Japan’s 2011 Earthquake and Tsunami:
Economic Effects and Implications for the
United States
Dick K. Nanto, Coordinator
Specialist in Industry and Trade
William H. Cooper
Specialist in International Trade and Finance
J. Michael Donnelly
Information Research Specialist
Renée Johnson
Specialist in Agricultural Policy
April 6, 2011
Congressional Research Service
7-5700
www.crs.gov
R41702
CRS Report for Congress
P
repared for Members and Committees of Congress
Japan’s 2011 Earthquake and Tsunami: Economic Effects and Implications for the U.S.
Summary
The March 11, 2011, earthquake and tsunami that occurred in Japan followed by the nuclear crisis
are having a large negative impact on the economy of Japan but a lesser effect on world trade and
financial markets. Japan has lost considerable physical and human capital. Physical damage has
been estimated to be from $195 billion to as much as $305 billion. (Greece’s GDP is $330
billion.) In excess of 27,000 persons in Japan are killed or missing, and more than 202,000 homes
and other buildings have been totally or partially damaged. The negative effects of the earthquake
and tsunami are being compounded by the continuing crisis at the Fukushima nuclear reactors and
the resulting evacuations, radioactive contamination, and shortages of electricity; continuing
aftershocks; and the extensive damage to infrastructure, homes, manufacturing plants, and other
buildings.
The earthquake-related events in Japan are still unfolding, and each round of economic
assessments seems more and more pessimistic. Analysts expect that over the next quarter or so,
Japan’s economy will contract and may fall into recession, but it may begin to expand later in the
year because of rebuilding activity. Much depends on whether the damage from the nuclear plant
can be contained, the speed at which electrical and oil refining capacity can be restored, and how
quickly Japan’s industrial base can recover. As the third-largest economy in the world, Japan’s
GDP at $5.5 trillion accounts for 8.7% of global GDP. The net impact of the disaster on global
GDP is that it is expected to shave about a half percentage point off global economic growth with
about half of that effect confined to Japan, itself.
Congressional interest on the economic side centers on humanitarian concerns, radioactive fallout
reaching the United States, the impact on U.S. citizens and American companies in Japan, the
effects on trade and supply chain disruptions, and increased volatility in Japanese and U.S.
financial markets, interest rates, and the yen-dollar exchange rate.
The impact on U.S. imports from and exports to Japan is expected to be modest as a proportion of
overall trade, but particular sectors or companies may be affected considerably. The United States
already has banned imports of certain vegetables and milk from the vicinity of the damaged
nuclear reactors and is monitoring other foods for radiation. Japan plays a major role in global
supply chains both as a supplier of parts and as a producer of final products. In this age of just-in-
time production processes, even a small disruption in the provision of a single component can
wreak havoc on an entire product line. Japan’s production of automobiles, semiconductors, and
electronics is likely to be affected the most, but companies in the United States that rely on Japan
for critical components such as electronic parts and batteries or transmissions for electrical
vehicles also will be affected. Tourist travel both into and out of Japan also is expected to fall.
There also is concern over speculation in currency markets and repatriation of assets back to
Japan that is raising the value of the yen. The G-7 monetary authorities intervened in March to
weaken the yen. Another concern is that Japan’s national debt, already at 200% of GDP, will rise
significantly as the government borrows to finance reconstruction. This may raise interest rates in
Japan and further complicate recovery efforts or, in the worst case, trigger a sovereign debt crisis
and loss of confidence in Japanese government bonds.
Legislation: H.Res. 172, S.Res. 101.
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Japan’s 2011 Earthquake and Tsunami: Economic Effects and Implications for the U.S.
Contents
Overview .................................................................................................................................... 1
Economic Impact ........................................................................................................................ 5
Manufacturing ...................................................................................................................... 5
Financial and Currency Markets............................................................................................ 7
Implications for the U.S.-Japan Economic Relationship............................................................. 11
Agriculture and Food ................................................................................................................ 14
Legislative Activity................................................................................................................... 16
Figures
Figure 1. Persons Killed, Missing, and Buildings Totally or Partially Damaged ........................... 2
Figure 2. A Tug Boat among Debris in Ofunato, Japan ................................................................ 3
Figure 3. Tsunami Damage to Seafood Cultivation in Japan......................................................... 5
Figure 4. Yen/Dollar Exchange Rate............................................................................................ 8
Figure 5. A Damaged Water Pipe Shoots into the Air, Hachinohe, Japan ...................................... 9
Figure 6. Aerial View of Minato, Japan, a Week After the Tsunami ............................................ 11
Tables
Table A-1. Japan’s Top Merchandise Exports by Market Country .............................................. 17
Table A-2. Japan’s Top Merchandise Imports From Source Countries ........................................ 17
Table A-3. Japan’s Top Surplus Balance Countries .................................................................... 18
Table A-4. Japan’s Top Deficit Balance Countries ..................................................................... 18
Table A-5. World Top Five Exporting and Importing Countries ................................................ 19
Table A-6. Monthly U.S. Merchandise Trade Data With Top Partner Countries.......................... 19
Appendixes
Appendix. ................................................................................................................................. 17
Contacts
Author Contact Information ...................................................................................................... 21
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Japan’s 2011 Earthquake and Tsunami: Economic Effects and Implications for the U.S.
Overview
The March 11, 2011, earthquake and tsunami that occurred in Japan followed by the nuclear crisis
at the Fukushima Nuclear Complex, evacuations, and shortage of electricity are having a large
negative economic impact on the country but a lesser effect on world markets. Japan has lost
considerable physical and human capital. Physical damage has been estimated from $195 billion
to as much as $305 billion,1 the latter figure being nearly four times as much as Hurricane Katrina
($81 billion) and roughly equivalent to the GDP of Greece and twice that of New Zealand. In
excess of 28,000 persons in Japan are killed or missing, and more than 196,000 homes and other
buildings have been totally or partially damaged.2 Earthquake-related events in Japan are still
unfolding; therefore, any economic impact assessments are at best preliminary. Nevertheless,
analysts expect that over the next quarter or so, Japan’s economy will contract and may fall into
recession, but it may expand later in the year and into 2010 because of rebuilding activity. As the
third-largest economy in the world, Japan’s GDP at $5.5 trillion accounts for 8.7% of global GDP.
Congressional interest on the economic side centers on humanitarian concerns, radioactive fallout
reaching the United States, the impact on U.S. citizens and American companies in Japan, the
effects on trade and disruptions to supply chains, and increased volatility in Japanese and U.S.
financial markets, interest rates, and the yen-dollar exchange rate.
