The Kaesong North-South Korean Industrial
Complex
Mark E. Manyin
Specialist in Asian Affairs
Dick K. Nanto
Specialist in Industry and Trade
March 17, 2011
Congressional Research Service
7-5700
www.crs.gov
RL34093
CRS Report for Congress
P
repared for Members and Committees of Congress
The Kaesong North-South Korean Industrial Complex
Summary
This purpose of this report is to provide an overview of the role, purposes, and results of the
Kaesong Industrial Complex (KIC) and examine U.S. interests, policy issues, options, and
legislation. The KIC is a six-year old industrial park located in the Democratic People’s Republic
of Korea (DPRK or North Korea) just across the demilitarized zone from South Korea. As of the
end of 2010, over 120 medium-sized South Korean companies were employing over 47,000
North Korean workers to manufacture products in Kaesong. The facility, which in 2010 produced
$323 million in output, has the land and infrastructure to house two to three times as many firms
and workers. Products vary widely, and include clothing and textiles (71 firms), kitchen utensils
(4 firms), auto parts (4 firms), semiconductor parts (2 firms), and toner cartridges (1 firm).
Despite a rise in tensions between North and South Korea since early 2008, the complex has
continued to operate and expand. The KIC was not shut down in 2010 despite two violent
incidents between the two Koreas that year: the March sinking of a South Korean naval vessel,
the Cheonan, which was found to be caused by a North Korean torpedo, and North Korea’s
artillery attack on a South Korean island in November. Indeed, the complex has become virtually
the last vestige of inter-Korean cooperation. After the Cheonan sinking, South Korea announced
it would cut off all inter-Korean economic relations except the Kaesong complex. It also has
reduced the number of South Korean workers—primarily government officials and business
managers—at the complex because of worries about them being taken hostage by North Korea.
The KIC represents a dilemma for U.S. and South Korean policymakers. On the one hand, the
project provides an ongoing revenue stream to the Kim Jong-il regime in Pyongyang, by virtue of
the share the government takes from the salaries paid to North Korean workers. South Korean and
U.S. officials estimate this revenue stream to be around $20 million per year. On the other hand,
the KIC arguably helps maintain stability on the Peninsula and provides a possible beachhead for
market reforms in the DPRK that could eventually spill over to areas outside the park and expose
tens of thousands of North Koreans to outside influences, market-oriented businesses, and
incentives.
The United States has limited direct involvement in the KIC, which the United States has
officially supported since its conception. At present, no U.S. companies have invested in the
Kaesong complex, though a number of South Korean officials have expressed a desire to attract
U.S. investment. U.S. government approval is needed for South Korean firms to ship to the KIC
certain U.S.-made equipment currently under U.S. export controls. The Korea-U.S. Free Trade
Agreement (KORUS FTA), which has yet to be submitted to Congress for approval, provides for
a Committee on Outward Processing Zones (OPZ) to be formed and to consider whether zones
such as the KIC will receive preferential treatment under the FTA. Although the KORUS FTA
says that the Executive branch will seek “legislative approval” for any changes to the agreement,
Congress’s precise role in accepting or rejecting these changes is not clear.
Another issue raised by the KIC is whether components made in the complex can enter the United
States if they are incorporated into products that are manufactured in South Korea and that
qualify as originating in South Korea. This possibility is likely to be determined mainly by the
KIC’s evolution; the more that is produced in the complex, the more products are likely to enter
South Korea’s supply chain.
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The Kaesong North-South Korean Industrial Complex
Contents
Developments from March 2010-June 2010 ................................................................................ 1
The KIC Survives Inter-Korean Tensions in 2010.................................................................. 2
The KIC and Inter-Korean Relations ..................................................................................... 4
Implications for U.S. Interests ............................................................................................... 5
The Development of the Kaesong Industrial Complex ................................................................. 5
Issues Related to the Kaesong Industrial Complex....................................................................... 9
Labor Issues.......................................................................................................................... 9
Financial Benefits for Pyongyang........................................................................................ 11
Kaesong and the Proposed Korea-U.S. Free Trade Agreement ............................................. 12
Negotiating History....................................................................................................... 12
The KORUS FTA’s Text................................................................................................ 13
Congress’s Role is Not Clear......................................................................................... 13
Labor Standards and KIC Potentially Providing a Competitive Advantage..................... 13
Kaesong-Made Components and the KORUS FTA........................................................ 14
The Control of Exports to Kaesong ..................................................................................... 14
Long-Term Geopolitical and Economic Issues........................................................................... 15
U.S. Interests and Policy Options .............................................................................................. 18
Figures
Figure 1. The Kaesong Industrial Complex and the North-South Korean Border.......................... 2
Figure 2. Kaesong’s Potential Logistical Role............................................................................ 18
Tables
Table 1. Key Statistics for the Kaesong Industrial Complex ......................................................... 1
Table 2. Hyundai’s Original Concept of the First Three Phases of the Master Plan for the
Kaesong Industrial Complex .................................................................................................... 7
Table 3. Production by Category in the Kaesong Industrial Complex ........................................... 8
Contacts
Author Contact Information ...................................................................................................... 21
Congressional Research Service
The Kaesong North-South Korean Industrial Complex
Developments from March 2010-June 2010
The Kaesong Industrial Complex (KIC) is an industrial park located in the Democratic People’s
Republic of Korea (DPRK or North Korea) just across the demilitarized zone from South Korea.
As of the end of December 2010, approximately 120 medium-sized South Korean companies
were using North Korean labor to manufacture products there, employing over 47,000 workers.
(See Table 1.) Currently, the park has much of the infrastructure (e.g., South Korean-built water,
sewage treatment, and electrical facilities) to enable the completion of the complex’s first phase,
an 800-acre site that would contain roughly 300 foreign manufacturers employing around
100,000 North Korean workers. If the master plan of Hyundai Asan, the co-developer of the
project, is followed the KIC eventually will be over 6,000 acres (nearly half the size of Manhattan
Island) and include high-technology zones, shopping districts, residential areas, and facilities for
tourism and recreation. At present, over 100 companies that have signed lease agreements to open
factories have not done so. The complex was planned, developed, and financed largely by South
Korea, and it has become a symbol of engagement between the North and the South. In 2010,
about $1.4 billion, or 76%, of the $1.9 billion in total trade between the two Koreas was
attributable to the KIC.1
Table 1. Key Statistics for the Kaesong Industrial Complex
End 2005
End 2006
End 2007
End 2008
End 2009
End 2010
No. of South Korean
11 15 65 93 118
121
Manufacturing Firms
(Jan. 2010)
Approx. No. of North
6,000 11,000 23,000 39,000 42,000 47,000
Korean Workers
Approx. No. of South
n.a. 700 800 1,500 960 Around
Korean Workers
500
Annual Production Value
$15 mil.
$74 mil.
$185 mil.
$250 mil.
$256 mil
$323 mil
Exports to 3rd Countries
–
$20 mil.
$40 mil
$36 mil
$29 mil
$37 mil
(i.e., not South Korea)
Sources: South Korean Ministry of Unification documents.
The purpose of this report is to provide an overview of the role, purposes, and results of the KIC
and examine U.S. interests, policy issues, options, and legislation.
1 South Korean Ministry of Unification, as reported by U.S. Embassy Seoul Economic Section, North Korea Economic
Briefing, January 21, 2011.
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The Kaesong North-South Korean Industrial Complex
Figure 1. The Kaesong Industrial Complex and the North-South Korean Border
Source: Prepared by CRS based on ESRI Data and Maps 9.3.1; IHS World Data.
