International Drug Control Policy
Liana Sun Wyler
Analyst in International Crime and Narcotics
March 21, 2011
Congressional Research Service
7-5700
www.crs.gov
RL34543
CRS Report for Congress
P
repared for Members and Committees of Congress
International Drug Control Policy
Summary
The global illegal drug trade represents a multi-dimensional challenge that has implications for
U.S. national interests as well as the international community. Common illegal drugs trafficked
internationally include cocaine, heroin, and methamphetamine. According to the U.S. intelligence
community, international drug trafficking can undermine political and regional stability and
bolster the role and capabilities of organized crime in the drug trade. Key regions of concern
include Latin America and Afghanistan, which are focal points in U.S. efforts to combat the
production and transit of cocaine and heroin, respectively. Drug use and addiction have the
potential to negatively affect the social fabric of communities, hinder economic development, and
place an additional burden on national public health infrastructures.
As an issue of international policy concern for more than a century, and as a subject of long-
standing U.S. and multilateral policy commitment, U.S. counterdrug efforts have expanded to
include a broad array of tools to attack the international drug trade. Such approaches include (1)
combating the production of drugs at the source, (2) combating the flow of drugs in transit, (3)
dismantling international illicit drug networks, and (4) creating incentives for international
cooperation on drug control.
Congress is involved in all aspects of U.S. international drug control policy, regularly
appropriating funds for counterdrug initiatives, conducting oversight activities on federal
counterdrug programs, and legislating changes to agency authorities and other counterdrug
policies. For FY2012, the Administration has requested from Congress approximately $26.2
billion for all federal drug control programs, of which $2.1 billion is requested for international
programs, including civilian and military U.S. foreign assistance. An additional $3.9 billion is
requested for interdiction programs related to intercepting and disrupting foreign drug shipments
en route to the United States.
Through its appropriations and federal oversight responsibilities, the 112th Congress may chose to
continue tackling several ongoing policy issues concerning U.S. international drug control policy,
including
• the role of the Department of Defense in counterdrug foreign assistance;
• challenges associated with sequencing alternative development and eradication
programs;
• the effectiveness of U.S. efforts to promote international drug control
cooperation; and
• how to reduce drug trafficking-related violence and other harmful manifestations
of the drug trade.
The 112th Congress may also choose to address authorizing legislation for the White House’s
Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP), which, pursuant to Section 714 of P.L. 105-
277, as amended, expired at the end of FY2010. ONDCP’s primary purpose is to establish
policies, priorities, and objectives for the overall U.S. drug control program, including domestic
and international aspects.
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Contents
Global Scope of the Problem....................................................................................................... 1
Drug Cultivation and Production Trends................................................................................ 1
Drug Trafficking and Consumption Trends............................................................................ 4
Consequences of the Drug Trade ........................................................................................... 5
Strategic Guidance ...................................................................................................................... 7
International Policy Framework ............................................................................................ 8
U.S. Foreign Policy Framework ............................................................................................ 9
U.S. National Drug Control Strategy ............................................................................. 10
International Drug Control Strategy Report ................................................................... 11
Regional Initiatives ....................................................................................................... 12
Overall U.S. Drug Control Funding........................................................................................... 16
U.S. Assistance for International Counternarcotics Programs..................................................... 18
Civilian Funding and Authorities......................................................................................... 18
Military Funding and Authorities......................................................................................... 21
Policy Issues ............................................................................................................................. 23
Combating the Production of Drugs at the Source................................................................ 23
Crop Eradication ........................................................................................................... 23
Alternative Development .............................................................................................. 25
Combating the Flow of Drugs in Transit.............................................................................. 26
Dismantling Transnational Drug Networks .......................................................................... 30
Extradition to the United States ..................................................................................... 30
Freezing and Blocking Foreign Criminal Assets ............................................................ 30
Building Foreign Law Enforcement Capacity ................................................................ 33
Creating Incentives for International Cooperation................................................................ 34
Conditions on Foreign Aid ............................................................................................ 34
Eligibility for Trade Preference Programs...................................................................... 38
Conclusion................................................................................................................................ 40
Figures
Figure 1. U.N. Estimates of Coca Bush Cultivation, 2000-2009................................................... 1
Figure 2. U.N. Estimates of Opium Poppy Cultivation, 2000-2009 .............................................. 3
Figure 3. U.S. Civilian Counternarcotics Assistance, by Region, FY2010 .................................. 19
Figure 4. U.S. Civilian Counternarcotics Assistance, by Function, FY2010 ............................... 20
Figure 5. U.S. Military Counternarcotics Assistance, by Region, FY2010.................................. 22
Figure 6. Major Money Laundering Countries and Jurisdictions of Primary Money
Laundering Concern............................................................................................................... 32
Figure 7. Map of World Drug Majors in FY2011 ....................................................................... 35
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Tables
Table 1. Regional Drug Consumption: Opiates, Cocaine, and Synthetics ..................................... 4
Table 2. Federal Drug Control Funding, FY2010 Final-FY2012 Request ................................... 17
Table 3. Federal Drug Control Funding, FY2005 Actual-FY2011 Request ................................. 17
Table 4. U.S. Civilian Counternarcotics Assistance, by Region, FY2007-FY2010...................... 19
Table 5. U.S. Civilian Counternarcotics Assistance, by Function, FY2007-FY2010 ................... 20
Table 6. U.S. Military Counternarcotics Assistance, by Region, FY2007-FY2010...................... 22
Table 7. U.S. Assistance for Crop Eradication, FY2007-FY2010 Est. ........................................ 23
Table 8.U.S. Alternative Development Foreign Assistance, FY2007-FY2010 Est....................... 25
Table 9.U.S. Civilian Assistance for Interdiction, FY2007-FY2010 Est...................................... 28
Table 10. Status of ATPA Beneficiary Countries ........................................................................ 39
Table A-1. Afghanistan: Comparison of Opium Poppy Cultivation Estimates............................. 42
Table A-2. Burma: Comparison of Opium Poppy Cultivation Estimates..................................... 42
Table A-3. Colombia: Comparison of Opium Poppy Cultivation Estimates ................................ 42
Table A-4. Laos: Comparison of Opium Poppy Cultivation Estimates........................................ 43
Table A-5. Mexico: Comparison of Opium Poppy Cultivation Estimates ................................... 43
Table A-6. Bolivia: Comparison of Coca Bush Cultivation Estimates......................................... 43
Table A-7. Colombia: Comparison of Coca Bush Cultivation Estimates..................................... 44
Table A-8. Peru: Comparison of Coca Bush Cultivation Estimates............................................. 44
Appendixes
Appendix A. Comparison of Drug Data, by Country, 2005-2009 ............................................... 42
Appendix B. U.S. Agency Roles................................................................................................ 45
Appendix C. Related CRS Reports ............................................................................................ 47
Contacts
Author Contact Information ...................................................................................................... 47
Acknowledgments .................................................................................................................... 48
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International Drug Control Policy
Global Scope of the Problem
Illegal drugs refer to narcotic, psychotropic, and related substances whose production, sale, and
use are restricted by domestic law and international drug control agreements.1 Common illegal
drugs trafficked internationally include cocaine, heroin, and synthetic drugs. International trade in
these drugs represents a lucrative and what at times seems to be an intractable criminal enterprise.
Drug Cultivation and Production Trends
Both cocaine and heroin are plant-derived drugs, cultivated and harvested by farmers in typically
low-income countries or in regions of the world with uneven economic development and a history
of conflict. Coca bush, the plant from which cocaine is derived, is mainly cultivated in three
South American countries: Colombia, Peru, and Bolivia. See Figure 1 (see also Appendix A for a
comparison of U.N. and U.S. drug cultivation and production data). During the past decade,
Colombia has been the primary source of coca bush cultivation. According to the United Nations,
however, Colombia’s proportion of the world’s total illegal coca bush cultivation has declined
from approximately 74% in 2000 to 43% in 2009.
Figure 1. U.N. Estimates of Coca Bush Cultivation, 2000-2009
250,000
200,000
150,000
ectares
Peru
H
n in
Colombia
ivatio
100,000
Bolivia
ult
C
50,000
0
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
Year
Source: U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), World Drug Report (2010), p. 162.
1 With few exceptions, the production and sale of controlled substances is legally permitted only if used for medical
and scientific purposes.
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Notes: Coca bush is the harvestable crop used in the production of cocaine, crack cocaine, and coca paste.
Figure 1 presents U.N.-published data on estimated illicit coca bush available internationally for harvest after
eradication. UNODC draws on several sources of data for these estimates, and changes in data collection
methodologies may make estimates incomparable over time. For Bolivia, sources through 2002 included the
Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission and the U.S. government. Since 2002 for the Yungas region
and for all regions of Bolivia since 2003 estimates were conducted by the National Illicit Crop Monitoring
System, supported by the UNODC. For Colombia and Peru, estimates were conducted by the National Illicit
Crop Monitoring System, supported by the UNODC. The U.S. government publishes separate estimates of illicit
coca bush cultivation. See Appendix A for a comparison of U.N. versus U.S. estimates.
Estimates of harvestable coca bush are used to calculate how much 100% pure cocaine could
theoretically be produced each year, based on the potency of sampled coca leaves and the
efficiency of clandestine labs, where the plant is chemically processed into cocaine. According to
United Nations estimates, the global total potential manufacture of pure cocaine in 2009 ranged
between 842 to 1,111 metric tons, with Colombia alone manufacturing some 410 metric tons.2
This represents roughly a stable trend in total potential manufacture of cocaine, compared to 2008
estimates.
Opium poppy, the plant from which opiates including heroin are derived, is cultivated mainly in
Southwest Asia (Afghanistan and Pakistan) and Southeast Asia (Burma/Myanmar and Laos). (See
Figure 2.) Opium poppy is also cultivated in Mexico, Guatemala, and Colombia, almost
exclusively for heroin consumption in the United States. Over the past decade, Afghanistan has
risen to prominence as the primary global source of illicit opium poppy cultivation, supplanting
Burma, where the majority of opium poppy cultivation took place in the 1990s. In 2009,
Afghanistan cultivated approximately 74% of the world’s total illegal opium poppy. Similar to
estimates to calculate potential cocaine manufacture, estimates are also used to calculate potential
opium and potential heroin manufacture. According to the United Nations, the global total
potential manufacture of opium in 2009 is estimated at 7,754 metric tons and the total potential
manufacture of heroin (of unknown purity) in 2009 is estimated at 634 metric tons.3
2 U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), World Drug Report (2010), p. 162.
3 U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), World Drug Report (2010), p. 138.
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Figure 2. U.N. Estimates of Opium Poppy Cultivation, 2000-2009
250,000
200,000
Other
Mexico
150,000
Colombia
ectares
H
Thailand
n in
Burma
ivatio
100,000
ult
Laos
C
Pakistan
50,000
Afghanistan
0
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
Year
Source: U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), World Drug Report (2010), p. 138.
Notes: Opium poppy is the harvestable crop used in the production of opiates, including opium and heroin.
Figure 2 presents U.N.-published data on estimated illicit opium poppy available internationally for harvest after
eradication. UNODC draws on several sources of data for these estimates, and changes in data collection
methodologies may make estimates incomparable over time. For ful sourcing details, see UNODC’s 2010 World
Drug Report. Note that 2009 estimates do not include totals for Mexico. Countries and regions included in the
“Other” category are Algeria, the Baltic countries, the Balkans, Central Asia and the Caucasus, Egypt, Guatemala,
Iraq, Lebanon, Peru, Russia and Member States of the Commonwealth of Independent States, South Asia,
Thailand (beginning in 2003), Ukraine, Venezuela, and Vietnam. The U.S. government publishes separate
estimates of illicit opium poppy cultivation. See Appendix A for a comparison of U.N. versus U.S. estimates.
Global illegal synthetic drug production is difficult to estimate. In general, the underlying
chemicals needed for the production of synthetic drugs such as amphetamine, methamphetamine,
and ecstasy4 are legally manufactured in industrial factories for legitimate commercial and
pharmaceutical purposes. In turn, some portion of the total legal production of these chemicals is
diverted and misused for illicit purposes. Such diverted chemicals typically are processed into
illegal synthetic drugs in clandestine laboratories, which can range in size from small residential-
sized kitchens to large-scale “superlabs” capable of processing high volumes of synthetic drugs.
According to the United Nations, however, the “variety and easy accessibility of the starting
materials needed to manufacture synthetic drugs allow production to occur virtually anywhere in
the world.”5
4 Ecstasy is the popular term for 3,4-methylenedioxmethamphetamine (MDMA).
5 U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), World Drug Report (2010), p. 203.
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Drug Trafficking and Consumption Trends
Major trafficking routes connect the drug producers with the drug consumers, with often
sophisticated drug trafficking organizations (DTOs) controlling the various aspects of the supply
chain. Current major drug transit pathways flow through Mexico and Central America (for drugs
produced in South America and destined for the United States), West Africa (for South American
cocaine destined for Europe and Afghan heroin en route to Europe and the United States), and all
the countries surrounding Afghanistan (heroin destined to Europe, Eurasia, and elsewhere).
Globally, between 155 and 250 million people, aged 15 to 64, used illicit substances, including
cannabis, at least once in 2008.6 North America has traditionally been the main consumer of
cocaine and cocaine-type drugs, with Europe’s demand for cocaine rising in recent years. Europe
and Asia have been the traditional markets for opiate-type drugs, including heroin. Asia and North
America have been major markets for synthetic drugs. See Table 1 for regional breakdowns.
Among these users, approximately 16 to 38 million are termed “problem drug users.”7 The latter
category of individuals are responsible for the consumption of most illegal drugs. The majority of
these problem drug users (an estimated 11 to 34 million) do not receive treatment.
Table 1. Regional Drug Consumption: Opiates, Cocaine, and Synthetics
estimated number of people, aged 15-64, who used opiates or cocaine at least once in 2008
Opiates Cocaine
Synthetics
Region
low estimate
high estimate
low estimate
high estimate
low estimate
high estimate
Africa
680,000 2,930,000 1,020,000 2,670,000 1,550,000 5,200,000
Asia
6,460,000 12,540,000 430,000 2,270,000 4,430,000 37,990,000
Europe
3,290,000 3,820,000 4,570,000 4,970,000 2,500,000 3,190,000
Latin
America
1,000,000 1,070,000 2,560,000 2,910,000 1,670,000 2,690,000
North
America
1,290,000 1,380,000 6,170,000 6,170,000 3,090,000 3,200,000
Oceania
120,000 150,000 330,000 390,000 470,000 630,000
Global
12,840,000 21,880,000 15,070,000 19,380,000 13,710,000 52,900,000
Source: U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), World Drug Report (2010), pp. 153, 173, and 214.