The damage from the earthquake and tsunami is being compounded by the evacuations and
uncertainty from the problems at the Fukushima nuclear reactors. Tokyo’s power supply is
experiencing a shortfall of as much as a third of peak capacity, and the electrical grid is
experiencing a current shortage of as much as a quarter of capacity. The earthquake also damaged
plants and equipment far from its epicenter. Port facilities, sensitive electronic equipment, 2,126
roads, and 56 bridges also were harmed. These were located in a wide area of the country that
even reached Tokyo’s northern suburbs. The human toll also has been great with 12,554 persons
killed, 15,077 missing, and another 2,866 injured (as of April 6, 2011). In Miyagi and Fukushima
prefectures, 1,669 public schools—69% of the total—were damaged or have collapsed.3 Higher
radiation levels are being detected in Tokyo’s water supply and in leafy vegetables and milk from
around the area of the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Plant. Depending on how long the nation’s
electrical generating capacity is impaired, how long and how wide an area of evacuation because
of radiation danger is continued, whether the nuclear reactors are brought under control, and how
quickly alternative sources can be found for critical electronic and automotive parts whose
production has been curtailed, the negative economic effects could grow.
In recent decades, Japan’s growth rate has lagged behind that of the world, so it has not been a
major contributor to global economic growth. The net impact of the disaster on global GDP,
therefore, is expected to be relatively small (minus about one-half a percentage point) with about
half of that effect confined to Japan, itself.
As for U.S.-Japan economic relations, it is likely that the impact of the earthquake and ensuing
events on the bilateral economic relationship will be modest overall; however, the effects could
1 Japan, Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry, Japan’s Nuclear Emergency—Update, April 6, 2011.
2 Data are updated daily. See Japan National Police Agency, Damage Situation and Police Countermeasures associated
with 2011Tohoku district - off the Pacific Ocean Earthquake. http://www.npa.go.jp/archive/keibi/biki/higaijokyo_e.pdf
3 “Many Tohoku Schools Still Shut By Quake,” NIKKEI.com, April 1, 2011.
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be more profound in the near term and on specific sectors and firms for which trade and
investment with Japan is particularly important.
Figure 1. Persons Killed, Missing, and Buildings Totally or Partially Damaged
As of April 6, 2011
Source: Underlying map from U.S. AID. Casualty and damage data from Japan, National Police Agency.
Japan plays a major role in global supply chains both as a supplier of parts and as a producer of
final products. In this age of just-in-time production processes, even a small disruption in the
provision of a single component can wreak havoc on an entire product line. Japan’s production of
automobiles, semiconductors, and electronics is likely to be affected the most, but companies in
the United States that rely on Japan for critical components such as electronic parts and batteries
or transmissions for electrical vehicles also will be affected. Tourist arrivals from Japan also are
expected to fall as will the number of Americans visiting Japan.
U.S. imports from and exports to Japan are temporarily being hindered because of shipping
bottlenecks and the nature of the disaster. In the medium term, a slowdown in growth in Japan is
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Japan’s 2011 Earthquake and Tsunami: Economic Effects and Implications for the U.S.
likely to reduce U.S. exports there, but eventually rebuilding will require large amounts of
construction supplies. If imports of certain products from Japan become scarce, China, South
Korea, or other nations may gain at Japan’s expense. Trade data for Japan are presented in the
Appendix to this report.
Figure 2. A Tug Boat among Debris in Ofunato, Japan
Source: U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 1st Class Matthew M. Bradley.
The U.S. Food and Drug Administration has banned imports of spinach and kakina from the four
Japanese prefectures of Fukushima, Ibaraki, Tochigi, and Gunma and milk from Fukushima
prefecture only. All milk and milk products and vegetables and fruits produced or manufactured
from the four Japanese prefectures affected are to be detained upon entry into the United States
and not allowed to enter the U.S. food supply unless shown to be free from radionuclide
contamination.4 The European Union, Australia, China, Hong Kong, South Korea, Philippines,
Singapore, India, and Canada have required increased surveillance of food products from Japan.
China has turned away a container ship from Japan that they claim had radiation levels too high.
International shipping companies reportedly are charging higher rates for calling at Japanese
ports. Premiums being required by ship owners to enter Japanese ports can be from $147,000 to
$588,000.5
4 U.S. Food and Drug Administration, What Is FDA Doing to Ensure the Safety of Products Imported from Japan?,
Radiation Safety/Questions About Food Safety, Washington, DC, updated March 23, 2011, http://www.fda.gov/
NewsEvents/PublicHealthFocus/ucm247403.htm.
5 “Shippers Seek Japan Premiums,” The Wall Street Journal Asia, April 1, 2011, Internet edition.
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The value of the yen has been increasing, prompting coordinated intervention by the G-7
countries (Group of Seven Industrial nations) to halt excessive yen appreciation. A repatriation of
assets back to Japan may put upward pressure both on the yen and on U.S. interest rates if
Japanese investors sell U.S. Treasury and other securities, but analysts expect that over time
eventually the damage from the disaster will weaken the yen.
The questions going forward include whether Japan’s debt burden will leave it unable to secure
the funds needed for rebuilding; whether the disaster has fundamentally altered the Japanese
economy and the competitive position of its industries relative to those in China, South Korea,
and other nations; what the impact will be on energy markets and the nuclear industry in Japan
and the world; how Japan and other countries should cope with large inflows of “hot money” that
can distort exchange rates; whether global supply chains can adjust to the loss of supply from
Japan; and how quickly Japan can regain its economic activity and rebuild its capital stock.
Since Japan has a history of severe earthquakes, its citizens and companies have made
considerable preparations and have recovered from previous disasters. The January 1995 Kobe
earthquake (6.8 magnitude) hit a region that was heavily industrialized and densely populated and
caused about $100 billion in damage. The immediate effect was a contraction in Japan’s economy
of 2.6% but a recovery that began the following month.6 The Kobe quake, however, did not
trigger a tsunami, a nuclear crisis, or severe shortages of electricity.
6 Kyohei Morita and Yuichiro Nagai, Japan Economic Focus, Economic implications of earthquake, Barclays Capital,
Japan Economic Research, March 15, 2011.
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Economic Impact
The direct damage from Japan’s earthquake
Figure 3. Tsunami Damage to Seafood
and tsunami has been concentrated in the
Cultivation in Japan
northern region of the country, some distance
from Japan’s industrial heartland. The
financial and economic effects, however, are
spreading through the Japanese economy, the
East Asian region, and also may affect
businesses and consumers in the United
States. The effect of the record 9.0 earthquake
was compounded by the ensuing tsunami that
swept as far as 6 miles inland in Japan,
causing widespread destruction, and that
spread out across the Pacific. It caused tens of
millions of dollars of damage in Hawaii, as
much as $40 million in damage in California,
and millions of dollars of damage primarily to
harbors and boats in Oregon. As shown in
Figure 3, the tsunami also destroyed or
damaged aquaculture facilities in prefectures
quite distant from the epicenter. The damage,
furthermore, has been compounded by the
nuclear contamination from the Fukushima
Daiichi Nuclear Plant plus a shortage of
gasoline and of electricity that has caused
rolling blackouts in Japan’s industrial centers.
