Libya: Background and U.S. Relations
Christopher M. Blanchard
Acting Section Research Manager
Jim Zanotti
Analyst in Middle Eastern Affairs
February 25, 2011
Congressional Research Service
7-5700
www.crs.gov
RL33142
CRS Report for Congress
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repared for Members and Committees of Congress
Libya: Background and U.S. Relations
Summary
Major anti-government protests broke out in Libya on February 15, and reports indicate that they
have since developed into a major uprising against the regime of Muammar al Qadhafi, who has
ruled the country for over 41 years. The uprising has elicited violent government responses,
which have reportedly precipitated divisions within the military and the regime itself. World oil
prices have risen, and the United States and other international actors are considering responses.
Prospects for U.S. and international influence on developments in Libya is uncertain. There is
currently no U.S. ambassador serving in Libya. U.S.-Libya military ties and U.S. foreign
assistance to Libya are minimal, given that full diplomatic relations were restored only five years
ago. Although U.S. trade with and investment in Libya has expanded since the lifting of most
sanctions in 2004, it remains relatively small in scope when compared with Libya’s economic ties
with Europe. Some activists, analysts, and officials, however, along with Libyan diplomats and
groups opposed to Qadhafi, have called on the United States and the international community to
take steps to address the situation. Possible options that could involve action and/or oversight
from Members of the 112th Congress include the following.
• Humanitarian Assistance.
• Suspending Foreign Assistance.
• International Arms Embargoes.
• Investigation and/or Prosecution of International Human Rights Violations.
• Economic Sanctions and/or Travel Bans. Imposing or reimposing unilateral
and/or multilateral sanctions against Libya and firms that do business with or in
Libya, possibly including asset freezes and travel bans targeting the Qadhafis and
individuals and entities aligned with them.
• “No-fly Zones.” Establishing and enforcing these zones within Libya and/or at its
borders in order to (1) prevent the Qadhafi regime from using aircraft for attacks
against its people and (2) prevent the importation of mercenaries and arms from
other countries.
• Direct Intervention or Threats. Ranging from intervention narrowly targeted to
accomplish humanitarian purposes such as providing health care, delivering
supplies, or evacuating foreign nationals; to intervention or threats of
intervention aimed at supporting Libyan rebels, deterring or apprehending
individuals suspected of human rights violations, and/or ousting the Qadhafi
regime.
Many analysts are debating whether particular options should be carried out unilaterally,
multilaterally, or both. Choosing unilateral action over multilateral action could improve response
time at the expense of effectiveness, international legitimacy, and future prospects for multilateral
cooperation. Given ongoing turmoil across the region, any step taken regarding Libya is likely to
set a precedent for U.S. and international involvement in other current or future crises.
The State Department announced on February 25 that it is suspending operations in Libya—but
has not broken off diplomatic relations—and on the same day White House Press Secretary Jay
Carney revealed U.S. plans to impose unilateral economic sanctions against the Qadhafi regime,
without providing specific details.
Congressional Research Service
Libya: Background and U.S. Relations
Contents
2011 Uprising and Violence ........................................................................................................ 1
Developments as of February 25 ........................................................................................... 1
U.S. and International Reactions ........................................................................................... 5
Possible U.S. and Congressional Responses .......................................................................... 8
The Uprising’s Origins ........................................................................................................ 10
Other Recent Developments ...................................................................................................... 11
Political and Economic Profile .................................................................................................. 12
Muammar al Qadhafi: A Profile........................................................................................... 12
Political Dynamics .............................................................................................................. 13
Government Structure ......................................................................................................... 13
The “Authority of the People” ....................................................................................... 14
Proposals for the Dissolution of State Ministries and Revenue Distribution ................... 14
Opposition Groups .............................................................................................................. 15
Exiles............................................................................................................................ 15
The Muslim Brotherhood .............................................................................................. 16
Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG).......................................................................... 17
Political Reform and Human Rights .................................................................................... 18
Legal and Institutional Reform ...................................................................................... 19
Human Rights Monitoring............................................................................................. 20
Fathi al Jahmi ............................................................................................................... 20
Libyan Foreign Policy......................................................................................................... 21
Energy and the Libyan Economy......................................................................................... 22
Oil Reserves and Production Capacity........................................................................... 22
Natural Gas................................................................................................................... 23
Military Profile and WMD Disarmament................................................................................... 24
The Libyan Military............................................................................................................ 24
Structure, Training, and Equipment ............................................................................... 24
Arms Sales.................................................................................................................... 25
WMD Programs and Disarmament ...................................................................................... 26
Nuclear, Chemical, and Ballistic Missile Programs........................................................ 26
Termination of WMD and Missile Programs ................................................................. 27
Motives for Disarmament.............................................................................................. 27
International Controls and Inspections........................................................................... 28