Notes: Global prevalence of opiate use, as a percentage of population totals, is between 0.3% and 0.5% (lower
and upper ranges). Subregions where prevalence is potential y higher than average include Eastern Africa (1.3% at
the upper range), the Near and Middle East (1.5% at the upper range), and Eastern/South-East Europe (0.9% at
the upper range). Global prevalence of cocaine use, as a percentage of population totals, is between 0.3% and
0.4% (lower and upper ranges). Subregions where prevalence is potential y higher than average include North
America (2.0% at the upper range), Oceania (1.7% at the upper range), Western/Central Europe (1.5% at the
upper range), the Caribbean (1.2% at the upper range), and South America (1.0% at the upper range). Global
prevalence of synthetics (amphetamine-, methamphetamine-, and ecstasy-group substances) use, as a percentage
6 U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), World Drug Report (2010), p. 123.
7 There is no universal definition for “problem drug user.” U.N. data are based on information submitted by Member
States to the United Nations and variously includes regular or frequent drug users deemed dependent on drug use and
suffering from social and health consequences as a result of their drug use. U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC),
World Drug Report (2010), p. 125.
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of population totals, is between 0.3% and 1.2% (lower and upper ranges). Subregions where prevalence is
potential y higher than average include Oceania (2.8% at the upper range), the Caribbean (1.9% at the upper
range), and East/Southeast Asia (1.4% at the upper range).
Consequences of the Drug Trade
The global illegal drug trade represents a multi-dimensional challenge that has implications for
U.S. national interests as well as the international community. Drug use and addiction have been
said to negatively affect the social fabric of communities, hinder economic development, and
place an additional burden on national public health infrastructures. According to the United
Nations, drugs are both a cause and consequence of poverty, with “22 of the 34 countries least
likely to achieve the Millennium Development Goals ... located in regions that are magnets for
drug cultivation and trafficking.”8 Intravenous drug users are at particular risk of contracting
diseases such as Hepatitis B, Hepatitis C, and HIV/AIDS. According to a recent study, as much as
31% of injecting drug users may be living with HIV, representing as much as 18% of the total
number of people internationally living with HIV.9
Observers suggest that drug trafficking also
Drug Trafficking Organizations (DTOs)
represents a systemic threat to international
The U.S. National Drug Threat Assessment defines
security. Revenue from the illegal drug trade
DTOs as “complex organizations with highly defined
provides international DTOs with the
command-and-control structures that produce,
transport, and/or distribute large quantities of one or
resources to evade government detection;
more illicit drugs.” 10
undermine and co-opt legitimate social,
political, and economic systems through
In addition to moving illicit drugs, DTOs are capable of
generating, moving, and laundering billions of dollars in
corruption, extortion, or more violent forms of
drug proceeds annual y. Major DTOs of concern to the
influence; penetrate legitimate economic
United States include Mexican and Colombian DTOs,
structures through money laundering; and, in
which are responsible for the production and transport
some instances, challenge the authority of
of most illicit drugs into the United States. Other major
national governments. In the process, a
DTOs of concern include the West African/Nigerian
DTOs and Southwest and East Asian DTOs.
transnational network of criminal safe havens
are established in which DTOs operate with
While DTOs are commonly identified by their nationality
of origin, they are known to be aggressively transnational
impunity. As in the recent emergence of West
and poly-criminal—seeking to expand their consumer
Africa as a major cocaine transit hub for Latin
markets, to diversify their criminal enterprises and
American drug traffickers, DTOs prey on
product variety, and to explore new transit points and
states with low capacity for effective
safe havens with low law enforcement capacity and high
governance or the enforcement of the rule of
corruption. Many of them also have links to other illicit
actors, including arms traffickers, money launderers,
law. This can exacerbate preexisting political
terrorists and insurgent groups, and corrupt officials.
instability, post-conflict environments, and
economic vulnerability.
8 U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), World Drug Report (2010), p. 5.
9 According to the study, there are between 11 and 21.2 million drug-injecting users, of which between 0.8 and 6.6
million may be living with HIV. Total global estimates of people living with HIV are between 30 and 36 million.
Bradley M. Mathers et al., “HIV Prevention, Treatment, and Care Services for People Who Inject Drugs: A Systematic
Review of Global, Regional, and National Coverage,” The Lancet, vol. 375, no. 9719 (March 20-26, 2010), pp. 1014-
1028.
10 U.S. Department of Justice, National Drug Intelligence Center, National Drug Threat Assessment 2010, No. 2010-
Q0317-001, February 2010. Note also that the National Drug Threat Assessment defines drug “cartels.” Specifically, it
defines drug cartels to be “large, highly sophisticated organizations composed of multiple DTOs and cells with specific
assignments such as drug transportation, security/enforcement, or money laundering. Drug cartel command-and-control
(continued...)
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By many accounts, drug trafficking, state weakness, political corruption, and powerful DTOs are
part of a seemingly self-perpetuating cycle.11 On the one hand, a drug trafficking presence in a
country can increase corruption and undermine political stability, while on the other hand, social
and political instability may be causal factors for attracting a thriving drug industry. Further,
academic literature on conflict duration indicates that control of a lucrative illegal drug trade in
the hands of a particular political actor, rebel, or insurgent group can lengthen a conflict. State
powers in the hands of a DTO through deeply entrenched kleptocracy serve as a force multiplier
to enhance a DTO’s power by harnessing the capacity of a state’s infrastructure—roads, seaports,
airports, warehouses, security apparatus, justice sector, and international political sovereignty—to
further the DTO’s illicit business aims.
The consequences of a thriving illicit drug trade co-located in a U.S. combat zone are illustrated
today in Afghanistan, where some portion of drug-related proceeds annually help facilitate the
current insurgency.12 In other regions, such as in the Western Hemisphere, Americans have been
murdered, taken hostage, and tortured for their involvement in counternarcotics operations—
highlighting the past and ongoing dangers associated with the international drug trade.13 In
addition, many observers are concerned about the potential spread of DTO-related violence from
Mexico into the United States.14 Moreover, several groups listed by the U.S. Department of State
as Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTOs) are known to be involved in drug trafficking.
(...continued)
structures are based outside the United States; however, they produce, transport, and distribute illicit drugs domestically
with the assistance of DTOs that are either a part of or in an alliance with the cartel.”
11 See for example, Cornelius Graubner, Drugs and Conflict: How the Mutual Impact of Illicit Drug Economies and
Violent Conflict Influences Sustainable Development, Peace and Stability, 2007.
12 U.S. Embassy Kabul, U.S. Forces Afghanistan, United States Government Integrated Civilian-Military Campaign
Plan for Support to Afghanistan, August 10, 2009.
13 Examples include the shooting down of a drug eradication plane in Colombia in 1993, which resulted in the
immediate shooting of the pilot and the taking hostage of three American defense contractors; the killing of five U.S.
Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) agents in Peru during the shooting down of a plane on a drug reconnaissance
mission; and the torture and murder of DEA undercover agent Enrique “Kiki” Camarena Salazar in Mexico in 1985.
Most recently, Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) Special Agent Jaime Zapata was killed in February 2011
in northern Mexico by suspected drug traffickers. Another ICE agent was wounded in the same incident.
14 See CRS Report R41075, Southwest Border Violence: Issues in Identifying and Measuring Spillover Violence,
coordinated by Kristin M. Finklea.
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2011 U.S. Intelligence Assessment of the Drug Threat
James R. Clapper, the Director of National Intelligence, presented the intelligence community’s annual threat
assessment to Congress in February 2011 and highlighted, among other issues, narco-threats to political and regional
stability, illicit finance for insurgents and terrorist groups, and the expanding role and capabilities of organized crime in
the illicit drug trade.15 The threat assessment made reference to the fol owing key trends:
• The drug threat to the United States, principally driven by “strong U.S. demand for illicit drugs,” stems mainly
from the Western Hemisphere: Mexico, Colombia, Canada, and the United States.
• Despite significant successes against Mexican drug cartels, “Mexico’s overall military and police capabilities
remain inadequate to break the trafficking organizations and contain criminal violence.”
• Efforts to discourage Afghan farmers from cultivating opium poppy will have limited effect due high opium prices,
the inability to implement alternative livelihood programs on a large scale due to insecurity, and the absence of a
market infrastructure in key poppy-growing regions.
• Drug trafficking is a major problem in Africa, as traffickers continue to use West Africa as a transit point for
Latin American cocaine destined for Europe. Systematic, high-level cooptation of government and law
enforcement officials facilitates the African drug trade, with Guinea-Bissau identified as “Africa’s first narco-
state.”
• Terrorists and insurgents are predicted to “increasingly” turn to crime to generate funds and acquire logistical
support. Examples of such groups, which are dependent on drug trafficking proceeds to remain viable as
terrorist and insurgent organizations, include the Taliban and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia
(FARC).
Strategic Guidance
Drug trafficking has been an issue of international policy concern for more than a century and a
subject of long-standing U.S. and multilateral policy commitment. Yet, tensions continue to
appear at times between U.S. foreign drug policy and approaches advocated by independent
observers and the international community.
Many U.S. policymakers have argued that the confluence of political and security threats
surrounding international drug trafficking necessitates a policy posture that emphasizes the
disruption and dismantlement of the criminal actors and organizations involved in all aspects of
the drug trade. At the same time, other observers and policymakers have argued that security and
law enforcement approaches to international drug control have failed to achieve notable successes
in “eliminating or reducing significantly” the supply of illicit drugs—a goal the United Nations
committed in 1998 to achieve by 2008 (and in 2009, recommitted to achieve by 2019).16
The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), for example, argues that international
concern with “public security” during the past decade has overshadowed other key tenets of drug
control policy, including public health and drug demand reduction.17 Numerous international non-
15 James R. Clapper, Director of National Intelligence, Statement for the Record on the Worldwide Threat Assessment
of the U.S. Intelligence Community for the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, February 10, 2011, and
for the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, February 16, 2011, available at http://www.dni.gov/testimonies/
20110210_testimony_clapper.pdf.
16 p. 215, UNODC, 2008 World Drug Report, June 2008,available at http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N98/
775/09/PDF/N9877509.pdf?OpenElement; UN Commission on Drugs, Report on the 52nd Session, E/2009/28,
E/CN.7/2009/12 (2009), p. 44.
17 Ibid, p. 217.
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governmental organizations (NGOs) also argue that greater emphasis should be placed on policies
that emphasize efforts to reduce health and social consequences; programs to promote treatment,
rehabilitation, and social re-integration for drug users; as well as sustainable and comprehensive
alternative development projects.18
Some advocates are calling for a reevaluation of current international drug policies.19 Such calls
for a new look at international drug policies are being advocated from an increasingly growing
sector of the policy community.20 It remains unclear whether such policy debates can translate
into lasting improvements to reduce the production, trafficking, use, and consequences of illegal
drug trade. However, changes could affect a range of foreign policy considerations for the United
States, including foreign aid reform, counterinsurgency strategy (particularly in Afghanistan), the
distribution of domestic and international drug control funding, and the relative balance of
civilian, law enforcement, and military roles in anti-drug efforts.
International Policy Framework
Efforts to combat drug trafficking have enjoyed a long-standing and robust commitment
internationally. One of the first multilateral efforts to combat drugs began with the International
Opium Commission of 1909. Since then, the international community has broadened and
deepened the scope of international drug control through several international treaties and
monitoring mechanisms.
Today, international drug control efforts are grounded on the policy foundations laid by three
United Nations treaties: the 1961 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, as amended; the 1971
Convention on Psychotropic Substances; and the 1988 Convention Against Illicit Traffic in
Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances. More than 95% of U.N. Member States, including
the United States, are parties to these three international drug control treaties.21
In combination, these U.N. treaties limit the international production and trade of a defined set of
narcotic drugs, psychotropic substances, and the precursor chemicals used to make these
substances for primarily medical and scientific purposes. The treaties also establish international
mechanisms to monitor treaty adherence—through the International Narcotics Control Board
(INCB)—and for the collection of data related to the illicit cultivation, production, and
manufacture of proscribed drugs.
18 See for example Vienna NGO Committee on Narcotic Drugs, “Beyond 2008 Declaration,” July 9, 2008; available at
http://www.vngoc.org/images/uploads/file/BEYOND%202008%
20DECLARATION%20AND%20RESOLUTIONS%20FINAL(1).pdf; Latin American Commission on Drugs and
Democracy, “Drugs and Democracy: Toward a Paradigm Shift,” April 2009.
19 In support of current prohibitionist policies, see “Drug Legalization Would Be ‘Catastrophe’, Says Ex-White House
Drug Spokesman Bob Weiner; Drugs Have Not ‘Won the War’; Op-ed Letter in New York Times Today,” PR
Newswire, June 18, 2009; Bob Weiner, “Time to End Prohibition for Drugs?” New York Times, op-ed, June 18, 2009;
“How to Stop the Drug Wars,” The Economist, March 5, 2009; John P. Walters, “Drug Legalization Isn’t the Answer,”
Wall Street Journal, op-ed, March 6, 2009.
20 See for example H.R. 2134, Western Hemisphere Drug Policy Commission Act of 2009; Rafael Pardo and Juan
Gabriel Aires, “Before Washington Ramps Up Yet another Losing War on Drugs, Why Not Let A Commission
Construct a Better Policy,” Christian Science Monitor, op-ed, August 11, 2009; Nicholas D. Kristof, “Drugs Won the
War,” New York Times, op-ed, June 14, 2009.
21 International Narcotics Control Board (INCB), 2010 Annual Report, 2011.
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U.N. policymaking on drug-related matters take place
through the U.N. Commission on Narcotic Drugs, which
Key U.N. Treaties and Entities
is a functional commission of the U.N. Economic and
for International Drug Control
Social Council. The U.N. Commission on Narcotic
* 1961 Single Convention on Narcotic
Drugs monitors global drug trends, develops strategies
Drugs, as amended
for international drug control, and recommends
* 1971 Convention on Psychotropic
measures to combat the world drug problem. To support
Substances
U.N. Member States in combating drugs, the UNODC
conducts field-based technical assistance projects
* 1988 Convention Against Illicit Traffic in
Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances
internationally and conducts research and analysis on
current drug market trends.
* International Narcotics Control Board
* U.N. Commission on Narcotic Drugs
Regional counterdrug-related organizations also
* U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime
supplement multilateral efforts globally. Such efforts
include the Inter-American Drug Abuse Control
Commission (CICAD), which is the drug control arm of the Organization of American States
(OAS), and the Drug Advisory Programme (DAP) of the Colombo Plan. CICAD serves as the
regional policy forum for all aspects of Western Hemisphere illegal drug issues. DAP supports
drug demand reduction, treatment, and rehabilitation in the Asia and Pacific regions. Related
international efforts also reinforce counternarcotics policies through their cross-cutting focus on
such transnational phenomena as money laundering, corruption, organized crime, and global
health.
U.S. Foreign Policy Framework
The United States has been involved in international drug control since at least the beginning of
the 20th century. Contemporary U.S. counternarcotics efforts were brought to the forefront of U.S.
policy debates in the late 1960s. In 1971, President Richard Nixon declared that illicit drugs were
America’s “public enemy number one.”22 President Ronald Reagan followed with a directive in
1986 that identified narcotics trafficking a threat to U.S. national security.23 Successive
administrations have continued to feature combating the international drug trade prominently
among U.S. foreign policy priorities. See Appendix B for a discussion of specific U.S. agency
roles in combating drugs internationally.
Since at least the late 1960s, Congress has also been active on drug policy issues, enacting key
provisions in U.S. law that define U.S. policies and authorities relating to international narcotics
control, exercising oversight responsibilities on U.S. counternarcotics policy, and appropriating
funds for international counternarcotics programs.