Source: NIKKEI.com
Japan’s economic growth, already anemic
because of the global recession in 2008-2009, is expected to drop into negative territory for a
quarter or two but turn positive again as the crisis passes and rebuilding commences. As the
extent of the damage becomes more apparent, forecasts for Japan’s economic growth are
becoming more and more pessimistic. Initial expectations were that the disaster would shave 0.2
to 0.5 percentage points off total GDP growth in 2011, but that growth still would be around 1%.
By March 23, an estimate by IHS Global Insight was for growth in 2011 to be 0.5% with
reconstruction in 2012 increasing it to about 3.5%.7 Morgan Stanley, however, expects a short and
deep recession in Japan with the economy shrinking by 1% to 3% in 2011 and a reduction in
global growth of about 0.5 percentage points.8
Manufacturing
Typically, the negative effects of a natural disaster are large immediately after the event and are
mostly concentrated in the region of the disaster. In the case of Japan’s disaster, however, the
7 IHS Global Insight, Japan: Japan’s Earthquake: a Macroeconomic Damage Assessment, Country Intelligence -
Analysis, March 24, 2011.
8 Morgan Stanley MUFG, Tohoku Earthquake: First Assessment, Japan Research, New York, NY, March 22, 2011, p.
6.
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Japan’s 2011 Earthquake and Tsunami: Economic Effects and Implications for the U.S.
negative impact is greater because the estimated $309 billion (5.7% of GDP and less than 2% of
capital stock)9 or more in damage from the combination of the earthquake and tsunami is being
compounded by the evacuations and uncertainty from the problems at the Fukushima nuclear
reactors, the shortfall in electricity, and a scarcity of gasoline that is hampering rescue and
recovery efforts. In addition to the nuclear plants destroyed, other generating plants are expected
to remain offline until repairs are made and safety ensured. This has caused rolling blackouts
lasting as long as three to four hours at a time that has disrupted Japan’s production capacity in its
industrial heartland farther south in the Tokyo-Osaka corridor. While the visual images mainly
have been of the tsunami and its aftermath, the earthquake also damaged plants and equipment far
from its epicenter. Port facilities,10 sensitive electronic equipment, 2,126 roads, and 56 bridges
also were harmed. These were located in a wide area of the country that even reached Tokyo’s
northern suburbs.11 The human toll also has been great. An estimated 245,000 people are in
evacuation shelters; 243,000 homes are without power; and 720,000 homes without potable
water.12
The three prefectures in eastern Tohoku that took the brunt of the earthquake and tsunami account
for about 6% to 7% of Japan’s GDP. The city of Sendai, with a population of roughly 1 million, is
in the middle of an agricultural region, but it still has a considerable number of industrial
facilities. The villages most damaged by the tsunami were engaged primarily in fishing, but
manufacturing accounts for about a quarter of production in the region,13 and plants in the most
severely damaged areas supply parts and products used in manufacturing elsewhere in Japan. As
of March 16, 2011, all 12 automakers in Japan reportedly had temporarily stopped production at
some plants. Companies such as Hitachi (equipment for power plants), Renesas Electronics
(semiconductors), NEC (electronics), Sony (electronics), and Fujitsu (computers) also had
suspended operations at certain plants in the affected area.14 Japan also supplies parts for
manufacturing in China, South Korea, and other Asian countries. As of March 25, Japanese oil
refiners had restored capacity in three of the six refineries that had halted production. The plants
restarted accounted for 17% of Japan’s domestic refining capacity and left 14% of capacity still
halted. However, since other refineries had been operating at below capacity, some production is
expected to be covered by other plants.15
9 World Bank, East Asia and Pacific Economic Update 2011, The Recent Earthquake and Tsunami in Japan:
Implications for East Asia, Washington, DC, March 21, 2011, http://siteresources.worldbank.org/
INTEAPHALFYEARLYUPDATE/Resources/550192-1300567391916/EAP_Update_March2011_japan.pdf.
10 Kesennuma and Ishonomaki ports are not operating.
11 Roads in Tokyo (16 roads) and in neighboring prefectures of Saitama (155) and Chiba (278) also were damaged.
12 U.S. Department of State, Japan Earthquake Update 17, March 21, 2011.
13 Kyohei Morita and Yuichiro Nagai, Economic Implications of Earthquake, op. cit.
14 “Production Bases Destroyed by Quake. Manufacturers’ Plants, Distribution Facilities in Tohoku, Northern Kanto
Hit Hard,” Yomiuri Shimbun, March 16, 2011.
15 “Quake-Hit Refiners Restoring Fuel Supply,” Nikkei.com, March 25, 2011.
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Some Business Disruptions
• A Hitachi factory north of Tokyo that makes 60% of the world’s supply of airflow sensors was shut down. This
caused General Motors to shut a plant in Shreveport, LA, for a week and Peugeot-Citroen to cut back
production at most of its European plants.
• Two Japanese plants accounting for 25% of the world’s supply of silicon wafers for computer chips were closed.
• A Toshiba plant making liquid crystal displays was damaged.
• Texas Instruments had to close a factory in Japan (until September 2011) accounting for about 10% of its
revenues.
• Sony Corp. temporarily closed seven damaged plants making high definition magnetic tapes, digital video discs,
lithium batteries, semiconductor lasers, and optical devices. The company also suspended operations in three
other plants because of electricity shortages.
• Hitachi Vehicle Energy, Ltd. announced it intended to resume production on March 28 of lithium ion car
batteries at its Ibaraki prefecture facility.
• Nippon Chemi-Con Corp., the largest producer of aluminum electrolytic capacitors used in everything from
computers to industrial equipment, has four Japanese factories that are down, so it intends to boost production
at 10 overseas bases, including factories in Indonesia, Malaysia, and China.
• Nihon Dempa Kogyo, the second-largest maker of quartz components (with a roughly 20% share of the global
market), is turning to operations in Malaysia and elsewhere to compensate for damage at its plant in northern
Japan which assembles quartz components for automotive applications.
• Nissan in Japan is considering importing engines from its plant in Tennessee because its engine factory in
Fukushima prefecture has been damaged.
• Japan's major automakers are expected to produce about 400,000 fewer vehicles domestical y as a result of the
earthquake and tsunami.
• Delta Airlines, the largest foreign carrier in Japan, is cutting capacity to and through its Tokyo hub by 15% to 20%
through May and expects the crisis in Japan to reduce profits in 2011 by $250 million to $400 million.
Sources: Various news articles and press releases.
Financial and Currency Markets
For the U.S. economy, the disaster in Japan came on top of the turmoil in the Middle East, rising
oil and food prices, and a weak recovery with unemployment hovering at 9%. It has added new
uncertainty to markets already under stress. The first effects have been financial as values on
stock markets dropped and paper values shrunk. Equity markets, however, have been recovering
as the impact of a disaster is factored into risk calculations and the economic effects become more
clear. Still the situation in Japan has added to instability in financial markets in the United States
and the world.
