Haiti’s National Elections: Issues and
Concerns
Maureen Taft-Morales
Specialist in Latin American Affairs
March 14, 2011
Congressional Research Service
7-5700
www.crs.gov
R41689
CRS Report for Congress
P
repared for Members and Committees of Congress
Haiti’s National Elections: Issues and Concerns
Summary
In proximity to the United States, and with such a chronically unstable political environment and
fragile economy, Haiti has been a constant policy issue for the United States. Congress views the
stability of the nation with great concern and commitment to improving conditions there. Both
Congress and the international community have invested significant resources in the political,
economic, and social development of Haiti, and will be closely monitoring the conduct of the
elections as a prelude to the next steps in Haiti’s development.
For the past 25 years, Haiti has been making the transition from a legacy of authoritarian rule to a
democratic government. Elections are a part of that process. In the short term, elections have
usually been a source of increased political tensions and instability in Haiti. In the long term,
elected governments in Haiti have contributed to the gradual strengthening of government
capacity and transparency.
Haiti is currently approaching the end of its latest election cycle. Like many of the previous
elections, the current process has been riddled with political tensions, allegations of irregularities,
and violence. The first round of voting for president and the legislature was held on Sunday,
November 28, 2010. That vote was marred by opposition charges of fraud, reports of
irregularities, and low voter turnout. When the electoral council announced that out-going
President Rene Préval’s little-known protégé, and governing party candidate, Jude Celestin, had
edged out a popular musician for a spot in the runoff elections by less than one percent, three
days of violent protests ensued. Tensions rose as people waited to see which candidates would
proceed to the second round, whether Préval would continue in office beyond the constitutional
expiration of his term, or if some sort of provisional government would have to be established.
The Haitian government asked the Organization of American States (OAS) for help and delayed
releasing final results, which were due out December 20, 2010, to give the OAS team of
international elections experts enough time to investigate and verify the process. The team began
its work on January 1, 2011, and gave President Préval a report with its recommendations on
January 13. The Haitian Provisional Electoral Council (CEP) released the final results of the first
round of voting on February 3, sending Mirlande Manigat, a constitutional lawyer and university
administrator, and Michel “Sweet Micky” Martelly, a popular singer, to the run-off race. The
governing party’s candidate was eliminated from the race by a narrow margin. After months of
dispute, the second round of elections is now scheduled to take place on March 20, 2011.
The United States is providing $14 million in election support through the U.S. Agency for
International Development (USAID).
This report provides an overview of the controversies surrounding the first round of voting in late
2010, and concerns related to the second and final round of the elections. In addition to ongoing
issues regarding the legitimacy of the upcoming March 20 elections, other questions have raised
concerns within the international community and Congress. These include the destabilizing
presence of former dictator Jean-Claude “Baby Doc” Duvalier, the possible return of former
President Jean-Bertrand Aristide, and the newly elected government’s ability to handle the
complex post-earthquake reconstruction process and its relationship with the donor community.
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Haiti’s National Elections: Issues and Concerns
Contents
Introduction ................................................................................................................................ 1
Background to the Current Elections ........................................................................................... 1
The Presidential Race............................................................................................................ 3
The First Round of Voting ............................................................................................... 3
Contested results and an impasse..................................................................................... 5
Investigations and revised results .................................................................................... 5
The Legislative Race............................................................................................................. 6
The Second Round Of Voting................................................................................................ 7
Issues and Concerns regarding Elections and Post-Election Governance...................................... 7
Short-term Issues .................................................................................................................. 7
Election monitoring ........................................................................................................ 7
Concerns about the Electoral Process .............................................................................. 8
The Provisional Electoral Council ................................................................................... 9
Legitimacy.................................................................................................................... 10
Long-term Issues................................................................................................................. 11
Reconstruction and the Management of Foreign Assistance ........................................... 11
Security and Human Rights........................................................................................... 12
Stability and the Return of Former Leaders ................................................................... 12
Outlook..................................................................................................................................... 13
Appendixes
Appendix. U.S. Elections Assistance ......................................................................................... 14
Contacts
Author Contact Information ...................................................................................................... 15
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Haiti’s National Elections: Issues and Concerns
Introduction
Congress views the stability of Haiti with great concern and commitment to improving conditions
there. Both Congress and the international community have invested significant resources in the
political, economic, and social development of Haiti, and will be closely monitoring the conduct
of the upcoming elections as a prelude to the next steps in Haiti’s development.
Haiti has been struggling to build and strengthen democratic institutions for 25 years, ever since
massive popular protests and international pressure forced dictator Jean-Claude Duvalier to
abandon his rule and flee the country in 1986. Known as “Baby Doc,” Duvalier came to power in
1971, succeeding his father, Francois “Papa Doc” Duvalier, who had ruled since 1957. Their 29-
year dictatorship was marked by repression and corruption. Hoping to reverse almost 200 years of
mostly violent and authoritarian rule, Haitians overwhelmingly approved a new constitution
creating a democratic government in 1987. De facto military rule, coups and thwarted attempts at
democratic elections continued until a provisional civilian government conducted what was
widely heralded as Haiti’s first free and fair elections in 1990, in which Jean-Bertrand Aristide, a
former Catholic priest, was elected President. In the short term, elections have usually been a
source of increased political tensions and instability in Haiti.