In 1998, Congress established the Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) to coordinate
all U.S. counterdrug policy, both domestically and internationally.24 ONDCP’s Director is the
22 Richard Nixon, “Remarks about an Intensified Program for Drug Abuse Prevention and Control,” June 17, 1971.
Briefing transcript at John T. Woolley and Gerhard Peters, The American Presidency Project, at
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/WS/?pid=3047.
23 Ronald Reagan, National Security Decision Directive 221, “Narcotics and National Security,” April 8, 1986, partially
declassified on November 7, 1995, redacted version available at http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nsdd/nsdd-221.htm.
24 See CRS Report R41535, Reauthorizing the Office of National Drug Control Policy: Issues for Consideration, by
Kristin M. Finklea.
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primary advisor to the President on drug policy issues. The State Department is statutorily
designated as the lead U.S. agency responsible for international counterdrug foreign assistance,
and the Defense Department is the lead in the detection and monitoring of foreign drug flows
destined for the United States. The U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) is the lead on
drug-related law enforcement. Multiple other U.S. agencies are also responsible for various
aspects of the U.S. counterdrug response.
The following sections describe several of the key U.S. government strategies and initiatives for
combating drugs internationally and in specific key regions around the world.
U.S. National Drug Control Strategy
U.S. involvement in international drug control rests on the central premise that helping foreign
governments combat the illegal drug trade abroad will ultimately curb illegal drug availability
and use in the United States. To this end, the current Administration maintains the goal of
reducing and eliminating the international flow of illegal drugs into the United States through
international cooperation to disrupt the drug trade and interdiction efforts.
Since 1999, Congress has required that the White House, through the Office of National Drug
Control Policy (ONDCP), submit to Congress a National Drug Control Strategy report each
year.25 This strategy describes the total budget for drug control programs—both domestically and
internationally—and outlines U.S. strategic goals for stemming drug supply and demand.
The international component of the Administration’s 2010 National Drug Control Strategy centers
on three specific “principles,” or goals: (1) collaborate with international partners to disrupt the
drug trade, (2) support drug control efforts of major drug source and transit countries, and (3)
attack key vulnerabilities of drug trafficking organizations (DTOs). The 2010 National Drug
Control Strategy is also particularly notable for its admission that the United States, due to U.S.
domestic consumption of illegal drugs, bears responsibility, in conjunction with drug-producing
and -transit countries, for the existence of the international drug trade.26
2010 U.S. Strategic “Principles” and “Actions” to Combat Drugs Internationally
The 2010 National Drug Control Strategy lists three strategic principles and corol ary actions to be achieved in
reducing the international drug supply. They include the fol owing:
Principle #1: Collaborate with International Partners to Disrupt the Drug Trade
Action A: Conduct Joint Counterdrug Operations
Action B: Strengthen Counterdrug Institutions in the Western Hemisphere
Action C: Disrupt Drug Flows in the Trans-Atlantic and Trans-Pacific Regions
Action D: Prevent Synthetic Drug Production and Precursor Chemical Diversion
Action E: Expand Prevention and Treatment Initiatives Bilateral y, Regional y, and Multilateral y
Action F: Expand Health Interventions for Injection Drug Users International y
Principle #2: Support the Drug Control Efforts of Major Drug Source and Transit Countries
25 This requirement was first established by Section 706 of the Office of National Drug Control Policy Reauthorization
Act of 1998 (Division C, Title VII, P.L. 105-277; 21 U.S.C. 1705) and has been subsequently amended.
26 Office of National Drug Control Policy, 2010 National Drug Control Strategy, p. 3.
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Action A: Strengthen Strategic Partnerships with Mexico
Action B: Disrupt the Nexus Between Drugs, Insurgency, and Corruption in Afghanistan
Action C: Build Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice Capacities in Source Countries in the Americas
Action D: Implement the Caribbean Basin Security Initiative
Action E; Promote Alternative Livelihoods for Coca and Opium Farmers
Action F: Support the Central American Regional Security Initiative
Action G: Develop a Comprehensive Counterdrug Strategy for the Western Hemisphere
Action H: Consolidate Gains Made in Colombia
Principle #3: Attack Key Vulnerabilities of Drug Trafficking Organizations (DTOs)
Action A: Improve Intelligence on the Vulnerabilities of DTOs
Action B: Disrupt Illicit Drug Trafficking in the Transit Zone
Action C: Target the Illicit Finances of DTOs
Action D: Target Cartel Leadership
International Drug Control Strategy Report
As required by the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, the State Department annually
submits to Congress an International Drug Control Strategy Report (INCSR).27 The INCSR,
released in two volumes each year, provides an overview of U.S. counternarcotics policies and
programs internationally. It also provides a country-by-country analysis of progress that foreign
governments, particularly those of major drug-producing and drug-transit countries, have made in
adhering to its international commitments to combat drugs (volume I) and related financial crimes
(volume II).
The 2011 INCSR, released on March 3, 2011, reports that drug trafficking and transnational
organized crime continue to threaten U.S. and citizen security interests, particularly as the profits
that the drug trade generates remain the most lucrative criminal activity internationally. The
INCSR also reports that while progress has been achieved in certain parts of the world, continued
progress to combat drugs internationally requires ongoing cooperation and willingness to adapt to
emerging threats.
Reported regional challenges to international drug control include combating drug trafficking in
the Western Hemisphere, not only in historically established major drug source and transit
countries such as Colombia and Mexico, but also in parts of Central America and the Caribbean,
which have become vulnerable to exploitation as drug traffickers adapt and adjust to new
smuggling corridors in the face of heightened enforcement pressure along old smuggling routes.
The cultivation of opium poppy for heroin in Afghanistan also remains a global drug problem,
despite improvements in the number of poppy-free provinces in Afghanistan in recent years.28
Nevertheless, the INCSR reports that “active insurgences tied to drug traffickers in the southern
27 See specifically Section 489 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (FAA), as amended, and Chapter 8 of the FAA
generally.
28 According to the 2011 INCSR, 7 provinces in Afghanistan currently cultivate opium poppy, compared to 21
provinces in 2005.
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and western provinces of Afghanistan overlap with 98 percent of the country’s poppy
cultivation.”29
Other reported challenges to international drug control include dealing with new and emerging
criminal activities and technologies designed to avoid detection. Such activities include the use of
the Internet to facilitate drug trafficking, use of new precursors and chemicals in the production of
illegal drugs, the development of self-propelled semi-submersible vessels designed specifically
for smuggling drugs, and screening containers for illegal cargo.
Regional Initiatives
The majority of U.S. counterdrug efforts internationally are concentrated in two regions: South
America and Afghanistan, which are focal points in U.S. efforts to combat the production and
transit of cocaine and heroin, respectively. The U.S. government is also involved in developing
several new counternarcotics programs, including in West Africa, the Caribbean (Caribbean Basin
Security Initiative), and Central America (Central America Regional Security Initiative).
Plan Colombia, the Andean Counterdrug Program, and Ongoing Assistance
Plan Colombia was developed by the government of Colombia in 1999 as a six-year plan,
concluding in 2005, to end the country’s decades-long armed conflict, eliminate drug trafficking,
and promote economic and social development. The plan aimed to curb trafficking activity and
reduce coca cultivation in Colombia by 50% over five years.30 Congress approved legislation in
support of Plan Colombia in 2000, appropriating foreign assistance funds under the Andean
Counterdrug Initiative (ACI) account each year ever since.31 ACI historically provided
counternarcotics assistance for Colombia, but also for other countries in the Andean region,
including at various times Bolivia, Brazil, Ecuador, Panama, Peru, and Venezuela.32 Beginning in
FY2008, Congress renamed ACI the Andean Counterdrug Program (ACP) and then subsequently
incorporated ACP into the International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE)
foreign aid account. Since ACI and ACP were first implemented, U.S. counterdrug assistance has
focused mainly on four strategic pillars:
1. eradicate coca and opium poppy crops,
2. interdict illegal drugs,
3. provide coca and opium poppy farmers other sources of income through
alternative development, and
4. build institutions to train security forces and to strengthen democratic governance
capacity.
29 2011 INCSR, p. 15.
30 See CRS Report RL32250, Colombia: Issues for Congress, by June S. Beittel.
31 The first appropriations legislation for Plan Colombia was located in the Military Construction Appropriations Act,
2001 (P.L. 106-246, Title III, Chapters 1 and 2).
32 In FY2005, ACI funds were also used for counternarcotics assistance in Guatemala and Nicaragua. Currently, ACI
funds are no longer used for counternarcotics assistance in Venezuela.
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For FY2012, ONDCP reports that the Administration is requesting $132.8 million for drug
control assistance to Colombia.33 Projects in FY2012 are intended to continue to support
Colombia’s National Consolidation Plan, the U.S.-Colombia Strategic Development Initiative,
and the nationalization of previous U.S.-supported Colombian military programs, including the
counterdrug brigade, Colombian Army aviation, and the air bridge denial program.
The Mérida Initiative and Beyond
The United States and Mexico announced on October 22, 2007, the start of a multiyear, bilateral
security agreement called the Mérida Initiative.34 This initiative aims to combat drug trafficking
and other criminal activity along the U.S.-Mexican border, as well as in Central America.35 Initial
U.S. bilateral assistance to Mexico and Central America under the initiative consisted of a $1.4
billion, three-year security package ending in FY2010 that would provide two main forms of
assistance: (1) equipment, including helicopters and surveillance aircraft, and technical resources
to combat drug trafficking, and (2) training and technical advice for Mexican and Central
American military, judicial, and law enforcement officials.36
In mid-January 2010, the State Department approved a new strategy for Mexico as a follow-on to
the Mérida Initiative after it ended in FY2010, called Beyond Mérida.37 Follow-on counterdrug
support to Central America would be provided through a separate program called the Central
American Regional Security Initiative (CARSI). For the follow-on assistance program to Mexico,
the character of U.S. support shifted from a focus on major counternarcotics equipment
acquisition that was designed to improve operational ability against drug traffickers to a longer-
term emphasis on institutional development and capacity building to the Mexican justice sector.
This shift included greater emphasis on social reforms that can galvanize community support to
fight organized crime, including drug trafficking.38 The Beyond Mérida strategy has four pillars:
1. disrupt and dismantle organized criminal groups;
2. institutionalize justice sector reforms to sustain the rule of law and respect for
human rights;
3. create an efficient, economically competitive border crossing that ensures “secure
two-way flows” of travelers and trade; and
4. support Mexican government efforts to build strong and resilient communities
through community organizations, civil society participation, sustainable
economic opportunities, community cohesion, and violence reduction.
33 Office of National Drug Control Policy, Drug Control Budget: FY2012 Funding Highlights, February 2011, p. 11.
34 The Mérida Initiative is named for the city where it was first conceived by Presidents George W. Bush and Felipe
Calderon in March 2007.
35 See CRS Report R41349, U.S.-Mexican Security Cooperation: the Mérida Initiative and Beyond, by Clare Ribando
Seelke and Kristin M. Finklea, and CRS Report RL32724, Mexico-U.S. Relations: Issues for Congress, by Clare
Ribando Seelke.
36 U.S. domestic commitments will be or have already been implemented under the National Southwest Border
Counternarcotics Strategy, the National Drug Control Strategy, the Security Cooperation Initiative, and the Southwest
Border Initiative. See CRS Report RL33106, Border Security and the Southwest Border: Background, Legislation, and
Issues, coordinated by Lisa M. Seghetti.
37 U.S. Department of State, “Mexico: Evolution of the Mérida Initiative,” document provided to CRS in January 2010.
38 INCSR 2010.
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For FY2012, ONDCP reports that the Administration is requesting $66 million for drug control
assistance to Mexico.39 Programs are intended to support short-term goals of dismantling drug
trafficking and other criminal organizations and the long-term goal of strengthening Mexico’s
justice sector institutions.
The 2009 U.S. National Southwest Border Counternarcotics Strategy
In 2007, the U.S. government released an National Southwest Border Counternarcotics Strategy. This strategy
outlined U.S. federal government roles and goals for preventing the illegal trafficking of drugs across the U.S.-Mexico
border. ONDCP released an updated version of the Southwest Border Strategy in 2009, which took into account
developments in bilateral U.S.-Mexico cooperation on drugs, particularly through the Mérida Initiative. In particular,
the 2009 update expanded the U.S. counterdrug mission along the Southwest border to include not only combating
the inbound flow of illegal drugs from Mexico into the United States, but also the outbound flow of illegal bulk cash
and weapons destined for Mexico-based drug trafficking organizations. In order to achieve the strategic goal of
substantially reducing the ”flow of illicit drugs, drug proceeds, and associated instruments of violence across the
Southwest border” the 2009 Strategy identifies six key objectives:
1. enhance intelligence capabilities associated with the Southwest border;
2. interdict drugs, drug proceeds, and related weapons at and between ports of entry, and in air and maritime
domains along the Southwest border;
3. ensure the prosecution of all significant drug trafficking, money laundering, bulk currency, and weapons smuggling
and trafficking cases;
4. disrupt and dismantle drug trafficking organizations;
5. enhance counterdrug technologies for drug detection and interdiction along the Southwest border; and
6. enhance U.S.-Mexico cooperation regarding joint counterdrug efforts.
Caribbean Basin Security Initiative
President Barack Obama announced the Caribbean Basin Security Initiative (CBSI) at the
Summit of the Americas in April 2009 as a security cooperation effort in the Caribbean Basin
region, focused on combating drug trafficking organizations, gangs, and other criminal groups.
