Bahrain: Reform, Security, and U.S. Policy
Kenneth Katzman
Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs
March 21, 2011
Congressional Research Service
7-5700
www.crs.gov
95-1013
CRS Report for Congress
P
repared for Members and Committees of Congress

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Bahrain: Reform, Security, and U.S. Policy

Summary
Protests that erupted in Bahrain following the uprising that overthrew Egyptian President Hosni
Mubarak on February 11, 2011, demonstrate that Shiite grievances over the distribution of power
and economic opportunities were not satisfied by previous efforts to include the Shiite majority in
governance. Possibly because of concerns that a rise to power of the Shiite opposition could
jeopardize the extensive U.S. military cooperation with Bahrain, the Obama Administration
criticized the early use of violence by the government but subsequently praised the Al Khalifa
regime for its offer of a dialogue with the demonstrators. It did not call for the King to step down,
and Administration contacts with his government are widely credited for the decision of the
regime to cease using force against the protesters as of February 19, 2011. However, as protests
escalated in March 2011, Bahrain’s government, contrary to the advice of the Obama
Administration, invited security assistance from other neighboring Gulf Cooperation Council
countries and subsequently moved to end the large gatherings. Some believe the crackdown has
largely ended prospects for a negotiated political solution in Bahrain, and could widen the
conflict to the broader Gulf region.
The 2011 unrest, in which some opposition factions have escalated their demands in response to
the initial use of force by the government, comes four months after the October 23, 2010,
parliamentary election. That election, no matter the outcome, would not have unseated the ruling
Al Khalifa family from power, but the Shiite population was hoping that winning a majority in
the elected lower house could give it greater authority. In advance of the elections, the
government launched a wave of arrests intended to try to discredit some of the hard-line Shiite
leadership as tools of Iran. On the other hand, Bahrain’s Shiite oppositionists, and many outside
experts, accuse the government of inflating the intensity of contacts between Iran and the
opposition in order to justify the use of force against Bahraini Shiites.
Unrest in Bahrain directly affects U.S. national security interests. Bahrain, in exchange for a tacit
U.S. security guarantee, has provided key support for U.S. interests by hosting U.S. naval
headquarters for the Gulf for over 60 years and by providing facilities and small numbers of
personnel for U.S. war efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan. Bahraini facilities have been pivotal to
U.S. strategy to deter any Iranian aggression as well as to interdict the movement of terrorists and
weapons-related technology on Gulf waterways. The United States has designated Bahrain as a
“major non-NATO ally,” and it provides small amounts of security assistance to Bahrain. On
other regional issues such as the Arab-Israeli dispute, Bahrain has tended to defer to Saudi Arabia
or other powers to take the lead in formulating proposals or representing the position of the
Persian Gulf states, collectively.
Fueling Shiite unrest is the fact that Bahrain is generally poorer than most of the other Persian
Gulf monarchies, in large part because Bahrain has largely run out of crude oil reserves. It has
tried to compensate through diversification, particularly in the banking sector and some
manufacturing. In September 2004, the United States and Bahrain signed a free trade agreement
(FTA); legislation implementing it was signed January 11, 2006 (P.L. 109-169).

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Contents
The Political Structure, Reform, and Human Rights .................................................................... 1
Post-Charter Elections........................................................................................................... 2
2002 Elections ................................................................................................................ 2
2006 Elections ................................................................................................................ 3
The 2010 National Assembly and Municipal Election: Prelude to the Uprising ................ 3
February 2011 Uprising......................................................................................................... 5
Government Tactics Change, As Do Protester Demands .................................................. 6
The Saudi/GCC Intervention ........................................................................................... 7
U.S. Posture on the Uprising ........................................................................................... 8
Possible Outcomes .......................................................................................................... 9
Other Human Rights Issues ................................................................................................... 9
Women’s Rights.............................................................................................................. 9
Religious Freedom ........................................................................................................ 10
Labor Rights ................................................................................................................. 10
Human Trafficking........................................................................................................ 10
Executions .................................................................................................................... 10
U.S. Efforts to Promote Political Reform and Religious Freedom ........................................ 10
U.S.-Bahrain Security and Foreign Policy Relations .................................................................. 11
U.S. Navy Headquarters in Bahrain..................................................................................... 11
Cooperation With U.S. Operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.................................................. 12
Pre-September 11 Cooperation ...................................................................................... 12
Post-September 11 and Post-Saddam Cooperation......................................................... 12
U.S. Arms Transfers and Military Aid.................................................................................. 13
Anti-Terrorism Cooperation ................................................................................................ 15
Relations with and Cooperation Against Iran....................................................................... 15
Bahrain-Iran Gas Development Deal and Other Economic Ties ..................................... 16
Other Foreign Policy Issues................................................................................................. 17
Qatar Territorial Disputes .............................................................................................. 17
Arab-Israeli Issues ........................................................................................................ 17
Economic Issues ....................................................................................................................... 18

Figures
Figure 1. Bahrain ...................................................................................................................... 20

Tables
Table 1. Comparative Composition of Elected COR .................................................................... 5
Table 2. Some Basic Facts About Bahrain ................................................................................. 19
Table 3. U.S. Assistance to Bahrain ........................................................................................... 19

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Contacts
Author Contact Information ...................................................................................................... 20

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The Political Structure, Reform, and Human Rights1
The Al Khalifa family, which is Sunni Muslim and generally not as religiously conservative as the
leaders of neighboring Saudi Arabia, has ruled Bahrain since 1783. The Al Khalifa family’s
arrival from the Saudi peninsula to take control ended a century of domination by Persian settlers.
The Al Khalifa subsequently received political protection from Britain, which was the dominant
power in the Gulf until the early 1970s. Bahrain became independent from Britain in August 1971
after a 1970 U.N. survey (some refer to its as a “referendum”) determined that its inhabitants
preferred independence to Iranian control.
Bahrain is led by King Hamad bin Isa Al Khalifa (about 66 years old), who succeeded his father,
Shaykh Isa bin Sulman Al Khalifa, upon his death in March 1999. Educated at Sandhurst Military
Academy in Britain, King Hamad was previously commander of the Bahraini Defense Forces
(BDF). His son, Shaykh Salman bin Hamad, about 49 years old, is Crown Prince. Shaykh Salman
serves concurrently as deputy commander of the BDF; the King is commander-in-chief. Shaykh
Salman is U.S.-and U.K.-educated and is, like the King, considered a proponent of reform and
accommodation with Bahrain’s Shiite majority—about 70% of the 503,000-person citizenry.2
(There are also an estimated 235,000 expatriates in Bahrain, according to the Central Intelligence
Agency’s “World Factbook” July 2010 estimate.) About 25% of the population is age 14 or
younger.
Until the February 2011 unrest, the Al Khalifa family had held onto all strategic ministry
positions and at least half of all ministerial slots. There have been four Shiite ministers (out of 23
cabinet positions); those ministries run by Shiites have been considered among the less critical
ministries. Shiites are also generally barred from serving in the security forces.
The King’s uncle (the brother of the late ruler), Prime Minister Khalifa bin Salman Al Khalifa,
along with hard-liners in the royal court (including Royal Court chief Shaykh Khalid bin Ahmad
Al Khalifa) and several other ministers, are perceived as skeptical of King Hamad’s reforms.
They believe that the concessions that King Hamad has made to the Shiite majority have caused
the Shiites to increase their political demands rather than satisfy them. Others believe that level of
unrest reached in February 2011 would have been reached long ago had the King’s reforms not
been enacted.
The minor political reforms under the current King’s father, Amir Isa (the December 1992
establishment of a 30-member appointed Consultative Council to comment on proposed laws and
its June 1996 expansion to 40 members), did not come close to quieting the demands of either
Shiites or Sunnis for the restoration of an elected national assembly, even though Bahrain’s
Sunnis are considered less hungry for “democracy” than are the Shiites. An elected assembly was
provided for under the 1973 constitution but abolished in August 1975. In the years just prior to

