Senegal: Background and U.S. Relations
Alexis Arieff
Analyst in African Affairs
March 25, 2011
Congressional Research Service
7-5700
www.crs.gov
R41369
CRS Report for Congress
P
repared for Members and Committees of Congress

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Senegal: Background and U.S. Relations

Summary
Senegal is a small, Francophone nation with a population of 13 million, located on West Africa’s
Atlantic coast. It has experienced steady, if limited, economic growth in recent years, but remains
one of the world’s least developed countries. Over 90% of Senegal’s population is Muslim, the
majority of whom adhere to an indigenous Sufi order. A semi-arid country in Africa’s Sahel
region, Senegal has struggled with food insecurity and the impact of global climate change.
Although Senegal is a secular democracy and enjoys relative stability by regional standards,
recent political trends have raised concerns among analysts and policy makers. President
Abdoulaye Wade (pronounced “wahd”), in office since 2000, was initially credited with
expanding civil liberties, liberalizing the economy, bolstering government health and education
services, and negotiating a landmark peace accord in the restive southern Casamance region. He
was returned to office in 2007 in an election that the State Department termed “open, peaceful,
and highly competitive.” However, Wade’s reputation has since been marred by his increasingly
unilateral exercise of power, along with reports of rising corruption, nepotism, and restrictions on
civil liberties. The president, who is in his 80s, has announced plans to run for a third term in
2012, which may require a constitutional amendment. Public unrest has escalated over
government policies and stagnant living conditions, and in March 2011, the government accused
a group of opposition and civil society activists of organizing a coup attempt. Opposition groups
rejected the allegations as politically motivated. Violence has also increased in Casamance since
mid-2009, despite the previously successful 2004 peace deal.
The State Department refers to U.S.-Senegalese relations as “excellent,” while noting concerns
over negative governance trends. Bilateral engagement has increased in recent years, in part due
to Senegal’s identity as a moderate, pro-Western Muslim country in a region affected by violent
extremism. U.S. foreign assistance focuses on democratic governance, economic growth, rural
development, public health, food security, reconciliation in Casamance, and military
professionalism. The United States also sees Senegal as an anchor of regional stability and a
potential partner in combating transnational security threats, such as terrorism, narcotics
trafficking, and maritime piracy. Senegal is a significant contributor of troops to international
peacekeeping missions, and thousands of Senegalese peacekeepers have received U.S. training
through the Africa Contingency Operations Training and Assistance (ACOTA) program.
Bilateral aid through State Department and U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID)
accounts has increased steeply in recent years, from $57.8 million in FY2008 to $106.3 million in
FY2010. The Obama Administration has requested $119.9 million for FY2012, and Senegal is
expected to be one of 13 African focus countries for the Administration’s new global food
security initiative, Feed the Future. In addition, a $540 million Millennium Challenge
Corporation (MCC) compact was signed in 2009.
Congress may play a role in guiding U.S. policy toward Senegal through its authorization,
appropriation, and oversight of foreign assistance, security cooperation programs, and executive
branch policies. Some Members of Congress, for example, have expressed concern over the
decision to award Senegal an MCC compact in light of recent governance trends.

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Senegal: Background and U.S. Relations

Contents
Background ................................................................................................................................ 1
U.S. Interests in Senegal ....................................................................................................... 2
Recent Congressional Actions ............................................................................................... 2
Politics........................................................................................................................................ 3
Recent Elections ................................................................................................................... 3
Concerns Over Political Trends ............................................................................................. 4
Governance................................................................................................................................. 6
Corruption ............................................................................................................................ 6
Human Rights and Press Freedom ......................................................................................... 7
The Economy.............................................................................................................................. 8
Security Issues .......................................................................................................................... 10
Violent Extremism .............................................................................................................. 10
The Casamance Conflict ..................................................................................................... 11
Illegal Trafficking and Organized Crime.............................................................................. 12
Foreign Relations ...................................................................................................................... 13
A Changing Relationship With France................................................................................. 13
Regional Relations .............................................................................................................. 14
Outreach to the Middle East and Ties with Iran ................................................................... 14
U.S. Relations ........................................................................................................................... 15
U.S. Assistance ................................................................................................................... 16
Agricultural Development and Food Security ................................................................ 17
Health ........................................................................................................................... 17
Security Assistance and Cooperation ............................................................................. 18
Millennium Challenge Corporation Compact................................................................. 19
Outlook..................................................................................................................................... 20

Figures
Figure 1. Map of Senegal ............................................................................................................ 1

Tables
Table 1. U.S. Bilateral Assistance for Senegal, Selected Accounts ............................................. 16

Contacts
Author Contact Information ...................................................................................................... 20

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Background
Senegal has remained relatively stable since
Figure 1. Map of Senegal
gaining independence from France in 1960,
despite its socioeconomic poverty. It is an
electoral democracy and among the few
countries in Africa never to have experienced
a military coup. Senegal is seen as a
diplomatic leader in Africa, particularly
among Francophone states. The population is
94% Muslim, most of whom adhere to
indigenous Sufi orders. The largest of these is
known as the Mouride brotherhoods, and
Mouride leaders are politically and
economically influential.1
Senegal’s first post-independence leader,
Léopold Senghor, was a poet and politician
celebrated as one of post-colonial Africa’s
most important intellectuals. Although a self-
described socialist and pan-Africanist,

Senghor cultivated close ties with the West (in
Source: CRS
particular, France), and resisted the Eastern
Bloc influence then prevalent in several of Senegal’s neighbors, such as Guinea and Mali.
Senghor presided over a de-facto one-party state through his ruling Socialist Party (PS) until
1981, when he stepped down and was succeeded by the PS’s Abdou Diouf. Diouf continued
Senghor’s pro-Western policies and oversaw Senegal’s gradual political liberalization. However,
opposition activists alleged that elections throughout the 1980s and 1990s were marred by fraud,
and Diouf used repressive tactics to suppress anti-government activism and demonstrations.2
In March 2000, longtime opposition leader Abdoulaye Wade (pronounced “wahd”) won
presidential elections widely seen as free and fair. Wade’s victory and the peaceful transfer of
power to his Senegalese Democratic Party (PDS) were hailed as a landmark for democracy in
Senegal and the region, which has seen few democratic transitions between civilian leaders.
Recently, however, Senegalese and international observers have raised concerns over apparent
democratic “backsliding.” Although Senegal has experienced economic growth in recent years,
many Senegalese reportedly feel excluded from the resulting wealth, which they perceive as
having been concentrated in the capital, Dakar, and among the political and economic elite.

1 For background on the Mourides, see John Glover, “Murid Modernity: Historical Perceptions of Islamic Reform,
Sufism, and Colonization,” in New Perspectives on Islam in Senegal, Mamadou Diouf and Mara A. Leichtman eds.,
New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009.
2 See, e.g., Country Watch, Senegal Country Review, 2001/2002. The current president, Abdoulaye Wade, was
imprisoned in the mid-1990s on charges widely seen as politically motivated.
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U.S. Interests in Senegal
U.S. policy toward Senegal focuses on
Senegal at a Glance
encouraging democratic governance,
Population: 12.6 million (2011 est.)
economic growth, rural development, public
Area: slightly smaller than South Dakota
health, food security, reconciliation in
Gross Domestic Product: $12.7 billion (2010)
Casamance, and military professionalism. The
United States views Senegal as an anchor of
Population Living on Less Than $2/Day
regional stability and a potential partner in
(Purchasing Power Parity): 60.4% (2005)
combating transnational security threats, such
Key Economic Sectors: fishing, tourism, groundnuts
as terrorism, narcotics trafficking, and
(peanuts), phosphates, cotton
maritime piracy. U.S. engagement has
Ethnic Groups: Wolof 43.3%, Fulbe 23.8%, Serer 14.7%,
increased in recent years, in part due to
Jola 3.7%, Mandinka 3%, European and Lebanese 1%,
Senegal’s identity as a moderate, majority-
other groups
Muslim country in a region affected by
Religion: Muslim 94%, Christian 5% (mostly Roman
violent extremism. At the same time, the State
Catholic), indigenous beliefs 1%
Department has expressed concern over
Languages: French (official), Wolof, other local
Senegal’s capacity to counter such threats on
languages
its own.3 President Wade has also pursued
Life Expectancy at Birth: 59.8 years
closer bilateral ties as part of a foreign policy
that appears broadly aimed at weaning
Literacy Rate: 42% (2006 est.)
Senegal from its traditional reliance on
Adult HIV/AIDS Prevalence Rate: 0.9% (2009 est.)
France. U.S. officials have nevertheless
Major Trading Partners: France, Mali, United
criticized recent democracy and governance
Kingdom, India, China, The Gambia, Italy, Belgium,
trends and expressed concern over their
Thailand, the Netherlands
potential to spark future instability.
Sources: CIA World Factbook 2011; World Bank
Recent Congressional Actions
Congress has played a role in U.S. policy toward Senegal through the annual appropriation of
foreign assistance and via the oversight of executive branch policies and strategies. Recent
congressional interest has arisen over a number of issues, including:
• socioeconomic development, health outcomes, and food security;
• democracy and governance trends;
• the management of bilateral assistance, in particular Senegal’s Millennium
Challenge Corporation (MCC) compact, amid concerns over corruption;
• Senegal’s troop contributions to international peacekeeping; and
• Senegal’s capacity to counter transnational security threats.
Several recent delegations of Members and staff have visited Senegal. President Wade has also
addressed congressional audiences on several occasions, including to mark the signing of
Senegal’s MCC compact in September 2009 and at a congressional “Africa Day” celebration in
July 2010.

