Peacekeeping/Stabilization and Conflict
Transitions: Background and Congressional
Action on the Civilian Response/Reserve
Corps and other Civilian Stabilization and
Reconstruction Capabilities
Nina M. Serafino
Specialist in International Security Affairs
March 4, 2011
Congressional Research Service
7-5700
www.crs.gov
RL32862
CRS Report for Congress
P
repared for Members and Committees of Congress
Peacekeeping/Stabilization and Conflict Transitions
Summary
The 112th Congress may face a number of issues regarding the development of civilian
capabilities to carry out stabilization and reconstruction activities. In September 2008, Congress
passed the Reconstruction and Stabilization Civilian Management Act, 2008, as Title XVI of the
Duncan Hunter National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009 (S. 3001, P.L. 110-417,
signed into law October 14, 2008). This legislation codified the existence and functions of the
State Department Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) and
authorized new operational capabilities within the State Department, a Civilian Response Corps
(CRC) of government employees with an active and a standby component, and a reserve
component. S/CRS slowly expanded, and the creation of the active and standby response
components is in progress. Nevertheless, some members have argued for changes.
S/CRS was established in 2004 to address long-standing concerns, both within Congress and the
broader foreign policy community, over the perceived lack of the appropriate capabilities and
processes to deal with transitions from conflict to stability. These capabilities and procedures
include adequate planning mechanisms for stabilization and reconstruction operations, efficient
interagency coordination structures and procedures in carrying out such tasks, and appropriate
civilian personnel for many of the non-military tasks required. Effectively distributing resources
among the various executive branch actors, maintaining clear lines of authority and jurisdiction,
and balancing short- and long-term objectives are major challenges for designing, planning, and
conducting post-conflict operations, as is fielding the appropriate civilian personnel.
Since July 2004, S/CRS has worked to establish the basic concepts, mechanisms, and capabilities
necessary to carry out such operations. With a staff that has slowly grown from a few dozen to
well over 100 individuals, S/CRS has taken steps to monitor and plan for potential conflicts, to
develop a rapid-response crisis management “surge” capability, to improve interagency and
international coordination, to develop interagency training exercises, and to help State
Department regional bureaus develop concepts and proposals for preventive action.
Not until four years later, in 2008, did Congress provide the first funding to establish civilian
response capabilities, as well as the first line-item funding for S/CRS. (This funding was provided
in a supplemental appropriation.) The Bush Administration plans at that point contemplated a
CRC force of 4,250, including a sizable reserve component of private citizens similar in concept
to the U.S. military reserve. The Obama Administration proceeded with plans and funding
requests to develop S/CRS and its operational arm, the CRC. The 111th Congress provided
funding to expand the active and standby units, but not the civilian reserve. The 111th Congress
also established a new USAID Complex Crises Fund (CCF) to support programs and activities
responding to emerging or unforeseen complex crises abroad. The State Department/USAID
December 2010 Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review (QDDR) proposals, if
implemented, would affect S/CRS and the CRC.
For FY2012, the Obama Administration requests $92.2 million for Conflict Stabilization
Operations and $75 million for the USAID Complex Crisis Fund. Its proposal for a new, joint
State Department-Department of Defense (DOD) Global Security Contingency Fund, with $50
million contributed by each department and a DOD transfer authority of $450 million, may play
into consideration of the request.
The 112th Congress’s consideration of the terms of future FY2011 funding, particularly if based
on the FY2008 budget level, may affect the future of S/CRS and the CRC. The FY2008 funding
was considerably below the FY2010-FY2011 level, and was appropriated as supplemental, not
regular, appropriations. This report will be updated as events warrant.
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Contents
Introduction ................................................................................................................................ 1
Background ................................................................................................................................ 2
Evolving Perceptions of Post-Conflict Needs ........................................................................ 3
Calls for Change ................................................................................................................... 6
Proposals for New Civilian Forces .................................................................................. 7
Critics Respond..................................................................................................................... 7
Creating Civilian Reconstruction and Stabilization Capabilities: Congressional and
Executive Actions, 2004-2007............................................................................................ 8
The “Lugar-Biden” Legislation ....................................................................................... 8
S/CRS Start-Up and Early Congressional Mandate.......................................................... 9
S/CRS Role in Interagency Coordination....................................................................... 10
Codifying Civilian Reconstruction and Stabilization Assistance and State Department
Capabilities: Title XVI, P.L. 110-417, October 14, 2008 ......................................................... 11
Authorizes Assistance for Reconstruction and Stabilization Crises................................. 11
Makes S/CRS a Permanent State Department Office and Assigns Specific
Functions ................................................................................................................... 12
Authorizes a Civilian Response Readiness Corps and a Civilian Reserve Corps............. 12
Development of the S/CRS Office, Responsibilities, and Capabilities ........................................ 14
Monitoring and Planning for Potential Conflicts.................................................................. 14
Developing and Carrying Out Conflict Response Activities ................................................. 14
Other Activities ................................................................................................................... 15
Current Development of the Civilian Response Corps (CRC) .................................................... 16
Initial CRC Funding: FY2008 and FY2009 ......................................................................... 16
FY2010 Funding ................................................................................................................. 17
The Obama Administration Request .............................................................................. 17
Congress’s FY2010 Appropriations and Rescission ....................................................... 18
Establishing the Civilian Response Corps Active Response Component (CRC-A) ............... 19
Establishing the Civilian Response Corps Standby Component (CRC-S)............................. 19
Establishing a Civilian Reserve Capability .......................................................................... 20
FY2011 Budget Request and Congressional Action ............................................................. 20
FY2012 Budget Request and Congressional Action ............................................................. 21
Conflict Stabilization Operations and Complex Crises Fund .......................................... 21
Global Security Contingency Fund................................................................................ 22
Issues for Congress ................................................................................................................... 22
S/CRS Effectiveness and Status........................................................................................... 22
QDDR Proposal to Reorganize State Department for Conflict and
Stabilization Operations ............................................................................................. 24
Appropriate Size for the Civilian Response Corps ............................................................... 26
Flexible Funding for S&R Operations ................................................................................. 27
Funding for a Reserve Component ...................................................................................... 29
QDDR Proposal to Establish a Expert Corps Roster ...................................................... 31
Tables
Table 1.CRC-S Contingents as of January 21, 2011 ................................................................... 19
Table 2.CRC-S Contingents as Planned for October 31, 2011 .................................................... 20
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Contacts
Author Contact Information ...................................................................................................... 32
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Introduction
The 112th Congress may consider several issues regarding the continuing development of the
Civilian Stabilization Initiative (CSI), the effort begun by the George W. Bush Administration to
develop a three-component “ready response” civilian force. For well over a decade, there has
been widespread concern that the U.S. government lacks appropriate civilian “tools” to carry out
state-building tasks in post-conflict situations. This concern grew from U.S. military operations in
Haiti, Somalia, Bosnia, and elsewhere, where military forces were tasked with a variety of state-
building tasks, such as creating justice systems, assisting police, and promoting governance. With
the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, consensus increased that the United States must develop
adequate civilian organizational structures, procedures, and personnel to response effectively to
post-conflict and other “stabilization and reconstruction” (S&R) situations.
The George W. Bush Administration launched several initiatives to do just that. The centerpiece
of its efforts was the establishment of the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and
Stabilization (S/CRS) in the Office of the Secretary of State. Created in mid-2004, S/CRS was
tasked with designing, and in some cases establishing, the new structures within the State
Department and elsewhere that would allow civilian agencies to develop effective policies,
processes, and personnel to build stable and democratic states. Among other tasks, S/CRS
developed plans for the creation of a civilian “surge” capability that could respond rapidly to
S&R emergencies.
In the early months of the Obama Administration, Administration officials signaled their support
for civilian S&R capabilities. In her January 2009 confirmation hearings before the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee, Secretary of State Hillary R. Clinton mentioned the State
Department’s new S&R responsibilities, citing a Department need to demonstrate competence
and secure funding to carry them out. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, while serving in that
position under former President George W. Bush, urged the development of civilian capabilities
in major speeches.1 As Senator, Vice President Joseph Biden was the co-sponsor, with Senator
Lugar, of legislation, first introduced in 2004, to create an office within the State Department that
would coordinate U.S. government S&R operations and deploy civilian government employees
and private citizens to carry out state-building activities in crises abroad.
In its second session, the 110th Congress enacted legislation that “operationalizes” certain groups
of personnel within the Department of State and other federal agencies for S&R efforts by
authorizing the creation of federal civilian “response” units, as well as the creation of a volunteer
S&R civilian reserve force, akin to the military reserve force. This legislation advances the work
of previous Congresses regarding Bush Administration initiatives to improve the conduct of
(S&R) efforts. With the passage in September 2008 of Title XVI of the Duncan Hunter National
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009 (S. 3001/P.L. 110-417), signed into law October
14, 2008, Congress established S/CRS as part of permanent law and formally “operationalized”
certain units in civilian federal agencies, most particularly the State Department, expanding its
mission from that of an institution devoted solely to diplomacy to one that also has a role in
effecting change through “on-the-ground” personnel and programs dedicated to promoting
1 U.S. Department of Defense. Speech by Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates, delivered at Kansas State University,
Manhattan, KA (the “Landon Lecture”), November 26, 2007, and U.S. Department of Defense, Speech by Secretary of
Defense Robert M. Gates at the AFRICOM Activation Ceremony, Washington, DC, October 1, 2008;
http://www.defenselink.mil/speeches/secdef.aspx.
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security and stability in transitions from conflict and post-conflict situations. This was
accomplished by authorizing the creation of a two component “readiness response” corps
consisting of a small active unit of federal employees drawn from several agencies and a federal
standby unit, and a large civilian reserve corps, analogous to the military reserve.
The 112th Congress may consider several remaining tasks. One is whether to create a mechanism,
such as envisioned in early legislation, to create a flexible, no-year, discretionary Conflict
Response Fund to be drawn upon by civilian agencies for S&R efforts. Another is to decide what
would constitute an appropriate level of staffing and funding for S/CRS, or an office that carries
out those functions, and whether and how to reposition S/CRS to carry out its functions. A third is
to decide on whether to support expected Administration plans to strengthen the Civilian
Response Corps of government employees and to create a new expert roster to deploy private
sector personnel.
The State Department’s December 2010 Quadrennial Diplomacy and Defense Review (QDDR),
with its broad reform agenda for State Department and USAID structures and activities,
addressed potential changes to S/CRS, the response corps, and the reserves.2 The QDDR proposes
reorganizing the structures to enhance the State Department’s ability to develop and implement
policy to address crises, conflict, and stability, including endowing an expanded version of
S/CRS’s mandate and capabilities in a new Bureau for Conflict and Stabilization Operations. It
also states that the State Department anticipates presenting Congress with a request for funds to
support an in-depth, two-year plan currently being formulated to expand and strengthen the
Civilian Response Corps’ active and standby components. Finally, it proposes replacing plans for
a Civilian Reserve Corps (CRC), modeled after the military reserves and national guard, with an
“expert roster” of private citizens who collectively possess a broad range of technical expertise
and experience necessary for dealing with complex crises.
The 112th Congress’s consideration of the terms of future FY2011 funding, particularly proposals
for a possible reversion to FY2008 funding levels, may affect the future of S/CRS and the civilian
response capability. In FY2008, S/CRS and the CRC received their first funding. This funding
was provided in supplemental, not regular, appropriations, and the level of these FY2008 start-up
funds was considerably below the FY2010-FY2011 level. (See the section on “Initial CRC
Funding: FY2008 and FY2009,” below, for details on those funds.)
This report provides background on these issues. It also discusses proposals and tracks related
legislative action. It will be updated as warranted.
Background
Former President George W. Bush’s pledge, articulated in his February 2, 2005, State of the
Union address, “to build and preserve a community of free and independent nations, with
governments that answer to their citizens, and reflect their own cultures” cast the once-discredited
concept of building or rebuilding government institutions, economies, and civic cultures in a new
light. During the 1990s, many policymakers considered the establishment of new institutions in
2 Department of State and U.S. Agency for International Development, Leading Through Civilian Power: The First
Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review, December 2010. See pp. 135-136, and 144-145,
http://www.state.gov/s/dmr/qddr/. Hereinafter referred to as QDDR.
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troubled countries to be an overly expensive, if not futile exercise. The use of U.S. military forces
for such activities, particularly in the first half of the decade, was troubling to many members.