Congress appropriated $37 million for the CBSI in FY2010 to variously combat drug trafficking
and organized crime, strengthen the rule of law, and promote social justice. The Obama
Administration’s FY2011 request for CBSI is $79 million, of which $31.2 million was requested
for the State Department to conduct the counterdrug aspects of CBSI. For FY2012, ONDCP
reports that the Administration is requesting $17.8 million for drug control assistance through the
CBSI.40 Drug control funding reportedly would support regional counternarcotics initiatives,
including efforts to improve regional capacity to interdict and eradicate drugs, reduce local
demand for drugs, as well as to counter money laundering and corruption.41
Central American Regional Security Initiative
The Central America Regional Security Initiative (CARSI) is a follow-on to anti-crime assistance
provided to the region originally through the Mérida Initiative. CARSI, through bilateral and
regional efforts, seeks support efforts designed to stop corrosive and interrelated effects of crime,
39 Office of National Drug Control Policy, Drug Control Budget: FY2012 Funding Highlights, February 2011, p. 11.
40 Office of National Drug Control Policy, Drug Control Budget: FY2012 Funding Highlights, February 2011, p. 11.
41 Ibid.
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drugs, violence, and corruption the region. According to the State Department’s 2010
International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, CARSI will extend U.S. commitments to
assistance Central American states to combat criminal organizations, gangs, and related-violence
in the region; to support justice sector capacity building; and to improve law enforcement
intelligence sharing within and among regional governments.42 The stated five goals of CARSI
are to
1. create safe streets and emphasize citizen safety;
2. disrupt the movement of criminals and contraband throughout Central America;
3. support the institutional capacity of governments in the region;
4. reestablish effective state presence and security in communities at risk; and
5. foster enhanced levels of coordination and cooperation among countries in
Central America for security and rule of law efforts.43
Of the total amount appropriated for CARSI, $12.1 million in FY2009 was appropriated for
counternarcotics-specific purposes in the region. In FY2010, an estimated $27 million was
appropriated. The Administration requested an additional $31 million for FY2011. For FY2011,
the State Department requests funds for counternarcotics-specific purposes in order to continue
support for U.S.-vetted units of local law enforcement officers in the region; demand reduction
programs; existing aviation assets in Guatemala for monitoring drug flows; and enhanced
regional land and maritime interdiction capabilities and logistics supports.44
Afghanistan Counterdrug Strategy
Drug control policy in Afghanistan has undergone a shift in strategy since June 2009, when the
late Ambassador Richard Holbrooke, who at the time was the Obama Administration’s Special
Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan, announced a halt to U.S. eradication efforts in
Afghanistan and a concurrent increase in priority to agricultural development (or alternative
livelihoods) assistance as well as interdiction.45 The drug policy shift was formalized with the
release of the Afghanistan and Pakistan Regional Stabilization Strategy in January 2010, which
connects U.S. counternarcotics policy with U.S. counterinsurgency goals in the region. The
January 2010 Regional Strategy had sections on combating the Afghan narcotics trade and
disrupting illicit financial flows, among others.46 The most significant changes in the January
2010 strategy include the elimination of U.S.-led eradication as a strategic goal, the addition as a
key initiative of increasing U.S. government personnel in Afghanistan (particularly DEA), and the
enhancement civilian-military coordination with new coordination centers in London, Kabul, and
42 INCSR 2010.
43 U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, “The Central American Regional Security Initiative: A Shared
Partnership,” Fact Sheet, August 5, 2010.
44 U.S. Department of State, Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, “FY2011 Program and
Budget Guide,” pp. 182-186.
45 Richard C. Holbrooke, “Holbrooke’s Briefing on Trip to Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Brussels, July 2009,” July 29,
2009. For further information on U.S. drug policy in Afghanistan, see CRS Report RL32686, Afghanistan: Narcotics
and U.S. Policy, by Christopher M. Blanchard.
46 U.S. Department of State, Office of the Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan, “Afghanistan and
Pakistan Regional Stabilization Strategy,” January 2010, http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/135728.pdf.
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Kandahar. Key initiatives to disrupt illicit financial flows include the Illicit Finance Task Force47
and the Afghanistan Threat Finance Cell.
In March 2010, the State Department released an updated U.S. Counternarcotics Strategy for
Afghanistan. It outlined two strategic goals—(1) counter the narcotics-insurgency nexus and (2)
counter the narcotics-corruption nexus—coupled with several related objectives. Reiterating the
January 2010 Regional Strategy, the March 2010 Counternarcotics Strategy confirms the U.S.
government’s decision to “no longer fund or support large-scale eradication of poppy fields,”
while condoning Afghan-led local eradication.48 The March 2010 Counternarcotics Strategy also
emphasized the need to improve the connection between the U.S. government’s counternarcotics
goals with the U.S. government’s counterinsurgency goals. To this end, ONDCP reports that the
Administration is requesting $102.6 million for FY2012 drug control assistance to Afghanistan.49
Counternarcotics Support to West Africa
While Africa has historically held a peripheral role in the transnational illicit drug trade, drug
traffickers have begun to view West Africa as a strategically placed transit and staging point along
cocaine trafficking routes from South America to Europe.50 While there is no region-wide
initiative in place to combat the growing drug trade through West Africa, the State Department
requested $13.2 million for counternarcotics assistance in Africa in FY2011, up from about $0.5
million in FY2006. At the same time, the Department of Defense (DOD) has reportedly allocated
$21.1 million in FY2010 and $30 million in FY2011 to counternarcotics programs in Sub-
Saharan Africa.
Overall U.S. Drug Control Funding
For FY2012, the Administration has requested approximately $26.2 billion for all federal drug
control programs, up from $25.9 billion in FY2010 (see Table 2).51 Of this, 23%, or $6 billion, is
requested for international and interdiction programs. Beginning with the FY2012 budget request,
ONDCP significantly restructured its budgeting process, adding 19 more agencies and programs
to the overall drug budget.52 According to ONDCP, these additional agencies had not previously
been included in the drug budget because the programs were deemed to be “unreliably estimated
47 Subsumed under the Illicit Finance Task Force includes a U.S.-Russia Counternarcotics/Financial Intelligence
Working Group with the first meeting convened in Moscow in December 2009.
48 U.S. Department of State, Bureau for South and Central Asian Affairs, U.S. Counternarcotics Strategy for
Afghanistan, March 24, 2010.
49 Office of National Drug Control Policy, Drug Control Budget: FY2012 Funding Highlights, February 2011, p. 11.
50 See CRS Report R40838, Illegal Drug Trade in Africa: Trends and U.S. Policy, by Liana Sun Wyler and Nicolas
Cook.
51 Office on National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP), National Drug Control Budget, FY2012 Funding Highlights,
February 2011.
52 The additional agencies and programs include U.S. Forest Service; Court Services and Offender Supervision Agency
for the District of Columbia; Defense Department Counterdrug OPTEMPO; Federal Judiciary; Centers for Medicare
and Medicaid Services; Health Resources and Services Administration; National Institute on Alcohol Abuse and
Alcoholism; Customs and Border Protection’s (CBP) Border Security Fencing, Infrastructure, and Technology; Federal
Law Enforcement Training Center; Federal Emergency Management Agency (Operation Stonegarden); Bureau of Land
Management; National Park Service; Asset Forfeiture Fund; Bureau of Prisons (Corrections Costs); Criminal Division;
Office of Federal Detention Trustee; U.S. Attorneys; U.S. Marshals Service; and Federal Aviation Administration.
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or were thought to be related to consequences of drug use (as opposed to directly related to drug
use reduction).”53 The addition of these agencies had the effect of increasing the total budget,
particularly domestic programs (compare Table 2 with Table 3).
Table 2. Federal Drug Control Funding, FY2010 Final-FY2012 Request
budget authority in $U.S. millions
FY2010
FY2011
FY2012
Activities
Final
Est.
Req.
International 2,595.0 2,367.5 2,138.4
Interdiction 3,658.0 3,706.7 3,901.0
Domestic 19,634.1 19,657.4 20,170.3
Total
25,887.1 25,731.6 26,209.7
Source: Adapted from Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP), National Drug Control Budget,
FY2012 Funding Highlights, February 2011. Totals may not add due to rounding.
Note: “International” activities refers to activities primarily focused on or conducted in areas outside the United
States, mainly conducted by the State Department, U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), Defense
Department, and Department of Justice. International activities include a wide range of drug control programs to
eradicate crops, seize drugs (except air and riverine interdiction seizures), arrest and prosecute major traffickers,
destroy processing capabilities, develop and promote alternative crops to replace drug crops, reduce demand,
investigate money laundering and financial crime activities, and promote the involvement of other nations in
efforts to control the supply of and demand for drugs. “Interdiction” refers to activities designed to intercept
and disrupt shipments of illegal drugs and their precursors en route to the United States from abroad.
“Domestic” refers to activities related to domestic demand reduction, including federal drug treatment and drug
prevention programs, as well as domestic law enforcement.
Table 3. Federal Drug Control Funding, FY2005 Actual-FY2011 Request
budget authority in $U.S. millions
FY2010
FY2011
Activities FY2005 FY2006 FY2007 FY2008 FY2009 Enact.
Req.
International 1,393.3 1,434.5 2,050.2 1,824.6 2,082.2 2,288.0 2,308.1
Interdiction 2,928.7 3,287.0 3,175.9 2,901.4 3,910.2 3,640.1 3,727.0
Domestic
8,462.2 8,422.6 8,618.0 8,550.3 9,286.0 9,103.4 9,517.5
Total
12,784.2 13,844.1 13,844.1 13,276.3 15,278.4 15,031.5 15,552.5
Source: Adapted from Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP), National Drug Control Strategy,
FY2011 Budget Summary, 2010. Totals may not add due to rounding.
53 Office on National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP), National Drug Control Budget, FY2012 Funding Highlights,
February 2011.
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U.S. Assistance for International Counternarcotics
Programs
A large component of the international component of ONDCP’s national drug budget, discussed
above, is committed to civilian- and military-funded assistance to foreign countries for
counterdrug support. Such foreign aid is designed to support foreign countries interdict and
eradicate drugs, support the development of alternative livelihoods, and reduce the local demand
for drugs. The following sections describe both civilian and military funding and authorities for
counternarcotics foreign assistance.
Civilian Funding and Authorities
The U.S. Department of State and U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) are the
two primary sources of civilian U.S. funding for international counternarcotics assistance.
Counternarcotics programs may be implemented by other U.S. government entities or to private
contractors. Funding spigots include the foreign aid accounts for Development Assistance (DA);
Economic Support Fund (ESF); Assistance for Europe, Eurasia, and Central Asia (AEECA); and
International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE).
Authority for the U.S. Department of State and USAID is derived from multiple provisions in the
Foreign Assistance Act (FAA) of 1961, as amended. Key provisions are located at Chapter 8 of
Part I of the FAA, as amended, entitled “International Narcotics Control.” Section 481 of the FAA
states that the Secretary of State is “responsible for coordinating all assistance provided by the
United States Government to support international efforts to combat illicit narcotics production or
trafficking.” Section 126 of the FAA also directs USAID, when planning programs of assistance
for countries in which illicit narcotics cultivation takes place, to “give priority consideration to
programs which would help reduce illicit narcotics cultivation by stimulating broader
development opportunities.”
Figure 3 and Figure 4 depict civilian assistance for international counternarcotics programs in
FY2010 by region and by program. Table 4 and Table 5 summarize trends in civilian assistance
for international counternarcotics programs from FY2007 through FY2010.
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Figure 3. U.S. Civilian Counternarcotics Assistance, by Region, FY2010
Operational Plan Estimates for the State Department and USAID Only
$517,049,000
$3,273,000
$1,000,000
$1,200,000
$9,223,000
$3,750,000
Africa
East Asia and Pacific
$489,454,200
Europe and Eurasia
Near East
South and Central Asia
Western Hemisphere
Source: U.S. Department of State, Office of the Director of Foreign Assistance (F), response to CRS request,
March 2011.
Note: Data included in this chart represent al State Department FY2008, FY2009, and FY2010 Operational Plan
updates as of March 15, 2011 (0100 EST). In FY2007, plans were completed by al USAID offices except Iraq and
by some State Department offices. FY 2009 GHCS-State and GHCS-USAID account values do not currently
include funds reported in the COPRS system for the PEPFAR program.
Table 4. U.S. Civilian Counternarcotics Assistance, by Region, FY2007-FY2010
Operational Plan Estimates for the State Department and USAID Only
FY2007 FY2008 FY2009 FY2010
Sub-Saharan
Africa 200,000 1,592,000 1,110,000 3,273,000
East Asia and
Pacific
600,000 2,317,000 1,000,000 1,000,000
Europe and Eurasia
—
1,269,000
887,000
1,200,000
Near
East
— — —
3,750,000
South and Central
Asia
4,000,000 317,934,046 454,125,000 489,454,200
Western
Hemisphere
527,429,000 540,843,000 401,343,100 517,049,000
TOTAL
532,229,000 863,955,046 858,465,100
1,015,726,200
Source: U.S. Department of State, Office of the Director of Foreign Assistance (F), response to CRS request,
July 2010.
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Note: Data included in this chart represent al State Department FY2008, FY2009, and FY2010 Operational Plan
updates as of March 15, 2011 (0100 EST). In FY2007, plans were completed by al USAID offices except Iraq and
by some State Department offices. FY 2009 GHCS-State and GHCS-USAID account values do not currently
include funds reported in the COPRS system for the PEPFAR program.
Figure 4. U.S. Civilian Counternarcotics Assistance, by Function, FY2010
Operational Plan Estimates for the State Department and USAID Only
3%
31%
49%
Interdiction
17%
Eradication
Alternative Development and Alternative Livelihoods
Drug Demand Reduction
Source: U.S. Department of State, Office of the Director of Foreign Assistance (F), response to CRS request,
March 2011.
Note: Data included in this chart represent al State Department FY2008, FY2009, and FY2010 Operational Plan
updates as of March 15, 2011 (0100 EST). In FY2007, plans were completed by al USAID offices except Iraq and
by some State Department offices. FY 2009 GHCS-State and GHCS-USAID account values do not currently
include funds reported in the COPRS system for the PEPFAR program.
Table 5. U.S. Civilian Counternarcotics Assistance, by Function, FY2007-FY2010
Operational Plan Estimates for the State Department and USAID Only
FY2007 FY2008 FY2009 FY2010
Interdiction
165,181,000 185,853,880 225,364,000 505,045,000
Eradication
202,952,000 331,245,000 261,166,000 169,227,000
Alternative
Development and
134,766,957 274,480,258 328,577,100 314,939,000
Alternative
Livelihoods
Drug Demand
Reduction
3,734,000 15,766,000 43,358,000 26,515,200
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FY2007 FY2008 FY2009 FY2010
Program Design
and Learning
25,595,043
652,000 — —
Administration and
Oversight
—
55,957,908 — —
TOTAL
532,229,000 863,955,046 858,465,100
1,015,726,200
Source: U.S. Department of State, Office of the Director of Foreign Assistance (F), response to CRS request,
March 2011.
Note: Data included in this chart represent al State Department FY2008, FY2009, and FY2010 Operational Plan
updates as of March 15, 2011 (0100 EST). In FY2007, plans were completed by al USAID offices except Iraq and
by some State Department offices. FY 2009 GHCS-State and GHCS-USAID account values do not currently
include funds reported in the COPRS system for the PEPFAR program.
Military Funding and Authorities
The U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) has multiple roles and responsibilities in the area of
counternarcotics. Pursuant to 10 U.S.C. 124, DOD is the single lead federal agency for the
detection and monitoring of aerial and maritime movement of illegal drugs toward the United
States and plays a key role in collecting, analyzing, and sharing intelligence on illegal drugs with
U.S. law enforcement and international security counterparts. In addition, Congress authorizes
DOD to offer counternarcotics assistance to train and equip foreign countries in their efforts to
build institutional capacity and control ungoverned spaces used by drug traffickers.
DOD maintains two counternarcotics foreign assistance training and/or equipping authorities,
originating from Section 1004 of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year
1991 (P.L. 101-510) and Section 1033 of the NDAA for FY1998 (P.L. 105-85). Under Section
1004, Congress authorized DOD to provide counterdrug-related training and transport of law
enforcement personnel to foreign law enforcement agencies worldwide, among other provisions.
Section 1033 enables DOD to assist specific countries’ counterdrug efforts by providing non-
lethal protective and utility personnel equipment, including navigation equipment, secure and
non-secure communications equipment, radar equipment, night vision systems, vehicles, aircraft,
and boats.