1 Much of the information in this section is from State Department reports: 2009 Country Reports on Human Rights
Practices (March 11, 2010); the International Religious Freedom Report for 2010 (November 17, 2010); and the
Trafficking in Persons Report for 2010 (June 14, 2010). CRS has no means to independently investigate the human
rights situation in Bahrain or confirm allegations of specific human rights abuses there.
2 The Shiite community in Bahrain consists of the more numerous “Baharna,” who are of Arab ethnicity and descended
from Arab tribes who inhabited the area from pre-Islamic times. Shiites of Persian ethnicity are less numerous, and
arrived in Bahrain over the past 400 years. They speak Persian and generally do not integrate with the Baharna or with
Sunni Arabs.
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Shaykh Hamad’s accession to rulership, there was daily anti-government violence during 1994-
1998, although the unrest gradually took on a Shiite sectarian character. As Hamad’s first reform
steps after taking over, he changed his title to “King,” rather than “Amir” and implying more
accountability, and held a referendum (February 14, 2002) on a new “National Action Charter
(constitution).”
One reason that the Shiite majority population was not satisfied by the National Action Charter
was that the elected Council of Representatives (COR) and the all-appointed Shura (Consultative)
Council were to be of equal size (40 seats each). Together, they constitute a National Assembly
(parliament) that serves as only a partial check on government power. The King, through the
prime minister, makes all cabinet appointments and thus exercises direct rule; the Assembly does
not appoint—or have power to reject—cabinet appointments. The COR can propose (but not
actually draft) legislation and both chambers can question ministers, although not in public
session. The COR can, by a two-thirds majority, vote no-confidence against ministers and the
prime minister and override the King’s veto of approved legislation, although none of these
actions has occurred since the COR was formed. The King has the authority to dissolve the COR
and amend the constitution. The Shura Council is formally limited to amending draft legislation
and, in concert with the COR, reviewing the annual budget, but these powers provide the Shura
Council with the ability to block action by the COR. The government has tended to appoint
generally more educated and pro-Western members to the Shura Council, and it is generally more
supportive of the government than is the elected COR. There is no “quota” for females in the
National Assembly, as has been included in democratic constitutions in post-Saddam Iraq and
post-Taliban Afghanistan.
The National Assembly has tended to address primarily economic and social issues, and not
national security issues. For example, in May 2010, it voted to ban sale of alcohol to Muslims,
although subject to implementing regulations made by the King, through the government. Other
legislation considered in the Bahraini National Assembly in recent years included bills to combat
cyber crime, regulate the pharmaceutical sector, regulate the press, create an anti-corruption body,
and establish a higher council on social security. However, many of these bills stalled in the 2006-
2010 parliament due to lack of consensus and broader Sunni-Shiite tensions.
Post-Charter Elections
Elections have been held every four years since 2002, each time marked by substantial tension
between the government and the Shiite majority. Formal political parties are banned, but factions
compete as “political societies” which serve as the functional equivalent of parties for election
purposes. In the COR elections, if no candidate in a contested district wins more than 50% in the
first round, a runoff is held one week later.
2002 Elections
The first elections under the Charter were held in October 2002. In the 2002 election, many Shiite
opposition “political societies,” including Al Wifaq, (formally, the Al Wifaq National Islamic
Society, also known as the Islamic National Accord Association—a large faction, led by Shaykh
Ali al-Salman), boycotted the elections on the grounds that setting the COR and the Shura
Council at the same size dilutes popular will. The 2002 boycott lowered turnout (about 52%) and
helped Sunnis win two-thirds of the COR seats. Of the 170 total candidates, 6 were women, but
none of the women were elected.
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2006 Elections
As was widely expected by experts, Sunni-Shiite tensions escalated again in the run-up to the
November 25, 2006, parliamentary and municipal elections. The tension was aggravated by the
Shiite perception that a once-repressed Shiite majority came to power in Iraq through U.S.-
backed elections and that the Bahraini majority was entitled to a similar result. In the fall of 2006,
some Shiites protested, particularly after allegations, some of which were publicly corroborated
by a government adviser (Salah al-Bandar) in August 2006 in a report to an outside human rights
organization, that the government was adjusting election districts so as to favor Sunni candidates.
It was also alleged that the government issued passports to Sunnis in an attempt to shift the
demographic balance to the Sunnis’ advantage.
In the November 2006 elections, two Shiite opposition blocs, Wifaq and the National Democratic
Action Association, participated, raising voter turnout to 72%. Wifaq is avowedly Islamist in
political orientation. A harder-line Shiite opposition faction, Al Haq (Movement of Freedom and
Democracy), boycotted. The opposition, led by Wifaq, won 17 seats, virtually all those it
contested. The Shiite opposition was therefore the largest single bloc in the COR, but it was short
of a majority.
The government was heartened that Sunni Muslim independents won 23 total seats. Of those, 9
were won by secular Sunnis and 14 were won by Islamist Sunnis (7 from the Salafists trend and 7
Muslim Brotherhood members). Only one woman (Latifa al Qaoud, who was unopposed in her
district) won, out of 18 female candidates (down from 31 female candidates in the 2002
elections). As evidence of continued friction, Wifaq boycotted the speakership contest, and
incumbent COR Speaker Khalifa al-Dhahrani was reelected speaker.
The King subsequently named a new Shura Council with 20 Shiites, 19 Sunnis, and one Christian
(a female). Ten women were appointed. However, the Shiites appointed were not all aligned with
opposition factions, and several were considered “pro-government.” Therefore, the Shura Council
was not a bastion of opposition to the government even though Shiites held half of its seats. In a
nod to the increased Shiite strength as a result of the elections, the government appointed a Shiite
(Jawad al-Araidh) as deputy prime minister and another (who is close to Wifaq) as a minister of
state for foreign affairs.
Heightened political tensions continued in between national elections. In December 2008, the
government made numerous arrests of Shiite demonstrators and accused some of being part of a
foreign-inspired “plot” to destabilize Bahrain. Some were accused of undergoing guerrilla or
terrorist training in Syria. On January 26, 2009, the government arrested three leading Shiite
activists, including the wheelchair-bound Dr. Abduljalil Alsingace and Mr. Hassan Mushaima,
both leaders of Al Haq. They were tried during February-March 2009 but, along with other Shiite
activists, were pardoned and released in April 2009. Alsingace has visited the United States
several times to highlight the human rights situation in Bahrain. (As noted below, Alsingace was
arrested again in August 2010.) Mushaima subsequently went into exile in Europe.
The 2010 National Assembly and Municipal Election: Prelude to the Uprising
The resentments over the 2006 election, and the still unfulfilled demand of Bahrain’s Shiites for
greater political power and an end to economic discrimination, carried over to the 2010 election.
The election was held on October 23, 2010. There were only a limited number of international
observers, primarily from various international human rights organizations. Two Bahraini human
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rights watchdog groups, the Bahrain Human Rights Society and the Bahrain Transparency
Society, again (for the third time) reached agreement to jointly monitor the 2010 elections.
Municipal elections were held concurrently.
The electorate was about 300,000 persons, voting in 40 districts spread throughout five
governorates. As was the case in the 2006 elections, Shiite oppositionists accused the government
of drawing district boundaries so as to prevent the election of a Shiite majority. Registration of
candidates took place during September 12-16, 2010. About 200 people registered to run, of
whom seven were women. However, one woman withdrew after registering, leaving a field of six
female candidates. Of the six, only one was formally endorsed by a political society, the National
Democratic Action Society (Waad, which means “promise” in Arabic). She is Munira Fakhro, a
prominent Shiite woman who was exiled prior to the political reform process under King Hamad.
In 2006, she narrowly lost to a Sunni Islamist (Minbar, or “platform,” faction). At least four
candidates in districts where there was no opposition were declared winners by September 28,
2010. One of them was a Wifaq member.
Wifaq, still by far the most prominent Shiite political society, registered candidates. Its leader,
Shaykh Ali Salman, was not a candidate, preferring to continue to lead the faction from the
background. Al Haq again boycotted, as it did in 2006. In the run-up to the election, the
government cracked down on Shiite activitists, particularly those who supported boycotting the
election. For example, on September 4, 2010, 23 Shiite leaders were arrested on charges of
attempting a violent overthrow of the government. They were among about 160 Shiites arrested
in August and September, under a 2006 anti-terrorism law that gives the government broad arrest
and prosecution powers. Among those arrested was Dr. Alsingace (see above), arrested August
13, 2010, upon his return from abroad. Alsingace remains incarcerated and has told his lawyers
that he has been beaten and deprived of sleep. A prominent Shiite cleric, Ayatollah Hussein Mirza
al-Najati, said to be close to the most senior Iraqi cleric Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, had his Bahrain
citizenship revoked on September 20, 2010.
Some observers asserted that the government crackdown would drive Bahraini Shiites to
politically support boycotting harder-line movements, such as Al Haq, and in so doing suppress
the election turnout among Shiites. The crackdown did not prompt Wifaq to reverse its decision to
compete. The crackdown might have helped the government’s election strategy but it also led to
stepped up demonstrations by Shiite youth in Shiite neighborhoods. The tensions are also widely
blamed for resulting in a bombing that damaged four police cars on September 15, 2010. The
tensions over the election almost certainly were a catalyst for the major unrest that has occurred
in February 2011, discussed further below.
Among Sunni political societies, there are two that are considered Islamist. They include Minbar,
mentioned above, which is an offshoot of the Muslim Brotherhood, and Al Asala, which is a
harder-line “Salafist” political society. In the 2006-2010 parliament, Asala and Minbar members
held 7 seats each.
2010 Election Results
Despite the preelection tensions, the election was held without major reports of violence and
produced some unexpected results, including:
• The increase of Wifaq’s representation from 17 seats in the 2006-2010 COR to 18
seats. However, the 18 is still short of a majority.
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• The unexpected losses by Sunni Islamist factions. Minbar and Asala each saw
dramatic reductions in their seats from 2006: Minbar (Muslim Brotherhood)
decreased to 2 seats (from 7) and Asala decreased to 3 seats (from 7). Most of the
seats were picked up by Sunni independents, who won 17 seats, up from 9 in the
2006-2010 parliament. In addition, the secular and ideological Waad won no
seats at all. These results appeared to represent a rejection of Islamist ideology,
and even all ideological candidates, in favor of pragmatists who would address
Bahrain’s economic difficulties.
• The same one woman won who had won in 2006.
• In the municipal elections conducted concurrently, one woman was elected in the
second round—the first woman to be elected to a municipal council.
In advance of the December 14, 2010, start of the next parliamentary term, the King named the
2010-2014 Shura Council. Thirty of the 40 serving Council members were reappointed, leaving
only 10 newly appointed members. The Council has four women, substantially fewer than the
2006-2010 Council that had nine women. Among the four, one is Jewish (Nancy Khadouri), out
of a Jewish population in Bahrain of about 40 persons, and one is Christian (Hala Qarrisah).
Bahrain has an estimated 1,000 Christians. The Council speaker, Ali al-Salih, was reappointed.
Table 1. Comparative Composition of Elected COR