The KIC Survives Inter-Korean Tensions in 2010
Twice in 2010, the KIC’s future was thrown into doubt by a marked deterioration in inter-Korean
relations. First, on March 26, 2010, a South Korean naval vessel, the Cheonan, sank in waters
disputed by the two Koreas. Nearly 50 South Korean sailors died in the incident. A multinational
investigation team led by South Korea determined that the ship was sunk by a North Korean
submarine.2 South Korea, backed by the United States and Japan, has said it will take the case
before the United Nations Security Council. On May 24, 2010, South Korean President Lee
Myung-bak also announced that North Korean ships would no longer be permitted to pass
through shipping lanes under South Korean control, and that North-South trade, visits, and
exchanges generally would be suspended. Exceptions were made for humanitarian aid to infants
and children, and for the KIC. Propaganda radio and loudspeaker broadcasts into North Korea
would also be resumed.3 South Korean Minister of Unification Hyun In-taek announced that new
investments in the complex would be stopped and that the number of South Korean personnel at
the complex—which had often approached 1,000 people in mid-week—would be reduced by as
much as 50%.4
2 South Korean Ministry of National Defense, “Investigation Result on the Sinking of ROKS ‘Cheonan,’” May 20,
2010. The Joint Civilian-Military Investigation Group (JIG) included 25 South Koreans and 24 non-Korean civilian and
military officials from the United States, Great Britain, Australia, and Sweden. North Korea has called the
investigation’s conclusion a “fabrication.” Pyongyang Korean Central Broadcasting Station, “DPRK NDC
Spokesman’s Statement on ROK’s Sunken Ship Investigation Results,” May 20, 2010, as translated from the Korean
by the Open Source Center.
3 Office of the President of South Korea, “Special Address to the Nation by the President Lee Myung-bak,” May 24,
2010.
4 South Korean Ministry of Unification Press Release, “Announcement of Measures against North Korea,” May 24,
2010. In March 2009, North Korea closed the North-South border for several days, leaving hundreds of South Korean
workers unable to return home.
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North Korea’s Committee for the Peaceful Reunification of the Fatherland, the government organ
responsible for inter-Korean relations, responded by labeling the actions by the “puppet” South
Korean government as “a declaration of war against us” and announcing that it would abrogate all
North-South non-aggression agreements, terminate contact with Lee’s government, and
“completely halt” all North-South cooperation projects, among other steps.5 However, the
Kaesong complex was not shut down, although North Korea threatened to take this step if South
Korean loudspeaker broadcasts resumed. (It also threatened to shoot at the loudspeakers.) Instead,
several South Korean government workers at the KIC were expelled. South Korea did not restart
its broadcasts.
Second, on November 23, North Korean artillery units fired over 150 shells onto and around
Yeonpyeong Island, across the North-South disputed western sea border. North Korea claimed
that the South Korean military had fired first, during routine U.S.-ROK exercises in the area.
According to one report, about half the North Korean shells hit the island. The barrage killed four
South Koreans (two marines and two civilians), wounded dozens, and destroyed or damaged
scores of homes and other buildings.6 It was North Korea’s first direct artillery attack on ROK
territory since the 1950-1953 Korean War. South Korea responded by shooting 80 shells at North
Korea. An official North Korean media outlet later said that the South Korean civilian deaths
were “regrettable.”7
The attacks prompted South Korea and the United States to hold large-scale naval exercises in the
Yellow Sea area with the USS George Washington aircraft carrier strike group and led to closer
U.S.-South Korea-Japan collaboration on security matters. In a nationally televised speech, Lee
announced that South Korea would no longer hold back on retaliating for North Korean
provocations. The South Korean Defense Minister stated that if attacked in the future, South
Korea would consider using its air force to strike back in North Korean territory.8
Despite these tensions, it appeared that both Koreas were reluctant to allow the complex to be
closed, or at least to be blamed for its closure. Aside from the park’s symbolic importance, both
sides would incur financial losses if it ceased operating. The KIC provides the North Korean
government with a constant revenue stream of around $2 million a month, by virtue of the share
the government takes from the salaries paid to North Korean workers. The prospect of triggering
social unrest due to depriving families in the Kaesong area, with a population of around 200,000,
of high-paying jobs may also be a factor for the North Korean regime of Kim Jong-il, who is
trying to pave the way for his son, Kim Jong-un, to succeed him.
5 “Press Statement by Spokesman for the Committee for the Peaceful Reunification of the Fatherland [CPRF],”
Pyongyang Korean Central Television, May 25, 2010. Translated from the Korean by the Open Source Center,
KPP20100525104004.
6 Stratfor.com, “Satellite Imagery: Tactical Details of the Korean Artillery Exchange,” November 30, 2010.
7 “DPRK KPA Supreme Command’s Communique on Artillery Gunfire Along Inter-Korean Border,” Pyongyang
Korean Central Broadcasting Station in Korean, November 23, 2010, translated by Open Source Center
KPP20101123106004; “DPRK Commentary Says 23 Nov Clash Due to US, Civilian Casualties ‘Very Regrettable’,”
Korean Central News Agency, November 27, 2010.
8 “'Full Text’ of ROK President Lee’s 29 November ‘Address to the Nation’,” Yonhap, November 29, 2010. Lee said
that for decades, South Korea had “tolerated provocations by the North time and again.… South Korea nonetheless
endured these continual provocations because we entertained a slight hope that the North would change course
someday…. At long last, we came to a realization … that prolonged endurance and tolerance will spawn nothing but
more serious provocations. If the North commits any additional provocations against the South, we will make sure that
it pays a dear price without fail.”
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As for South Korea, a closure could make the central government liable for hundreds of millions
of dollars in insurance payments to the South Korean companies that use the park. Although there
have been conflicting reports about whether South Korean manufacturers in the park are
profitable, it is possible that a number of them would suffer significant financial hardship if the
KIC were closed.
The up and down treatment of the Kaesong complex in 2010 fits the patterns that have existed for
the past three years.
The KIC and Inter-Korean Relations
The KIC is virtually the last vestige of the range of inter-Korean cooperation projects initiated
during the period of détente between South Korea and North Korea from 2000-2008. Relations
began deteriorating after new developments in both Koreas. In December 2007, a new,
conservative South Korean president, Lee Myung-bak, was elected. Lee’s administration
cancelled a range of large-scale infrastructure inter-Korean projects that his predecessor had
promised South Korea would finance, instituted a more “reciprocity-based” policy toward North
Korea, and was openly critical of human rights conditions in North Korea. Lee has linked
progress on a number of items in inter-Korean relations to North Korea’s agreement to
denuclearize.
Lee’s government has been ambivalent about KIC. On one hand, the complex has been physically
expanding since Lee took office. As shown in Table 1, the number of South Korean
manufacturers operating in the complex has nearly doubled since his inauguration in early 2008.9
Under Lee, a number of steps have been taken to support the KIC, including providing special tax
breaks to small- and medium-sized enterprises that outsource their manufacturing to KIC
companies; allowing KIC companies to resell their lots inside the complex; reducing health care
premiums by 50% for South Korean workers in the complex; and issuing new loans and trade
insurance to KIC companies.10
On the other hand, the Lee administration has halted plans for a major expansion of the complex.
Of the 57 South Korean firms that have opened factories in Kaesong since Lee took office, only 7
received approval from his government. In October 2007, with the complex outgrowing the
greater Kaesong area’s ability to provide workers, Lee’s predecessor, Roh Moo-hyun (2003-
2008), promised North Korea that Seoul would build dormitories to house tens of thousands of
new North Korean workers. Lee cancelled these plans. It is unclear to what extent his government
will link construction of the dorms to North Korea’s behavior in nuclear talks and/or to some sort
of apology for the Cheonan sinking and the Yeonpyeong Island attack. Alternatively, the Lee
government may decide to link the dorms to developments within the park. For instance, many
South Koreans want more provisions for the safety of South Korean workers at the complex and
to allow greater communication services (such as cell phones, which currently are prohibited at
the complex).
In North Korea, Kim Jong-il’s reported stroke in the summer of 2008 coincided with a more
bellicose and provocative stance, including the testing of a nuclear device in May 2009. For
9 These new firms were those who had been granted approval during the Roh Moo-hyun government.
10 South Korean Ministry of Unification, The Lee Myung-bak Administration’s North Korea Policy, May 2010, p. 45-
52.
