U.S.-China Relations: Policy Issues
Susan V. Lawrence
Analyst in Asian Affairs
Thomas Lum
Specialist in Asian Affairs
March 11, 2011
Congressional Research Service
7-5700
www.crs.gov
R41108
CRS Report for Congress
P
repared for Members and Committees of Congress
U.S.-China Relations: Policy Issues
Summary
The 112th Congress faces important questions about what sort of relationship the United States
should have with China and how the United States should respond to China’s “rise.” After 30
years of fast-paced economic growth, China’s economy is now the second largest in the world
after the United States. China is driving global economic growth and has become an Asian
economic hub. With economic success, China has developed significant global strategic clout. It
is also engaged in an ambitious military modernization drive, including efforts to develop
extended-range power projection capabilities and such advanced weapons as a stealth bomber. It
continues to suppress all perceived challenges to the Communist Party’s monopoly on power.
In previous eras, the rise of new powers produced rivalry and conflict. Today, with low levels of
“strategic trust” between the United States and China, some analysts believe eventual conflict
between the two nations is inevitable. Others, like the Harvard historian Joseph S. Nye, Jr., have
argued that, “The belief in the inevitability of conflict can become one of its main causes.” The
Obama Administration has repeatedly assured China that the United States “welcomes a strong,
prosperous and successful China that plays a greater role in world affairs,” and does not seek to
prevent China’s re-emergence as a great power. It has wrestled, however, with how to engage
China on issues affecting stability and security in the Asia-Pacific region, and how to persuade
China to address economic policies the United States sees as denying a level playing field to U.S.
firms trading with and operating in China. Such economic policies include China’s currency
policy, its alleged discrimination against foreign firms in favor of domestic ones, and its weak
protections for intellectual property rights. The Administration has also grappled with how best to
press China on its human rights record and how to reconcile different approaches to addressing
climate change. The two nations have cooperated to address global economic challenges and,
with more mixed results, nuclear proliferation concerns related to Iran and North Korea.
The bilateral relationship was characterized by significant discord in 2010. For the United States,
points of friction included China’s currency and industrial policies; its reluctance to condemn a
series of North Korean provocations; its expansive claims to disputed territory in the South China
Sea; and its ongoing suppression of domestic dissent. For China, points of friction included U.S.
arms sales to Taiwan; President Obama’s meeting with Tibet’s exiled spiritual leader, the Dalai
Lama; U.S. joint military exercises with South Korea in the Yellow Sea; and the U.S. declaration
of a “national interest” in freedom of navigation in the South China Sea. China’s President and
Communist Party General Secretary Hu Jintao made a state visit to the United States in January
2011, during which the two presidents issued a 41-point joint statement that sought to bridge
differences and emphasize common interests. A major leadership transition in China in 2012 and
a presidential election in Taiwan the same year could complicate future bilateral relations.
The first part of this report provides an overview of the U.S.-China relationship and Obama
Administration policy toward China. A summary of major policy issues in the relationship
follows, beginning with security issues and Taiwan, and continuing with economic issues, climate
change and clean energy cooperation, and human rights. The report includes five appendices.
Appendix A provides a chronology of meetings between the U.S. and Chinese presidents and
information about select bilateral dialogues. Appendix B analyzes the Joint Statement issued
during President Hu’s January 2011 state visit. Appendix C lists congressionally mandated annual
reports related to China. Appendices D and E list China-related legislation introduced in the 112th
and 111th Congresses. Throughout, this report directs the reader to other CRS reports for more
detailed information about individual topics. This report will be updated periodically.
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Contents
Overview of U.S.-China Relations .............................................................................................. 1
Obama Administration Policy...................................................................................................... 3
Selected Policy Issues ................................................................................................................. 6
Security Issues ...................................................................................................................... 6
Chinese Military Modernization...................................................................................... 6
U.S.-China Military-to-Military Relations ....................................................................... 7
Maritime Disputes........................................................................................................... 9
Nuclear Non-Proliferation ............................................................................................. 11
Taiwan ................................................................................................................................ 13
Cross-Strait Relations.................................................................................................... 15
U.S. Arms Sales to Taiwan ............................................................................................ 15
Economic Issues ................................................................................................................. 16
Global Rebalancing....................................................................................................... 17
China’s Currency Policy................................................................................................ 18
The Bilateral Trade Deficit ............................................................................................ 19
China’s Holdings of U.S. Treasuries .............................................................................. 19
China’s Compliance with World Trade Organization (WTO) Commitments ................... 20
China’s “Indigenous Innovation” Policies...................................................................... 21
China’s Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) ............................................ 22
Safety of Chinese Products............................................................................................ 22
Climate Change and Clean Energy Cooperation .................................................................. 23
Human Rights Issues........................................................................................................... 25
Nobel Laureate Liu Xiaobo ........................................................................................... 28
Tibet ............................................................................................................................. 29
Xinjiang........................................................................................................................ 30
China’s Engagement with the Developing World ........................................................... 31
Tables
Table 1. U.S. Goods Trade with China over Time ...................................................................... 19
Table A-1. Bilateral Meetings Between President Barack Obama and Chinese President
Hu Jintao ............................................................................................................................... 32
Table A-2. Two High-level Recurring U.S.-China Dialogues ..................................................... 32
Table A-3. U.S.-China Military Dialogues ................................................................................. 33
Table C-1. Selected Executive Branch Reports to Congress on China ........................................ 36
Table C-2. Selected Executive Branch Reports to Congress Related to China ............................ 37
Table C-3. Selected Reports on China By Congressionally-Mandated Commissions .................. 38
Table D-1. Legislation Related to China in the 112th Congress ................................................... 39
Table E-1. Economic Legislation Related to China in the 111th Congress ................................... 40
Table E-2. Human Rights Legislation Related to China in the 111th Congress ............................ 41
Table E-3. Environment/Energy Legislation Related to China in the 111th Congress................... 43
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Table E-4. Other Legislation Related to China in the 111th Congress .......................................... 43
Appendixes
Appendix A. Presidential Meetings and Select Dialogues .......................................................... 32
Appendix B. Core Documents: Analysis of the 2011 and 2009 U.S.-China Joint
Statements ............................................................................................................................. 34
Appendix C. Congressionally-Mandated Annual Reports Related to China ................................ 36
Appendix D. Legislation Related to China Introduced in the 112th Congress .............................. 39
Appendix E. Legislation Related to China Introduced in the 111th Congress............................... 40
Contacts
Author Contact Information ...................................................................................................... 44
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Overview of U.S.-China Relations
After 30 years of fast-paced economic growth, China, also known by its formal name, the
People’s Republic of China (PRC), has emerged as the world’s second largest economy, and the
United States-China relationship has expanded to encompass a broad range of global, regional,
and bilateral issues. Washington seeks Beijing’s cooperation in rebalancing the global economy. It
looks to China, a fellow permanent member of the United Nations Security Council, to help block
the nuclear ambitions of Iran and North Korea. With the United States and China now the two
largest emitters of greenhouse gases, Washington seeks Beijing’s cooperation in reaching a new
international agreement on steps to address climate change. The United States also seeks to
engage China on ways to uphold peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific, including in the Taiwan
Strait, the South China Sea, and the East China Sea. The lingering effects of the 2008-2009 global
financial crisis on the United States economy have added to the urgency of Washington’s efforts
to try to achieve a so-called level playing field for U.S. firms that trade with and operate in China.
The United States also seeks to promote human rights and the rule of law in China, including in
the sometimes restive ethnic minority regions of Tibet and Xinjiang.
Hanging over the relationship is the meta question of whether, as China grows in economic and
military power, the United States and China can manage their relationship in such a way as to
avoid the debilitating rivalry and conflict that have accompanied the rise of new powers in
previous eras. The United States and China are already engaged in what President Obama has
termed “friendly competition.”1 Some analysts believe eventual conflict with China is inevitable.
Others, like the Harvard historian Joseph S. Nye, Jr., have argued that, “The belief in the
inevitability of conflict can become one of its main causes.”2 Mindful of history, and of the stakes
for their respective economies and the world, the leaders of both countries have repeatedly
averred that they do not want conflict and committed to work together where their interests
overlap, and to try to find ways to manage their differences.
The U.S.-China relationship remains dogged, however, by long-standing mutual mistrust. That
mistrust stems in part from the two countries’ very different political systems. Many in the United
States are uncomfortable with China’s authoritarian system of government and sometimes brutal
suppression of dissent and see continued Communist Party rule in a post-Cold War world as an
anachronism. Many Communist Party elites in China are suspicious that the United States seeks
to constrain China’s rise. Some believe that the United States seeks to destabilize China, with the
goal of foisting multi-party democracy upon it and pushing the Communist Party from power.
The two countries’ different economic models have led to mistrust, too. Some in the United States
believe that China has achieved its economic successes by playing by a different, and not always
fair, set of rules. Such critics point to China’s strong reliance on exports for growth and to the
PRC government’s policy of keeping China’s currency artificially weak, in part to make Chinese
exports more attractive to importing nations. Other points of contention include Chinese
industrial policies that appear to be intended to help Chinese domestic firms scale the value chain
by discriminating against foreign firms, and China’s inability or unwillingness to prevent
1 The White House Office of the Press Secretary, “Press Conference with President Obama and President Hu of the
People’s Republic of China,” press release, January 19, 2011, http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/01/19/
press-conference-president-obama-and-president-hu-peoples-republic-china.
2 Joseph S. Nye, Jr., “The Challenge of China,” in How to Make America Safe: New Policies for National Security, ed.
Stephen Van Evera, 74 ed. (Cambridge, MA: The Tobin Project, 2006).
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violations of foreign intellectual property by Chinese entities. For their part, PRC officials have
criticized the United States for its high levels of consumption, low savings rate, long-term debt,
and alleged protectionism and loose monetary policy.
Mistrust is particularly pronounced on security matters. The United States increasingly sees
China’s military modernization as aimed at constraining the U.S. military’s freedom of movement
in Asia and deterring U.S. intervention in the case of Chinese use of force against Taiwan, the
self-ruled island of 23 million over which China claims sovereignty.3 In mirror image, China sees
the United States as intent on thwarting its unification with Taiwan and constraining the activities
of the Chinese military throughout Asia. Although China stated in U.S.-China Joint Statements in
2011 and 2009 that it “welcomes the United States as an Asia-Pacific nation that contributes to
peace, stability and prosperity in the region” (see Appendix B for analysis of the joint
statements), many in China chafe at surveillance activities undertaken by the U.S. military along
China’s coast and at U.S. military exercises in waters near China. They also see U.S. military
alliances in Asia as aimed to a significant degree at keeping China’s actions in check. With U.S.
troops deployed in Afghanistan, which shares a short border with China to the west, and with U.S.
military and intelligence agencies deeply engaged in Pakistan, with which China shares a longer
western border, some Chinese commentators speak of their country as being “encircled” by U.S.
forces.4
A sweeping leadership transition in China and presidential elections in Taiwan, both scheduled
for 2012, could further complicate the U.S.-China relationship. Chinese Communist Party
General Secretary Hu Jintao and Premier Wen Jiabao are scheduled to retire from their party posts
in late 2012, at the Chinese Communist Party’s 18th Congress, and from their state posts at the
first meeting of the 12th National People’s Congress in March 2013. In all, seven of China’s top
nine leaders are expected to step down from their positions in 2012 and 2013. Vice President Xi
Jinping, currently the Communist Party’s sixth most senior leader, is widely expected to take over
from Hu Jintao as China’s top leader, but other top posts remain contested. In Taiwan’s
presidential election campaign, the incumbent Kuomintang Party president, who has presided
over expanded engagement with China, is expected to face a strong challenge from a candidate
for the Democratic Progressive Party, which has sharply questioned that engagement. Some
analysts believe that political jockeying in China may be contributing to greater Chinese
assertiveness on the international stage, particularly over territorial claims, as candidates for
higher office may feel the need to show themselves to be robustly defending China’s national
interests. Other analysts argue that the transition should soon bring greater stability to China’s
international relations, as leaders may feel they need to establish a peaceful international
environment to aid in a smooth transition.
3 In a December 2010 speech, Admiral Michael Mullen, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, declared that, “some of
the specific capabilities [that China is developing] are very clearly focused on and pointed at the United States of
America. And they are anti-access capabilities. We’re not going away [from Asia], so we’re going to be there.”
Admiral Michael Mullen, Speech at the Center for American Progress, Washington, DC, December 1, 2010,
http://www.jcs.mil/speech.aspx?id=1500.
4 A Chinese military commentator, Air Force Colonel Dai Xu, has referred to the United States carrying out a “C-shape
encirclement” of China. See Ge Qian, “Sino-U.S. Relations Tense as South China Sea Issues Escalate,” Southern
Metropolis News (Guangzhou), July 27, 2010, p. AA16. Colonel Dai published a book in China entitled “C-Shape
Encirclement” in 2010.
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Obama Administration Policy
Faced with a rising China, the Obama Administration has repeatedly emphasized that it
“welcomes a strong, prosperous and successful China that plays a greater role in world affairs.”5
President Obama signaled soon after taking office that he hoped to work with China to address a
broad range of global issues, most prominently the global financial crisis, climate change, and
nuclear non-proliferation, but also such issues as security in Afghanistan and Pakistan and the
threat of pandemic disease. In remarks in July 2009, he argued that partnership between the
United States and China was “a prerequisite for progress on many of the most pressing global
challenges.”6
At the same time, the Administration has called for “strategic reassurance” from China about its
intentions. In a September 2009 speech, Undersecretary of State James B. Steinberg asserted that,
“Just as we and our allies must make clear that we are prepared to welcome China’s ‘arrival’ …
as a prosperous and successful power, China must reassure the rest of the world that its
development and growing global role will not come at the expense of security and well-being of
others.”7
Some observers have questioned whether the Obama Administration’s global agenda with China
has meant a diminution of emphasis on such traditional issues in the bilateral relationship as
human rights and Taiwan. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton became a lightning rod for such
questioning when she stated in February 2009 that the United States would continue to press
China on such issues as Taiwan and Tibet and human rights, “but our pressing on those issues
can’t interfere with the global economic crisis, the global climate change crisis, and the security
crisis.”8 The Administration was careful to give human rights a high profile during President Hu
Jintao’s state visit to the United States in January 2011, but it continues to argue that that
disagreements on such issues as human rights and Taiwan should not prevent the United States
from seeking to work together with China on other issues.
Part of the Obama Administration’s stated response to China’s rise has been an emphasis on
“robust regional engagement” by the United States across Asia. In a major address about China
policy ahead of President Hu’s state visit, Secretary Clinton noted that the Administration has
worked to strengthen its security alliances with Japan, South Korea, Thailand, Australia, and the
Philippines; stepped up relations with India, Indonesia, Vietnam, Malaysia, Singapore, and New
Zealand; and pursued a major free trade agreement with South Korea. She also said it had
committed itself to strengthening regional institutions. In what was widely interpreted as a
reference to a newly powerful China that the Administration believes is still learning how to
5 This language appeared in joint statements issued by the U.S. and Chinese presidents in 2009 and 2011.
6 The White House Office of the Press Secretary, “Remarks by the President at the U.S./China Strategic and Economic
Dialogue,” July 27, 2009, http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-uschina-strategic-and-
economic-dialogue.
7 James B. Steinberg, “China’s Arrival: The Long March to Global Power,” keynote address to the Center for a New
American Security, Washington, DC, September 24, 2009, http://www.cnas.org/files/multimedia/documents/
Deputy%20Secretary%20James%20Steinberg's%20September%2024,%202009%20Keynote%20Address%20Transcri
pt.pdf.
8 Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton, Working Toward Change in Perceptions of U.S. Engagement Around the
World, Department of State, Roundtable with Traveling Press, February 20, 2010, http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/
2009a/02/119430.htm.