2006 Lower House
2010 Lower House
Shi te Islamist (Wifaq)
17
18
Sunni Independent (mostly secular)
9
17
Sunni Islamist (Minbar, Muslim
7 2
Brotherhood, moderate Islamist)
Sunni Islamist (Asala, Salafi,
7 3
conservative Islamist

February 2011 Uprising
King Hamad’s efforts to accommodate Shiite aspirations were demonstrated to have failed when
a major uprising began on February 13, 2011, in the immediate wake of the success of an uprising
in Egypt that forced the resignation of Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak. After a few days of
protests and relatively minor confrontations with the mostly Bahraini Sunni and expatriate Sunni
security forces, the mostly Shiite demonstrators converged on a major public square, “Pearl
Roundabout,” named after a statue in the middle of the traffic circle that depicts Bahrain’s pearl-
diving past. The uprising took place even though King Hamad tried to prevent the spread of the
Egypt and Tunisia unrest into Bahrain by offering all Bahraini families a $2,700 one-time
payment. The initial demands of the protesters were numerous, but generally centered on such
political reforms as altering the constitution to expand the powers of the COR; ending
gerrymandering that prevents Shiites from winning a majority in the COR; providing more jobs
and economic opportunities; and, among some protesters, replacing hard-line Prime Minister
Khalifa. A consistent theme among protesters appeared to be to end the sense among Shiites that
they are “second class citizens.” On February 15, 2011, King Hamad spoke to the nation and
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announced the formation of a committee to investigate the use of force against protestors, which
had killed two until that time.
The unrest took on new dimensions in the early morning of February 17, 2011, when security
forces surrounded the thousands of demonstrators in Pearl Roundabout, many of whom were
asleep, and used rubber bullets and tear gas to remove them from the location. At least four
demonstrators were killed, and others died subsequently. The government asserted it had warned
of an impending move to expel the protestors, an account disputed by the protesters. At a news
conference later on February 17, Foreign Minister Khalid Al Khalifa claimed Bahraini forces had
used a minimum of force, that some of the protesters were found with weaponry, and that the
Pearl Roundabout was cleared to avoid a “sectarian abyss”—a reference to possible all-out civil
conflict between the Shiites and Sunnis. Amid heavy security patrols to prevent demonstrators
from regrouping in Pearl Roundabout, additional protests took place on February 18, 2011, with
additional press reports of gunshots by security forces, including in the context of funerals for
those demonstrators who were killed. Politically, Wifaq pulled all 18 of its COR deputies out of
the COR immediately following the February 17 crackdown. Britain closed its embassy in
Bahrain after the February 17, 2011, crackdown, and announced it might ban further arms exports
to Bahrain.
Government Tactics Change, As Do Protester Demands
In part at the reported urging of the United States to cease using additional force against peaceful
protests, the government changed tactics on February 19, 2011, by ordering security forces not to
confront protesters. That day, demonstrators re-entered Pearl Roundabout and held large
demonstrations at or around that location subsequently. A February 22, 2011, demonstration was
said to be perhaps the largest in Bahrain’s history. It followed by one day a large counter-
demonstration by mostly Sunni supporters of the government in an affluent Sunni neighborhood.
At the same time, the government, with Crown Prince Salman leading the effort, invited the
representatives of the protesters to begin a formal dialogue to try to agree on a package of
reforms. That effort was supported by a gesture by King Hamad on February 22, 2011, to release
and pardon about 25 political prisoners, including the exiled leader of the hardline Al Haq,
Hassan Mushaima (who returned to Bahrain from exile in Europe on February 27, 2011). On
February 26, 2011, King Hamad changed several cabinet posts; this included dropping two Al
Khalifa family members from the cabinet, thereby somewhat reducing the dominance of the
family. The posts changed were those that can influence job opportunities and living conditions.
Ending the use of force, offers of dialogue, and the cabinet reshuffles did not prevent the
protesters’ demands from escalating or cause the protesters to leave the Pearl Roundabout.
However, the government concessions did expose long-standing splits in the opposition, such as
that between the more moderate Wifaq and the more hardline Al Haq. Anger at the government’s
initial use of force appeared to shift many demonstrators closer to Al Haq, which, as of the
beginning of March 2011, has demanded a resignation of the monarchy outright. Wifaq and other
more moderate groups stopped short of that demand, and appeared willing to accept the formation
of a constitutional monarchy with an elected prime minister, a cabinet that is more representative
of the population, and efforts to promote more job opportunities for Shiites. Six smaller hardline
Shiite political societies reportedly joined Al Haq in insisting on maximalist demands.3 The

