Department of Defense Contractors in
Afghanistan and Iraq: Background and
Analysis
Moshe Schwartz
Specialist in Defense Acquisition
Joyprada Swain
Research Associate
March 29, 2011
Congressional Research Service
7-5700
www.crs.gov
R40764
CRS Report for Congress
P
repared for Members and Committees of Congress

---

Department of Defense Contractors in Afghanistan and Iraq: Background and Analysis

Summary
The critical role contractors play in supporting military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq
necessitates that the Department of Defense (DOD) effectively manage contractors during
contingency operations. Lack of sufficient contract management can delay or even prevent troops
from receiving needed support and can also result in wasteful spending. Some analysts believe
that poor contract management has played a role in permitting abuses and crimes committed by
certain contractors against local nationals, which may have undermined U.S. counterinsurgency
efforts in Afghanistan and Iraq.
DOD relies extensively upon contractors to support overseas contingency operations. As of
December 2010, DOD had more contractor personnel in Afghanistan and Iraq (159,000) than
uniformed personnel (144,000). Contractors made up 52% of DOD’s workforce in Afghanistan
and Iraq. Since December 2009, the number of DOD contractors in Afghanistan has exceeded the
number in Iraq.
According to DOD, in Afghanistan, as of December 2010, there were 87,483 DOD contractor
personnel, compared to approximately 96,900 uniformed personnel. Contractors made up 47% of
DOD’s workforce in Afghanistan at that time. This compares to December 2008, when
contractors represented 69% of DOD’s workforce in Afghanistan. According to DOD data, the
recent surge of uniformed personnel in Afghanistan and the increase in contract obligations did
not result in a corresponding increase in contractor personnel.
DOD obligated approximately $11.8 billion on contracts performed primarily in the Afghanistan
theater of operations (including surrounding countries) in FY2010, representing 15% of total
DOD obligations in the area. From FY2005-FY2010, DOD obligated approximately $33.9 billion
on contracts in the Afghanistan theater, representing 16% of total DOD obligations in the area.
According to DOD, in Iraq, as of December 2010, there were 71,142 DOD contractor personnel
in Iraq compared to approximately 47,305 uniformed personnel in-country. Contractors made up
60% of DOD’s workforce in Iraq. Contractor and troop levels have decreased every quarter for
the last eight quarters.
DOD obligated approximately $15.4 billion on contracts in the Iraq theater in FY2010,
representing 20% of total DOD obligations in the area. From FY2005-FY2010, DOD obligated
approximately $112.1 billion on contracts in the Iraq theater of operations, representing 19% of
total DOD obligations in the area.
A number of analysts have questioned the reliability of DOD’s contractor data. DOD officials
have acknowledged data shortcomings and have stated that they are working to improve the
reliability and the type of data gathered. DOD is implementing a database to track and monitor
contractor personnel during a contingency operation. DOD has also taken a number of steps to
try to improve how it manages contractors in Afghanistan and Iraq, including efforts to centralize
contracting support and management; implement regulatory and policy changes, train uniformed
personnel on how to manage contractors; and increase the size of the acquisition workforce in
theater. A number of these initiatives have been reflected in or were the result of legislation.
This report provides a detailed analysis of contractor personnel trends and contracting dollars
obligated in U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM), Afghanistan, and Iraq.
Congressional Research Service

---

Department of Defense Contractors in Afghanistan and Iraq: Background and Analysis

Contents
Background ................................................................................................................................ 1
Managing Contractors During Contingency Operations ............................................................... 2
Contractors in the Central Command Region............................................................................... 4
Contractors in CENTCOM.................................................................................................... 5
Number of Contractors.................................................................................................... 5
DOD Contract Obligations .............................................................................................. 8
Contractors in Afghanistan .................................................................................................... 9
Number of Contractors.................................................................................................... 9
Type of Work Performed by Contractors........................................................................ 10
Profile of Contractors.................................................................................................... 10
DOD Contract Obligations ............................................................................................ 12
Contractors in Iraq .............................................................................................................. 13
Number of Contractors.................................................................................................. 13
Type of Work Performed by Contractors........................................................................ 13
Profile of Contractors.................................................................................................... 15
DOD Contract Obligations ............................................................................................ 17
Efforts to Improve Contractor Management and Oversight ........................................................ 18
Selected Congressional Hearings and Legislation ...................................................................... 20
Private Security Contractors................................................................................................ 20
Contractors Training Local Security Forces ......................................................................... 21
Contract Management, Oversight, and Coordination............................................................ 22
Training Contractors and the Military in Contingency Contracting ...................................... 22

Figures
Figure 1. Contractor Personnel as Percentage of Workforce in Recent Operations........................ 2
Figure 2. Number of Contractor Personnel in CENTCOM vs. Troop Levels ................................ 7
Figure 3. Contract Action Obligations for Iraq and Afghanistan Theaters..................................... 9
Figure 4. Number of Contractor Personnel in Afghanistan vs. Troop Levels............................... 10
Figure 5. Contractor Personnel Trends in Afghanistan by Nationality ........................................ 11
Figure 6. Contract Action Obligations for Afghanistan Theater .................................................. 12
Figure 7. Number of Contractor Personnel in Iraq vs. Troop Levels ........................................... 13
Figure 8. Contractor Personnel in Iraq by Type of Service Provided .......................................... 14
Figure 9. Percent of Contractor Personnel Performing Types of Service in Iraq.......................... 15
Figure 10. Number of Contractor Personnel in Iraq by Nationality............................................. 16
Figure 11. Contractor Personnel Trends in Iraq by Nationality ................................................... 17
Figure 12. Contract Action Obligations for Iraq Area of Operations ........................................... 18
Figure A-1. Trend Analysis of Contractor Personnel by Type of Service Provided in Iraq........... 24

Congressional Research Service

---

Department of Defense Contractors in Afghanistan and Iraq: Background and Analysis

Tables
Table 1. Comparison of Contractor Personnel to Troop Levels..................................................... 6
Table 2. Contractor Personnel in Afghanistan ............................................................................ 11
Table 3. Contractor Personnel in Iraq......................................................................................... 15
Table A-1. Number of Contractor Personnel in Iraq by Type of Service Provided....................... 25
Table B-1. Contractor Personnel and Troop Level Data for Iraq................................................. 26
Table B-2. Contractor Personnel and Troop Level Data for Afghanistan..................................... 26
Table C-1. Total Contract Action Obligations for Afghanistan.................................................... 29
Table C-2. Total Contract Action Obligations for Iraq................................................................ 29

Appendixes
Appendix A. Contractor Personnel in Iraq by Type of Service Provided..................................... 24
Appendix B. Contractor and Troop Level Data .......................................................................... 26
Appendix C. Comparison of CRS, CBO, and GAO Methodology for Determining DOD
Contract Obligations in Afghanistan and Iraq ......................................................................... 28

Contacts
Author Contact Information ...................................................................................................... 30

Congressional Research Service

---

Department of Defense Contractors in Afghanistan and Iraq: Background and Analysis

Background
The Department of Defense (DOD) has often relied upon contractors to support military
operations. During the Revolutionary War, the Continental Army relied on contractors to provide
such goods and services as transportation and engineering services, construction, clothing, and
weapons.1 Since then, advances in warfare and technology have expanded the functions and
responsibilities of contractors in military operations.2 After the Cold War, reliance on contractors
further increased when DOD cut logistic and support personnel.3 As a result of these cuts, DOD
lost in-house capability and was forced to rely even further on contractor support.4 Many analysts
now believe that DOD is unable to successfully execute large missions without contractor
support. These analysts point to recent contingency operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, and the
Balkans—the three largest military operations of the past 15 years—where contractors have
comprised approximately 50% of DOD’s combined contractor and uniformed personnel workforce in
country (see Figure 1).5

1 Deborah C. Kidwell, “Public War, Private Fight? The United States and Private Military Companies,” Global War on
Terrorism Occasional Paper 12, Combat Studies Institute Press, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 2005, p. 9. See also James
F. Nagle, History of Government Contracting, 2nd ed. (Washington, D.C.: The George Washington University Law
School, 1999), pp. 16-19.
2 Congressional Budget Office, Contractors’ Support of U.S. Operations in Iraq, August 2008, p. 12.
3 CRS Report R40057, Training the Military to Manage Contractors During Expeditionary Operations: Overview and
Options for Congress, by Moshe Schwartz, p. 1.
4 For example, in 2008 the Government Accountability Office (GAO) found that the Army had a contract for 11,000
linguists because DOD did not have the number of linguists needed. See U.S. Government Accountability Office, DOD
Needs to Address Contract Oversight and Quality Assurance Issues for Contracts Used to Support Contingency
Operations, GAO-08-1087, September 26, 2008, p. 6.
5 For purposes of this report, DOD’s workforce is defined as uniformed personnel and the contractor workforce. DOD
civilian personnel are excluded from this count. According to DOD’s Joint Personnel Status Report, as of September 8,
2009, the DOD civilian workforce in Iraq was 2,033 employees (less than 1.0% of the total force) and the DOD civilian
workforce in Afghanistan was 1,706 employees (1.0% of the total force).
Congressional Research Service
1