In the long term, elections in Haiti have contributed to the slow strengthening of government
capacity and transparency. Elected governments have developed long term development plans
resulting in international technical and financial assistance. They have developed national budgets
and made them public. The number of employees in bloated state enterprises has been reduced.
The government carried out the fiscal management and transparency reforms necessary to qualify
for debt relief from multilateral and some bilateral creditors under the Enhanced Heavily Indebted
Poor Countries Initiative in 2009. Human rights violations have been drastically reduced. Despite
controversy over some aspects of the 2006 elections, Préval was accepted as the legitimate head
of state by Haitians and the world community, and oversaw a period of economic growth and
relative internal political stability before a devastating earthquake struck the nation in January
2010.
There is still much to be accomplished. Some parts of the government are not fully independent,
the judicial system is weak, and corruption and political violence still threaten the nation’s
stability. Haitian governance capacities, already limited, were considerably diminished by the
earthquake. Poverty is massive and deep, and there is extreme economic disparity between a
small privileged class and the majority of the population.
The United States and other members of the international community continue to support efforts
to hold free and fair elections in Haiti in the belief that in the long run they will contribute to
improved governance and, eventually, improved services to Haitian citizens and greater stability
which will allow for increased development. Congress has given bipartisan support to this policy
approach.
Background to the Current Elections
The road to democratic development has been bumpy, and the international community became
increasingly involved in trying to keep Haiti on that road. Aristide was overthrown in a military
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coup eight months after he was inaugurated. For three years, the coup leaders resisted
international demands that Aristide be restored to office. Only when faced with a U.S. military
intervention did the regime relent. Aristide returned in 1994 under the protection of some 20,000
U.S. troops, who transferred responsibility to a United Nations mission in1995. With U.S.
assistance, President Aristide disbanded the army and began to train a professional civilian police
force. In 1996 Haitians saw their first transfer of power between two democratically elected
presidents when Aristide was succeeded by Rene Préval.
Subsequent elections held under Presidents Aristide and Préval, both of whom served two non-
consecutive terms1, were marred by alleged irregularities, low voter turnout, and opposition
boycotts. Some election conflicts left Haiti without a fully functioning government, as when most
of the legislators’ terms expired in 1999 without elections being held to replace them. President
Préval then ruled by decree for the remaining two years of his first term. The international
community, including an OAS mission, tried in vain for several years to mediate negotiations
between the Aristide government and the opposition over the elections in which Aristide was
reelected in 2000. Tension and political violence continued throughout Aristide’s second term,
culminating in his flight into exile in 2004, after the refusal of the opposition to negotiate, an
armed rebellion, and loss of international support. There were numerous allegations that Aristide
was involved in drug trafficking and other corrupt activities. An interim civilian government was
formed and oversaw elections in 2006 in which Préval, after a dispute over the vote calculation,
was elected to a new term.
Since the earthquake that ravaged the Haitian capital of Port-au-Prince and surrounding areas on
January 12, 2010, political stability has been especially uncertain, due to the loss of many
political figures and government officials, massive damage to government infrastructure, and
mounting frustrations at what is widely perceived as slow progress in reconstruction and
distribution of over $9 billion in pledged international assistance. An outbreak of cholera has
further complicated the situation.
At stake in the current election process are the offices of President, the entire 99-member
Chamber of Deputies, and 11 of 30 Senators. The newly elected officials will be responsible for
directing reconstruction efforts. Many observers therefore believe that it is especially important
that these elections be conducted fairly, so that the new government will be accepted as legitimate
by both the Haitian public and international donors, including the United States, who are
providing technical and financial support to the election process. The UN Stabilization Mission
for Haiti (MINUSTAH) is providing security and technical support.
Parliamentary elections had originally been scheduled for February 28, 2010, but were postponed
because of the earthquake. The terms of all of the Chamber of Deputies and of one-third of the
Senate expired on May 10, 2010. Because elections were not held before then, the legislature
ceased to function as a whole. Normally, the legislature must approve federal procurement
contracts and authorize spending. Before it adjourned, however, the legislature passed a State of
Emergency law in April 2010 giving the executive branch those and other broad powers for 18
months, to October 2011. The date mandated in the constitution for any president’s inauguration
is February 7 (the anniversary of Duvalier’s flight into exile). Because of the delays caused by the
1 Jean Bertrand Aristide served as President in Haiti from February through September 1991; 1994 – 1996; and 2001 –
2004. Rene Préval has served as President from 1996 – 2001; and 2006 – 2011 (term extended until May 14).
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earthquake, and the difficulty of organizing elections following such a disaster, the legislature
also authorized the extension of Préval’s term to May 14, if necessary.
The President, Senators, and Deputies are elected to serve five-year terms. The constitution limits
presidents to two non-consecutive terms. There are no term limits for the legislature, although
turnover for its members has been high. The first round of both the presidential and legislative
elections took place on November 28, 2010. According to the Haitian constitution, if no candidate
receives an absolute majority of the vote, a runoff vote between the top two candidates is held for
presidential and Chamber of Deputy seats. For Senate seats, candidates who lack an absolute
majority but have at least 20% more votes than the next candidate are declared the winner.
The Presidential Race
President Préval is completing his second non-consecutive term, the maximum allowed by the
Haitian constitution. Nineteen candidates vied to succeed him in the first round. Like most
previous elections in Haiti, this one has centered around personalities more than parties or issues.