3 “Bahrain Hard-Liners Call for Royal Family to Go. Cable News Network website, March 9, 2011.
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regime’s offer of dialogue was not taken up consistently or systematically by the more moderate
groups either, and only informal meetings took place in search of a political solution.
The Saudi/GCC Intervention
With no dialogue underway, protests escalated through early March. On March 1, 2011,
demonstrators blocked the entrance to the parliament building and delayed the meeting of its
bodies for six hours. The protest also began to spark Sunni-Shiite clashes; some experts believed
these had the potential to evolve into outright sectarian conflict. On March 13, 2011, protesters
blockaded the financial district of the capital, Manama, prompting governmental fears that the
unrest could choke this major economic sector. Security forces trying to contain the growing
protests were overwhelmed and, on March 13, Bahrain requested that the Gulf Cooperation
Council (GCC), of which it is a member, send additional security forces to protect key sites. In
response to the request, on March 14, 2011, a GCC force spearheaded by about 1,000 Saudi
forces (in armored vehicles) and 500 UAE policemen crossed into Bahrain and took up positions
at key locations in and around Manama. Subsequently, on March 15, 2011, King Hamad declared
a three-month state of emergency, and Bahraini security forces, backed by the GCC forces,
cleared demonstrators from Pearl Roundabout (and demolished the pearl monument itself on
March 19, 2011). Some additional protester deaths were reported in this renewed crackdown. In
conjunction with the crackdown, seven Shiite leaders were arrested, including Al Haq’s
Mushaima. Wefaq’s leader, Shaykh Ali Salman, was not arrested. The remaining Shiite ministers
in the cabinet, many of the Shiites in the Shura Council, and many Shiites in other senior posts in
the judiciary and elsewhere resigned.
Well before intervening in Bahrain, the GCC states had begun to fear that the Bahrain unrest
could spread to other GCC states. It was also feared that Iran might be able to exploit the
situation. None of the other GCC states has a Shiite majority (like Bahrain), but most of them,
including Saudi Arabia, have substantial Shiite minorities. The GCC states met at the foreign
minister level on February 16, 2011, and expressed solidarity with the government of Bahrain.
King Hamad visited Saudi Arabia on February 23, 2011, for consultations on how to handle the
unrest, and Crown Prince Salman visited UAE on March 2, 2011. Those countries have arranged
for large pledges of aid to help the Bahrain government (and that of Oman, which also has faced
unrest) create jobs for Shiites. Some experts speculate that Saudi intervention could prompt a
wider conflict; Al Haq leader Hassan Mushaima affirmed those fears in March 2011 when he
warned that Saudi intervention could prompt Iranian intervention on the side of the Shiite
protesters.
To date, there has been little evidence of direct Iranian intervention. However, Iranian leaders
have criticized the Bahraini crackdown and Bahrain and Iran have withdrawn their ambassadors
from each others’ capitals. On March 21, 2011, King Hamad indirectly accused Iran of
involvement in the unrest by saying a “foreign plot” had been foiled by the GCC assistance.
Secretary of Defense Gates has not accused Iran of instigating the unrest but has warned that the
protraction of the crisis allows Tehran opportunities to exploit it, perhaps by urging Bahrain’s
Shiites not to compromise but instead seek outright replacement of the regime.4

4 http://www.stripes.com/gates-protracted-bahrain-negotiations-allowing-greater-iran-influence-1.137532
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U.S. Posture on the Uprising
The U.S. response to the unrest in Bahrain has been, to some extent, colored by the response to
the broader Middle East unrest, although with an eye toward the vital U.S. interests in Bahrain
discussed below. The U.S. concern is that a fall of the Al Khalifa regime and ascension of a
Shiite-led government could increase Iran’s influence and lead to a loss of the use of Bahrain’s
military facilities. In phone calls to their counterparts after the February 17, 2011, clearing of
Pearl Roundabout, Secretary of State Clinton and Secretary of Defense Gates reportedly
expressed concern to the Bahrain government for using force against the protesters. White House
spokesman Jay Carney said the violence was not an appropriate response to peaceful
demonstrators making “reasonable demands.” These contacts and statements apparently
contributed to the earlier government decision to exercise restraint against protesters. Some have
criticized the Administration for previously muting criticism of Bahrain’s human rights record,
citing Secretary of State Clinton’s comments in Bahrain on December 3, 2010, referring to the
October 2010 elections, saying: “I am impressed by the commitment that the government has to
the democratic path that Bahrain is walking on. It takes time; we know that from our own
experience.”5
Just prior to the March 15, 2011, crackdown, Secretary of State Clinton and other U.S. officials
had praised the release of political prisoners and called on all parties to take up the offer by the
Crown Prince for a broad political dialogue on reform.6 In a statement, President Obama praised
the February 26 cabinet reshuffle and King Hamad’s restatements of his commitment to reform.7
The U.S. position—in particular not calling for the Al Khalifa monarchy to come to an end—may
reflect concern among U.S. officials about the consequences were the regime to fall. U.S. officials
fear that if a Shiite-led regime come to power there, Iran’s influence in Bahrain would increase to
the point where it might be successful in persuading Bahrain to ask the United States to vacate
Bahraini military facilities.
The U.S. position did not change significantly following the March 14, 2011, GCC intervention
and subsequent crackdown. On March 19, 2011, Secretary Clinton reiterated the U.S. support for
the Crown Prince’s offer of dialogue, and said
Bahrain obviously has the sovereign right to invited GCC forces into its territory under its
defense and security agreements…. [The United States has] made clear that security alone
cannot resolve the challenges facing Bahrain. As I said earlier this week, violence is not and
cannot be the answer. A political process is. We have raised our concerns about the current
measures directly with Bahraini officials and will continue to do so.
The Administration also stepped up efforts to help resolve the crisis. Assistant Secretary of State
for the Near East Jeffrey Feltman was sent to Bahrain as of March 14, 2011, to attempt to achieve
the beginning of a sustained dialogue between the government and the opposition.
The Obama Administration, which presented its FY2012 budget request on February 14, 2011,
just as the unrest in Bahrain was growing, has not announced any alteration of its military and
anti-terrorism assistance or arms sales policy for Bahrain. In his February 25, 2011, visit, Joint

5 Department of State. “Remarks With Foreign Minister Al Khalifa After Their Meeting.” December 3, 2010.
6 Secretary of State Clinton Comments on the Situation in the Middle East. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=
GbucMZUg3Gc
7 “Obama Welcomes Bahrain Cabinet Reshuffle.” Reuters, February 27, 2011.
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Chiefs Chairman Mullen reaffirmed the U.S.-Bahrain defense relationship. However, press
reports say arms sales to Bahrain and other U.S. allies are under review because of the unrest in
the region.8 It is possible that outside experts and some in Congress might object to further sales
to Bahrain, particularly of equipment that could be used against protesters. Levels of those sales
and aid are discussed in the sections below.
Possible Outcomes
Outcomes are difficult to predict. Some believe the GCC intervention and subsequent crackdown
has hardened the protest movement to the point where it will attempt to defy the government and
drive it from power. The overthrow of the government and the ascension of a Shiite-led regime is
possible, although the GCC intervention has probably made this outcome less likely.
The Obama Administration and many experts believe that compromise is still likely, even in light
of the GCC intervention. Ideas for a compromise include a change of the constitution to allow for
direct selection of the prime minister by an empowered COR. Some believe that, short of an
alteration of the constitution, another potential compromise could involve Wefaq leader Shaykh
Ali Salman becoming prime minister, although hardline Al Khalifa members are almost certain to
oppose the ousting of Prime Minister Khalifa Al Khalifa. Another possibility could include the
broad reshuffling of the cabinet to give Shiites many more ministerial posts and control of key
economic ministries. Other potential amendments to the constitution could include expanding the
elected COR, enhancing its powers relative to the upper house, or abolishing the upper house.
Other reforms could include redistricting that would permit Shiites to win a COR majority.
Other Human Rights Issues
Many of the general human rights issues are intimately tied to the power struggle between the
Sunni-led regime and the Shiite majority, as noted in U.S. government reports on human rights
and religious freedom in Bahrain. Beyond the Sunni-Shiite schism in Bahrain, State Department
reports, such as the human rights report for 2009, note problems for non-Muslims and for
opponents of the government. Bahrain allows freedom of worship for Christians, Jews, and
Hindus although the constitution declares Islam the official religion.
Women’s Rights
Bahrain has tended to be relatively progressive as far as law and regulations. Women can drive,
own and inherit property, and initiate divorce cases. However, as with its neighbors, Bahrain’s
practices and customs tend to limit women’s rights. To try to showcase its progressiveness, the
government has promoted several women to high positions. Since 2005, there have been two
female ministers—Minister of Social Affairs Fatima bint Ahmad al-Balushi and Minister of
Information and Culture Mai bint Muhammad Al Khalifa. A previous female minister of health,
Nada Haffadh, resigned in October 2007 following allegations of corruption in her ministry by
conservatives who oppose women occupying high-ranking positions. Two other women,
including the president of the University of Bahrain, have ministerial rank, and Huda Azar Nunu,
a female attorney and the only Jew in the Shura Council, is ambassador to the United States.