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comport itself in ways that its neighbors do not find threatening, Secretary Clinton said that in the
multilateral settings of regional institutions, “responsible behavior is rewarded with legitimacy
and respect, and we can work together to hold accountable those who take counterproductive
actions to peace, stability, and prosperity.”9
An additional element of the Obama Administration’s approach is an effort to embed China in
international institutions. The United States and China are fellow permanent members of the
United Nations Security Council and, since President Obama took office, have worked together
successfully in the Security Council to pass sanctions targeting North Korea and Iran’s nuclear
programs, although critics have accused China of taking a minimalist approach to implementation
of those sanctions. The United States has worked with China on economic issues in the G-20
grouping, and welcomed a greater Chinese role in the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the
World Bank. It has also sought to resolve trade disputes with China through the rules-based
mechanisms of the World Trade Organization, and brought complaints about China’s currency to
the IMF.
In an effort to increase clarity about each side’s intentions and promote cooperation between
officials of the two countries at all levels and across multiple departments, the Obama
Administration has embraced and added to a broad array of official dialogues inherited from the
George W. Bush Administration. The relationship’s highest-profile regularly scheduled dialogue
is the annual Strategic and Economic Dialogue (S&ED). The other dialogue of comparable
seniority is the Joint Commission on Commerce and Trade (JCCT), established in 1983 as a high-
level forum for discussion of bilateral trade issues.10 Dialogue on strategic issues remains limited,
however, with U.S. officials sometimes complaining that even at the height of the Cold War, the
United States and the Soviet Union had closer consultation on strategic issues than the United
States and China do now. (See Appendix A for details of the S&ED and JCCT.)
The Obama Administration has also supported myriad forms of bilateral government-to-
government cooperation that rarely make headlines, such as Department of Energy cooperation
with China on clean energy projects. Arguing that neither side can advance the relationship
without support from its people, the Obama Administration has used its bully pulpit to promote
people-to-people initiatives, including a high-profile public-private effort to expand the number
of Americans who study in China, known as the 100,000 Strong Initiative.
The Obama Administration points to some successes in working with China to address pressing
global issues, including coordination of stimulus spending to address the global financial crisis
(2008-2009) and cooperation in negotiating new sanctions against North Korea (in 2009) and Iran
(in 2010) over their nuclear programs. In the year following President Obama’s November 2009
state visit to China, however, the bilateral relationship was strained by a series of sometimes
heated disagreements. Frictions in the relationship following President Obama’s November 2009
state visit to China included:
• 12/2010: U.S. and Chinese negotiators clashed at the Copenhagen Climate
Change Conference before coming to an eleventh hour agreement on the
document that became the Copenhagen Accord.
9 Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton, “A Broad Vision of U.S.-China Relations in the 21st Century,” Inaugural
Richard C. Holbrooke Lecture, Washington, DC, January 14, 2011.
10 See JCCT factsheet at http://www.export.gov/china/policyadd/jcct.asp?dName=policyadd.
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• 1/2010: Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, in a policy speech on Internet
freedom, urged U.S. Internet companies to oppose censorship in their overseas
operations and called upon the PRC government to conduct an investigation of
recently discovered cyberattacks on the computer systems of U.S. companies.11
• 1/2010: China reacted angrily to the Obama Administration’s notification to
Congress of its plans to sell $6.4 billion worth of arms to Taiwan, suspending
military-to-military ties with the United States in protest.
• 2/2010: China condemned President Obama’s unofficial meeting at the White
House with Tibet’s exiled spiritual leader, the Dalai Lama. (President Obama had
informed his Chinese counterpart about the planned meeting during his
November 2009 state visit to China.)
• 3/2010: Despite U.S. pressure, China declined to condemn its neighbor North
Korea for its alleged torpedo attack on U.S.-ally South Korea’s naval vessel, the
Cheonan.
• 7/2010: China’s Foreign Minister protested U.S. plans to hold military exercises
in the Yellow Sea in response to North Korea’s provocations. The Yellow Sea
borders China to the east.
• 7/2010: Responding to the actions of China and other claimants to disputed
territory in the South China Sea, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton told a meeting
of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Regional Forum in
Hanoi that the United States had a “national interest” in freedom of navigation
and respect for international law in the South China Sea. China’s Foreign
Minister called Secretary’s Clinton’s comments “in effect an attack on China.”12
• 9/2010: After a Chinese fishing trawler collided with Japanese Coast Guard
vessels near disputed islands in the East China Sea, the United States angered
China by voicing its support for Japan in the ensuing China-Japan spat, and by
clarifying that that the disputed islands are among areas covered by the U.S.
military alliance with Japan.
• 11/2010: China declined to condemn North Korea over revelations of its uranium
enrichment program and over its shelling of a South Korean island, and later also
blocked United Nations action over the uranium program. It also again protested
U.S. joint military exercises with South Korea in the Yellow Sea.
• Simmering throughout the Obama Administration have been sharp differences
over China’s currency and industrial policies.
In January 2011, China’s President and Communist Party General Secretary Hu Jintao made a
state visit to the United States.13 (See Table A-1 for a chronology of meetings between the two
11 Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton, “Remarks on Internet Freedom,” Washington, DC, January 21, 2010,
http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2010/01/135519.htm.
12 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi Refutes Fallacies on
the South China Sea Issue, Statement posted on website, July 25, 2010, http://www.mfa.gov.cn/eng/zxxx/t719460.htm.
13 Hu’s was the third state visited hosted by President Obama. The first two world leaders welcomed to the Obama
White House for state visits were Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh in November 2009 and Mexican President
Felipe Calderón in May 2010.
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leaders.) Both countries’ presidents used the trip to reassure each other about their respective
intentions, to refocus on their shared interests, and to restate their belief in all that their countries
stand to benefit from cooperation and to lose from conflict. Their pledges were contained in a 41-
point Joint Statement, which also served to update the relationship to “a cooperative partnership
based on mutual respect and mutual benefit.” President Obama pleased China, and raised the ire
of China’s critics, by according President Hu an intimate dinner for six at the White House, a 21-
gun salute at an arrival ceremony on the South Lawn of the White House the next morning, and a
state dinner. China won goodwill with the Obama Administration by placing orders for U.S.
goods reportedly valued at over $45 billion. Nonetheless, many areas of disagreement between
the two sides remained.
Selected Policy Issues
Congress may face unique challenges in exercising oversight over the United States’ relationship
with a China that is rapidly growing in economic, military, and geopolitical power, especially at a
time when United States and other Western countries are still at an early stage in their recovery
from the global economic downturn of 2008-2009. Selected policy issues for Congress related to
the bilateral relationship are summarized in the sections below, starting with security issues and
Taiwan, followed by climate change and clean energy cooperation, economic issues, and human
rights issues.
Security Issues
Security-related policy issues for Congress include how the United States should respond to
China’s military modernization, to China’s efforts to keep U.S. military ships and aircraft out of
waters and airspace near its coast, and to China’s more vigorous assertions of sovereignty over
disputed maritime territories in Asia. U.S. engagement with China on such issues has been made
more challenging by China’s reluctance to commit to sustained, reliable communication with the
U.S. military. Security issues also include the question of how best to win China’s cooperation on
nuclear non-proliferation issues, most prominently the challenge of reining in the nuclear
programs of Iran and China’s neighbor North Korea, and how to manage long-standing tensions
over the island of Taiwan, over which China claims sovereignty.
Chinese Military Modernization
China’s military, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), continues to modernize rapidly, supported
by more than two decades of steady increases in military spending. According to the Pentagon’s
2010 report to Congress on China’s military, China’s official military budget rose an average of
11.8% annually in inflation-adjusted terms over the decade from 2000 to 2009. In March 2011,
China announced that its defense budget for 2011 would be 12.7% greater than in 2010.14 The
Pentagon believes China’s actual military spending to be more than twice the amount officially
disclosed, estimating China’s total military-related spending in 2009 at over $150 billion.15
14 Jason Dean, “China Defense Budget To Increase By 12.7%,” Wall Street Journal, March 4, 2011, p. 7.
15 Office of the Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the
People’s Republic of China 2010, August 2010, pp. 42-43, http://www.defense.gov/pubs/pdfs/2010_CMPR_Final.pdf.
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With modernization, analysts believe China’s military is increasingly able to envision missions
beyond China’s immediate territorial interests. The Pentagon report to Congress welcomed the
Chinese military’s contributions to international peacekeeping efforts, humanitarian assistance
and disaster relief, and counter-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden, but raised concerns about
China’s new abilities to pursue “anti-access and area-denial strategies” in the Western Pacific and
its development of extended-range power projection capabilities. The Pentagon believes that
China’s short-term focus remains preparing for contingencies related to the island democracy of
Taiwan, over which China claims sovereignty, including the possibility that the United States
military will come to Taiwan’s aid if China tries to use force to bring Taiwan under its control.
The Pentagon report stated: “The PLA is developing the capability to deter Taiwan independence
or influence Taiwan to settle the dispute on Beijing’s terms while simultaneously attempting to
deter, delay, or deny any possible U.S. support for the island in case of conflict.” The report added
that “the balance of cross-Strait military forces continues to shift in the mainland’s favor.”16
Analysts see evidence of China’s commitment to the acquisition of the most modern defense
technology in its efforts to develop a stealth fighter jet and an “aircraft carrier killer” land-based
anti-ship ballistic missile capable of striking moving targets at sea. China carried out the first test-
flight for its J-20 stealth fighter during Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates’ visit to China in
January 2011. The U.S. Navy says China has a “workable design” for the missile, but has not yet
subjected it to a full-scale test.17 In addition, recognizing the likely centrality of cyber operations
to any future military conflict, China has been bolstering the ability of its military to carry out
computer network attacks and computer network defense.18
The U.S. military has long been troubled by what it believes to be China’s lack of transparency
about its military intentions. In testimony before Congress in March 2010, Admiral Robert F.
Willard, head of the U.S. Pacific Command, stated that, “China’s interest in a peaceful and stable
environment that will support the country’s developmental goals is difficult to reconcile with the
evolving military capabilities that appear designed to challenge U.S. freedom of action in the
region or exercise aggression or coercion of its neighbors, including U.S. treaty allies and
partners.”19
For more information, see CRS Report RL33153, China Naval Modernization: Implications for
U.S. Navy Capabilities—Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
U.S.-China Military-to-Military Relations
The military-to-military relationship remains among the least developed parts of the U.S.-China
relationship. Congress sought to limit the scope of the military relationship in the National
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000 (P.L. 106-65), when it barred exchanges or
16 Ibid, p. I.
17 Tony Carpaccio, “China’s Anti-Ship Missiles Aren’t Effective Yet, U.S. Navy Says,” Bloomberg.com, January 4,
2011.
18 Office of the Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the
People’s Republic of China 2010, August 2010, pp. 7 and 37, http://www.defense.gov/pubs/pdfs/
2010_CMPR_Final.pdf..
19 Admiral Robert F. Willard, “Statement on U.S. Pacific Command Posture,” Testimony Before the Senate Armed
Services Committee, March 24, 2010, p. 12, http://www.pacom.mil/web/pacom_resources/pdf/
Willard_Statement_SASC_032610.pdf.
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contacts with China that include “inappropriate exposure” to a range of subjects, including
surveillance and reconnaissance operations and arms sales. But the Obama Administration has
pushed hard for a Chinese commitment to a “reliable and sustained” military relationship, arguing
that, “the on-again-off-again cycle that has all too often characterized the military-to-military
relationship increases the risks and dangers of an incident or accident that could derail the overall
bilateral relationship.”20
China has been an often unwilling partner. Although President Obama and China’s President Hu
pledged in their 2009 Joint Statement to “take concrete steps to advance sustained and reliable
military-to-military relations in the future,” and reaffirmed in their 2011 Joint Statement that “a
healthy, stable, and reliable military-to-military relationship is an essential part” of their shared
vision, China continues to link the military relationship to the issue of U.S. arms sales to Taiwan.
China suspended military-to-military relations in October 2008 over the issue of Taiwan arms
sales by the George W. Bush Administration, and again suspended the military-to-military
relationship after the Obama Administration notified Congress of a new $6.4 billion package of
arms sales to Taiwan in January 2010.
With President Hu Jintao’s January 2011 state visit to the United States pending, the two
governments agreed in September 2010 to a resumption of military-to-military exchanges. They
held the 11th round of the U.S.-China Defense Consultative Talks in December 2010 (see Table
A-3 below), and Secretary of Defense Robert Gates made a long-delayed trip to China in January
2011. On that trip, he and his Chinese counterpart agreed to a program of exchanges and to
cooperation in such non-traditional security areas as counterterrorism, peacekeeping, counter-
piracy, humanitarian assistance, and disaster relief. In a joint press conference with Secretary
Gates during the trip, however, China’s Minister of Defense General Liang Guanglie suggested
that any future Taiwan arms sales could again disrupt the relationship.21 En route to Beijing,
Secretary Gates also proposed a new strategic security dialogue with China covering nuclear,
space, missile defense, and cyber security issues. Chinese officials said they would “study” the
proposal.22
For more information, see CRS Report RL32496, U.S.-China Military Contacts: Issues for
Congress, by Shirley A. Kan.
20 Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for East Asia Michael Schiffer, “Building Cooperation in the U.S.-China
Military-to-Military Relationship,” Speech to the International Institute for Strategic Studies, Washington, DC, January
6, 2011, http://www.iiss.org/about-us/offices/washington/iiss-us-events/iiss-us-address-building-cooperation-in-the-us-
china-military-to-military-relationship/.
21 In response to a question at the joint press conference, Minister Liang stated that, “United States arms sales to
Taiwan seriously damaged China’s core interests and we do not want to see that happen again; neither do we hope that
the U.S. arms sales to Taiwan will again and further disrupt our bilateral and military-to-military relationship.”
Department of Defense, “Joint Press conference with Secretary Gates and General Liang from Beijing, China,”
transcript, January 10, 2011, http://www.defense.gov/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=4750.
22 Department of Defense, “Joint Press conference with Secretary Gates and General Liang from Beijing, China,”
transcript, January 10, 2011, http://www.defense.gov/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=4750.
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Maritime Disputes
U.S. Military Operations in China’s Exclusive Economic Zone
The United States and China disagree about the legality of U.S. military ships and planes
operating in and over waters near China. Although the United States is not a party to the United
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), it interprets UNCLOS as allowing it to
conduct peaceful surveillance activities and other military activities without permission in a
country’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), defined by UNCLOS as extending from the edge of a
country’s territorial sea to 200 nautical miles from the coast. With that understanding, the United
States military has long operated in China’s EEZ, carrying out air and naval surveillance missions
to monitor China’s military deployments and capabilities, surveying the ocean floor to facilitate
submarine navigation, and engaging in military exercises with allies such as South Korea and
Japan.
China, which is a party to UNCLOS, is one of a minority of nations that interprets the Convention
differently, arguing that UNCLOS allows countries to limit military activities in their EEZs.
China’s broad claims to disputed territory in the South China Sea and East China Sea suggest that
China considers its EEZ to cover potentially large, though ill defined, portions of both waterways,
as well as a significant, though also ill defined, portion of the Yellow Sea. In 2001 and 2009,
China’s attempts to enforce its interpretation of UNCLOS resulted in several dangerous
encounters between U.S. ships and aircraft and Chinese ships and aircraft. In 2010, China
reiterated its opposition to foreign military activities in its EEZ in response to the announcement
of joint military exercises between the United States and South Korea in the Yellow Sea,
following provocations by North Korea.23
South China Sea
Chinese maps dating to before the China’s Communists came to power appear to claim most of
the South China Sea as Chinese territory. China explicitly claims sovereignty over four groups of
islets and atolls and their undefined “adjacent waters,” which are reportedly rich in fishing
resources and potentially in oil and gas deposits. Those islets and atolls are the Paracels (known
in Chinese as the Xisha), the Spratlys (Nansha in Chinese), the entirely submerged Macclesfield
Bank (Zhongsha in Chinese), and the largely submerged Pratas (Dongsha in Chinese). Territory
claimed by China is also claimed in part by Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, and
Vietnam, and in entirety by Taiwan.