A group of Haitian journalists, the Public Policy Intervention Group, with the support of the
National Democratic Institute and the Commission on Presidential Debates, tried to encourage
more substantive discussions among the presidential candidates by holding a series of debates
that were broadcast nationwide. All 19 presidential candidates participated.
The First Round of Voting
The top three candidates, according to polls before the first round, were Mirlande Manigat, Jude
Celestin, and Michel “Sweet Micky” Martelly.2
Manigat is a Vice Rector and professor of constitutional law at the private Université Quisqueya
in Port-au-Prince. She is a former Senator and First Lady—her husband Leslie Manigat was
elected in 1988 in elections held under a military regime, and overthrown four months later.
Mirlande Manigat describes herself and her Rassemblement des Democrates Nationaux (RDNP ,
Assembly of Progressive National Democrats) party as center-left, or as “capitalist with a human
face,” in the tradition of Brazil’s moderate leftist President Lula da Silva.3 Some other analysts
regard her as more of a conservative.
Jude Celestin, a technocrat, was little known before Préval chose him to run as his successor on
the ticket of the Inite (Unity) party created by the President. As Director of the National
Equipment Center, Celestin oversaw the construction of hundreds of miles of roads that made
remote villages and farmlands accessible. He was reportedly described by many as an extremely
focused workaholic. Questions had arisen about his background: he claimed an engineering
degree from the Swiss Ecole Polytechnique de Lausanne, which reportedly has no records of his
attendance or graduation, and he has four properties in Florida in foreclosure.
Polling at a distant third was Michel Martelly, a famous Haitian kompa dance musician, known
for his bawdy performances, and popular with young voters. He acknowledges his political
inexperience, but said he would seek expert international advice to guide him in developing
2 It is important to note that polls have been historically unreliable in Haiti.
3 Time, “The Woman Who Would be Haiti’s New President,” November 15, 2010.
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foreign investments and tourism to stimulate the economy. Martelly, also a businessman, has
personal financial issues. He defaulted on over $1 million in loans and had three properties in
Florida go into foreclosure, raising questions about his financial management skills.4
Of the 16 remaining candidates, eight were former government officials. Most prominent among
them were: Jacques-Edouard Alexis, prime minister under Préval who was dismissed in 2008 by
the legislature following violent protests over high food and cost-of-living prices; Yvon Neptune,
prime minister under former President Jean-Bertrand Aristide; and Leslie Voltaire, an urban
planner who has served as Minister of Education, and of Haitians Living Abroad, as Chief of
Staff to Aristide, advisor to Préval, and a coordinator for the government’s reconstruction
planning.
Both international and domestic election observers said that election day was “marred by
disorganization, dysfunction, various types of irregularities, ballot stuffing and incidents of
intimidation, vandalism of polling stations and violence.”5 These problems were reported
throughout the country, but were most prevalent in the capital of Port-au-Prince. According to the
OAS observation team,
More subversive of the process was the toxic atmosphere created by the allegations of
“massive fraud”. The JEOM [OAS /Caribbean Community Joint Election Observation
Mission]observed instances where even before the voting started, any inconvenience or small
problem led to the immediate cry of fraud. Such conduct continued during the day.6
The Joint Election Observation Mission concluded that the irregularities, “serious as they were,”
did not necessarily invalidate the electoral process. Several Haitian civil society groups and
election observation groups presented their reports to the OAS mission; although they gave a
“scathing indictment of the shortcomings, irregularities and fraud that tarnished” the elections,
they did not call for the elections to be cancelled.7 (See “Election Monitoring” below for further
information on the observation process.)
Some critics, including some Members of Congress, called for the elections to be annulled and
new elections to be held, and criticized the OAS electoral mission for having a pro-government
bias.8 Some critics continued to charge that former President Aristide’s Lavalas party had been
excluded from the current elections, although according to the Provisional Electoral Council
(CEP), the Haitian government body responsible for organizing the elections, the OAS, and
diplomatic sources, no faction of Lavalas had submitted any candidate for either the presidential
or legislative elections. Many former Lavalas members ran under other parties’ banners.
4 Frances Robles, "Haiti candidate Martelly lost three S. Florida properties to foreclosure," Miami Herald, March 7,
2011.
5 Organization of American States, Report of the OAS-Caricom Joint Electoral Observation Mission on the First Round
of the Presidential and Legislative Elections of 28 November 2010 in Haiti, February 2011, p. 4.
6 Organization of American States, OAS-CARICOM Joint Electoral Observation Mission on Haiti's Presidential and
Legislative Elections of 28 November 2010, press release E-461-10, November 29, 2010,
http://www.oas.org/en/media_center/press_release.asp?sCodigo=E-461/10.
7 Organization of American States, Report of …February 2011, op. cit, p. 7.
8 See, for example, Congressional Black Caucus Task Force on Foreign Policy and International Affairs, “Statement on
Haiti Elections and OAS Report,” press release, February 1, 2011, as reprinted by Center for Economic and Policy
Research, http://www.cepr.net/index.php/blogs/relief-and-reconstruction-watch/congressional-black-caucus-statement-
on-elections. See also James Morrell, “Haiti-Elections: Send this mission packing,” AlterPresse, January 5, 2011; some
of the “facts” in this article are, by the author’s own account, “incomplete” and “unconfirmed.”
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Contested results and an impasse
On December 7, 2010, the CEP announced preliminary results. The reported tally for President
was 31.37% for Mirlande Manigat, 22.48% for Jude Celestin, and 21.84% for Michel Martelly.