Currently, DOD is authorized to provide Section 1033 assistance to 22 countries, including (in
chronological order) Peru and Colombia (Sec. 1033, P.L. 105-85); Afghanistan, Bolivia, Ecuador,
Pakistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan (Sec. 1021, P.L. 108-136); Azerbaijan,
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Armenia, Guatemala, Belize, and Panama (Sec. 1022, P.L. 109-364);
Mexico and the Dominican Republic (Sec. 1022, P.L. 110-181); and Guinea Bissau, Senegal, El
Salvador, and Honduras (Sec. 1024, P.L. 110-417).
Figure 5 and Table 6 summarize DOD estimates, provided to CRS, for DOD-funded counterdrug
assistance to foreign countries, by region. Note that, unlike the State Department, DOD
counternarcotics funding is not budgeted or allocated by country or region. In annual defense
department appropriations, DOD has received department-wide funding for drug control efforts,
both domestically and internationally, through a single central transfer account, called “Drug
Interdiction and Counter-Drug Activities.”
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Figure 5. U.S. Military Counternarcotics Assistance, by Region, FY2010
$461,612,000
$15,190,000
$53,100,000
$24,346,000
$12,608,000
$956,000
$458,271,000
Sub-Saharan Africa
East Asia and Pacific
Europe and Eurasia
Near East
South and Central Asia
Western Hemisphere
Source: U.S. Department of Defense (DOD), Office of Counternarcotics and Global Threats, response to CRS
request, March 2011.
Note: This data reflect non-budget quality estimates of DOD counterdrug support provided or efforts in these
countries/regions; DOD formal budget submissions to Congress do not measure counterdrug programs by
countries/regions.
Table 6. U.S. Military Counternarcotics Assistance, by Region, FY2007-FY2010
FY2007 FY2008 FY2009 FY2010
Sub-Saharan
Africa 7,389,000 10,703,000 18,228,000 15,190,000
East Asia and
Pacific
25,992,000 33,091,000 37,673,000 24,346,000
Europe and Eurasia
1,755,000
4,884,000
6,806,000
12,608,000
Near
East
978,000 6,000 824,000 956,000
South and Central
Asia
337,336,000 361,698,000 330,973,000 458,271,000
Western
Hemisphere
394,903,000 405,624,000 484,330,000 461,612,000
TOTAL
768,353,000 816,006,000 878,834,000 972,983,000
Source: U.S. Department of Defense (DOD), Office of Counternarcotics and Global Threats, response to CRS
request, March 2011.
Note: This data reflect non-budget quality estimates of DOD counterdrug support provided or efforts in these
countries/regions; DOD formal budget submissions to Congress do not measure counterdrug programs by
countries/regions.
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Policy Issues
Over the years, U.S. counterdrug efforts have expanded to include a broad array of tools to attack
the drug trade using several foreign policy approaches. Through its appropriations and federal
oversight responsibilities, the 112th Congress may choose to evaluate current efforts, which
appear to center around four main drug control policy strategies: (1) combating the production of
drugs at the source, (2) combating the flow of drugs in transit, (3) dismantling illicit drug
networks, and (4) creating incentives for international cooperation on drug control. The following
sections describe and analyze each of these primary strategies and their legislative sources.
Combating the Production of Drugs at the Source
Major U.S. policy tools for combating the production of illicit drugs, particularly cocaine and
heroin, center on the eradication of coca bush and opium poppy crops and the provision of
alternative livelihood options to drug crop farmers. Both policy approaches ultimately seek to
reduce the amount of illicit drug crops cultivated.
Crop Eradication
Eradication programs seek to combat the flow of plant-based illegal drugs at the root of the
supply chain—in the fields where the crops are grown. Crop eradication can take several forms,
including (1) aerial fumigation, which involves the spraying of fields with herbicide; (2) manual
removal, which involves the physical up-rooting and destruction of crops; and (3) mechanical
removal, which involves the use of tractors and all-terrain vehicles to harrow the fields. The
United States supports programs to eradicate coca, opium, and marijuana in a number of
countries, including primarily Colombia and Afghanistan (see Table 7). These efforts are
conducted by U.S. government agencies and contractors that administer U.S. eradication
programs providing producer countries with support to eradicate drug crops with chemical
herbicides, technical assistance, specialized equipment, and spray aircraft. In FY2009, the State
Department spent approximately $432 million on international eradication programs.54
Table 7. U.S. Assistance for Crop Eradication, FY2007-FY2010 Est.
(in current U.S. $)
FY2007
FY2008
FY2009
FY2010
est.
Afghanistan —
169,871,000
237,000,000
35,000,000
Bolivia
8,544,000 7,285,000 8,496,000 6,930,000
Colombia
159,208,000 137,880,000
— 109,050,000
Guatemala 200,000
200,000
270,000
22,000
Laos —
145,000
—
—
Mexico
200,000 — — —
Pakistan
2,300,000 1,000,000 1,000,000 2,000,000
54 State Department response to CRS request, February 26, 2010.
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FY2007
FY2008
FY2009
FY2010
est.
Peru
32,500,000 14,864,000 14,400,000 16,120,000
Western
Hemisphere
— — —
105,000
Regional
Total
202,952,000 331,245,000 261,166,000 169,227,000
Source: U.S. Department of State, Office of the Director of Foreign Assistance (F), response to CRS request,
March 2011.
Note: Data included in this chart represent al State Department FY2008, FY2009, and FY2010 Operational Plan
updates as of March 15, 2011 (0100 EST). In FY2007, plans were completed by al USAID offices except Iraq and
by some State Department offices. FY 2009 GHCS-State and GHCS-USAID account values do not currently
include funds reported in the COPRS system for the PEPFAR program.
Eradication is a long-standing but controversial U.S. policy regarding international drug control.
As recently as 2008, the State Department had considered crop control the “most cost-effective
means of cutting supply,” because drugs cannot enter the illegal trade if the crops were never
planted, destroyed, or left unharvested.55 Without drug cultivation, the State Department’s
rationale continued, “there would be no need for costly enforcement and interdiction operations.”
Proponents of eradication further argue that it is easier to locate and destroy crops in the field
than to locate subsequently processed drugs on smuggling routes or on the streets of U.S. cities.
Put differently, a kilogram of powder cocaine is far more difficult to detect than the 300 to 500
kilograms of coca leaf that are required to make that same kilogram. Also, because crops
constitute the cheapest link in the narcotics chain, producers may devote fewer economic
resources to prevent their detection than to conceal more expensive and refined forms of the drug
product.
Opponents of expanded supply reduction policy generally question whether reduction of the
foreign supply of narcotic drugs is achievable and whether it would have a meaningful impact on
levels of illicit drug use in the United States. Manual eradication requires significant time and
human resources, reportedly involving upward of 20 work-hours of effort to pull up and destroy
one hectare of coca plants.56 Aerial application of herbicide is not legal or feasible in many
countries and is expensive to implement where it is permitted.57 Aerial fumigation in Colombia
has also raised allegations that the herbicide chemical used has caused negative human, animal,
and environmental consequences.58
Others question whether a global policy of simultaneous crop control is cost-effective or
politically feasible because eradication efforts may also potentially result in negative political,
economic, and social consequences for the producing country, especially in conflict or post-
conflict environments.59 Some argue that this has been the case with respect to eradication efforts
55 U.S. Department of State, 2008 INCSR, at http://www.state.gov/p/inl/rls/nrcrpt/2008/.
56 Kevin J. Riley, Snow Job? The War Against International Cocaine Trafficking (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction
Publishers, 1996), p. 112.
57 Colombia is currently the only country that conducts regular aerial spraying of coca and opium poppy.
58 For further discussion of eradication policy in Colombia, see CRS Report RL33163, Drug Crop Eradication and
Alternative Development in the Andes, by Connie Veillette and Carolina Navarrete-Frias.
59 Barnett R. Rubin and Alexandra Guaqueta, Fighting Drugs and Building Peace: Towards Policy Coherence between
Counter-Narcotics and Peace Building, Dialogue on Globalization, Occasional Paper No. 37, November 2007.
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in Afghanistan, where some U.S. officials have acknowledged that poppy eradication may have
caused many poor Afghan farmers to ally with insurgents and other enemies of the Afghan
government.60 In 2009, Richard Holbrooke, who was the Obama Administration’s Special
Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan at the time, called Western eradication policies in
Afghanistan “a failure” and stated that they have “wasted hundreds and hundreds of millions of
dollars.”61 Further, aerial eradication remains a high-risk activity, as spray planes and their crew
are targeted by drug traffickers. In 2003, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC),
which the State Department lists as a foreign terrorist organization, shot down a U.S. government
plane in the Colombian jungle, killing the American pilot and a Colombian air force sergeant and
taking three other crew members, all U.S. defense contractors, hostage.62 They remained FARC
hostages until July 2008.63
Alternative Development
U.S. counterdrug policy also includes foreign assistance specifically targeted to illicit drug crop
farmers. Alternative development can be viewed as a form of drug crop eradication. The ultimate
goal is to convince current farmers to abandon their drug crops and switch to licit, sustainable
livelihoods and sources of income. Whereas other eradication methods involve the physical
removal or chemical destruction of illicit drug crops, alternative development involves the
introduction of crop substitution options, training in sustainable farming techniques, infrastructure
development, and other projects that make alternative livelihoods economically more attractive.
The U.S. government considers alternative development a key component to drug supply
reduction policies and has active programs in Southeast Asia, Southwest Asia, and South America
(see Table 8).
Table 8.U.S. Alternative Development Foreign Assistance, FY2007-FY2010 Est.
(in current U.S. $)
Country FY2007 FY2008 FY2009
FY2010
est.
Afghanistan
— 123,475,185 161,518,000 157,000,000
Bolivia 26,174,500
7,662,073
17,746,100
17,248,000
Colombia
57,533,000 108,857,000 109,831,000 101,021,000
Ecuador 8,194,957
2,269,000
7,737,000
10,449,000
Laos —
300,000
100,000
—
Pakistan —
—
—
2,000,000
Peru
42,864,500 21,917,000 31,645,000 27,221,000
TOTAL
134,766,957 274,480,258 328,577,100 314,939,000
60 Thom Shanker and Elisabeth Bumiller, “U.S. Shifts Afghan Narcotics Strategy,” New York Times, July 23, 2009;
Staff of Senator John F. Kennedy, “Afghanistan’s Narco War: Breaking the Link between Drug Traffickers and
Insurgents,” A Report to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, August 10, 2009.
61 Ibid.
62 For further discussion, see CRS Report RL32250, Colombia: Issues for Congress, by June S. Beittel, and CRS
Report RS21049, Latin America: Terrorism Issues, by Mark P. Sullivan.
63 “Colombia: U.S. Hostages Spotted,” New York Times, June 10, 2008; “Betancourt, U.S. Contractors Rescued from
FARC,” CNN.com, July 3, 2008.
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Source: U.S. Department of State, Office of the Director of Foreign Assistance (F), response to CRS request,
March 2011.
Note: Data included in this chart represent al State Department FY2008, FY2009, and FY2010 Operational Plan
updates as of March 15, 2011 (0100 EST). In FY2007, plans were completed by al USAID offices except Iraq and
by some State Department offices. FY 2009 GHCS-State and GHCS-USAID account values do not currently
include funds reported in the COPRS system for the PEPFAR program.
U.S. alternative development programs, funded and run mainly by the State Department and U.S.
Agency for International Development (USAID), support U.S. counternarcotics objectives by
helping countries develop economic alternatives to narcotics production, expand legal
employment opportunities, and offer other incentives to farmers to discontinue planting illicit
drug crops. In theory, this approach is designed to complement law enforcement and eradication
efforts to provide both a “carrot and stick” strategy.
For several decades, alternative development has been implemented in various forms and with
varying success.64 Since the late 1960s, when alternative development policies were initially
conceived as simply crop substitution projects, efforts have somewhat expanded to include a
broader concept of alternative development. Current U.S. programs include not only crop
substitution projects but also the development of and assistance for roads, infrastructure, and
health care.
Some observers, however, claim that while current U.S. efforts often aim to achieve this
broadened concept of alternative development, they may not always achieve it in practice. Some
indicate that a relationship between alternative development projects and a reduction in illicit
drug production may be tenuous, as policy coordination between alternative development projects
and eradication and interdiction efforts remains limited in some cases.65 Further, it appears that
alternative development projects are not implemented in most regions where illicit crops are
grown today. According to reports, approximately 10% to 15% of areas under illicit cultivation
are covered by alternative development projects supported by the international community, and,
on average, 5% of farmers of illicit crops receive alternative development assistance.66 Common
factors limiting the reach and prevalence of alternative development projects include ongoing
security threats in areas of illicit crop cultivation, lack of political will or resources to administer
alternative development projects, and local distrust of government or external influences.
Combating the Flow of Drugs in Transit
Interdiction efforts seek to combat the drug trade as traffickers begin moving drug products from
source countries to their final destinations. The Department of Defense is the single lead federal
agency for the detection and monitoring of aerial and maritime movement of illegal drugs toward
the United States. Along with the Defense Department, several other U.S. federal agencies are
involved in coordinating operations with foreign government interdiction forces and providing
64 See, for example, UNODC, Alternative Development: A Global Thematic Evaluation, Final Synthesis Report, 2005,
at http://www.unodc.org/pdf/Alternative_Development_Evaluation_Dec-05.pdf.
65 See, for example, “A Failed Balance: Alternative Development and Eradication,” Transnational Institute, Drugs and
Conflict Debate Paper 4, March 2002.
66 See, for example, UNODC, The Economic Viability of Alternative Development, UNODC internal paper, 1999, at
http://www.unodc.org/pdf/Alternative%20Development/EconomicViability_AD.pdf; UNODC, Alternative
Development: A Global Thematic Evaluation, Final Synthesis Report, 2005; and UNODC, World Drug Report,
Chapter 3: Alternative Development, 2000, p. 152.
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law enforcement training and other forms of assistance to foreign countries in order to deny drug
traffickers the use of transit routes.
Within the so-called “transit zone”—a 42-million square-mile area between Central and South
America and the U.S. southern borders, which covers the Caribbean Sea, the Gulf of Mexico, and
the eastern Pacific Ocean—a DOD-led interagency group called the Joint Inter-Agency Task
Force South (JIATF-South) coordinates interdiction operations across federal agency participants,
as well as international liaisons from Great Britain, France, the Netherlands, and several Latin
American countries. The U.S.-Mexican border is the primary point of entry for cocaine shipments
and other drugs smuggled into the United States.67
Outside the transit zone, other international
International Drug Flow Attack Strategy
interdiction operations involving U.S.