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roughly a nine-month period from November 2008 through August 2009, the North Korean
military appeared to be dictating policy decisions with regard to the KIC. During this time, North
Korean authorities imposed a number of restrictions on the KIC, including closing down the
border for several days in March 2009, effectively trapping hundreds of South Korean workers at
the complex. The restrictions are blamed for the decline in the complex’s aggregate production in
2009. The apparent reassertion of civilian control in the late summer of 2009—the time period
when Kim Jong-il is commonly thought to have reasserted his authority—brought a relaxation of
most of the restrictions. North Korea also stepped back from demands it had made that investors
dramatically increase wages and payments.
Implications for U.S. Interests
The KIC represents a policy dilemma. On the one hand, as mentioned above, the project provides
an ongoing revenue stream to the Kim Jong-il regime in Pyongyang. On the other hand, the KIC
provides a possible beachhead for market reforms in the DPRK that could eventually spill over to
areas outside the park and expose tens of thousands of North Koreans to outside influences and
incentives. Expanding the park would exacerbate the dilemma: The regime would reap additional
funds, but bringing in workers from areas north of Kaesong could also enhance the park’s
potential to serve as a “Trojan horse” in the medium-to-long term. The original plans for the KIC
envisioned the complex eventually housing hundreds of foreign (i.e., non-North Korean)
manufacturers, employing hundreds of thousands of North Korean workers.
The United States has limited direct involvement in the KIC, which the United States has
officially supported since its conception. At present, no U.S. companies have invested in the
Kaesong complex, though a number of South Korean officials have expressed a desire to attract
U.S. investment. U.S. government approval is needed for South Korean firms to ship to the KIC
certain U.S.-made equipment currently under U.S. export controls. The Korea-U.S. Free Trade
Agreement (KORUS FTA), which has yet to be submitted to Congress for approval, provides for
a Committee on Outward Processing Zones (OPZ) to be formed and to consider whether zones
such as the KIC will receive preferential treatment under the FTA (see “Kaesong and the
Proposed Korea-U.S. Free Trade Agreement” below). The EU-Korea FTA, which was signed in
2009, contains a similar provision.
The Development of the Kaesong Industrial
Complex
The KIC resulted from an initiative led by the Hyundai Group beginning in 1998 that coincided
with the Republic of Korea’s (ROK) “sunshine policy” that attempted to improve relations
between South Korea and the DPRK. The KIC is located about 106 miles southeast of Pyongyang
and 43 miles north of Seoul just across the demilitarized zone (DMZ) in the DPRK. The purposes
of the KIC as stated by South Korea have been to develop an industrial park in which South
Korean businesses could manufacture products using North Korean labor, provide an opening for
North Korea to liberalize and reform its economy, and ease tensions across the DMZ. Although
begun primarily as a private sector venture, both governments are heavily involved in the project.
Groundbreaking occurred in June 2003 and again in April 2004. Hyundai Asan and the Korea
Land Corporation (both from South Korea) have been developing and managing the complex.
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South Korean companies operating in Kaesong receive certain incentives from the ROK
government and have certain rights as determined by negotiated agreements with the DPRK. The
KIC is a duty-free zone, with no restrictions on the use of foreign currency or credit cards and no
visa required for entry or exit. Property and inheritance rights are ensured. South Korean law
breakers in Kaesong are not to go on trial in the North.11 The corporate tax rate is 10% to 14%
with an exemption for the first five years after generating profits and a 50% reduction for the
ensuing three years. The South Korean government (through its Inter-Korea Cooperation Fund)
offered companies that established their operations in the KIC (in the pilot project and first phase)
loans with low interest rates equal to those applied to public works projects. These loans totaled
about $40 million as of the end of 2005.12 Out of the first 26 firms to either begin operations or
contemplate beginning operations in the near term, 25 of them applied for loans from the Inter-
Korea Cooperation Fund.13 South Korea also provides political risk insurance that will cover
financial losses up to 90% of a company’s investment in the KIC up to 5 billion South Korean
won ($5.4 million). Under a South Korean law passed in April 2007, South Korean small and
medium-sized firms operating in the KIC are eligible for state subsidies and other benefits equal
to their counterparts at home.14
Table 2 shows the first three phases of the master plan for the project. The first phase
encompasses 800 acres with as many as 300 South Korean firms operating in the complex. At the
end of phase 3, the plan calls for as much as 4,800 acres in the industrial zone with as many as
1,500 firms employing 350,000 North Korean workers and producing $16 billion worth of
products per year. It also includes 2,200 acres in a supporting zone with residential facilities
(dorms), commercial establishments (hotels, restaurants, offices, conference rooms), and tourist
facilities (golf course, peace park, theme park). The Master Plan also includes an Expansion Zone
of 1,600 acres for industrial use and 4,000 acres for support. This would be used after phase 3 and
would accommodate an additional 500 companies, 150,000 employees, and estimated production
of $4 billion per year. Counting the expansion zone, the grand totals for the Master Plan would be
6,400 acres for the Industrial Zone (10 square miles), 6,200 acres for the Supporting Zone, 2,000
companies, 500,000 workers, and $20 billion per year in products. The industrial and supporting
zones together cover an area roughly one-fifth the size of Washington, DC.
11 Under the Agreement Regarding Admission and Staying in the Kaesong Industrial Complex and Mt. Kumgang
Special Tourism Zong (a.k.a. the Passage Agreement), the principle of compulsory repatriation of offenders was
acknowledged by Pyongyang. This was important for South Korean businesses because under North Korean law, even
crumbling a newspaper that displays Kim Jong-il’s picture is considered a criminal act. (See Lim, Eul-chul. Kaesong
Industrial Complex, History, Pending Issues, and Outlook, Seoul: Haenam Publishing Company, 2006, pp. 42-43.)
12 Hyundai Asan. Kaesong Industrial Park, brochure. c. 2006. ROK. Ministry of Unification. Gaesong Industrial
Complex: Frequently Asked Questions (May 21, 2006).
13 Lim, Eul-chul. Kaesong Industrial Complex, op. cit., p. 172.
14 South Korean Assembly Passes Bill on Inter-Korean Industrial Complex. Yonhap News Agency, April 27, 2007.
Reported by BBC Monitoring Asia Pacific.
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Table 2. Hyundai’s Original Concept of the First Three Phases
of the Master Plan for the Kaesong Industrial Complex
Phase 1
(includes pilot)
Phase 2
Phase 3
Year
2002-2007
2006-2009
2008-2012
Total Land at
800 acres in
2,000 acres in
4,800 acres in
Completion of Stage
Industrial Zone.
Industrial Zone
Industrial Zone
Kaesong City as a
800 acres in
1,600 acres in
Supporting Zone
Supporting Zone
Supporting Zone
Total ROK Firms
300 800
1,500
at Completion of Stage
Total DPRK Workers at
100,000 200,000 350,000
Completion of Stage
Source: ROK, Ministry of Unification.
The KIC aims to attract South Korean companies, particularly small and medium sized
enterprises, seeking lower labor and other costs for their manufactured products as an alternative
to establishing subsidiaries in China or other low-wage markets. As indicated in Table 1, by the
end of 2010, about 120 companies had begun operations in Kaesong and were employing over
47,000 North Korean workers.
Of the $374 million initial cost for the first stage, $223 million was to be provided by the South
Korean government. Much of the supporting infrastructure has been built, including a job training
center, a water supply plant (which sends about one-quarter of its 60,000 tons/day capacity to
Kaesong City), a wastewater treatment plant, and an electricity substation. In December 2006, the
Korea Electric Power Corporation connected North Korea and South Korea by a 100,000 kilowatt
power-transmission line and in June 2007 began transmission of high-voltage electricity for use
by the companies in the KIC. In December 2007, the two Koreas announced what was to be daily
train service across the demilitarized zone along a recently reconnected rail line between the two
Koreas. Regular train service, however, has not begun. The plan is for the trains to connect the
KIC to South Korea in the south and to China in the north. Currently, the trains terminate south of
Kaesong, in Bongdong, which does not have loading facilities.15 Meanwhile, Kaesong is
connected to South Korea by a road that has thousands of vehicles per day passing through the
checkpoints.