Although it appeared that all but one legislative race would need to proceed to a second round as
well, the most controversy surrounded the presidential results. The U.S. Embassy stated that it
was “concerned” by official preliminary results that were “inconsistent with the published
results” of various domestic and international observers.9 The CEP’s announcement was followed
by three days of violent protests, with Martelly supporters charging that fraud had put Celestin
ahead, and that their candidate should have placed second. Tensions continued, as various actors
called for action across a range of options, including but not limited to, accepting the preliminary
results, sending the top three candidates to a run-off (although the constitution calls for only the
top two candidates to proceed), holding new elections, or re-counting the ballots.
Investigations and revised results
Negotiations between the OAS and the Haitian government ensued, resulting in the OAS sending
a team of election experts to Haiti on December 30, 2010 to verify the results of the presidential
election. The team conducted a statistical analysis of a national random sample of the vote count,
finding that as voter participation rates rose above the national average of about 23 percent, so
also rose the probability of serious irregularities.10 The expert mission then reviewed the result
sheets from all polling places where participation rate was 50 percent or higher and a single
candidate garnered 150 votes or more, and from all polling places where the participation rate
was greater than 100 percent. Using criteria established in Haitian electoral law, the expert
mission recommended that votes from some of these polling places be excluded from the final
tally. Some votes for all the candidates were excluded because of irregularities; the top three
candidates had by far the most votes excluded. The revised tally reversed the second and third
place candidates, giving Martelly 22.2 percent, and Celestin 21.9 percent of the vote, still less
than one percent difference between the two. Manigat remained in first place with 31.6 percent of
the vote.
Although the expert mission said that, “By any measure, these were problematic elections,” it
ruled out the option of conducting a new national election. Because the irregularities most
affected the top three candidates, the mission concluded that “a new election would involve more
contests and candidacies than the evidence warranted.” The mission made recommendations for
improving the process in the second round, including improving poll worker training, creating a
more transparent and consistent verification process at the central vote tabulation center, and
replacing poll workers at locations where irregularities occurred.
The expert verification mission submitted its report to President Préval on January 13, 2011.
Préval was reported to be displeased with some of the team’s methodology, what was seen as its
usurping of the CEP’s role, and that the report had been leaked. Some advocacy groups and other
9 Embassy of the United States, Dept. of State, "Statement by the Embassy of the United States Following the
Publication of Results of the November 28 National Elections by the CEP," press release, December 7, 2010,
http://haiti.usembassy.gov/press-releases-2012/untitled6.html.
10 Information and quotes in this section on the expert mission’s findings are from: Organization of American States,
Expert Verification Mission of the Vote Tabulation of the November 28, 2010 Presidential Election in the Republic of
Haiti, Final Report, Port-au-Prince, Haiti, January 13, 2011.
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critics also objected to their methodology.11 Other long-time Haiti observers said that there was
“no reason to question its impartiality and seriousness of purpose.”12
Worried that Préval would insist on his candidate advancing to the second round, the United
States and other major donors applied pressure on the Préval Administration to accept the OAS
recommendations. The State Department revoked some Haitian officials’ visas, and warned it
might review U.S. aid to Haiti if the recommendations were ignored. Secretary of State Hillary
Clinton traveled to Haiti January 30, saying that the U.S. was not about to cut off aid, but she
pressed President Préval to accept the OAS recommendations. Préval sent the report to the CEP
on January 18 for implementation. The CEP said that it would implement the technical
recommendations for improving the second round, and take the recommendation regarding the
second and third place candidates into consideration as it resumed the dispute resolution phase of
the electoral process that had been suspended during the verification process. Tension continued
as observers wondered whether the CEP would accept or reject the OAS recommendations.
A second OAS team of legal experts accompanied the CEP’s disputes and challenges phase and
the adjudication of complaints. Concluding that phase, the CEP released the final presidential and
legislative election results on February 3, accepting that Mirlande Manigat and Michel Martelly
would proceed to the second round of presidential elections. The public response was calm. The
candidates resumed campaigning on February 17.
The Legislative Race13
The legislative offices up for election included the entire 99-member Chamber of Deputies, and
11 of 30 Senate seats.
While some critics charged that fraud had been used to advance Inite legislative candidates, the
OAS election expert mission’s mandate was only to examine the presidential results, not the
legislative ones. The CEP handled legislative disputes and challenges and the adjudication of
complaints, and was accompanied during this phase by the second OAS team of legal experts.
The legal expert mission “observed with satisfaction” that legislative candidates submitted a large
number of complaints, “demonstrating that grievances can be effectively addressed by rule of the
law procedures.”14
In the Senate, four races were determined by the first round, seating three Inite and one Altenativ
candidate. Seven contests will proceed to a second round, with seven Inite candidates facing
candidates from three other parties. In the Chamber of Deputies, Préval’s party won or proceeded
to runoffs in 68 of the 99 races.
11 See, for example, Mark Weisbrot and Jake Johnston, Analysis of the OAS Mission’s Draft Report on Haiti’s Election,
Center for Economic and Policy Research, Issue Brief, January 2011,
http://www.cepr.net/documents/publications/haiti-oas-analysis-2011-01.pdf.