8 Adam Entous. “U.S. Reviews Arms Sales Amid Turmoil.” Wall Street Journal, February 23, 2011.
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Religious Freedom
On freedoms for religions other than Islam, the November 17, 2010, State Department report on
international religious freedom, in the section on Bahrain, says that non-Muslims have been able
to practice their religion privately without government interference, and to maintain places of
worship. However, the government requires licenses for churches to operate, and has in the past
threatened to shutter un-licensed churches serving Indian expatriates. The Baha’i faith, declared
blasphemous in Iran and Afghanistan, has been discriminated against in Bahrain. A Baha’i
congregation was repeatedly denied an official license, although other State Department reports
(human rights reports for 2008 and for 2009) say that the Baha’i community now gathers and
operates openly.
Labor Rights
On labor issues, Bahrain has been credited with significant labor reforms, including a 2002 law
granting workers, including non-citizens, the right to form and join unions. The law holds that the
right to strike is a legitimate means for workers to defend their rights and interests, but their right
is restricted in practice, including a prohibition on strikes in the oil and gas, education, and health
sectors. There are about 50 trade unions in Bahrain.
Human Trafficking
On human trafficking, Bahrain was elevated in the 2008 Trafficking in Persons report to “Tier 2
Watch List,” from Tier 3 in the 2007 report, because it is “making significant efforts” to comply
with the minimum standards for elimination of trafficking, but has not shown results, to date. The
2009 Trafficking in Persons Report (June 16, 2009) kept Bahrain as Tier 2 Watch List, with
explanatory language similar to that of the 2008 report. The 2010 Trafficking in Persons Report
(June 14, 2010) upgraded Bahrain yet again to Tier 2 (dropping the “watch list” designation) on
the grounds that Bahrain is making significant efforts to comply with minimum standards and has
begun making prosecutions under its anti-trafficking statutes.
Executions
Another issue is that of executions. Human Rights Watch and other groups assert that Bahrain is
going against the international trend to end execution. In November 2009, Bahrain’s Court of
Cassation upheld the sentencing to death by firing squad of a citizen of Bangladesh. That
sentenced was imposed for a 2005 murder. From 1977 until 2006, there were no executions in
Bahrain. Allegations of torture against Shiite opposition figures are widespread.9
U.S. Efforts to Promote Political Reform and Religious Freedom
The United States has long sought to accelerate political reform in Bahrain and to empower its
political societies through several programs, including the “Middle East Partnership Initiative
(MEPI).” Some funds have been used to help build an independent judiciary and strengthen the
COR. Other U.S.-funded programs focus on women’s empowerment, media training, educational

9 Human Rights Watch. “Bahrain: Torture Redux. “ February 2010.
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opportunities, and civil society legal reform. MEPI funds have been used to fund AFL-CIO
projects with Bahraini labor organizations, and to help Bahrain implement the U.S.-Bahrain FTA.
In May 2006 Bahrain revoked the visa for the resident program director of the National
Democratic Institute (NDI), and has not allowed the office to reopen. NDI is conducting
programs to enhance parliamentary capabilities through a local NGO. In February 2010, the
MEPI office of State Department signed a memorandum of understanding with Bahrain to
promote entrepreneurship there and promote opportunities for trade with U.S. small businesses.
Still, some human rights group and Bahraini activists believe the United States has consistently
(including during the February 2011 unrest) downplayed democracy promotion in favor of
broader security issues.
According to the State Department’s International Religious Freedom report for 2010 (November
17, 2010), “The U.S. government discusses religious freedom with the [Bahraini] government as
part of its overall policy to promote human rights.” The religious freedom report also noted that
the U.S. government sponsored the visit to the United States of a prominent Sunni cleric, Shaykh
Salah Al-Jowder, to discuss religious freedom and interfaith dialogue.
U.S.-Bahrain Security and Foreign Policy Relations10
U.S.-Bahrain relations are intimate and mutually reinforcing, thereby raising the stakes for the
United States in the February 2011 unrest. A U.S. Embassy in Manama, Bahrain’s capital, opened
in September 1971, when the threat level in the Persian Gulf was perceived as relatively low.
Since then, defense issues have become a central feature of U.S.-Bahrain relations. Although Iraq
is no longer a strategic threat to the region because it cannot project power outside its borders,
Iran’s nuclear program is considered a growing threat to the Persian Gulf states, including
Bahrain. There is also the issue of terrorism and piracy in the Gulf, as exemplified by a July 28,
2010, explosion on a Japanese oil tanker in that waterway. The explosion is widely suspected to
have been a terrorist attack, and a faction linked to Al Qaeda (Abdullah Azzam Brigades) claimed
responsibility.
In large part to keep powerful neighbors in check, Bahrain has long linked its security to the
United States, and U.S. efforts to address threats in Iraq, Iran, and Afghanistan have benefitted
from access to Bahraini facilities. In recognition of the relationship, in March 2002, President
Bush (Presidential Determination 2002-10) designated Bahrain a “major non-NATO ally
(MNNA),” a designation that facilitates U.S. arms sales.
U.S. Navy Headquarters in Bahrain
February 2008 marked the 60th anniversary of a U.S. naval command presence in Bahrain;
MIDEASTFOR (U.S. Middle East Force), its successor, NAVCENT (naval component of U.S.
Central Command), as well as the Fifth Fleet (reconstituted in June 1995) are headquartered
there, at a sprawling facility called “Naval Support Activity-Bahrain.” The facility now covers
over 100 acres, and about 2,300 U.S. personnel, mostly Navy, are assigned there.11 Some smaller

10 Information in this section obtained from a variety of press reports, and the Defense Security Cooperation Agency
(DSCA).
11 Unclassified information provided to CRS by the Department of Defense. Figures are as of June 30, 2010.
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U.S. ships (minesweepers) are docked there, but the Fifth Fleet also consists of a Carrier Battle
Group, an Amphibious Ready Group, and various other ships that are afloat or which dock
elsewhere in the region. To further develop the facility (sometimes referred to as “Bahrain
Island”), recent appropriations and requests include $54 million for FY2008 (including $19
million for a Special Operations Forces facility);12 no funds for FY2009; $41.5 million for
FY2010 (P.L. 111-117); and a requested $258 million for FY2011 for several facilities in Bahrain.
With these and other funds that are expected to be appropriated, construction began in May 2010
of a major, $580 million expansion of the facility to allow larger ships to dock there; the project is
expected to be completed, in several phases, by 2015. A January 2008 lease agreement between
the United States and Bahrain allowed for the expansion by making available the
decommissioned Mina (port) Salman. In addition, $45 million of the funds is to be used to expand
an apron at Shaykh Isa Air Base.
Cooperation With U.S. Operations in Iraq and Afghanistan
Pre-September 11 Cooperation
Bahrain was part of the U.S.-led allied coalition that ousted Iraq from Kuwait in 1991, hosting
17,500 troops and 250 combat aircraft at Shaykh Isa Air Base (mentioned above). Bahrain and the
United States signed a 10-year defense pact signed on October 28, 1991, seven months after that
war, and renewed in October 2001. The pact not only provides the United States access to
Bahrain’s air bases and to pre-position strategic materiel (mostly U.S. Air Force munitions), but
also requires consultations with Bahrain if its security is threatened, and it expanded exercises
and U.S. training of Bahraini forces.13
Following the liberation of Kuwait in February 1991, there were about 1,300 U.S. military
personnel in Bahrain during the 1990s to contain Saddam Hussein’s Iraq, and Bahraini pilots flew
strikes over Iraq during the war; Iraq fired nine Scud missiles at Bahrain during the war, of which
three hit facilities there. Bahrain hosted the regional headquarters for U.N. weapons inspections in
Iraq during 1991-1998, and the U.S.-led Multinational Interdiction Force (MIF) that enforced a
U.N. embargo on Iraq during 1991-2003. Since the early 1990s, the United States has reportedly
stationed two Patriot anti-missile batteries there.14
Post-September 11 and Post-Saddam Cooperation
The naval headquarters, the U.S. use of which predated the defense pact, has been used to
coordinate the operations of over 20 U.S. warships performing support missions for U.S. and
allied naval operations related to the U.S. military operations ongoing in Iraq and Afghanistan.
These ships are also part of Combined Task Force (CTF) 151 and 152 that seek to interdict the
movement of terrorists, arms, or weapons of mass destruction (WMD)-related technology and
narcotics across the Arabian Sea. These task forces also seek to counter piracy in the Arabia Sea.