The value of the yen and interest rates also are being affected. Investors, hedge funds, and
speculators have bought yen in anticipation that Japan’s wealth holders, insurance companies, and
possibly the government will have to repatriate overseas investments in order to finance insurance
payouts and rebuilding. The value of the yen (83.8 yen per dollar on February 15, 2011, and 122
yen per dollar less than four years ago) touched a record 76.25 yen per dollar on March 17 before
retreating to the 80 yen level after the Group of Seven (G-7) Industrial Nations agreed to
“cooperate as appropriate” to address excessive and volatile movements in the foreign exchange
market (in other words, to intervene to weaken the value of the yen). This decision was made by
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Japan’s 2011 Earthquake and Tsunami: Economic Effects and Implications for the U.S.
monetary authorities in Japan, the United States, the eurozone, Canada, and Britain.16 Since then
the yen has retreated to about 83 yen per dollar. Japan’s Ministry of Finance has argued that
Japan’s life and casualty insurers already have secured considerable funding and intend to tap
domestic markets rather than repatriating funds from overseas and that the strength of the yen was
due to speculation.17 Any yen appreciation that does occur would make Japanese exports less
competitive in U.S. markets and U.S. exports more competitive in Japanese markets. In addition,
since China’s yuan has been linked closely to the value of the dollar, Chinese exporters are likely
to gain further price competitiveness relative to those from Japan.
Approximately a quarter of developing East
Figure 4. Yen/Dollar Exchange Rate
Asia’s long-term debt is denominated in yen.
(yen per dollar)
For China, 8% of its external government
debt is in yen. The figure for Thailand is
110
about 60%, for Vietnam about 35%, for the
Philippines about 32%, and for Indonesia
Weaker yen
100
about 30%. A 1% appreciation in the value of
the yen translates into a $250 million increase
in annual debt servicing on yen-denominated
March 11
90
Earthquake and Tsunami
securities by East Asia’s developing
countries.18
Stronger yen
80
Another question deals with the impact on
March 17
G-7 Intervention
U.S. interest rates and how they might be
70
affected by changes in capital flows to and
from Japan. Japanese investors are major
1/2/2009
3/2/20095/1/20097/2/20099/1/2009
11/2/2009
1/4/2010
3/1/20105/3/20107/2/20109/1/2010
11/1/20101/4/2011
3/1/2011
private foreign holders of U.S. Treasury
securities that finance the U.S. national debt,
Source: CRS. Underlying data from PACIFIC
and their importance has soared over the last
Exchange Rate Service.
few years. At the end of 2010, Japanese
residents held $882.3 billion in U.S. securities. At one time, Japanese investors were the largest
foreign holders of U.S. Treasury securities, but beginning in September 2008, residents in China
surpassed them and, as of the end of 2010, held $1,160.1 billion in U.S. Treasury securities.19
Japanese holdings of U.S. Treasury securities underscore the debtor/creditor link between the
United States and Japan. As the U.S. government continues to incur budget deficits and maintains
a low national savings rate, the United States has had to rely increasingly on foreign creditors to
finance the rising national debt. Some analysts have suggested that Japanese private and
government investors in U.S. Treasury securities may have to slow down or diminish their
holdings to finance reconstruction operations in Japan. Such a move could increase the interest
rates that the U.S. government must pay to finance its debt. Other analysts have suggested such
an impact would be limited as Japan should have sufficient domestic capital to cover the extra
expenses. As the disaster developed, the flight to the safety of U.S. Treasury securities by
investors all over the world more than offset any repatriation of funds back to Japan.
16 Dan Milmo, “G7 rallies behind Japan in bid to curb soaring yen,” The Guardian, March 18, 2011,
http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2011/mar/18/g7-japan-curb-soaring-yen-intervention.
17 From an internal report by Medley Global Advisors, March 16, 2011.
18 World Bank, The Recent Earthquake and Tsunami in Japan: Implications for East Asia, March 21, 2011, op. cit.
19 U.S. Department of the Treasury, http://www.ustreas.gov/tic/.
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The Bank of Japan has been injecting funds into the banking system to ensure that there would be
no shortage of cash or funds to lend and no spikes in Japan’s interest rates. As of March 17, the
bank had made liquidity injections of $418 billion (33 trillion yen) into financial markets. This far
exceeded the 4.5 trillion yen injected after the collapse of Lehman Brothers in 2008.20
Figure 5. A Damaged Water Pipe Shoots into the Air, Hachinohe, Japan
Source: U.S. Navy photo by Chief Mass Communication Specialist Daniel Sanford.
In Japan, a concern is that the public debt, at about 200% of GDP, has become so high that
borrowing to finance reconstruction could trigger a loss of confidence in the ability of the
Japanese government to repay its debts. In such a case, Japan could face a sovereign debt crisis
similar to that faced by Greece. Prior to the earthquake, in January 2011, Standard & Poor’s, the
credit ratings agency, had already downgraded Japan’s long-term sovereign debt to AA- from AA.
This is three levels below the highest possible rating. This was S&P’s first downgrade of Japanese
government debt since 2002.21 When Greece faced a sovereign crisis in 2010, its national debt
was 123% of GDP. In Japan’s case, however, 95% of its national debt is owned by Japanese
citizens, not foreign hedge and other funds. According to one analyst, it is unlikely that those
citizens would dump their bond holdings if the government takes on more debt to rebuild the area
20 Ibid.
21 Hiroko Tabuchi and Bettina Wassener, “S.&P. Downgrades Japan as Debt Concerns Spread,” The New York Times,
January 27, 2011, Internet edition. Moody’s gives Japanese government debt a similar rating.
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struck by the earthquake and tsunami. Financially, Japan’s government appears to have more
maneuvering room than might seem apparent by the debt ratios.22
Most insurance payments are expected to be borne primarily by Japanese insurance companies
and their government. Insurance companies everywhere, however, pass some of their risk
exposure onto global reinsurance providers. One estimate values the insured damage from the
earthquake and subsequent fires at $11 billion to $21 billion. The damage from the tsunami added
another $8 billion to $9.7 billion for a combined total of approximately $20 billion to $30
billion.23 Even property insurance claims of $50 billion, however, would be equivalent only to
about 10% of Japan’s insurance premium income and less than 1% of insurance company assets.24
Not included are insured production losses and claims related to nuclear contamination. Japanese
insurers jointly own a reinsurer, the Japan Earthquake Reinsurance Company, which in turn is
backstopped by the Japanese government. Ultimately, the government stands as the insurer of last
resort in the case of earthquakes. As for individual homeowners, most tend not to carry
earthquake or flood insurance. Household rebuilding, therefore, is likely to come out of
household savings, some of which has been invested overseas.