As part of U.S. law enforcement efforts to combat the
agencies, mainly DEA, include Operation
flow of drugs and related illicit movements of cash and
Containment, Project Cohesion, and Project
laundered drug proceeds, DEA developed the
International Drug Flow Attack Strategy (DFAS) in mid-
Prism. Operation Containment, a
2005. The goal of the strategy is to disrupt cocaine
multinational law enforcement effort
movements between the source zones in Latin America
established in 2002 and led by DEA, aims to
and the United States through intelligence-led operations
place a “security belt” around Afghanistan to
that are coordinated with foreign law enforcement
prevent processing chemicals for converting
counterparts in source zones, transit zones, and arrival
zones. Although descriptions of many aspects of the
opium poppy to heroin from entering the
DFAS initiative are not available publicly, the State
country and opium and heroin from leaving.68
Department reports that Operation All Inclusive, a multi-
Project Cohesion, an international precursor
year counterdrug law enforcement operation in the
chemical control initiative established in 2005
Western Hemisphere, has been one of the primary
and led by the International Narcotics Control
efforts implementing DFAS techniques and tools. From
January 2008 through September 2008, Operation Al
Board (INCB),69 tracks precursor chemicals
Inclusive netted more than 100 metric tons of cocaine,
involved in the production of cocaine and
225 kilograms of heroin, 140 metric tons of marijuana,
heroin. Project Prism, a U.N.-sponsored
$92 million in drug proceeds, and 1,278 arrests.
initiative, monitors and controls illicit trade in
precursor chemicals used in the production of amphetamine-type synthetic drugs. The Obama
Administration’s revised 2010 counternarcotics policy for Afghanistan also emphasizes in
particular interdiction and the dismantling of Afghan drug trafficking syndicates.70
Several U.S. agencies also provide foreign law enforcement training and assistance in order to
enhance interdiction efforts abroad. The Department of State, the U.S. Coast Guard, U.S.
Customs and Border Protection, and DEA are involved in providing anti-narcotics law
enforcement training, technical assistance, and equipment for foreign personnel. The U.S.
military provides international support for drug monitoring and detection. In addition, the United
States regularly contributes funding and expertise to law enforcement assistance activities of the
United Nations and other international organizations.
67 U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ), National Drug Intelligence Center (NDIC), National Drug Threat Assessment
2008, October 2007, Product No. 2007-Q0317-003, at http://www.usdoj.gov/ndic/pubs25/25921/index.htm#Top.
68 Statement of the Honorable Michele M. Leonhart, Acting Administrator, Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA),
House Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice, Science and Related Agencies, March 12,
2008, at http://www.usdoj.gov/dea/pubs/cngrtest/ct031208.html.
69 The INCB is an independent and quasi-judicial control organ monitoring the implementation of the United Nations
drug control conventions.
70 See also James Risen, “U.S. to Hunt Down Afghan Drug Lords Tied to Taliban,” New York Times, August 10, 2009;
“U.S. Drug Agents Target Afghan Poppy Pushers,” National Public Radio, July 29, 2009.
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U.S. interdiction activities in the transit zone, spanning the continental and maritime border areas
between the United States and Latin America and the Caribbean, are sometimes considered
among the bright spots of U.S. counterdrug efforts. The State Department reports that its
interdiction activities in the Caribbean, including Operation Bahamas Turks and Caicos
(OPBAT), contributed to a drop in illegal drug flows from 70% in the 1980s to less than 10% in
recent years.71 A 2005 report released by the Government Accountability Office (GAO), for
example, highlighted the role of improved interagency coordination and international cooperation
for improvements in transit zone interdiction operations.72 Drug trafficking organizations,
however, are reportedly growing increasingly sophisticated in their evasion techniques, and some
observers are concerned that current interdiction capabilities may not be sufficient for long-term
reductions in drug supplies. Proponents of strong drug interdiction policies, for example, have
long been concerned that the nation’s focus on anti-terror objectives will detract from resources
and political will needed to combat foreign illicit drug production and trafficking. Supporting
such concerns, the 2005 GAO report states that the commitment of U.S. military assets to Iraq
and Afghanistan in the 2000s may have hampered the ability of U.S. law enforcement to intercept
drug shipments in the future.
Some observers, however, caution that interdiction efforts could raise the retail price of illegal
drugs, potentially resulting in a perverse incentive that actually increases the economic rewards to
drug traffickers; interdiction efforts that appear to be reaping success in dismantling major drug
trafficking networks may nevertheless pose the unintended consequence of sparking short-term
increases in drug trafficking-related violence, as surviving drug traffickers compete with one
another for control—often violently—of drug routes. This appears to have been in part a
contributing factor to the ongoing drug-related violence in Mexico—and some observers are
raising the concern that similar consequences may occur in Afghanistan under the Obama
Administration’s renewed emphasis on interdiction efforts to combat the Afghan opiate trade.73
Table 9.U.S. Civilian Assistance for Interdiction, FY2007-FY2010 Est.
Country FY2007
FY2008
FY2009
FY2010
est.
Afghanistan —
14,622,000
21,000,000
254,879,000
Argentina —
70,000
85,000
275,000
Bolivia 20,696,000
18,138,000
12,688,000
8,270,000
Brazil —
833,000
300,000
200,000
Cape Verde
—
496,000
500,000
723,000
Colombia 113,612,000
99,248,000
—
83,900,000
Dominican Republic
—
150,000
3,250,000
1,750,000
Eastern Caribbean
—
—
230,000
—
Ecuador —
6,143,000
6,359,000
2,550,000
71 U.S. Department of State, Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, Program and Budget
Guide, Fiscal Year 2008 Budget, Publication No. 11453, September 2007, p. 92.
72 U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO), Drug Control: Agencies Need to Plan for Likely Decline in Drug
Interdiction Assets and Develop Better Performance Measures for Transit Zone Operations, GAO-06-200, November
2005.
73 See CRS Report R41576, Mexico’s Drug Trafficking Organizations: Source and Scope of the Rising Violence, by
June S. Beittel.
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Country FY2007
FY2008
FY2009
FY2010
est.
El Salvador
—
200,000
—
—
Georgia —
300,000
150,000
200,000
Ghana —
496,000
500,000
500,000
Guatemala 840,000
1,140,000
1,610,000
1,056,000
Guinea —
—
50,000
—
Guinea-Bissau —
—
—
1,500,000
Haiti 1,010,000
1,350,000
2,835,000
—
Honduras —
608,400
—
—
Indonesia 500,000
500,000
500,000
500,000
Jamaica —
250,000
150,000
—
Kazakhstan —
316,000
204,000
180,000
Kyrgyz Republic
—
775,000
547,000
—
Laos —
365,000
300,000
300,000
Mexico 12,916,000
18,908,000
144,200,000
75,000,000
Morocco —
—
—
750,000
Mozambique —
—
—
300,000
Nicaragua —
500,000
—
—
Nigeria —
450,000
60,000
250,000
Pakistan 700,000
1,000,000
2,000,000
2,000,000
Panama —
770,000
600,000
—
Paraguay —
278,000
215,000
500,000
Peru 14,807,000
17,132,000
18,500,000
19,325,000
Philippines 100,000
—
—
—
Tajikistan —
—
1,300,000
1,350,000
The Bahamas
—
—
150,000
—
Trans-Sahara Counter-
Terrorism Partnership
— — —
2,000,000
Trinidad and Tobago
—
177,000
230,000
—
Turkey —
25,000
235,000
—
Turkmenistan —
—
145,000
175,000
Western Hemisphere
Regional
— —
6,000,000
25,862,000
TOTAL 165,181,000
185,853,880
225,364,000
505,045,000
Source: U.S. Department of State, Office of the Director of Foreign Assistance (F), response to CRS request,
March 2011.
Note: Data included in this chart represent al State Department FY2008, FY2009, and FY2010 Operational Plan
updates as of March 15, 2011 (0100 EST). In FY2007, plans were completed by al USAID offices except Iraq and
by some State Department offices. FY 2009 GHCS-State and GHCS-USAID account values do not currently
include funds reported in the COPRS system for the PEPFAR program.
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Dismantling Transnational Drug Networks
Key U.S. foreign policy tools available for targeting major drug traffickers and their illicit
networks include establishing extradition agreements with foreign countries, freezing and
blocking foreign criminal assets within U.S. jurisdiction, and building foreign capacity to
investigate, arrest, prosecute, and incarcerate drug traffickers domestically.
Extradition to the United States
The U.S. government regularly uses extradition as an important judicial tool against suspected
drug traffickers located abroad. Extradition refers to the formal surrender of a person by a state to
another state for prosecution. Proponents of extradition to the United States argue that suspected
criminals are more likely to receive a fair trial in U.S. courts than in countries where the local
judicial process may be corrupt and where suspects can use bribes and intimidation to manipulate
the outcome of a trial.
U.S. bilateral judicial cooperation with
State Department Narcotics Rewards
Mexico and Colombia is often cited as
Program
particularly exemplary, yielding record
Through the Narcotics Rewards Program, the State
numbers of extradited traffickers to the United
Department offers up to $5 million for information
States.75 In 2010, Mexico extradited 94
leading to the arrest or conviction of certain major drug
traffickers.74 Currently, the State Department is offering
individuals to the United States. Colombia
rewards for information associated with 40 at-large
extradited 186 to the United States in 2009,
foreign drug traffickers, Mexican and Colombian
yielding a total of more than 1,041 individuals
traffickers. According to the State Department, rewards
since 1997, when Colombia’s legislature
have been paid for assistance in the capture of at least
enacted a non-retroactive law to formalize
nine previously listed drug traffickers.
U.S.-Colombian extradition cooperation.
Some anecdotal evidence appears to suggest that the threat of extradition has affected the
behavior of foreign drug trafficking organizations. For example, some Colombian drug traffickers
are reportedly distancing themselves from overt drug distribution activities, which could be used
as evidence to trigger extradition. Nevertheless, this counterdrug tool remains controversial and is
not universally supported. Many countries simply refuse to extradite drug traffickers, citing
concerns about the potential use of the death penalty in the United States against its citizens and
state sovereignty rights. Burma is one such country, which continues to refuse to extradite four
suspected drug traffickers under indictment in the United States. Some observers claim that
suspected traffickers often take advantage of such limitations in the extradition system and seek
safe haven in countries that are unwilling to extradite.
Freezing and Blocking Foreign Criminal Assets
To reap the financial benefits of the illegal drug trade, traffickers must launder their illicit profits
into the licit economy. As a result, the United States and other members of the international
community have sought to use anti-money laundering efforts as a tool to combat this upstream
74 http://www.state.gov/p/inl/narc/rewards/c27667.htm.
75 U.S. Department of State, 2008 INCSR; see also CRS Report RL32724, Mexico-U.S. Relations: Issues for Congress,
by Clare Ribando Seelke.
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International Drug Control Policy
activity in the illegal drug market. Currently, several U.S. agencies are involved in international
anti-money laundering efforts designed to enhance financial transaction transparency and
regulation, improve cooperation and coordination with foreign governments and private financial
institutions, and provide foreign countries with law enforcement training and support.
Congress has been active in pursuing anti-money laundering regulations and program oversight.
In 1999, Congress passed the Foreign Narcotics Kingpin Designation Act to authorize the
President to target the financial profits that significant foreign narcotics traffickers and their
organizations (known as “Specially Designated Narcotics Trafficker Kingpins,” or SDNTKs)
have accumulated from their illicit activities.76 This tool seeks to deny SDNTKs and their related
businesses access to the U.S. financial system and all trade transactions involving U.S. companies
and individuals.77
Following the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, Congress further strengthened U.S. measures
to combat money laundering by providing the Secretary of the Treasury with new authorities to
impose a set of regulatory restrictions, or “special measures,” against foreign jurisdictions,
foreign financial institutions, and certain classes of financial transactions involving foreign
jurisdictions, if deemed by the Treasury Secretary to be “of primary money laundering
concern.”78 These anti-money laundering tools are designed not only to address drug trafficking,
but also to combat other forms of related criminal activity, including terrorist financing.
In addition, Congress requires that the State Department include in its annual International
Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR) a separate volume devoted to the state of
international money laundering and financial crimes in each country. Among the report’s
congressionally mandated requirements, the State Department annually identifies the world’s
“major money laundering countries,” defined as those countries “whose financial institutions
engage in currency transactions involving significant amounts of proceeds from international
narcotics trafficking” and other serious crimes (see Figure 6).
76 Title VIII, International Narcotics Trafficking, of P.L. 106-120, the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2000 (21 U.S.C. 1901-1908; 8 U.S.C. 1182).
77 The law was reportedly modeled on Treasury’s sanctions program pursuant to Executive Order 12978 (October
1995) against Colombia drug cartels under authority of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (Title II of
P.L. 95-223; 50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.) and the National Emergencies Act (P.L. 94-412; 50 U.S.C. 1601 et seq.).
78 Section 311 of the International Money Laundering Abatement and Financial Anti-Terrorism Act of 2001 (Title III,
Subtitle A of P.L. 107-56, the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001) amends the Bank Secrecy Act of 1970 at 31 U.S.C. 5318A.
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Figure 6. Major Money Laundering Countries and Jurisdictions of Primary Money Laundering Concern
Sources: U.S. Department of State, 2011 INCSR; U.S. Department of the Treasury, Financial Crimes Enforcement Network, Section 311 Special Measures, at
http://www.fincen.gov/statutes_regs/patriot/section311.html.
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U.S. officials and some observers have highlighted the value of anti-money laundering efforts in
combating drug trafficking. In 2007, the Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control
(OFAC) reported that anti-money laundering efforts against Colombian drug cartels have been
effective in isolating and incapacitating designated supporters, businesses, and front companies
linked to the Cali Cartel and Norte del Valle Cartel.79 Some observers also describe the Treasury
Secretary’s additional authorities to designate jurisdictions of primary money laundering concern
and apply “special measures” against these jurisdictions as having “potentially profound effects
on the financial services industry.”80 Treasury’s designation of Banco Delta Asia, for example,
successfully resulted in the freezing of some $25 million in North Korean assets—funds that
reportedly included counterfeit U.S. currency and profits from other North Korean criminal
activity, including drug trafficking.81
Skeptics of the use of anti-money laundering efforts to combat drug trafficking argue that tracking
illicit financial transactions may be more difficult and may yield less success than other
counterdrug tools.82 As the State Department’s 2008 money laundering and financial crimes
report reveals, major challenges in tracking and disrupting international money laundering
activities remain.83 The same types of money laundering methods—bulk cash smuggling, trade-
based money laundering, and others—that the State Department identified as issues of concern
more than a decade ago remain among the most used forms of money laundering today. Further,
emerging challenges include the growing volume of financial transactions, especially the volume
of international electronic transfers, and the movement of illegal money laundering outside
formal banking channels, including through “hawala”-type chains of transnational money brokers
and through the use of stored-value cards.
Building Foreign Law Enforcement Capacity
Another element of U.S. efforts to dismantle foreign drug networks involves providing foreign
countries with the tools also improve their domestic efforts to dismantle drug networks. Such
assistance, in the form of training, equipping, and other institutional capacity building, ultimately
seeks to strengthen foreign judicial and law enforcement institutions and assist in developing host
nation administrative infrastructures to combat the illicit drug trade. Institutional development
programs focus mainly on fighting corruption and training to support criminal justice system
reforms and the rule of law. A variety of U.S. agencies are involved in counterdrug-related
capacity building efforts abroad, including the State Department, USAID, the Department of
Justice, and the Department of Defense.
According to the State Department, drug trafficking organizations often seek to subvert or co-opt
governments in order to guarantee a secure operating environment and essentially “buy their way
into power.”84 Anti-corruption efforts thus seek to prevent traffickers from undermining the
79 U.S. Department of the Treasury, Office of Foreign Assets Control, Impact Report: Economic Sanctions against
Colombian Drug Cartels, March 2007.