In the case of disputed maritime territory, China’s official policy is to set aside the issue of
sovereignty and pursue joint development with other claimants. As its economic and military
might has grown, however, China has appeared increasingly keen to assert its sovereignty in the
South China Sea. Examples of new Chinese assertiveness include China’s harassment of U.S.
23 In July 2010, China’s Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi told Secretary of State Hillary Clinton that China, “firmly
opposes foreign warships and military aircraft entering the Yellow Sea and other coastal waters of China to engage in
activities affecting China’s security and interests.” See Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC, “Yang Jiechi Meets
with U.S. Secretary of State Clinton and Canadian Foreign Minister Cannon,” press release, July 23, 2010,
http://www.china-embassy.org/eng/zmgx/t719784.htm. In November 2010, a Foreign Ministry spokesman declared
that, “We oppose any party to take any military acts in our exclusive economic zone without permission.” See “China
Opposes Any Military Acts in Exclusive Economic Zone Without Permission,” Xinhua, November 26, 2010.
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surveillance vessels (see “U.S. Military Operations in China’s Exclusive Economic Zone,”
above); China’s dispatch of Fisheries Administration patrol vessels to “protect its sea territory”;24
Chinese pressure on international energy companies ExxonMobil and BP not to work with
Vietnam to explore for oil and gas in areas off Vietnam’s coast that China considers part of its
Exclusive Economic Zone; and the spring 2010 suggestion by some Chinese officials in closed-
door meetings with senior U.S. officials that China now considers the South China Sea a “core
national interest.”
Responding to the trend, and to provocative behavior by other claimants, in July 2010, Secretary
of State Hillary Clinton, speaking with the support of a dozen other Asia-Pacific nations, stated a
U.S. “national interest” in freedom of navigation and respect for international law in the South
China Sea. She also stated that the United States opposes “the use or threat of force by any
claimant,” and “is prepared to facilitate initiatives and confidence building measures” in the area,
consistent with a 2002 agreement between China and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations
(ASEAN), the ASEAN-China Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea.25
China’s Foreign Minister declared Secretary Clinton’s comments to have been “in effect an attack
on China,” and warned the United States against making the South China Sea “an international
issue or multilateral issue.” 26 Tensions over the South China Sea have eased since her statement,
with China agreeing to discuss the drafting of implementing guidelines for a code of conduct with
ASEAN representatives.
East China Sea
In the East China Sea, China is involved in a territorial dispute with Japan and Taiwan over the
sovereignty of islands known in China as the Diaoyu, in Taiwan as the Diaoyutai, and in Japan as
the Senkakus. The islands are reportedly rich in fishing resources and oil and gas deposits. A
September 2010 collision between Japanese Coast Guard vessels and a Chinese fishing trawler
near the islands briefly raised the territorial dispute to the level of a major international crisis. It
also forced the United States to clarify that while it does not take a position on the sovereignty of
the islands, its security alliance with Japan covers all areas under Japanese administration,
including the Diaoyu/Diaoyutai/Senkakus, raising the sobering, if remote, possibility of a future
conflict between China and the United States over the islands.
In the September 2010 incident, China rapidly escalated pressure against Japan in order to force
Japan to release the Chinese trawler captain. Many observers saw China’s actions as
disproportionate, and perhaps as a harbinger of how a more powerful China might seek to assert
its will in the future. Most controversially, China was accused by Japan of imposing a temporary
“de facto ban” on exports to Japan of rare earth elements needed for defense and green
technologies. China denied that it had imposed such a ban.27
24 Zhang Xin, “China charts course toward secure South China Sea,” The China Daily, June 1, 2009.
25 Remarks at Press Availability, Hillary Rodham Clinton, Secretary of State, National Convention Center, Hanoi,
Vietnam, July 23, 2010, http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2010/07/145095.htm. The text of the Declaration on the
Conduct of Parties In the South China Sea can be found at http://www.aseansec.org/13163.htm. ASEAN comprises 10
Southeast Asian nations: Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Lao, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand,
Vietnam.
26 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi Refutes Fallacies on the
South China Sea Issue, Statement posted on website, July 25, 2010, http://www.mfa.gov.cn/eng/zxxx/t719460.htm.
27 For more information on rare earths, see CRS Report R41347, Rare Earth Elements: The Global Supply Chain, by
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Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Nuclear non-proliferation has been a major priority for the Obama Administration, which has
sought to make cooperation on the issue a core component of the U.S.-China relationship, with a
focus on reining in the nuclear programs of Iran and North Korea. China, a nuclear power, a
fellow veto-wielding permanent member of the United Nations Security Council, and a party to
the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty, has supported United Nations sanctions against both
countries in the past, although it resisted new United Nations action over a series of North Korean
provocations in 2010. In the 2011 U.S.-China Joint Statement, Washington and Beijing agreed to
work together for an early entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty and for
an early commencement of negotiations on a Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty in the Conference on
Disarmament. They also agreed to establish a Center of Excellence on Nuclear Security in China
to serve as a central site for training in all aspects of nuclear security.
Iran
Since 2006, China has been an important partner in U.S.- and European-led multilateral efforts to
rein in Iran’s suspected nuclear weapons program. China has participated in negotiations with
Iran over the program as part of the P5+1 grouping (permanent members of the United Nations
Security Council plus Germany). It has also supported a series of U.N. resolutions imposing
limited U.N. sanctions against Iran, although it has frequently urged the use of dialogue rather
than sanctions to address the nuclear program. Influenced by its reliance on crude oil imports
from Iran and its investments in the Iranian energy and other sectors, however, China has joined
Russia in pushing for more narrowly targeted sanctions than the U.S. and European nations
sought. In the case of U.N. Resolution 1929, passed in June 2010, for example, Russia and China
successfully insisted that new sanctions not target Iran’s civilian economy or its population.
Since passage of U.N. Resolution 1929, the United States has sought to encourage China to
follow the lead of the United States and European Union countries in imposing bilateral sanctions
on Iran’s energy and financial sector that exceed those mandated in U.N. Security Council
resolutions. China has declined to impose its own bilateral sanctions and has criticized other
countries for doing so. U.S. officials give China credit, however, for not moving to take over
contracts given up by other countries, a behavior that the United States refers to as “backfilling.”
In March 2011, Robert Einhorn, the State Department’s Special Advisor for Nonproliferation and
Arms Control, cited, “substantial evidence that Beijing has taken a cautious, go-slow approach
toward its energy cooperation with Iran.”28
The United States has for many years implicated Chinese firms in sales to Iran of missile
technology. The Central Intelligence Agency’s latest report to Congress on the Acquisition of
Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions,
covering 2010, states that, “Chinese entities continue to supply a variety of missile-related items
to multiple customers, including Iran, Syria, and Pakistan.”29
(...continued)
Marc Humphries.
28 State Department Special Advisor for Nonproliferation and Arms Control Robert Einhorn, “The Impact of Sanctions
on Iran’s Nuclear Program,” Remarks to Arms Control Association Briefing Series, Washington, DC, March 9, 2011,
http://www.armscontrol.org/events/RoleSanctionsIranNuclear.
29 Office of the Director of National Intelligence, Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology
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For more information, see CRS Report RS20871, Iran Sanctions, by Kenneth Katzman; CRS
Report RL32048, Iran: U.S. Concerns and Policy Responses, by Kenneth Katzman; and CRS
Report RL31555, China and Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and Missiles: Policy
Issues, by Shirley A. Kan.
North Korea
The United States and the PRC share a common interest in peace and stability on the Korean
peninsula and in verifiable denuclearization of the peninsula. The United States continues to call
on China, however, to do more to leverage its relationship with North Korea to persuade
Pyongyang to improve relations with South Korea and denuclearize. Washington also wants
Beijing to strengthen its implementation of U.N. sanctions against North Korea.
China hosts the Six-Party Talks on North Korea’s nuclear program.30 It also supported U.N.
Resolution 1718 (2006), condemning North Korea for its first nuclear test and imposing limited
sanctions, and U.N. Resolution 1874 (2009), condemning North Korea’s second nuclear test and
imposing expanded sanctions, although U.S. officials say that China has taken a minimalist
approach to enforcing those sanctions.31 At the same time, however, China serves as North
Korea’s largest supplier of fuel and food supplies and its most powerful diplomatic ally.32
In the last year, as the United States sought to isolate North Korea in response to a series of North
Korean provocations, China stepped up its engagement, hosting two visits from North Korea’s
reclusive leader Kim Jong-il and sending a series of senior Communist Party officials to
Pyongyang. China has also worked at the United Nations to shield North Korea from
condemnation for the March 2010 sinking of a South Korean naval vessel, the Cheonan; the
November 2010 revelation that North Korea had built a sophisticated uranium enrichment
facility; and North Korea’s November 2010 shelling of South Korea’s Yellow Sea island of
Yeonpyeong. China appears to believe that it is more likely to be able to moderate North Korean
behavior through engagement than through isolation of the regime. Analysts also state that
Beijing fears the consequences of a collapse of the North Korean regime, which could include
military hostilities, waves of North Korean refugees flooding into China’s northeast provinces,
and ultimately a reunified Korean peninsula allied with the United States. A succession process
underway in North Korea has contributed to China’s sense of the North Korean regime’s fragility.
President Hu Jintao’s state visit to Washington in January 2011 served to bridge some differences
between the U.S. and Chinese positions. In the U.S.-China Joint Statement issued during the visit,
China, which had been silent about the revelations related to North Korea’s uranium enrichment
program, for the first time stated its “concern” about the program. It also joined the United States
(...continued)
Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions, Covering 1 January to 31 December
2010, March 2011, p. 7, http://www.fas.org/irp/threat/wmd-acq2010.pdf.
30 The participants in the Six-Party Talks are China, Japan, North Korea, Russia, South Korea, and the United States.
31 See Mary Beth Nikitin, Emma Chanlett-Avery, and Mark Manyin, et al., Implementation of U.N. Security Council
Resolution 1874, CRS memo released by Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Washington, DC, October 8, 2010,
http://lugar.senate.gov/issues/foreign/reports/NKoreaCRSReport.pdf.
32 According to a 2003 fact sheet on the website of China’s Foreign Ministry, China has provided North Korea with aid
in the form of grain, coke, food oil, and fertilizer since 1994. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC, “DPRK: Bilateral
relations,” fact sheet, October 23, 2003, http://www.mfa.gov.cn/eng/wjb/zzjg/yzs/gjlb/2701/.
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in highlighting the importance of an improvement in relations between North and South Korea,
and of North Korea’s full implementation of commitments it made in a September 2005 Joint
Statement of the Six-Party Talks, including abandonment of all nuclear weapons and nuclear
programs.
China’s treatment of North Korean refugees has been an issue of concern for the Congress. China
considers North Koreans who have fled their homeland to China to be economic migrants, rather
than refugees, and continues to resist allowing the United Nations High Commissioner on
Refugees access to them. China’s official policy is to repatriate the refugees to North Korea,
where they face prison camp sentences or worse. North Korean refugees continue to trickle out of
China to neighboring countries in North and Southeast Asia, however, and a large number of
North Korean refugees continue to live underground in China.
For more information, see CRS Report R41043, China-North Korea Relations, by Dick K. Nanto
and Mark E. Manyin; CRS Report R40684, North Korea’s Second Nuclear Test: Implications of
U.N. Security Council Resolution 1874, coordinated by Mary Beth Nikitin and Mark E. Manyin;
CRS Report RL31555, China and Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and Missiles:
Policy Issues, by Shirley A. Kan; and CRS Report RS22973, Congress and U.S. Policy on North
Korean Human Rights and Refugees: Recent Legislation and Implementation, by Emma Chanlett-
Avery.
Taiwan
Among the most sensitive and complex issues in bilateral U.S.-China relations are the United
States’ relationship with the island democracy of Taiwan, also known as the Republic of China,
and Taiwan’s relationship to the PRC. Even as Washington and Beijing pursue their “cooperative
partnership based on mutual respect and mutual benefit,” they continue to plan for the possibility
that they could one day find themselves involved in a military confrontation over Taiwan’s fate.
Taiwan, which has a population of 23 million, has been self-governing since 1949. The PRC
claims sovereignty over the island, however, and vows to gain political control over it eventually,
either peacefully or by force. To underscore its intent to bring Taiwan under its control, the PRC
deploys over one thousand missiles opposite Taiwan’s coast and has engaged in a program of
military modernization and training that defense experts believe is based on deterring any attempt
by the U.S. military to come to Taiwan’s defense. (See “Chinese Military Modernization,”
above.)
In the 1972 Shanghai Communiqué that paved the way for the establishment of diplomatic
relations between the United States and China, the United States declared that it “acknowledged”
that Chinese on both sides of the Taiwan Strait considered Taiwan to be part of China. It also
declared its “interest in a peaceful settlement of the Taiwan question by the Chinese themselves.”
In the 1979 Taiwan Relations Act (P.L. 96-8), Congress reinforced the U.S. interest in a peaceful
settlement, stating that it is U.S. policy that the establishment of diplomatic relations with China
“rests upon the expectation that the future of Taiwan will be determined by peaceful means” and
that it is similarly U.S. policy “to maintain the capacity of the United States to resist any resort to
force or other forms of coercion that would jeopardize the security, or the social or economic
system, of the people of Taiwan.” In addition, during negotiations over the third U.S.-China joint
communiqué, in 1982, the Reagan Administration conveyed to Taiwan “Six Assurances,”
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including that the United States would not mediate between Taiwan and China, would not
pressure Taiwan to enter into negotiations with the PRC, and had not agreed to consult with
Beijing prior to making arms sales to Taiwan.33
In the years since, the United States has played a delicate role in managing its relations with
Beijing and Taipei, and the relations between the two. The United States has repeatedly assured
China that it does not support independence for Taiwan, but it has retained ambiguity about its
willingness to defend Taiwan in a conflict with China. That ambiguity is intended both to deter
China from attempting to use force to bring Taiwan under its control, and to deter Taiwan from
moves that might trigger China’s use of force, such as a declaration of formal independence. As
part of a statement known as the “Three No’s,” President Clinton also in 1998 publicly stated that
the United States does not support Taiwan’s membership in any international organizations for
which statehood is a requirement.34 Complicating U.S. policy is the fact that Taiwan has
blossomed into a vibrant democracy. As Taiwan has sought to define its place in the world and
expand its “international space,” the United States has faced difficult questions about its role in
constraining the Taiwan people’s aspirations.
The Three Joint Communiqués and the Taiwan Relations Act
The governments of the United States and China consider three joint communiqués concluded in 1972, 1979, and
1982 to underpin their bilateral relationship. The United States considers The Taiwan Relations Act of 1979 to be a
fourth core document guiding the relationship, although China does not. In addition, in 1982, during negotiations over
the third U.S.-China joint communiqué, the United States reportedly orally conveyed “Six Assurances” to the
government of Taiwan. The documents and their key statements are listed below:
• The Shanghai Communiqué (Joint Communiqué, of the United States of America and the
People’s Republic of China), dated February 28, 1972. The United States declared that it “acknowledges
that all Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Strait maintain there is but one China and that Taiwan is a part of
China.” The United States also reaffirmed its “interest in a peaceful settlement of the Taiwan question by the
Chinese themselves” and committed as an “ultimate objective” to withdrawing all U.S. forces and military
installations from Taiwan.35
• Joint Communiqué on the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations Between the United States of
America and the People’s Republic of China, dated January 1, 1979. The United States recognized the
government of the People’s Republic of China as the sole legal government of China and, in that context, stated
that “the people of the United States will maintain cultural, commercial, and other unofficial relations with the
people of Taiwan.”