The 15 companies operating in the Pilot Industrial Complex in Kaesong in 2006 and their
products included Sonoko Cuisine Ware (kitchenware), SJ Tech (semiconductor component
containers), Shinwon (apparel), Samduk Trading (footwear), Bucheon Industrial (wire harness),
Taesung Industrial (cosmetics containers), Daewha Fuel Pump (automobile parts), Munchang Co.
(apparel), Romanson (watches, jewelry), Hosan Ace (fan coils), Magic Micro (lamp assemblies
for LCD monitors), JY Solutec (automobile components and molds), TS Precision Machinery
(semiconductor mold components), Yongin Electronics (transformers, coils), and JCCOM
(communication components).16
15 Economist Intelligence Unit. South Korea Country Report. January 2008.
16 Republic of Korea. Ministry of Unification. Gaeseong Industrial Complex Project—Status and Tasks, June 2005.
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As shown in Table 3, in 2010, the KIC-produced goods totaled $323.3 million, about a 25%
increase from 2009. As of the end of December 2010, a little over half of the cumulative
production total had been in textiles and clothing, around 20% had been in electronics products as
well as in metals/machinery, and about 10% had been in chemical products. The share of textile
and clothing production has increased over time, from 46% in 2007 to 53% in 2009.17 Examples
of the variety of products made in Kaesong include socks, pajamas, shoes, auto parts (4 firms),
semiconductor parts (2 firms), toner cartridges (1 firm), fish nets, and motorcycle helmets.
Currently, all products made in the KIC are shipped to South Korea for sale there or for export
after clearing customs in the ROK. The primary export destinations in 2010 were Australia, the
European Union, Russia, and China. Other than labor, land, and site construction materials, there
now is no local procurement of inputs into the manufacturing processes in the KIC nor are
products manufactured in the KIC sold in North Korean markets. Most companies there use
labor-intensive manufacturing processes with raw materials and intermediate goods from South
Korea shipped to Kaesong for final assembly. As the KIC is expanded, however, companies could
procure some of their manufacturing inputs locally.18
Table 3. Production by Category in the Kaesong Industrial Complex
(US $1,000)
Textiles
Electric and
and
Chemical
Metals and
Electronic
Clothing
Products
Machinery
Products
Other Total
2005 6,780 1,768
5,250
1,108
-
14,906
2006 27,793 10,900
20,853
14,191
- 73,737
2007 85,543 18,262
41,947
39,027
-
184,779
2008 132,179 21,785
49,250
47,162
1,046 251,422
2009 152,050 26,179
37,312
37,584
3,350 256,475
179,235 32,092 48,637
59,147 4,212
323,323
2010
71 firms
9 firms
23 firms
13 firms
5 firms
121 firms
Source: ROK, Ministry of Unification documents.
It is not yet clear whether South Korean companies operating in the KIC are doing so primarily
for political purposes or whether their operations in the complex are economically viable. Also, it
is not clear whether companies in the complex would be economically viable without South
Korean government support in providing infrastructure and loans with below-market interest
rates. The KIC does provide small and medium-sized businesses access to labor costs lower than
those in China or Vietnam, a workforce that speaks the same language, and proximity to large
markets in South Korea. Some companies appear to be using production in Kaesong to replace
that in China, South Korea, or elsewhere, but others may be using government-subsidized loans
and political risk insurance to invest in politically popular projects. The long list of companies
that have applied to enter the KIC, however, indicates that investments there likely are seen as
profitable for most businesses. It also should be noted that an estimated 40% of the small and
17 Figures derived from statistics provided by ROK Ministry of Unification. See Table 3.
18 ROK. Ministry of Unification. Gaesong Industrial Complex: Frequently Asked Questions (May 21, 2006).
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medium-sized South Korean companies that established operations in China have not been
successful there. Many have withdrawn from that market. The KIC is viewed as essential for
survival by some of these companies.19
The experience of some of the early investors in Kaesong may be indicative of the economic
viability of the project. ShinWon (clothing) established operations in the KIC to take advantage of
the dexterity and lower cost of North Korean workers, favorable logistics, and to avoid nontariff
barriers in China and Southeast Asia. By manufacturing about 16% of five of its clothing lines
there, it expects to accrue considerable savings in production costs. It considers its Kaesong
factory to be optimal when compared with those it has in China, Indonesia, Vietnam, and
Guatemala.20
Samduk Trading Company produces high-quality shoes in the KIC. Start-up costs were high
because of the need to train workers. It took eight months for some production lines to reach 60%
of the productivity level of South Korean companies. The Romanson company (watches) finds
the KIC superior to production in China because of the common language and low labor costs. It
reportedly plans to move 75% of its watch production to the KIC. The Moonchang company
(uniforms, seat covers, leisure clothes) faced a rough start in dealing with its North Korean
workers but feels it is now on the right track. The Woori Bank is in a difficult situation because of
the limited customer base and low demand for personal or business loans. Its main business is
currency exchange. It provides zero interest rates on deposits because there are no means to make
profits by investing deposits elsewhere in North Korea.21
Issues Related to the Kaesong Industrial Complex
The KIC has raised several issues with U.S. policy makers. These include labor conditions,
financial benefits for Pyongyang, the KIC in the KORUS FTA, and the control of U.S. exports to
Kaesong.
Labor Issues
A question with respect to the KIC has been the conditions for North Korean workers there and
whether they are being exploited.22 In January 2007, Jay Lefkowitz, President Bush’s special
envoy for human rights in North Korea, wrote that one of the concerns he had with the Kaesong
Industrial Complex is that authorities take a portion (as much as 45%) of the wages paid by the
South Korean companies. He noted that verified details are elusive, and neither the DPRK nor
South Korean government, nor any company, has been able to state definitively how much of his
or her wage a Kaesong worker is allowed to keep.23
19 Lim, Eul-chul. Kaesong Industrial Complex, History, Pending Issues, and Outlook, Seoul: Haenam Publishing
Company, 2006, pp. 68-69.
20 Ibid., pp. 101-103.
21 Ibid., pp. 108-126.
22 Rights Body Criticizes South Korea Over Refugee Protection, Inter-Korean Complex. Yonhap News Agency, Seoul.
Reported by BBC Monitoring Asia Pacific. London, January 12, 2007.
23 Lefkowitz, Jay P. For a Few Dollars More, Wall Street Journal, January 10, 2007. p. A16.
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According to South Korean officials, average wages and working conditions at Kaesong are far
better than those in the rest of North Korea.24 The monthly minimum wage is $60.78, or between
$2 and $3 per day. On top of the minimum wage, companies pay the North Korean authorities a
15% social insurance fee providing for unemployment and occupational hazards. Increases in the
minimum wage are capped at 5% per year. The minimum wage has risen from $50 per month
when the park opened in 2004. General workers receive the base rate, while team leaders and
heads of companies receive more. Workers also receive overtime pay.25 For extended working
hours, the overtime premium is 50% of the hourly wage rate. For public holidays and nighttime
work (10 p.m. to 6 a.m.), the overtime premium is 100% of the hourly wage rate. In some cases,
North Korean workers have asked for additional night shift or weekend work in order to qualify
for additional pay.26 Companies also may pay cash rewards as a special incentive. Many
employees received $20-$30 per month in overtime pay. Thus, adding the minimum wage, the
15% social insurance fee, and the overtime payments, it appears that KIC manufacturers pay
around $100 per month for each employee.