The Bush Administration, in response to concerns about the threats posed by weak and fragile
states, reframed both U.S. security and international development policy and initiated dramatic
corresponding changes in U.S. governmental structures and practices. These changes, the Bush
Administration argued, would enable the United States to perform such tasks more efficiently and
at a lesser cost, particularly in transitions from conflict and in post-conflict situations.
A key component of these changes was the establishment and reinforcement of new civilian
structures and forces, in particular S/CRS and the civilian response/reserve corps. The Bush
Administration made these new civilian entities a prominent feature in two initiatives: the
National Security Presidential Directive 44 (NSPD-44) of December 2005 on the management of
interagency reconstruction and stabilization operations and the “transformational diplomacy”
reorganization of State Department personnel and practices announced in January 2006.
These initiatives were intended to enhance the United States’ ability to function effectively on the
world scene in the environment. created by the terrorist attacks on the United States of September
11, 2001 (9/11). In that environment, many analysts perceive that the greatest threats to U.S.
security often will emerge within states that are either too weak to police their territory or lack the
political will or capacity to do so. To deal with that environment, in 2006 former Secretary of
State Condeleezza Rice outlined a new U.S. foreign policy strategy focusing on the “intersections
of diplomacy, democracy promotion, economic reconstruction and military security” and
involving extensive changes in government to carry that strategy out.3 State-building (or nation-
building as it is often called) was at the center of this strategy. Both initiatives reinforced the
important role that the Bush Administration gave S/CRS in policymaking and implementation
dealing with conflict transitions and weak and fragile states.
Evolving Perceptions of Post-Conflict Needs4
The creation of S/CRS in July 2004 responded to increasing calls for the improvement of U.S.
civilian capabilities to plan and carry out post-conflict state-building operations. Several factors
combined after 9/11 to lead many analysts to conclude that such operations are vital to U.S.
security and that the United States must reorganize itself to conduct them effectively, in particular
by creating new and improving existing civilian institutions to carry them out. Foremost among
these factors, for many analysts, was the widespread perception since 9/11 that global instability
directly threatens U.S. security and that it is a vital U.S. interest to transform weak and failing
states into stable, democratic ones. Related to this was the expectation that responding to the
threat of instability will require the United States and the international community to intervene
periodically in foreign conflicts with “peacekeeping”5 and “stabilization” forces at about the same
3 Taken from a speech delivered by then-Secretary of State Condeleeza Rice. Remarks at Georgetown School of
Foreign Service, January 18, 2006. Available at http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2006/59306.htm. This theme was
reiterated by Stephen Krasner, director of Policy Planning at the State Department. Remarks at the Center for Global
Development, January 20, 2006. Available at http://www.cgdev.org/doc/event%20docs/Krasner%20Transcript.pdf.
4 Parts of this Background section and the following section on S/CRS are drawn from a now archived CRS Report
RS22031, Peacekeeping and Post-Conflict Capabilities: The State Department’s Office for Reconstruction and
Stabilization, by Nina M. Serafino and Martin A. Weiss.
5 “Peacekeeping” is a broad, generic, and often imprecise term to describe the many activities that the United Nations
and other international organizations, and sometimes ad hoc coalitions of nations or individual nations, undertake to
promote, maintain, enforce, or enhance the possibilities for peace. These activities range from providing election
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intensive pace as it had done since the early 1990s. Because that pace stressed the U.S. military,
many policymakers believed that the United States must create and enhance civilian capabilities
to carry out the peacebuilding tasks that are widely viewed as necessary for stability and
reconstruction in fragile, conflict-prone, and post-conflict states. Finally, numerous analyses
distilling years of experience with multifaceted peacekeeeping and peacebuilding operations
raised hopes that rapid, comprehensive, and improved peacebuilding efforts could significantly
raise the possibilities of achieving sustainable peace.
Post-conflict operations are complex undertakings, usually involving the participation of several
United Nations departments and U.N. system agencies, the international financial institutions, and
a plethora of non-governmental humanitarian and development organizations, as well as the
military and other departments or ministries of the United States and other nations.6 The United
States developed its contributions to the earliest international “peacekeeping” operations of the
1990s on an ad hoc basis, with little interagency planning and coordination, and often with the
U.S. military in the lead. The military was called upon to perform such missions not only for its
extensive resources but also because no other U.S. government agency could match the military’s
superior planning and organizational capabilities. In addition, because of its manpower, the
military carried out most of the U.S. humanitarian and nation-building contribution, even though
some believed that civilians might be better suited to carry out such tasks, especially those tasks
involving cooperation with humanitarian NGOs.
During the 1990s, many analysts began to perceive the need to improve and increase civilian
contributions to peacekeeping operations, especially for those activities related to planning and
conducting operations and to establishing a secure environment. An important Clinton
Administration initiative was the May 1997 Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 56, entitled
The Clinton Administration’s Policy on Managing Complex Contingency Operations. According
to the white paper explaining it, PDD 56 sought to address interagency planning and coordination
problems through new planning and implementing mechanisms.7 Due to what some analysts
describe as internal bureaucratic resistance, PDD 56’s provisions were never formally
implemented, although some of its practices were informally adopted. (In December 2005,
President Bush issued National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD) 44, which replaced PDD-
(...continued)
observers, recreating police or civil defense forces for the new governments of those countries, organizing and
providing security for humanitarian relief efforts, and monitoring and enforcing cease-fires and other arrangements
designed to separate parties recently in conflict. (Many of these activities are often also referred to as “nation-building”;
a better term, some analysts suggest, is “state-building.”) As used here, the term encompasses both “peace
enforcement” operations, sent to enforce an international mandate to establish peace, and “peacebuilding” activities.
Peacebuilding activities, usually undertaken in a post-conflict environment, are designed to strengthen peace and
prevent the resumption or spread of conflict, including disarmament and demobilization of warring parties, repatriation
of refugees, reform and strengthening of government institutions, election-monitoring, and promotion of political
participation and human rights.
6 The term “post-conflict stabilization and reconstruction” is broad but is usually understood to encompass tasks and
missions to promote security and encourage stable, democratic governance and economic growth following major
hostilities. In the past, many of the “stabilization” activities were loosely labeled “peacekeeping.” Reconstruction
involves repairing (in some cases creating) the infrastructure necessary to support long-term economic growth and
development. This infrastructure can be physical (e.g., roads and schools), or institutional (e.g., legal and tax systems)
For additional background on various aspects of post-conflict reconstruction and assistance, see CRS Report RL33557,
Peacekeeping and Related Stability Operations: Issues of U.S. Military Involvement, by Nina M. Serafino; and CRS
Report RL33700, United Nations Peacekeeping: Issues for Congress, by Marjorie Ann Browne.
7 The Clinton Administration’s Policy on Managing Complex Contingency Operations: Presidential Decision
Directive. May 1997. http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/pdd56.htm.
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56. For more information, see below.) The Clinton Administration also attempted to remedy the
shortage of one critical nation-building tool, international civilian police forces, through PDD 71,
which a white paper describes as outlining policy guidelines for strengthening criminal justice
systems in support of peace operations.8 While never implemented by the Clinton Administration,
PDD 71 has been partially put into force by the Bush Administration.9
Improvements in the provision of social and economic assistance were also viewed as crucial to
successful outcomes. Post-conflict populations need “safety net” and poverty alleviation
programs, as well as technical assistance and advice on monetary and fiscal policy and debt
management in order to create an environment conducive to democratization and economic
growth.10 While the popular image of U.S. post-conflict assistance is the post-World War II
Marshall Plan, through which the United States provided the foreign assistance needed for
Europe’s post-conflict reconstruction, the United States is no longer the sole, and often not the
dominant, donor in post-conflict situations. Multilateral institutions became increasingly
important during the 1990s, when small, regional conflicts proliferated following the collapse of
the Soviet Union.
International organizations such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund now
play crucial roles, working with the U.S. government to provide economic assistance and
technical advice on rebuilding post-conflict economies. (Nevertheless, although the United States
has provided some funding for economic reconstruction multilaterally for the recent Afghanistan
and Iraq operations, most U.S. funding for post-conflict operations is provided bilaterally.) Many
analysts now judge that multilateral assistance is more effective for the recipient country than
bilateral aid for two reasons.11 First, disbursing funds multilaterally through U.N. agencies or
international organizations gives greater assurance that it will reach recipients than providing aid
bilaterally with direct payments to individual governments or non-governmental organizations
(NGOs). In addition, analysts find that bilateral aid is more likely to be apportioned according to
the donor’s foreign policy priorities rather than the economic needs of the recipient country.12
For many analysts and policymakers, the ongoing Iraq operation has illustrated a U.S.
government need for new planning and coordination arrangements that would provide a
leadership role for civilians in post-conflict phases of military operations and new civilian
capabilities to augment and relieve the military as soon as possible, and greater international
coordination. The perception of a continued need for such operations, and the perceived
inefficiencies of the still largely ad hoc U.S. responses have reinvigorated calls for planning and
coordination reform. The extreme stresses placed on the U.S. military by combat roles in Iraq and
8 U.S. Text: The Clinton Administration White Paper on Peace Operations. February 24, 2000, http://www.fas.org/irp/
offdocs/pdd/pdd-71-4.htm, hereinafter referred to as PDD-71 White Paper; and U.S. Text: Summary of Presidential
Decision Directive 71, http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/pdd/pdd-71-1.htm.
9 See CRS Report RL32321, Policing in Peacekeeping and Related Stability Operations: Problems and Proposed
Solutions, by Nina M. Serafino.
10 Collier, Paul and Hoeffler, Anke “Aid, Policy and Growth in Post-Conflict Societies,” World Bank Working Paper,
October 2002.
11 Milner, Helen, “Why Multilateralism? Foreign Aid and Domestic Principal Agent Problems,” available at
http://www.wcfia.harvard.edu/seminars/pegroup/milner.pdf, and Schiavo-Campo, S., “Financing and Aid
Arrangements In Post-Conflict Situations,” World Bank Working Paper, May 2003.
12 Alesina, Alberto and Dollar, David, “Who Gives Foreign Aid to Whom and Why?” NBER Working Paper No.
w6612, June 1998.
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Afghanistan have pushed those calls in a new direction, to the development of adequate civilian
capabilities to perform those tasks.
Calls for Change
The perception that international terrorism can exploit weak, unstable states convinced many
policymakers and analysts of the need to strengthen U.S. and international capabilities to foster
security, good governance and economic development, especially in post-conflict situations. The
9/11 Commission and the Commission on Weak States and U.S. National Security found that
weak states, as well as unsuccessful post-conflict transitions, pose a threat to U.S. security.13
These groups argued that such states often experience economic strife and political instability that
make them vulnerable to drug trafficking, human trafficking and other criminal enterprises, and to
linkage with non-state terrorist groups (such as the links between the previous Taliban
government in Afghanistan and the Al Qaeda terrorist network). Weak states also are unprepared
to handle major public health issues, such as HIV/AIDS, that can generate political and economic
instability.14 These commissions, and other analysts, argued for assistance to the governments of
weak states and of post-conflict transitions regimes to help them control their territories, meet
their citizens’ basic needs, and create legitimate governments based on effective, transparent
institutions.
These and other studies recognized a need to enhance U.S. government structures and capabilities
for conducting post-conflict operations.15 Although differing in several respects, the studies
largely agreed on five points: (1) the ad hoc system needs to be replaced with a permanent
mechanism for developing contingency plans and procedures for joint civil-military operations
led by civilians; (2) mechanisms to rapidly deploy U.S. civilian government and government-
contracted personnel need to be put in place; (3) preventive action needs to be considered; (4) the
U.S. government needs to enhance multinational capabilities to carry out post-conflict security
tasks and to better coordinate international aid; and (5) flexible funding arrangements are needed
to deal with such situations. In addition, some urged substantial amounts of funding for flexible
U.S. and international accounts.16
13 The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States,
New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 2004, and On the Brink: A Report of the Commission on Weak States and US
National Security, sponsored by the Center for Global Development, May 2004. Also see CRS Report RL34253, Weak
and Failing States: Evolving Security Threats and U.S. Policy, by Liana Sun Wyler.