• The August 17th Communiqué (Joint Communiqué of the United States of America and the
People’s Republic of China), dated August 17, 1982. The United States stated “that it does not seek to
carry out a long-term policy of arms sales to Taiwan, that its arms sales to Taiwan will not exceed, either in
qualitative or in quantitative terms, the level of those supplied in recent years … and that it intends gradually to
reduce its sale of arms to Taiwan, leading, over a period of time, to a final resolution.”
• The Taiwan Relations Act (TRA), enacted April 10, 1979. The TRA stated that it is U.S. policy “that the
United States decision to establish diplomatic relations with the People’s Republic of China rests upon the
expectation that the future of Taiwan will be determined by peaceful means.” The TRA also stated that it is U.S.
policy “to consider any effort to determine the future of Taiwan by other than peaceful means, including by
boycotts or embargoes, a threat to the peace and security of the Western Pacific area and of grave concern to
33 See CRS Report RL30341, China/Taiwan: Evolution of the “One China” Policy—Key Statements from Washington,
Beijing, and Taipei, by Shirley A. Kan.
34 President Clinton’s statement, made on June 30, 1998, in Shanghai, was: “I had a chance to reiterate our Taiwan
policy which is that we don't support independence for Taiwan, or ‘two Chinas’, or ‘one Taiwan, one China’, and we
don't believe that Taiwan should be a member in any organization for which statehood is a requirement.”
35 The United States withdrew all military personnel from Taiwan in 1979, during the Carter Administration.
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the United States,” and “to maintain the capacity of the United States to resist any resort to force or other
forms of coercion that would jeopardize the security, or the social or economic system, of the people on
Taiwan.” The law stated that, “the United States will make available to Taiwan such defense articles and defense
services in such quantity as may be necessary to enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability.”
Cross-Strait Relations
The United States has long urged China to try harder to win over hearts and minds in Taiwan,
rather than threatening Taiwan with military force. Washington has welcomed the improvement
of relations between the two sides since 2008, when Ma Ying-jeou of the Kuomintang (KMT)
Party won election as president of Taiwan, ending eight years of rule by the independence-leaning
Democratic Progressive Party (DPP). Under President Ma, long-stalled official talks with China
reconvened in June 2008 in Beijing, resulting in groundbreaking agreements on direct charter
flights, the opening of permanent offices in each other’s territories, and Chinese tourist travel to
Taiwan, among others. Other rounds produced accords related to postal links, food safety, and
Chinese investment in Taiwan. 36
In April 2009, in an indication of greater flexibility on both sides, the World Health Organization
(WHO) invited Taiwan to attend the 2009 World Health Assembly (WHA) as an observer. 37 The
invitation, issued with China’s assent, marked the first time that Taiwan had been permitted to
participate in an activity of U.N. specialized agency since it lost its U.N. seat to China in 1971.
Taiwan is now seeking observer status in a second international body long closed to it, the
International Civil Aviation Organization.
Beijing and Taipei signed a landmark free trade arrangement, the Economic Cooperation
Framework Agreement (ECFA), in June 2010, removing many remaining barriers to trade and
investment across the Taiwan Strait and hastening cross-strait economic integration. That
integration has raised fears among some in both Taiwan and the United States about a possible
erosion of Taiwan’s autonomy. At the same time, it has increased the potential economic and
human costs of cross-strait conflict for both sides. In the joint statement issued during Chinese
President Hu Jintao’s state visit to Washington in January 2011, the United States said it
“applauded” the ECFA and “welcomed the new lines of communication developing between” the
two sides of the Taiwan Strait.
U.S. Arms Sales to Taiwan
The issue of U.S. arms sales to Taiwan is among the most contentious in the U.S.-China
relationship. The PRC argues that U.S. arms sales embolden those in Taiwan who seek Taiwan’s
formal independence—China calls them “separatist forces”—and that the arms sales are therefore
destabilizing.38 China also charges that continued U.S. arms sales represent a betrayal of U.S.
36 The Taiwan and PRC governments conduct cross-strait talks through quasi-official organizations. In Taiwan, cross-
strait talks are handled by the Straits Exchange Foundation (SEF), a private organization authorized by the government
to handle these exchanges. The corresponding body in the PRC is the Association for Relations Across the Taiwan
Strait (ARATS).
37 Low, Y.F., “CNA: World Health Assembly’s Invitation Raises Taiwan’s International Profile,” Taipei Central News
Agency, April 29, 2009.
38 At a meeting in Singapore in June 2010, Ma Xiaotian, Deputy Chief of the General Staff of the Chinese military,
stated, in a reference to Taiwan, that “China has yet to achieve national unification and there is still support for the
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commitments under the August 17th Communiqué of 1982, in which the United States stated its
intention “gradually to reduce its sale of arms to Taiwan, leading, over a period of time, to a final
resolution.” The U.S. government argues that U.S. arms sales contribute to stability by giving
Taiwan’s leaders the confidence to engage with China. The United States also cites its obligation
under the Taiwan Relations Act (P.L. 96-8) to provide Taiwan with defense articles and services
“in such quantity as may be necessary to enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense
capability.” On a trip to Beijing in January 2011, Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates raised the
possibility of some day “re-examining” U.S. policies related to arms sales to Taiwan. “[O]ver
time if the environment changed and if the relationship between the [sic] China and Taiwan
continued to improve and the security environment for Taiwan changed, then perhaps that would
create the conditions for re-examining all of this,” he said. He emphasized, however, that any
change would be “an evolutionary and a long-term process.” 39
In January 2010, after President Obama notified Congress of a $6.4 billion package of arms sales
originally announced at the end of the George W. Bush Administration, including Patriot PAC
missiles and Blackhawk helicopters, Beijing denounced the move and suspended military-to-
military relations with the United States in protest. (See “U.S.-China Military-to-Military
Relations” above.) Looking forward, Taiwan hopes the United States will agree to sell it 66 F-16
C/D fighter aircraft and help it to upgrade its existing fleet of F-16 A/B aircraft. China
strenuously opposes the sale of F-16 C/Ds to Taiwan, arguing that they are offensive, rather than
defensive in nature, and that selling them to Taiwan would run counter to the U.S. pledge in the
August 17th Communiqué of 1982 not to sell arms sales to Taiwan that “exceed, either in
qualitative or in quantitative terms, the level of those supplied in recent years.”
For more information, see CRS Report R41263, Democratic Reforms in Taiwan: Issues for
Congress, by Shirley A. Kan; CRS Report RL30341, China/Taiwan: Evolution of the “One
China” Policy—Key Statements from Washington, Beijing, and Taipei, by Shirley A. Kan; and
CRS Report RL30957, Taiwan: Major U.S. Arms Sales Since 1990, by Shirley A. Kan.
Economic Issues
The U.S. and Chinese economies are the first and second largest in the world on both a nominal
dollar basis and a purchasing power parity basis, although the United States’ economy is three
times larger than China’s. China is today a driver of global economic growth. It has also become
an important economic hub for Asia. China is the United States’ second largest trading partner,
largest supplier of imports (imports from China make up 19% of all U.S. imports), third largest
export market (exports to China account for 7% of all U.S. exports), and second largest export
market for agricultural products. China is also the largest foreign holder of U.S. Treasury
securities and, according to U.S. data, by 2008 it was the destination for a cumulative $45.7
(...continued)
separatist forces from outside the country.” Ma Xiaotian, “New Dimensions of Security,” Address to the 9th IISS Asian
Security Summit, the Shangri-La Dialogue, Singapore, June 5, 2010, http://www.iiss.org/conferences/the-shangri-la-
dialogue/shangri-la-dialogue-2010/plenary-session-speeches/second-plenary-session/ma-xiaotian/.
39 U.S. Department of Defense, “Media Roundtable with Secretary Gates from Beijing, China,” press release, January
11, 2011, http://www.defense.gov/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=4751.
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billion in U.S. foreign direct investment (compared to China’s cumulative $1.2 billion foreign
direct investment in the United States).40
Because of the size of the two economies, the bilateral economic relationship and the economic
decisions of both countries have a profound impact on the global economy. Shortly after the onset
of the global financial crisis, both countries announced large stimulus spending packages.
China’s, valued at $586 billion (or 13% of annual GDP), combined with a major expansion of
credit, helped its economy grow by 9.1% in 2009 and by an estimated 10.5% in 2010.41 Those
growth rates, which far outstripped economic growth in every other major economy, are credited
with helping lead the world out of recession.
The Obama Administration has sought to cooperate with China in addressing the global financial
crisis and rebalancing the global economy, working primarily through the mechanism of the G-20
grouping of nations. It has also sought to work directly with China to resolve a host of issues
related to bilateral trade and investment, most prominently China’s currency and industrial
policies. The United States has also challenged China on trade issues through the World Trade
Organization and on currency issues in the International Monetary Fund.
Major priorities for China in its relationship with the United States include rebalancing the global
economy, keeping U.S. markets open to Chinese exports, and removing barriers to Chinese
investment in the United States. China hopes to persuade the Obama Administration to award it
formal designation as a market economy, a step that would make Chinese firms less vulnerable to
U.S. anti-dumping and anti-subsidy investigations. China also seeks reform of the U.S. export
control system to allow China to buy more advanced technology from the United States. The two
countries are engaged in negotiations over a bilateral investment treaty (BIT).
For more information, see CRS Report RL33536, China-U.S. Trade Issues, by Wayne M.
Morrison; and CRS Report RL33534, China’s Economic Conditions, by Wayne M. Morrison.
Global Rebalancing
With the immediate financial crisis past, the focus of the G-20 leaders is now on the need for
fundamental restructuring of the global economy, with the greatest onus for action on the United
States and China. The United States runs the world’s largest trade deficit in goods and services.
China runs the world’s largest surplus. Many economists say that such huge imbalances in global
trade undermine the health of the global economy, and that the United States needs to save more
and consume less, while China needs to reduce its dependence on exports and investment in
infrastructure and consume more.
China has repeatedly pledged to boost domestic consumption. An October 2010 International
Monetary Fund report indicated some preliminary success, with Chinese domestic demand
growing close to 13% in 2009, leading to a significant reduction in China’s current account
surplus that year.42 China’s draft 12th Five Year Plan, covering the years 2011 to 2015, includes a
40 Office of the United States Trade Representative, U.S.-China Trade Facts, http://www.ustr.gov/countries-regions/
china.
41 International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook: Recovery, Risk, and Rebalancing, October 2010, p. 2,
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2010/02/pdf/text.pdf.
42 International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook, Washington, DC, October 2010, p. 4, http://www.imf.org/
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heavy focus on development of domestic consumption. China has been critical of the United
States for its failure to address its part of the rebalancing equation by significantly reducing its
long-term debt.
China’s Currency Policy
The issue of China’s management of its currency, the renminbi (“people’s money”) or RMB,
dominated meetings between U.S. and Chinese officials for much of 2010. The Chinese
government allowed the renminbi to appreciate by 21% in relation to the dollar between 2005 and
2008, but China has intervened in currency markets since then to keep the RMB exchange rate at
a level that some economists believe is still significantly undervalued against world currencies.43
An undervalued RMB makes China’s exports to the world artificially cheap, and China’s imports
from the rest of the world, including the United States, artificially expensive for Chinese
consumers. The Treasury Department argues that significant appreciation of China’s currency
could help stem outsourcing of U.S. jobs and make U.S. goods and services more competitive
globally, as well as slow inflation and damaging asset price increases in China. Chinese officials
deny that China’s currency practices are a significant cause of the U.S. global trade imbalance
and argue that in focusing on the currency issue, the United States is seeking to make China a
scapegoat for the United States’ lack of competitiveness, as well as for problems in the global
economy attributable to multiple nations, including the United States.
China’s central bank, the People’s Bank of China, announced plans in June 2010 to “enhance the
RMB exchange rate flexibility.”44 Since then, the government has allowed the renminbi to
appreciate at a pace of about 6% a year in nominal terms, and inflation made the appreciation
greater in real terms. Nonetheless, the United States continues to press China to allow the
currency to appreciate more rapidly. At the G-20 summit in Seoul in November 2010, President
Obama urged China “in a gradual fashion to transition to a market-based system” for determining
the value of its currency, so that “everybody benefits from trade rather than just some.”45 In the
111th Congress, the House approved (348-79) a bill, H.R. 2378 (the Currency Reform for Fair
Trade Act) that would have allowed the Commerce Department to consider “fundamentally
undervalued currencies” as illegal export subsidies, but the measure was not taken up by the
Senate. Analysts note that if the Chinese currency does appreciate substantially, U.S. consumers
will face higher prices for the wide array of goods currently imported from China, and U.S.
factories will likely face higher costs for Chinese-made inputs.
For more information about China’s currency policy, see CRS Report RS21625, China’s
Currency: An Analysis of the Economic Issues, by Wayne M. Morrison and Marc Labonte, and
CRS Report RL32165, China’s Currency: Economic Issues and Options for U.S. Trade Policy, by
Wayne M. Morrison and Marc Labonte.
(...continued)
external/pubs/ft/weo/2010/02/pdf/text.pdf.
43 See, for example, C. Fred Bergsten, “We can fight fire with fire on the renminbi,” Financial Times, October 3, 2010.
44 People’s Bank of China, Further Reform the RMB Exchange Rate Regime and Enhance the RMB Exchange Rate
Flexibility , June 19, 2010, http://www.china-embassy.org/eng/zt/renmingbihuigai_eng/t710127.htm.
45 The White House Office of the Press Secretary, Press Conference by the President After G20 Meetings in Seoul,
Korea, November 12, 2010, http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2010/11/12/press-conference-president-after-
g20-meetings-seoul-korea.
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The Bilateral Trade Deficit
Trade between the United States and China has expanded dramatically in the years since China
acceded to the World Trade Organization in December 2001. In 2010, bilateral trade in goods
totaled $457 billion, with U.S. imports from China totaling $365 billion and U.S. exports to
China totaling $92 billion. Although exports to China are growing rapidly, the disparity in imports
and exports produced a U.S. goods trade deficit with China of $268 billion in 2010, according to
U.S. data. In trade in services, the United States runs a surplus with China, with exports to China
of $16 billion in 2008 (the latest year for which numbers are available) and imports from China
valued at $10 billion.46
Economists argue that the global trade balance is a more meaningful indicator of an economy’s
health than bilateral balances. Many American analysts nonetheless point to the United States’
bilateral goods trade imbalance with China to highlight China’s allegedly unfair trade practices
and undervalued currency and their impact on the U.S. economy. Chinese officials, who cite
different figures for the bilateral trade deficit than the United States, routinely seek to shift some
of the blame for the trade deficit to the United States by criticizing U.S. controls on exports of
advanced technology. They also argue that the sharp increase in exports to the United States
reflects the shifting of production from other countries to China, with many “made in China”
products containing components made in other countries, but counted as being from China.
Before Chinese President Hu Jintao’s January 2011 state visit to the United States, China signed a
raft of contracts that the Obama Administration said added up to over $45 billion in increased
U.S. exports to China. Critics noted that some of the deals had been set in motion years earlier.
Table 1. U.S. Goods Trade with China over Time
U.S. Imports from
U.S. Exports to
U.S. Trade Deficit
Year
China
China
with China
1995 $46
billion $12
billion $34
billion
2000 $100
billion
$16 billion
$84 billion
2005 $243
billion
$41 billion
$202 billion
2010 $365
billion
$92 billion
$273 billion
Source: U.S. trade data reported by Global Trade Information Services.
Notes: This table does not reflect U.S. trade with China in services, in which the United States runs a surplus.