KIC employees receive 14 days per year in vacation time. At first, North Korean workers were
reluctant to ask for leave time, but now they do.27 Female employees receive 60 days paid
maternity leave.28 As of 2006, labor costs in Kaesong are approximately 8% of those in a South
Korean metropolitan area.29 South Korean labor laws extend to South Korean workers in the
KIC.30
The wages of North Korean workers are paid in dollars (or other hard currency other than South
Korean won) first to the Central Special Direct General Bureau, a North Korean government
agency. Article 34 of the Labor Law of the Kaesong Industrial Complex, however, states that
wages must be paid directly to employees in cash. The DPRK claims that this is not being
implemented now because of the lack of foreign exchange centers in the KIC.31 In 2007, the ROK
Ministry of Unification stated that of the $57.50 minimum monthly salary at the time, $7.50 or
15% of the base pay went for social insurance. The North Korean government also deducted $15,
or 30%, for a socio-cultural policy fee that goes for rental of state-owned housing, education,
medical services, social insurance, and social welfare and reportedly is given to the Kaesong City
People’s Committee. According to the Ministry, the remaining $35 was paid to the workers in
cash (in North Korean won) or as chits that could be exchanged for daily supplies (food and
necessities).32 At the exchange rate of 140 North Korean won per dollar at the time, the $35
translated into 4,900 won. (A kilogram of rice cost about 44 won if bought from North Korea’s
public distribution system but as much as 1,000 won if bought on the open market. The average
24 The DPRK has ratified no International Labor Organization conventions.
25 Kaesong Industrial District Management Committee (KIDMAC), “Kaesong Industrial Complex,” December 2009.
26 Kaesong Industrial Complex Management Council. Survey of North Korean Workers from Fifteen Different
Companies. February 2007. (Partial translation by the ROK Embassy in Washington, DC.)
27 Ibid.
28 ROK. Ministry of Unification. Gaesong Industrial Complex: Frequently Asked Questions (May 21, 2006).
29 Hyundai Asan. Kaesong Industrial Park, brochure. c. 2006.
30 South Korean Assembly Passes Bill on Inter-Korean Industrial Complex. Yonhap News Agency, April 27, 2007.
Reported by BBC Monitoring Asia Pacific.
31 ROK. Ministry of Unification. Gaesong Industrial Complex: Frequently Asked Questions (May 21, 2006).
32 Ko, Gyoung-Bin. All the Salary Goes to the North Korean Workers at the Gaeseong Industrial Complex (GIC),
January 31, 2007. Ministry of Unification document #uni4101.
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family consumes about 60 kilograms of rice per month.)33 Companies provide the workers with a
way to verify their wages by having them sign a ledger or provide a pay slip when they receive
their pay.
North Korean workers commute to the KIC by bus provided by the Kaesong Industrial Complex
Management Council and by some 1,000 bicycles also provided for workers living closer to the
complex. According to the KIC Management Council, the health condition of workers at the KIC
has visibly improved as they have had access to better nutrition.34
The actual recruitment of workers is done by North Korea’s Central Guidance Agency on Special
Zone Development, a cabinet level administrative body. The South Korean hiring company,
however, may reject any recruit provided or if the recruit does not demonstrate the requisite skills
(e.g., sewing), hire the worker as a trainee at 70% or less of the minimum wage. Employers
cannot freely punish or fire incompetent workers. They must give instructions through North
Korean mid-level managers. Directly scolding employees is regarded as humiliation and
prohibited.35 The experience of many companies, however, is that labor management is a
challenge during the start-up phase of a factory in the KIC. Gradually, however, North Korean
workers begin to identify with the company, and a level of trust is developed between the South
Korean executives and the North Korean managers and workers.36
Currently, North Korean workers do not have the right to change employers. This promises to
keep labor costs from escalating as they have in other developing markets as foreign firms bid for
skilled workers. This also provides companies in the KIC with a stable (though aging)
workforce.37 This practice, however, conflicts with what would be consistent with internationally
accepted workers’ rights.
Financial Benefits for Pyongyang
A key aspect of the KIC for U.S. interests is how much the North Korean government derives in
hard currency from the project, including leasing fees and its share of the wages of North Korean
workers. The wages are first paid in hard currency (dollars) to a North Korean government
agency that deducts for certain items before paying the North Korean workers in won or in chits
to be exchanged for food and necessities. South Korean and U.S. government officials estimate
that the North Korean government collects around $2 million per month, primarily from social
insurance taxes and a socio-cultural fee deducted from the wages received by North Korean
workers (the socio-cultural fee reportedly goes to the Kaesong city, not the central government).
In addition, there are land lease fees and other payments to the North Korean government. When
the project was initiated, Hyundai Asan paid North Korea $12 million for a 50-year lease on the
entire Kaesong site. Hyundai Asan and the Korea Land Co. also purchase sand and gravel and
other raw materials from North Korea for use in site development at Kaesong, though these
33 North Korea Today, No. 38, September 2006. Good Friends: Centre for Peace, Human rights and Refugees.
September 27, 2006.
34 Kaesong Industrial Complex Management Council. Survey of North Korean Workers from Fifteen Different
Companies. February 2007. (Partial translation by the ROK Embassy in Washington, DC.)
35 Lim, Eul-chul. Kaesong Industrial Complex, op. cit., p. 144.
36 Ibid., p. 98ff.
37 Ibid., p. 103.
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purchases effectively came to a halt in 2010.38 Companies in the KIC also pay North Korea’s job
reference agency (recruiting agency) a commission of $17 per employee sent.39
Under an agreement on taxation, businesses in the KIC are subject to a 10% to 14% corporate
income tax, but the tax has an exemption for five years after first generating profits and a 50%
deduction for the ensuing three years. This compares favorably to corporate tax rates in South
Korea (12% to 28%), China (15%), and in Vietnam (10% to 15%).40
In 2004, the Hyundai Research Institute estimated that North Korea could receive $9.55 billion in
economic gains over the course of nine years if the KIC were to be developed fully and operated
successfully. This would include $4.6 billion in foreign currency earnings with $700 million
derived directly from the operation of the KIC, $2.5 billion from sales of raw materials and other
industrial products, and $1.4 billion from corporate taxes.41 Considering that in international trade
in goods in 2005, North Korea exported $1.8 billion and imported $3.6 billion, the estimated total
gains of $9.55 billion over nine years associated with the Kaesong Industrial Complex would be
quite significant (provided it progresses according to plan).
Kaesong and the Proposed Korea-U.S. Free Trade Agreement
Negotiating History
During the negotiations on the KORUS FTA, South Korea requested that products exported from
the complex be considered to have originated in South Korea in order to qualify for duty-free
status under the proposed FTA. Under the South Korea-ASEAN FTA, for example, preferential
tariffs are applied to 100 items manufactured in the Kaesong Industrial Complex.42 The Korea-
Singapore and Korea-European Free Trade Association (EFTA) FTA agreements also include
products from the KIC.43 Singapore accepts 88.6% of the traded products from the KIC as long as
no products are directly exported from the DPRK. The Korean FTA with EFTA limits coverage to
2.9% of the total trade and only for those exports that have first been brought into the South
Korean territory and which have 60% of the total materials cost as South Korean.44 In the
negotiations between South Korea and the European Union, Seoul requested products from
Kaesong be covered by the proposed FTA. The final 2009 EU-South Korea FTA, however,
contains a provision similar to that included in the KORUS FTA.45 In 2006, the European Union
38 Communication from the Office of Korean Affairs, U.S. Department of State to the Congressional Research Service,
June 7, 2007; 2011 communication with Ministry of Unification.
39 Lim, Eul-chul. Kaesong Industrial Complex, History, Pending Issues, and Outlook, Seoul: Haenam Publishing
Company, 2006, p. 144.