14 Prins, Gwyn, “AIDS and Global Security,” International Affairs, vol. 80, Issue 5, 2004.
15 The reports are (1) Play to Win: The Final Report of the Bi-partisan Commission on Post-Conflict Reconstruction,
Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) and the Association of the U.S. Army (AUSA), 2003 (a book-
length version was published in mid-2004, Winning the Peace: An American Strategy for Post-Conflict Reconstruction,
Robert C. Orr, ed.); (2) Clark A. Murdock, Michèle A. Flournoy, Christopher A. Williams, and Kurt M. Campbell,
principal authors. Beyond Goldwater-Nichols: Defense Reform for a New Strategic Era Phase I Report, CSIS, March
2004; (3) Hans Binnendijk and Stuart Johnson, eds. Transforming for Stabilization and Reconstruction Operations,
National Defense University Center for Technology and National Security Policy, April 2004, (4) On the Brink: Weak
States and US National Security, Center for Global Development, May 2004; Office of the Under Secretary of Defense
for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics. Defense Science Board 2004 Summer Study on Transition to and From
Hostilities, December 2004; and In the Wake of War: Improving U.S. Post-Conflict Capabilities, Washington, D.C.:
Council on Foreign Relations, Report of an Independent Task Force, July 2005.
16 The July 2005 Council on Foreign Relations report recommends the establishment of a conflict response fund of
$500 million, a five-fold increase over the amount requested by the Bush Administration for FY2006. In addition, the
report recommends establishing a new $1 billion standing multilateral reconstruction trust fund under the auspices of
the Group of Eight industrialized nations. This trust fund would be modeled on existing post-conflict trust funds located
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Proposals for New Civilian Forces
A prominent feature of several of the reports on stabilization and reconstruction operations was a
recommendation to develop rapidly deployable civilian forces to undertake state-building
functions, particularly those related to rule of law, even before hostilities had ceased. Many
analysts view the early deployment of rule of law personnel as essential to providing security
from the outset of an operation, which they argue will enhance the possibilities for long-term
stability and democracy in an intervened or post-conflict country. Many view the development of
civilian groups to do so as permitting the earlier withdrawal of military personnel than would
otherwise be possible.
The concept of a cohesive, rapidly deployable unit of civilian experts for stabilization and
reconstruction operations dates back at least to the Clinton Administration. In PDD-71, which
dealt with strengthening criminal justice systems in peace operations, the Clinton Administration
identified such an initiative as a high priority, according to the PDD-71 White Paper.17 Six studies
between 2003 and 2005 endorsed the creation of cohesive, rapidly deployable units of civilian
experts for stabilization and reconstruction operations. These include a 2003 report of the
National Defense University (NDU);18 a March 2004 report of the Center for Strategic and
International Studies (CSIS);19 an April 2004 report of the U.S. Institute of Peace (USIP);20 a
book by a USIP analyst;21and the Defense Science Board 2004 Summer Study on transitions from
hostilities.22
Critics Respond
Some analysts have questioned the utility of S/CRS and of the rationale that underlines its
creation and the adoption of the transformational diplomacy strategy more broadly. Two think-
tank studies published in January 2006 dispute the concept that weak and failed states are per se
among the most significant threats to the United States. They point out that weak states are not
the only locations where terrorists have found recruits or sought safe-haven as they have
exploited discontent and operated in developed countries as well. A report of the Center for
Global Development states that many factors beyond the weakness or lack of government
institutions—demographic, political, religious, cultural, and geographic—contribute to the
development of terrorism.23 As a result, an emphasis on weak and failed states can lead the United
(...continued)
at the United Nations and the World Bank.
17 That white paper states that PDD 71 instructed that “programs must be developed that enable the U.S. to respond
quickly to help establish rudimentary judicial and penal capacity during peace operations and complex contingencies.”
PDD-71 White Paper, op. cit., p. 6.
18 Transforming for Stabilization and Reconstruction Operations, op.cit.
19 Beyond Goldwater-Nichols: Defense Reform for a New Strategic Era, Phase 1 Report, op.cit. See pp. 64-65.
20 Robert M. Perito, Michael Dziedzic and Beth C. DeGrasse, Building Civilian Capacity for U.S. Stability Operations.
Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, Special Report 118, April 2004.
21 Robert M. Perito, Where is the Lone Ranger When We Need Him? America’s Search for a Postconflict Stability
Force. Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2004. See pp 323-337 for an extensive discussion of
this proposal.
22 Transition to and From Hostilities, op.cit., p 58.
23 Patrick Stewart. Weak States and Global Threats: Assessing Evidence of “Spillovers.” Working Paper No. 73, Center
for Global Development, January 2006.
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States to give short shrift to more tangible threats and to areas of greater U.S. interest. The CATO
Institute study worries that former Secretary Rice’s focus on promoting “responsible sovereignty”
as an underpinning of transformational diplomacy may provide potential justification for eroding
the current international norm of respect for national sovereignty, leading the United States into
fruitless interventions.24
In addition, some analysts are skeptical that the problems of weak and failed states can be most
dealt with through military and political interventions aimed at creating viable government
institutions. The effectiveness of past efforts is a subject of debate, with differing views on the
criteria for and the number of successes, draws, and failures, as is the best means to achieve
success.
There is some skepticism that state-building efforts will result in success in most instances. In the
words of one scholar, “barring exceptional circumstances (the war against the Taliban after 9/11),
we had best steer clear of missions that deploy forces (of whatever kind) into countries to remake
them anew.... The success stories (Germany, Japan) are the exceptions and were possible because
of several helpful conditions that will not be replicated elsewhere.”25 Others, however, point to
cases such as Mozambique and El Salvador as examples that state-building efforts can promote
peace after civil strife.
Creating Civilian Reconstruction and Stabilization Capabilities:
Congressional and Executive Actions, 2004-2007
The “Lugar-Biden” Legislation
On February 25, 2004, Senators Lugar and Biden introduced the Stabilization and Reconstruction
Civilian Management Act of 2004 “to build operational readiness in civilian agencies.” (At the
time, these senators were respectively the chairman and ranking member of the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee [SFRC].) The bill provided concrete proposals for establishing and funding
the two new “operational” entities that had been recommended in think tank reports. This
legislation contained three main proposals: (1) establish in law and fund a State Department
Office for Stabilization and Reconstruction, (2) create an Emergency Response Readiness Force,
and (3) create and fund an annually replenishable emergency response fund similar to that used
for refugee and migration funds.26 The SFRC reported S. 2127 on March 18, 2004, but it was not
24 Justin Logan and Christopher Preble. Failed States and Flawed Logic: The Case against a Standing Nation-Building
Office. CATO Policy Analysis Paper No. 560, Cato Institute, January 11, 2006. The authors make substantial reference
to a Fall 2004 paper by Stephen Krasner, State Department Director of Policy Planning, that challenged the
conventional sovereignty norms. Krasner argues that these norms are outmoded and an obstacle to dealing with the
international threats caused by weak and unstable states. He argues for granting international acceptance to new norms
of shared-sovereignty (more than one country) or international trusteeships following successful interventions, Stephen
Krasner, “Sharing Sovereignty,” International Security, Vol. 28, No. 4, Spring 2004, pp. 5-43.
25 Rajan Menon, “Low Intensity Conflict in the Emerging Strategic Environment,” as reproduced in U.S. Army
Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute. Strategic Requirements for Stability Operations and Reconstruction:
Final Report. pp. 80-81. This report summarizes the result of a conference held April 19-20, 2006, and three preceding
workshops, conducted under the aegis of the Dwight D. Eisenhower National Security Series. It also reproduces several
papers presented at one workshop. The final report was distributed by e-mail in late 2006, but as of January 18, 2007,
does not appear on either the PKSOI or Eisenhower Series website.
26 The emergency response fund would have been subject to limited conditions, but requiring extensive consultation
with Congress, similar to spending authority provisions of Section 614 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as
(continued...)
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considered by the full Senate; its companion bill (H.R. 3996, 108th Congress, introduced by
Representative Schiff) was not considered by the House International Relations Committee. In
subsequent years, similar legislation was introduced,27 but until 2008 the only bill to pass either
chamber was a subsequent Lugar-Biden measure, the Reconstruction and Stabilization Civilian
Management Act of 2006 (S. 3322/109th Congress). S. 3322 was introduced in the Senate May
26, 2006, and approved without amendment by unanimous consent the same day. It was received
by the House on June 6, 2006, and referred to the House International Relations Committee. No
further action occurred until the 110th Congress until the House passage of on March 5, 2008, of a
House bill with almost the same title, the Reconstruction and Stabilization Civilian Management
Act of 2008 (H.R. 1084) , and the incorporation of a version of that bill into the conference
version of the FY2009 NDAA, (S. 3001, P.L. 110-417, see below).
S/CRS Start-Up and Early Congressional Mandate
S/CRS began operations in July 2004 on a somewhat more tentative status than that envisioned
by the Lugar-Biden bill. The office was created by then-Secretary of State Colin Powell without
statutory authority, and the coordinator, appointed by the Secretary, was not given the rank of
“Ambassador-at-Large.” By the beginning of 2005, S/CRS had a staff of 37 individuals from the
State Department, USAID, and several other U.S. government agencies, including the
Departments of Defense, Commerce, and the Treasury.
The U.S. military supported S/CRS’s creation and its mission. In prepared statement for
testimony before the Armed Services committees in February 2005, General Richard B. Myers,
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, cited the creation of S/CRS as “an important step” in
helping “post-conflict nations achieve peace, democracy, and a sustainable market economy.” “In
the future, provided this office is given appropriate resources, it will synchronize military and
civilian efforts and ensure an integrated national approach is applied to post-combat
peacekeeping, reconstruction and stability operations,” according to General Myers.28
(...continued)
amended. FAA Section 614(a)(3) requires the President to consult with and provide a written policy justification to the
House Committee on Foreign Affairs (now International Relations), the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, and
the Appropriations committee of each chamber. CBO estimated that implementing the bill would cost some $50 million
in 2005 and $550 million from 2005 through 2009.
27 These include two similar versions of the original Lugar-Biden bill with same name: the Stabilization and
Reconstruction Civilian Management Act of 2005 (S. 209/109th Congress, by Senators Lugar, Biden, and Hagel), and
of 2006 (S. 3322/109th Congress by Senators Lugar, Biden, Hagel, Alexander and Warner, and H.R. 6104/109th
Congress by Representatives Farr, Blumenaurer and Saxton). Similar provisions were included in Title VII of the
Senate version of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act for FY2006 and FY2007 (S. 600/109th Congress). A related
bill was the International Security Enhancement Act of 2005 (H.R. 1361/109th Congress, introduced by Representative
Dreier), which also would provide authority for preventive action not included in the other bills. (H.R. 1361 would
have allowed the president, acting through S/CRS, to authorize the deployment to a country likely to enter into conflict
or civil strife in addition to countries emerging from conflict.) Related bills were: The Winning the Peace Act of 2003
(H.R. 2616/108th Congress, introduced by Representative Farr); the International Security Enhancement Act of 2004
(H.R. 4185/108th Congress, introduced by Representative Dreier); and the United States Assistance for Civilians
Affected by Conflict Act of 2004 (H.R. 4058/108th Congress, introduced by Representative Hyde).
28 Posture Statement of General Richard B. Myers, USAF, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, before the 109th
Congress. Senate Armed Services Committee, February 17, 2005, p. 31, as posted on the Senate Armed Services
Committee website.
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S/CRS also received an endorsement from a task force headed by two former members. The June
2005 report of the congressionally mandated Task Force on the United Nations, chaired by former
Speaker of the House of Representatives Newt Gingrich and former Senate Majority Leader
George Mitchell, recommended that the United States strengthen S/CRS and that Congress
provide it with the necessary resources to coordinate with the United Nations.29
2004 Congressional Mandate
Congress first endorsed the creation of S/CRS in 2004 as part of the Consolidated Appropriations
Act for FY2005 (H.R. 4818, P.L. 108-447), signed into law December 8, 2004. Section 408,
Division D, defined six responsibilities for the office, the first five of which respond to the first
need—to create a readily deployable crisis response mechanism—stated above. As legislated by
P.L. 108-447, S/CRS’s functions are (1) to catalogue and monitor the non-military resources and
capabilities of executive branch agencies, state and local governments, and private and non-profit
organizations “that are available to address crises in countries or regions that are in, or are in
transition from, conflict or civil strife”; (2) to determine the appropriate non-military U.S.
response to those crises, “including but not limited to demobilization, policy, human rights
monitoring, and public information efforts”; (3) to plan that response; (4) to coordinate the
development of interagency contingency plans for that response; (5) to coordinate the training of
civilian personnel to perform stabilization and reconstruction activities in response to crises in
such countries or regions”; and (6) to monitor political and economic instability worldwide to
anticipate the need for U.S. and international assistance. In subsequent legislation (S. 3001, P.L.