3 See State Department, Trafficking in Persons Report 2010, June 14, 2010; State Department Office of the Coordinator
for Counterterrorism, Country Reports on Terrorism 2009, August 5, 2010.
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Several pieces of draft legislation introduced during the 111th Congress contained references to
Senegal. These included H.Con.Res. 16, S. 1966, H.R. 5268, and H.Res. 1405. The Senate
version of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010 (S. 1390) was
accompanied by a report noting that the Senate Armed Services Committee “shares the [Defense]
Department’s concerns about the burgeoning illegal narcotics trade in West Africa and urges the
Department to expand its authorized activities with Guinea-Bissau and Senegal” under Section
1033 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1998 (P.L. 105-85), as amended.4
This language was not included in the final conference report on the bill, which was passed into
law as P.L. 111-84 on October 28, 2009.
Politics
Wade benefited from widespread support following his initial electoral victory in 2000, and he
was reelected in 2007. However, public discontent with the government, particularly among
young people, has risen over continuing economic hardships and high unemployment;
perceptions of growing corruption and nepotism; and the president’s increasingly unilateral
exercise of power. Since 2008, popular demonstrations have repeatedly erupted over a range of
issues, including power cuts, unemployment, food prices, and the president’s attempts to prolong
his time in office. In some cases, demonstrations have led to rioting and violence. The
government has at times sought to ban public protests, as in December 2010 when opposition
parties organized a march in Dakar against wasteful public spending. On March 19, 2011, as
opposition leaders convened a protest rally modeled after mass uprisings in North Africa and
attended by an estimated 5,000 people, the government arrested a group of civil society and
opposition party activists and claimed they were organizing a coup attempt. Opposition leaders
rejected the allegations as politically motivated.5
Wade has stated that he intends to run for reelection in 2012, when he will be 86 years old.6 Such
a move would be in apparent contravention of the constitution, which imposes a two-term limit,
and of Wade’s own campaign promises in 2007.7 The president and his supporters contend that
his current term (2007-2012) is his first under the 2001 constitution that set the two-term limit,
and that he is therefore entitled to run once more. However, most observers believe Wade’s
candidacy would require a constitutional amendment.8 In any case, an amendment to the
constitution could potentially be easy to secure, given the ruling party’s overwhelming majority in
the national legislature.
Recent Elections
While Senegal’s recent elections have been positively viewed by the international community, the
conduct of national elections in 2007 caused a standoff between the ruling party and the
opposition that continues to affect national-level politics. Wade won reelection in February 2007

4 S.Rept. 111-35, July 2, 2009. Section 1033 provides the Defense Department with authority to provide support for the
counternarcotics activities of certain foreign governments.
5 Coumba Sylla, “Senegal Opposition Deride Plot Accusation,” AFP, March 19, 2011.
6 Radio France Internationale (RFI), “Abdoulaye Wade Déclare Sa Candidature Pour 2012,” September 17, 2009.
7 Agence France Presse (AFP), “Senegal’s Wade Not Eligible to Run in 2012: Reports,” August 23, 2010.
8 Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU), “Country Watchlist: Senegal,” October 1, 2009.
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with 56% of the vote in a field of 15 candidates; the election was ascertained to be largely free
and fair by international monitors, despite minor irregularities.9 Wade’s closest rival was a former
ally and prime minister, Idrissa Seck, who captured 15%. Ousmane Tanor Dieng, of the former
ruling Socialist Party, garnered 13.6%, while a number of smaller parties split the remaining
votes. Turnout was reported at 73% of registered voters.10 However, the main opposition coalition
of 12 parties contested the results and called for the redrawing of district boundaries and the
replacement of the head of the national elections commission, whom opposition leaders perceived
as biased toward the ruling party. After accusing Wade of refusing to discuss their concerns, the
opposition coalition boycotted legislative elections held in June 2007. Consequently, Wade’s PDS
and allied parties—known as the Sopi (“Change”) coalition—swept the National Assembly,
capturing 131 out of 150 seats. Turnout was reportedly low.11
In August 2007, elections were held for 35 seats in a new upper legislative chamber, the Senate.
Under the 2006 constitutional amendment that created the Senate, 35 of its 100 members are
elected by parliamentary deputies and regional council representatives, while 65 are appointed by
the president. Opposition parties, which had opposed the Senate’s creation, boycotted the vote.
Wade’s PDS captured 34 of the contested seats, with the remaining one going to an allied party.
While Wade remains popular among some segments of the population, signs of an electoral
backlash, inspired by political as well as economic grievances, have recently emerged. Some
analysts have traced this discontent to a “crisis of legitimacy” following the 2007 boycott, though
Senegalese discontent with ruling authorities dates back much farther—including to pre-Wade
administrations.12 In local elections held in 2009, the opposition made significant gains, winning
a majority of seats and nearly all urban areas. The opposition also defeated Wade’s son, Karim, in
the race for mayor of Dakar. Karim was subsequently appointed to head a new Ministry of
International Cooperation, National Planning, Air Transport, and Infrastructure; he currently
serves as Energy Minister. This reinforced concern among many Senegalese that Wade was
planning a dynastic succession by promoting his son’s political aspirations.13 While discontent
reportedly remains high, the peaceful acceptance of opposition gains in 2009 convinced some
observers that the electoral system retained a potential for fairness.
Concerns Over Political Trends
Following his election in 2000, Wade initially took steps to expand government transparency and
accountability. For example, in 2001, a new constitution was approved by referendum that
reduced presidential terms from seven to five years and set a two-term limit. Wade has received
praise over his handling of the economy and his commitment to raising education and health
standards. Recently, however, opposition leaders, rights advocates, and diplomats have expressed