12 Appropriated in Division 1 of P.L. 110-161.
13 Details of the U.S.-Bahrain defense agreement are classified. Some provisions are discussed in Sami Hajjar, U.S.
Military Presence in the Gulf: Challenges and Prospects (U.S. Army War College: Strategic Studies Institute), March
2002, p. 27.
14 Walter Pincus. “Bahrain Government’s Ties With the United States Run Deep.” Washington Post, February 22,
2011.
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In March 2008, Bahrain took a turn in a rotation to command CTF-152, and it commanded again
in December 2010. Bahrain commanded an anti-piracy task force in Gulf/Arabian Sea waters in
October 2010. These operations are offshoots of Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) in
Afghanistan, which ousted the Taliban after the September 11 attacks. Bahrain allowed the United
States to fly combat missions from its bases (Shaykh Isa Air Base) in both OEF and the war to
oust Saddam Hussein in March-April 2003 (Operation Iraqi Freedom, OIF). During both OEF
and OIF, Bahrain publicly deployed its U.S.-supplied frigate warship (the Subha) to help protect
U.S. ships, and it sent ground and air assets to Kuwait in support of OIF. Bahrain hosted about
4,000 U.S. military personnel during major combat of OEF (October 2001-May 2003).
Bahrain and UAE have been the only Gulf states to deploy their own forces to provide aid to
Afghanistan. In January 2009, Bahrain sent 100 police officers to Afghanistan on a two-year tour
to help U.S./NATO-led stabilization operations there.
Bahrain’s participation in OIF came despite domestic opposition in Bahrain to that war. Because
of its limited income, Bahrain has not contributed funds to Iraq reconstruction, but it attended the
“Expanded Neighbors of Iraq” regional conference process which last met in Kuwait on April 22,
2008. That process was suspended in late 2008 as Iraq stabilized and the United States has begun
the process of withdrawal, expected to be complete by the end of 2011. On October 16, 2008,
Bahrain’s first post-Saddam ambassador to Iraq (Saleh Ali al-Maliki) presented his credentials in
Baghdad, in line with King Hamad’s pledge to President Bush in March 2008. Some of the other
Gulf states, most notably Saudi Arabia, have still not established a full embassy in Iraq, in part
due to differences between Saudi Arabia and the Shiite-led government of Prime Minister Nuri al-
Maliki.
U.S. Arms Transfers and Military Aid
To assist Bahrain’s ability to cooperate with the United States on regional security issues,
Congress and successive Administrations, citing Bahrain’s limited income, have supported
military assistance to Bahrain’s small force. The main recipient of such assistance is the relatively
small Bahrain Defense Force (BDF), which has about 13,000 personnel (plus about 1,200
National Guard). The BDF and the police are run by Sunni Bahrainis, but are said to supplement
their ranks with unknown percentages of paid Sunni Muslim recruits from neighboring countries,
including Pakistan, Yemen, Jordan, Iraq, and elsewhere. Until 1998, Bahrain’s internal security
services were run by a former British colonial police officer, Ian Henderson, who had a reputation
among Shiites for using repressive measures. The current director of the internal security service
is Shaykh Khalifa bin Abdullah Al Khalifa, considered a hardliner in the royal family.
Bahrain is eligible to receive grant “excess defense articles” (EDA). The United States transferred
the FFG-7 “Perry class” frigate Subha (see above) as EDA in July 1997. According to the State
Department’s FY2012 budget request, the U.S. Navy is supporting providing another frigate (an
“extended deck frigate”) to Bahrain as EDA because the Subha is approaching the end of its
service life. In 1996, the United States gave Bahrain a no-cost five-year lease on 60 M60A3
tanks; title subsequently passed to Bahrain. Foreign Military Financing (FMF) was suspended for
Bahrain in FY1994 but restarted in appreciation of Bahrain’s support in OEF and OIF.
Recent FMF (and funds provided under “Section 1206” of the National Defense Authorization
Act of 2006, P.L. 109-163), have been provided to help Bahrain maintain U.S.-origin weapons, to
enhance inter-operability with U.S. forces, to augment Bahrain’s air defenses, to support and
upgrade the avionics of its F-16 fleet, and to improve counter-terrorism capabilities. As an
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example, the United States has supplied Bahrain with a coastal radar system that reportedly
provides Bahrain and the U.S. Navy a 360-degree field of vision around Bahrain.15 Some funds
have been used to build up Bahrain’s Special Operations forces. The Defense Department
estimates that, in part due to U.S. assistance, as of FY2008, about 45% of Bahrain’s forces are
fully capable of integrating into a U.S.-led coalition.
As noted in the table, small amounts of International Military Education and Training funds
(IMET) are provided to Bahrain to inculcate principles of civilian control of the military,
democracy, and interoperability with U.S. forces. During FY2010, 26 Bahraini students attended
U.S. military schools.
Purchases With National Funds
Despite its limited funds (Bahrain’s total government budget was about $6 billion in 2009),
Bahrain has purchased some U.S. systems. In 1998, Bahrain purchased 10 U.S.-made F-16Cs
from new production, worth about $390 million. In 1999, the United States sold Bahrain 26
Advanced Medium-Range Air-to-Air Missiles (AMRAAM) to arm the F-16s, although some
Members were concerned that the AMRAAM sale could promote an arms race in the Gulf.
Section 581 of the FY1990 foreign operations appropriation act (P.L. 101-167) made Bahrain the
only Gulf state eligible to receive the STINGER shoulder-fired anti-aircraft missile, and the
United States has sold Bahrain about 70 Stingers since 1990. (This authorization has been
repeated in subsequent legislation.) To allay congressional concerns about possible U.S.
promotion of missile proliferation in the region, an August 2000 sale of 30 Army Tactical Missile
Systems (ATACMs, a system of short-range ballistic missiles fired from a multiple rocket
launcher) included an agreement for joint U.S.-Bahraini control of the weapon. (A notification of
a possible sale to Bahrain of 30 ATACM missiles and associated equipment, valued at about $70
million, was sent to Congress on November 4, 2010. Lockheed Martin is the prime contractor for
the missiles.)
Among recent sales notified to Congress by the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA)
are a sale, worth up to $42 million, of 180 “Javelin” anti-armor missiles and 60 launch units; a
sale, worth up to $252 million, of nine UH-60M Blackhawk helicopters; a sale, notified August 3,
2007, of six Bell search and recovery helicopters, valued at about $160 million; and a sale,
notified on July 28, 2009, of up to 25 AMRAAMs (Raytheon Missile Systems Corp.) and
associated equipment, valued at about $74 million.
Some of the most recent sales are in accordance with the State Department’s “Gulf Security
Dialogue,” begun in 2006 to counter Iran, and under which a total of about $20 billion worth of
U.S. weapons might be sold to the Gulf monarchy states. Only a small portion of that total sales
volume is reportedly slated for Bahrain. As noted above, U.S. arms sales policy to Gulf allies and
other Middle Eastern countries is said to be under review in light of regional unrest that began in
early 2011, including Bahrain.