For more information, see CRS Report RS22640, What’s the Difference?—Comparing U.S. and
Chinese Trade Data, by Michael F. Martin, and CRS Report R40167, Globalized Supply Chains
and U.S. Policy, by Dick K. Nanto.
China’s Holdings of U.S. Treasuries
The U.S. federal budget deficit has increased rapidly since 2008, financed by sales of Treasury
securities. China has been the largest foreign holder of U.S. Treasury securities, and thus the
largest foreign financer of the U.S. federal budget deficit, since September 2008, with its holdings
46 Office of the United States Trade Representative, U.S.-China Trade Facts, http://www.ustr.gov/countries-regions/
china.
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in December 2010 standing at $1.16 trillion and accounting for 26% of all foreign holdings of
Treasury securities.47 Some observers have raised concerns about the possibility of China
destabilizing the U.S. economy by drawing down its holdings of U.S. Treasuries. Economists
familiar with China’s balance of payments system note, however, that China’s financial system
does not allow foreign currency to be spent in China, meaning that China has no choice but to
invest its large current account surplus overseas; the United States is the only economy large
enough to absorb foreign exchange on the scale that China is accumulating it.48 The combination
of China’s reliance on exports to the United States and its purchase of U.S. debt has given China a
major stake in the health of the U.S. economy. Some analysts argue that China’s holdings of U.S.
Treasuries have also shifted the balance of financial power between Washington and Beijing,
emboldening China to speak out with criticisms of the way the U.S. economy is managed. China
has been critical of the Federal Reserve’s Quantitative Easing
For more information, see CRS Report RL34314, China’s Holdings of U.S. Securities:
Implications for the U.S. Economy, by Wayne M. Morrison and Marc Labonte.
China’s Compliance with World Trade Organization (WTO) Commitments
Since 2006, the U.S. government has repeatedly raised concerns about alleged backsliding in
China’s implementation of commitments it made as part of its 2001 accession to the World Trade
Organization, most prominently the problem of “excessive, trade-distorting government
intervention intended to promote or protect China’s domestic industries and state-owned
enterprises.”49 Another major concern has been China’s allegedly inadequate protection of
intellectual property rights.
The Obama Administration has filed four cases against China with the World Trade Organization,
including three in 2010. Those four cases relate to China’s import substitution subsidies in the
wind energy sector, its anti-dumping and countervailing duties on grain-oriented electrical steel
from the United States, its restrictions on foreign suppliers of electronic payment services, and its
restraints on exports of raw materials used in the steel, aluminum, and chemical sectors. Since the
Obama Administration came into office, China has initiated three cases against the United States,
two in 2009 and one in 2011. They dispute a U.S. ban on Chinese poultry, U.S. special safeguards
tariffs on car tires, 50 and U.S. anti-dumping measures against warm-water shrimp from China.51
In March 2011, the WTO Appellate Body handed China a major victory when it ruled against the
U.S. application of anti-dumping and countervailing duty measures on four categories of Chinese
products. The measures had been the subject of a case China filed against the United States in
47 U.S. Department of the Treasury, “Major Foreign Holders of Treasury Securities,” February 28, 2011,
http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/data-chart-center/tic/Documents/mfh.txt.
48 Derek Scissors, Chinese Investment in the U.S.: $2 Trillion and Counting, The Heritage Foundation, blog post,
Washington, DC, March 1, 2011, http://www.heritage.org/Research/Reports/2011/02/Chinese-Investment-in-the-US-
$2-Trillion-and-Counting.
49 United States Trade Representative, 2010 Report to Congress on China’s WTO Compliance, December 2010, p. 2,
http://www.ustr.gov/webfm_send/2460.
50 Scott Kennedy, China’s WTO Cases, December 13, 2011, http://chinatrack.typepad.com/files/china-wto-cases-1.pdf.
51 Owen Fletcher, “UPDATE: China Min: Submitted US Antidumping Measures On Shrimp For WTO Resolution ,”
Dow Jones Newswires, February 28, 2011.
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September 2008, in the last months of the George W. Bush Administration.52 The ruling raised
questions about the viability of the Obama Administration’s use of punitive duties as a strategy
for mitigating the impact of low-cost Chinese imports on certain sectors of the U.S. economy.
China’s “Indigenous Innovation” Policies
The U.S. business community has expressed strong concern about Chinese industrial policies that
appear to be intended to limit market access for non-Chinese goods and services and promote
domestic Chinese industries. They are considered part of China’s drive to support “indigenous
innovation.” The policies include government procurement catalogues that favor domestic
industries, patent rules that appear to allow Chinese companies to obtain patents for products that
they did not invent, and a new anti-monopoly law that the PRC government has allegedly used to
try to force technology transfers from foreign firms to Chinese firms.53 At the December 2010
meeting of the U.S.-China Joint Commission on Commerce and Trade, 54 the Obama
Administration reported that the Chinese side made some concessions, agreeing, among other
things, not to base government procurement decisions on where intellectual property is owned or
developed, to submit a “robust” revised offer to join the WTO’s Government Procurement
Agreement, and to revise a major equipment catalogue and ensure that it does not discriminate
against foreign suppliers. The Administration said that China also agreed not to discriminate
against foreign companies in purchases of products and technologies necessary for development
of China’s “smart” electric power grid, or to impose discriminatory technology or standards
preferences on the development of its third generation or “3G” telecommunications infrastructure.
Many analysts consider the challenge of indigenous innovation policies to be long-term, however.
China’s December 2010 JCCT concessions related only to a small part of the indigenous
innovation program and as Secretary of Commerce Gary Locke noted in a January 2011 speech,
such statements are only the first step in a process that may or may not lead to a lasting change on
the ground. Locke outlined five steps he identified as necessary to create a new “norm” in
Chinese commercial culture: “a statement of principle from Chinese officials that action will be
taken to solve a market access issue”; codification into binding law or regulations; faithful
implementation by the central government; implementation by provincial and local governments;
and, “the most important step,” making the new law or regulation “an accepted way of doing
business in China’s commercial culture.” Locke complained that, “When it comes to indigenous
innovation, intellectual property or a variety of other market-access issues, an enduring frustration
is that in too many cases only the earliest steps are taken, but not all five. Perhaps an agreement is
made, but it never becomes binding. Or perhaps there’s a well-written law or regulation at the
national level, but there’s lax enforcement at the provincial or city level.” Locke warned that,
52 United States Trade Representative, “USTR Statement Regarding WTO Appellate Body Report in Countervailing
Duty Dispute with China,” press release, March 11, 2011, http://www.ustr.gov/about-us/press-office/press-releases/
2011/march/ustr-statement-regarding-wto-appellate-body-report-c.
53 For details of China’s “indigenous innovation” policies and their alleged impact on U.S. business interests, see James
McGregor, China’s Drive for ‘Indigenous Innovation’—A Web of Industrial Policies, US Chamber of Commerce, July
2010, http://www.uschamber.com/sites/default/files/reports/100728chinareport_0.pdf.
54 For details of China’s pledges at the December 2010 JCCT meeting, see Export.gov, “The U.S.-China Joint
Commission on Commerce and Trade (JCCT) Outcomes on U.S. Requests,” press release, December 15, 2010,
http://www.export.gov/china/policyadd/JCCT_outcomes.asp, and United States Trade Representative, 2010 Report to
Congress on China’s WTO Compliance, December 2010, pp. 3-4, http://www.ustr.gov/webfm_send/2460.
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“What was agreed to at the JCCT were important statements of principle and policy—but they
must be turned into concrete action with results.”55
China’s Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights (IPR)
The United States Trade Representative continues to place China on its Priority Watch List of
countries that are the worst violators of intellectual property rights, a list that currently comprises
11 countries.56 USTR’s annual Special 301 report on IPR, issued in April 2010, stated that China’s
IPR enforcement regime “remains largely ineffective and non-deterrent” and reported that of all
products seized at U.S. borders for infringement of intellectual property rights in 2009, 79% were
from China.57 In USTR’s Special 301 out-of-cycle review of “notorious markets,” released in
February 2011, 8 of 30 Internet and physical markets highlighted for their facilitating of piracy
and counterfeiting were based in mainland China, including popular Chinese search engine
Baidu.58 At the December 2010 meeting of the U.S.-China Joint Commission on Commerce and
Trade, China pledged to step up its efforts to ensure the use of legal software by government
agencies and state-owned enterprises, to crack down on piracy of online academic journals, and to
clarify the liabilities of market managers who rent space to counterfeiters. China has announced
many anti-piracy campaigns in the past, but has so far lacked either the will or the ability to curb
IPR violations significantly.
Safety of Chinese Products
In recent years, the U.S. Consumer Product Safety Commission (CPSC) and the Food and Drug
Administration (FDA) have been flooded with complaints about dangerous and defective
consumer products, pharmaceuticals, medical devices, and food items manufactured in China and
the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of China and exported to the United States.
Priority areas for the CPSC include the persistent problem of lead in children’s products from
China and dangerous defects in Chinese-made drywall, toys, cigarette lighters, fireworks,
electrical products, and all-terrain vehicles.59 Among the FDA’s priority areas is the problem of
counterfeit and tainted pharmaceuticals originating in China. In 2007 and 2008, contaminated
Heparin from China was linked to 149 deaths in the United States.60
55 Secretary of Commerce Gary Locke, “Remarks at U.S.-China Business Council Luncheon,” January 13, 2011,
http://www.commerce.gov/news/secretary-speeches/2011/01/13/remarks-us-china-business-council-luncheon.
56 The other countries on USTR’s “Priority Watch List” are Algeria, Argentina, Canada, Chile, India, Indonesia,
Pakistan, Russia, Thailand, and Venezuela.
57 United States Trade Representative, “2010 Special 301 Report,” April 30, 2010.
58 Office of the United States Trade Representative, “USTR Announces Results of Special 301 Review of Notorious
Markets,” press release, February 28, 2011, http://www.ustr.gov/about-us/press-office/press-releases/2011/february/
ustr-announces-results-special-301-review-notorio. The eight Chinese markets identified were search engine Baidu, e-
marketplace Taobao, peer-to-peer sports telecast service TV Ants, smartphone software site 91.com, and the China
Small Commodities Market in Yiwu; the Luowu (sic) Market in Shenzhen; PC Malls in Beijing, Shanghai, and other
Chinese cities; and the Silk Market in Beijing.
59 Inez Tenenbaum, Chairman of US Consumer Product Safety Commission, “Closing Statement,” Remarks to the
U.S.-China Consumer Product Safety Summit, Wuxi, China, October 26, 2009, http://www.cpsc.gov/PR/
tenenbaum102609.pdf.
60 Allan Coukell, Director, Pew Prescription Project, The Pew Charitable Trusts, “Protecting Consumers from
Adulterated Drugs,” written comments submitted to an FDA meeting, May 1, 2009, http://www.fda.gov/downloads/
NewsEvents/MeetingsConferencesWorkshops/UCM163646.pdf.
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For more information on this issue, see CRS Report RS22713, Health and Safety Concerns Over
U.S. Imports of Chinese Products: An Overview, by Wayne M. Morrison.
Climate Change and Clean Energy Cooperation
China relies heavily on coal to power its fast-growing economy and has been the world’s largest
emitter of the most common greenhouse gas, carbon dioxide, since 2006,61 although on a per
capita basis, China’s carbon dioxide emissions are about one-third those of the United States.62 In
2008, China and the United States, the world’s second largest emitter, together produced about
41% of the world’s carbon dioxide emissions,63 making both countries key players in efforts to
address climate change.
The Obama Administration hoped to make cooperation with China in battling climate change a
pillar of a new relationship focused on global issues, but in practice, the two countries’ different
approaches to international climate change negotiations have produced frequent friction.
Disagreements have centered on the relative responsibilities of developed and major developing
nations for addressing climate change. China, along with many other developing countries, has
long argued that developed nations bear the lion’s share of the historical responsibility for climate
change and continue to have far higher levels of emissions per capita, so they alone should be
subject to legally binding commitments to reduce emissions, while developing nations’ reductions
should be voluntary.64 Chinese officials have described attempts to force developing countries to
accept legally binding emissions targets as an attempt to restrict those countries’ rights to
develop.65 The U.S. Congress has long indicated that it will not support legally binding
commitments to reduce U.S. emissions without binding commitments from other major emitters,
starting with the world’s current leading emitter, China.66 The Obama Administration has adopted
the same position.
Negotiators representing the United States and China clashed at the Copenhagen Climate Change
Conference in Denmark in December 2009, but eleventh hour negotiations between President
61 PBL Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency, “China CO2 emissions in perspective,” press release, June 22,
2007, http://www.pbl.nl/en/news/pressreleases/2007/20070622ChineseCO2emissionsinperspective.html.
62 J.G.J. Olivier and J.A.H.W. Peters, No Growth in Global CO2 Emissions in 2009, Netherlands Environmental
Assessment Agency, Bilthoven, The Netherlands, June 2010, p. 5, http://www.rivm.nl/bibliotheek/rapporten/
500212001.pdf.
63 International Energy Agency, CO2 Emissions from Fuel Combustion Highlights: 2010 Edition, Paris, France, 2010,
pp. 8-9, http://www.iea.org/co2highlights/co2highlights.pdf.
64 Scientists believe the United States is responsible for 29% of energy-related carbon dioxide emissions since 1850,
while China is responsible for 8%. Joanna Lewis, “The State of U.S.-China Relations on Climate Change: Examining
the Bilateral and Multilateral Relationship,” Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars China Environment
Series, no. 11 (2010/2011), p. 8.
65 China’s chief climate change negotiator Xie Zhenhua charged in a January 2010 speech that, “Developed countries
are using climate change issues to restrict the development of developing countries and maintain the North-South gap
between the rich and the poor, with countries like China, Brazil, and India particularly targeted; they are very worried
about China’s pace of development.” “Xie Zhenhua’s Speech at Peking University, Guanghua College of Management,
January, 2010,” World Resources Institute China FAQs, http://www.chinafaqs.org/library/xie-zhenhuas-speech-peking-
university-guanghua-college-management-january-2010 (unofficial English translation). Original Chinese text
available at http://finance.sina.com.cn/hy/20100109/11137218805.shtml.
66 As early as 1997, the Byrd-Hagel Resolution (S.Res. 98) held that the United States should not enter into any
international agreement requiring binding commitments to limit greenhouse gas emissions unless the agreement also
subjects developing countries to specific binding commitments.
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Obama, China’s Premier Wen Jiabao, and leaders from Brazil, India, and South Africa, helped
produce a political accord that was credited with rescuing the conference from failure. In the
accord, which was not legally binding, China and other developing nations agreed to a form of
“symmetry” in obligations for developed and developing nations, a major priority for the United
States, by agreeing that both groups of nations should record climate change mitigation
commitments in appendices to the accord on an equally voluntary basis. The United States
pledged to reduce its emissions “in the range of” 17% below 2005 levels by 2020. China declined
to pledge an absolute reduction target, but rather pledged to reduce its carbon intensity (the
amount of carbon dioxide emitted per unit of GDP) by 40% to 45% below 2005 levels by 2020.
In the final negotiation with President Obama, China also agreed to the principle that mitigation
actions taken by developing nations should be subject to a form of verification, known as
“international consultation and analysis” or ICA.67
In the year after Copenhagen, U.S. and Chinese negotiators wrangled over the details of how ICA
should work. At the U.N. Climate Change Conference in Cancun, Mexico, in December 2010,
however, China agreed that all major emitters, whether developed or developing countries, should
report to the U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change at least every four years, and that
those able to do so should report every two years with information related to their greenhouse gas
emissions. China also agreed that a “Subsidiary Body for Implementation” would analyze the
reports, albeit “in a manner that is non-intrusive, non-punitive and respectful of national
sovereignty,” and that technical experts would be empowered to analyze a long list of metrics.68
Analysts expect more friction between U.S. and Chinese negotiators in the run-up to the
December 2011 climate change conference in Durban, South Africa. China is seeking an
extension of the Kyoto Protocol, whose first commitment period for reductions of greenhouse gas
emissions is set to expire in 2012. The United States is not a party to the Kyoto Protocol and
objects to its principle that only developed nations should be subject to binding emissions
reduction targets.