12 Editorial, "Haiti's decision," Miami Herald, February 3, 2011.
13 Official results from Conseil Electoral Provisoire, at http://cephaiti2010.org/. Translated by author.
14 Organization of American States, Report of …February 2011, op. cit, p. 8.
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The Second Round Of Voting
The final round of voting for president and the legislature is scheduled to be held on March 20,
2011. Final results are not expected before April 16.
Mirlande Manigat was still the frontrunner in early March, although a poll by Haiti’s private
sector showed Michel Martelly pulling ahead by March 9.15 Haitian-born hip-hop musician
Wyclef Jean, who was ruled ineligible to run for president himself because he did not meet
Haitian residency requirements, has thrown his support behind Martelly.
Political tensions had initially decreased following the announcement of the second-round
presidential candidates. On March 8, however, three men putting up posters in support of Manigat
were found dead, showing signs of mutilation, suggesting that political tensions could still erupt
at any moment.
Local elections for municipal councils, town delegates, and other posts are due to be held as well.
USAID’s post-disaster election assessment suggested they be held in mid-2011. So far there is no
date scheduled to hold them.
Issues and Concerns regarding Elections and Post-
Election Governance
The concerns over this particular election cycle in Haiti are shared by the international donor
community, Congress, and the Obama Administration. Each group is deeply concerned about the
political stability of the government, its ability to move forward with a clearly defined plan for
the reconstruction and development of post-earthquake Haitian society, and the effectiveness of
the foreign aid each provides. In the long term, elections in Haiti have led to the slow
strengthening of government capacity and transparency. In the short term, elections have usually
been a source of increased political tensions and instability.
Short-term Issues
Election monitoring
The Organization of American States (OAS) /Caribbean Community (CARICOM) Joint Election
Observation Mission is the only major international monitor of the current election process. The
mission has had long-term observers on the ground since August 3, 2010. By November 19, 2010
it had 68 observers dispersed across Haiti’s 10 departments (political subdivisions).16 It deployed
more observers the week leading up to and on the November 28 election day, when there were
15 Mateos, March 4, 2011, op.cit.; and Jacqueline Charles, “Manigat, Martelly kept to script in rare debate for Haiti
presidency; Haiti presidential candidates offered little clarity on policies Wednesday in a televised presidential debate,”
Miami Herald, March 9, 2011.
16 Organization of American States, The Joint Mission OAS/CARICOM in Haiti provides an update after more than
three months of activity, November 19, 2010, http://wwww.reliefweb.int/rw/rwb.nsf/db900SID/VDUX-
8BCRQE?OpenDocument.
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118 observers. The joint mission has been observing the various phases of the electoral process,
and will continue to do so until the official results of the second round elections are published.
The mission has met regularly with the Provisional Electoral Council, making suggestions based
on its observations. It has also met with political parties, passing on their concerns to the CEP as
well. Some people believed there should have been more long-term international observers, but
donors thought that given the difficulty in logistics posed by post-earthquake conditions, and
Haiti’s relatively small size, the single, smaller mission would suffice.
The OAS plans to have about 200 observers for the March 20 elections, and to conduct a quick
parallel vote count. Part of the reason it was unable to conduct a quick count during the first
round was that observers were called back early from the field due to security concerns.
Some observers criticized the mission for not questioning the validity of the elections earlier in
the process. Others criticized the mission for being both part of the process, through its technical
assistance to the office providing identity cards, and judge of that same process.
Other smaller organizations and diplomatic missions, including the U.S. and Canadian embassies,
and about 6,000 nonpartisan domestic election observers monitored voting on election day across
the country during the first round. These groups plan to observe the March 20th round as well.
Concerns about the Electoral Process
The OAS/CARICOM observation mission has expressed ongoing concerns about security. Some
opposition candidates alleged during the first round of voting that candidates and supporters of
the ruling Inite party distributed weapons. The OAS mission asked those making accusations to
present evidence so that investigations could be carried out.17 In November the OAS/CARICOM
election monitoring team expressed concern about election-related violence, and asked candidates
to “carry out their campaigning in a calm atmosphere and to display tolerance, friendliness and
mutual respect.”18 Even at this late date, observers worry that the eruption of violence or political
unrest -- such as could be caused by the return of Aristide, for example -- could be a possible
cause for postponement. If either candidate contests the outcome of the election, violence could
erupt after the elections.
Angered by rumors that UN troops may have introduced cholera to Haiti, Haitians attacked UN
soldiers in late 2010. Any further attacks against UN troops could be particularly problematic, as
MINUSTAH is responsible for providing security for the election process, as well as
transportation of ballots and other election material. There are 9,000 MINUSTAH security
personnel, and 3,500 Haitian National Police (PNH) providing security. As of March 7, UN
officials said a review of and changes in security were still underway in preparation for the
second round.19 An early assessment of the elections issued a reminder that MINUSTAH’s
mandate is mostly to observe and support the PNH, not to handle situations directly.20
17 [Ambassador Colin Granderson], “Presentation made to the Extraordinary Meeting of the Group of Friends of Haiti:
Update on Elections and Perspectives on Reconstruction Efforts,” OAS General Services Building, Washington, DC,
Oct. 27, 2010.
18 "The OAS/CARICOM Joint Election Observation Mission in Haiti calls on Political Actors to Conduct Campaigning
in Atmosphere of Tolerance and Friendliness," States News Service, November 11, 2010.