15 “Bahrain Government’s Ties With the United States Run Deep.” Op. cit.
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Anti-Terrorism Cooperation
Bahrain’s cooperation in post-September 11 regional security operations was discussed above. As
far as terrorists operating inside Bahrain itself, the State Department’s report on international
terrorism for 2009 (released August 5, 2010) credits Bahrain for having “actively monitored
terrorism suspects” and for achieving convictions of five men accused of membership of a
terrorist organization—the first use of a 2006 counterterrorism law. The report, however, as did
the same report of the previous year, notes that Bahrain has not overcome legal constraints that
have sometimes hampered its ability to detain and prosecute suspected terrorists.
Bahrain also continues to host the Middle East and North Africa Financial Action Task Force
(MENA/FATF) secretariat and its Central Bank, Financial Information Unit (within the Central
Bank), and local banks cooperate with U.S. efforts against terrorism financing and money
laundering. As noted by the State Department in the FY2012 budget justification, some of the
U.S. assistance to Bahrain (NADR funds) are used to provide training to its counter-terrorism
institutions and to augment the ability of Bahraini forces to protect U.S. diplomatic and military
facilities in Bahrain. The Bahraini Ministry of Interior is the lead agency that receives this support
and, according to the FY2012 budget justification, the Administration is “reviewing” the use of
this aid to ensure that none was used “against protestors” in the 2011 unrest.
Relations with and Cooperation Against Iran
As noted previously, Bahrain focuses its foreign policy intently on Iran, which has purportedly
demonstrated an ability to aggravate Bahrain’s domestic turmoil to a greater degree than has any
other regional power. Bahrain perceives Iran as willing and able to support Shiite groups against
Bahrain’s Sunni-dominated government, although in recent years, and in the current crisis,
evidence of direct Iranian interference in Bahrain has been limited. In December 1981, and then
again in June 1996—a time when Iran was actively seeking to export its Islamic revolution—
Bahrain publicly accused Iran of trying to organize a coup by pro-Iranian Bahraini Shiites (the
Islamic Front for the Liberation of Bahrain, IFLB). Bahrain’s leaders have hinted that Iran might
be supporting the February 2011 unrest, an assertion that most experts believe lacks concrete
evidentiary support. However, as noted above, Iran is likely to exert far greater influence over a
Shiite-dominated Bahrain than it does over the current government.
Bahrain’s fears are amplified by lingering suspicions, sometimes fed by Iranian actions, that Iran
never accepted the results of the 1970 U.N. survey giving Bahrain independence rather than
integration with Iran. Those findings were endorsed by U.N. Security Council Resolution 278,
which was ratified by Iran’s parliament. After these official determinations, Bahrain had
considered the issue closed, after over a century of Persian contestation of Bahraini sovereignty.
Those contests included an effort by Reza Shah Pahlavi of Iran in the 1930s to deny Bahrain the
right to grant oil concessions to the United States and Britain.
In recent years, Bahrain’s leadership—and other countries in the region—have reacted strongly
against statements by Iranian editorialists and advisers to Iranian leaders appearing to reassert
Iran’s claim. One such example was a July 2007 Iranian newspaper article reasserting the Iranian
claim to Bahrain. However, that article, along with the Bahraini Crown Prince’s November 3,
2007, comment that Iran is developing a nuclear weapon (Iran claims it is developing only
civilian nuclear power), did not mar the visit of Iranian President Ahmadinejad on November 17,
2007. In March 2009 by former Iranian parliament speaker Ali Akbar Nateq Nuri, now an advisor
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to Iran’s Supreme Leader, again referring to Bahrain as Iran’s 14th province. Iran’s Foreign
Ministry immediately tried to limit any diplomatic damage by asserting respect for Bahrain’s
sovereignty and independence, but some Arab governments sharply criticized the Nateq Nuri
comments. Morocco broke relations with Iran as a response.
At the same time, so as not to provide Iran a pretext to pressure Bahrain, Bahrain’s leaders have
sometimes tried to silence voices in Bahrain that publicly attack Iran. An example is the one-day
suspension in 2009 of the newspaper Akhbar al Khaleej (Gulf News) for running an editorial by a
Bahrain Shura Council member who criticized Iranian leaders.
Bahrain has generally supported the U.S. position that Iran is not fully cooperating with U.N.
Security Council requirements to verifiably demonstrate that its nuclear program is not a cover
for a nuclear weapons program. In the joint news conference with Secretary Clinton on December
3, 2010, referenced earlier, the foreign minister restated Bahrain’s support for Iran’s right to
nuclear power for peaceful uses. However, it stated forthright that “when it comes to taking that
[nuclear] power, to developing it into a cycle for weapon grade, that is something that we can
never accept, and we can never live with in this region.”16 Bahrain also regularly invites high-
ranking Iranian officials to the annual International Institute for Security Studies (IISS)
conference in Bahrain called the “Manama Dialogue,” held every December. At times, there have
been expectations that U.S. officials might meet with Iranian officials at the margins of the
conference, although such meetings have not taken place in practice. Iranian officials have
sometimes been known to cancel their travel to the meeting on short notice, particularly if they
sense that the conference will feature U.S. or other criticism of Iran.
Bahrain-Iran Gas Development Deal and Other Economic Ties
One of the ways Bahrain stays engaged with Iran is through discussions of major energy projects
with Iran and by conducting normal trade and banking ties with it. The 2007 Ahmadinejad visit
resulted in a preliminary agreement for Bahrain to buy 1.2 billion cubic feet per day (for 25 years)
of Iranian gas via an undersea pipeline to be built. The deal would have involved a $4 billion
investment by Bahrain to develop Phases 15 and 16 of Iran’s South Pars gas field, which
presumably would be the source of the gas that Bahrain would import. The March 2009
comments of Nateq Nuri, discussed above, led to the suspension of this deal. On October 21,
2009, Bahrain’s Minister of Oil and Gas Abd al-Husayn Mirza said talks on the deal would
“resume soon,” although the 2011 unrest and withdraw of mutual ambassadors further clouds the
prospects for the deal.
There are no indications that Iran-Bahrain commerce has been affected by the 2011 unrest.
Energy market observers say that Bahrain energy firms are still supplying gasoline to Iran. No
U.N. Security Council Resolution bars such sales, but a U.S. law signed on July 1, 2010—the
Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010 (CISADA, P.L. 111-
195)—provides for sanctions against foreign firms that sell more than $1 million worth of
gasoline to Iran. Some energy firms in the Gulf, including in Kuwait, reportedly have become