80 See, for example, Douglas N. Greenburg, John Roth, and Katherine A. Sawyer, “Special Measures under Section 311
of the USA PATRIOT Act,” The Review of Banking and Financial Services, vol. 23, no. 6, June 2007.
81 See also CRS Report RL33885, North Korean Crime-for-Profit Activities, by Liana Sun Wyler and Dick K. Nanto.
82 See for example R. T. Naylor, “Wash-Out: A Critique of Follow-the-Money Methods in Crime Control Policy,”
Crime, Law, and Social Change, vol. 32, 1999, pp. 1-57.
83 U.S. Department of State, 2008 INCSR, Vol. 2, at http://www.state.gov/p/inl/rls/nrcrpt/2008/vol2/.
84 U.S. Department of State, 2008 INCSR.
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legitimacy and effectiveness of foreign government institutions. Some observers, however, argue
that counterdrug policies are placing too little emphasis on projects that help foreign countries
develop a culture supportive of the rule of law. One expert explained in congressional testimony
in 2007, “unless foreign police organizations recognize and internalize what the rule of law
means, what its key characteristics are, and why the rule of law is necessary to accomplish their
mission, no amount of aid will get the job done.”85
Creating Incentives for International Cooperation
Congress has historically played a major role in developing counternarcotics-related legislative
conditions on U.S. foreign assistance and unilateral trade preference programs.
Conditions on Foreign Aid
In an effort to deter foreign governments from aiding or participating in illicit drug production or
trafficking, the President may suspend U.S. foreign assistance appropriations to countries that are
major illegal drug producers or major transit countries for illegal drugs, known as “drug
majors.”86 For FY2011, the President has identified 20 drug majors (see Figure 7). Of these,
Congress requires that the President certify that the drug majors have not “failed demonstrably”
to make at least “substantial efforts” to adhere to their obligations during the previous year under
international counternarcotics agreements.
Defining the Drug Majors
A “major illicit drug producing country” is statutorily defined in Sec. 481 of the Foreign
Assistance Act of 1961 (FAA), as amended (22 U.S.C. 2291(e)(2)), as a country in which:
• (a) 1,000 hectares of more of illicit opium poppy is cultivated or harvested during a year;
• (b) 1,000 hectares or more of illicit coca is cultivated or harvested during a year; or
• (c) 5,000 hectares or more of illicit cannabis is cultivated or harvested during a year,
unless the President determines that such illicit cannabis production does not
significantly affect the United States.
A “major drug transit country” is statutorily defined in Sec. 481 of the FAA, as amended (22
U.S.C. 2291(e)(5)), as a country
• (a) in which there is a significant direct source of illicit narcotic or psychotropic drugs or
other controlled substances significantly affecting the United States; or
• (b) through which such drugs or substances are transported.
85 Statement of Dr. Roy S. Godson, Emeritus Professor, Government, Georgetown University, President, National
Strategy Information Center, House Foreign Affairs Committee, Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere, “Violence
in Central America,” June 26, 2007.
86 Since 1992, Congress has required that the President submit annual reports that identify major drug transit and major
drug producing countries, known as the “drug majors.” Major illicit drug producing countries are defined by section
481(e)(2) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2291(e)(2)) as a country in which (1) 1,000 hectares or
more of illicit opium poppy is cultivated or harvested during a year, (2) 1,000 hectares or more of illicit coca is
cultivated or harvested during a year, or (3) 5,000 hectares or more of illicit cannabis is cultivated or harvested during a
year, unless the President determines that such illicit cannabis production does not significantly affect the United
States. Major drug-transit countries are defined by section 481(e)(5) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C.
2291(e)(5)) as a country (1) that is a significant direct source of illicit narcotic or psychotropic drugs or other controlled
substances significantly affecting the United States, or (2) through which are transported such drugs or substances.
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Failure to receive a presidential certification of substantial counternarcotics efforts may result in
certain foreign assistance prohibitions against those drug majors. Decertified drug majors may
continue to receive U.S. foreign assistance, however, if the President determines that assistance is
“vital” to U.S. national interests. Alternatively, foreign assistance to drug majors countries may
nevertheless be withheld by Congress, despite a presidential certification, if Congress enacts a
joint resolution disapproving of the President’s certification.
For FY2011, the President did not certify three drug majors—Bolivia, Burma, and Venezuela.
However, for two of the three countries, Bolivia and Venezuela, the President partially waived the
aid sanctions, permitting the U.S. government to provide assistance to Venezuela for “limited
programs” and to Bolivia for “continued support for bilateral programs” (see Figure 7).87
Figure 7. Map of World Drug Majors in FY2011
Source: Barack Obama, Presidential Determination No. 2010-16, “Memorandum to the Secretary of State:
Major Drug Transit or Major Illicit Drug Producing Countries for Fiscal Year 2011,” September 2010.
Since its creation in 1986, the drug majors designation process has garnered significant
controversy. Supporters of the process argue that, overall, it is an “effective diplomatic
instrument” to enforce international drug control commitments because it holds foreign
governments “publicly responsible for their actions before their international peers.”88 However,
in a few extreme cases, the drug majors designation does not appear to have much effect on a
country’s drug control policies. In the case of Bolivia’s designation in 2008, the policy appears to
have had the opposite effect, in part causing a further rift in counternarcotics policy between
87 Barack Obama, Presidential Determination No. 2010-16, “Memorandum to the Secretary of State: Major Drug
Transit or Major Illicit Drug Producing Countries for Fiscal Year 2011,” September 16, 2010.
88 See, for example, U.S. Department of State, 1996 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR), 2007, at
http://www.state.gov/www/global/narcotics_law/1996_narc_report/exesum96.html.
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Bolivia and the United States.89 Observers from many countries criticize the unilateral and non-
cooperative nature of the drug certification requirements; such critics recommend moving toward
multilateral and regional fora for evaluating governments’ counterdrug efforts. Others question
the extent to which the process reduces the scope of the illegal drug trade, when many of the
world’s drug producers and transit areas are located in countries that are not designated as drug
majors or decertified by the President. Some have suggested the OAS/CICAD Multilateral
Evaluation Mechanism (MEM), a regional system of peer review on drug control policies in OAS
countries, could serve as an alternative model to facilitate international drug control
cooperation.90
89 See, for example, Antonio Regalado, “Bolivia Plants Coca and Cocaine Flows,” Wall Street Journal, August 18,
2009; Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, “Fourth Report to the Congress on the Operation of the Andean Trade
Preference Act as Amended,” April 30, 2009.
90 For additional information on the OAS/CICAD Multilateral Evaluation Mechanism (MEM), see the 2011 INCSR.
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Congressional Role in Drug Certification Procedures
When making the annual drug majors decisions, the President may choose from two legislatively mandated methods
available. One is codified at 22 U.S.C. 2291j while the second is codified at 22 U.S.C. 2291j-1.
The Original Certification Procedure: 22 U.S.C. 2291j
Beginning 1986 (P.L. 99-570), Congress required that the President determine and certify to Congress that major
illicit drug producing or drug transit countries (i.e., drug majors) were “fully cooperating” with the U.S. government
to combat the illegal drug trade. 22 U.S.C. 2291j requires that 50% of certain bilateral assistance be withheld and that
the U.S. government oppose multilateral development assistance to the drug majors until the President makes his
determinations and certifications.91 If the President does not determine and certify a drug major as having met the
“fully cooperating” requirement (or if Congress enacts a joint resolution disapproving of a Presidential certification),
then the President must decide which of the two following actions will take place:
• U.S. Denial of Assistance: 100% of bilateral assistance is prohibited from being obligated and the U.S.
government continues to oppose multilateral development assistance until the country is eligible for certification;
or
• Continuance of All or a Portion of Aid for National Interest Reasons: Aid continues, not because the
country qualifies for certification, but because the President determines that “the vital national interests of the
United States require that the assistance withheld ... be provided.” In this scenario, multilateral development
assistance could also be supported.
The Revised Drug Majors Process: 22 U.S.C. 2291j-1
While not eliminating the certification procedures under 22 U.S.C. 2291j, the Foreign Operations, Export Financing,
and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 2002 (P.L. 107-115), temporarily al owed for the suspension of the prior
certification procedures and their replacement with a new set of procedures. The Foreign Relations Authorization
Act, Fiscal Year 2003 (P.L. 107-228), made permanent the modified certification requirement under P.L. 107-115, and
this new requirement became codified under 22 U.S.C. 2291j-1.
In lieu of fol owing the original certification procedures (22 U.S.C. 2291j), the revised drug majors process (22 U.S.C.
2291j-1) required the President to designate and withhold assistance from only the worst offending drug majors—
those that were determined by the President as having “failed demonstrably” to make substantial efforts to combat
illicit drugs. It also eliminated the requirement to withhold initially 50% of bilateral aid prior to the President’s
designation and certification to Congress.
The change in standards from whether a country had “cooperated fully” to whether it had “failed demonstrably”
effectively shifted the “burden of proof to an assumption that foreign nations were cooperating with the United States
and had to be proved otherwise to trigger the restrictions” in foreign assistance.92 For those countries that were
designated as having failed demonstrably, the same two options remained as under 22 U.S.C. 2291j: (1) 100% denial of
U.S. bilateral and multilateral assistance or (2) continuance of all or a portion of aid for national interest reasons.
Methamphetamine Precursor Chemicals
An additional certification process was enacted by Congress as part of the Combat Methamphetamine Epidemic Act
of 2005.93 This law amends the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 to require the State Department to report the five
largest importing and exporting countries of two precursor drugs, ephedrine and pseudoephedrine, commonly used
to produce methamphetamine, and certify whether these countries are fully cooperating with the United States on
methamphetamine chemical precursor control. Nations deemed not to be fully cooperating face a loss of U.S. bilateral
assistance and U.S. opposition to multilateral assistance in the multilateral development banks.94 For FY2010, the State
91 Aid subject to withholding included all aid under Chapter 32 of Title 22 of the U.S. Code except (1) aid under Part
VIII (International Narcotics Control) of Subchapter I of Chapter 32 of Title 22 of the U.S. Code; (2) any other
narcotics-related aid under Subchapter I of Chapter 32 of Title 22 of the U.S. Code; and (3) aid involving disaster
relief, refugees, and provisions of food and medicine.
92 H.Rept. 108-167, Part I, p. 18.
93 Section 722 of Title VII of USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005 (P.L. 109-177; 21 U.S.C.
801 note) amended the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 at Sections 489 and 490; for further explanation, see also
H.Rept. 109-133.
94 As with the drug majors certification process, the President can waive the foreign assistance restrictions if he
(continued...)
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Department identified 16 major precursor chemical source countries: Argentina, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Chile,
China, Germany, India, Mexico, the Netherlands, Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan, Thailand, the United Kingdom, and
the United States. So far, the President has not decertified any country for its efforts to control methamphetamine
precursor chemicals.
Other Drug-Related Foreign Aid Certification Requirements
Several additional drug-related certification requirements have appeared in recent appropriations legislation for
specific countries. While not codified certifications processes, failure to be certified under these provisions can result
in the prohibition of various amounts of foreign aid. For example, since 2006, Congress has placed conditions on a
portion of U.S. economic assistance to Afghanistan (the amount varies in appropriations legislation for different fiscal
years) by requiring the President to certify that the Afghan government is “cooperating ful y” with counternarcotics
efforts prior to the obligation of funds, or to issue a national security waiver in order to allow assistance to continue
even when counternarcotics cooperation does not reach the cooperating fully standard.95 For each year, the
President has issued a national security waiver.96 For Mexico in FY2009 and FY2010, for example, 15% of U.S. aid for
counternarcotics efforts is similarly contingent on a certification that human rights complaints and violations, which
have reportedly increased from 182 in 2006 to 1,230 in 2008 as counternarcotics efforts have been ramped up, are
addressed.97
Eligibility for Trade Preference Programs
In 1991, Congress passed the Andean Trade Preference Act (ATPA; P.L. 102-182). Congress later
renewed and expanded the program in the 2002 Andean Trade Promotion and Drug Eradication
Act (ATPDEA; P.L. 107-210).98 The ATPA and subsequent amendments have permitted select
beneficiary countries in South America to export certain products to the United States duty-free or
at otherwise preferential trade levels.99
One of the purposes of the ATPA has been to support, in part, broader U.S. international
counterdrug policy. By reducing the costs associated with exporting legitimate goods to the
United States, ATPA would theoretically provide an incentive for drug-producing countries in
South America to switch to economically viable alternative sources of income. In addition,
pursuant to the ATPA, one of the eligibility criteria for renewed benefits under the Act is whether
the beneficiary countries have upheld their international, regional, and bilateral commitments to
combat drugs.100 (See Table 10 on the status of ATPA beneficiary countries.)
(...continued)
determines that providing aid to the country is vital to U.S. national interest.
95 For FY2006, see the 2006 Foreign Operations Appropriations Act, P.L. 109-102; for FY2007, see the Revised
Continuing Appropriations Resolution, 2007, P.L. 110-5; for FY2008, see the FY2008 Consolidated Appropriations
Act, P.L. 110-161; and for FY2009, see the Omnibus Appropriations Act, 2009, P.L. 111-8.
96 See CRS Report RL32686, Afghanistan: Narcotics and U.S. Policy, by Christopher M. Blanchard, for additional
information on this congressional certification requirement.
97 Ginger Thompson and Marc Lacey, “Mexico Drug Fight Fuels Complaints,” New York Times, August 19, 2009.
98 See CRS Report RS22548, ATPA Renewal: Background and Issues, by M. Angeles Villarreal.
99 Current law on the ATPA and ATPDEA is codified at 19 USC 3201 through 19 USC 3206.
100 The section of the ATPA/ATPDEA, as amended, which specifies the eligibility requirements, currently refers to a
section in law – Section 481(h)(2)(A) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (FAA) – that was subsequently moved to
490 of the FAA. This provision defines successful foreign cooperation on drug control as whether “during the previous
year the country has cooperated fully with the United States, or has taken adequate steps on its own, to achieve full
compliance with the goals and objectives established by the United Nations Convention Against Illicit Traffic in
Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances....”
Section 490 of the FAA thus establishes a high threshold for drug control cooperation—full cooperation with the
(continued...)
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Table 10. Status of ATPA Beneficiary Countries
Date of Presidential
Date When
Date When
Date When
Proclamation
Beneficiary
Beneficiary Status
Beneficiary
Beneficiary
Designating
Status Went into
was Suspended (if
Expired or is Set
Country
Beneficiary Countries
Effect
applicable)
to Expire in Law
July 2, 1992 (Presidential
Bolivia
Proclamation No. 6456;
effective July 22,
October 1, 2008 (73
57 FR 30097)
1992
FR 57158)a
June 30, 2009
July 2, 1992 (Presidential
Colombia
effective July 22,
Proclamation No. 6455;
1992
N/A
February 12, 2011
57 FR 30069)
April 13, 1993
Ecuador
effective April 30,
(Presidential Proclamation
No. 6544; 58 FR 19547)
1993
N/A
February 12, 2011
August 11, 1993
Peru
effective August 26,
(Presidential Proclamation
1993
N/A
December 31, 2010b
No. 6585; 58 FR 43239)
Source: CRS summary of the ATPA, as amended, and Federal Register (FR) notices.
a. Bolivia has been suspended from the ATPA trade preference program because it failed to meet one of the
eligibility requirements for the program. Specifically, it failed demonstrably, during the previous 12 months,
to make substantial efforts to uphold its international commitment to combat drugs. Its suspension in
December 2008, in effect, suspended trade preferences. In June 2009, the time period expired for the
President to re-designate Bolivia as a beneficiary country.
b. The ATPA trade preferences were not renewed because Peru has entered into a free trade agreement with
the United States, which was implemented in February 2009.