---

Department of Defense Contractors in Afghanistan and Iraq: Background and Analysis

Figure 1. Contractor Personnel as Percentage of Workforce in Recent Operations
70%
60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%
Balkans
Afghanistan
Iraq

Source: Balkans: Congressional Budget Office. Contractors’ Support of U.S. Operations in Iraq. August 2008. p. 13;
Afghanistan and Iraq: CRS analysis of DOD data, calculated as an average for the period September 2007–
December 2010.
Contractors are often seen as providing operational benefits to DOD. Using contractors to
perform non-combat activities augments the total force and can free up uniformed personnel for
combat missions. Since contractors can be hired faster than DOD can develop an internal
capability, contractors can be quickly deployed to provide critical support capabilities when
necessary. Contractors also provide expertise in specialized fields that DOD may not possess,
such as linguistics. Using contractors can also save DOD money. Contractors can be hired when a
particular need arises and be let go when their services are no longer needed. Hiring contractors
only as needed can be cheaper in the long run than maintaining a permanent in-house capability.
Using local nationals as contractors could also help develop the local economy and workforce,
contributing to stability and counter-insurgency operations.
Managing Contractors During Contingency
Operations
Lack of sufficient contract management can prevent troops from receiving needed support and
lead to wasteful spending.6 In addition, some analysts believe that lax contractor oversight may
lead to contractor abuses, which can undermine U.S. counter-insurgency efforts.
Questions have been raised about DOD’s ability to effectively manage contractors during
contingency operations.7 Some analysts assert that DOD has not adequately planned for the use of

6 U.S. Government Accountability Office. Stabilizing And Rebuilding Iraq: Actions Needed to Address Inadequate
Accountability over U.S. Efforts and Investments. GAO-08-568T. March 11, 2008. p. 4,6; See also Urgent Reform
Required: Army Expeditionary Contracting, Op. Cit., p. 2.
7 See U.S. Government Accountability Office, High-Level DOD Action Needed to Address Long-standing Problems
(continued...)
Congressional Research Service
2

---

Department of Defense Contractors in Afghanistan and Iraq: Background and Analysis

contractors, lacks contingency contracting experience, and does not sufficiently coordinate
contracts across military services.8 In January 2009, Secretary of Defense Roberts Gates
acknowledged DOD’s failure to adequately plan for the use of contractors, when he testified that
use of contractors occurred
without any supervision or without any coherent strategy on how we were going to do it and
without conscious decisions about what we will allow contractors to do and what we won’t
allow contractors to do... We have not thought holistically or coherently about our use of
contractors, particularly when it comes to combat environments or combat training.9
In 2007, a report by the Commission on Army Acquisition and Program Management in
Expeditionary Operations (the Gansler Report) found that contracting officer representatives, who
are responsible for managing contracts, usually have no prior experience with contractors and
receive negligible training on how to manage contractors.10 Some analysts and industry
representatives argue that as a result, DOD is not getting the most out of the services provided by
contractors in Afghanistan and Iraq.
Questions have also been raised about DOD spending on contractors. The Commission on
Wartime Contracting highlighted over-spending on contracts as a key concern.11 It reported that
managerial shortages and limited oversight of contractors led to potentially unnecessary
construction, such as a new $30 million dining facility to be completed a year before U.S. troops
were required to leave Iraq, even though a then-recently upgraded dining facility was located
nearby.12
Many analysts argue that only a culture shift in the military will improve contracting outcomes.
The Gansler Report found that despite the importance of acquisitions to military performance,
the Army apparently has not valued the skill and experience required to perform those
processes ... without significant systemic change, the Army acquisition processes
[contracting process] can be expected to inevitably return to below-mediocrity.13
Other analysts have argued that DOD’s current approach to managing service contracts tends to
be reactive and has not fully addressed key factors for success.14 These analysts argue that to
improve contracting outcomes, DOD must (1) understand how and why it uses contractors,

(...continued)
with Management and Oversight of Contractors Supporting Deployed Forces, GAO-07-145, December 18, 2006.
8 U.S. Government Accountability Office, Contract Management: DOD Developed Draft Guidance for Operational
Contract Support but Has Not Met All Legislative Requirements, GAO-09-114R, November 20, 2008, p. 1.
9 U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Armed Services, To Receive Testimony on the Challenges Facing the
Department of Defense, 110th Cong., 2nd sess., January 27, 2009.
10 Commission on Army Acquisition and Program Management in Expeditionary Operations, Urgent Reform Required:
Army Expeditionary Contracting, October 31, 2007, p. 43.
11 Commission on Wartime Contracting: Interim Findings and Path Forward, 111th Cong., 1st sess., June 10, 2009;
Commission on Wartime Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan, At What Cost? Contingency Contracting In Iraq and
Afghanistan, June 2009.
12 Ibid, p. 52-54.
13 Urgent Reform Required: Army Expeditionary Contracting, p. 9; see also New American Foundation, Changing the
Culture of Pentagon Contracting, November 5, 2008.
14 For example, see U.S. Government Accountability Office, Defense Acquisitions: Tailored Approach Needed to
Improve Service Acquisition Outcomes, GAO-07-20, November 9, 2006, Highlights Page and p. 9.
Congressional Research Service
3

---

Department of Defense Contractors in Afghanistan and Iraq: Background and Analysis

including the number of contractors and types of services provided; (2) develop better
management and contract oversight structures; and (3) establish and commit to a strategic
approach that defines how contractors should be used to achieve operational success.
The use of contractors in Afghanistan and Iraq raises a number of issues for Congress, including
(1) what role contractors should play in contingency operations, (2) whether DOD is gathering
and analyzing the right data on the use of contractors, (3) what steps DOD is taking to improve
contract management and oversight, and (4) the extent to which contractors are included in
military doctrine and strategy. This report will discuss current contracting trends in Afghanistan
and Iraq and steps DOD has taken to improve contractor oversight and management.
Contractors in the Central Command Region
Contractors supply a wide variety of services and products—including base support, construction,
security, training local security forces, and transportation—to assist DOD operations in
Afghanistan and Iraq.15 While many of these contractors work in Afghanistan and Iraq, a number
are also present in surrounding countries within the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) Area of
Responsibility and in the United States.16 For example, at Camp Arifjan, Kuwait, the Army relied
on contractors to refurbish and repair vehicles used in Afghanistan and Iraq, such as the Bradley
Fighting Vehicle and armored personnel carriers.17
DOD did not begin to gather and release data on contractors in CENTCOM until the second half
of 2007. As a result, the following CRS analysis covers the period from September 2007 to
December 2010. Contractor data in this report is based primarily on CENTCOM’s quarterly
manual census.
DOD is implementing the Synchronized Predeployment and Operational Tracker (SPOT), which
is designed to track and monitor contractor personnel within a contingency operation. In
January 2007, DOD chose SPOT as its primary system for collecting data on contractor
personnel. In July 2008, DOD, the Department of State, and USAID signed a memorandum of
understanding designating SPOT as the system to track contractor.18 DOD originally planned to
have SPOT replace the CENTCOM quarterly census as the tracking mechanism for contractor
data by Q1 2010.19 According to a recent GAO report, the transition to SPOT has been delayed
and is expected to be completed no later than Q4 FY2011.20

15 For a discussion on DOD’s use of private security contractors in Iraq and Afghanistan, see CRS Report R40835, The
Department of Defense’s Use of Private Security Contractors in Afghanistan and Iraq: Background, Analysis, and
Options for Congress, by Moshe Schwartz.
16 USCENTCOM is responsible for operations in 20 countries in and around the Middle East including Afghanistan,
Bahrain, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Lebanon, Oman, Pakistan, Qatar, Saudi Arabia,
Syria, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, U.A.E., Uzbekistan, and Yemen. The number of contractors based in the U.S. is small;
these contractors are not included in this analysis.
17 U.S. Government Accountability Office, Defense Logistics: The Army Needs to Implement an Effective Management
and Oversight Plan for the Equipment Maintenance Contract in Kuwait, GAO-08-316R, January 22, 2008.
18 DOD, Department of State, and USAID were required to sign a memorandum of understanding governing how to
track contracts and contractor personnel in Iraq and Afghanistan. See P.L. 110-181, sec 861.
19 August 23, 2009 version of CRS Report R40764, Department of Defense Contractors in Iraq and Afghanistan:
Background and Analysis, by Moshe Schwartz, p. 4.
20 According to GAO, as of October 2010, SPOT “still cannot reliably track information on contracts, assistance
(continued...)
Congressional Research Service
4