9 State Department, “2009 Human Rights Report: Senegal,” March 2010. The State Department elsewhere referred to
the 2000 and 2007 elections as “open, peaceful, and highly competitive.” State Department, “Background Note:
Senegal,” updated January 21, 2011.
10 State Department, “Background Note.”
11 Official figures claimed 38% turnout, and opposition leaders contended actual turnout was far lower.
12 Penda Mbow, “Senegal: The Return of Personalism,” Journal of Democracy, January 2008.
13 Wade has, at times, sought to dispel such succession rumors, stating, “I have no intention of putting my son in my
place before I go…. But he is a citizen of Senegal and he is free to stand in elections when he wants to.” AFP,
“Senegal’s Wade Denies Grooming Son for Presidency,” July 15, 2010. He has also defended Karim Wade’s cabinet
appointments as merit-based. AFP, “Senegal’s President Denies Dynastic Ambitions,” October 23, 2010.
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concerns over increasing authoritarianism, nepotism, and abuses of power by senior officials. In
2009, Freedom House downgraded Senegal’s ranking on political and civil liberties from “Free”
to “Partly Free,” attributing the change to “the growing authoritarian power of the president and
ruling party.”14 Still, civil society organizations, the media, and the opposition operate with a high
degree of freedom, particularly when compared to other countries in the region.
Perceptions of cronyism—particularly the sense that Wade is promoting his son, Karim, as a
presidential successor—have provoked particular ire among the Senegalese public. Controversy
was also sparked by Wade’s decision, in 2009, to construct a $27 million monument to the
“African Renaissance,” a 50-yard-high bronze statue that overlooks Dakar. Wade declared
himself the “intellectual owner” of the monument and claimed he was therefore entitled to a 35%
cut of future related tourism revenues. The statue, reportedly partly financed by North Korea, was
inaugurated in April 2010 for Senegal’s celebration of its 50th anniversary of independence.15
News coverage, particularly in the Senegalese press, was largely negative, and the statue sparked
local opposition on political, economic, and esthetic grounds.16
Wade has also taken steps to centralize power in a system that already endows the presidency
with significant authority. Under Senegal’s constitution, the prime minister is appointed by the
president, who can dismiss him at will, and the president also appoints the justices of the
country’s highest appeals court and constitutional council. The further creation, in 2006, of a
Senate in which 65 of 100 members are selected by the president, followed by the ruling party’s
electoral sweep in 2007, led local civil society groups to warn of “the de-facto return of a single-
party system in all state institutions.”17 In 2008, Wade successfully backed a constitutional
amendment reextending the presidential term from five to seven years.18 While the change does
not apply to Wade’s current term in office, it is expected to enter into force following the next
presidential election in 2012. Some advocates allege that the president has taken steps to
undermine the independence of regulatory and oversight bodies, including the electoral
commission, the media regulator, and the judiciary.19 The Senegalese press has also portrayed
Wade as taking harsh steps to marginalize potential political opponents, such as former Prime
Minister Idrissa Seck, who was dismissed from his position in 2004, then arrested and charged
with embezzlement and threatening national security. Seck was never granted a trial; he was held
in prison for over six months before all charges were eventually dropped.
In 2008, opposition parties organized a series of national conferences that brought together
political parties and non-governmental organizations to discuss perceived economic, political, and
social problems. The discussions concluded that greater parliamentary scrutiny of the executive
and a more independent judiciary were needed to strengthen democratic participation and
accountability. They also concluded that elected officials and appointed heads of state agencies

14 Freedom House, Freedom in the World in 2009, August 16, 2010.
15 Reuters, “Statue Casts Shadow on Dakar’s African Renaissance,” August 19, 2009. Wade has stated that his share of
revenues will go to care for poor children.
16 See, e.g., Associated Press (AP), “Rising Amid Squalor, Senegal Monument Stirs Anger,” September 23, 2009;
Walfadjri, “Sermon De Ce Vendredi : Les imams prêchent contre le monument de la Renaissance,” December 11 2009;
RFI, “Manifestation de l’Opposition Sénégalaise Contre le Monument de la Renaissance Africaine,” April 3, 2010; Le
Quotidien, “Le Monument de la Renaissance Africaine et la Fumisterie Religieuse des Sénégalais,” April 14, 2010.
17 Wal Fadjri, “Face à la Crise Sociale, Politique, Economique - La Société Civile Vers la Création d’un Système
d’Alerte et d’Action Unitaire,” October 10, 2007; CRS translation from the French.
18 The legislative proposal was submitted by the then-Interior Minister; the legislature is controlled by the ruling PDS.
19 Penda Mbow, “Senegal: The Return of Personalism,” op. cit.
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should be required to declare their assets upon assuming and leaving their posts, as an anti-
corruption measure. Wade’s administration declined to participate in the consultations.20
Governance
Senegal has a good human rights record and relatively effective government service provision
compared to other countries in the region. Senegal has been particularly praised for its HIV/AIDS
programs, which were initiated in the mid-1980s—long before most—and have contributed to a
low rate of infection (less than 1% of the adult population) compared to many African countries.21
Senegal’s anti-malaria program, launched in 2005, has also received praise.22 However, observers
contend that official corruption is rising, and some analysts have critiqued the concentration of
wealth in the capital and among a relatively small elite. Attempts by Wade and other ruling party
officials to limit press freedom have also raised concerns among some analysts and rights groups.
The Senegalese government has made improvements in agriculture and rural infrastructure a
policy priority, along with containing the spread of HIV/AIDS and expanding access to primary
education. According to the World Bank Institute, “government effectiveness” in Senegal is above
the worldwide median, and improved between 2003 and 2008.23 However, on the same scale,
Senegal ranked lower in “voice and accountability” and “control of corruption” in 2008 (latest
data available) than in either 2003 or 1998.24 According to the government, 40% of the national
budget is invested in education, and the rate of immunization has improved significantly over the
past 10 years.25 Still, many rural areas and some urban neighborhoods remain underserved by
roads, electricity, basic sanitation, and drinking water. Frustrations over high unemployment,
severe power cuts, and perceived shortcomings in social welfare provision have sparked public
unrest, particularly in Dakar and other urban centers. Alleged gaps in service provision in
Casamance have also provided a basis for ongoing conflict there, though the government has
attempted to improve service delivery in the region in recent years, with donor assistance.26
Corruption
The State Department in 2011 referred to a “gradual erosion of good governance and
transparency” in Senegal.27 Senegal’s rank on Transparency International’s Corruptions
Perceptions Index has dropped in recent years, falling from 71 in 2007 to 105 in 2010, out of 178

20 EIU, “Senegal Politics: Conclusions of the Assises Nationales Are Published,” July 16, 2009; Freedom House,
“Senegal,” Freedom in the World 2009.
21 The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) attributes Senegal’s success at maintaining low HIV
prevalence to “the confluence of a number of factors, including strong political leadership, early involvement and
leadership among religious leaders, conservative cultural norms regarding sexual practices, and a comprehensive
strategic approach implemented early in the epidemic.” Health Profile: Senegal, HIV/AIDS, 2004.
22 Olivier Talles, “Ce Qui Va de Mieux: Recul Spectaculaire du Paludisme au Sénégal,” La Croix, November 5, 2010.
23 D. Kaufmann et al, “Governance Indicators for 1996-2008,” in World Bank Institute, Governance Matters: 2009.
24 D. Kaufmann et al, “Governance Indicators for 1996-2008.”
25 AFP, “Senegal President Says No Mistakes in 10 Years in Power,” March 19, 2010; World Health Organization,
“Immunization Profile – Senegal,” updated December 2009.
26 See, e.g., USAID, Evaluation of the USAID Peace-Building Program in Casamance and Sub-Region, 2006.
27 State Department, FY2012 Congressional Budget Justification for Foreign Operations, March 2011.
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countries assessed. Senegal nevertheless continues to rank better on the Index than many of its
neighbors, including fellow democracies such as Mali, Benin, and Niger. Several recent high-
profile corruption scandals have negatively affected the government’s reputation. For example, in
early 2010, Senegalese officials reportedly attempted to extort $200 million from a Luxembourg-
based telecommunications company, Millicom.28 In September 2009, Wade gave nearly $200,000
in cash to the outgoing International Monetary Fund (IMF) resident representative during a
meeting over dinner in September 2009. Wade later admitted to giving the money as a “farewell
gift,” but denied he was attempting to influence IMF assessments.29
The mechanisms of corruption reportedly vary from petty bribes to contractual kickbacks and
embezzlement from state-owned accounts. Some analysts allege that Wade’s administration has
created opportunities for corruption through the privatization of parastatals, such as the national
telecommunications agency, and by creating new “special agencies” in charge of aspects of state
procurement, such as the Agency for Investments and the National Agency for the Organization
of the Islamic Conference.30 The latter, then headed by Wade’s son, Karim, oversaw government
procurement for large public infrastructure projects initiated ahead of Senegal’s hosting of the
Organization of the Islamic Conference summit in 2008, and was repeatedly implicated in
corruption allegations.31 The government has recently taken small steps to combat corruption,
such as establishing audit and anti-corruption commissions and an independent authority to
oversee government procurement.32 It remains to be seen how effective and independent these
new entities will be. U.S. embassy officials have also recently praised Senegal’s efforts to
increase budget transparency, in line with pressure from international financial institutions and
bilateral donors, including through the use of software that tracks government accounting.33
Human Rights and Press Freedom
According to the 2009 State Department human rights report, the government “generally
respected citizens’ rights,” although the report cited problems in a number of areas, including
prison conditions and treatment of prisoners; corruption; violence and discrimination against
women; child abuse, child labor, and child marriage; and human trafficking. The report also
documented abuses by Casamance rebel factions, including extra-judicial killings.34 Amnesty
International has accused Senegalese security forces of torturing suspects in custody in
connection with criminal cases, civil offenses, and the conflict in Casamance, a practice that the
government contends is rare and that it has promised to combat.35 The 1999 Penal Law outlawed
domestic violence and female genital mutilation; however, implementation has been uneven, and