110-417, the Duncan Hunter National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009), Congress
expanded this list of functions. (See below.)
Congress funds S/CRS under the State Department’s Diplomatic and Consular Affairs budget.
S/CRS has received funding through annual appropriations and supplemental appropriations.
S/CRS Role in Interagency Coordination
The S/CRS role in interagency coordination was formalized under NSPD-44, issued by former
President Bush on December 7, 2005, to improve conflict-response coordination among executive
branch agencies. NSPD-44 assigns the Secretary of State the lead responsibility for developing
the civilian response for conflict situations and related S&R activities; the Secretary may direct
the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization to assist with those tasks. Under NSPD-44,
the Secretary of State is also responsible for, and may delegate to the Coordinator, coordination of
the interagency processes to identify states at risk, the leadership of interagency planning to
prevent or mitigate conflict, and the development of detailed contingency plans for stabilization
and reconstruction operations, as well as for identifying appropriate issues for resolution or action
through the National Security Council (NSC) interagency process as outlined in President Bush’s
first National Security Policy Directive (NSPD-1, “Organization of the National Security Council
System,” signed February 1, 200130). NSPD-44, entitled “Management of Interagency Efforts
29 American Interests and U.N. Reform: Report of the Task Force on the United Nations. Washington, DC: United
States Institute of Peace, June 2005, p. 25.
30 NSPD-1 established 17 NSC/PPCs to “be the main day-to-day fora for interagency coordination of national security
policy,” providing policy analysis for more senior committees (the NSC Principals Committee and the NSC Deputies
Committee) and ensuring timely responses to presidential decisions. Membership on the NSC/PCC is to consist of
representatives from the departments of State, Defense, Justice, and the Treasury, and the Office of Management and
(continued...)
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Concerning Reconstruction and Stabilization,” expanded S/CRS activities beyond those conferred
by the congressional mandate (see above). (NSPD-44 supersedes PDD-56, referred to above.)
S/CRS developed the mechanism for interagency cooperation in actual operations, drafting the
January 22, 2007, Interagency Management System (IMS) for Reconstruction and Stabilization,
which was approved by a National Security Council (NSC) deputies meeting. This document lays
out a plan for interagency coordination in responding to highly complex reconstruction and
stabilization crises. Under the IMS, the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization is one of
three co-chairs of the central coordinating body for the U.S. government response to a crisis. (The
others are the appropriate regional Assistant Secretary of State and the relevant NSC Director.)
Under the plan, S/CRS is charged with providing support to a civilian planning cell integrated
with relevant military entities (a geographic combatant command or an equivalent multinational
headquarters).
Codifying Civilian Reconstruction and Stabilization
Assistance and State Department Capabilities:
Title XVI, P.L. 110-417, October 14, 2008
The effort to expand civilian capabilities to perform stabilization and reconstruction tasks reached
an important benchmark in October 2008. Through Title XVI of the Duncan Hunter National
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009 (P.L. 110-417), Congress amended the basic
foreign assistance and State Department statutes to (1) authorize the President to provide
assistance for a reconstruction and stabilization crisis, (2) formally establish S/CRS and assign it
specific functions, and (3) authorize a Response Readiness Corps (RRC) and a Civilian Reserve
Corps (CRC). The authority to provide assistance for a reconstruction and stabilization crisis was
created by amending chapter 1 of part III of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended
(FAA, 22 U.S.C. 2734 et seq.) by inserting a new section. This authority is, however, subject to a
time limitation: it may be exercised only during FY2009-FY2011. The new authority for S/CRS,
the RRC and the CRC was created by amending Title I of the State Department Basic Authorities
Act of 1956 (22 U.S.C. 2651a et seq.). These authorities are permanent.
Authorizes Assistance for Reconstruction and Stabilization Crises
Under the heading Authority to Provide Assistance for Reconstruction and Stabilization Crises,
Section 1604 of P.L. 110-417 adds a new section to the FAA. Section 681 provides authority for
the President to use U.S. civilian agencies or non-federal employees to furnish assistance for
reconstruction and stabilization in order to prevent conflict and to secure peace. The specific
authority permits the President to “to assist in reconstructing and stabilizing a country or region
that is at risk of, in, or is in transition from, conflict or civil strife.” As passed in P.L. 110-417, this
authority may be exercised for three fiscal years (FY2009-FY2011).
(...continued)
Budget, the offices of the President and Vice President, the Central Intelligence Agency, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and
the NSC. Representatives from the Departments of Agriculture and Commerce, and the Office of the U.S. Trade
Representative, are to participate when issues pertain to their responsibilities.
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To provide such assistance, the President must determine that U.S. national security interests are
served by using such personnel. The President may use funds made available under any other
provision of the FAA that are transferred or reprogrammed for the purposes of this section,
subject to the 15-day prior notification to congress required by section 634A, FAA. The President
must also consult with and provide a written policy justification to Congress’s foreign affairs and
appropriations committees (under Section 614(a)(3), FAA) prior to its use. The assistance may be
provided notwithstanding any other provision of law, and on such terms and conditions as the
President may determine. The section does not provided authority “to transfer funds between
accounts or between Federal departments or agencies.”
Makes S/CRS a Permanent State Department Office and Assigns Specific
Functions
A major objective of proponents of improving the civilian capacity to perform stabilization and
reconstruction operations was to provide S/CRS with a permanent authorization and specified
functions mandated by law. Such an authorization was a key feature of the initial and subsequent
versions of the Lugar-Biden legislation. P.L. 110-417, Section 1605, codifies the existence of
S/CRS by amending Title 1 of the State Department Basic Authorities Act of 1956 (22 U.S.C.
2651 et seq.), which, among other functions, provides for the establishment of the higher level
positions within the Department of State. This codification prevents the dismantling of the office
without the legislative consent of Congress. It also assigns nine specific functions to S/CRS,31
largely mirroring the functions assigned by Congress in its original legislation on S/CRS, as cited
above. In general, these functions convey on the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization
an overall responsibility for monitoring and assessing political and economic instability, and
planning an appropriate U.S. response. Some of these functions are to be undertaken in
coordination or conjunction with USAID and other relevant executive branch agencies.
Authorizes a Civilian Response Readiness Corps and a Civilian Reserve Corps
Civilian personnel available through the U.S. government to perform S&R activities are scarce,
decentralized in organization, and difficult to call up. Many analysts viewed the remedy to this
31 The specific functions, as detailed in P.L. 110-417, Section 1605, are (1) “Monitoring, in coordination with relevant
bureaus within the Department of State and the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), political
and economic instability worldwide to anticipate the need for mobilizing United States and international assistance for
the stabilization and reconstruction of a country or region that is at risk of, in, or ... in transition from, conflict or civil
strife”; (2) “Assessing the various types of stabilization and reconstruction crises that could occur and cataloging and
monitoring the non-military resources and capabilities of agencies ... that are available to address such crises”;
(3) “Planning, in conjunction with USAID, to address requirements, such as demobilization, rebuilding of civil society,
policing, human rights monitoring, and public information, that commonly arise in stabilization and reconstruction
crises”; (4) “Coordinating with relevant agencies to develop interagency contingency plans to mobilize and deploy
civilian personnel to address the various types of such crises”; (5) “Entering into appropriate arrangements with
agencies to carry out activities under this section and the Reconstruction and Stabilization Civilian Management Act of
2008”; (6) “Identifying personnel in State and local governments and in the private sector who are available to
participate in the Civilian Reserve Corps ... or to otherwise participate in or contribute to reconstruction and
stabilization activities”; (7) “Taking steps to ensure that training of civilian personnel to perform such reconstruction
and stabilization activities is adequate and, is carried out, as appropriate, with other agencies involved with stabilization
operations”; (8) “Taking steps to ensure that plans for United States reconstruction and stabilization operations are
coordinated with and complementary to reconstruction and stabilization activities of other governments and
international and nongovernmental organizations, to improve effectiveness and avoid duplication”; and
(9) “Maintaining the capacity to field on short notice an evaluation team to undertake on-site needs assessment.”
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situation as the creation of a corps of “on-the-ground” civilian personnel which could develop and
implement state-building activities and interact with U.S. military personnel at all levels in order
to foster security and stability in troubled situations. From the beginning, Luger\Biden legislation
sought to authorize the establishment of such a corps. The Bush Administration began creating a
small response cadre of government employees in its FY2006 and FY2007 budget submissions,
and proposed a full-scale corps in its February 2008 Civilian Stabilization Initiative.32
P.L. 110-417 establishes the Response Readiness Corps and the Civilian Reserve Corps “to
provide assistance in support of stabilization and reconstruction activities in foreign countries or
regions that are at risk of, in, or are in transition from, conflict or civil strife.”
[Note that the terminology for this “surge” capability differs in the legislation from that used by
the Bush and Obama Administration in naming its components. The Obama Administration
combines the Civilian Response Readiness Corps and the Civilian Reserve Corps into one
“Civilian Response Corps” (CRC) with three components. The Obama Administration’s CRC
active and standby units (CRC-A and CRC-S) correspond to this legislation’s Civilian Response
Readiness Corps, and the reserve component (CRC-R) corresponds to this legislation’s Civilian
Reserve Corps.]
This civilian capability consists of two components:
• The Response Readiness Corps (RRC) of federal employees composed of active
and standby components consisting of U.S. government personnel, including
employees of the Department of State, USAID, and other agencies who are
recruited and trained to provide reconstruction and stabilization assistance when
deployed to do so by the Secretary of State. No specific number is provided for
members of these components. The legislation notes that members of the active
component would be specifically employed to serve in the Corps. The Secretary
of State is authorized to establish and maintain the SRC, in consultation with the
Administrator of USAID and the heads of other appropriate U.S. government
agencies. The Secretary of State alone is authorized to deploy its members.
• The Civilian Reserve Corps (CRC) of individuals with “the skills necessary for
carrying out reconstruction and stabilization activities, and who have volunteered
for that purpose.” The Secretary is authorized to establish the Corps in
consultation with the Administrator of USAID, and is authorized to employ and
train its members, as well as to deploy them subject to a presidential
determination under the proposed Section 618 of the Foreign Assistance Act of
1961, as amended. No size was specified for the Civilian Reserve Corp. For the
Corps to deploy, the President must issue a determination that U.S. national
security interests would be served by providing assistance for a reconstruction
and stabilization crisis (see above).
32 In its FY2006 and FY2007 budget requests, the Bush Administration’s budget proposed funding for S/CRS to
establish a 100-person ready-response cadre of government employees. In 2007, Congress approved $50 million in
supplemental funds (available through FY2008) to establish and maintain a civilian reserve corps, the release of these
funds was made contingent on a subsequent authorization of the corps. (Section 3810, [U.S. Troop Readiness,
Veterans’ Care, Katrina Recovery, and Iraq Accountability Appropriations Act, 2007, H.R. 2206, P.L. 110-28, signed
into law May 25, 2007.)
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Development of the S/CRS Office, Responsibilities,
and Capabilities
Since 2004, S/CRS has worked to develop the knowledge, capacity, and procedures to ably
respond to the needs of countries at risk of conflict, in transitions from conflict, and in the early
stages of recovery from conflict. S/CRS has slowly grown from a few dozen to a staff of 175, as
of January 27, 2010. Of that staff, a little under half are State Department personnel: 30 Foreign
Service officers, 45 State Department permanent civil service employees, and one additional State
Department person on detail from another State office. Eleven others are on detail from other
executive branch agencies: Justice (1); Office of the Director of National Intelligence (1); USAID
(3); DOD (3); Army Corps of Engineers (1); the Department of Agriculture (1); and the
Department of Health and Human Services (1). In addition, 80 contract employees work for
S/CRS, as do eight fellows and interns. S/CRS carries out a wide range of activities: monitoring
potential conflict, planning for U.S. responses to conflict, and evaluating and initiating programs
to prevent conflict or the spread of conflict, among others.