---

Department of Defense Contractors in Afghanistan and Iraq: Background and Analysis

A number of analysts have raised questions about the reliability of the data gathered by DOD. In
October 2010, GAO reported that the quarterly contractor reports represent only a rough
approximation of the number of contractors and therefore should not be relied upon for precise
analysis.21 GAO has also stated that because of data reliability issues, “caution should be used”
when trying to use quarterly census data to identify trends or draw conclusions about the number
of contractor personnel.22 DOD officials have acknowledged data shortcomings and have stated
that they are working to improve the reliability and the type of data gathered.23 Reliable data on
local nationals, particularly in Afghanistan, has been the most difficult to gather.24 According to
DOD
The reported number of local national personnel in Afghanistan continues to fluctuate as we
address reporting challenges. Specifically, there has been inconsistency in the reporting of
day laborer personnel. SPOT [the Synchronized Predeployment and Operational Tracker
system] does not require the registration of contractors working on a contract for less than 30
days. However, some contracting activities (in some quarters) include these contractors in
their total manual census/SPOT Plus count. The inconsistency of who is counted is
compounded by the frequent turnover of personnel responsible to provide input to the census
and their individual understanding of reporting requirements. The issue was highlighted in
the 4th quarter FY 2010 census. OSD has, in conjunction with USCENTCOM and the SPOT
PM published guidance to clarify census reporting requirements.25
Contractors in CENTCOM
Number of Contractors
According to DOD, as of December 31, 2010, there were approximately 176,000 DOD contractor
personnel in the CENTCOM AOR compared to approximately 209,000 uniformed personnel in
the region who are supporting operations in Afghanistan and Iraq.26 Contractors made up 46% of

(...continued)
instruments, and associated personnel in Iraq or Afghanistan.” See U.S. Government Accountability Office,
Contingency Contracting :Further Improvements in Agency Tracking of Contractor personnel and Contracts in Iraq
and Afghanistan, GAO-10-187, November 2, 2009; U.S. Government Accountability Office, Contingency Contracting:
DOD, State, and USAID Continue to Face Challenges in Tracking Contractor Personnel and Contracts in Iraq and
Afghanistan , GAO-10-1, October 1, 2009.
21 U.S. Government Accountability Office, Iraq and Afghanistan: DOD, State and USAID Face Continued Challenges
in Tracking Contracts, Assistance Instruments, and Associated Personnel, GAO-11-1, October 1, 2010, p. 18; See also,
U.S. Government Accountability Office, Contingency Contracting: DOD, State, and USAID Contracts and Contractor
Personnel in Iraq and Afghanistan, GAO-09-19, October 1, 2008, p. 6.
22 U.S. Government Accountability Office, Iraq and Afghanistan: DOD, State and USAID Face Continued Challenges
in Tracking Contracts, Assistance Instruments, and Associated Personnel, GAO-11-1, October 1, 2010, p. 4.
23 Ibid. See also DOD US CENTCOM FY2009 2nd Quarter Contractor Census Report.
24 Based on email correspondence with DOD official, received by CRS on January 18, 2011. Commenting on the
unique difficulty in tracking Afghan local nationals, a DOD official wrote “many Afghan local nationals contracted by
the U.S. government do not need to access U.S. controlled facilities or data systems and therefore, they do not require a
base access card or a Letter of Authorization. Without these enforcement mechanisms, the ability to capture
information about this population in the automated system is significantly challenged. Literacy challenges and the lack
of identity documentation in Afghanistan further complicate the issue. Only now is the Afghan government starting to
use biometrics.”
25 Based on email correspondence with DOD official, received by CRS on January 18, 2011.
26 According to DOD, as of December 2010, there were 213,105 troops dedicated to supporting operations in Iraq and
Afghanistan, of which approximately 3,700 were based outside of the CENTCOM region (Djibouti, Kenya, Ethiopia,
(continued...)
Congressional Research Service
5

---

Department of Defense Contractors in Afghanistan and Iraq: Background and Analysis

DOD’s combined contractor and uniformed personnel workforce in the CENTCOM AOR,27
representing a .84:1 ratio between contractors and uniformed personnel (see Table 1).
Table 1. Comparison of Contractor Personnel to Troop Levels
(As of December 2010)
Contractors
Troops
Ratio

Afghanistan Only
87,483
96,900
.90:1
Iraq Only
71,142
47,305
1.50:1
CENTCOM
AOR
176,161 209,000
.84:1
Source: CENTCOM 1st Quarter FY 2011 Contractor Census Report; Troop data from Joint Chiefs of Staff,
“Boots on the Ground” January report to Congress.
Notes: CENTCOM AOR includes figures for Afghanistan and Iraq. CENTCOM troop level adjusted by CRS to
exclude troops deployed to non-Central Command locations (e.g., Djibouti, Philippines, Egypt). Troop levels for
non-CENTCOM locations are from DMDC, DRS 11280, “Location Report” for June 2010, which is the most
recent data available.
The number of contractor personnel in the CENTCOM AOR roughly tracks to the number of
troops (see Figure 2).

(...continued)
and the Philippines). We subtracted the 3,700 personnel from the total number of troops to approximate the number of
troops based in the CENTCOM region. This adjustment was made for all prior CENTCOM AOR troop levels. See
Boots on Ground report to Congress. Data from Djibouti, Kenya, Ethiopia, and the Philippines is drawn from the
“Average Number of Members deployed on any given day by Service Component and Month/Year” and the “Location
Report”, dated June 2010, which is the most recent data available to CRS.
27 For purposes of this report, DOD’s workforce is defined as uniformed personnel and the contractor workforce. DOD
civilian personnel are excluded from this count. According to DOD’s Joint Personnel Status Report, as of September 8,
2009, the DOD civilian workforce in Iraq was 2,033 (less than 1.0% of the total force) and the DOD civilian workforce
in Afghanistan was 1,706 (less than 1.0% of the total force).
Congressional Research Service
6

---

Department of Defense Contractors in Afghanistan and Iraq: Background and Analysis

Figure 2. Number of Contractor Personnel in CENTCOM vs. Troop Levels
300,000
250,000
200,000
150,000
100,000
50,000
0
Mar.
June
Sept.
Dec.
Mar.
June
Sept.
Dec.
Mar.
June
Sept.
Dec.
08
08
08
08
09
09
09
09
10
10
10
10
Troops
Contractors

Source: CENTCOM Quarterly Contractor Census Reports. For troop levels, see Defense Manpower Data
Center (DMDC), DRS 21198, “Average Number of Members deployed on any given day by Service Component
and Month/Year,” June 2010; DMDC, DRS 11280, “Location Report”. Troop level data for December 2010
based on Boots on Ground Report to Congress because DMDC data was not available.
Notes: Historic troop level data based on data provided by DOD in June 2010. Troop levels for prior months
are adjusted in successive reports and therefore may differ from earlier or subsequent DOD and CRS reports.
According to GAO, lessons learned and data analysis from past operations must be included in
the development of a strategic plan to define contractor involvement in future operations.28 Many
analysts agree that understanding the role contractors play in various DOD operations—including
the relationship between contractors and troop levels—could help to more effectively determine
contractor support requirements in Afghanistan and Iraq, as well as future operations.
According to DOD, contracting with local nationals is an important element in counter-
insurgency strategy.29 Employing local nationals injects money into the local economy, provides
job training, builds support among local nationals, and can give the U.S. a more sophisticated
understanding of the local landscape, says DOD. In January 2009, General Raymond Odierno
issued a memorandum to this effect, stating “employment of Iraqis not only saves money but it
also strengthens the Iraqi economy and helps eliminate the root causes of the insurgency—
poverty and lack of economic opportunity.”30 The memorandum set forth a goal of increasing the
percentage of local national contractors. Despite this policy, DOD has trended away from using

28 U.S. Government Accountability Office, Iraq and Afghanistan: Availability of Forces, Equipment, and Infrastructure
Should Be Considered in Developing U.S. Strategy and Plans, GAO-09-380T, February 12, 2009.
29 Based on discussions with DOD officials, July 23, 2009.
30 General Raymond T. Odierno, Memorandum, Increased Employment of Iraq Citizens Through Command Contracts,
Multi-National Force-Iraq, January 31, 2009.
Congressional Research Service
7

