enforcement Act of 1999, was introduced on January 19, 1999. This bill
included provisions providing for an biennial budget. The measure was jointly referred to the
Committee on the Budget and Committee on Governmental Affairs. The Committees on the
Budget and Governmental Affairs held a joint hearing on January 27, 1999. S. 93 was not
reported out of committee.
On May 16, 2000, during consideration of H.R. 853, an amendment (H.Amdt. 708) was offered
on the floor of the House to add a new title establishing a biennial budget process. The
amendment failed, 201-217.65
107th Congress
H.R. 981, the Budget Responsibility and Efficiency Act of 2001, was introduced on March 13,
2001. This bill would have amended the Congressional Budget Act to provide for a biennial
budget cycle. The measure was jointly referred to the Committee on the Budget, Committee on
64 It is notable that in contrast to the comprehensive approach to biennial budgeting taken in most biennial budgeting
proposals, S. 1824, as reported, included two-year budget resolutions and multi-year authorizations, but not two-year
appropriations.
65 House debate, Congressional Record, vol. 146, part 6 (May 16, 2000), p. 7978.
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Rules, and Committee on Government Reform. The Committee on the Budget reported the
measure with an amendment on September 5, 2001 (H.Rept. 107-200, Part I). The Committee on
Rules reported the measure with an amendment on November 14, 2001 (H.Rept. 107-200, Part 2).
No further action was taken.
108th Congress
During House consideration of H.R. 4663, the Spending Control Act of 2004, an amendment
(H.Amdt. 621) was offered that sought to replace the text of the bill with the “Family Budget
Protection Act of 2004,” a budget process reform proposal containing provisions to provide for a
biennial budget. The amendment failed, 88-326.66
109th Congress
S. 3521, the Stop Over Spending Act of 2006, was introduced on June 15, 2006. This bill
contained provisions providing for a biennial budget cycle. The measure was referred to the
Committee on the Budget, which reported the measure with an amendment on July 14, 2006
(S.Rept. 109-283). No further action was taken.
Author Contact Information
Jessica Tollestrup
Analyst on Congress and the Legislative Process
jtollestrup@crs.loc.gov, 7-0941
Acknowledgments
This report, in part, builds on the analysis previously contained in CRS Report RL30550, Biennial
Budgeting: Issues and Options, by James V. Saturno.
66 House debate, Congressional Record, vol. 150, part 10 (June 24, 2004), p. 14089.
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