Monitoring and Planning for Potential Conflicts
To monitor potential crises, S/CRS asked the National Intelligence Council (NIC) to provide it
twice a year with a list of weak states most susceptible to crisis, from which S/CRS chooses one
or more as test cases to prepare contingency plans for possible interventions. S/CRS also has
worked with the USAID Office of Conflict Management and Mitigation, which develops
techniques for preparing highly detailed assessments of current and impending conflicts. In
addition, S/CRS has worked with the U.S. military’s Joint Forces Command (JFCOM) to develop
a common civilian-military planning model for stabilization and reconstruction operations.
S/CRS also assists U.S. embassies abroad in assessing the potential for conflict in individual
countries.
Developing and Carrying Out Conflict Response Activities
S/CRS takes a lead in planning, developing, and implementing many small conflict response
programs. From FY2006 through FY2009, S/CRS used funds provided under DOD’s “Section
1207” to carry out conflict prevention and response efforts in 14 individual countries and other
countries in Southeast Asia and the Trans-Sahara region. 33 In the wake of the January 2010
earthquake in Haiti, S/CRS has played a supporting role to USAID’s humanitarian relief effort.
Well before Congress authorized the creation of a Civilian Response Corps (see below), S/CRS
took the first steps in the lengthy process of creating integrated and coherent groups of crisis-
response personnel from executive branch agencies. In 2006, S/CRS created, as a pilot project, a
small nucleus of active and retired government employees to deploy to operations. S/CRS began
deploying members of the active response component during the last half of 2006. In 2006, ARC
members were deployed to Darfur, Lebanon, Chad, and Nepal. About 10 other deployments
33 For more on this program, and funding details, see CRS Report RS22871, Department of Defense “Section 1207”
Security and Stabilization Assistance: Background and Congressional Concerns, FY2006-FY2010, by Nina M.
Serafino.
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followed, some with standby component members and other members of the S/CRS staff.
Subsequent deployments to many other countries followed.34
In 2010, S/CRS and the CRC carried out three primary missions, conducted in Afghanistan,
Kyrgyzstan, and Sudan.
• As of August 2010, there were 26 S/CRS and CRC staff in Afghanistan
providing support to the government of Afghanistan in implementing the Afghan
National Development Strategy, to coalition military regional commands, and to
communications and elections efforts. Personnel deployed in Afghanistan are
supported by a 15-person Afghan Engagement Team at S/CRS in Washington,
D.C., which also supports other agencies’ efforts in Afghanistan, including the
Office of the Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan, regional
bureaus, regional combatant commands, and partner nations.
• In February 2010, S/CRS staff deployed to Kyrgyzstan at the request of the State
Department’s South and Central Asia Bureau to provide assessment and planning
support for the development of a five-year strategic plan for the country. After the
April overthrow of the government, S/CRS supported efforts that led to a six-
month interagency stabilization strategy, and then deployed 18 of its personnel
and 17 CRC members to help implement the strategy. S/CRS and the CRC also
provide support to a wide variety of other U.S. activities involving elections,
strategic communications, stabilization and conflict-mitigation assistance, and
economic and trade assessments and advice, as well as to the Organization for
Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) efforts.
• Beginning in April 2010, six S/CRS planners, accompanied at times by USAID
staff, supported the election preparation work of the U.S. Special Envoy to Sudan
as that office prepared for the January 2011 referendum on self-determination in
Southern Sudan, as well as other support to the special envoy and to U.S.
government interagency groups working on Sudan. As of January 11, 2011, there
were 15 Washington D.C.-based personnel (6 S/CRS and 9 CRC) engaged in
Sudan work.
Other Activities
To address the need for greater interagency, particularly civil-military, planning and coordination,
S/CRS worked with the military entities to develop civilian-military training exercises for
stabilization and reconstruction operations. It has entered into an agreement with the U.S. Army
34 The first active response component member was deployed to Lebanon, to assist with efforts to train and equip
additional Lebanese Internal Security (LIS) forces. (The purpose of this effort was to enhance LIS ability to replace the
Lebanese Army Forces, which had been maintaining law and order in conflictive areas such as the Bekaa Valley before
being deployed to southern Lebanon.) Several standby response component members also deployed to post-conflict
situations in 2006. The first person from this group was deployed to eastern Chad and two more began working in
Nepal on demobilizing and reintegrating Maoist rebels. In the course of early 2007, several active component members
deployed to Kosovo to help prepare for the status settlement process, one deployed to Beirut to help coordinate
reconstruction assistance, and one to Chad to monitor activities on the Chad side of the border with Sudan. Other
response corps deployments were to Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Cuba, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Georgia,
Haiti, Iraq, Liberia, and Sri Lanka, as well as to work with the U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM). Original plans had
called for the ARC to number 30 by the end of 2006. U.S. Department of State. Fact Sheet: State Department Stands
Up Active Response Corps. August 23, 2006; http://www.state.gov/s/crs/rls/71038.htm.
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to train civilian planners. And, among other activities, it has developed ties with other
international participants to coordinate and enhance civilian capabilities for stabilization and
reconstruction activities.
Current Development of the Civilian Response
Corps (CRC)
On July 16, 2008, then Secretary of State Rice formally launched the Civilian Response Corps
active and standby components with a speech thanking Congress for the passage of funding in the
Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2008, to establish the CRC. Under plans developed by the
Bush Administration (and continued by the Obama Administration) the three-component corps
would consist of a 250-member active component (CRC-A) of U.S. government employees who
could deploy within 48 hours, a 2,000-member standby component (CRC-S) of U.S. government
employees who could deploy within 30 days, and a 2,000-member reserve component (CRC-R)
of experts from other public institutions and the private sectors who would be available for
deployment in 45-60 days.
Under the leadership of S/CRS, two other State Department offices and eight other contributing
departments and agencies are now recruiting the first 100 members of the CRC-A, and 500
members of the standby component. Besides the State Department, contributors are USAID and
the Departments of Agriculture (USDA), Commerce, Justice, Health and Human Services (HHS),
Homeland Security (DHS), Treasury, and Transportation.
Initial CRC Funding: FY2008 and FY2009
As of May 7, 2009, the date the Obama Administration presented its detailed FY2010 budget
request, Congress had appropriated $140 million for the establishment and deployment of the
active and standby civilian response components. These FY2008 and FY2009 funds together
provided for the establishment of a 250-member active component and a 500-member standby
component.
In June 2008, Congress specifically provided $65 million for S/CRS and USAID S&R activities
in supplemental appropriations through the Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2008, P.L. 110-252,
signed into law June 30, 2008.35 Of that amount, up to $30 million was appropriated as FY2008
funds (under the State Department Diplomatic and Consular Programs account) for the State
Department “to establish and implement a coordinated civilian response capacity” and up to $25
million was appropriated to USAID as FY2008 supplemental funds for that agency to do the
same (122 Stat.2328-2329). The remaining $10 million was part of FY2009 supplemental bridge
fund appropriations for the State Department. (This appropriation was less than the $248.6
million that the Bush Administration requested in February 2008, for its CSI, which rolled into
one its request for funds for continued operations of S/CRS, funds for a 250-member interagency
CRC Active Response component and a 2,000-member Standby Response component, and a
2,000-member Civilian Reserve component, and money for deployment of experts.)
35 The $10 million in FY2009 bridge fund supplemental appropriations for the State Department was provided as part
of a lump sum for State Department diplomatic and consular programs.
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In March 2009, Congress provided $75 million in FY2009 appropriations to the newly created
Civilian Stabilization Initiative account in order to establish and support the CRC active and
standby components (Omnibus Appropriations Act, 2009, P.L. 111-8, signed into law March 11,
2009). This included $45 million in State Department funds and $30 million in USAID funds.
FY2010 Funding
The Obama Administration Request
The Obama Administration’s May 7, 2009, FY2010 budget request of $323.272 million for the
Civilian Stabilization Initiative (CSI) was designed to continue Bush Administration plans for the
establishment of a 4,250 member, three-component civilian response corps. According to the
State Department request for these funds, this CSI would provide “trained, equipped, and
mission-ready civilian experts and institutionalized systems to meet national security imperatives,
including in partnership with the U.S. Armed Forces.” This corps will enable the President and
Secretary of State “to react to unanticipated conflict in foreign countries” while reducing or
eliminating “the need for large military deployments in such crises,” according to the State
Department request.
The requested FY2010 CSI funding also was intended to support the continued development of
the CRC, including the establishment of a reserve component, which has yet to receive funds, and
provide for the institutional structure to coordinate interagency conflict response efforts. CRC
development requires not only recruitment and hiring, but the training and pre-positioning of
equipment for U.S. government response personnel. The State Department broke down the uses
of the requested $323 million as follows:
• $136.9 million to build and support an active component of 250 members and a
standby component of 2,000 members, to fund up to 1,000 members of the active
and standby component to deploy to S&R missions in FY2010;
• $63.6 million to establish a trained and equipped 2,000 member reserve
component that will draw other public and private sector experts into U.S. S&R
responses;
• $12.5 million to fund the deployment of other experts during the first three
months of an operation, “ensuring that critical staff such as police trainers and
advisors can be deployed when ... most needed”;
• $51.3 million to sustain deployed personnel and provide logistics for up to 130
responders for three months, including $7.1 million to operate and maintain a
civilian deployment center;
• $34.3 million to provide security for up to 130 civilian responders (in up to three
deployed field teams) in a semi-permissive environment for three months; and
• $24.7 million to augment Washington-area leadership, including 10 new
positions for S/CRS operations and staff.
The Obama Administration requested an additional $40 million in the Economic Support Fund
(ESF) account for Stabilization Bridge Funds (SBF) to provide for urgent on-the-ground needs
during the initial stages of a crisis. These funds could be used while other funds are
reprogrammed, transferred, or appropriated for the crisis. Under its “General Provisions” request,
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the Obama Administration asks authority to transfer SBF funds into the CSI account. In response,
Congress provided a $50 million “Complex Crisis Fund” under USAID. (See the section on
“Flexible Funding for S&R Operations,” below.)
Congress’s FY2010 Appropriations and Rescission
For FY2010, Congress provided $150 million for the CSI Active and Standby components in the
Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related programs Appropriations Act, 2010,
Division F of the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2010, (H.R. 3288, P.L. 111-117, signed into
law December 16, 2009). Of this, Congress provided $120 million to the State Department and
$30 million to USAID. It did not provide funding for the proposed reserve component. The P.L.
111-117 appropriations language requires USAID and the State Department to coordinate their
activities.
Congress specified that the CSI funds were provided to enable the State Department and USAID
to “support, maintain, mobilize, and deploy a Civilian Response Corps ... and for related
reconstruction and stabilization assistance to prevent or respond to conflict or civil strife in
foreign countries or regions, or to enable transitions from such strife” under Section 667 of the
FAA. These funds are available until expended.
The bill’s conference report (H.Rept. 111-366) mandated the allocations detailed below, in bold,
from the State Department’s funding. The State Department’s actual allocations, made after $70
million in rescissions,36 are indicated in italics.
• $21.0 million for active response component salaries, benefits, and other
personnel costs ($22.3 million).
• $15.2 million for Active and Standby Response Component training ($8.6
million).
• $25.0 million for equipment acquisition ($1.1 million).
• $26.7 million for deployments ($12.3 million).
• $8.0 million for operations support ($8.4 million).
• $21.1 million for S/CRS policy and planning functions ($27.2 million).
In addition, Congress established a new USAID Complex Crisis Fund with $50 million to
“support programs and activities to respond to emerging or unforeseen complex crises overseas.”
These funds are also available until expended.
36 Of the FY2010 CSI funds, Congress later rescinded $70 million—all $30 million of the USAID funding and $40
million from the State Department funding—in the FAA Air Transportation Modernization and Safety Improvement
Act, P.L. 111-226, Section 328b(1)and(2), signed into law August 10, 2010.
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Establishing the Civilian Response Corps Active Response
Component (CRC-A)
As originally planned by the Bush Administration, and contemplated by early plans of the Obama
Administration, the total number of personnel for the CRC-A was 250. By early 2010, the Obama
Administration contemplated a CRC-A of 247 members onboard, trained, and ready for
deployment as of the end of Y2010. This is nearly all the originally planned goal of 250 CRC-A
members. The planned distribution among the agencies participating at that time was State, 68;
USAID, 91; Justice, 62; USDA, 8; HHS, 5; Commerce, 5; DHS, 7; and Treasury, 1. This was to
be achieved by September 30, 2010. In mid-2010, however, S/CRS halted formation of the active
unit to rethink the appropriate distribution of specialties and, consequently, the necessary
contribution from each agency. It is still in the process of formulating a new division of labor for
the CRC-A. Meanwhile, the Treasury Department has withdrawn, and two new agencies—the
Department of Energy (DOE) and the Department of Transportation (DOT)—have been added.