Cooperation between the United States and China on energy efficiency and clean energy
technology development has proceeded more smoothly. During President Obama’s November
2009 state visit to China, the United States and China announced a broad package of cooperative
clean energy projects, including establishment of U.S.-China Clean Energy Research Centers and
joint initiatives to develop energy efficient buildings, electric vehicle standards, and clean coal
and large-scale carbon capture and storage technologies.69 China has been eager to work with the
United States in developing and deploying clean energy technologies as a matter of national
competitiveness. China’s chief climate change negotiator argued in a January 2010 speech that,
“countries with low-carbon technologies or low-carbon industries will have a development
advantage and more development space.” He said some considered global competition in clean
energy development to be “as significant as the space race in the Cold War.”70
67 For a detailed account of U.S. and Chinese positions at Copenhagen, see Joanna Lewis, “The State of U.S.-China
Relations on Climate Change: Examining the Bilateral and Multilateral Relationship,” Woodrow Wilson International
Center for Scholars China Environment Series, no. 11 (2010/2011).
68 Jennifer Morgan and Deborah Seligsohn, “What Cancun Means for China and the U.S.,” World Resources Institute,
December 15, 2010, http://www.wri.org/stories/2010/12/what-cancun-means-china-and-us.
69 U.S. Department of Energy, “U.S.-China Clean Energy Announcements,” press release, November 17, 2010,
http://www.energy.gov/news2009/8292.htm.
70 “Xie Zhenhua’s Speech at Peking University, Guanghua College of Management, January, 2010,” World Resources
Institute China FAQs, http://www.chinafaqs.org/library/xie-zhenhuas-speech-peking-university-guanghua-college-
management-january-2010 (unofficial English translation.) Original Chinese text available at
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China leads the world in investment in low-carbon industries and has become a leader in the
production of some green energy technologies, such as photovoltaic solar panels. Experts say,
however, that the PRC continues to lag behind the United States in research and development.
China’s embrace of clean energy has sometimes stirred controversy. The United States has
challenged China’s support for its domestic wind turbine industry through the World Trade
Organization. China’s ambitious plans to double its hydropower capacity by 2020 have embroiled
it in disputes with down-river neighbors in Southeast and South Asia and fed criticism from
overseas groups about China’s management of Tibet’s water resources.
For more information, see CRS Report RL32721, Greenhouse Gas Emissions: Perspectives on
the Top 20 Emitters and Developed Versus Developing Nations, by Larry Parker and John
Blodgett, and CRS Report R41287, China and the United States—A Comparison of Green Energy
Programs and Policies, by Richard J. Campbell.
Human Rights Issues
China’s human rights conditions are a principal U.S. interest. Some analysts contend that the U.S.
policy of engagement with China has failed to produce meaningful political reform, and that
without fundamental progress in this area, the bilateral relationship will remain unstable. Others
argue that U.S. engagement has helped to accelerate economic and social change and build social
and legal foundations for democracy and the advancement of human rights in the PRC.
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton described the Obama Administration’s human rights policy as
one of “principled pragmatism.” This policy is based upon the premise that tough but quiet
diplomacy is both less disruptive to the overall relationship and more effective in producing
change than public censure.71 Many human rights activists have complained that the Obama
Administration has reduced the prominence of human rights in U.S. policy toward China. Some
policy observers have argued that this approach has resulted in a PRC leadership that is less
cooperative, rather than more.72
Despite reducing the prominence of human rights as a condition for moving forward in other
areas of the bilateral relationship or in the relationship overall, a trend that started under President
George W. Bush, the Obama Administration has continued to press China on human rights issues,
both privately and openly. In particular, the Administration has spoken out regarding prominent
Chinese political prisoners, jailed U.S. citizens, Internet censorship, and repression in Tibet and
Xinjiang. The U.S. government also has continued to fund programs that promote the
development of the rule of law and civil society in the PRC. Congressional interests and concerns
have included the release of Chinese political prisoners, global Internet freedom, the persecution
of unofficial Christian churches and Falun Gong practitioners, and the conditions of ethnic
minorities in China. The U.S. government has continued to administer programs in China
(...continued)
http://finance.sina.com.cn/hy/20100109/11137218805.shtml.
71 Elise Labott, “Clinton Defends Stance on Human Rights,” CNN.com, March 11, 2009; Charley Keyes, “U.S. is
‘Pragmatic’ with China, Russia,” CNN.com, December 15, 2009.
72 “It’s Time For The Obama Administration To Burst Beijing’s Bubble,” Washington Post, Thursday, February 4,
2010.
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mandated by Congress promoting the rule of law, civil society, and Tibetan development and
environmental conservation.73
In May 2010, the United States and China held the 14th round of the bilateral human rights
dialogue, which had resumed in 2008 after a six-year hiatus. No breakthroughs were reported in
the discussions headed by Assistant Secretary of State Michael Posner and PRC Ministry of
Foreign Affairs Department of International Organizations Director General Chen Xu. According
to some critics, the separate dialogue runs the risk of further removing human rights from the core
areas of the U.S.-China relationship. However, some Administration officials suggested that,
given the deep disagreements on human rights and other contentious issues, the holding of the
dialogue and the agreement to continue them represented a positive step. Topics included political
prisoners, freedom of religion and expression, labor rights, the rule of law, and conditions in Tibet
and Xinjiang. The Chinese delegation also visited the U.S. Supreme Court and were briefed on
ways in which human rights issues are handled in the United States.74 In the Joint Statement
issued during Chinese President Hu Jintao’s visit to the United States in January 2011, China
committed to holding the next round of the human rights dialogue before the next meeting of the
Strategic and Economic Dialogue in May 2011, and to hold a meeting of the Legal Experts
Dialogue before the human rights dialogue.
The PRC leadership has instituted few real checks on its power and remains extremely sensitive
to social instability, autonomous political activity, and potential challenges to its authority. In
recent years, the government has cracked down heavily upon political activists, human rights
lawyers, and social organizations. In February 2011, an online appeal that appeared be authored
by Chinese activists overseas called on people in China to take part in a “Jasmine Revolution” –
peaceful “protest walks” in major cities on consecutive Sundays, to highlight the desire for
greater democracy in China in light of popular movements sweeping the Middle East. Although a
few hundred protesters reportedly were turned away by public security forces from the main city
square in Shanghai, uniformed and plainclothes police and curious onlookers appeared to far
outnumber demonstrators in Beijing, while in other cities there was little if any protest activity.
Government authorities reportedly detained dozens of human rights activists and lawyers,
charged several prominent dissidents with subversion, and physically assaulted and threatened
foreign reporters.75
The number of people imprisoned for endangering state security, the most serious political crime,
rose from roughly 300 in 2006 to nearly 700 in 2009, according to one estimate.76 Major ongoing
human rights problems include the following: the arbitrary use of state security laws against
political dissidents; unlawful detention; excessive use of violence by security forces and their
proxies; torture of persons in state custody; harassment and persecution of people involved in
unsanctioned religious activities; coercive family planning policies; and state controls over
information. Many Tibetans, ethnic Uighur (Uygur) Muslims, and Falun Gong adherents have
73 For more information, see CRS Report RS22663, U.S.-Funded Assistance Programs in China, by Thomas Lum.
74 Foster Klug, “No Breakthroughs in U.S., China Human Rights Talks,” Associated Press, May 14, 2010; State
Department Special Briefing with Michael Posner, Assistant Secretary for Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, May
14, 2010.
75 Peter Ford, “Report on China’s ‘Jasmine Revolution’? Not If You Want Your Visa,” Yahoo! News, March 3, 2011;
“Jasmine Activists Charged,” Radio Free Asia, February 25, 2011; Anita Chang, “China Tries to Stamp Out ‘Jasmine
Revolution’,” Associated Press, February 20, 2011.
76 Dui Hua Foundation, “Chinese Government Appears to Halt Sentence Reductions for Political Prisoners,” Dui Hua
Human Rights Journal, February 22, 2011.
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been singled out for especially harsh treatment. There are an estimated 25,000 prisoners of
conscience, according to some experts, including those serving lengthy sentences (5-15 years or
longer) for political crimes, Falun Gong adherents, and other detainees on various charges.77
Despite the lack of fundamental political change, in the past decade, many PRC citizens have
experienced marginal improvements in human rights protections while small-scale human rights
activism has increased. In the past several years, the PRC government has passed laws prohibiting
specific acts of torture, reducing the number of crimes punishable by death, protecting property
and labor rights, and promoting government transparency. Despite censorship and severe
restrictions on political speech and activity, the Internet has provided Chinese citizens with an
unprecedented level and variety of information, news, and opportunities to express opinions about
Chinese society and expose government corruption.
In 2010, the PRC government announced that
An American Detained in China
it had amended legislation on the protection of
Xue Feng, a China-born, naturalized U.S. citizen, was
state secrets to clarify the definition of a state
arrested in Beijing in 2007 on charges related to his
secret, reduce the level of protected
acquisition of a Chinese database on China’s oil industry
while working for an American firm. In July 2010, after
information, and open some information to the
having been held incommunicado for a period and
public. Although the changes could potentially
allegedly tortured, Xue was sentenced to eight years in
help to reduce the number of people charged
prison for providing state secrets to foreigners. Xue
with disseminating state secrets, many
claimed that he had believed the database to be
observers believe that the law still can be used
commercially available. U.S. consular officials have had
regular contact with Xue, although U.S. officials were
broadly against political dissidents,
denied access to Xue’s November 2010 appeal hearing,
businesspersons, and others. The legal
in violation of the 1980 U.S.-China Consular
changes also imposed stricter requirements on
Convention.78 In February 2011, the Beijing High Court
Internet service providers and
upheld the verdict.
telecommunications companies to monitor
discourse and to report the transfer of state secrets to authorities.79 Criminal law revisions enacted
in 2011 inflicted greater penalties upon organ traffickers, employers who violate labor contracts,
and violators of food safety regulations. However, they also included provisions that appear to
staunch political activity, including those that prohibit funding of organizations and individuals
“engaged in activities that endanger state security” and increase sentences on those who “gather
others on numerous occasions” to commit the crime of “creating a serious disturbance.”80
In response to a surge in labor disputes and unrest, including strikes at several large, foreign-
owned factories, in 2010, the PRC government approved substantial wage raises in many
enterprises and cities. Some Chinese labor experts and official sources expressed support for
higher wages, a greater advocacy role for China’s official union, the All China Federation of
Trade Unions (ACFTU), and the process of collective bargaining.81 However, Chinese workers
77 The Dui Hua Foundation. These figures represent rough estimates. Many Falun Gong adherents have served terms in
“reeducation through labor” camps (generally up to 3 years per term).
78 Embassy of the United States, Beijing, “DCM’s Statement: Appeal Trial of Dr. Feng Xue,” press release, October 30,
2010, http://beijing.usembassy-china.org.cn/113010dcm.html.
79 Zhao Ran, “China Amends Law on State Secrets,” Global Times, September 27, 2010; Gillian Wong, “China Set to
Tighten State-Secrets Law Forcing Internet Firms to Inform on Users,” Washington Post, April 28, 2010.
80 Dui Hua Foundation, “Broad Changes to China’s Criminal Law Enacted,” Dui Hua Human Rights Journal, March 2,
2011; Gillian Wong, “China Drops Death Penalty for Some Economic Crimes,” Associated Press, February 25, 2011.
81 Peng Pu, “Drive to Give Trade Unions Stronger Role,” Global Times, August 30, 2010.
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are still not allowed to form independent unions, and the government remains vigilant against the
development of a national labor movement. In May 2010, the U.S. Department of Labor and the
ACFTU held meetings on the sidelines of the U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue.
These discussions were billed as the start of an annual bilateral discussion on labor issues and the
promotion of labor rights.
Prominent Political Dissidents
Chen Guangcheng, a lawyer who is blind, was jailed in 2006 after he attempted to seek redress for villagers allegedly
subject to illegal, excessive, and harsh treatment related to China’s one child policy. He was released from prison in
September 2010 but remains under house arrest.
Zheng Enchong, a lawyer and housing rights activist, has faced harassment and been confined to his home by local
security personnel since his release from prison in 2006.
Gao Zhisheng, a rights lawyer who defended Falun Gong practitioners and others, was detained and allegedly
tortured in 2007. PRC authorities apprehended Gao in February 2009 and held him at various unknown locations for
over a year. After being allowed to make some contact with family members and the press in April 2010, Gao
disappeared again.
Hu Jia, who advocated on behalf of HIV/AIDS patients, other human rights activists, and environmental causes, was
sentenced to three years and six months in prison in 2008 for “inciting subversion of state power.”
Huang Qi, a human rights advocate, was sentenced to three years in prison in November 2009. A PRC court
convicted Huang for “possessing state secrets” after posting online appeals and complaints from families whose
children had been killed in school buildings during the Sichuan earthquake of May 2008.
Liu Xiaobo, a critic of the PRC government who was active in the 1989 democracy movement and helped to draft
Charter ’08, a document calling for democracy and disseminated online, was sentenced to 11 years in prison in
December 2009. The Beijing court convicted Liu of “inciting subversion of state power.” In October 2010, Liu won
the Nobel Peace Prize.
Nobel Laureate Liu Xiaobo
In October 2010, the Nobel Committee awarded Liu Xiaobo, formerly a professor at Beijing
Normal University and a long time political dissident, activist, and writer, the Nobel Peace Prize
for his “long and non-violent struggle for fundamental human rights.” He had spent three years in
prison for his role in the 1989 democracy movement and three years in a labor camp (1996-1999)
for openly questioning Communist Party rule. From 2003 to 2007, Liu served as President of the
Independent Chinese PEN Center, which advocates freedom of speech and press, and experienced
frequent harassment by local authorities. In December 2008, Liu helped draft “Charter ’08”
commemorating the 60th anniversary of the United Nations’ adoption of the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights.82 The document, signed by 300 Chinese citizens and posted online, called for
human rights and fundamental changes in China’s political system. It eventually garnered roughly
10,000 additional signatures online. The PRC government shut down the Charter’s website,
reportedly harassed, interrogated, or revoked career benefits to roughly 100 original signatories,
and arrested Liu. In December 2009, a Beijing court sentenced Liu to 11 years in prison on
charges of "inciting subversion of state power.”
The PRC government barred members or representatives of Liu’s family from traveling to Oslo to
accept the Nobel Peace Prize and verbally pressured some foreign governments not to send
representatives to the Nobel ceremony.83 PRC authorities also harassed, detained, and
82 “Charter ‘08” was inspired by “Charter 77,” the Czechoslovakian democratic movement.
83 “Keith B. Richburg, “On Eve of Nobel Ceremony, China Cracks Down and Lashes Out,” Washington Post,
(continued...)
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interrogated dozens of fellow Chinese dissidents and political activists and blocked access to
western news media in China in the days leading up to the awards ceremony.
Tibet
Along with Taiwan and Xinjiang, Tibet is a particularly sensitive issue in U.S.-China relations.
Although the Chinese Communist Party has controlled Tibet since 1951, it continues to face
challenges to its authority there. The religious policies of the atheist Communist Party have
engendered resentments among Tibetans, many of whom still venerate the leader of Tibetan
Buddhism, the Dalai Lama, who fled into exile in India in 1959. Other sources of grievances for
Tibetans include the domination of the local economy by migrants from other parts of China and
China’s ambitious plans to lay railways and build hydroelectric dams across the ecologically
delicate Tibetan plateau. The State Department’s 2009 Human Rights Report for Tibet charged
that China’s government had carried out “extrajudicial killings, torture, arbitrary arrests,
extrajudicial detention, and house arrest” in the region.84 China’s leaders often seek to blame the
Dalai Lama for Tibet’s restiveness. They also blame the international community, and particularly
the United States, arguing that international support for the Dalai Lama has encouraged forces
intent on “splitting” Tibet from China.