19 Jacqueline Charles, "In Haiti, officials promise fixes ahead of March runoff election," Miami Herald, March 7, 2011.
20 Sophie Lagueny and Rudolf Derose, Post-Disaster Assessment on the Feasibility of Organizing Free and Fair
(continued...)
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After the first-round elections, the U.S. State Department issued a new travel warning strongly
urging U.S. citizens to avoid non-essential travel to Haiti in part because of “continued high
crime, the cholera outbreak, frequent disturbances in Port-au-Prince and in provincial cities, and
limited police protection ...” and because “travel within Haiti is hazardous.”21 Since the first-
round elections, there have been violent protests resulting in deaths. Once the final results were
announced, the atmosphere was calmer. Nonetheless, the situation remains volatile.
Observers of the electoral process also voice concern about the level of voter participation
because it will affect the legitimacy of the election’s results. In April and June 2009, voter turnout
for partial Senate elections was a meager 11 percent of the electorate. Turnout is usually much
higher for presidential elections, however, and the observation mission viewed active
campaigning and large numbers of voters going to verification centers as signs that turnout would
be healthy. Although turnout was higher than in 2009, it was only about 22 percent in the first
round of the current election process. Some observers wonder if fear of cholera and of violent
protests might have suppressed voter turnout, and worry that they could do so again in the second
round.
In the joint observation mission’s November 11 statement, it repeated its concern over the use of
state resources during the current campaign season. The mission appealed “to the political parties
to adhere to the provisions aimed at guaranteeing the fairness of the election race,” and said that
the “state authorities must...ensure that agents of the state are not involved in activities related to
campaigning.”22
The OAS/CARICOM mission’s October report expressed concern about several technical aspects
of the electoral process. The distribution of voter identification cards seemed to be the greatest
issue. About 400,000 new cards were printed but distribution was slow. About 4.7 million people
have registered to vote, an estimated 95% of the adult population. The report estimated that about
6% of those listed in the voter registry are deceased. This was attributed mostly to the listing of
people who died during the earthquake, for most of whom there are no death certificates, which
are needed to remove someone’s name from the registry. The report noted that safeguards such as
photos on the electoral list, the need for a voter identification card, and indelible ink indicating
votes had been cast, had been put in place to prevent multiple voting. Registering the internally
displaced appears not to have been as big a problem as some thought it would be, as not that
many internally displaced requested replacement identity cards. The majority of displaced people
in temporary camps appear to live near their former residences and polling stations, so that few
additional polling places for them were needed, according to U.S. officials familiar with election
preparations.
The Provisional Electoral Council
Negative perceptions regarding the Provisional Electoral Council are widespread and contributed
to questions regarding the elections’ credibility both before and after the December vote. In late
2009, President Préval cut ties to the Lespwa movement that elected him in 2006, and formed a
(...continued)
Elections in Haiti, USAID, produced by the International Foundation for Electoral Systems, April 2010, p.iv.
21 U.S. Dept. of State, “Travel Warning, Haiti” issued Dec. 9, 2010,
http://travel.state.gov/travel/cis_pa_tw/tw/tw_4632.html.
22 States News Service, op.cit.
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new movement, Inite. Opposition groups accused the presidentially appointed electoral council of
bias in favor of the President’s new movement. The electoral council disqualified without
explanation about 15 rival political groups, which included members of Lespwa who did not join
Préval’s new party.
An assessment of the feasibility of organizing elections after the earthquake stated that the
operational branch of the CEP was technically capable of organizing elections, but warned that
the lack of credibility of the Council as a whole posed a major problem. The report recommended
replacing the commission, but the Preval Administration chose not to do so.23 The
OAS/CARICOM mission’s October report acknowledged that “the widespread mistrust of the
CEP is perhaps by far the major obstacle to the credibility and legitimacy of the elections.”
But the mission suggests that the CEP may be being blamed for some of the shortcomings of
previous CEPs and of the Préval administration as well. For example, the previous CEP caused
controversy by barring former President Jean-Bertrand Aristide's Fanmi Lavalas party from
participating in legislative elections in April 2009 for mostly technical reasons. Part of the
problem was that two rival factions within Lavalas submitted separate lists of candidates. The
council rejected both lists because neither faction had documents signed by the party's head,
Aristide. Aristide lives in exile in South Africa. Although technically correct, some observers felt
the decision had a politically motivated element, to prevent the once powerful Lavalas from
gaining more seats in the National Assembly. Neither faction ever produced the required
document, however, and Fanmi Lavalas did not try to register presidential or legislative
candidates with the current CEP for the 2010 elections.
The observation mission report notes that the current CEP has been responsive to criticism,
improving the transparency of its actions, and communicating more openly with the public,
political parties, and civil society organizations. The CEP began to implement some of the
improvements recommended by the OAS and other observer missions as soon as they were
received following the first round. About 500 poll workers and supervisors at voting centers
where fraud and irregularities were high have been fired; education requirements for poll workers
have been raised to a 12th grade equivalent; and officials are still trying to clean up the voter
lists.24
Legitimacy
An immediate concern for all involved is that the upcoming elections, carried out with $14
million in U.S. assistance, do not exhibit the same level of irregularities, fraud and violence as the
last round, and are sufficiently free and fair to produce a government considered legitimate in the
eyes of the Haitian public and the international community. The ability of the Haitian authorities
to carry out these elections in an acceptable manner will be a key test that could determine the
political tone in Haiti for the next several years.