28 Lawrence Delevingne, “The Joy Of Doing Business In Africa: How Senegalese Politicians Tried To Shake Down
Millicom For $200 Million,” Business Insider, February 4, 2010.
29 IMF, “IMF Statement on Investigation of Incident in Senegal,” October 26, 2009; AFP, “Senegal President Admits
‘Gift’ to IMF Agent: Fund,” October 27, 2009. The money was returned to the government of Senegal.
30 See, e.g., Tarik Dahou and Vincent Foucher, “Le Sénégal, Entre Changement Politique et Révolution Passive. ‘Sopi’
or not ‘Sopi’?” Politique Africaine, December 2004.
31 See, for example, Abdou Latif Coulibaly, Contes et Mecomptes de l’ANOCI, Paris: L’Harmattan, 2009.
32 Oxford Analytica, “Senegal: Governance Concerns Rise Over Wade Agenda,” July 29 2010.
33 U.S. Embassy Dakar, “Senegal’s Budget Process is Transparent [UNCLASSIFIED],” May 4, 2010.
34 State Department, “2009 Human Rights Report.”
35 Amnesty International, Senegal: Land of Impunity, September 15, 2010. The government acknowledged that torture
had occurred, albeit with “minimal” frequency, and “renewed its engagement to spare no effort” to eradicate such
practices. AFP, “Senegal: La Pratique de la Torture Existe Mais Est ‘Minime’ (Gouvernement),” September 16, 2010.
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both are reportedly widespread.36 Senegalese law also criminalizes homosexuality, and violence
against gay men (and men perceived as gay), including by police, is common.37 Human rights
organizations have criticized the government for perceived delays in prosecuting former Chadian
President Hissène Habré, who lives in Senegal, for crimes allegedly committed under his
leadership in Chad (1982-1990).38
A 2010 Human Rights Watch report documented abuses and economic exploitation of children by
teachers and traditional leaders at Senegalese Quranic schools, where tens of thousands of young
boys, often separated from their families, receive religious instruction.39 In response to the report
and related U.S. pressure over child trafficking, the government announced it would enforce a
ban on street begging in Dakar and brought seven Quranic teachers to trial. However, police
sweeps and other enforcement efforts raised new child protection concerns.40
Senegal has long been considered a regional leader in press freedom. Local media express a
diverse range of political opinions and frequently provide a platform for anti-government views.
Since 2008, however, criminal prosecutions of journalists have escalated, along with physical
attacks against members of the press and media outlets, allegedly biased enforcement of media
regulation by state agencies, and verbal assaults on the media by Wade and other officials. In
August 2008, the offices and employees of two private newspapers were attacked by men
reportedly driving government vehicles, shortly after a government minister threatened retaliation
against newspapers that had run critical stories. A dozen individuals convicted in the attacks later
benefitted from a presidential pardon.41 For two years, the government prevented a media group
owned by renowned Senegalese musician Youssou Ndour, who has been publicly critical of
Wade, from obtaining a license to start a private television station; a license was finally granted in
May 2010. While formal censorship is rare, the government has also reportedly attempted to
suppress the sale of publications critical of Wade’s governance record.42
The Economy
Senegal is a semi-arid, predominantly agrarian country with few natural resources. Its key foreign
exchange earners are fishing, peanuts, phosphates, and tourism. Senegal is also highly dependent

36 Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), Social Institutions and Gender Index, at
http://genderindex.org/country/senegal.
37 HRW, Fear for Life: Violence Against Gay Men and Men Perceived as Gay in Senegal, November 2010.
38 In July 2006, the African Union directed Senegal to prosecute Habré after Belgium issued an international arrest
warrant charging him with crimes against humanity, war crimes, and torture. Wade initially agreed to a prosecution,
and the Senegalese legislature amended the constitution and passed legislation aimed at removing any legal obstacles.
However, the government has since stalled, contending that action requires significant additional donor funding. In
March 2011, Senegal and the AU agreed to create, in Senegal, an “ad hoc” international court with jurisdiction to try
Habré. For background, see HRW, “The Case Against Hissène Habré, an ‘African Pinochet,’” at
http://www.hrw.org/justice/habre/.
39 Human Rights Watch (HRW), “Off the Backs of the Children”: Forced Begging and Other Abuses against Talibés
in Senegal, April 15, 2010.
40 Rukmini Callimachi, “Beggars Swept Out of Central Dakar as Senegal Attempts to Appease US,” AP, September 5,
2010.
41 Committee to Protect Journalists, Attacks on the Press in 2009.
42 State Department, “2009 Human Rights Report.”
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on foreign aid, which in 2007 represented about 23% of overall government spending.43
Remittances from Senegalese workers abroad also provide significant financial inflows,
reportedly totaling $902 million in 2007, or triple the level of foreign direct investment.44 While
over 77% of the workforce is engaged in (mostly subsistence) agriculture, the service sector is
responsible for over 63% of gross domestic product (GDP).45 Although government investments
in infrastructure, pro-business reforms, and donor assistance have provided the conditions for
relatively strong economic growth in the past decade, Senegal continues to be one of the world’s
least developed countries (LDCs), as measured by the United Nations. It experienced 4.0%
average annual growth between 1997 and 2002, and annual growth of over 5.5% between 2003
and 2006, according to the IMF.46 The economy was affected by the global economic crisis: the
IMF estimates that there was a “marked slowdown” in real GDP growth in 2008 and 2009, to
3.2% and 2.2% annually, respectively.47 The IMF estimates that growth rebounded to 4% in 2010
and projects that it will reach 4.4% in 2011.48
Wade’s administration has undertaken reforms aimed at maintaining macroeconomic stability,
improving the management of public finances, enhancing the competitiveness of key sectors, and
weaning parastatal firms off public subsidies. In 2009, the World Bank named Senegal one of the
world’s “top ten reformers,” citing regulatory and trade reforms.49 Still, some economic analysts
contend that bureaucratic burdens placed on the operation of private businesses; corruption; rigid
labor laws; a lack of transparency in public contracting; shortfalls in judicial independence and
efficiency; and opaque land titling procedures hinder further growth.50 Chronic electricity
shortages also pose a serious challenge to private sector development. Some analysts have also
criticized Wade’s focus on “prestige” projects, such as a new international airport and new
highways in Dakar, to the perceived exclusion of projects more likely to have a broad
socioeconomic impact.51
The IMF has expressed approval for the government’s fiscal management, although it also
observed in 2009 that “recurring governance and transparency concerns constitute risks to the
program—and ultimately economic growth.”52 In 2010, the IMF noted that Senegal’s real GDP
growth over the previous 15 years had lagged behind Africa’s “best-performing, non-oil exporting
countries” by at least 2% annually; the Fund attributed the difference to Senegal’s relative
deficiencies in a number of areas “including infrastructure, non-price competitiveness, and