---

Department of Defense Contractors in Afghanistan and Iraq: Background and Analysis

local nationals as contractor personnel in Afghanistan and Iraq. The percentage of contractors
who were local nationals in both countries dropped from 42% in December 2009 to 36% in
December 2010.
An analysis of contractor data also appears to indicate differences in how DOD used contractors
in Afghanistan when compared to Iraq. For example, 53% of contractors in Afghanistan are local
nationals compared to only 15% in Iraq (see 0). Some analysts contend that understanding these
differences—and why they occur—could help DOD to strategically plan for the management and
use of contractors in future operations. For example, had DOD understood the extent to which it
would rely on private security contractors in Afghanistan and Iraq, DOD might have put in place
a more robust oversight and coordination mechanism earlier. 31
DOD Contract Obligations
According to the Federal Procurement Data System – Next Generation (FPDS), DOD obligated
approximately $27.2 billion on contracts in the Afghanistan and Iraq theaters of operations in
FY2010, representing 17% of DOD’s total war obligations in the Afghanistan and Iraq theaters of
operations.32 From FY2005 through FY2010, DOD obligated approximately $146 billion on
contracts in the Iraq and Afghanistan theaters of operations (see Figure 3), representing 18% of
total war spending for operations in Afghanistan and Iraq.33

31 In addition, a number of military bases in Iraq were not large enough to house contractors because DOD did not
originally know how many contractors would be deployed with the military. As a result, DOD had to quickly find
alternative housing for these contractors, which resulted in increased costs for DOD. Based on discussions with DOD
officials, July 23, 2009.
32 Based on total obligations of approximately $146 billion. Data includes total war-related obligations by year incurred
(with classified request based on appropriations), based on data provided by the Defense Finance and Accounting
Service. Classified appropriations allocated 60% to Iraq operations and 40% to Afghanistan operations. See CRS
Report RL33110, The Cost of Iraq, Afghanistan, and Other Global War on Terror Operations Since 9/11, by Amy
Belasco. When using this data, it is important to recognize the limitations of FPDS. GAO, CBO, and SIGIR have all
raised concerns over the accuracy and reliability of the data contained in FPDS. Given these concerns, data from FPDS
is used in this report only to identify broad trends and rough estimations.
33 Based on total obligations of approximately $805 billion. Data for contract expenditures in both operations was
retrieved from FPDS–NG. Data includes total war-related obligations by year incurred (with classified request based on
appropriations), based on data provided by the Defense Finance and Accounting Service. Classified appropriations
allocated 60% to Iraq operations and 40% to Afghanistan operations. The percentage of contract expenditures for
operations in Afghanistan and Iraq from FY2005 through FY2010 were 22%, 22%, 15%, 17%, 18%, and 17%,
respectively.
Congressional Research Service
8

---

Department of Defense Contractors in Afghanistan and Iraq: Background and Analysis

Figure 3. Contract Action Obligations for Iraq and Afghanistan Theaters
(In millions of dollars)
$30,000
$25,000
$20,000
$15,000
$10,000
$5,000
$-
FY2005
FY2006
FY2007
FY2008
FY2009
FY2010

Source: FPDS-NG, January 26, 2011, for FY2005-FY2010.
Notes: Some of the contracts performed in countries categorized as being in the Iraqi theater support
operations in both Iraq and Afghanistan.
Contractors in Afghanistan
Number of Contractors
As reflected in Table 1, according to DOD, as of December 2010, there were 70,599 DOD
contractor personnel in Afghanistan, compared to approximately 96,900 uniformed personnel.
Contractors made up 47% of DOD’s workforce in Afghanistan (see Figure 4). This compares to
December 2008, when contractors represented 69% of DOD’s workforce in Afghanistan. 34

34 The number of contractors in Afghanistan in December 2008 represents the highest recorded percentage of
contractors used by DOD in any conflict in the history of the United States. See CRS Report R40057, Training the
Military to Manage Contractors During Expeditionary Operations: Overview and Options for Congress, by Moshe
Schwartz.
Congressional Research Service
9

---

Department of Defense Contractors in Afghanistan and Iraq: Background and Analysis

Figure 4. Number of Contractor Personnel in Afghanistan vs. Troop Levels
120,000
100,000
80,000
60,000
40,000
20,000
-
Sep. Dec. Mar. Jun. Sep. Dec. Mar. Jun. Sep. Dec. Mar. Jun. Sep. Dec.
07
07
08
08
08
08
09
09
09
09
10
10
10
10
Total Contractors
Troops

Source: CENTCOM Quarterly Census Reports; Troop Levels in the Afghan and Iraq Wars, FY2001-FY2012: Cost
and Other Potential Issues, by Amy Belasco; Joint Staff, Joint Chiefs of Staff, “Boots on the Ground” monthly
reports to Congress.
Type of Work Performed by Contractors
DOD does not report the breakdown of services that contractors provide in Afghanistan, with the
exception of data on private security contractors. Nevertheless, the types of services provided by
contractors in Afghanistan are similar to those conducted in Iraq, including logistics, construction,
linguistic services, and transportation; the percentage of contractors providing each service is
likely different.35 DOD officials have stated in the past that they will start providing data on the
breakdown of services in Afghanistan. However, to date, they have not done so.
Profile of Contractors
As of December 2010, of the approximately 87,000 contractors in Afghanistan, 19,000 were U.S.
citizens, 22,000 were third-country nationals, and 47,000 were local nationals (see Table 2).
Local nationals made up 53% of contractor personnel.

35 The percentage of private security contractors operating in Iraq is different that of those operating in Afghanistan.
See CRS Report R40835, The Department of Defense’s Use of Private Security Contractors in Afghanistan and Iraq:
Background, Analysis, and Options for Congress, by Moshe Schwartz.
Congressional Research Service
10

---

Department of Defense Contractors in Afghanistan and Iraq: Background and Analysis

Table 2. Contractor Personnel in Afghanistan
(As of December 2010)

Total Contractors U.S. Citizens Third-Country Nationals Local Nationals
Number 87,483
19,381 21,579
46,523
Percent of Total 100%
22%
25%
53%
Source: CENTCOM 1st Quarter FY2011 Contractor Census Report.
As discussed above, the number of local nationals in recent census reports continues to fluctuate
as DOD works to “address the challenges associated with the day to day employment of
individual [local national] contractors.”
In September 2010, General Petraeus, Commander of the International Security Assistance
Force/United States Forces—Afghanistan, wrote that US and NATO forces must “[H]ire Afghans
first, buy Afghan products, and build Afghan capacity”36 Based on the available data, DOD uses
more local nationals in Afghanistan than U.S. citizens and third-country nationals combined.
However, the percentage of contractor personnel who are local nationals has steadily declined
from a high of 86% in September 2008 to 53% in December 2010 (see Figure 5), despite DOD’s
policy of trying to hire local nationals.
Figure 5. Contractor Personnel Trends in Afghanistan by Nationality
100%
80%
60%
40%
20%
0%
Sep. Dec. Mar. Jun. Sep. Dec. Mar. Jun. Sep. Dec. Mar. Jun. Sep. Dec.
07
07
08
08
08
08
09
09
09
09
10
10
10
10
Local Nationals
Third Country Nationals
U.S. Citizens

Source: CENTCOM Quarterly Contractor Census Reports.

36 General David H. Petraeus, COMISAF's Counterinsurgency (COIN) Contracting Guidance, International Security
Assistance Force/United States Forces - Afghanistan, September 8, 2010, p. 1.
Congressional Research Service
11

---

Department of Defense Contractors in Afghanistan and Iraq: Background and Analysis

DOD Contract Obligations
According to FPDS, DOD obligated approximately $11.8 billion on contracts in the Afghanistan
theater of operations in FY2010, representing 15% of total obligations in the Afghanistan in the
area.37 From FY2005-FY2010, DOD obligated approximately $33.9 billion on contracts primarily
in the Afghanistan theater, representing 16% of total DOD obligations for operations in that area
(see Figure 6. For a breakout of contract obligations see Table C-1).38
Figure 6. Contract Action Obligations for Afghanistan Theater
(In millions of dollars)
$12,000
$10,000
$8,000
$6,000
$4,000
$2,000
$-
FY2005
FY2006
FY2007
FY2008
FY2009
FY2010

Source: FPDS-NG, January 26, 2011, for FY2005-FY2010.
Notes: For purposes of this analysis, the Afghan theater includes: Afghanistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Pakistan,
Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. Some contracts performed in countries in the Afghan theater also
support operations in Iraq. Conversely, some contracts performed in countries in the Iraqi theater support
operations in Afghanistan. Due to data limitations, obligations for contracts performed in a given country can not
be accurately allocated between operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.