23 Sophie Lagueny and Rudolf Derose, op.cit., pp. 12-13.
24 Jacqueline Charles, March 7, 2011, op. cit.
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Long-term Issues
Reconstruction and the Management of Foreign Assistance
In the longer term, the United States and the international community are concerned about the
ability of whichever government is elected to manage the billions of dollars of international aid.
Both candidates have expressed nationalistic views, leading to concerns about whether they will
continue to work within the current framework of the Interim Haitian Recovery Commission
(IHRC). The IHRC, formed in late 2010, was designed to last 18 months, at which time the
Commission would become the Haitian-run Haitian Development Authority. While there has been
criticism that the IHRC is not approving and distributing aid effectively, there is also widespread
concern that the Haitian government is not ready to assume full control of the process either. The
government’s nascent institutions, which had limited capacity before the earthquake, were set
back severely by the earthquake’s destruction. Gross mismanagement of funds by the next Haitian
administration could prompt donors to impose conditions, reconsider further funding of
programs, or return to directing aid solely through non-governmental organizations. Both
candidates have pledged to make Haiti less dependent on foreign assistance, but are not clear on
how they would do so.
There are also concerns about the effect either candidate will have on relations with the United
States and with other major donors and international organizations. Donors worry about whether
either candidate will try to change dramatically current development and recovery plans. Both
candidates have been vague on specific policy plans. If they want to be assured of continued
donor assistance, they will face difficulty straying far from the current strategy, which was agreed
upon by the Haitian government and international donors at the April 2010 donors conference,
and upon which foreign assistance programs are based.
Asked what her priorities were, Mirlande Manigat echoed a common feeling that “everything is a
priority.”25 She went on to say that her immediate priorities would be solving the cholera
problem, and addressing the situation of displaced Haitians living in camps. In terms of long-term
development, she said that education is key as a tool for development and for reducing frustration
among Haiti’s youth. She also said that Haiti’s “very unacceptable” social inequalities required
profound changes to reduce social volatility. Opponents disparage her age (she is 70), criticize her
for being more comfortable speaking in French than Creole, and for being removed from Haiti’s
impoverished masses. In her recent campaign stops, she has addressed Haitian crowds and press
in Creole, and has appeared in a Port-au-Prince slum.26
Michel Martelly, age 49, also emphasizes education, along with agricultural production and the
importance of family. He said his campaign is “to bring joy, to bring music, to bring love, to bring
peace, prosperity, development and change in every corner of the country of Haiti.”27 Critics raise
concern about his lack of political or institutional management experience, and his personal
financial problems. Martelly, who often performs in outlandish costumes, is trying to shift his
image, and is wearing three-piece suits. He also hired a Spanish public relations firm to handle his
campaign.
25 Trenton Daniel, "Professor, first lady and ( maybe) president," Miami Herald, February 13, 2011.
26 Jacqueline Charles, "Campaign opens for Haiti's presidential runoff," Miami Herald, February 21, 2011.
27 Jacqueline Charles, Feb. 21, 2011, op.cit.
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Security and Human Rights
In terms of security, Manigat has proposed strengthening the Haitian National Police and Martelly
has proposed recreating the Haitian army,28 which overthrew Aristide shortly after he became
Haiti’s first elected president, and was disbanded by Aristide after he was restored to office by the
international community. At a recent debate, both candidates supported establishing a national
security force as a way of creating jobs. Martelly said the military should replace MINUSTAH,
while Manigat said that MINUSTAH could be phased out eventually, but that it would not be a
priority.29 The proposal to reconstitute the Haitian army raises alarm not only about diverting
funds from current development and reconstruction programs, but also about respect for human
rights. The army was an instrument of state repression under the Duvalier regime, along with the
Duvaliers’ secret police, the Tontons Macoutes, and under the de facto military regimes that
followed Duvalier’s and Aristide’s ousters. Both security forces committed gross violations of
human rights over decades.
Both candidates have some association with de facto military regimes. As noted earlier, Manigat’s
husband, Leslie Manigat was elected President in 1988 in elections run by the military. His term
lasted less than six months, however: when Manigat tried to introduce reform and reduce
corruption, the military overthrew him.
Martelly was “once a favorite of the thugs who worked on behalf of the hated Duvalier family
dictatorship,” according to the Washington Post, and was “closely identified with sympathizers of
the 1991 military coup that ousted Pres[ident] Jean-Bertrand Aristide,” according to the Miami
Herald.30 One of his advisors, Gervais Charles, is currently Jean-Claude Duvalier’s lawyer.
Stability and the Return of Former Leaders
In addition to electoral political tensions, another destabilizing factor is the reappearance on the
scene of two of Haiti’s most divisive leaders. Jean-Claude “Baby Doc” Duvalier returned
unexpectedly from 25 years in exile on January 16, 2011. Two days later, the Haitian government
formally charged him with corruption and embezzlement. Private citizens have filed charges of
human rights violations against Duvalier for abuses they allege they suffered under his regime.
Former President Jean-Bertrand Aristide, in exile since his government collapsed in the face of
political conflict in 2001, says that he would also like to return soon, and the Haitian government
issued him a new passport. Préval has long said Aristide was free to return, but that he should be
prepared to face corruption and other charges as well. Both are seen as highly polarizing figures
able to stir up unrest. The Obama Administration has cautioned that Aristide’s return before the
elections would be an “unfortunate distraction.”31
It is a significant accomplishment that Haiti, long characterized by impunity for its leaders, has
brought charges against its former dictator. Duvalier is currently not allowed to leave the country,
while a judge determines whether there is sufficient evidence to proceed with a trial. Trying
Duvalier and/or Aristide, however, would be a severe strain on Haiti’s weak judicial system.