43 State Department, “Background Note.” According to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
(OECD), Senegal received over a billion dollars in official development assistance in 2009, excluding debt relief.
44 State Department, “Background Note.”
45 CIA World Factbook, statistics dated 2010.
46 IMF Regional Economic Outlook data, updated April 2009; IMF, “Statement at the Conclusion of an IMF Mission to
Senegal,” March 25, 2010. The economy was nonetheless hit hard by the global economic crisis: the IMF estimates that
real GDP growth averaged about 2% in 2008 and 2009, but predicts that growth will rebound to roughly 3.5% in 2010.
47 IMF, Senegal: Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper Annual Progress Report, December 2010.
48 IMF, “IMF Executive Board Completes Final Review Under PSI with Senegal and Approves New Three-Year PSI,”
Press Release No. 10/469, December 3, 2010.
49 World Bank, “Top Ten Reformers from Doing Business 2009,” at [www.doingbusiness.org].
50 EIU, Senegal, April 2010; State Department, “2010 Investment Climate Statement—Senegal,” May 2010. The lack
of transparency in public contracting persists despite the passage of a 2008 law to enhance transparency in public
procurement and public tenders.
51 Oxford Analytica, “Senegal: Governance Concerns Rise Over Wade Agenda,” July 29 2010.
52 IMF, Fourth Review Under the Policy Support Instrument and Second Review Under the Exogenous Shocks Facility,
December 7, 2009.
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strength of fiscal institutions, as well as factors such as governance, the quality of institutions, and
financial market development.”53
Senegal continues to face challenges in alleviating poverty and addressing the burden of
disease.54 Socioeconomic indicators are poor. Senegal ranked 144 out of 169 countries assessed
by the 2010 U.N. Human Development Index. Seventeen percent of the population is
undernourished, and 31% of the population lacks reliable access to clean water, according to the
World Bank. Nearly 60% of the adult population is illiterate. Like many Sahel countries, Senegal
suffers from food insecurity, attributable in part to a dry and unpredictable climate, poor water
and land management, demographic pressures, and periodic locust infestations. It relies on
imports for 70% of its food supply – a rate higher than any other country in Sub-Saharan Africa.55
The effects of global climate change are expected to further worsen food insecurity in Senegal, as
in much of the region.56 Discontent over socioeconomic conditions has contributed to a high rate
of emigration, particularly among young men and often in highly unsafe conditions.57
Security Issues
Senegal’s primary internal security concern is unrest in the southern Casamance region, where a
low-level separatist insurgency persists despite a landmark 2004 peace agreement. Transnational
security threats include violent extremism, narcotics trafficking, and organized crime. Senegal has
a relatively well-trained and disciplined military of about 17,000 personnel. The United States
provides a range of security assistance and cooperation (see “Security Assistance and
Cooperation,” below).
Violent Extremism
According to the State Department, Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), which is active in
neighboring Mauritania and Mali, has attempted to set up transit points and facilitation networks
in Senegal, though it has not launched attacks there. The State Department reported that
Senegalese authorities “cooperated with the United States to identify terrorist groups operating in
Senegalese territory,” but that Senegal “lacked specific counterterrorism legislation and current
laws made it difficult to prosecute terrorist suspects. More work remained to be done to develop
first responder services, to facilitate the quick sharing of information between agencies, and to
control porous borders where police and security services were undermanned and ill-equipped to
prevent illicit cross-border trafficking.”58 Wade has called for greater regional cooperation and

53 IMF, “IMF Executive Board Completes Final Review,” op. cit.
54 A UNICEF spokesperson stated in December 2010 that 75% of rural households were affected by “chronic poverty.”
Agence de Presse Sénégalaise (APS), “Au Sénégal, 6 Ménages Sur 10 Sont Pauvres ou Vulnérables, Selon la
Représentante de l’UNICEF,” December 13, 2010.
55 U.S. government, “Feed the Future,” Senegal FY2010 Implementation Plan, at
http://www.feedthefuture.gov/documents/FTF_2010_Implementation_Plan_Senegal.pdf.
56 UNDP and Government of Senegal, Changement Climatique, Sécurité Alimentaire et Développement Humain, 2010;
Oxfam Senegal profile, December 2009.
57 See International Organization on Migration (IOM), Migration au Sénégal: Profil National, 2009.
58 State Department, Country Reports on Terrorism 2009, August 5, 2010. For background on AQIM, see CRS Report
R41070, Al Qaeda and Affiliates: Historical Perspective, Global Presence, and Implications for U.S. Policy,
coordinated by John Rollins.
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Western donor support in efforts to counter AQIM, while local media commentators have raised
concerns over Senegal’s ability to patrol its borders against transnational terrorists.59 Many
analysts believe that although Senegal’s population is largely Muslim, there is little indigenous
support for Islamist extremism, given the country’s long history of religious tolerance.
The Casamance Conflict
Senegal’s Casamance region has suffered from a low-level but disruptive separatist conflict since
the early 1980s. An agriculturally fertile region that borders Guinea-Bissau to the south,
Casamance is cut off from northern Senegal by The Gambia. The region is also religiously and
ethnically distinct. It was historically populated by members of the Diola (also spelled Jola)
ethnic group, who largely follow Christian and animist beliefs, in contrast to the country’s
Muslim majority.60 Drawing partly on Diola perceptions of economic and political
marginalization, the Movement of Democratic Forces of Casamance (MFDC, after its French
acronym) initiated an armed insurgency in 1982 after non-violent protests were harshly
repressed.61 Attacks on military and government targets spiraled during the 1990s, and were met
with stepped-up military operations and reported human rights abuses by Senegalese troops. In
addition, the use of land mines hindered regional economic growth and development, further
entrenching local grievances and isolation.62
The Casamance conflict is highly localized and poses little existential threat to the central
government. However, it has long evaded attempts to achieve a comprehensive peace. The MFDC
split into two main factions in the 1990s, one of which reportedly received support from The
Gambia, the other from Guinea-Bissau. Each faction has reportedly since splintered many times.
Multiple cease-fires and peace agreements have been signed between the government and various
MFDC leaders, culminating in a landmark agreement brokered by President Wade in 2004 that
brought relative stability to the region.
Violence has resurged since mid-2009, with several deadly confrontations between remnant rebel
forces and government troops. A Senegalese military source alleged in December 2010 that rebel
fighters had displayed “new equipment… such as rocket launchers, mortars, and machine guns”;
the interception of an Iranian arms shipment in Nigeria in late 2010 caused Senegal to break off
diplomatic relations in February (see “Foreign Relations,” below).63 While the conflict remains
locally contained, it has hurt the regional economy, which is ordinarily a tourism destination, and
caused population displacements in rural areas. Government-sponsored peace talks are ostensibly
ongoing, but are relatively inactive due partly to MFDC fragmentation, and the government has

59 Helen Vesperini, “African Leaders Urged to Tackle Al-Qaeda Threat,” AFP, February 2, 2010; Walfadjri,
“Terrorisme Religieux dans le Sahel—AQMI aux Portes du Sénégal,” August 3, 2010.
60 While the Diola constitute a majority in Casamance, they represent only about 4% of the national population. There
are also significant Diola communities in Guinea-Bissau and The Gambia. Minority Rights Group International,
“World Directory of Minorities and Indigenous Peoples - Senegal: Diola (Jola),” 2008.
61 For background on the MFDC, see Ferdinand de Jong and Geneviève Gasser, “Contested Casamance,” Canadian
Journal of African Studies, 39, 2 (2005).
62 Limited demining operations have taken place in recent years with international support, but they have been hindered
by lack of funds and logistical challenges. The MFDC planted mines without keeping track of their location, while the
Senegalese army denies using any landmines, and the government ratified the comprehensive landmine banning treaty
in 1998. IRIN, Laying Landmines to Rest?, Special Report, November 2004.
63 AFP, “Violence Surges in Casamance as Peace Process Stays Blocked,” December 29, 2010.
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rejected the rebels’ demand for a regional referendum on self-determination.64 MFDC fighters and
ex-combatants reportedly also engage in banditry and organized crime, including narcotics and
arms trafficking, further entrenching the presence of transnational crime networks.65
Illegal Trafficking and Organized Crime
The U.N. Office of Drugs and Crime (UNODC) assesses the total value of illicit trafficking flows
through Senegal at 8.2 times the value of GDP.66 The area that has drawn the most international
concern is the flow of cocaine from South America to Europe: the drug reportedly enters Senegal
either overland or by sea via neighboring Guinea-Bissau and Guinea, or directly by air. Analysts
believe transnational drug flows represent a significant potential threat to regional stability and
the rule of law in West Africa. Narcotics trafficking presents opportunities for enrichment that far
outweigh the region’s formal economies, and can distort economic and governance incentives as
powerful individuals seek to maintain their access to the financial benefits of such flows.67
Three large cocaine seizures were reported in Senegal in 2007, totaling 1,200 kg; 1,250 kg; and
3,100 kg respectively.68 In early 2009, a Senegalese court convicted and sentenced to jail five
South American nationals arrested in connection with one of the 2007 seizures. Total cocaine
flows through West Africa are reported to have declined since their peak in 2008.69 Still, seizures
have continued, albeit in smaller quantities than those reported in 2007. Most appear to be the
product of accident and luck, rather than sustained law enforcement investigations.
The cocaine trade is thought to benefit from well-established regional smuggling networks and
routes that are also leveraged for duty-free cigarettes, counterfeit prescription drugs, small arms,
and persons.70 Senegal’s relatively good transportation and telecommunications infrastructure
may also serve as a draw for traffickers. Senegal is a significant source and hub for human
trafficking between West Africa and Europe. In 2010, the State Department classified Senegal as
“Tier 2 Watchlist” under the Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000 (TVPA,
P.L. 106-386).71
Though Senegal’s judiciary and law enforcement agencies are relatively effective compared to
many in the region, these institutions are still considered too weak to effectively prevent or
prosecute organized crime and related financial crimes, such as money laundering and terrorist
financing. Significant portions of the economy are cash-based. According to the State
Department, “reportedly, most money laundering involves domestically generated proceeds from