37 Based on total obligations of $79.4 billion. Data includes total war-related obligations by year incurred (with
classified request based on appropriations), based on data provided by the Defense Finance and Accounting Service.
Classified appropriations allocated 60% to Iraq operations and 40% to Afghanistan operations. See CRS Report
RL33110, The Cost of Iraq, Afghanistan, and Other Global War on Terror Operations Since 9/11, by Amy Belasco.
38 Based on total obligations of $216.4 billion. Data includes total war-related obligations by year incurred (with
classified request based on appropriations), based on data provided by the Defense Finance and Accounting Service.
Classified appropriations allocated 60% to Iraq operations and 40% to Afghanistan operations. See CRS Report
RL33110, The Cost of Iraq, Afghanistan, and Other Global War on Terror Operations Since 9/11, by Amy Belasco.
The percentage of contract expenditures for operations in Afghanistan from FY2005 through FY2010 were 12%, 16%,
16%, 19%, 16%, and 15% respectively.
Congressional Research Service
12

---

Department of Defense Contractors in Afghanistan and Iraq: Background and Analysis

Contractors in Iraq
Number of Contractors
As reflected in Table 1 (above), according to DOD, as of December 2010, there were
approximately 71,000 DOD contractor personnel in Iraq compared to 47,000 uniformed
personnel in-country. Contractors made up approximately 60% of DOD’s workforce in Iraq. Both
contractor and troop levels have decreased every quarter over the last two years (see Figure 7).
Figure 7. Number of Contractor Personnel in Iraq vs. Troop Levels
180,000
150,000
120,000
90,000
60,000
30,000
-
Sep. Dec. Mar. Jun. Sep. Dec. Mar. Jun. Sep. Dec. Mar. Jun. Sep. Dec.
07
07
08
08
08
08
09
09
09
09
10
10
10
10
Total Contractors
Troops

Source: CENTCOM Quarterly Census Reports; Joint Staff, Joint Chiefs of Staff, “Boots on the Ground”
monthly reports to Congress.
Notes: The y-intercept for the level of troops and contractor personnel is similar. The R2 value for the linear
trend line for contractor personnel is 0.92 and for uniformed personnel is .89. R2 is a statistical term used to
describe the goodness of the fit between the trend line and the data points. R2 is a descriptive measure between
0 and 1. The closer the R2 value is to one, the better the fit of the trend line to the data.
Type of Work Performed by Contractors
Contractors perform a wide range of services in Iraq. As of December 2010, approximately
42,000 personnel (60% of contractors) performed base support functions such as maintaining the
grounds, running dining facilities, and performing laundry services (see Figure 8). Security was
the second most common service provided, with approximately 13,000 personnel (18% of
contractors). Combined, these two categories accounted for almost 80% of DOD contractors in
Iraq.
Congressional Research Service
13

---

Department of Defense Contractors in Afghanistan and Iraq: Background and Analysis

Figure 8. Contractor Personnel in Iraq by Type of Service Provided
(As of December 2010)

Source: DOD US CENTCOM 1st Quarter Contractor Census Report.
Notes: Numbers may vary slightly from data in other sections of the report due to differences in the points in
time when data was gathered. The Department of Defense did not separately track Logistics/Maintenance or
Training until the first quarter of 2010.
As the overall number of troops in Iraq has decreased, so too has the overall number of
contractors. For example, since June 2008, as troop levels dropped by approximately 106,000
(69%), total contractors fell by approximately 88,000 (55%). However, as reflected in Appendix
A, the number of contractors did not decrease uniformly across the contractor workforce. For
example, during the same period, contractors providing base support and construction declined by
53% (47,000 personnel) and 97% (35,000 personnel) respectively, whereas the number of
contractors providing security actually increased by 39% (3,500 personnel).
This data indicates that as the services required by DOD change during the course of operations,
the percentages and numbers of contractors providing different types of services also change. The
drop in the number of contractor personnel performing base support and construction is a
reflection of DOD’s shrinking footprint and winding down of reconstruction activities. As
reflected in Figure 9, the percentage of contractors performing base support has remained
relatively constant, the percentage working in construction has decreased, and the percentage
performing security has increased.
Congressional Research Service
14

---

Department of Defense Contractors in Afghanistan and Iraq: Background and Analysis

Figure 9. Percent of Contractor Personnel Performing Types of Service in Iraq
(As of December 2010)
70%
60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%
Mar. 08 June
Sep.
Dec.
Mar. 09 June
Sep.
Dec.
Mar. 10 June
Sep.
Dec.
08
08
08
09
09
09
10
10
10
Base Support
Construction
Security

Source: CENTCOM Quarterly Census Reports.
Profile of Contractors
Of the approximately 70,000 contractors in Iraq as of December 2010, some 20,000 were U.S.
citizens, 10,000 were local nationals, and 41,000 were third-country nationals (see Table 3).
Third-country nationals made up more than half of all contractor personnel.
Table 3. Contractor Personnel in Iraq
(As of December 2010)

Total Contractors U.S. Citizens Third-Country Nationals Local Nationals
Number 71,142
19,943 40,776
10,423
Percent of Total 100%
28%
57%
15%
Source: CENTCOM 1st Quarter FY2011 Contractor Census Report.
From June 2008 to June 2010, the number of Iraqi contractor personnel dropped by almost 60,000
(85%), while the number of U.S. personnel decreased by nearly 7,000 (25%) (see Figure 10).
This can be only partially explained by the drop in the number of contractor personnel performing
construction (35,000); local nationals generally represent more than 80% of these workers.
Congressional Research Service
15

---

Department of Defense Contractors in Afghanistan and Iraq: Background and Analysis

Figure 10. Number of Contractor Personnel in Iraq by Nationality
180,000
150,000
120,000
90,000
60,000
30,000
-
Sep. Dec. Mar. Jun. Sep. Dec. Mar. Jun. Sep. Dec. Mar. Jun. Sep. Dec.
07
07
08
08
08
08
09
09
09
09
10
10
10
10
U.S. Nationals
Third Country Nationals
Local Nationals
Total Contractors

Source: CENTCOM Quarterly Contractor Census Reports.
The percentage of contractors who are local nationals has steadily dropped from a high of 53% in
December 2007 to a low of 13% in June 2010 (see Figure 11). This drop has occurred despite a
DOD policy to increase the percentage of local national contractors.39

39 General Raymond T. Odierno, Memorandum, Increased Employment of Iraq Citizens Through Command Contracts,
Multi-National Force-Iraq, January 31, 2009.
Congressional Research Service
16

---

Department of Defense Contractors in Afghanistan and Iraq: Background and Analysis

Figure 11. Contractor Personnel Trends in Iraq by Nationality
(As percentage of total contractor workforce)
70%
60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%
Sep. Dec. Mar. Jun. Sep. Dec. Mar. Jun. Sep. Dec. Mar. Jun. Sep. Dec.
07
07
08
08
08
08
09
09
09
09
10
10
10
10
U.S. Citizens
Third Country Nationals
Local Nationals

Source: CRS analysis of DOD data as contained in CENTCOM Quarterly Censuses.
DOD Contract Obligations
DOD obligated approximately $15.4 billion on contracts in the Iraq theater of operations in
FY2010, representing 20% of total spending in those regions. 40 From FY2005 to FY2010, DOD
obligated approximately $112.8 billion on contracts primarily in the Iraq theater of operations,
representing 19% of total obligations for operations in Iraq.41

40 Based on total obligations of $76.6 billion. Data includes total war-related obligations by year incurred (with
classified request based on appropriations), based on data provided by the Defense Finance and Accounting Service.
Classified appropriations allocated 60% to Iraq operations and 40% to Afghanistan operations. See CRS Report
RL33110, The Cost of Iraq, Afghanistan, and Other Global War on Terror Operations Since 9/11, by Amy Belasco.
41 Based on total obligations of $588.6 billion. Data includes total war-related obligations by year incurred (with
classified request based on appropriations), based on data provided by the Defense Finance and Accounting Service.
Classified appropriations allocated 60% to Iraq operations and 40% to Afghanistan operations. See CRS Report
RL33110, The Cost of Iraq, Afghanistan, and Other Global War on Terror Operations Since 9/11, by Amy Belasco.
The percentage of contract expenditures for operations in Iraq from FY2005 through FY2009 were 24%, 23%, 15%,
17%, 20%, and 20%, respectively.
Congressional Research Service
17

---

Department of Defense Contractors in Afghanistan and Iraq: Background and Analysis

Figure 12. Contract Action Obligations for Iraq Area of Operations
(In millions of dollars)
$25,000
$20,000
$15,000
$10,000
$5,000
$-
FY2005
FY2006
FY2007
FY2008
FY2009
FY2010