The current number of CRC-A personnel is 135.
According to plans in 2009, the Civilian Response Corps would be composed of personnel filling
over 100 specific job specialties. The first 100 active component members would be hired
for roughly half of those specialties. These were to include 29 rule of law personnel dealing with
police, the judicial system, corrections, and human rights. Other personnel would be skilled in
commerce, finance, revenue and budgets; civil works and infrastructure; demobilization,
disarmament, and reintegration; security sector reform; agriculture; strategic communications;
health; drug enforcement; environment; urban and rural planning and management; and
disarming explosives.
Establishing the Civilian Response Corps Standby
Component (CRC-S)
The Obama Administration’s current goal for the response corps’ standby component is 2,268,
excluding contribution from new members the DOE and DOT, which are as yet undetermined.
As of January 21, 2011, the CRC-S had 1,062 members contributed by seven agencies ready and
trained for deployment. They were distributed as follows.
Table 1.CRC-S Contingents as of January 21, 2011
State USAID Justice USDA HHS Commerce DHS
724
175
73 2 9 51 27
Plans have called for a CRC-S of 2,000 members. Current plans call for 1,374 members to be
onboard from these seven agencies as of the end of FY2011. This may well change depending on
funding and on the current review of CRC capabilities. The extent to which the new CRC
agencies, DOE and DOT, will contribute will depend on funding and other decisions.
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Table 2.CRC-S Contingents as Planned for October 31, 2011
State USAID Justice USDA HHS Commerce DHS
754
200
200 64 40 60 56
An eventual total goal of 2,268 CRC-S members was contemplated. Again, however, this number,
as well as previous plans for agency contributions, may change
Establishing a Civilian Reserve Capability
In line with former President Bush’s 2008 State of the Union speech, mentioned above, S/CRS
had developed by early 2009 a general concept for a reserve component of retired government
personnel, personnel from state and local governments, private for-profit companies, and non-
profit NGOs to carry out rule of law, civil administration, and reconstruction activities.37
Nevertheless, Congress turned down the sole budget request for the reserve corps: $63.3 million
for FY2010 for a 2,000-member CRC reserve component (CRC-R), whose members would be
deployable within 45-60 days. The Obama Administration did not request FY2011 funds for a
civilian reserve. In briefings to Congress, Administration officials stated that the Administration
would complete work establishing the CRC active and standby components before requesting
funds for a reserve component.
With the State Department’s December 2010 QDDR, the Obama Administration announced a
change of course regarding a civilian reserve. The QDDR proposes replacing the reserve with “a
more cost-effective ‘Expert Corps’ consisting of an active roster of technical experts, willing but
not obligated to deploy to critical conflict zones.”38 (See the section on “Funding for a Reserve
Component,” below, for more information.)
FY2011 Budget Request and Congressional Action
In its FY2011 budget request submitted February 1, 2010, the Obama Administration requested
$184 million for the CSI, to be available until expended. This was $34 million over the total CSI
funding provided by Congress for FY2010. Although Congress divided FY2010 CSI funding
between the State Department and USAID, the Administration requested the entire FY2011 CSI
budget under the State Department. Under the continuing resolutions for FY201139 in effect
through March 4, 2011 (P.L. 111-322), and through March 18, 2011 (P.L. 112-4), total CSI
funding remained at the FY2010 level before rescissions.
H.R. 1, Full-Year Continuing Appropriations, 2011, as passed by the House February 19, 2011,
would set the CSI funding level at $40 million for State and $7 million for USAID.
37 Two outside studies forming the basis for planning for the reserve were completed in 2006. BearingPoint, Inc.
Management Study for Establishing and Managing a Civilian Reserve. Prepared for the U.S. Department of State,
Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization. May 30, 2006.
38 QDDR, p. 145.
39 P.L. 111-242, as amended, October 1, 2010, through December 21, 2010; P.L. 111-322, December 22, 2010, through
March 4, 2011.
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The FY2011 funding request broke down planned CSI allocations as follows, in bold. The State
Department’s planned allocations for FY2011, based on P.L. 111-322 appropriations calculated at
an annual rate, are indicated in italics.
• CRC active component salaries, benefits and other personnel expenses: $45.1
million ($16.0 million).
• Training for CRC active and standby components: $12.2 million ($5.2 million).
• Equipment acquisition: $12.3 million ($25.0 million).
• Deployments: $69.6 million ($34.7 million).
• Deployment center: $4.1 million (0).
• CRC operations support: $11.0 million ($13.0 million).
• S/CRS policy and planning: $29.8 million ($26.1 million).
For FY2011, the Administration also asked for $100 million for the Complex Crises Fund, which
it stated “will replace funding formerly provided through the Department of Defense Section
1207 authority.”40 According an accompanying document, the requested funds
will support activities to prevent or respond to emerging or unforeseen crises that address
reconstruction, security, or stabilization needs. Funding will target countries or regions that
demonstrate a high or escalating risk of conflict or instability, or an unanticipated
opportunity for progress in a newly-emerging or fragile democracy. Projects will aim to
address and prevent root causes of conflict and instability through a whole-of-government
approach and will include host government participation, as well as other partner resources
where possible and appropriate.41
As noted above, Congress established this account in 2009 with initial funding from the FY2010
budget of $50 million, the level at which it has continued under the FY2011 continuing
resolutions through March 4 (P.L. 111-322) and through March 18, 2011 (P.L. 112-4). H.R. 1 does
not mention this fund.
FY2012 Budget Request and Congressional Action
Conflict Stabilization Operations and Complex Crises Fund
For FY2012, the Obama Administration requests $92.2 million for Conflict Stabilization
Operations (CSO), the new name for the CSI, and $75 million for the USAID Complex Crises
Fund. The request was broken down as follows.
• CRC active component salaries, benefits, and other personnel expenses: $31.9
million.
• Training for CRC active and standby components: $9.6 million.
40 Department of State, Executive Budget Summary: Function 150 & Other International Programs Fiscal Year 2011,
p. 66.
41 Ibid.
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• Equipment acquisition: $1.0 million.
• Deployments: $15.5 million.
• Deployment center: $0.6 million.
• CRC operations support: $7.7 million.
• Headquarters policy and planning: $25.9 million.
Global Security Contingency Fund
The DOD and State Department FY2012 budget requests each ask for a $50 million appropriation
to establish a new, joint (or “pooled”) State-DOD Global Security Contingency Fund (GSCF),
which could possibly be used in connection with CRC activities. The DOD request also asks for a
$450 million transfer authority to move funds from unspecified DOD accounts to the GSCF.
According to the State Department request, the purpose would be “to address rapidly changing,
transnational, asymmetric threats, and emergent opportunities.” The State Department’s request
first points to the fund as a means “to streamline the way the U.S. Government provides
assistance for military forces and other security forces responsible for conducting border and
maritime security, internal security, and counterterrorism operations, as well as the government
agencies responsible for such forces.” The fund could also be used to provide assistance to
foreign justice sector and other rule of law programs, and to stabilization efforts “where the
Secretary of State decides that civilian providers are challenged to provide such assistance.” As
described by the State Department request and DOD officials, the GSCF would be a three-year
pilot project, subject to a joint Secretary of State-Secretary of Defense “dual-key” approval
process, with programs would be “collaboratively developed” by State and DOD. These programs
would be implemented primarily by these agencies, but also by USAID and others as appropriate.
Administration officials have discussed the GSCF proposal as modeled after two DOD authorities
exercised in conjunction with the State Department—the authority for building the capacity of
foreign military partners (Section 1206, P.L. 109-163, as amended) and the authority for DOD to
provide the State Department with funds for reconstruction, security, and stabilization activities
(Section 1207, P.L. 109-163, as amended, which expired September 30, 2010).42 Section 1207
was the authority under which DOD transferred funding to State to support CRC activities.
Although the GSCF’s stated purposes overlap with Sections 1206 and 1207, the extent to which it
might actually be used for Section 1206 and 1207 purposes is not clear.
Issues for Congress
S/CRS Effectiveness and Status
S/CRS has encountered substantial difficulties in building its capabilities and carrying out its
functions, and many analysts have expressed doubts about the office’s ability and capacity to
42 For more information on these two authorities, see CRS Report RS22855, Security Assistance Reform: “Section
1206” Background and Issues for Congress, and CRS Report RS22871, Department of Defense “Section 1207”
Security and Stabilization Assistance: Background and Congressional Concerns, FY2006-FY2010.
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carry out its mission. A perceived lack of initiative by the State Department to provide S/CRS
with necessary personnel and responsibility has been blamed on an “anti-operational” social
culture of the State Department. (For several years, it was also blamed on a perceived lack of
sufficient funding from Congress.) Some point to resistance from the regional bureaus, which
traditionally have the lead on conflict response abroad, to S/CRS involvement in specific crises.43
Some cite the lack of necessary support from top State Department leadership to overcome this
bureaucratic resistance and ensure that S/CRS plays a larger and constructive role.
Many analysts agree that the U.S. government needs a civilian entity or entities that can
effectively perform the planning and lessons learned functions assigned to S/CRS by Congress, as
well as the coordination function for specific operations that the Secretary of State may assign to
the Coordinator under NSPD-44. Some would resolve the problem by improving S/CRS, some by
assigning operational functions to USAID, and some by replacing it with a new organization.
Some observers have argued that the magnitude of the S/CRS mission requires improved
capabilities within the office and enhanced status, if it is to provide adequate direction and
personnel for an interagency response to stabilization and reconstruction crises. “It is not clear
that S/CRS is large enough, well enough funded, or sufficiently high in rank to pull an
interagency effort together,” according to a 2008 MIT Security Studies Program report.44 To
provide the head of S/CRS with greater clout within the State Department and in dealing with
other departments and agencies, some suggest that rank of that official or the status of the Office
itself, be upgraded. Some suggest that the Coordinator’s functions be assigned to an Under
Secretary, or that S/CRS become a State Department bureau headed by an Assistant Secretary.
(The “Coordinator” position is the equivalent of an Assistant Secretary, according to an S/CRS
official.)
Nevertheless, others have questioned whether all of the functions assigned S/CRS are appropriate
for that office. For instance, some contend that an office with the mission of mobilizing civilian
personnel for stabilization and reconstruction missions would be better placed in USAID,45 which
fields disaster response units (the Disaster Assistance Response Teams) and has an Office of
Transition Initiatives that has worked in post-conflict settings.
A recent study by a former U.S. Ambassador to Senegal and to Guinea, Dane F. Smith, Jr., now a
senior associate at CSIS, finds that leadership for reconstruction and stabilization missions should
be exercised through a State Department office “like that of” S/CRS, but one that incorporates a
much greater number of personnel from other civilian agencies (as well as some from DOD) and
would be “a fully integrated State-USAID operation.” Ambassador Smith also cites a need to
establish a new balance between the regional bureaus and the S/CRS-like office that would draw
43 A recent study notes “the unwillingness of the geographic bureaus to cede to S/CRS a major role in dealing with
high-priority conflicts. S/CRS was largely excluded from decisions on the U.S. government response to the Lebanon
and Somalia crises in 2006 and 2007, respectively.” although “the bureaus now agree that S/CRS can play a useful role
in modestly augmenting embassy resources through deployment of Active Response Component.” Dane F. Smith, Jr.
U.S. Peacefare: Organizing American Peace-Building Operations. Center for Strategic and International Studies and
Praeger Security International: Santa Barbara, CA: 2010, p. 216. Hereinafter referred to as U.S. Peacefare.
44 Cindy Williams and Gordon Adams. Strengthening Statecraft and Security: Reforming U.S. Planning and Resource
Allocation. MIT Security Studies Program Occasional Paper, June 2008, p. 89.
45 Gordon Adams, Obama’s test: Bringing order to the national security process. Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, web
version, January 26, 2009; http://www.thebulletin.org.