40 Ibid., pp. 73-74.
41 Ibid., p. 61.
42 Merchandise FTA with Five ASEAN Countries to Take Effect Next Month. Yonhap News (Seoul), May 30, 2007.
43 Channel News Asia, Singapore. South Korea, Singapore Initial Free Trade Accord, April 17, 2005. EFTA includes
Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway, and Switzerland. ROK, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade. Korea-European Free
Trade Association (EFTA) FTA, June 16, 2007.
44 Lim, Eul-chul. Kaesong Industrial Complex, History, Pending Issues, and Outlook, Seoul: Haenam Publishing
Company, 2006, p. 189.
45 Article 15.2.1 of the EU-Korea Free Trade Agreement creates a Committee on Outward Processing Zones on the
Korean Peninsula, which is described in Annex IV of the Protocol Concerning the Definition of ‘Originating Products’
and Methods of Administrative Co-Operation, http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2009/october/tradoc_145192.pdf.
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(15 nations) imported $185.7 million worth of goods from North Korea. Switzerland imported
$0.8 million and Singapore $6.6 million.
For the United States, however, from the beginning of the FTA negotiations, the U.S. position was
that only products originating in South Korea would be included.46 At a U.S. House International
Relations Committee hearing on July 20, 2006, Assistant U.S. Trade Representative Karan Bhatia
indicated that the proposed FTA would not cover goods made in a free-trade zone in North
Korea.47
The KORUS FTA’s Text
The text of the Korea-U.S. Free Trade Agreement (signed by representatives of each government
but not yet approved by Congress) does not provide for duty-free entry into the United States for
products made in the Kaesong Industrial Complex. Annex 22-B to the proposed FTA, however,
provides for a Committee on Outward Processing Zones (OPZ) on the Korean Peninsula to be
formed and to “identify geographic areas that may be designated outward processing zones,”
determine whether any such zone “has met the criteria established by the Committee,” and
recommend them to the respective governments, which “shall be responsible for seeking
legislative approval for any amendments to the Agreement with respect to outward processing
zones.” The Committee also is to “establish a maximum threshold for the value of the total input
of the originating final good that may be added within the geographical area of the outward
processing zone.” Decisions of the Committee would require “unified consent” (this arguably
provides the U.S. side with veto power over any recommendation of the committee). The criteria
to be met include but are not limited to “progress toward denuclearization of the Korean
Peninsula; the impact of the outward processing zones on intra-Korean relations; and the
environmental standards, labor standards and practices, wage practices and business and
management practices prevailing in the outward processing zone, with due reference to the
situation prevailing elsewhere in the local economy and the relevant international norms.” The
OPZ committee is to meet at least annually beginning a year after the agreement goes into effect.
Congress’s Role is Not Clear
Annex 22-B gives Congress a role, albeit an ambiguous one, in deciding whether the products
made in the KIC or other similar North Korean industrial parks would be included in the KORUS
FTA. According to the terms of the agreement, the OPZ Committee will pass its decisions to the
South Korean and U.S. governments, which then would be responsible for “seeking legislative
approval for any amendments” to the KORUS FTA. However, neither the Bush nor Obama
Administrations have specified what form this legislative approval will take.
Labor Standards and KIC Potentially Providing a Competitive Advantage
A question has arisen with respect to language in Annex 22-B pertaining to labor standards and
practices in the KIC with due reference to the “situation prevailing elsewhere in the local
economy and the relevant international norms.” Is the local economy in this case that of the
46 For details, see CRS Report RL34330, The Proposed U.S.-South Korea Free Trade Agreement (KORUS FTA):
Provisions and Implications, coordinated by William H. Cooper.
47 Hyde Warns USTR to Keep Kaesong, Visas out of Korea FTA. Inside US Trade, July 21, 2006.
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The Kaesong North-South Korean Industrial Complex
DPRK or that of South Korea, and can products from the KIC be produced under conditions
contrary to International Labor Organization agreements that lay out basic international standards
or worker rights yet still be recommended by the OPZ Committee to be included under the
FTA?48
A further issue with respect to the KIC and the KORUS FTA is that if KIC products made with
the low-cost North Korean labor are allowed to be treated as South Korean in origin under the
proposed KORUS FTA, South Korean exporters would enjoy a large cost advantage over their
counterparts in the United States.
Kaesong-Made Components and the KORUS FTA
Another issue raised by the KORUS FTA is whether intermediate products made in the KIC can
enter the United States under the provisions of the FTA if they are incorporated into products that
are manufactured in South Korea and that qualify as originating in South Korea. The same
concern exists with respect to products made in China or elsewhere if they have North Korean
inputs. Currently, discrete goods of North Korean origin may not be imported into the United
States either directly or through third countries, without prior notification to and approval of the
Office of Foreign Assets Control of the Department of the Treasury.49
If enacted, the KORUS FTA would likely have only a marginal impact on whether the United
States imports goods that contain KIC-made components. The possibility of goods of South
Korean origin with North Korean content exists now. KIC-made content could also increase due
to the KORUS FTA increasing U.S. imports of South Korean manufactured goods above current
levels. However, whether KIC-made components enter the United States is more likely to be
determined by the future evolution of the KIC itself, rather than by the fate of the KORUS FTA.
If the complex expands, and/or if KIC factories begin to make more components, then South
Korean and other nations’ companies could use them in manufacturing final products, which
could then be exported to the United States and other countries.
The Control of Exports to Kaesong
The United States maintains a comprehensive economic embargo against the DPRK because of
its designation as a state sponsor of international terrorism. The Departments of Commerce and
the Treasury jointly administer the trade embargo under the Trading With the Enemy Act of 1917
and the Export Administration Act. The Department of Commerce licenses U.S. exports and re-
exports, while Treasury grants general and/or specific licenses for financial transactions by U.S.
persons with DPRK entities. The Department of Commerce requires a license for the export to
North Korea of virtually all commodities, technology, and software, except for technology
generally available to the public and gift parcels (not exceeding $400).50 For instance, in FY2006,
48 See Letter, Rep. Sander Levin, Chair of the House Ways and Means Subcommittee on Trade to Ambassador Susan
Schwab, USTR. June 12, 2007.
49 U.S. Treasury, Office of Foreign Assets Control. North Korea: What You Need to Know About Sanctions. c. 2007.
See Title 31, Part 500, U.S. Code of Federal Regulations.
50 U.S. Bureau of Industry and Security. Embargoed Countries and Entities (Section 746), Export Control Program
Description and Licensing Policy. For information on U.S. export controls, see CRS Report RL31832, The Export
(continued...)
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the U.S. Bureau of Industry and Security approved two items for export to the DPRK. They were
glass (fiber optic) transmission items (5A991) worth $213,919 and software (5D992) for
$3,600.51 The transmission items were telecommunications equipment used by Korea Telecom in
setting up the communications lines between the two Koreas and into the KIC.52
The South Korean government also maintains strict controls over exports to the DPRK. The
restricted items include machinery and inspection equipment to produce metal and machines,
electronics, optics, laser-related equipment, microorganism cultivating devices and chemical
product facilities, and sophisticated high-technology equipment and materials. Even the latest
versions of personal computers, commonly available in the South, are restricted and, if their
export is approved, they have to be kept under lock and key in the KIC.53 New high-technology
monitoring systems, including tracking devices, are also being used for items with sensitive dual-
use technology.
In the October 2007 summit between South Korean President Roh Moo-hyun and North Korean
leader Kim Jong-il, the North agreed to improvements in how Kaesong operates, including
swifter customs clearance for goods crossing its border, and better computer and cell-phone
communications connections between Seoul and Kaesong factories. As mentioned above, the Lee
government has made North Korea’s implementation of these provisions preconditions for paying
for the building of the dormitories that appear to be necessary for the KIC to undergo any
significant expansion.