Source: FPDS-NG, January 26, 2011, for FY2005-FY2010.
Notes: Based on Congressional Budget Office methodology, the Iraqi theater includes: Iraq, Bahrain, Jordan,
Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and the United Arab Emirates. See Congressional Budget Office,
Contractors’ Support of U.S. Operations in Iraq, August 2008, p. 3.
Some contracts performed in countries in the Afghan theater also support operations in Iraq. Conversely, some
contracts performed in countries in the Iraqi theater support operations in Afghanistan. Due to data limitations,
obligations for contracts performed in a given country can not be accurately allocate between operations in Iraq
and Afghanistan.
Data listed above differs from data reported by CBO and GAO due primarily to differences in methodology. For
a detailed discussion of differences in CRS, CBO, and GAO data and methodology, see Appendix C.
Efforts to Improve Contractor Management and
Oversight
In January 2009, Secretary Defense Robert Gates testified that contractors were used in Iraq
“without any supervision or without any coherent strategy on how we were going to do it and
without conscious decisions about what we will allow contractors to do and what we won’t allow
contractors to do …and those are the areas that I think especially we need to focus on first.”42
In light of DOD’s experiences in Afghanistan and Iraq, and in response to legislation and the
findings of numerous studies (including the Gansler Report, GAO reports, and Special Inspector
General for Iraq Reconstruction reports), DOD has taken a number of steps to try to improve how
it manages contractors in Afghanistan and Iraq. These efforts have included organizational

42 U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Armed Services, Challenges Facing the Department of Defense, 111th Cong.,
1st sess., January 27, 2009.
Congressional Research Service
18

---

Department of Defense Contractors in Afghanistan and Iraq: Background and Analysis

changes such as setting up the Joint Contracting Command to provide a more centralized
contracting support and management system;43 implementing regulatory and policy changes
aimed at improving management;44 improving training for uniformed personnel on how to
manage contractors;45 and increasing the size of the acquisition workforce in theater.46
DOD senior officials are also making a concerted effort to elevate the importance of contracting
and think about the role of contractors during contingency operations. In a September 2010
memorandum to commanders, contracting personnel, uniformed personnel, and civilians in
Afghanistan, General Petraeus, Commander of the International Security Assistance Force/United
States Forces—Afghanistan, stated that “contracting has to be a ‘commander’s business.’”47 This
statement is consistent with the efforts of other senior leaders, including the Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff’s establishment of a task force on contractor reliance in contingency operations
and Secretary Gates’ testimony.
A number of these initiatives have been reflected in or were the result of legislation. For example,
the Joint Contingency Acquisition Support Office was established as a result of section 854 of the
FY2007 John Warner National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) requiring DOD to create a
team of contingency contracting experts that can be deployed to support military operations.48 In
the FY2008 NDAA, Congress mandated contingency contracting training for non-acquisition
military personnel who will have relevant contracting responsibilities.49
A number of analysts and government officials believe that some of these efforts have improved
DOD’s ability to manage and oversee contractors in Afghanistan and Iraq. For example, in Iraq,
DOD established Contractor Operations Cells to coordinate the movement of PSCs and the
Armed Contractor Oversight Directorate to manage PSCs.50 The improvements in how DOD
manages PSCs in Iraq have been noted by the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction,
the Commission on Wartime Contracting, and the GAO.51

43 USCENTCOM, 2nd Quarterly Contractor Census Report, p. 4, May, 2009.
44 These changes include establishing DOD Directive 3020.40 - Orchestrating, Synchronizing, and Integrating
Program Management of Contingency Acquisition Planning and its Operational Execution on March 24, 2009 (assigns
program management responsibilities for acquisitions in contingency operations) and creating the Operational Contract
Support Concept of Operations signed on March 31, 2010.
45 DOD is developing an on-line course that offers pre-deployment training to personnel about planning for and
working with contractors during military operations. Additionally, the Army continues to develop informational
handbooks to help guide military personnel who work with contractors regarding the contracting process and their
specific roles and responsibilities when coordinating with contractors.
46 USCENTCOM, 2nd Quarterly Contractor Census Report, p. 4-5, May, 2009.
47 General David H. Petraeus, COMISAF's Counterinsurgency (COIN) Contracting Guidance, International Security
Assistance Force/United States Forces - Afghanistan, September 8, 2010, p. 1.
48 P.L. 109-364, Sec. 854.
49 P.L. 110-181 Sec. 849.
50 The Armed Contractor Oversight Division in Iraq was renamed the Armed Contractor Oversight Bureau. For a
detailed discussion on DOD efforts to improve the coordination of PSC movements throughout Iraq, see Government
Accountability Office, REBUILDING IRAQ: DOD and State Department Have Improved Oversight and Coordination
of Private Security Contractors in Iraq, but Further Actions Are Needed to Sustain Improvements, GAO-08-966, July
31, 2008; Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, Field Commanders See Improvements in Controlling and
Coordinating Private Security Contractor Missions in Iraq, SIGIR 09-022, July 28, 2009. Commission on Wartime
Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan, At What Cost? Contingency Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan, Interim Report,
June 2009, p. 73.
51 U.S. Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, Field Commanders See Improvements in Controlling and
(continued...)
Congressional Research Service
19

---

Department of Defense Contractors in Afghanistan and Iraq: Background and Analysis

Despite these efforts, DOD still faces challenges in managing contractors. As an April 2010 Joint
Staff report stated, “[A]lthough progress has been made in the past 4 years to improve operational
contract support (OCS) policy and doctrine, significant challenges remain.”52 For example, DOD
was recently criticized for not knowing who is receiving money from U.S.-funded contracts in
Afghanistan. There have been allegations that money from U.S.-funded contracts has gone to
local warlords and the Taliban.53 Recent criticism also includes DOD’s continued inability to
accurately track contracts and contractor personnel in Afghanistan and Iraq.54
Selected Congressional Hearings and Legislation
Congress has held a number of hearings and passed legislation relating to DOD contracting
efforts in Afghanistan and Iraq. Hearings have taken place in a number of different committees
and have covered a wide array of related issues, including private security contractors,
interrogators, logistic support, contract management and oversight, and training requirements.
Congress has also passed legislation annually in a number of these areas. Such legislation
generally occurs in the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA). The following section
provides a highlight of key congressional activity related to contingency contracting.
Private Security Contractors
Congress has focused more on private security contractors than other contracting issues, even
though such contractors have generally comprised roughly 10-20% of DOD contractors in
Afghanistan and Iraq. Hearings have been held in the Senate Committee on Armed Services,55 the
Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs,56 the House Committee on
Oversight and Government Reform,57 and the House Committee on Armed Services.58 This issue

(...continued)
Coordinating Private Security Contractor Missions in Iraq, SIGIR 09-022, July 28, 2009; U.S. Congress, House
Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs,
Commission on Wartime Contracting: Interim Findings and Path Forward, 111th Cong., 1st sess., June 10, 2009; U.S.
Government Accountability Office, REBUILDING IRAQ: DOD and State Department Have Improved Oversight and
Coordination of Private Security Contractors in Iraq, but Further Actions Are Needed to Sustain Improvements, GAO-
08-966, July 31, 2008.
52 Captain Peter G. Stamatopoulus, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Dependence on Contractor Support in
Contingency Operations Task Force, Department of Defense, Phase II: An Evaluation of the Range and Depth of
Service Contract Capabilities in Iraq, April 30, 2010, p. 1.
53 U.S. Congress, House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Subcommittee on National Security and
Foreign Affairs, Investigation of Protection Payments for Safe Passage along the Afghan Supply Chain, 111th Cong.,
2nd sess., June 22, 2010. See also Senate Armed Services Committee, “Inquiry into the Role and Oversight of Private
Security Contractors in Afghanistan,” October 7, 2010.
54 U.S. Government Accountability Office, Iraq and Afghanistan: DOD, State, and USAID Face Continued Challenges
in Tracking Contracts, Assistance Instruments, and Associated Personnel, 11-1, October 2010.
55 U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Armed Services, Inquiry into the Treatment of Detainees in U.S. Custody, 110th
Cong., 1st sess., August 3, 2007.
56 U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, An Uneasy Relationship: U.S.
Reliance on Private Security Firms in Overseas Operations, 110th Cong., 2nd sess., February 27, 2008.
57 U.S. Congress, House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Private Security Contracting in Iraq and
Afghanistan, 110th Cong., 1st sess., October 2, 2007.
58 U.S. Congress, House Committee on Armed Services, Contingency Contracting: Implementing a Call for Urgent
(continued...)
Congressional Research Service
20