16 Department of State. Transcript of Remarks by Secretary Clinton and Foreign Minister Al Khalifa. December 3,
2010.
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reticent to continue supplying gasoline to Iran because of the U.S. action, but Bahrain is not
known to have publicly disavowed further gasoline sales to Iran.17
In March 2008, the U.S. Department of Justice sanctioned Future Bank, headquartered in
Bahrain, because it is controlled and partially owned by Iran’s Bank Melli. The sanctions, under
Executive Order 13382 (anti-proliferation), prevent U.S. citizens from participating in
transactions with Future Bank and require the freezing of any U.S.-based bank assets. The Bank
remains in operation.
Other Foreign Policy Issues
Bahrain has close relations with the other GCC states, in particular Saudi Arabia, as evidenced by
its turn to Saudi Arabia to help it deal with the 2011 unrest. Virtually all the GCC states have
political structures similar to that of Bahrain, and several have substantial Shiite minorities
(although not majorities, as Bahrain does). Saudi Arabia’s Shiites (about 10% of the population)
are located mostly in the eastern provinces, across a causeway constructed in 1986 that connects
the two countries. This linkage partly explains Saudi concerns about the unrest shaking the royal
family in Bahrain.
Qatar Territorial Disputes18
The United States cooperates closely with both Qatar and Bahrain, which is why the Bahrain-
Qatar territorial dispute was closely watched by U.S. policymakers. The resolution of the dispute
has partly removed these tensions as an issue for U.S. Gulf policy. Qatar, like Bahrain, is a GCC
monarchy; however, their relations have been sometimes acrimonious because of territorial
disputes with roots in the 18th century, when the ruling families of both countries controlled parts
of the Arabian peninsula. Qatar-Bahrain relations have improved since an International Court of
Justice ruled on March 16, 2001, on the disputes. The ICJ ruled in favor of Qatar on some of the
issues, and in favor of Bahrain on others, but the central dispute—over the Hawar Islands—was
decided in favor of Bahrain. Qatar expressed disappointment over the ruling but said it accepted it
as binding, and the two have since muted mutual criticism and cooperated on major regional
issues. The territorial disputes were referred to the ICJ by Qatar in 1991 after clashes in 1986 in
which Qatar landed military personnel on a man-made reef (Fasht al-Dibal) that was in dispute,
and took some Bahrainis prisoner. Saudi mediation in the 1986-1991 period proved fruitless. That
reef was awarded to Qatar in the ICJ ruling. However, the ICJ ruled against Bahrain’s claim to the
town of Zubara on the Qatari mainland, where some members of the Al Khalifa family were long
buried. Two smaller islands, Janan and Hadd Janan, were ruled not part of the Hawar Islands
group and were awarded to Qatar.
Arab-Israeli Issues
On the Arab-Israeli dispute, Bahrain has not been as significant a mediator or broker as have its
larger neighbors in the Gulf or broader Middle East. Bahrain has not taken a leading role in recent
efforts to reconcile Hamas and Fatah to rebuild Palestinian unity, for example. On the other hand,

17 CRS conversations with foreign diplomats, including some from the Gulf. July – September 2010.
18 See The Estimate. Dossier: The Bahrain-Qatar Border Dispute: The World Court Decision, Part 1 and Part 2. March
23, 2001 and April 6, 2001.
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Bahrain is not inactive on the issue; on October 1, 2009, the foreign minister called for direct
talks with Israel. In the previously cited December 3, 2010, joint press conference with the
foreign minister, Secretary of State Clinton expressed appreciation for Bahrain’s support of
Palestinian Authority leaders who are trying to build viable institutions and rule of law in the
Palestinian territories.
Earlier, Bahrain participated in the 1990-1996 multilateral Arab-Israeli talks, and it hosted a
session on the environment (October 1994). Bahrain did not follow Oman and Qatar in
exchanging trade offices with Israel. In September 1994, all GCC states ceased enforcing
secondary and tertiary boycotts of Israel while retaining the ban on direct trade (primary boycott).
In conjunction with the U.S.-Bahrain FTA, Bahrain dropped the primary boycott and closed
boycott-related offices in Bahrain.
Still, the Arab-Israeli dispute always has the potential to become a political issue within Bahrain.
Islamist hard-liners in Bahrain have accused the government of trying to “normalize” relations
with Israel, citing the government’s sending a delegate to the November 27, 2007, summit on
Middle East peace in Annapolis, the foreign minister’s meeting with Israeli officials at U.N.
meetings in September 2007, and by proposing (in October 2008) a “regional organization” that
would group Iran, Turkey, Israel, and the Arab states. That proposal has not been implemented to
date. In late October 2009, the elected COR passed a bill making it a crime (punishable by up to
five years in jail) for Bahrainis to travel to Israel or hold talks with Israelis. The bill, which has
not proceeded to become law (concurrence by the upper house, and acceptance by the King),
apparently was a reaction to a visit by Bahraini officials to Israel in July 2009. The visit was to
obtain the release of five Bahrainis taken prisoner by Israel when it seized a ship bound with
goods for Gaza, which is controlled by Hamas. In June 2010, Sunni and Shiite Islamists in
Bahrain held a demonstration to denounced the Israeli seizure of a ship in a flotilla intended to
run the Israeli blockade of the Hamas-run Gaza Strip.
Economic Issues
Like the other Gulf states, Bahrain was affected by the international financial crisis of 2008-2009,
but perhaps to a lesser extent than the wealthier states of Kuwait, UAE, and Saudi Arabia.
Bahrain did not experience the construction and real estate “bubble” to the degree that this
occurred in, for example, UAE.
Bahrain has the lowest oil and gas reserves of the Gulf monarchy states, estimated respectively at
210 million barrels of oil and 5.3 trillion cubic feet of gas. Some economic statistics are presented
in Table 2. Without the ample oil or gas resources of its neighbors, Bahrain has diversified its
economy by emphasizing banking and financial services (about 25.5% of GDP). At current rates
of production (35,000 barrels per day of crude oil), Bahrain’s onshore oil reserves will be
exhausted in 15 years, but Saudi Arabia shares equally with Bahrain the 300,000 barrels per day
produced from the offshore Abu Safa field. The United States buys virtually no oil from Bahrain;
the major U.S. import from it is aluminum. Aluminum and other manufacturing sectors in
Bahrain account for the existence in Bahrain of a vibrant middle and working class among its
citizens. However, these classes are largely composed of majority Shiite Muslims who are
envious of the “ownership class” mostly of Sunni Muslims.
To encourage further reform and signal U.S. appreciation, the United States and Bahrain signed
an FTA on September 14, 2004. Implementing legislation was signed January 11, 2006 (P.L. 109-
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Bahrain: Reform, Security, and U.S. Policy

169). In 2009, the United States exported $668 million worth of goods to Bahrain, and imported
$463 million in goods from that country. In 2005, total bilateral trade was about $780 million,
suggesting that trade has expanded significantly following the FTA.

Table 2. Some Basic Facts About Bahrain
Population
About 740,000, of which 503,000 are citizens
Religions
81% Muslim, 9% Christian, 10% other
GDP (purchasing power parity) $28
billion (2009)
Budget
$5.81 billion revenues, $5.86 billion
expenditures (2009)
External Debt
$11 billion (2009)
Inflation Rate
3% (2009)
GDP Real Growth Rate
2.9% in 2009, down from over 6% in 2008
Size of Bahrain Defense Forces (BDF)
About 13,000, plus about 1,200 National
Guard. Some personnel are expatriates,
including other Arab and Pakistani.
Source: CIA, The World Factbook.

Table 3. U.S. Assistance to Bahrain
($ in millions)
FY2011
FY2012

FY03 FY04
FY05 FY06
FY07
FY08 FY09
FY2010
request
request
FMF
90.0 24.6 18.847 15.593 14.998 3.968 8.0
19.0
19.5
25.0
IMET
0.448 0.600
0.649 0.651 0.616 0.622 .661
.670
.700
.700
NADR


1.489 2.761 .776 0.744 .500
1.10
1.5
.500
“Section
1206”
5.3
24.54
4.3
16.2


Notes: IMET = International Military Education and Training Funds, used mainly to enhance BDF military
professionalism and promote U.S. values. NADR = Non-Proliferation, Anti-Terrorism, De-Mining and Related
Programs, used to sustain Bahrain’s counterterrorism capabilities and interdict terrorists. Section 1206 are DOD
funds used to train and equip Bahrain’s special forces, its coastal surveillance and patrol capabilities, and to
develop its counter terrorism assessment capabilities. (Named for a section of the FY2006 Defense
Authorization Act, P.L. 109-163.) FY2008 funds derived from FY2008 supplemental (P.L. 110-252), and the
Consolidated appropriation (P.L. 110-329). FY2009 funds included funding from FY2008 supplemental (P.L. 110-
252) as wel as regular appropriation (P.L. 111-8). FY2010 funds from Consolidated Appropriation (P.L. 111-117).
FY2011 levels are general y held at FY2010 levels because of the Continuing Resolution funding al operations.
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Bahrain: Reform, Security, and U.S. Policy

Figure 1. Bahrain

Source: https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ba.html.

Author Contact Information

Kenneth Katzman

Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs
kkatzman@crs.loc.gov, 7-7612


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