Long-Term Geopolitical and Economic Issues
The Kaesong Industrial Complex sits at the hub of spreading concentric sets of economic and
geopolitical interests and concerns. At its narrowest sense, the KIC is a business venture in which
participants are seeking profits and business advantages. On the South Korean side, the KIC
provides small and medium-sized companies with a manufacturing platform and opportunity to
access low-cost labor without having to go overseas to establish subsidiaries or to outsource the
assembly of their products to China or other markets. On the DPRK side, the KIC provides jobs
for workers who can earn relatively higher wages without crossing their borders illegally or
working under contract in labor-scarce countries such as those in the Russian Far East or in
Middle Eastern countries.
At a somewhat wider set of interests, the KIC provides a channel for rapprochement between the
DPRK and South Korea. Kaesong developed partly from South Korea’s sunshine policy of
economic engagement with the North. It can be viewed as a confidence-building measure
between two countries whose hostility toward each other has lingered since the 1950-52 Korean
(...continued)
Administration Act: Evolution, Provisions, and Debate, by Ian F. Fergusson.
51 Bureau of Industry and Security, U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Industry and Security Annual Report,
Fiscal Year 2006. c. 2007, p. 93.
52 The export license was approved by the U.S. Export Administration on November 16, 2005. (See Lim, Eul-chul.
Kaesong Industrial Complex, History, Pending Issues, and Outlook, Seoul: Haenam Publishing Company, 2006, p.
206.)
53 Ibid., p. 204.
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War. As has been the case with the extensive economic interchange between China and Taiwan,54
the KIC may provide a bridge for communication and a catalyst for cultural interaction, and it can
create stakeholders in each other’s economies with a shared interest in stability, liberalization, and
increased communication across the DMZ.
At a still wider set of interests, the KIC may be the proverbial camel’s nose under the tent in
attempts to reform, liberalize, and modernize the North Korean economy. In neighboring China in
1978, foreign businesses were first allowed to operate in special economic zones. Now foreign
invested businesses generate more than half of China’s exports and imports. The Chinese speak of
practicing socialism with Chinese characteristics and, indeed, many state-owned enterprises still
encumber the Chinese economic system. The state-owned enterprises that are successful,
however, operate much like privately owned enterprises, and one is hard pressed to find other
significant differences between the Chinese brand of socialism and market capitalism. In May
2010, Kim Jong-il paid his fifth visit to China to visit special economic zones and to discuss
issues. He also visited an industrial site.55 Likewise, the KIC exposes average North Koreans to
modern business methods and to the accouterments of Western industrial society.
According to the Economist Intelligence Unit, the decrepit North Korean economy has “three
crying needs: deeper market reforms, greater openness, and above all, massive investment to
modernize decrepit plant and infrastructure.”56 The KIC potentially addresses all three of these
needs to a limited extent. However, reports from North Korea indicate that the economic reforms
there currently are stalled—even being reversed. Unlike China’s reforms, moreover, the initiative
for the KIC came from abroad, is viewed with suspicion by many, and is an isolated case.
Pyongyang, however, has renamed the Rajin-Sonbong region bordering China as Rason and is
attempting to attract more Chinese investment there.57 In sum, it is still too early to tell if Kaesong
will succeed, much less have a large effect on the rest of the North Korean economy.
At a geopolitical level, Kaesong is one part of the standoff between the DPRK and the United
States, China, South Korea, Japan, and Russia, over North Korea’s nuclear weapons program.
Under the rubric of the six-party talks lie a bundle of strategic issues, such as the ability of North
Korea to finance its nuclear program, the need for humanitarian and energy aid, the stability of
the Kim Jong-il regime, and the enforcement of various economic sanctions being applied to
North Korea. A major goal of the United States in the six-party talks is to halt and verifiably
dismantle North Korea’s capability to produce nuclear fuel and nuclear bombs or to proliferate
nuclear material or technology to potentially hostile countries or groups. The U.S. strategy to
accomplish this is a combination of sticks (sanctions, diplomatic isolation, name calling) and
carrots (promises of aid, diplomatic recognition, security guarantees) conveyed to North Korea
through the six-party talks, bilateral meetings, and occasional media blasts. Under this strategy,
there is little reason to provide the DPRK with any financial reward, even if it is to the benefit of
South Korea, unless it shows significant progress in its commitments under the six-party talks.
This is particularly the case if North Korea carries out attacks against South Korea.
54 For a discussion of this issue, see CRS Report RL32882, The Rise of China and Its Effect on Taiwan, Japan, and
South Korea: U.S. Policy Choices, by Dick K. Nanto and Emma Chanlett-Avery.
55 See, for example, Wu Jiao, “Development is key during Kim’s visit,” China Daily (Internet edition), May 5, 2010.
56 The Economist Intelligence Unit. Country Report, North Korea, May 2007. p. 13.
57 Scott Snyder, Rajin-Sonbong: A Strategic Choice for China in Its Relations with Pyongyang, China Brief Volume:
10 Issue: 7, The Jamestown Foundation, April 1, 2010.
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The South Korean goals with respect to North Korea, however, not only include the
denuclearization of the Korean peninsula but eventual reunification and reconstruction of the
DPRK’s economy. A major South Korean concern is the potential cost of reunification either in
the form of a flood of economic emigrants to the South or in actual budgetary outlays to help
rebuild the North’s civilian economy. The high cost to West Germany of the integration of East
Germany after the fall of the Berlin Wall has provided little comfort to the policy makers in
Seoul. The South Korean strategy, therefore, has tended to be longer on carrots (promises of food,
fuel, and fertilizer) and shorter on sticks (sanctions) with a heavy reliance on engagement across
the interactive spectrum and on diplomacy to resolve the issue. Even after the North Korean
nuclear test in 2006, South Korea continued the KIC operations. It only halted its plans to call for
new applicants to enter the KIC. Likewise, North Korea’s provocations in 2010 did not result in
the closing of the complex. Existing production facilities continued to manufacture and expand.
Although ROK President Lee Myung-bak has said he will seek more reciprocity in Seoul’s
dealings with Pyongyang, and he has been somewhat vague about how he will treat the KIC, his
statements and actions to date have been widely interpreted to mean that phase 1 of the complex,
at a minimum, will continue operating. Undoubtedly, the KIC would be a centerpiece if Lee
enacts his “Grand Bargain,” under which South Korea would provide massive development
assistance if North Korea dismantles its nuclear program.
For South Korea, not only does Kaesong provide entry into the decrepit DPRK economy, but it is
a key factor in building up and reforming the economy in the North with an eye toward eventual
reunification. Beijing’s strategy before the return of Hong Kong in 1997 has been instructive to
Seoul. A major reason that many of the first economic reforms in China occurred in nearby
Guangdong Province, particularly just across the border from Hong Kong in Shenzhen city, was
that Beijing tried to stem pressures to immigrate to Hong Kong by raising the standard of living
and industrial development in the region abutting the returning territory. This strategy has been so
successful that some immigration, particularly of Hong Kong retirees, has been going from Hong
Kong to Guangdong Province and not the other way around. Likewise, Beijing has broadened ties
with Taiwan through allowing cross-strait investments, travel, business visas, communication,
and other business-based activities. In some sectors, particularly in the manufacture of computers
and other electronic products, Taiwan and the east coast of China have become one integrated
economy. Kaesong arguably could begin a similar process with North Korea.
South Korea also aims to become a hub of East Asia. In order to accomplish this, it would like to
be connected to China, Russia, and to Europe via railways that pass through North Korea. As part
of the KIC project, North and South Korea have reconnected a railroad line connecting the north
and south and have conducted a test run on it. (A second line on the opposite side of the peninsula
also was connected.) In terms of logistics, a shipment by rail from South Korea via Kaesong to
Hamburg, Germany would take about 27 days by ship, 10 days via the Trans-Siberian Railway,
and 7 days via the Trans-China Railway.58 (See Figure 2.)
58 Hyundai Asan. Kaesong Industrial Park, brochure. c. 2006.
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Figure 2. Kaesong’s Potential Logistical Role
Source: Hyundai Asan
U.S. Interests and Policy Options
The three national interests of the United States that form the basis of all policy discussion are
security, economic well-being, and value projection. These three national interests all play into
consideration of the Kaesong Industrial Complex.