The U.S. government recognizes the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) and Tibetan areas in four
Chinese provinces as part of China and has always done so. Congress, however, has at times
referred to Tibet as “an occupied country” and to the Dalai Lama and his government-in-exile as
“Tibet’s true representatives.85 Reflecting continuing strong congressional support for the Dalai
Lama, Congress in 2006 passed legislation (P.L. 109-287) to award him the Congressional Gold
Medal, the nation’s highest civilian honor, “in recognition of his many enduring and outstanding
contributions to peace, non-violence, human rights, and religious understanding.”
The Tibetan Policy Act of 2002 (P.L. 107-228) guides Executive Branch policy related to Tibet. It
directs the Executive Branch to encourage the PRC to enter into dialogue with the Dalai Lama or
his representatives “leading to a negotiated agreement on Tibet,” and to work to end PRC
government interference in the religious affairs of the Tibetan people. It requires the State
Department to maintain a Special Coordinator for Tibetan Issues to promote dialogue between the
PRC and the Dalai Lama or his representatives and protect “the distinct religious, cultural,
linguistic, and national identity of Tibet.” The act also states that it is the policy of the United
States to support development projects in Tibet; directs the Secretary of State to “make best
efforts” to establish a U.S. office in the Tibetan capital, Lhasa; and requires the President and the
Secretary of State to use meetings with the PRC government to request the release of Tibetan
political prisoners. The incumbent Special Coordinator for Tibet is Undersecretary of State for
(...continued)
December 9, 2010.
84 U.S. Department of State, 2009 Human Rights Report: China (includes Tibet, Hong Kong, and Macau), March 11,
2010, http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2009/eap/135989.htm#tibet.
85 The Foreign Relations Authorization Act for FY1992-1993 (P.L. 102-138) included a Declaration of Congress
entitled, “China’s Illegal Control of Tibet.” It stated that, “Tibet, including those areas incorporated into the Chinese
provinces of Sichuan, Yunnan, Gansu, and Quinghai [sic], is an occupied country under the established principles of
international law,” and that, “Tibet’s true representatives are the Dalai Lama and the Tibetan Government in exile.”
Similar language can be found in such legislation as P.L. 103-236 and S.Res. 271 (1992).
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Democracy and Global Affairs Maria Otero. Notably, Chinese officials have never met with her
or any of her predecessors in their Tibet roles, or allowed a Special Coordinator to travel to Tibet.
Over China’s strenuous objections, President Obama met with the Dalai Lama in the White
House Map Room on February 18, 2010.86 The Obama Administration had postponed meeting
with the Dalai Lama in the fall of 2009 in order to ease the way for a resumption of dialogue
between the PRC government and representatives of the Dalai Lama. That dialogue, the ninth
round of meetings between the two sides since 2002, took place in January 2010, with the Dalai
Lama’s representatives pledging respect for the authority of the Chinese central government, but
continuing to push for genuine autonomy for the Tibetan people within China. Both sides
indicated that the meetings produced no breakthroughs.
Xinjiang
Xinjiang, known officially as the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region or XUAR, is home to 8.5
million Uighur Muslims, a Turkic ethnic group.87 Once the predominant group in Xinjiang, they
now constitute about 45% of the region’s population as many Han (Chinese), the majority ethnic
group in China, have migrated there, particularly to the capital, Urumqi. Uighurs and human
rights groups have complained of Chinese policies such as restrictions on access to mosques, the
training and role of imams, the celebration of Ramadan, contacts with foreigners, and
participation in the hajj. Uighur children (under 18) are forbidden from entering mosques and
government workers are not allowed to practice Islam. More recent Uighur grievances have
included a perceived loss of ethnic and cultural identity, a lack of consultation by the government,
and economic discrimination.
The Chinese government fears not only Uighur demands for greater religious and cultural
freedom but also Uighurs’ links to Central Asian countries and foreign Islamic organizations. The
Chinese government claims that the East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM), a Uighur
organization that advocates the creation of an independent Uighur Islamic state, has been
responsible for small-scale terrorist attacks in China and has ties to Al Qaeda. ETIM is on the
United States’ and United Nations’ lists of terrorist organizations.
Due to perceived national security-related concerns, the Chinese government has imposed stern
ethnic and religious policies on Uighurs in Xinjiang, often conflating Uighur activism with
separatism. Following July 2009 demonstrations and inter-ethnic strife in Urumqi that left nearly
200 dead, about two-thirds of them Han, the Chinese government further restricted speech,
assembly, information, communication with other parts of China and the world, and religious
activities. The Xinjiang government has intensified the process of promoting Mandarin Chinese
and continued the demolition of parts of the old city of Kashgar. The whereabouts of many
Uighurs seized after the unrest remain unknown. Government initiatives to address grievances
have focused primarily upon increasing investment, developing the economy, and raising incomes
in the region, and secondarily upon preserving cultural items.
For more information about human rights in China, see CRS Report RL34729, Human Rights in
China: Trends and Policy Implications, by Thomas Lum and Hannah Fischer. For more
86 “Beijing Demands U-Turn on Obama’s Dalai Lama Meet,” Agence France Presse, February 12, 2010.
87 Estimates of China’s Muslim population range from 20 million to 30 million people.
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information on Chinese policy toward Xinjiang, see CRS Report RL33001, U.S.-China
Counterterrorism Cooperation: Issues for U.S. Policy, by Shirley A. Kan.
China’s Engagement with the Developing World
As part of a drive to gain political and cultural influence and to secure energy and mineral
supplies and markets, in the past decade, China has reached out to the developing world,
including Africa, Central America, Latin America, Southeast Asia, and the Pacific, through high-
level official visits and exchanges; economic assistance, loans, and investments; participation in
regional organizations; and Chinese-language and cultural programs. Competition with Taiwan
for diplomatic recognition also has spurred PRC engagement in some regions.88
According to many experts, China’s foreign economic assistance and investments have
complicated U.S. and other Western efforts to curb human rights abuses and promote democracy
in places such as Angola and Sudan in Africa, Burma and Cambodia in Southeast Asia, and Fiji in
the Southwest Pacific. The United States government has taken preliminary steps to discuss and
coordinate development assistance and projects with China, in order to promote “donor best
practices” and convergence between Chinese foreign assistance practices and those of major
bilateral and multilateral aid donors. Under the Obama Administration, some dialogues have
taken place between staff and senior-level officials of the U.S. Agency for International
Development (USAID) and the PRC Ministry of Commerce’s Department of Aid to Foreign
Countries. At the second U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue (S&ED), held in May
2010, the two governments reportedly held a meeting on development issues and agreed to
engage in further dialogue in the future.89
For more information, see CRS Report R40940, China’s Assistance and Government-Sponsored
Investment Activities in Africa, Latin America, and Southeast Asia, by Thomas Lum.
88 After Chinese successes in persuading a number of Taiwan’s diplomatic partners to switch recognition to Beijing,
Taiwan currently has diplomatic relations with Belize, Burkina Faso, the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Gambia,
Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, the Marshall Islands, Nauru, Nicaragua, Palau, Panama, Paraguay, and the Vatican.
89 Jonathan Stromseth, “Searching for Global Cooperation in Sino-U.S. Relations: The Case of Foreign Aid,” In Asia,
The Asia Foundation, June 9, 2010.
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Appendix A. Presidential Meetings and Select
Dialogues
Table A-1. Bilateral Meetings Between President Barack Obama and Chinese
President Hu Jintao
Date Location Venue
April 1, 2009
London, United Kingdom
Sidelines of G-20 Summit
September 22, 2009
New York
Sidelines of United Nations
Summit on Climate Change
November 17, 2009 a
Beijing, China
President Obama’s state
visit to China
April 12, 2010
Washington, DC
Sidelines of Nuclear
Security Summit
June 26, 2010
Toronto, Canada
Sidelines of G-20 summit
November 11, 2010
Seoul, South Korea
Sidelines of G-20 summit
January 19, 2011b
Washington, DC
President Hu’s state visit to
the United States
a. The two presidents met twice on November 17, 2009, first in a bilateral meeting, and then in an expanded
bilateral meeting. The U.S. government counts these as two separate bilateral meetings.
b. The two presidents also met twice on January 19, 2011, again in a bilateral and then an expanded bilateral
meeting.
Table A-2. Two High-level Recurring U.S.-China Dialogues
Chinese
Frequency
U.S.
Principal(s)
Principal(s)
Scope
Strategic and
Secretary of State
State Councilor for
Held annually, with
Immediate and long-
Economic Dialogue (strategic track),
foreign affairs
venue alternating
term issues of
Secretary of the
(strategic track) and
between Washington strategic and
Treasury (economic
Vice Premier for
and Beijing.
economic
track). Other U.S.
foreign trade
importance. Includes
cabinet officials
(economic track).
multiple sub-
participate.
Multiple Chinese
dialogues.
ministers participate.
Joint Commission
Secretary of
Vice Premier for
Held annually, with
Bilateral trade issues.
on Commerce and
Commerce and
foreign trade.
venue alternating
Includes ten working
Trade
United States Trade
Chinese ministers
between Washington groups covering
Representative.
participate.
and Beijing.
trade and investment
Secretary of
issues, business
Agriculture also
development and
participates.
industrial
cooperation, and
commercial law, with
a side dialogue on
export controls
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Table A-3. U.S.-China Military Dialogues
Dialogue U.S.
Principal
Chinese
Principal Description
Defense Consultative
Under Secretary of
Deputy Chief of the
Highest level bilateral
Talks
Defense for Policy
General Staff, People’s
dialogue between the two
Liberation Army
militaries. Provides
framework for the military-
to-military relationship.
Defense Policy
Deputy Assistant Secretary
Director, Foreign Affairs
Established in 2005. Forum
Coordination Talks
of Defense for East Asia
Office, Ministry of National
for discussion of regional
Defense
and global issues.
Military Maritime
Director, Strategic Planning
Deputy Chief of Staff,
Established in 1989. Forum
Consultative Agreement and Policy Bureau, U.S.
People’s Liberation Army
for discussion on issues
Pacific Command
Navy
related to operational and
tactical safety at sea.
Source: Office of the Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving
the People’s Republic of China 2010, August 2010, pp. 57-58, http://www.defense.gov/pubs/pdfs/
2010_CMPR_Final.pdf.
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Appendix B. Core Documents: Analysis of the
2011 and 2009 U.S.-China Joint Statements
During the January 18-21, 2011 state visit to the United States of China’s President and
Communist Party General Secretary Hu Jintao, the United States and China released a 41-point
Joint Statement. Along with another U.S.-China Joint Statement issued during President Obama’s
state visit to China in November 2009, the new statement is part of an effort to update the
bilateral relationship to reflect China’s new place in the world order. The 2011 and 2009 Joint
Statements built on a previous Joint Statement issued in 1997, during the Bill Clinton
Administration.
The 2011 and 2009 Joint Statements contain significant statements of principle related to the
ways the two countries view their relationship. They include the following:
• “The United States and China committed to work together to build a cooperative
partnership based on mutual respect and mutual benefit.” (2011)
• The two sides committed “to building a positive, cooperative, and comprehensive
U.S.-China relationship for the 21st century.” (2011 and 2009)
• “The United States reiterated that it welcomes a strong, prosperous and
successful China that plays a greater role in world affairs.” (2011 and 2009)
• “China welcomes the United States as an Asia-Pacific nation that contributes to
peace, stability and prosperity in the region.” (2011 and 2009)
• The two sides pledged “respect for each other’s sovereignty and territorial
integrity.” (2011 and 2009)
• “The two sides agreed that respecting each other’s core interests is extremely
important to ensure steady progress in U.S.-China relations.” (2009)
While many Americans see the first two of these statements as formulaic, and therefore relatively
meaningless, the Chinese side sees them as providing reassurance about U.S. intentions toward
China, and thus considers them to be of great significance. After President Hu’s 2011 state visit,
Chinese commentators presented the “cooperative partnership” language as an upgrading of the
bilateral relationship and as one of the major accomplishments of the visit.90
With the third statement, welcoming a “strong, prosperous and successful China,” analysts say
the Obama Administration sought to signal to China that the United States does not seek to
“contain” China or prevent its emergence as a major power, as some in China fear. With the
90 See, for example, “Hu’s visit opens new chapter in China-US ties,” Xinhua, January 22, 2011 and “Hu’s visit
sketches blueprint for China-U.S. ties,” Xinhua, January 23, 2011. The “positive, cooperative, and comprehensive”
formulation was first agreed to in a meeting between Presidents Obama and Hu in April 2009. President Clinton and
China’s President Jiang Zemin pledged in the 1997 Joint Statement “to build toward a constructive strategic
partnership,” but President George W. Bush avoided describing the United States relationship with China as one of
“partnership.” During his administration, China referred to the relationship as “constructive and cooperative,” while
President Bush described the relationship as, “constructive, cooperative, and candid” (adding the word “candid.”)
Steven Lee Myers, “Bush Praises China but Continues Rebuke During Embassy Dedication in Beijing,” The New York
Times, August 7, 2008.
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fourth statement, China’s leaders offered reassurance to the United States. China’s leaders have
long indicated an ambivalence about the U.S. presence in Asia, sometimes accepting that the U.S.
presence has provided stability that allowed for the region’s post-World War II growth, and
sometimes seeing the U.S. presence as complicating relationships among the nations of Asia, or
worse. The statement that China welcomes the United States as “an Asia-Pacific nation that
contributes to peace, stability and prosperity in the region,” is the most positive characterization
of the U.S. presence in Asia that China has yet agreed to put in writing. The wording of the
Chinese-language version of the statement is more conditional than the English, however. The
Chinese text states that China welcomes U.S. “efforts” for peace, stability, and prosperity in the
region, suggesting that China may not believe that the United States is currently succeeding in
contributing to peace, stability, and prosperity.91
The sovereignty and core interests language is the most sensitive in the Joint Statements. The
parameters of each country’s sovereignty and territorial integrity is not defined, giving the United
States some flexibility in its interpretation of respect for China’s sovereignty, but also raising
questions about how China may interpret the U.S. pledge. China claims sovereignty not only over
the Chinese mainland, Hong Kong, and Macau, but also over Taiwan, the self-governing island of
23 million that lies off the east coast of the Chinese mainland; and over disputed territory in the
South China Sea and East China Sea. The “sovereignty and territorial integrity” language appears
in both Joint Statements in close proximity to language related to Taiwan, suggesting that China
may, at a minimum, expect this language to reflect deference to its claims to Taiwan.92 (See
sections on “Taiwan” and “Maritime Disputes” below.)
Some critics have suggested that the “core interests” language in the 2009 Joint Statement may
have raised unrealistic expectations on the Chinese side of greater U.S. deference to China on
issues that China considers part of its core interests, such as Taiwan, Tibet, and the maintenance
of domestic stability through strict controls on the Internet.93 Because the statement did not define
“core interests,” some analysts believe the language may also have encouraged China to
experiment with referring to the South China Sea as a “core national interest” in some closed-
door meetings with foreign officials in 2010. According to Secretary of State Hillary Clinton,
those statements contributed to the U.S. decision to declare a “national interest” in freedom of
navigation in the South China Sea at a meeting in Hanoi in July 2010.94 The “core interests”
language was not repeated in the 2011 Joint Statement.