As of April 6, 2011, earthquake insurance payments stemming from the March 11 quake reached
33.4 billion yen (about $402 million) on 31,627 cases. Most of these payments were for damage
in the Tokyo area because the amounts for payments for the devastation in the areas around
Sendai worst hit by the quake are yet to be determined.25
22 Marcus Noland, Will the Crisis Create a New Japan?, Peterson Institute for International Economics, op-ed,
Washington Post, March 16, 2011.
23 AIR Worldwide, AIR Worldwide Updates Estimate of Insured Losses from the Mw 9.0 Tohoku Earthquake Based
on Detailed Analysis of Ground Motion and Tsunami Footprint, Press Release, Boston, MA, March 25, 2011,
http://www.air-worldwide.com/NewsAndEventsItem.aspx?id=20437.
24 International Monetary Fund, Global Markets Analysis Division, Monetary and Capital Markets Division, Global
Markets Monitor, Washington, DC, March 17, 2011.
25 “Quake Insurance Payments Hit Y33.4 bn,” NIKKEI.com, April 6, 2011.
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Figure 6. Aerial View of Minato, Japan, a Week After the Tsunami
Source: U.S. Marine Corps photo by Lance Cpl. Ethan Johnson.
Implications for the U.S.-Japan Economic
Relationship
The U.S.-Japan economic relationship is very strong and mutually advantageous. The two
economies are integrated via trade in goods and services—they are important markets for each
other’s exports and important sources of imports. Japan and the United States are also connected
via capital flows. Japan is a major foreign source of financing of the U.S. national debt and will
likely remain so for the foreseeable future, as the mounting U.S. debt needs to be financed and the
stock of U.S. domestic savings remains insufficient to meet the demand. Japan is also a
significant source of foreign private portfolio and direct investment in the United States, and the
United States is the origin of much of the foreign investment in Japan.
Japan and the United States remain important trading partners to one another; however, their
relative importance has declined over the years as other trading partners have increased their
importance. In 1996, Japan accounted for 10.8% of U.S. exports and 14.8% of imports, but for
only 4.7% of U.S. exports and 6.3% of U.S imports by 2010. In 1996, the United States
accounted for 27.2% % of Japanese exports and 22.7% of Japanese imports, but for only 15.4%
of Japanese exports and 9.7% of Japanese imports by 2010. The diminished importance has been
the result in part of the development of international production networks and the segmentation of
production processes across countries giving rise to China as a important trading partner for both
the United States and Japan.
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Japan’s 2011 Earthquake and Tsunami: Economic Effects and Implications for the U.S.
An important factor in determining the volume of trade flows is the relative growth rates in each
of the trading partners. For example, in 2009, both U.S. exports to Japan and imports from Japan
declined substantially, reflecting the effects of the global economic downturn. The crisis was
particularly hard on a Japan that was trying to recover from more than a decade and a half of
economic stagnation. In 2010, U.S.-Japan trade showed signs of recovery as both the U.S. and
Japanese economies grew, 2.9% and 4.0%, respectively.26 If, as expected, the Japanese economy
experiences slower economic growth as a result of the earthquake-related crisis, U.S. exports
could decline, depending on the extent of the impact. A major portion of U.S. exports to Japan
consists of optical and medical equipment; computers and components; semiconductors; and
agricultural products, such as meat and wheat. Many economists expect Japanese economic
growth to rise as the country begins to recover from the damage.27
Increasingly, international trade results from the segmentation of production processes that take
place within transnational supply chains. On the one hand, such transnational production
networks can result in more efficient production and lower costs; on the other hand, any
disruptions within the chain can halt production down the line. One possible, albeit incomplete,
indicator of the role of supply chains in U.S.-Japan trade is the amount of that trade that is in
intermediate goods—that is goods that are used in the making of final goods. In 2010, 55.3% of
U.S. exports were in intermediate goods (capital goods, except automotive; industrial supplies
and materials); 48.9% of U.S. imports from Japan were in intermediate goods.
Some sectors of U.S.-Japan trade are likely to be affected. For example, close to 35% of U.S.
imports from Japan in 2010 consisted of passenger cars and auto parts. Some Japanese auto
manufacturers, such as Toyota Motor Corp., have assembly operations in the immediate vicinity
of the earthquake. Other manufacturers who may not be directly located in the earthquake area
have been affected by power outages and other effects of the disaster and have had to curtail
operations, reducing output. Japanese auto manufacturers have also been adversely affected by
disruption of operations of parts suppliers.28
In addition, U.S.-based auto manufacturers may also be affected by the problems in Japan. Some
Japanese-owned companies in the United States have had to curtail operations because they
cannot obtain parts from Japan. For example, some models assembled in the United States by
Toyota, Mitsubishi, Nissan, and Mazda import engines and/or transmissions from Japan.29 Also,
some U.S.-name plate manufacturers have been affected. For example, Ford Motor Co. depends
on imports of Japanese-made memory chips and batteries. In addition, a significant portion of
U.S. imports from Japan are in machinery (20.6%), including printers and computers, and
electrical machinery (15.2%), including semiconductors, shipments of which could be interrupted
because of the crisis. The full extent of the effects of the problems in Japan is yet to be
determined.30
26 Economist Intelligence Unit.
27 According to one estimate, Japan’s GDP growth could be reduced by 0.3% resulting in no growth for the current
quarter. Global Insight. Japan’s March 2011 Earthquake: Disruption, Risks and Outlook, March 16, 2011. Another
estimate puts the loss at 0.5% GDP. Standard Charted Research, Japan—Assessing the Impact ,March 15, 2011.
28 Automotive News, March 14, 2011.
29 National Highway Administration, http://www.nhtsa.gov.
30 Automotive News, March 15, 2011.
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Japan’s 2011 Earthquake and Tsunami: Economic Effects and Implications for the U.S.
In 2010, Japanese suppliers accounted for more than one-fifth of global semiconductor
production, and companies headquartered in Japan generated $63.3 billion in microchip revenue.
This represented 20.8% of the worldwide market. Not all of the actual production, however, is
located in Japan.31
Tourism also is likely to be affected. Hawaii already has experienced cancellations of tours from
Japan. Japanese tourists accounted for $1.9 billion in revenue in Hawaii, 18% of tourist arrivals
there, and numbered second only to arrivals from other parts of the United States.32 For the
United States as a whole, about 3.5 million tourists from Japan arrived in 2010, placing Japan in
fourth place after Canada, Mexico, and the United Kingdom.33
The Obama Administration has engaged in discussions with Japan regarding the possibility of
Japan joining negotiations to establish the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) Initiative. Before the
March 11 earthquake, the government of Prime Minister Kan indicated it would make a decision
on TPP by this June. However, some members of the Japanese Diet have indicated that that
decision may have to be delayed as a result of the disaster.34
In addition to trade, an important U.S.-Japan economic link is foreign direct investments (FDI),
that is, investments in plants, firms, and real estate that signify a long-term commitment:
• In 2009, the U.S. investors had $103.6 billion in foreign direct investments in
Japan. The largest investments were in non-depository financial institutions,
including insurance, at $49.3 billion (48.2%). Another $16.9 billion (16.3%) were
in various aspects of manufacturing and $8.2 billion (7.9%) were in wholesale
trade.