The main security concern for the United States is the location of the KIC in the DPRK. U.S.
security concerns with respect to North Korea center on two major considerations: (1) the
DPRK’s nuclear program and (2) potential conflict across the DMZ separating North Korea and
South Korea. The KIC has opposing effects upon these security considerations. On one hand,
since income in any country is fungible, anything that increases revenue to the Pyongyang regime
has the potential to contribute to the DPRK’s military (including its missile and nuclear program).
It is likely, however, that the DPRK’s nuclear program has assured funding from the government.
Also, given Kim Jong-il’s “military first” policy, the North Korean military has top priority in the
allocation of scarce economic resources. It also has call on certain economic activities and
government subsidies for them. It is not clear how much, if any, income (over that used to pay for
expenses related to Kaesong) for Pyongyang from the KIC currently is directed toward the DPRK
military or nuclear program. Since the KIC land formerly was a military base that had to be
vacated,59 some arrangement may have been made to compensate the military for relinquishing a
strategically important piece of ground. Even if the income from the KIC does not go directly into
59 Lim, Eul-chul. Kaesong Industrial Complex, History, Pending Issues, and Outlook, Seoul: Haenam Publishing
Company, 2006. p. 37.
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military purposes, it may bolster funds for civilian purposes that had been cut because of the
budgetary demands of the military. The Kim regime, moreover, uses scarce foreign exchange to
bolster the loyalty of its inner circle of elites who use it to buy imported luxury goods.
U.N. Security Council resolutions 1718 (adopted October 2006) and 1874 (adopted June 2009)
explicitly prohibit any member state from providing funds that go to support North Korea’s
nuclear weapons program. Resolution 1718 states in Section 8(d) that all Member States shall, in
accordance with their respective legal processes, ensure that any funds, financial assets or
economic resources are prevented from being made available by their nationals or by any persons
or entities within their territories, to or for the benefit of persons or entities engaged in or
providing support for the DPRK’s programs related to nuclear weapons, other weapons of mass
destruction, and ballistic missile related programs.
As for tensions across the DMZ, the KIC already has played an important role in increasing the
level of engagement between the DPRK and South Korea and in raising the priority of economic
activity relative to security concerns. Even though the border between North Korea and South
Korea is heavily guarded and crossings had been rare, the military on both sides have acquiesced
to the daily traffic on the North-South highway to Kaesong and the re-connection of two railways
across the DMZ (along with limited tourist visits and family reunions).
In terms of the second U.S. national interest of economic well-being, the KIC currently has little
relevance, although it has some effect through U.S. trade and investment relations with South
Korea. U.S. companies have no investments in Kaesong and U.S. trade with North Korea in 2009
was virtually non-existent. South Korea, however, is the seventh largest trading partner of the
United States, and the United States is South Korea’s third largest trading partner. If the six-party
talks on the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula were to re-start and progress far enough, the
United States could re-establish diplomatic relations with the DPRK, lift economic sanctions, and
eventually grant that country normal trade relations (most-favored nation) status. If so, trade with
North Korea could be done on the same basis as trade with most other countries of the world.
Absent that development, South Korea’s request to treat products made in the KIC as South
Korean in origin would seem to be the only way to bring the KIC into the set of industrial
locations open to normal or preferential trade with the United States. Meanwhile, South Korean
companies exporting KIC products likely will continue to avoid the U.S. market rather than face
economic sanctions and high U.S. tariffs. This may give countries that include the KIC in their
FTAs with South Korea (such as ASEAN and EFTA) a possible small diplomatic advantage over
the United States in dealing with Seoul. Moreover, South Korea is likely to press the United
States to change its KIC policy. This could be a source of future U.S.-ROK tension even if the
KORUS FTA is passed.
The third U.S. national interest is projecting U.S. values such as a market-based economy,
representative government, and nations adhering to world standards for working conditions,
environmental regulation, and other humanitarian considerations. In this respect, the KIC
potentially could play a significant role as a demonstration project to educate North Koreans on
the workings of a market-based economy. The KIC provides an opportunity for businesses to
operate in North Korea according to what may be higher labor and environmental standards than
exist in the rest of the country and to educate North Korean middle managers on how such
standards work.
Currently, the 40,000 North Koreans employed in the KIC are too few and the project too small to
have a significant impact on the development of the North Korean middle class (a factor in the
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The Kaesong North-South Korean Industrial Complex
development of a more representative society), and the number of the elites in the DPRK with an
economic interest in the complex probably is still relatively small. If the project continues to
develop and the DPRK opens other free-trade zones, however, something akin to the economic
reforms in China or the economic transformation that is now occurring in Vietnam60 could occur
in North Korea. This could weaken the hold by Pyongyang on the daily lives of citizens and bring
the country more into the globalized world. Such economic liberalization also could reduce
pressures on North Korea to engage in illicit trade in order to cover its trade deficit61 and diminish
the need for Pyongyang to saber rattle in order to divert attention from its domestic problems.
In the short run, however, increased revenues strengthen the regime’s hand and make it less
vulnerable to outside pressure. Also, spillover effects will depend on North Korea adding much
more value to the production processes which it has yet to do. Finally, there is some question
about the extent to which KIC is commercially viable, or whether incentives and supports given
to South Korean firms are critical as opposed to marginal in their profit and loss calculations.
Trade between the DPRK and South Korea tends to be government-based, in contrast to trade
between China and North Korea. This may blunt the lessons learned by Pyongyang.
The United States currently has a mixed policy with respect to the KIC. Since South Korea is a
close ally of the United States, Washington has been supportive of efforts by South Korea to
engage the North in inter-Korean projects that benefit South Korea. On the other hand, the United
States has been firm in predicating any economic or other concessions on actions by the DPRK to
curtail or eliminate its nuclear program.
Major policy considerations and options for Congress, given the above U.S. interests, include the
following:
• In considering whether or not to approve the KORUS FTA, Congress may
express its support or non-support of the exclusion of the KIC from the FTA as
negotiated. Congress may also specify the conditions under which the KIC can or
can not be brought under the provisions of the proposed FTA. Congressional
disapproval of the proposed KORUS FTA likely would have a large negative
impact on prospects for the future of the KIC with respect to the United States.
• In the debate over the KORUS FTA, Congress may focus attention on labor and
other conditions in the KIC and encourage reforms.
• If the KORUS FTA is approved, Congress may provide close oversight of the
Committee on Outward Processing Zones.
• Since the United States already imposes a range of economic and financial
sanctions on the DPRK, the United States could either tighten or loosen them.
This could affect non-South Korean businesses in determining whether to invest
in the KIC or to purchase products made there. The United States also could
tighten (or loosen) U.S. controls on the export of dual-use technology items to
the KIC.
60 See, for example, Bradsher, Keith, Vietnam’s Roaring Economy Is Set for World Stage, The New York Times,
October 25, 2006.
61 See, for example, CRS Report RL33885, North Korean Crime-for-Profit Activities, by Liana Sun Wyler and Dick K.
Nanto.
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• The United States could impose restrictions on or provide inducements to U.S.
business activity in KIC.
• The U.S. government could encourage other countries (or groups of countries,
such as the European Union) to (or not to) include the KIC in their respective
FTAs with South Korea.
• If the DPRK takes the necessary steps to halt its nuclear program as outlined in
the six-party talks, support (or oppose) measures leading toward normal trading
relations status for the DPRK and the lifting of economic sanctions.
• The U.S. government could place restrictions on South Korean firms that do
business in North Korea.
Author Contact Information
Mark E. Manyin
Dick K. Nanto
Specialist in Asian Affairs
Specialist in Industry and Trade
mmanyin@crs.loc.gov, 7-7653
dnanto@crs.loc.gov, 7-7754
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