64 AFP, “Senegal Says No to Casamance Independence Referendum,” February 21, 2011.
65 U.N. Office of Drugs and Crime (UNODC), Transnational Trafficking and the Rule of Law in West Africa: A Threat
Assessment, July 2009. According to most reports, MFDC factions long financed themselves through proceeds from the
sub-regional trade in hashish, but the entry of cocaine and other narcotics into the region has reportedly altered existing
trafficking networks and the dynamics of the conflict.
66 UNODC, Transnational Trafficking, op. cit.
67 See CRS Report R40838, Illegal Drug Trade in Africa: Trends and U.S. Policy, by Liana Sun Wyler and Nicolas
Cook.
68 UNODC, World Drug Report 2010.
69 UNODC, Transnational Trafficking and the Rule of Law in West Africa.
70 UNODC, Transnational Trafficking and the Rule of Law in West Africa.
71 State Department, Trafficking in Persons Report 2010. See also CRS Report RL34317, Trafficking in Persons: U.S.
Policy and Issues for Congress, by Alison Siskin and Liana Sun Wyler.
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corruption and embezzlement…. Also of concern are criminal figures who launder and invest
their personal and their organization’s proceeds from the growing West Africa narcotics trade….
Other areas of concern include the transportation of cash, gold and gems through Senegal’s
airport and across its porous borders.”72 Money laundering associated with the drug trade is
thought to have fueled a recent boom in real estate construction in Dakar and the coastal city of
Mbour.73 Financial flows associated with money laundering may distort legitimate markets,
posing a threat to long-term growth and stability, while the potential for terrorist financing may
threaten U.S. national security interests.
Foreign Relations
Senegal has long benefited from close partnerships with Western donors. At the same time, its
leaders have increasingly pursued non-traditional sources of economic support, including from
Iran, Arab states, and China, while maintaining strong ties to France, the European Union, and the
United States. For example, President Wade broke diplomatic ties with Taiwan in 2005; economic
and diplomatic cooperation with China has reportedly since expanded.74 Ties with the Middle
East are also increasingly important. This strategy appears to be motivated by both pragmatism
and a desire to emphasize independence and diplomatic strengths to a domestic audience. Senegal
also appears to be playing potential rivals off one another in order to spark greater offers of aid
and investment, thereby maximizing potential sources of economic assistance and hedging
against conditions placed on Western aid flows.
Senegal cultivates a position of regional diplomatic leadership and seeks a high profile in regional
organizations such as the African Union (AU) and the Economic Community of West African
States (ECOWAS). It is a significant contributor of peacekeepers in Africa and elsewhere. As of
June 2010, over 1,500 Senegalese troops (nearly one-tenth of Senegal’s total armed forces) and
roughly 770 police were serving in U.N. peacekeeping missions, notably in Haiti, the Democratic
Republic of Congo (DRC), Darfur, Liberia, and Côte d’Ivoire.75 The largest Senegalese
peacekeeping contingent is in Darfur, with over 1,300 soldiers and police.
A Changing Relationship With France
Senegal’s relationship with France has historically been a source of vital economic and security
support. Dakar served as the regional colonial capital of French West Africa for the first half of
the 20th century, and Senegal was a key French ally in the region throughout the Cold War. France
remains Senegal’s biggest source of Senegalese imports and of bilateral development aid.76 Until
early 2010, France stationed over 1,000 troops at a military base in Dakar. However, France’s

72 State Department Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, Money Laundering and
Financial Crimes Country Database, May 2010.
73 CRS interviews with regional experts; Christopher Thompson, “How Drugs Are Funding a Boom in Senegal,” The
Hindu, March 11, 2009.
74 EIU, Country Profile 2008: Senegal.
75 United Nations, U.N. Mission’s Summary Detailed by Country, February 28, 2011, at
http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/contributors/2011/feb11_3.pdf.
76 According to statistics on official development assistance from the Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD), accessed by CRS in March 2011.
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recent attempts to reduce its military presence in Africa have coincided with attempts by Wade to
assert greater independence from the former colonial ruler. In April 2010, in tandem with
Senegal’s celebration of 50 years of independence, France transferred its base back to Senegalese
control and initiated a withdrawal of all but 300 military personnel. France is also reportedly
renegotiating its long-standing bilateral defense cooperation agreement.77
Regional Relations
Senegal largely enjoys cordial relations with neighboring states, and has generally refrained from
direct involvement in neighboring conflicts, apart from regional diplomatic outreach and conflict
resolution efforts.78 Still, disputes have occasionally arisen. In November 2010, the government
of Côte d’Ivoire recalled its ambassador and accused Senegal of interfering in domestic politics
after Wade met with opposition presidential candidate Alassane Ouattara ahead of a tense run-off
election against incumbent president Laurent Gbagbo.79 Relations with neighboring Guinea-
Bissau and The Gambia, which is entirely surrounded by Senegal, have been strained at times
over these countries’ alleged links to Casamance rebels and a low-level border dispute with
Guinea-Bissau. In 1998, Senegal deployed troops in Guinea-Bissau in support of then-President
João Bernardo Vieira, who was threatened by a military mutiny tied to the Casamance insurgency.
Senegal’s relations with its northern neighbor Mauritania were historically acrimonious: in 1989,
a dispute over grazing rights along the border sparked riots and vigilante reprisals in both
countries, resulting in the forced expulsion from Mauritania into Senegal of tens of thousands of
so-called “Afro Mauritanians” (members of “black” ethnic groups that are present in both
countries and have faced societal discrimination in Mauritania). The two countries have pursued a
rapprochement in recent years, and the United Nations has facilitated the return of displaced
populations. Wade brokered a June 2009 political agreement in Mauritania that paved the way for
elections following a 2008 military coup.
Outreach to the Middle East and Ties with Iran
Senegal is an active member of the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC), having headed
the organization in the 1970s and hosted the annual summit twice (in 1969 and 2008). Wade’s
administration has pursued greater economic and cultural ties with a number of Arab states and,
until recently, Iran. Ahead of the 2008 OIC summit, Senegal benefitted from substantial
infrastructure assistance from Arab aid agencies; according to the OECD, Arab countries’ net
official development assistance to Senegal totaled $43.7 million in 2007 and $19.7 million in
2008. In public appearances with Middle Eastern leaders, Wade often emphasizes a shared
religious identity and heritage.