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on their respective strengths for planning and conducting operations, and for the Secretary of
State to ensure effective cooperation.46
Another study would reassign S/CRS functions to a new, independent entity, the U.S. Office for
Contingency Operations (USOCO), responsible to the NSC. As proposed in a February 2010
report by the Office of the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, the USOCO “would
become the locus for planning, funding, staffing, and managing” stabilization and reconstruction
operations, “replacing the fragmented process that now exists. Importantly, it would provide a
single office whose sole mission is ensuring that the United States is ready to go when the next
contingency occurs; and it would provide someone to hold accountable for failures in planning
and executions.”47
Another recent proposal would divide the S/CRS’s functions among the NSC, the State
Department Policy Planning Office, and USAID. As proposed by an April 2010 joint study of the
Brookings Institution and the CSIS, the NSC would take on “the design and management of
whole-of-government coordination systems,” a “more robust policy planning office at the State
Department,” would provide the “helpful planning support that S/CRS has provided to regional
bureaus on a case-by-case basis,” and USAID would assume the “operational responsibilities of
building and maintaining the Civilian Response Corps.”48 (USAID might also take on the
planning support if a policy and strategic planning entity were to be established there, according
to the proposal.)
QDDR Proposal to Reorganize State Department for Conflict and
Stabilization Operations
In line with proposals to elevate the status of S/CRS functions, the December 2010 QDDR
proposes restructuring the State Department in order for it to “exercise the leadership demanded
in complex political and security contingencies.”49 This is to be accomplished by integrating
46 “To facilitate effective cooperation between S/CRS and the bureaus in major crises will require leadership from the
Secretary of State. Depriving the bureaus of their primary diplomatic role would generate bureaucratic foot dragging.
Moreover, short-circuiting the sources of regional expertise and experience is likely to lead to critical mistakes in
practice. A useful rule of thumb would be to assign primacy in foreign policy guidance to the geographic bureaus and
primacy in program design and implementation to S/CRS. Since these two responsibilities overlap in practice, a
practical modus operandi would need to be worked out in each case.” U.S. Peacefare, p. 216.
47 Office of the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, Applying Iraq’s Hard Lessons to the Reform of
Stabilization and Reconstruction Operations, Arlington, VA, February 2010, p. 25, http://www.sigir.mil. This quote
continues: “Currently, there is no single agency that devotes its entire mission to SROs. For State and Defense, they are
but a small part of the departments’ larger missions.” Under this proposal, USOCO would tie DOD capacity and
resources to State Department and USAID expertise “by closely linking its planning and operations with State,
Defense, and USAID, bringing out the best-developed SRO aspects from each, while avoiding the ‘stovepiping’ that
tends to limit departmental action. USOCO would fit between and among State, Defense, and USAID, providing the
integrative ‘glue’ that SRO planning and execution currently lack.” (p. 27) The report warns that because the USOCO
concept “impinges upon existing ‘turf,’” it will “draw resistance.” But the decision on whether to pursue the proposal
should be shaped by a careful analysis of whether the current departmentalized system has the genuine potential to
generate an integrated approach to planning and managing SROs.” (p. 27).
48 Noam Unger, Margaret L. Taylor, Frederick Barton. Capacity for Change: Reforming U.S. Assistance Efforts in Poor
and Fragile Countries. The Brookings Institution and the Center for Strategic and International Studies, April 2010. p.
29.
49 QDDR, p. 135.
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“conflict and stabilization operations into core functions of the State Department.”50 Under the
plan set out in the ADDR, S/CRS would be subsumed under a new Bureau for Conflict and
Stabilization Operations (CSO), which would “build upon but go beyond the mandate and
capabilities of S/CRS,” serving “as the institutional locus for policy and operational solutions for
crisis, conflict, and instability.”51 Under this plan, the Assistant Secretary leading the CSO Bureau
“will coordinate early efforts at conflict prevention and rapid deployment of civilian responders
as crises unfold, working closely with the senior leadership of USAID’s Bureau of Democracy,
Conflict, and Humanitarian Assistance.”52 In addition, this Bureau would be placed under a new
Under Secretary for Civilian Security, Democracy, and Human Rights.53
The QDDR lays out five other functions of the CSO Bureau.54 In respect to interagency work, the
CSO Bureau would bear responsibility, in cooperation with other State Department bureaus and
USAID, to (1) build the capabilities and systems of the CRC, other interagency surge teams, and
other deployable assets; (2) provide expertise and operational guidance for the development of
policies and strategies to prevent and respond to crises and conflicts; and (3) provide specialists in
crisis, conflict, and state fragility to regional bureaus in order to serve as CSO liaisons and to
integrate conflict prevention work across the State Department. In relation to other countries and
international organizations, the CSO Bureau would be responsible for institutionalizing an
international operational crisis response framework, and coordinating efforts among key allies
and other partners to build civilian capacity, strengthening interoperability, and cooperation.
As part of this restructuring, the QDDR promises to ensure that the new CSO Bureau would be
staffed with personnel with the requisite expertise and experience in conflict management and
prevention, and draw others with needed expertise in other areas from elsewhere in State, as well
as USAID and other U.S. government agencies. The CSO Bureau would also create a new cadre
of senior diplomats trained and experienced in conflict resolution and mediation to deploy to
conflict zones and at-risk weak states. The State Department would also develop a quick, flexible
contracting mechanism to deploy people and resources to the field.
In parallel with the creation of the CSO Bureau, the State Department would also revamp related
USAID capabilities. The QDDR calls for expanding USAID’s Office of Transition Initiatives
(OTI), enhancing its field presence, and augmenting its staff abroad and in Washington. The
QDDR promises that the State Department will work more closely with OTI, and signals OTI’s
risk-taking, problem solving, and innovative organizational culture as a model for State’s crisis
response and stabilization. It also states that the CSO Bureau will work with OTI leadership to
ensure effective design and start-up of the new bureau. Other improvements are proposed,
including an expansion of USAID’s capacity for conflict programs and transitions from relief to
development.
50 QDDR, p. 135.
51 QDDR, p. 135.
52 QDDR, p. 136.
53 According to the QDDR, this Under Secretary would also oversee three currently existing bureaus—the Bureau of
International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, the Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration, the Bureau
of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor—and other offices. See p. 135.
54 QDDR, see p. 136.
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Appropriate Size for the Civilian Response Corps
Some policymakers and analysts question whether the CRC active, standby, and reserve
components are large enough to perform effectively their intended functions. One study, prepared
by the National Defense University (NDU) Center for Technology and National Security Policy,
argues that the CRC should be considerably larger, with 5,000 total in the active and standby
components and 10,000 in the reserve component. An active/standby component of that size
“would provide a fairly large pool of trained experts in each category” if personnel were
“properly distributed,” according to the study. “This sizable, diverse pool, in turn, would help
provide the flexibility, adaptability, and modularity to tailor complex operations to the missions
and tasks at hand in each case, without worrying that the act of responding effectively to one
contingency would drain the force or expertise in key areas needed to handle additional
contingencies.”55 This study also states that a combined active and standby force numbering
2,500 (compared to the 2,250 now planned) “should be backed by a reserve force of 4,500
personnel, not 2,000.”56
Another study envisions the possibility of a larger corps than currently contemplated by the
Obama Administration, but somewhat smaller than that proposed in the NDU study. Co-
sponsored by the American Academy of Diplomacy and the Stimson Center, this study finds that
the “magnitude of growth beyond FY2010 will depend largely on the experience gained based on
deployments in that year. For the purposes of projection, we propose that the active response team
would grow to 500 by FY2014, the standby response corps would remain at 2,000, and the
civilian reserve would grow to 4,000.”57
Some members of Congress, however, questioned in authorization and appropriations reports
whether the CRC active and standby units were being expanded too rapidly, at the cost of
effectiveness. In the Senate Appropriations Committee (SAC) report accompanying its FY2011
Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations Bill, 2011 (S.
3676, S.Rept. 111-237, July 29, 1010),58 the SAC expressed its concerns:
The Committee continues to believe that the success of CSI can best be achieved through a
gradual stand up and implementation and is concerned that CSI has not been adequately
integrated into the overall United States response to crises and disasters, including in Haiti
and Kyrgyzstan. The Committee is also concerned that the timelines for hiring, training, and
deployment of its civilian corps have been overly ambitious and unrealistic.
55 Christel Fonzo-Eberhard and Richard L. Kugler. “Sizing the Civilian Response Capacity for Complex Operations” in
Civilian Surge: Key to Complex Operations, edited by Hans Binnendijk and Patrick M. Cronin. Center for Technology
and National Security Policy, National Defense University. December 2008. p. 7.
56 Ibid., p. 9.
57 Ambassador Thomas Boyatt, et.al., A Foreign Affairs Budget for the Future: Fixing the Crisis in Diplomatic
Readiness, American Academy of Diplomacy and the Henry L. Stimson Center, October 2008, p. 45;
http://www.stimson.org.
58 The committee allocated $50 million for the CSI, some $134 million below the budget request and $70 million below
the FY2010 level. This cut reflected the elimination of deployment funding, which it stated should come from the
Complex Crisis Fund and other crisis and disaster response funds, as well as the acquisition of new space and an
additional 14 new positions.
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The SAC also noted approval that the Administration did not request reserve component funding,
stating that it would consider such funding “only after the CSI has established a record of
effective operations and can demonstrate programmatic accomplishments.”
Flexible Funding for S&R Operations
For many years, proponents of “operational” civilian capabilities for S&R operations have urged
Congress to provide the State Department with a flexible conflict or crisis response fund that
would allow U.S. government civilian agencies to respond rapidly to S&R emergencies. The
Bush Administration repeatedly requested such a fund, and proposals for a flexible, replenishable
fund were including in early versions of the Lugar-Biden legislation and subsequent related
legislation.59 But Congress, which has long resisted the provision of “blank check” pots of money
as an abdication of constitutional appropriation and oversight powers, turned down several Bush
Administration requests for more flexible S&R funding mechanisms in the State Department
budget.60
The first session of the 111th Congress, on the other hand, took a first step in providing flexible
funding by creating a USAID Complex Crises Fund with a $50 million appropriation in the
Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs appropriations act (Division F of
the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2010, P.L. 111-117), although this is less money than many
analysts would argue is necessary. This fund was Congress’s response to the Obama
Administration’s FY2010 budget request for a total of $116 million in flexible funding for S&R
purposes: $40 million for a Stabilization Bridge Fund under the Economic Support Fund account
(mentioned above), and $76 million for a Rapid Response fund under the USAID Transition
Initiatives (TI) account “to provide flexible funding to respond to emerging opportunities to
divert conflict in new and fragile democracies.” As stated by the conferees on the bill, this “new
account provides greater flexibility to USAID to prevent or respond to emerging or unforeseen
complex crises overseas, and … consolidates the budget request for a Rapid Response Fund and a
Stabilization Bridge Fund to provide greater efficiency and oversight by the Administration and
Congress of these activities.”61 (The conferees defined “complex crisis” for the purposes of this
59 A provision for a flexible, replenishable fund was included in early versions of the Lugar-Biden legislation. Most
recently, some legislation in the 110th Congress contained provisions for a $75 million replenishable fund that could be
used by the President to respond to crises in countries or regions at risk of, in, or in transition from conflict or civil
strife. Of that, some $25 million could be used for expenses related to the development, training, and operations of the
Response Readiness Corps.
60 These requests were contained in both annual and supplemental appropriations measures) for no-year funds to be
used for conflict emergencies in foreign countries or regions, and proposals in previous iterations of the Lugar/Biden
legislation to establish a replenishable fund for conflict response.
61 Conferees stated that the Complex Crises Fund is similar to the $100 Emergency Crises Fund proposed by the Senate
Appropriations Committee (SAC). The SAC’s version of the Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related
Programs, 2010, appropriations bill (S. 1434) bill would have established a new $100 million Emergency Crises Fund
to “enable the Secretary of State, in consultation with the USAID Administrator, to respond to unforeseen complex
foreign crises, under certain conditions and after consultation with Congress.” (S.Rept. 111-44, to accompany S. 1434,
p. 46.) In its report SAC explained that this fund, together with other funds provided under the CSI and TI accounts,
would assist with the State Department’s effort to “assume most if not all of the functions currently funded” by Section
1207. (S.Rept. 111-44, p. 46.) “In order to prevent gaps in the U.S. government’s ability to act expeditiously to prevent
crises, the Committee emphasizes that funding and authorities provided under the ECF and TI accounts may be utilized
to carry out crisis prevention activities including in locations where no CSI deployment is required. The Committee
intends the Departments of State and Defense to coordinate formulation and implementation of security and
stabilization assistance, as appropriate, whether through the utilization of section 1207 or the new capabilities within
the Department of State.” (S.Rept. 111-44, p. 47.) The HAC, which provided no flexible funding for the State
(continued...)