---

Department of Defense Contractors in Afghanistan and Iraq: Background and Analysis

was also raised in other hearings, such as the House Committee on Oversight and Government
Reform’s hearing on the Commission on Wartime Contracting: Interim Findings and Path
Forward59 and the House Committee on the Judiciary’ hearing on Enforcement of Federal
Criminal Law to Protect Americans Working for U.S. Contractors in Iraq.60 The National
Security and Foreign Affairs Subcommittee of the House Committee on Oversight and
Government Reform conducted a hearing Investigation of Protection Payments for Safe Passage
along the Afghan Supply Chain, which focused on armed private security contractors providing
convoy security along the Afghan supply chain.61 More recently, the Senate Armed Services
Committee issued a report that found evidence of U.S.-funded prime contractors supporting the
Taliban and subcontracting to warlords.62
In the FY2008 NDAA, Congress required the Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the
Secretary of State, to prescribe regulations and guidance relating to screening, equipping, and
managing private security personnel in areas of combat operations. These regulations were to
include tracking private security personnel (PSC), authorizing and accounting for weapons used
by PSCs, and reporting requirements whenever a security contractor discharges a weapon, kills or
injures another person, or is killed or injured.63 Included in the FY2009 NDAA is a “Sense of
Congress” that private security contractors should not perform inherently governmental functions,
such as security protection of resources, in high-threat operational environments.64 In the same
legislation, Congress mandated that interrogation is an inherently governmental function that
DOD may not outsource to contractors.65
Contractors Training Local Security Forces
Over the last year, Congress has turned its attention to contractors training local security forces in
Afghanistan and Iraq. Such hearings have raised a number of issues, including the behavior of
such contactors, whether there is sufficient contract oversight, and the cost of such contracts. The
Senate Committee on Armed Services held a hearing on Contracting in a Counterinsurgency: An
Examination of the Blackwater-Paravant Contract and the Need for Oversight, which focused on
the shooting of Afghan civilians by two Paravant employees.66 The Ad Hoc Subcommittee on

(...continued)
Reform, 110th Cong., 2nd sess., April 9, 2008.
59 U.S. Congress, House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Subcommittee on National Security and
Foreign Affairs, Commission on Wartime Contracting: Interim Findings and Path Forward, 111th Cong., 1st sess., June
9, 2009.
60 U.S. Congress, House Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security,
Enforcement of Federal Criminal Law to Protect Americans Working for U.S. Contractors in Iraq, 110th Cong., 1st
sess., December 19, 2007.
61 U.S. Congress, House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Subcommittee on National Security and
Foreign Affairs, Investigation of Protection Payments for Safe Passage along the Afghan Supply Chain, 111th Cong.,
2nd sess., June 22, 2010.
62 Senate Armed Services Committee, “Inquiry into the Role and Oversight of Private Security Contractors in
Afghanistan,” October 7, 2010.
63 P.L. 110-181, sec 862.
64 P.L. 110-417, sec 832.
65 P.L. 110-417, sec 1057.
66 U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Armed Services, Contracting in a Counterinsurgency: An Examination of the
Blackwater-Paravant Contract and the Need for Oversight, 111th Cong., 2nd sess., February 24, 2010.
Congressional Research Service
21

---

Department of Defense Contractors in Afghanistan and Iraq: Background and Analysis

Contracting Oversight of the Senate, Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs
held a hearing Afghan Police Force Training, which raised the issue of waste and a lack of
oversight on $6 billion spent on contracts to train the Afghan national police force.67
Contract Management, Oversight, and Coordination
Management and oversight of contracting personnel in contingency operations has been of
significant interest to Congress. Hearings on these issues have been held in the Senate Committee
on Armed Services68 and the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental
Affairs.69 This issue was also raised by the House Committee on Armed Services’ hearing on
Coordinating Contract Support on the Battlefield: Defense, State, and U.S. AID70 and the House
Committee on Oversight and Government Reform’s hearing on Commission on Wartime
Contracting: Interim Findings and Path Forward.71
In the FY2008 NDAA, Congress mandated the creation of a memorandum of understanding
between the Secretary of Defense, Secretary of State, and Administrator of the United States
Agency for International Development to promote coordinated contingency contracting
practices.72 Congress also established the Commission on Wartime Contracting to study wartime
contracting in Afghanistan and Iraq, determine the extent to which the federal government relies
on contractors, and examine how U.S. objectives are achieved by this reliance on contractors.73 In
the FY2009 NDAA, Congress added additional requirements and reporting mechanisms for
alleged crimes committed by or against contractor personnel in Iraq or Afghanistan.74
Training Contractors and the Military in Contingency Contracting
Some testimony at various hearings emphasized that increased training is necessary for non-
acquisition personnel throughout the military.75 Concerned that DOD contractors and personnel

67 U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, Ad Hoc Subcommittee on
Contracting Oversight, Contracts for Afghan National Police Training, 111th Cong., 2nd sess., April 15, 2010.
68 U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Readiness and Management Support, To
Receive Testimony on Department of Defense Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan, 110th Cong., 2nd sess., April 2,
2008.
69 U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, Subcommittee on Federal
Financial Management, Government Information, Federal Services, and International Security, Management and
Oversight of Contingency Contracting in Hostile Zones, 110th Cong., 2nd sess., January 24, 2008.
70 U.S. Congress, House Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, Coordinating
Contract Support on the Battlefield: Defense, State, and U.S. AID, 111th Cong., 1st sess., April 1, 2009.
71 U.S. Congress, House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Subcommittee on National Security and
Foreign Affairs, Commission on Wartime Contracting: Interim Findings and Path Forward, 111th Cong., 1st sess., June
9, 2009.
72 P.L. 110-181, sec 861.
73 P.L. 110-181, sec 841.
74 P.L. 110-417, sec 854.
75 See U.S. Congress, House Committee on Armed Services, Contingency Contracting: Implementing a Call for Urgent
Reform, 110th Cong., 2nd sess., April 10, 2008; U.S. Congress, House Committee on Oversight and Government
Reform, Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs, Commission on Wartime Contracting: Interim
Findings and Path Forward, 111th Cong., 1st sess., June 9, 2009; and U.S. Congress, House Committee on Armed
Services, Contingency Contracting: Has the Call for Urgent Reform been Answered?, 111th Cong., 1st sess., March 25,
(continued...)
Congressional Research Service
22

---

Department of Defense Contractors in Afghanistan and Iraq: Background and Analysis

are not sufficiently trained to execute contingency contracting, Congress passed legislation
requiring DOD to implement training requirements for contingency contracting personnel (in
coordination with the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the
Defense Acquisition University), and to provide specific training to contract management
personnel.76 In the FY2008 NDAA, Congress called for contract management training for
personnel outside the acquisition workforce who are responsible for contractor oversight. The
FY2008 NDAA also mandated the incorporation of contractors in mission-readiness exercises
with uniformed personnel.77 In addition, Congress passed legislation establishing of a
government-wide Contingency Contracting Corps that will be available for deployment in
responding to an emergency or major disasters, or a contingency operation.78 Congress authorized
this corps to receive specific training in contingency contracting.

(...continued)
2009..
76 P.L. 109-163, sec 817 and P.L. 109-364, sec 854.
77 P.L. 110-181, sec 849
78 P.L. 110-417, sec. 870
Congressional Research Service
23

---

Department of Defense Contractors in Afghanistan and Iraq: Background and Analysis

Appendix A. Contractor Personnel in Iraq by Type
of Service Provided

Figure A-1. Trend Analysis of Contractor Personnel by Type of Service Provided in
Iraq
100,000
90,000
80,000
70,000
60,000
50,000
40,000
30,000
20,000
10,000
-
Mar. 08
June 08 Sep. 08
Dec. 08
Mar. 09
June 09 Sep. 09
Dec. 09
Mar. 10
June 10 Sep. 10
Dec. 10
Base Support
Construction
Other
Security
Translator/ Interpreter
Transportation
Communication
Logistics/ Maintenance
Training

Source: CENTCOM Quarterly Census Reports.
Notes: DOD did not separately track Logistics/Maintenance or Training until the first quarter of 2010.
Percentage Breakdown of Contractors in Iraq by Nationality.

Congressional Research Service
24

---

Table A-1. Number of Contractor Personnel in Iraq by Type of Service Provided
Base
Translator/
Logistics/
Date
Support
Security Interpreter Construction Transport Training Communication Maintenance
Other
Mar.
08 80,150 7,259 8,136 29,937
7,774
-- 5,029
--
11,103
June
08 89,716 9,193 8,399 36,224
7,702
-- 4,096
--
7,098
Sep. 08
90,386
12,633
8,798
29,626
7,771
--
3,010
--
11,222
Dec.
08 80,931 8,380 9,268 20,729
6,685
-- 700
--
21,357
Mar. 09
77,669
10,422
9,241
19,941
2,383
--
1,460
--
11,494
June
09 71,783
13,145
9,128 10,090
1,616
--
2,183
-- 11,761
Sep. 09
65,763
12,684
8,765
9,933
1,375
--
2,983
--
12,228
Dec.
09 61,725 11,095 8,414
3,385
2,060 1,458 2,429
6,085
3,384
Mar.
10 62,295 11,610 7,661
2,171
1,796
918 1,004
3,684
4,322
June 10
49,256
11,413
5,165
1,336
1,782
574
603
488
9,004
Sep. 10
43,759
11,628
4,572
2,753
1,115
626
646
445
8,562
Dec. 10
42,386
12,743
4,432
1,144
1,039
591
527
429
7,851
Source: CENTCOM Quarterly Census Reports.
Notes: DOD did not separately track logistics/maintenance or training until the first quarter of FY2010.