A long-standing issue of debate, however, has been the extent to which the ATPA has been
effective in providing Andean coca farmers alternative livelihoods and ultimately reducing illicit
coca cultivation. As required by the ATPA legislation, the United States International Trade
Commission (USITC) submits to Congress a biennial report that includes, among other matters,
an analysis of the effectiveness of the ATPA/ATPDEA in “promoting drug-related crop
eradication and crop substitution efforts of the beneficiary countries.”101 The last report was
issued in September 2010, evaluating the 2008-2009 time period, concluding, as the USITC has
in previous years, that “the effectiveness of ATPA in reducing illicit coca cultivation and
promoting crop substitution efforts in the Andean countries continues to be small and mostly
indirect.”102
(...continued)
United States and full compliance with U.N. standards—that prior Administrations have argued is difficult to prove. As
a result, Congress enacted an alternative standard for defining foreign cooperation on drug control at Section 5 of the
International Narcotics Control Act of 1992 (P.L. 102-583). This provision defines failed foreign cooperation on drug
control as whether a country has “failed demonstrably, during the previous 12 months, to make substantial efforts—(i)
to adhere to its obligations under international counternarcotics agreements; and (ii) to take counternarcotics measures
set forth in section 489(a)(1) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961....”
Notably, Administrations have used the latter criteria for measuring drug control cooperation, Section 5 of the
International Narcotics Control Act of 1992 (P.L. 102-583), for determining whether a country under the
ATPA/ATPDEA remains eligible for beneficiary status.
101 19 U.S.C. 3204.
102 U.S. International Trade Commission, Andean Trade Preference Act: Impact on U.S. Industries and Consumers and
on Drug Crop Eradication and Crop Substitution, 2009, 14th Report, Investigation No. 322-352, USITC Publication
(continued...)
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Conclusion
Many observers highlight the importance of international drug control policy, particularly because
of the transnational nature of the drug trade, whereas others continue to criticize existing policies
and mechanisms for failing to achieve sufficient progress in combating illegal drugs.103 The
UNODC has reported in recent years that global drug use has stabilized, on average; global
opium poppy and coca cultivation is in decline; and global illicit drug seizures are up—and that a
major contributing factor has been the continued international support for drug control policies.104
Global coordination, many say, is vital for lasting success in combating the international drug
trade. At the same time, however, others criticize the international drug control system for failing
to achieve the United Nation’s stated goal of “eliminating or reducing significantly” by 2008 the
production and availability of synthetic drugs and precursors, as well as the cultivation of the
coca bush, cannabis plant, and opium poppy.105 In 2009, the U.N.’s Commission on Narcotic
Drugs set a new date of 2019 to “eliminate or reduce significantly and measurably” the
cultivation of illegal plant-based drugs, the demand for illegal drugs, the production and
trafficking of synthetic drugs, the diversion and trafficking of precursor chemicals used in the
manufacture of illegal drugs, and drug-related money laundering.106
The 112th Congress may continue to exercise its oversight and assess existing U.S. international
drug policy. Emerging questions in the drug policy debate include the following:
• In what ways are counternarcotics strategies facilitating or driving recent
increases in drug trafficking-related violence? Are spikes in drug-related violence
common or inevitable consequences of heightened counternarcotics operations?
In what ways might governments mitigate or dampen current and potentially
future increases in drug-related violence?
• How do counternarcotics policies interact with counterterrorism,
counterinsurgency, and anti-money laundering priorities, particularly in countries
such as Afghanistan, where the U.S. government may have an interest in all three
issues?
• What role should the Department of Defense play in providing foreign
counternarcotics assistance?
• How should U.S. policymakers weigh the benefits of aerial eradication as a
counternarcotics policy tool with the social, financial, and political costs it may
incur?
• To what extent is it a common phenomenon that human rights are violated over
the course of drug-related investigations and operations? In what ways might
human rights violations undermine or threaten drug control policies?
(...continued)
No. 4188 (September 2010).
103 “The International War on Drugs,” Cato Handbook for Congress, 2003, 2009.
104 UNODC, World Drug Report, 2008 edition for the stability of drug use patterns and the 2009 edition for cultivation
and seizures trends in 2008.
105 UN General Assembly, Political Declaration, A/RES/S-20/2, October 21, 1998.
106 UN Commission on Drugs, Report on the 52nd Session, Political Declaration, E/2009/28, E/CN.7/2009/12 (2009).
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• To what extent should U.S. counternarcotics policy take into account economic
development, social development, and health and harm reduction programs, and
are such efforts sufficiently coordinated with international and bilateral partners?
• How do counternarcotics policies interact with related foreign policy goals of
anti-corruption, justice sector reform, and improving the rule of law?
• How might international regulatory and legal constraints limit the reach of U.S.
counternarcotics policy and potentially offer drug syndicates foreign safe havens?
What legislative options might be available to prevent such legal safe havens
from existing?
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Appendix A. Comparison of Drug Data, by Country,
2005-2009
Drug Crop Cultivation Estimates
Opium Poppy Cultivation
Table A-1. Afghanistan: Comparison of Opium Poppy Cultivation Estimates
2005-2009
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
United
104,000 165,000 193,000 157,000 123,000 n/a
Nations
United
107,400 172,600 202,000 157,000 131,000 119,000
States
Source: U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), World Drug Report (2010), p. 138; U.S. Department of
State, Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, International Narcotics Control Strategy
Report, Vol. 1 (2011), p. 21.
Notes: U.N. source is the National Illicit Crop Monitoring System, which is supported by UNODC.
Table A-2. Burma: Comparison of Opium Poppy Cultivation Estimates
2005-2009
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
United
Nations
32,800 21,500 27,700 28,500 31,700
United
States
40,000 21,000 21,700 22,500 17,000
Source: U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), World Drug Report (2010), p. 138; U.S. Department of
State, Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, International Narcotics Control Strategy
Report, Vol. 1 (2011), p. 21.
Notes: U.N. source is the National Illicit Crop Monitoring System, which is supported by UNODC.
Table A-3. Colombia: Comparison of Opium Poppy Cultivation Estimates
2005-2009
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
United
Nations 1,950
1,023 715 394 356
United
States
n.a. 2,300 1,000 n.a. 1,100
Source: U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), World Drug Report (2010), p. 138; U.S. Department of
State, Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, International Narcotics Control Strategy
Report, Vol. 1 (2011), p. 21.
Notes: U.N. source is the Government of Colombia. In 2005, the U.S. government did not conduct a survey
due to cloud cover. Partial surveys were conducted by the U.S. government in 2007 and 2009 due to cloud
cover. The U.S. government did not conduct a survey in 2008.
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Table A-4. Laos: Comparison of Opium Poppy Cultivation Estimates
2005-2009
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
United
Nations
1,800 2,500 1,500 1,600 1,900
United
States
5,600 1,700 1,100 1,900 1,000
Source: U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), World Drug Report (2010), p. 138; U.S. Department of
State, Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, International Narcotics Control Strategy
Report, Vol. 1 (2010), p. 23.
Notes: U.N. source is the National Illicit Crop Monitoring System, which is supported by UNODC. In 2009, the
U.S. government conducted a partial survey of only the Phongsali growing area.
Table A-5. Mexico: Comparison of Opium Poppy Cultivation Estimates
2005-2009
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
United
Nations
3,300 5,000 6,900 15,000 n/a
United
States
3,300 5,000 6,900 15,000 19,500
Source: U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), World Drug Report (2010), p. 138; U.S. Department of
State, Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, International Narcotics Control Strategy
Report, Vol. 1 (2011), p. 21.
Notes: U.N. source is the U.S. government.
Coca Bush Cultivation
Table A-6. Bolivia: Comparison of Coca Bush Cultivation Estimates
2005-2009
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
United
Nations
25,400 27,500 28,900 30,500 30,900
United
States
26,500 25,800 29,500 32,000 35,000
Source: U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), World Drug Report (2010), p. 162; U.S. Department of
State, Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, International Narcotics Control Strategy
Report, Vol. 1 (2011), p. 21.
Notes: U.N. sources through 2002 included the Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission and the U.S.
government. Since 2002 for the Yungas region and for al regions of Bolivia since 2003, estimates were
conducted by the National Illicit Crop Monitoring System, supported by the UNODC.
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Table A-7. Colombia: Comparison of Coca Bush Cultivation Estimates
2005-2009
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
United
Nations
86,000 78,000 99,000 81,000 68,000
United
States
144,000 157,200 167,000 119,000 116,000
Source: U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), World Drug Report (2010), p. 162; U.S. Department of
State, Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, International Narcotics Control Strategy
Report, Vol. 1 (2011), p. 21.
Notes: U.N. source is the National Illicit Crop Monitoring System, which is supported by UNODC.
Table A-8. Peru: Comparison of Coca Bush Cultivation Estimates
2005-2009
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
United
Nations
48,200 51,400 53,700 56,100 59,900
United
States
34,000 42,000 36,000 41,000 40,000
Source: U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), World Drug Report (2010), p. 162; U.S. Department of
State, Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, International Narcotics Control Strategy
Report, Vol. 1 (20101), p. 21.
Notes: U.N. source is the National Illicit Crop Monitoring System, which is supported by UNODC.
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Appendix B. U.S. Agency Roles
Several U.S. agencies are involved in implementing U.S. international counternarcotics activities
in support of the Administration’s National Drug Control Strategy. These agencies include the
following:
• Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP). Located within the
Executive Office of the President, ONDCP establishes U.S. counterdrug policies
and goals, and coordinates the federal budget to combat drugs both domestically
and internationally. Every year, ONDCP’s director, sometimes referred to as the
U.S. drug czar, produces the National Drug Control Strategy and the federal
counterdrug budget summary.
• Department of State. The Secretary of State is responsible for coordinating all
international counterdrug programs implemented by the U.S. government,
including foreign counternarcotics assistance. The State Department identifies
fighting the production, transportation, and sale of illegal narcotics among its
primary goals. Every March, the State Department’s Bureau of International
Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) produces the International
Narcotics Strategy Report (INCSR), which describes the efforts of key countries
to attack all aspects of the international drug trade, including anti-money
laundering during the previous calendar year.
• U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). USAID provides
assistance for long-term economic and social development. The USAID
Administrator serves concurrently as the State Department’s Director of U.S.
Foreign Assistance, with a rank equivalent to Deputy Secretary of State. USAID
plays a role in counternarcotics development assistance, especially regarding
alternative livelihood programs, which are designed to offer alternatives to
farmers that will enable and encourage them to discontinue planting poppy and
other illicit crops.
• Department of Defense (DOD). DOD maintains the lead role in detecting and
monitoring aerial and maritime transit of illegal drugs into the United States and
plays a key role in collecting, analyzing, and sharing intelligence on illegal drugs
with U.S. law enforcement and international security counterparts. In addition,
DOD provides counternarcotics foreign assistance to train, equip, and improve
the counternarcotics capacity and capabilities of relevant agencies of foreign
governments with its Counternarcotics Central Transfer Account appropriations.
• Department of Justice (DOJ). The Attorney General is responsible for federal
law enforcement and to ensure public safety against foreign and domestic threats,
including illegal drug trafficking. This translates into an array of responsibilities
that include law enforcement operations, drug-related intelligence analysis, and
prosecution and criminal justice activities, as well as police and justice sector
training. Primary agencies under DOJ that focus on international drug control
include the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), the Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI), the National Drug Intelligence Center (NDIC), the
Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Force (OCDETF), and the El Paso
Intelligence Center (EPIC).
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• Department of Homeland Security (DHS). The Secretary of Homeland
Security is responsible for U.S. policies related to interdiction of illegal drugs
entering the United States from abroad. The Strategic Plan for DHS identifies
securing the U.S. border against illegal drugs as one of its primary objectives.
Key offices within DHS that participate in counterdrug activities include the
Customs and Border Protection (CBP), U.S. Coast Guard, and Immigration and
Customs Enforcement (ICE).
• Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). The CIA’s Crime and Narcotics Center
(CNC) collects intelligence information and develops intelligence analyses to
support or conduct operations countering illicit drug activities, including trends
in illegal drug crop cultivation and production.
• Department of the Treasury. The Treasury Department participates in
counterdrug efforts as they pertain to targeting the illicit financial proceeds that
result from drug trafficking. Key offices that participate in combating drug-
related money laundering include the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC)
and the Financial Crime Enforcement Network (FinCEN).
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Appendix C. Related CRS Reports
For further information related to drug policy issues, see the following CRS reports:
• CRS Report R41535, Reauthorizing the Office of National Drug Control Policy:
Issues for Consideration, by Kristin M. Finklea.
• CRS Report R41215, Latin America and the Caribbean: Illicit Drug Trafficking
and U.S. Counterdrug Programs, by Clare Ribando Seelke, Liana Sun Wyler, and
June S. Beittel.
• CRS Report R41349, U.S.-Mexican Security Cooperation: the Mérida Initiative
and Beyond , by Clare Ribando Seelke and Kristin M. Finklea.
• CRS Report RL32724, Mexico-U.S. Relations: Issues for Congress, by Clare
Ribando Seelke.
• CRS Report R41576, Mexico’s Drug Trafficking Organizations: Source and
Scope of the Rising Violence, by June S. Beittel.
• CRS Report R41075, Southwest Border Violence: Issues in Identifying and
Measuring Spillover Violence, coordinated by Kristin M. Finklea.
• CRS Report RL34112, Gangs in Central America, by Clare Ribando Seelke.
• CRS Report RL32250, Colombia: Issues for Congress, by June S. Beittel.
• CRS Report RS22548, ATPA Renewal: Background and Issues, by M. Angeles
Villarreal.
• CRS Report RL32686, Afghanistan: Narcotics and U.S. Policy, by Christopher
M. Blanchard.
• CRS Report RL34225, Burma and Transnational Crime, by Liana Sun Wyler.
• CRS Report R40838, Illegal Drug Trade in Africa: Trends and U.S. Policy, by
Liana Sun Wyler and Nicolas Cook.
• CRS Report R41547, Organized Crime: An Evolving Challenge for U.S. Law
Enforcement, by Jerome P. Bjelopera and Kristin M. Finklea, Organized Crime:
An Evolving Challenge for U.S. Law Enforcement, by Jerome P. Bjelopera and
Kristin M. Finklea.
• CRS Report R41004, International Terrorism and Transnational Crime: Security
Threats, U.S. Policy, and Considerations for Congress, by John Rollins and
Liana Sun Wyler.
Author Contact Information
Liana Sun Wyler
Analyst in International Crime and Narcotics
lwyler@crs.loc.gov, 7-6177
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Acknowledgments
This report is an update and expansion of CRS Report RL33582, International Drug Trade and U.S.
Foreign Policy, by Raphael F. Perl, last updated November 6, 2006.
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