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account as “a disaster or emergency, usually of long-term duration, that includes a combination of
humanitarian, political and security dimensions which hinders the provision of external
assistance.”)
Proponents of flexible funding argue that it is needed because many crises that demand a U.S.
rapid response cannot be foreseen and thus planned for in annual budget submissions. In addition,
they argue, the existing mechanisms for transferring funds to an emergency situation are too time-
consuming to provide an immediate response. Some proponents have argued for a mechanism
like the automatically replenishable Emergency Refugee and Migration Assistance (ERMA)
emergency relief account, funded through foreign operations appropriations. Many proponents
suggest that ERMA provides a model for a response fund to be used for conflicts or related crisis
situations. Several bills were introduced that would, among other provisions, permanently
establish a conflict response fund, but none passed Congress.
In December 2007, the HELP Commission recommended the establishment of two rapid-
response crisis funds. One would be a permanent humanitarian crisis response fund to meet the
needs of natural disasters. The other would be a foreign crisis fund to meet security challenges.
No recommendation was made regarding the agency responsible for these funds.62
Since 2006, the funding for security and stabilization activities that Congress made available
through the DOD budget served as a de facto response fund for small S&R projects carried out by
personnel from the State Department and USAID. Section 1207 of the conference version of the
National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2006 (P.L. 109-163, H.R. 1815/S.
1042; signed into law January 6, 2006, and subsequently amended) authorized the Secretary of
Defense to provide the Secretary of State with up to $100 million in services, defense articles and
funding for reconstruction, security, or stabilization assistance to a foreign country per fiscal
year.63 The Obama Administration, in its FY2010 budget request asked for an appropriation of
$200 million, according to a DOD Summary Budget Justification document.64
Although “Section 1207” authority was repeatedly extended, Congress allowed it to expire at the
end of FY2010. Defense authorizers and appropriators had signaled their unwillingness to extend
it through FY2011. In action on the FY2010 NDAA (P.L. 111-84, signed into law October 28,
2009), conferees extended the authority through FY2010, but stated that “Congress has always
intended for this transfer authority to be temporary and are disappointed that the Department of
State has not yet achieved the capacity to fulfill its statutory requirements. The conferees urge the
administration to work toward this goal as rapidly as possible. They further recommend that the
administration examine ways to maintain this coordination [between DOD and State Department]
in the absence of this authority.”65
(...continued)
Department in its version of the bill, would nonetheless have provided $50 million in the USAID TI account for a
Rapid Response Fund (RRF), with RRF programs to be implemented by the USAID Office of Transition Initiatives.
(H.Rept. 111-187, p. 58.).
62 http://www.helpcommission.gov/portals/0/recommendations_final.pdf. Recommendation 3.5.
63 For more on Section 1207, see CRS Report RS22871, Department of Defense “Section 1207” Security and
Stabilization Assistance: Background and Congressional Concerns, FY2006-FY2010.
64 U.S. Department of Defense, Fiscal Year 2010 Budget Request Summary Justification, May 2009, p. 1-13.
65 Similarly, both the House and the Senate armed services committees both stressed the temporary nature of Section
1207 authority. HASC wrote: “While the projects undertaken with funds provided by this authority are worthy, the
(continued...)
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Similarly, defense appropriators signaled their expectation that DOD’s Section 1207 funding
would not be provided for another year. In their report on the FY2010 Department of Defense
Appropriations Act (P.L. 111-118, H.Rept. 111-380), conferees recommended an allocation of
$97.09 million (from the overall Defense Security Cooperation Agency appropriation), but stated
that the establishment of the Complex Crises Fund “will enable USAID and the Department of
Sate to meet emergent requirements that fall under their purview without relying on the
Department of Defense.” Nevertheless, they argued for continued DOD participation in the
planning process for small-scale security and stabilization projects, directing the Secretaries of
Defense and State and the Director of USAID “to maintain and strengthen the interagency
process created from the section 1207 program when formulating, reviewing, and approving
future projects that would have been funded through section 1207.”
In creating the Complex Crises Fund, conferees on the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2010
(P.L. 111-117) urged the State Department and USAID to develop additional capacity in order to
replace Section 1207 DOD funding with additional Complex Crises funding. “USAID and the
Department of State should continue to establish and bolster crisis prevention and response
capabilities in order to assume most, if not all, of the functions currently funded” by DOD under
Section 1207 authority, they wrote. Much like the defense appropriations conferees, the foreign
operations conferees also specified that “USAID and the Departments of State and Defense shall
continue to consult on the formulation and implementation of stabilization and security
assistance, as appropriate, whether through the utilization of section 1207 or funds appropriated
by this Act.”
As noted above, the Administration requested $100 million for the CCF from the FY2011 budget,
stating that this will replace funding previously provided under Section 1207 authority. The
FY2011 continuing resolution now in force through March 4, 2011, provides FY2011 funding for
the CCF at the $50 million FY2010 level.
Funding for a Reserve Component
In his January 23, 2007, State of the Union address, former President Bush pointed to the need for
a civilian reserve corps as a tool in the generational struggle against terrorism. “Such a corps
would function much like our military reserve,” he said. “It would ease the burden on the armed
forces by allowing us to hire civilians with critical skills to serve on missions abroad when
America needs them. It would give people across America who do not wear the uniform a chance
to serve in the defining struggle of our time.”
In 2008, Congress provided authorization for the establishment of a Civilian Reserve Corps (P.L.
110-417, see above) that could substitute for military troops in a wide variety of state-building
(...continued)
committee is concerned that insufficient progress has been made in building the capacity within the Department of
State to assume the statutory and fiscal responsibility necessary to fulfill its statutory requirements.... The committee
stresses that it has always been a temporary authority and urges the Administration to develop capacity within the
Department of State so that this transfer authority is no longer required.” (H.Rept. 111-166, p. 413) SASC also
“reaffirms its view that Section 1207 is a temporary authority.” (S.Rept. 111-35, p. 193.) Under its version of the bill
(H.R. 2647), HASC would have reduced FY1207 authority to $25 million for FY2010, while the SASC version (S.
1390) retained the full $100 million.
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activities. The Bush Administration’s 2008 CSI proposal called for the establishment of a reserve
component of 2,000; the Obama Administration’s 2009 CSI proposal called for the same.
Nevertheless, Congress has not provided funds to establish a civilian reserve. In considering the
Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations Bill, 2010 (H.R.
3081 and S. 1434), House and Senate appropriators denied the Obama Administration’s request
for funding for the CSI reserve component. In their respective reports (H.Rept. 111-187 and
S.Rept. 111-44), both committees indicated their desire for a gradual build-up of the civilian
response corps components, with the focus now on the active and standby components.
Proponents of the creation of a civilian reserve corps foresee a variety of advantages from the
creation of such a corps. DOD promoted the concept on the grounds that it would free military
personnel from state-building tasks during military operations, thus increasing the personnel
available for combat and other more strictly military tasks.66 Proponents also view such a corps as
a means to enhance prospects for success in S&R operations as the personnel who would be sent
to perform such tasks would in general have a much higher level of expertise and depth of
experience than soldiers and could, unlike many military personnel assigned to such tasks,
perform at peak efficiency from the outset. Many view this as particularly true at the national
level, where extensive experience with developing national-level structures is desirable over the
long run. (Although military Civil Affairs officers are largely reservists whose civilian jobs are
relevant to state-building tasks, many analysts state that there are too few civil affairs personnel to
provide the depth needed to deploy the appropriate person in most circumstances.) Many argue
that civilian personnel are also preferable for symbolic reasons, as they may signal a greater
commitment to the construction of a democratic state.
Skeptics look at the concept of a civilian reserve as untested and potentially unfeasible. Some
wonder whether qualified experts would sign up in sufficient quantities to make the corps an
effective replacement for military troops in S&R operations. Some question whether the existence
of such a corps would provide an incentive to interventions of various types that the United States
otherwise would not have undertaken.
Cost may well be a major issue. In 2008, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) assembled a
cost estimate for the Bush Administration’s CSI. Its estimate for the recruiting, screening,
enrolling, training, and equipping the 2,000 members contemplated by the CSI was $87 million in
FY2009 and $47 million in 2010.67 (The CBO estimate of first-year costs is considerably higher
66 However, DOD Directive 3000.05, Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition and Reconstruction (SSR)
Operations, issued November 28, 2005, states that many stability operations tasks “are best performed by indigenous,
foreign, or U.S. civilian professionals,” but nonetheless “U.S. military forces shall be prepared to perform all tasks
necessary to establish or maintain order when civilians cannot do so.” Among the tasks listed are the rebuilding of
various types of security forces, correctional facilities, and judicial systems, the revival or building of the private sector,
and the development of representative governmental institutions. (Points 4.3, 4.3.1-4.3.3, available at
http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/html/300005.htm.)
Some military analysts argue that at the beginning of an operation or in extremely volatile situations the use of U.S.
troops to perform nation-building efforts may be considered highly desirable as they can “multi-task,” performing
combat missions in one area while switching quickly to state-building efforts in another. In addition, some believe that
it will always be desirable to have trained military civil affairs officers who can deal with civilian leaders and
populations involved in state-building efforts at the local level, as a means of demonstrating goodwill toward such
populations and enhancing the image of soldiers, especially in counterinsurgency operations.
67 The Congressional Budget Office estimated the cost of implementing the Civilian Reconstruction and Stabilization
Management Act, H.R. 1084 (110th Congress),67 if “employed in a manner consistent with the [President’s] Civilian
Stabilization Initiative.” (The estimate is included in H.Rept. 110-537, 110th Congress.)
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than the Obama Administration’s $63.6 million FY2010 request to establish the reserve.)
Although some may view the potential cost of the civilian corps as high, some proponents argue
that the costs of deploying civilian personnel would result in a net savings to the military. (It is
likely, however, that any possible savings would depend on the circumstances in which such
civilian personnel were deployed and the effect of their deployment on the number of military
personnel needed.) Proponents also maintain that even if high, the monetary cost to maintain and
deploy civilian reservists would still be relatively inexpensive when compared to the multiple
costs, both tangible (such as money and lives) and intangible (such as domestic and international
political support and loss of strategic leverage) of prolonged or failed military interventions.
QDDR Proposal to Establish a Expert Corps Roster
The QDDR proposes replacing the reserve with “a more cost-effective ‘Expert Corps’ consisting
of an active roster of technical experts.”68 According to the QDDR, this Expert Corps roster could
be composed of current temporary hires who have served successfully in Iraq, Afghanistan,
Pakistan, and elsewhere, as well as other civilians with critical skills who have not been
previously deployed. Other countries, such as Canada and Germany, and international
organizations, such as the United Nations and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in
Europe, use roster systems for civilian deployments to nation-building and post-conflict
missions.69
The roster concept is substantially different from the CSI concept of a reserve corps modeled
after the military reserves and guard. Under that concept, a reserve component of more than 2,000
members, civilians from outside government with various types of expertise, would be in reserve
status for four years with a required deployment of up to one year. Unlike the concept for a
reserve corps, roster members would not be obligated to deploy to critical conflict zones.
However, neither would roster members be provided with re-employment rights, as was
contemplated for reserve corps members.
The QDDR states that the Administration will request funding and needed authorities for the
Corps. The Administration expects the roster to be less costly than the more elaborate reserve
corps. According to the QDDR, the budget would support actual deployments, rather than support
and maintenance for a large reserve. Still, some costs, such as equipment acquisition, might
remain. And while some savings would most likely accrue from eliminating benefits such as
pensions and from the costs of an intensive training regime, some analysts might argue that
certain benefits, such as health coverage, should be offered to recruit quality personnel, and that a
good training program is essential to effective performance.
68 QDDR, see p. 145.
69 For information on the experiences of the Germany, Canada, and the United Nations in recruiting personnel for state-
building rosters and deployments to other countries, see CRS Report RL33647, A Civilian Reserve for Stabilization and
Reconstruction Abroad: Summary of a Workshop on U.S. Proposals and International Experiences and Related Issues
for Congress, by Nina M. Serafino.
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Author Contact Information
Nina M. Serafino
Specialist in International Security Affairs
nserafino@crs.loc.gov, 7-7667
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