• In 2009, Japanese investors had $271.9 billion in FDI in the United States. $81.7
billion (30.0%) of the investments were in manufacturing, including $35.6 billion
in the transportation equipment (including passenger car production), and $119.4
billion were in wholesale trade.
Many of these foreign direct investments generate trade and employment:
• In 2008 (latest data available), U.S. companies had 946 affiliates in Japan that
employed 585.3 thousand employees. Of that number, 752 firms were majority-
owned affiliates that employed 296.5 thousand employees. The majority-owned
affiliates accounted for $11.8 billion in U.S. exports to and $1.5 billion in U.S.
imports from Japan.
• In 2008, Japanese affiliated companies in the United States employed 741.7
thousand employees in the United States. They accounted for $60.1 billion in
U.S. exports and $183.8 billion in U.S. imports.
31 E-mail communication from Dale Ford, Senior Vice President, Market Intelligence, IHS iSuppli company. March 17,
2011.
32 “Japan crisis ‘terrible’ for Hawaii tourism,” UPI.com, March 17, 2011.
33 U.S. Department of Commerce, International Trade Administration, Table C - Section 5: United Kingdom, Japan, S.
Korea, PRC (EXCL Hong Kong), ROC(Taiwan) Non-Resident Visitation to the U.S. By world region/country of
residence 2010, 2010 Monthly Tourism Statistics, Washington, DC, Data through November 2010,
http://tinet.ita.doc.gov/view/m-2010-I-001/table5.html.
34 Washington Trade Daily, March 25, 2011.
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Agriculture and Food35
The widespread devastation from the March 2011 earthquake and tsunami affected many
agricultural and fishery areas in Japan. The Japanese government is still assessing the extent of
the overall damages to the country’s agricultural, forestry, and fisheries sectors. Damages to
agricultural crops, land, and facilities have been reported in several prefectures, including
Aomori, Iwate, Miyagi, Akita, Yamagata, Fukushima, Ibaraki, Tochigi, Gunma, Saitama, Chiba,
Yamanashi, Nagano, Niigata, and Mie, among others.36 Among fisheries, “catastrophic damages”
to fish vessels and harbor facilities have been reported in Iwate, Miyagi, and Fukushima
prefectures; other damages are also reported elsewhere.
Japan’s agricultural and fisheries industries account for a small share (less than 2%) of its total
yearly GDP; however, these industries remain an important aspect of the country’s overall
economy and governmental policies. Japan’s principal food commodities include fish and
seafood, rice, vegetables, fruits and nuts, and dairy and poultry products. Agricultural output,
measured at the farm level, totals about $70 billion annually. The value of Japan’s fisheries
account for another $14 billion. Japan remains a net importer of food and fisheries products, with
imports totaling $57 billion in 2010. The United States was the leading supplier, accounting for
about one-fourth of imports ($13.8 billion in 2010). Japan’s exports of these same products
totaled $4 billion in 2010.37 Leading exports include fish and seafood (about 40% of all imports),
and also processed foods, bakery, and grains products, and other crops.
The U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) has compiled statistics of crop production in the
five coastal prefectures—Aomori, Iwate, Miyagi, Akita, Yamagata, Fukushima, and Ibaraki.
These five prefectures account for about 17% of all cultivated farmland in Japan.38 USDA’s
summary using 2007 production data show that these five prefectures account for about 21% of
Japan’s total marine fisheries and aquaculture production by volume and 17% of all agricultural
output by volume. These areas also account for similar shares of the nation’s rice, soybeans,
vegetables, and livestock production. These prefectures also house 40% of all hogs raised in
Japan and about one-tenth of all cattle and dairy herds.
The Japanese government has been monitoring possible radioactive contamination of plant and
animal products and tap water in some of these prefectures as well as other adjacent southern
prefectures near the disabled Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Plant. Daily testing has been conducted
since March 19, 2011, to detect possible radioactive contaminants on a wide range of plant and
animal products, including fish.39 Testing for radioactive contaminants in foods is ongoing and
spans many adjacent prefectures.
35 Prepared by Renée Johnson, Specialist in Agricultural Policy. Contact her for more background information and for
full references on all cited data and official statements.
36 Japan’s Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries (MAFF), “The damages caused by the 2011 off the Pacific
coast of Tohoku Earthquake and Actions taken by Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries,”
http://www.maff.go.jp/e/quake/press_110328-1.html.
37 Global Trade Atlas, http://www.gtis.com/gta/. Imports, actual U.S. dollars. Harmonized System (HS) codes in
chapters 01-21.
38 USDA, Economic Research Service (ERS), “Japan: Current Issues in Japanese Agriculture,” Table 1.
http://www.ers.usda.gov/Briefing/Japan/currentissues.htm.
39 Reports are posted by Japan’s Ministry of Health, Labour, and Welfare (MHLW), “Information about 2011 Tohoku -
Pacific Ocean Earthquake,” http://www.mhlw.go.jp/english/topics/2011eq/index.html.
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Japan’s 2011 Earthquake and Tsunami: Economic Effects and Implications for the U.S.
The Japanese government has taken action to restrict the distribution of potentially contaminated
foods. On March 23, 2011, Japan’s Ministry of Health, Labour, and Welfare made a series of
announcements restricting the distribution and consumption of certain foods, including non-head
type leafy vegetables, any head type leafy vegetables (such as spinach, komatsuna, cabbages),
and any flowerhead brassicas (broccoli, cauliflower) produced in Fukushima prefecture;40 spinach
and kakina (a leafy vegetable) harvested in Fukushima, Ibaraki, Tochigi, and Gunma prefectures;
and also fresh raw milk produced in Fukushima prefecture.41 The Ministry also notes that “in
Fukushima Prefecture, there is no capability for coastal fishing in the sea area of the prefecture …
due to damage of the coast by the earthquake.” Japan’s Fisheries Agency expects that “fishery
activities will not be resumed for a while in the sea area of Fukushima prefecture.”42
Following these reports, many countries increased their surveillance of food imports from Japan,
including the European Union, Australia, China, Hong Kong, South Korea, Philippines,
Singapore, India, and Canada, among others. In the United States, the U.S. Food and Drug
Administration (FDA) issued an “Import Alert” regarding the importation of all milk and milk
products and fresh vegetables and fruits produced or manufactured from the four Japanese
prefectures of Fukushima, Ibaraki, Tochigi, and Gunma.43 U.S. food imports are regulated by
FDA, which monitors the safety of most types of food imports, and USDA’s Food Safety and
Inspection Service (FSIS), which regulates the safety of meat and poultry imports.44
Some in Congress have indicated concern that radioactive contaminated foods might enter the
U.S. through its food imports.45 Both FDA and USDA have issued formal statements regarding
the current situation in Japan.46 FDA has stated: “FDA’s screening at U.S. borders will remain
vigilant and will be augmented with radiation screening of shipments” and its import tracking
system “has been programmed to automatically flag all shipments of FDA-regulated products
from Japan.” USDA has stated that “USDA and its federal partners through the Food Emergency
Response Network are preparing to begin sampling, if necessary.” Existing U.S. trade laws,
including the Tariff Act of 1930 (19 U.S.C. 1304), generally require all imported articles to be
marked with the English name of the country of origin. Various other country-of-origin labeling
requirements also apply under other laws that govern FDA and USDA47 and other USDA
40 MLHW, “Restriction of distribution and/or consumption of foods concerned in Fukushima and Ibaraki Prefectures,”
Notice No.0323-1, March 23, 2011, http://www.mhlw.go.jp/stf/houdou/2r98520000015wun-att/
2r98520000015xym.pdf.