77 Reuters, “France Says to Pull Bulk of Soldiers from Senegal,” June 8, 2010.
78 Senegal and Mali were granted independence jointly as the Mali Federation; the union broke up less than a year later.
In 1982, Senegal joined with The Gambia to form the nominal confederation of Senegambia. The envisaged integration
of the two countries was never carried out, and the union was dissolved in 1989.
79 Ouattara was subsequently confirmed by the United Nations as the winner of the election, but a prolonged standoff
has ensued as Gbagbo refuses to step down. See CRS Report RS21989, Côte d’Ivoire’s Post-Election Crisis , by
Nicolas Cook.
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Iran-Senegal ties warmed considerably in recent years, though they were recently disrupted due to
Senegalese concerns over Iranian arms shipments to the region. In mid-December 2010, Senegal
recalled its ambassador over a cache of arms that were seized in Nigeria in October. In February
2011, Senegal cut diplomatic ties, stating that a military investigation showed the arms were
destined for Casamance rebels.80 Previously, senior Iranian and Senegalese officials had made
multiple visits to each others’ capitals; both countries had pledged to strengthen economic,
diplomatic, and cultural cooperation; and the Iranian government had referred to Senegal as its
“special partner” in Africa while Senegal’s foreign minister described Iran as a “friend of
Africa.”81 Iranian interests appeared to focus on Senegal’s diplomatic influence, Iran’s attempt to
foster cohesion with Muslim leaders while countering Arab cultural and political influence in
Africa, and the perceived potential for Senegal to serve as a base for Iranian exports to the
region.82 In November 2009, during a visit by Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad to Dakar,
Wade reportedly referred favorably to Iran’s nuclear program, stating that the Iranian president
“tells me that his country is simply developing uranium for peaceful means.”83
U.S. Relations
The State Department refers to U.S.-Senegalese relations as “excellent.”84 Presidents Bill Clinton
and George W. Bush both visited Senegal during their tenures, and President Wade met President
Bush at the White House in June 2001. U.S. officials have nevertheless criticized recent
democracy and governance trends. The State Department’s FY2012 aid budget request for
Senegal refers to “the gradual erosion of governance and transparency,” and states that democracy
promotion is currently a focus of U.S. assistance activities.85 In May 2010, the U.S. Ambassador
to Senegal suggested in a statement that Senegal had to reduce corruption in order to retain
Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) assistance (see below), provoking a hostile, though
short-lived, public response from President Wade.86
Senegal is eligible for trade benefits, including apparel benefits, under the African Growth and
Opportunity Act (AGOA; Title I, P.L. 106-200). Senegal hosted the fourth annual AGOA Forum
in July 2005; it was attended by then-Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice. A bilateral investment
treaty was signed in 1983 and entered into force in 1990 after ratification by the U.S. Senate. U.S.
direct foreign investment in Senegal is estimated at more than $150 million; significant U.S.
investors include General Electric, Fortesa International, Crown Manufacturing, Phillip-Morris,

80 AP, “Senegal Cuts Ties with Iran Over Weapons Shipment Believed to Target Senegalese Forces,” February 23,
2011.
81 Le Monde, “Sénégal: La Tentation Iranienne,” April 16, 2010; IHS Global Insight, “Senegal Pushes for Renewed
Relations with Iran During President’s Visit,” October 20, 2009; FARS, “Senegal FM Describes Iran as ‘Friend of
Africa,’” December 13, 2010.
82 According to the IMF, the value of Iranian exports to Senegal jumped from less than $1 million annually to $23
million in 2007; they totaled $16 million in 2009. IMF, Direction of Trade Statistics, accessed August 8, 2010.
83 AFP, “Senegal Supports Iran’s Stance in Nuclear Dispute,” November 26, 2009.
84 State Department, “Senegal: Background Note.”
85 State Department, FY2012 Congressional Budget Justification for Foreign Operations.
86 Wade criticized the Ambassador’s statement and, referring to MCC aid, said the United States should “take it and
give it to some country where people don't mind being insulted.” Reuters, “U.S. Tells Senegal Aid Hangs on Anti-Graft
Effort,” May 27, 2010; AFP, “Senegal President Snaps at US Over Corruption Comment,” May 29, 2010.
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Pfizer, and Citibank.87 U.S. bilateral imports totaled $5.1 million in 2010, and bilateral exports
totaled $217.7 million.88
U.S. Assistance
Bilateral foreign assistance focuses on democratic governance, economic growth, rural
development, public health, food security, reconciliation in Casamance, and military
professionalism. The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) has invested over $1
billion in Senegal since 1961.89 The bulk of current bilateral assistance funding is devoted to
economic growth, agriculture, and health. Senegal also benefits from a wide range of multilateral
assistance through international financial institutions, such as the World Bank, the IMF, and the
African Development Bank (AfDB), all of which receive substantial financial support from the
United States. In 2004, Senegal became eligible for $850 million in multilateral debt relief under
the Highly Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) initiative.90
Bilateral aid through State Department and USAID accounts has increased significantly in recent
years, from under $60 million in FY2007 to $106.3 million in FY2010 (Table 1), not including
Senegal’s $540 million MCC compact. The Obama Administration has requested $119.9 million
for FY2012. The increase largely reflects growing investments in food security and health
assistance. Other agencies that fund and implement assistance programs in Senegal include the
Defense Department, the Department of Agriculture, the Peace Corps, the Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention, and the U.S. Geological Survey.
Table 1. U.S. Bilateral Assistance for Senegal, Selected Accounts
$ thousands
FY2010
FY2011
FY2012
FY2007 FY2008 FY2009 (actual)
(requested)
(requested)
TOTAL
58,755 57,859 93,754 109,480 136,935 119,860
DA 14,846
21,
798
55,834 56,528 75,150 56,250
ESF

4,000 0 0
400 0 0
Food Aid (P.L.
4,898
4,070
3,355
Not available
Not available
Not available
480)
GHCS (State
300 [Child
1,535 1,535 1,768 1,535 1,535
Dept.)
Survival and
Health, CSH]
GHCS
29,116
[CSH]
29,279 32,043 48,350 57,350 60,800
(USAID)
FMF 500 0 0 300 400 325
NADR 3,975
- a -
a
1,143 - -

87 State Department, “2010 Investment Climate Statement—Senegal,” May 2010.
88 U.S. International Trade Commission data, accessed on March 25, 2011.
89 USAID Senegal, “USAID/Senegal: A Look Back at Almost 50 Years of Progress,” 2010, at http://senegal.usaid.gov.
90 International Monetary Fund and International Development Association, “Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC)
Initiative – Statistical Update,” March 31, 2004.
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FY2010
FY2011
FY2012
FY2007 FY2008 FY2009 (actual)
(requested)
(requested)
IMET 1,120
1,177 987 991
1,000 950
INCLE 0 0 0 0
1,500 0
Source: State Department Congressional Budget Justification for Foreign Operations, FY2009-FY2012
Notes: This table reflects bilateral assistance authorized under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (P.L. 87-191,
as amended) and Title II of the Food for Peace Act (P.L. 480). It does not include aid disbursed from regional
accounts or funded through agencies other than the State Department and USAID.
DA=Development Assistance; ESF=Economic Support Fund; GHCS=Global Health and Child Survival;
FMF=Foreign Military Financing; NADR=Nonproliferation, Anti-terrorism, Demining, and Related Programs;
IMET=International Military Education and Training; INCLE=International Narcotics Control and Law
Enforcement.
a. While the State Department has not requested any bilateral NADR funding since FY2008, Senegal received
at least $4.88 million in regional Anti-Terrorism Assistance (ATA) between FY2007 and FY2009, which is
funded through the NADR account, under the regional Trans-Sahara Counter-Terrorism Partnership.
Agricultural Development and Food Security
USAID bilateral assistance for agricultural development, which is funded largely through the DA
account, increased significantly in FY2009 as part of the Obama Administration’s Global Hunger
and Food Security Initiative, to $33 million from $1.2 million in FY2008.91 Current programs
focus on increasing food productivity and access to domestic and regional markets. A USAID-led
natural resources management program further aims to bolster the sustainable, profitable, and
decentralized use of agricultural and other resources. Efforts are being made to coordinate
USAID’s agricultural programs with implementation of Senegal’s MCC Compact, which is also
partly focused on food security. Current programs are expected to lay the foundation for a multi-
sectoral, multi-year strategy organized under the Administration’s new Feed the Future initiative,
of which Senegal is one of 13 African focus countries.92 USAID’s Office of Foreign Disaster
Assistance (OFDA) also funds and coordinates regional emergency food security responses, and
USAID has supported regional drought and locust invasion preventive efforts.
Health
Health assistance, which totaled over $50 million in FY2010, focuses on decreasing maternal and
child mortality, preventing and treating prevalent diseases—notably, malaria, tuburculosis, and
HIV/AIDS—and improving health care delivery. USAID has provided support to Senegal’s
national HIV/AIDS strategy, which has been praised by health advocates. Senegal is one of 15
focus countries for the President’s Malaria Initiative (PMI), which is led by USAID and
implemented with the CDC. In line with Senegal’s own malaria control strategy, PMI supports
four key interventions to prevent and treat malaria: insecticide-treated mosquito nets, indoor
insecticide spraying, preventive treatment for pregnant women, and diagnosis and treatment.93