91 The Chinese text of the line in question reads, “The Chinese side states that it welcomes efforts by the United States,
as an Asia-Pacific nation, for peace, stability, and prosperity in the region.” CRS translation of Xinhua News Agency,
Zhongmei lianhe shengming (China-U.S. Joint Statement), November 17, 2010, http://news.xinhuanet.com/world/2009-
11/17/content_12475620_2.htm.
92 In the 2011 Joint Statement, the sentence reaffirming “respect for each other’s sovereignty and territorial integrity”
followed immediately after a sentence reaffirming that three U.S.-China Joint Communiqués concluded in 1972, 1979,
and 1982 “laid the political foundation for the relationship.” All three of the Joint Communiqués relate to the issue of
Taiwan. The 2009 Joint Statement directly linked respect for sovereignty to the Three Communiqués, and thus to
Taiwan, stating, “The two countries reiterated that the fundamental principle of respect for each other’s sovereignty and
territorial integrity is at the core of the three U.S.-China joint communiqués which guide U.S.-China relations.”
93 Thomas J. Christensen, “The Advantages of an Assertive China: Responding to Beijing’s Abrasive Diplomacy,”
Foreign Affairs, vol. 90, no. 2 (March/April 2011), p. 54.
94 Greg Sheridan, “China actions meant as test, Hillary Clinton says,” The Australian, November 8, 2010.
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Appendix C. Congressionally-Mandated Annual
Reports Related to China
Table C-1. Selected Executive Branch Reports to Congress on China
Agency
Report Title
Contents
Authorizing Legislation
Department of Defense
Military and Security
Chinese military
Section 1202, National
Developments Involving
technological
Defense Authorization
the People’s Republic of
development; Chinese
Act, FY2000 (P.L. 106-65),
China
security strategy and
as amended
military strategy; Chinese
military organizations and
operational concepts; U.S.-
China engagement and
cooperation on security
matters
Department of State
Report on Tibet
Steps taken to encourage
Section 611, Foreign
Negotiations
the PRC government to
Relations Authorization
enter into a dialogue with
Act, FY2003, “Tibetan
the Dalai Lama or his
Policy Act of 2002,” (P.L.
representatives leading to
107-228)
a negotiated agreement on
Tibet, and status of any
such dialogue
United States Trade
China’s WTO Compliance
China’s compliance with
Sections 421 and 413(b)(2)
Representative
commitments made in
of the U.S.-China Relations
connection with its
Act of 2000 (P.L. 106-286)
accession to the World
Trade Organization
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Table C-2. Selected Executive Branch Reports to Congress Related to China
Agency
Report Title
Contents
Authorizing Legislation
Central Intelligence
Unclassified Report to
Acquisition by foreign
Section 721, Intelligence
Agency (submitted by the
Congress on the
countries of dual-use and
Authorization Act for
Deputy Director of
Acquisition of Technology
other technology useful
FY1997 (P.L. 104-293)
National Intelligence for
Relating to Weapons of
for the development of
Analysis)
Mass Destruction and
weapons of mass
Advanced Conventional
destruction and advanced
Munitions
conventional munitions
Department of State
Country Reports on
Status of internationally
Sections 116(d) and
Human Rights Practices
recognized human rights as 502B(b) of the Foreign
(China report includes
set forth in the Universal
Assistance Act of 1961
separate section on Tibet.
Declaration of Human
(FAA) (P.L. 87-195), as
Hong Kong, and Macau
Rights
amended, and section 504
have separate reports.)
of the Trade Act of 1974
(P.L. 93-618), as amended
Department of State
Country Reports on
Foreign government
Section 140, Foreign
Terrorism (China report
counter-terrorism
Relations Authorization
includes separate sections
cooperation
Act, FY1988-1989 (P.L.
on Hong Kong and Macau)
100-204), as amended
Department of State
International Narcotics
Drug and chemical
Section 489, Foreign
Control Strategy Report
control, money laundering, Assistance Act of 1961
and financial crimes
(FAA) (P.L. 87-195), as
amended
Department of State
Annual Report on
Supplements most recent
Section 102(b),
International Religious
human rights reports with
International Religious
Freedom (Separate
detailed information on
Freedom Act of 1998 (P.L.
reports on Tibet, Hong
matters involving
105-292)
Kong, and Macau are
international religious
appended to the China
freedom
report)
Department of State
Trafficking in Persons
Foreign government
Section 104, Victims of
Report
efforts to eliminate severe
Trafficking and Violence
forms of trafficking in
Protection Act of 2000
persons, such as forced
(P.L. 106-386)
labor and sex trafficking
Department of State
Voting Practices in the
Information on voting
Section 406, Foreign
United Nations
practices of all UN
Relations Authorization
members. Lists each
Act for FY1990-1991 (P.L.
country’s votes on
101-246)
“important issues” and
provides statistics on
coincidence of each
country’s votes with U.S.
votes
Department of Treasury
Report to Congress on
International economic
Section 3005, Omnibus
International Economic
policy, including exchange
Trade and
and Exchange Rate Policies rate policy
Competitiveness Act of
1988 (P.L. 100-418)
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Agency
Report Title
Contents
Authorizing Legislation
United States Trade
National Trade Estimate
Inventory of the most
Section 181,Trade Act of
Representative
Report on Foreign Trade
important foreign barriers
1974 (P.L. 93-618), as
Barriers
affecting U.S. exports of
amended
goods and services, foreign
direct investment by U.S.
persons, and protection of
intellectual property rights
United States Trade
Special 301 Report
Global review of the state
Section 182, Trade Act of
Representative
of intellectual property
1974 (P.L. 93-618), as
rights protection and
amended
enforcement
Table C-3. Selected Reports on China By Congressionally-Mandated Commissions
Commission Report
Contents
Authorizing
Legislation
Congressional-Executive
Annual Report
Human rights and rule of
Section 302(g), U.S.-China
Commission on the
law in China
Relations Act of 2000 (P.L.
People’s Republic of
106-286), as amended
China
U.S.-China Economic
Report to Congress
The national security
Section 1238(c), Floyd D.
and Security Review
implications of the U.S.-
Spence National Defense
Commission
China bilateral trade and
Authorization Act for 2001
economic relationship
(P.L. 106-398), as amended
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Appendix D. Legislation Related to China
Introduced in the 112th Congress
Table D-1. Legislation Related to China in the 112th Congress
Date of Major
Action
(Introduced and
Sent to Relevant
Bill
Legislative
Committee or
Number
Sponsor
Passed)
Title/Description
H.Res.
DeLauro Intr.
February
18, Expressing the sense of the House of Representatives that
106
2011
defense systems, including the helicopter fleet used to
transport the President of the United States, should not be
procured, directly or indirectly, from an entity controlled,
directed, or influenced by the Government of China
H.R. 1
Rogers Intr.
February
11,
Full-year Continuing Appropriations Act, 2011. Sec. 1339 bars
2011
the National Aeronautics and Space Administration and the
Office of Science and Technology Policy from using funds “to
participate, collaborate, or coordinate in any way with China
or any Chinese-owned company unless such activities are
specifically authorized by a law enacted after the date of
enactment of this division.” It also bars use of funds to host
Chinese visitors at facilities belonging to or used by NASA.
S. 15
Vitter
Intr. January 25, 2011 To prohibit the regulation of carbon dioxide emissions in the
United States until China, India, and Russia implement similar
reductions.
H.R. 375 Kildee
Intr. January 20, 2011 Fix United States Government Contracting Deficit with China
Act
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Appendix E. Legislation Related to China
Introduced in the 111th Congress
Table E-1. Economic Legislation Related to China in the 111th Congress
Date of Major Action
Legislative
(Introduced and Sent to
Bill Number
Sponsor
Relevant Committee or Passed)
Title/Description
H.Res. 44
Poe
Intr. January 9, 2009
Condemning the PRC for
unacceptable business practices.
H.R. 471
Altmire
Intr. January 13, 2009
The Supporting America’s
Manufacturers Act.
H.R. 496
Rangel
Intr. January 14, 2009
Trade Enforcement Act of 2009.
H.R. 499
Davis Intr. January 14, 2009
Nonmarket Economy Trade Remedy
Act of 2009.
S.Res. 739/
Nelson/Wexler Intr. March 30, 2009/April 2, 2009
Drywal Safety Act of 2009.
H.R. 1977
H.R. 2310/
Larsen/Cantwel
Intr. May 7, 2009/May 8, 2009
United States-China Market
S. 1616
Engagement and Export Promotion
Act.
S. 3134
Schumer
Intr. March 17, 2010
Currency Exchange Rate Oversight
Reform Act of 2010.
S. 3240
Cornyn
Intr. April 21, 2010
Foreign-Held Debt Transparency and
Threat Assessment Act.
H.R. 5312
Schauer
Intr. May 13, 2010
Reciprocal Government Procurement
with China Creates American Jobs
Act.
H.R. 5319
Johnson
Intr. May 18, 2010
Foreign-Held Debt Transparency and
Threat Assessment Act.
S. 3505
Stabenow
Intr. June 17, 2010
China Fair Trade Act of 2010.
H.R. 6071
Sherman
Intr. July 30, 2010
Emergency China Trade Act of 2010.
H.R. 2378
Ryan
Passed in the House, September 29,
Currency Reform for Fair Trade Act.
2010
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Table E-2. Human Rights Legislation Related to China in the 111th Congress
Date of Major
Action
(Introduced and
Sent to Relevant
Bill
Legislative
Committee or
Number
Sponsor
Passed)
Title/Description
S.Res. 24 Casey
Intr. January 28,
A resolution commending China’s Charter 08 movement
2009
and related efforts for upholding the universality of human
rights and advancing democratic reforms in China.
H.Res. 156
McCotter
Intr. February 11,
Supporting Charter 08 and the ideals of the Charter 08
2009
movement.
H.R. 1340
Miller Intr.
March
5,
2009
Tibetan Refugee Assistance Act of 2009.
H.Res. 226
Holt
Passed March 11,
A resolution recognizing the plight of the Tibetan people
2009
and calling for a sustained multilateral effort to bring about a
durable and peaceful solution to the Tibet issue.
H.R. 2271
Smith
Intr. May 6, 2009
Global Online Freedom Act.
S.Res. 155
Brown
Intr. May 21, 2009
A resolution expressing the sense of the Senate that the
Government of the People’s Republic of China should
immediately cease engaging in acts of cultural, linguistic, and
religious suppression directed against the Uyghur people.
S.Res. 171
Inhofe
Passed June 8, 2009
A resolution commending the people who have sacrificed
their personal freedoms to bring about democratic change
in the People’s Republic of China and expressing sympathy
for the families of the people who were killed, wounded, or
imprisoned on the occasion of the 20th anniversary of the
Tiananmen Square Massacre in Beijing, China from June 3
through 4, 1989.
H.Res. 590
Wu
Intr. June 26, 2009
Expressing grave concerns about the sweeping censorship,
privacy, and cyber-security implications of China’s Green
Dam filtering software, and urging U.S. high-tech companies
to promote the Internet as a tool for transparency and
freedom of expression.
H.Res. 624 Delahunt Intr. July 10, 2009
Condemning al violent repression by the Government of
the People’s Republic of China of peaceful Uighur protests.
H.Con.Res.
Minnick
Passed in the House,
Expressing the sense of Congress that China release
151
October 1, 2009
democratic activist Liu Xiaobo from imprisonment.
H.Res. 877
Wu
Passed November 7,
Expressing support for Chinese human rights activists Huang
2009
Qi and Tan Zuoren for engaging in peaceful expression as
they seek answers and justice for the parents whose
children were killed in the Sichuan earthquake of May 12,
2008.
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Date of Major
Action
(Introduced and
Sent to Relevant
Bill
Legislative
Committee or
Number
Sponsor
Passed)
Title/Description
H.Res. 953
McGovern
Intr. December 8,
Expressing the sense of the House of Representatives that
2009
the Government of the People’s Republic of China has
violated internationally recognized human rights and legal
due process standards by carrying out executions after trials
marred by procedural abuses and by carrying out arbitrary
detentions targeting Uyghurs and other individuals in
Xinjiang in the aftermath of a suppressed demonstration and
ensuing mob violence on July 5 to 7, 2009.
S.Res. 405
Kaufman
Passed February 2,
A resolution reaffirming the centrality of freedom of
2010
expression and press freedom as cornerstones of United
States foreign policy and United States efforts to promote
individual rights, and for other purposes.
H.Res. 605 Ros-
Passed March 16,
Recognizing the continued persecution of Falun Gong
Lehtinen
2010.
practitioners in China on the 10th anniversary of the Chinese
Communist Party campaign to suppress the Falun Gong
spiritual movement and calling for an immediate end to the
campaign to persecute, intimidate, imprison, and torture
Falun Gong practitioners.
H.Res.
McCarthy
Intr. July 13, 2010
Commending Google Inc. and other companies for
1512
advocating for an uncensored Internet, adhering to free
speech principles, and keeping the Internet open for users
worldwide.
H.Res.
Smith
Intr. September 22,
Calling on the Government of the People’s Republic of
1650
2010
China to immediately release Chen Guangcheng and his
relatives from house arrest and to cease persecuting and
harassing Chen Guangcheng, his relatives, and supporters.
H.Res.
Smith
Passed December 8,
Congratulating imprisoned Chinese democracy advocate Liu
1717
2010
Xiaobo on the award of the 2010 Nobel Peace Prize.
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Table E-3. Environment/Energy Legislation Related to China in the 111th Congress
Date of Major Action
(Introduced and Sent
Bill
Legislative
to Relevant
Number
Sponsor
Committee or Passed)
Title/Description
S.Res. 76 Cantwell
Intr. March 18, 2009
A resolution expressing the sense of the Senate that the
United States and the People’s Republic of China should
work together to reduce or eliminate tariff and nontariff
barriers to trade in clean energy and environmental
goods and services.
S.Res. 77 Cantwell
Intr. March 18, 2009
A resolution expressing the sense of the Senate that the
United States and the People’s Republic of China should
negotiate a bilateral agreement on clean energy
cooperation.
H.R.
Israel
Intr. May 7, 2009
United States-China Energy Cooperation Act.
2312
Table E-4. Other Legislation Related to China in the 111th Congress
Date of Major Action
(Introduced and Sent to
Bill
Legislative
Relevant Committee or
Number
Sponsor
Passed)
Title/Description
H.Con.Res.
Forbes
Intr. March 12, 2009
Condemning any action of the PRC that
72
unnecessarily escalates bilateral tensions, including
the incidents in the South China Sea against the
USNS Impeccable in March 2009.
H.R. 2311
Kirk
Intr. May 7, 2009
United States-China Diplomatic Expansion Act of
2009.
H.R. 2313
Davis
Intr. May 7, 2009
U.S.-China Language Engagement Act.
H.Res. 509 Hastings
Intr. June 4, 2009
Encouraging the United States to ful y participate in
the Shanghai Expo in 2010.
S.Res. 217
Kerry
Intro. July 20, 2009
A resolution commending Captain Wei Jiafu and
the China Ocean Shipping Company for increasing
business relations between the United States and
China.
H.Res. 784 Green
Passed October 28, 2009
Honoring the 2560th anniversary of the birth of
Confucius and recognizing his invaluable
contributions to philosophy and social and political
thought.
S.Res. 532
Kerry
Intr. May 17, 2010
A resolution recognizing Expo 2010 Shanghai,
China and the USA Pavilion at the Expo.
H.Res. 1324 McMahon
Passed May 20, 2010
Expressing condolences and sympathies for the
people of China fol owing the tragic earthquake in
the Qinghai province of the Peoples Republic of
China on April 14, 2010.
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Author Contact Information
Susan V. Lawrence
Thomas Lum
Analyst in Asian Affairs
Specialist in Asian Affairs
slawrence@crs.loc.gov, 7-2577
tlum@crs.loc.gov, 7-7616
Congressional Research Service
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