41 MLHW, “Handling Monitoring of Radioactive Contaminants for Agricultural and Livestock Products,’ Notice
No.0323-1, March 23, 2011, http://www.mhlw.go.jp/english/topics/2011eq/dl/food-110323.pdf.
42 Japan’s Fisheries Agency, “Questions and answers on fishery products,” http://www.jfa.maff.go.jp/e/q_a/index.html.
Also see http://www.jfa.maff.go.jp/e/inspection/index.html for other testing and inspection reports.
43 FDA, “Import Alert 99-33,” March 25, 2011, http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/cms_ia/importalert_621.html.
44 CRS Report RL34198, U.S. Food and Agricultural Imports: Safeguards and Selected Issues; and CRS Report
RS22600, The Federal Food Safety System: A Primer. In addition, USDA’s Animal and Plant Health Inspection
Service (APHIS) is responsible for protecting plant and animal resources from domestic and foreign pests and diseases,
and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is responsible for coordinating agencies’ food security activities,
including border inspections by DHS’s U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP).
45 See, for example, “DeLauro Wants All Japanese Food Bound for the U.S. Tested,” CQ Health Beat, March 23, 2001.
46 FDA, “Radiation,” http://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/PublicHealthFocus/ucm247403.htm; and USDA, “USDA’s
Radiation Safety Questions and Answers,” http://www.usda.gov/wps/portal/usda/usdahome?contentidonly=true&
contented=radiation_safety_qa.html.
47 For example, FDA requirements under the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (21 U.S.C. 301 et seq.); FSIS
requirements under the Federal Meat Inspection Act (21 U.S.C. 601 et seq.) and the Poultry Products Inspection Act
(21 U.S.C. 451 et seq.).
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Japan’s 2011 Earthquake and Tsunami: Economic Effects and Implications for the U.S.
programs.48 Several international organizations, including organizations within the United
Nations, are monitoring international concerns over the safety of food produced in Japan.49
Many U.S. and international industry sources have indicated that the current situation in Japan
might cause disruption in global food markets, but also have indicated the likelihood that
Japanese demand for imported food might increase. Historically, Japan has been an important
trading partner with the United States, and is our fourth-largest agricultural export market. It is
still not clear what effect, if any, Japan’s food supply and demand situation will have on world
farm commodity markets and food prices.
Legislative Activity
H.Res. 172 (Honda). Expressing heartfelt condolences and support for assistance to the people of
Japan and all those affected in the aftermath of the deadly earthquake and tsunamis of March 11,
2011.
S.Res. 101 (Reid) A resolution expressing the sense of the Senate relating to the March 11, 2011,
earthquake and tsunami in Japan. Passed by unanimous consent in the Senate on March 14, 2011.
48 For example, requirements under Country of Origin Labeling program and the Perishable Agricultural Commodities
Act.
49 See, for example, U.N. World Health Organization (WHO), “FAQs: Japan Nuclear Concerns”; U.N. Food and
Agriculture Organization (FAO), “United Nations System Response”; U.N., “Nuclear Emergency in Japan and Food
Safety Concerns”; International Food Safety Authorities Network (INFOSAN), “Information on Nuclear Accidents and
Radioactive Contamination of Foods”; and Codex Alimentarius, “Codex General Standard for Contaminants and
Toxins in Food and Feed,” Stand. 193-1995.
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Appendix.
Table A-1. Japan’s Top Merchandise Exports by Market Country
Millions of U.S. Current Dollars
% Share
Rank
Country
2008 2009 2010
2008
2009
2010
0 —World—
781,952.3 580,465.4 770,112.2 100.0
100.0
100.0
1
China
124,952.2
109,576.6
149,692.3
16.0
18.9
19.4
2
United States
137,306.0
93,624.2
118,798.2
17.6
16.1
15.4
3
Korea, South
59,418.2
47,217.0
62,299.1
7.6
8.1
8.1
4
Taiwan
46,033.6
36,409.8
52,474.2
5.9
6.3
6.8
5
Hong Kong
40,280.6
31,858.7
42,315.2
5.2
5.5
5.5
6
Thailand
29,491.5
22,247.9
34,235.6
3.8
3.8
4.5
7
Singapore
26,627.5
20,694.3
25,236.7
3.4
3.6
3.3
8
Germany
23,984.3
16,646.2
20,445.2
3.1
2.9
2.7
9
Malaysia
16,436.8
12,859.1
17,643.1
2.1
2.2
2.3
10
Netherlands
21,077.0
13,512.5
16,399.5
2.7
2.3
2.1
Source: Japan Customs via Global Trade Atlas.
Note: Countries ranked by trade value in 2010.
Table A-2. Japan’s Top Merchandise Imports From Source Countries
Millions of Current U.S. Dollars
% Share
Rank Country
2008
2009
2010
2008
2009
2010
0 —World—
762,487.7 551,787.9 692,844.6
100.0 100.0 100.0
1
China
143,657.2
122,514.5
153,370.1
18.8
22.2
22.1
2
United States
77,666.9
58,959.1
67,400.1
10.2
10.7
9.7
3
Australia
47,677.2
34,729.6
44,805.6
6.3
6.3
6.5
4
Saudi Arabia
50,840.8
29,192.0
35,890.3
6.7
5.3
5.2
5
United Arab Emirates
46,759.0
22,713.8
29,280.6
6.1
4.1
4.2
6
Korea, South
29,500.7
21,977.6
28,641.8
3.9
4.0
4.1
7
Indonesia
32,555.1
21,810.6
28,113.8
4.3
4.0
4.1
8
Taiwan
21,824.6
18,336.6
23,073.8
2.9
3.3
3.3
9
Malaysia
23,241.2
16,726.6
22,708.1
3.1
3.0
3.3
10
Qatar
26,422.4
15,924.2
21,697.0
3.5
2.9
3.1
Source: Japan Customs via Global Trade Atlas.
Note: Countries ranked by import value in 2010.