CRS-25

---

Department of Defense Contractors in Afghanistan and Iraq: Background and Analysis

Appendix B. Contractor and Troop Level Data
The Department of Defense posts the results of its quarterly CENTCOM census report at
http://www.acq.osd.mil/log/PS/hot_topics.html. Data is usually posted between six and eight
weeks after the end of the quarter. Because the website only posts the most recent two quarters,
CRS has provided the data from previous census reports in the tables below.
Table B-1. Contractor Personnel and Troop Level Data for Iraq
Quarter
Total
U.S.
Third Country
Local
Troop
Ending
Contractors
Nationals
Nationals
Nationals
Levels
Sep. 2007
154,825
26,869
45,422
82,534
169,000
Dec. 2007
163,591
31,325
56,368
75,898
165,700
Mar. 2008
149,378
29,351
57,270
62,757
160,500
June 2008
162,428
26,611
62,650
70,167
153,300
Sep. 2008
163,446
28,045
72,109
63,292
146,800
Dec. 2008
148,050
39,262
70,875
37,913
148,500
Mar. 2009
132,610
36,061
60,244
36,305
141,300
June 2009
119,706
31,541
56,125
32,040
134,600
Sep. 2009
113,731
29,944
53,780
30,007
129,200
Dec. 2009
100,035
27,843
51,990
20,202
114,300
Mar. 2010
95,461
24,719
53,549
17,193
95,900
June 2010
79,621
22,761
46,148
10,712
88,320
Sep. 2010
74,106
20,981
42,457
10,668
48,410
Dec. 2010
71,142
19,943
40,776
10,423
47,305
Source: CENTCOM Quarterly Census Reports and “Boots on the Ground” monthly reports to Congress.
Table B-2. Contractor Personnel and Troop Level Data for Afghanistan
Quarter
Total
U.S.
Third Country
Local
Troop
Ending
Contractors
Nationals
Nationals
Nationals
Levels
Sep. 2007
29,473
3,387
2,864
23,222
24,500
Dec. 2007
36,520
5,153
3,815
27,552
24,600
Mar. 2008
52,336
4,220
4,678
43,438
28,800
June 2008
41,232
4,724
4,121
32,387
34,000
Sep. 2008
68,252
5,405
4,381
58,466
33,500
Dec. 2008
71,755
5,960
5,232
60,563
32,500
Mar. 2009
68,197
9,378
7,043
51,776
52,300
June
2009 72,968 10,036 11,806 51,126 55,100
Sep. 2009
104,101
9,322
16,349
78,430
62,300
Dec. 2009
107,292
10,016
16,551
80,725
69,000
Congressional Research Service
26

---

Department of Defense Contractors in Afghanistan and Iraq: Background and Analysis

Quarter
Total
U.S.
Third Country
Local
Troop
Ending
Contractors
Nationals
Nationals
Nationals
Levels
Mar. 2010
112,092
16,081
17,512
78,499
79,100
June 2010
107,479
19,103
14,984
73,392
93,800
Sep. 2010
70,599
20,874
15,503
34,222
96,600
Dec. 2010
87,483
19,381
21,579
46,523
96,900
Source: CENTCOM Quarterly Census Reports and “Boots on the Ground” monthly reports to Congress.
Congressional Research Service
27

---

Department of Defense Contractors in Afghanistan and Iraq: Background and Analysis

Appendix C. Comparison of CRS, CBO, and GAO
Methodology for Determining DOD Contract
Obligations in Afghanistan and Iraq
In 2008, CBO published a report that tracked the U.S. government’s obligations in Iraqi theater
from FY2005-FY2007 using FPDS-NG data.79 CRS used the same methodology in determining
the value of contract obligations in the Afghanistan and Iraq theaters, relying on the data in
federal government’s FPDS database to conduct its analysis. Differences in the data reported by
CBO in its 2008 report can be attributed to FPDS, which subsequent to the release of the CBO
report, has continuously updated information and restated prior years.
For the past three years, GAO published annual reports on contracting in Afghanistan and Iraq.80
The GAO reports included only information on contracts performed in Iraq and Afghanistan.
However, in some cases, these contracts included performance in other countries as well. Because
of how DOD reported the data to GAO, GAO could not isolate the portion of obligations that
were specific to Afghanistan or Iraq. GAO did not include in its analysis contracts performed
wholly outside of Afghanistan and Iraq but still within the respective theaters of operations.
GAO’s analysis did not rely exclusively on FPDS data: GAO also reviewed manually compiled
lists of obligations and deobligations, and took other steps to refine the data.
The data used by CRS and CBO allocates place of performance based on the principal place of
performance as indentified by FPDS. Because FPDS only allows for one country to be listed as
the place of performance, contracts listed as being performed in one country can also involve
substantial performance in other countries. As a result of differences in methodologies, some
contract obligations may be allocated to different countries by GAO, CRS, and CBO.

79 Congressional Budget Office, Contractors’ Support of U.S. Operations in Iraq, August 2008.
80 U.S. Government Accountability Office, Contingency Contracting: DOD, State, and USAID Contracts and
Contractor Personnel in Iraq and Afghanistan, 09-19, October 1, 2008. See also U.S. Government Accountability
Office, Contingency Contracting: DOD, State, and USAID Continue to Face Challenges in Tracking Contractor
Personnel and Contracts in Iraq and Afghanistan, 10-1, October 1, 2009. See also U.S. Government Accountability
Office, Iraq and Afghanistan: DOD, State, and USAID Face Continued Challenges in Tracking Contracts, Assistance
Instruments, and Associated Personnel, 11-1, October 1, 2010.
Congressional Research Service
28

---

Department of Defense Contractors in Afghanistan and Iraq: Background and Analysis

Table C-1. Total Contract Action Obligations for Afghanistan
FY2005
FY2006
FY2007
FY2008
FY2009
FY2010
Afghanistan
$1,566,743,610 $2,369,796,988 $3,195,878,220 $5,952,398,745 $7,146,505,524 $11,266,769,733
Kazakhstan
$29,696,861 $7,495,471 $5,113,688
$26,038,365
$41,970,867 $59,116,526
Kyrgyzstan
$61,751,645 $32,297,583 $360,291,188 $17,568,564
$326,688,826 $119,507,687
Pakistan
$33,710,475 $162,445,997 $62,848,359 $203,365,810
$221,731,297 $156,860,439
Tajikistan
$495,329
$20,626
$
0 $11,000 $951,307 $3,384,903
Turkmenistan
$13,278,462 $17,800,196 ($497,308)
$194,688,206
$14,258,634 $180,515,672
Uzbekistan
$48,542,478 ($10,210,717) $11,763,398 $13,910,651 $8,646,691 $20,271,894
Source: FPDS-NG, January 26, 2011, for FY2005-FY2010.
Table C-2. Total Contract Action Obligations for Iraq
FY2005 FY2006 FY2007 FY2008 FY2009 FY2010
Iraq
$13,936,557,118 $12,880,086,264 $12,424,968,873 $15,140,815,305 $9,204,318,064 $6,918,071,383
Bahrain
$498,830,223 $675,802,906 $496,862,601
$1,124,966,805
$1,913,164,861
$499,866,486
Jordan
$107,941,450 $366,463,184 $70,750,722 $77,883,341 $11,248,812 $12,659,106
Kuwait
$2,159,410,194 $4,556,048,622 $4,159,363,917
$4,159,365,050 $5,076,239,693
$4,475,580,322
Qatar
$186,755,204 $126,924,969 $223,458,228
$333,434,881
$738,243,100 $273,770,839
Saudi
Arabia
$770,658,807 $794,222,528 $175,467,136
$316,466,796
$853,899,470 $713,507,658
Turkey
$106,538,349 $256,684,243 $317,177,234
$162,549,446
$273,977,692 $127,228,630
UAE
$399,298,596 $667,304,112 $226,104,619
$1,122,186,089
$293,421,407
$2,368,834,180
Source: FPDS-NG, January 26, 2011, for FY2005-FY2010.




Congressional Research Service
29

---

Department of Defense Contractors in Afghanistan and Iraq: Background and Analysis

Author Contact Information

Moshe Schwartz
Joyprada Swain
Specialist in Defense Acquisition
Research Associate
mschwartz@crs.loc.gov, 7-1463
jswain@crs.loc.gov, 7-5973


Congressional Research Service
30

---