91 Figures provided by USAID, July 2010.
92 Senegal’s FY2010 “implementation plan” for Feed the Future is at
http://www.feedthefuture.gov/documents/FTF_2010_Implementation_Plan_Senegal.pdf. See CRS Report R40945, The
U.S. Global Food Security Initiative: Issues for Congress, by Charles E. Hanrahan and Melissa D. Ho, for background.
93 Country Profile, President’s Malaria Initiative: Senegal, April 2010.
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Security Assistance and Cooperation
Along with France, the United States is a top provider of training, equipment, and support for
Senegal’s armed forces.94 In part because the United States sees Senegal as a potential target of
violent extremism, and because Senegal is perceived as a partner in security cooperation, Senegal
benefits from a range of U.S. counter-terrorism assistance programs. The United States has also
provided counternarcotics aid amid growing U.S. concern over drug trafficking from South
America through West Africa. Bilateral security assistance additionally focuses on military
professionalization, maritime security, and peacekeeping training.
Senegal is one of 10 participant countries in the Trans-Sahara Counter-Terrorism Partnership
(TSCTP), a multi-year, interagency program aimed at defeating terrorist organizations in North
and West Africa by promoting democratic governance, discrediting terrorist ideology, and
strengthening regional counterterrorism capabilities. The State Department has provided at least
$4.88 million in Anti-Terrorism Assistance (ATA) through TSCTP to Senegalese police and
aviation, maritime, and border security agents.95 Through its complementary Operation Enduring
Freedom-Trans Sahara (OEF-TS), the Defense Department (DOD) has conducted a number of
exercises and conferences with the Senegalese armed forces; in May 2010, Senegal participated
in “Operation Flintlock” in Burkina Faso, a multinational military exercise coordinated by DOD’s
U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM). Flintlock aims to enhance regional counter-terrorism
cooperation in North and West Africa. Other U.S. agencies providing assistance in coordination
with TSCTP include the Department of Treasury and the Department of Justice.
Senegal has benefited from several DOD “Section 1206” security assistance programs since
FY2007, including two multi-country regional counter-terrorism programs in support of OEF-TS,
totaling $4.5 million, and three regional maritime security programs totaling $26.5 million.96
DOD also funds counternarcotics assistance in Senegal. Senegal further benefits from a State
Partnership Program with the National Guard of Vermont.
Peacekeeping Training
Over 12,000 Senegalese soldiers have received U.S. training through the Africa Contingency
Operations Training and Assistance (ACOTA) program, which assists troops planning to deploy
in international peacekeeping missions. Senegal is the fourth-ranking country worldwide in terms
of the total number of personnel trained through the program.97 The Administration’s FY2011
request for Foreign Military Financing (FMF) funds for Senegal states that they will be used to
support Senegal’s participation in “multinational responses to threats to peace” in Africa.98

94 State Department, “Background Note.”
95 Figures provided by the State Department and the Defense Department, FY2007-FY2009.
96 Section 1206 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006 provides the Secretary of Defense with
authority to train and equip foreign military and maritime security forces. For background, see CRS Report RS22855,
Security Assistance Reform: “Section 1206” Background and Issues for Congress, by Nina M. Serafino.
97 Figures provided by the State Department, June 2010.
98 FY2011 Congressional Budget Justification for Foreign Operations.
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Millennium Challenge Corporation Compact
Senegal has been eligible for MCC assistance since the start of eligibility determinations in 2004.
Eligibility is based on policy performance, relative to the median for low-income countries, on a
range of criteria related to political freedom, government service provision, and economic
governance.99 In April 2009, the MCC awarded Senegal $13.39 million to support the
development of a compact. In September 2009, the MCC approved a five-year, $540 million
compact aimed at encouraging economic growth through improvements in infrastructure and
agricultural production. The compact, which entered into force in September 2010, focuses on
road rehabilitation and expanding irrigation in two geographic regions that are considered to hold
potential for commercial agriculture, the northern Senegal River Valley and the southern
Casamance region. During the official compact signing, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton
encouraged President Wade to “make Senegal the shining example of what a free market
democracy can look like in the world.”100
Congressional Concerns
Several Members of Congress have expressed concerns over the decision process and timing of
Senegal’s MCC compact, given perceived democratic backsliding and rising corruption. In March
2010, U.S. Senator Arlen Specter wrote to the MCC’s chief executive officer, Daniel Yohannes,
that allegations of corrupt practices by Senegalese officials “lend the impression that the MCC
country team may not be responding adequately to the problem of corruption.”101 During an April
2010 hearing on the MCC before the House Appropriations Subcommittee on State, Foreign
Operations, and Related Programs, Chairwoman Nita Lowey raised concerns over corruption and
restrictions on private enterprise in Senegal and stated, “this was supposed to be a new process,
and we’re seeing business as usual, corruption as usual.”102 In media comments in August 2010,
Representative Ed Royce referred to Senegal’s MCC compact as “a mistake.”103
MCC officials have defended the decision to award Senegal a compact, stating that Senegal has
performed in the top quartile on most MCC indicators, including “control of corruption”; that
Senegal’s government is highly committed to the compact’s policy objectives; and that Senegal is
also “a good investment bet” for the MCC’s food security and global health initiatives.104 MCC
officials have also stated that there are ample policy tools at their disposal to monitor MCC
disbursements and to ensure Senegal’s compliance with good governance standards throughout
the duration of the compact, including regular consultation with Senegalese officials and the
potential to partially or wholly terminate disbursements if negative governance trends continue.105
In September 2010, MCC Vice President for Compact Implementation Patrick C. Fine stated that
prior to enabling the compact to enter into force, “we consulted with civil society. We've had very

99 See MCC, “Senegal FY10” and “Senegal FY09,” at [www.mcc.gov]. For background, see CRS Report RL32427,
Millennium Challenge Corporation, by Curt Tarnoff.
100 MCC, “MCC Board of Directors Approves $540 Million Compact with Republic of Senegal,” September 7, 2009;
State Department, “Secretary of State Clinton Delivers Remarks at Signing Ceremony of Grant Agreement Between the
Millennium Challenge Corporation and the Government of Senegal,” September 16, 2009.
101 David Freddoso, “Specter: Senegal shakes down Americans. Twice,” The Washington Examiner, March 16, 2010.
102 Hearing on the Millennium Challenge Corporation, April 14, 2010, transcript via Congressional Quarterly (CQ).
103 Chuck Neubauer, “For Senegal: U.S. Aid, 164-Ft. Statue,” The Washington Times, August 15, 2010.
104 “Millennium Challenge Corporation Hosts Post-Board Public Outreach,” March 25, 2010, transcript via CQ.
105 MCC response to CRS inquiry, September 22, 2009.
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candid conversations with the government. We looked at what steps had been taken in the last two
years to address some of the genuine concerns that people had, and we looked at Senegal’s
overall score on our indicators... And when we did all of that we came to the conclusion that entry
into force was merited at this time.”106 In congressional testimony in March 2011, MCC CEO
Daniel Yohannes stated that Senegal had reformed certain procurement procedures in response to
pressure from the MCC, the State Department, and multilateral institutions.107
Outlook
As Senegal prepares for national elections in 2012, tensions may persist between its record as a
stable democracy and concerns over recent negative political trends. The upcoming elections are
reportedly seen by many Senegalese as a potential watershed for the country’s political future, in
which Senegal may either further its democratic consolidation through a second peaceful and
transparent transition between elected civilian administrations, or potentially experience a flawed
election that could damage its international image.108 Senegal’s recent economic performance,
and a renewed focus on food security, may provide the foundation for enhanced socioeconomic
development. At the same time, growing corruption, insecurity in Casamance, and the potentially
distortive effects of transnational drug trafficking could pose barriers to future growth and
security. Events in the turbulent surrounding region—which has seen two military coups since
2008, in Guinea and Mauritania, in addition to lingering political unrest in Guinea-Bissau and
renewed civil war in Côte d’Ivoire—may also impact Senegal’s trajectory.

Author Contact Information

Alexis Arieff

Analyst in African Affairs
aarieff@crs.loc.gov, 7-2459



106 Millennium Challenge Corporation Holds Public Outreach Meeting, September 29, 2010, via CQ.
107 House Appropriations Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Holds Hearing on the
Proposed Fiscal 2012 Appropriations for the Millennium Challenge Corporation, March 15, 2011, via CQ.
108 One local media commentator has speculated that in 2012, “Senegal will either show itself truly democratic or won’t
be for much longer.” Walfadjri, “Election Présidentielle: Qui en 2012?” August 27, 2009; CRS translation.
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