28 "Michel Martelly," New York Times, March 7, 2011.
29 LatinNews Daily, "Martelly and Manigat square off in Haiti," Latin American Newsletters, March 10, 2011.
30 Scott Wilson, "Political Notes Fill Carnival in Haiti; Music Underscores Nation's Discontent," Washington Post,
February 13, 2002; and “Haiti,” Miami Herald, September 3, 1996.
31 "Aristide return not helpful before Haiti vote says U.S.," Reuters, February 9, 2011.
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Because the judicial system is not fully independent, the attitudes of the new president could also
have a large impact on any judicial process.
Presidential candidate Mirlande Manigat says that Duvalier’s case is for the judiciary to handle.
She also says that Aristide’s return could create more “agitation” and she hopes he will postpone
his return until after the elections.32 Fellow candidate Michel Martelly has called for clemency for
former leaders, saying that, “If I come to power, I would like all the former presidents to become
my advisors in order to profit from their experience.”33 He also said he was “ready” to work with
officials who had served under the Duvalier regimes.34
Outlook
In proximity to the United States, and with such a chronically unstable political environment and
fragile economy, Haiti has been a constant policy issue for the United States. Congress views the
stability of the nation with great concern and commitment to improving conditions there.
The main priorities for U.S. policy regarding Haiti are to strengthen fragile democratic processes,
continue to improve security, and promote economic development. Other concerns include the
cost and effectiveness of U.S. aid; protecting human rights; combating narcotics, arms, and
human trafficking; addressing Haitian migration; and alleviating poverty.
Congress has monitored Haiti closely, and has established a number of conditions on assistance
over the years. Congressional priorities for assistance to Haiti have included “aggressive action to
support the Haitian National Police;”35 ensuring that elections are free and fair; developing
indigenous human rights monitoring capacity; facilitating more privatization of state-owned
enterprises; promoting a sustainable agricultural development program; and establishing an
economic development fund to encourage U.S. investment in Haiti.
Haiti’s March 20 national elections are being closely watched by the international community as
well as by Congress. Over the past decade, the United States and other international donors have
been politically, economically, and militarily involved in Haiti, investing significant resources
both in the attempt to build and strengthen Haiti’s democracy and political stability and in
providing significant amounts of development, humanitarian and other assistance. Congress and
other bilateral donors have again provided another financial stake in Haiti’s long-term
development by providing funds for this election cycle and will be closely monitoring the conduct
of the elections as a prelude to the next steps in Haiti’s development.
32 Irenea Renuncio Mateos, "Election 2011: Haitian Presidential Candidate Expresses Concern About Potential Return
of Ousted Leader Before Vote," IHS Global Insight Daily Analysis, March 4, 2011.
33 Clarens Renois, "Haiti politicians hope for reconciliation," Agence France-Presse, January 21, 2011, http://www.abs-
cbnnews.com/global-filipino/world/01/21/11/haiti-politicians-hope-reconciliation
34 "Haitian candidate open to including Duvalier officials," Agence France Presse, March 2, 2011.
35 P.L. 106-113.
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Appendix. U.S. Elections Assistance
The United Nations and other international donors are providing technical and financial support
of the current elections process. The United States is providing $14 million in election support
through the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). This aid, which encompasses
support for both the first and second round voting process, includes:36
• An assessment of the feasibility of organizing free and fair elections;
• Support to the Provisional Electoral Council (CEP) for election organization and
administration. This includes training for voting center staff; technical assistance for
nationwide civic and voter education campaigns; technical assistance to improve the
CEP’s ability to communicate with the public and the press; and the establishment of a
call-in information center through which voters can find out where to vote;
• Support to a national network of nonpartisan community action groups to organize
election-related civic education and get-out-the-vote activities;
• Technical assistance to political parties to help them compete more effectively in the
2010-2011 elections, increase the chance that they will accept election results, and reduce
the potential for political conflict. Activities include training in poll watching;
participation in candidate debates, and election dispute resolution.
• Support of domestic and international electoral observation to monitor the entire election
period, to increase the confidence and participation of voters and political parties.
• Support for the organization of presidential debates to provide the electorate with greater
access to information about candidates and issues.
• Support for procurement of elections material, such as ballots and ballot boxes, through a
contribution to the elections trust fund managed by the United Nations Development
Program.
• After the elections, programs to build broad national support for electoral reform,
including the establishment of an independent, permanent electoral council.
According to USAID, there may be relatively minor additional costs involved in making
improvements for the second round based on recommendations from domestic, OAS, and other
observers of the first round. These could include additional staff and training for voting centers,
increasing the hours and capabilities of the voter information center, and adding enough
international observers to conduct a parallel vote count. The USAID mission in Haiti has $0.5
million in FY2010 Economic Support Funds available for these purposes. The UNDP and OAS
will be seeking additional funding from other donors as well.
36 U.S. Agency for International Development, USAID Elections Support;
http://www.usaid.gov/helphaiti/elections.html.
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Author Contact Information
Maureen Taft-Morales
Specialist in Latin American Affairs
mtmorales@crs.loc.gov, 7-7659
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