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Table A-3. Japan’s Top Surplus Balance Countries
Millions of Current U.S. Dollars
Rank Country
2008
2009
2010
0
—World—
19,464.6 28,677.5 77,267.5
1
United States
59,639.1
34,665.0
51,398.1
2
Hong Kong
38,718.8
30,760.4
40,794.9
3
Korea, South
29,917.6
25,239.4
33,657.4
4
Taiwan
24,209.0
18,073.2
29,400.4
5
Singapore
18,734.8
14,589.1
17,081.3
6
Panama
10,952.7
12,641.4
15,004.8
7
Thailand
8,678.5
6,225.0
13,210.8
8
Netherlands
17,255.2
10,055.1
12,445.4
9
United Kingdom
8,974.6
6,123.4
7,874.2
10
Mexico
6,137.0
4,037.7
5,979.6
Source: Japan Customs via Global Trade Atlas.
Note: Countries ranked by 2010 balance data.
Table A-4. Japan’s Top Deficit Balance Countries
Millions of U.S. Current Dollars
Rank Country
2008
2009
2010
1
Saudi Arabia
-42,941.6
-23,801.2
-29,407.0
2
Australia
-30,389.3
-22,548.7
-28,960.7
3
United Arab Emirates
-35,872.2
-16,222.6
-21,946.9
4
Qatar
-24,391.2
-14,295.9
-20,555.9
5
Indonesia
-19,947.6
-12,481.7
-12,192.0
6
Iran
-16,336.0
-7,655.0
-9,080.2
7
Kuwait
-13,117.7
-7,744.6
-8,870.8
8
Russia
3,112.3
-5,560.9
-8,100.3
9
Malaysia
-6,804.4
-3,867.5
-5,065.0
10
Chile
-5,166.4
-3,954.9
-4,849.5
Source: Japan Customs via Global Trade Atlas.
Note: Countries ranked by 2010 balance values.
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Table A-5. World Top Five Exporting and Importing Countries
Merchandise Trade, All Commodities, Calendar Years 2008-2010
Top Five Reporting Countries Exports with World, Ranked by 2010 Exports
Millions of Current United States Dollars
% Change
% of Total
Country
2008
2009
2010
2010/2009
2010
World
Total
15,426,934 11,794,981 12,592,915
6.8
100.0
China
1,428,319 1,201,663 1,577,941 31.3
12.5
USA
1,287,442 1,056,043 1,277,504 21.0
10.1
Germany 1,448,973 1,120,639 1,268,890 13.2
10.1
Japan
781,952 580,465 770,112 32.7
6.1
Netherlands
638,503 498,503 573,352 15.0
4.6
Top Five Reporting Countries Imports from World, Ranked by 2010 Imports
Millions of Current United States Dollars
% Change
% of Total
Country
2008
2009
2010
2010/2009
2010
World
Total
15,950,342 12,041,608 12,854,666
6.8
100.0
USA
2,103,641 1,559,625 1,912,092 22.6
14.9
China
1,133,388 1,005,555 1,394,813 38.7
10.9
Germany 1,185,536 925,833
1,066,723 15.2
8.3
Japan
762,488 551,788 692,845 25.6
5.4
France
716,502 559,895 606,168 8.3
4.7
Source: CRS with National Trade Reporting Agencies via Global Trade Atlas.
Notes: Statistics based on countries reporting as of 3/22/2011.
Table A-6. Monthly U.S. Merchandise Trade Data With Top Partner Countries
Through January 2011, in Millions of U.S. Dollars
United States: Exports to Top Market Countries
Rank Country
Sep-10
Oct-10
Nov-10
Dec-10
Jan-11
0
—World—
107,789 117,596 112,948 116,990 110,243
1
Canada
21,883
22,193
20,989
20,441
20,675
2
Mexico
14,008
15,353
14,840
14,520
14,840
3
China
7,168
9,303
9,481
10,121
8,078
4
Japan
4,979
5,551
5,221
5,460
4,993
5
Germany
4,110
4,373
4,566
4,098
3,648
6
United Kingdom
3,940
4,273
3,858
4,163
4,136
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United States: Exports to Top Market Countries
Rank Country
Sep-10
Oct-10
Nov-10
Dec-10
Jan-11
7
Netherlands
3,146
3,387
3,266
3,290
3,164
8
Korea, South
3,004
3,335
3,189
3,451
3,197
9
Brazil
2,974
3,219
3,005
3,035
3,212
10
Taiwan
2,358
2,218
2,532
2,606
2,283
United States: Imports from Top Source Countries
Rank Country
Sep-10
Oct-10
Nov-10
Dec-10
Jan-11
0
—World—
166,372 170,119 168,850 166,398 166,274
1
China
34,999
34,820
35,116
30,802
31,350
2
Canada
22,980
23,285
22,741
24,313
24,359
3
Mexico
19,780
21,106
20,456
19,211
19,735
4
Japan
10,017
11,217
11,015
11,360
9,974
5
Germany
6,768
7,669
7,662
7,362
6,768
6
Korea, South
4,269
4,427
4,769
4,151
4,200
7
Venezuela
2,843
2,432
2,691
2,743
3,648
8
United Kingdom
3,972
4,382
4,151
4,472
3,598
9
Taiwan
3,303
3,246
3,311
3,228
3,225
10
Nigeria
2,817
2,209
2,114
2,905
3,145
United States: Top Deficit Balance Partners
Rank Country
Sep-10
Oct-10
Nov-10
Dec-10
Jan-11
0
—World—
-58,584 -52,523 -55,901 -49,408 -56,031
1
China
-27,831
-25,517
-25,634
-20,682
-23,271
2
Japan
-5,037
-5,666
-5,794
-5,900
-4,981
3
Mexico
-5,772
-5,753
-5,617
-4,691
-4,895
4
Germany
-2,658
-3,296
-3,096
-3,264
-3,120
5
Ireland
-2,247
-2,711
-2,312
-2,613
-1,917
6
Saudi Arabia
-1,790
-1,398
-2,106
-1,761
-1,594
7
Canada
-1,097
-1,093
-1,752
-3,872
-3,684
8
Nigeria
-2,465
-1,844
-1,749
-2,524
-2,876
9
Russia
-1,796
-1,547
-1,667
-1,403
-2,126
10
Venezuela
-1,899
-1,231
-1,580
-1,995
-2,817
Source: U.S. Dept. of Commerce, Bureau of Census via Global Trade Atlas.
Congressional Research Service
20
Japan’s 2011 Earthquake and Tsunami: Economic Effects and Implications for the U.S.
Author Contact Information
Dick K. Nanto, Coordinator
J. Michael Donnelly
Specialist in Industry and Trade
Information Research Specialist
dnanto@crs.loc.gov, 7-7754
mdonnelly@crs.loc.gov, 7-8722
William H. Cooper
Renée Johnson
Specialist in International Trade and Finance
Specialist in Agricultural Policy
wcooper@crs.loc.gov, 7-7749
rjohnson@crs.loc.gov, 7-9588
Congressional Research Service
21