Background and Recent History ................................................................................................ 29
The Qadhafi Era.................................................................................................................. 30
The Green Book and Qadhafi’s Ideology....................................................................... 30
Terrorism and Confrontation with the United States....................................................... 31
Qadhafi’s Arab-Israeli Intransigence.............................................................................. 31
International Isolation and Signs of Change................................................................... 32
Issues in U.S.-Libyan Relations................................................................................................. 32
Comprehensive Claims Settlement Agreement .................................................................... 33
Settlement Details ......................................................................................................... 34
Settlement Eligibility and Adjudication ......................................................................... 35
Pan Am Flight 103 and Megrahi’s Release .......................................................................... 35
Lockerbie Appeal and Megrahi’s Release ...................................................................... 36
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Libya: Background and U.S. Relations
BP plc and UK-Libya Prisoner Transfer Agreement ....................................................... 37
U.S. Foreign Assistance to Libya......................................................................................... 38
Funding for New U.S. Embassy Construction................................................................ 40
Counterterrorism Cooperation ............................................................................................. 40
Further Reading and Historical Resources ................................................................................. 41
Figures
Figure 1. Map Depicting Libyan Cities, Energy Infrastructure, and Conflict Areas....................... 4
Figure 2. Map of Libya ............................................................................................................... 7
Tables
Table 1. Libyan Military Personnel............................................................................................ 24
Table 2. Recent U.S. Foreign Assistance to Libya ...................................................................... 39
Appendixes
Appendix A. Libya’s Pre-Qadhafi History ................................................................................. 42
Appendix B. Normalization of Relations, Terrorism, and Related Claims .................................. 45
Contacts
Author Contact Information ...................................................................................................... 49
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Libya: Background and U.S. Relations
2011 Uprising and Violence1
Developments as of February 25
Major anti-government protests broke out in Libya on February 15, intensified during and after an
organized “day of rage” on February 17, and have since developed into a major uprising against
the regime of Muammar al Qadhafi
(see “Muammar al Qadhafi: A
Military and Paramilitary Forces,
Profile” below), who has ruled the
Mercenaries, and Rebels
country for over 41 years. The
The relative weakness and disorganization of the Libyan military (see
uprising is taking place against a
“Political Dynamics” and “The Libyan Military” below)—particularly
backdrop of turmoil and political
in comparison to its more professional counterpart in Egypt—
change happening throughout the
arguably renders military defections reported during the February
Middle East and North Africa,
2011 uprising less relevant to the uprising’s outcome and the
country’s internal security than the continuing loyalty of Muammar al
particularly in Libya’s neighboring
Qadhafi’s numerous paramilitary forces and security services.
countries Egypt (to the east) and
According to a December 2010 report by Anthony Cordesman and
Tunisia (to the west). Libya is a
Aram Nerguizian of the Center for Strategic and International
major energy-producing country,
Studies, these forces seem to include, among others, a 3,000-man
responsible for nearly 2% of the
Revolutionary Guard Corps to guard Qadhafi with armored vehicles,
world’s oil production and
rocket launchers, and anti-aircraft weaponry; a 2,500-man Islamic Pan
containing Africa’s largest oil
African Legion; a people’s militia with a nominal strength of about
40,000; and a multi-layered apparatus featuring personal bodyguards
reserves, and the unrest has led to a
and various “committees” (i.e., people’s, revolutionary, purification)
sharp increase in world oil prices.
of regime loyalists.2
Because of tight government
According to the Washington Post, resources have traditionally flowed
controls, international media have
to loyalist units within military, paramilitary, and other security
not been able to monitor the
forces. For assistance in quelling the February 2011 uprising, some of
situation in Libya in the same way
these units, such as the “Khamis Brigade,” (named for Qadhafi’s
they have monitored uprisings in
youngest son, who commands it) have reportedly flown foreign
fighters into the Tripoli vicinity. Identity cards from Guinea, Niger,
other countries in the region.
Chad, Mauritania, and Sudan have reportedly been found on dead
Updates, which often do not provide
individuals clad in Libyan uniforms. Many analysts find it likely for
a clear or full picture of ongoing
foreign mercenaries detached from local conditions to be more
developments, have come largely
ruthless than indigenous forces.3
from amateur video footage and
Regime opponents—perhaps a mix of military defectors and
mobile communications, although
protestors—have in some cases reportedly successful y resisted and
some international media have
battled regime loyalists, gaining control of or disabling key cities,
accessed areas in eastern Libya
roads, airports, and border crossings. The overall extent of their
armed strength in western Libya is the subject of several anecdotes,
under opposition control. The
but remains unclear.
regime has periodically cut off at
least some Libyans’ access to
Internet, satellite television feeds, and phone and mobile communications.
1 This section was prepared by Jim Zanotti, Analyst in Middle Eastern Affairs. All other sections were prepared by
Christopher M. Blanchard, Analyst in Middle Eastern Affairs.
2 Anthony Cordesman and Aram Nerguizian, The North African Military Balance: Force Developments & Regional
Challenges, Center for Strategic and International Studies, December 7, 2010, available at http://csis.org/files/
publication/101203_North_African_Military_Balance_final.pdf.
3 Similar dynamics may exist with the largely Pakistani security forces in Bahrain. Peter Finn, “Gaddafi said to use
paramilitary forces, foreign fighters in crackdown,” Washington Post, February 24, 2011.
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Libya: Background and U.S. Relations
Opponents of the Qadhafi regime have reportedly taken over Benghazi, Libya’s second-largest
city, and much of the surrounding northeastern Mediterranean region of Cyrenaica (see Figure 1,
below).4 On February 20, large-scale unrest reportedly spread to Tripoli, Libya’s capital and
largest city (estimated population: 1.1 million). As of February 24, battles were reportedly
ongoing for control of cities in western Libya near Tripoli, including Misurata, Zuara, and
Zawiyah. Thousands of refugees and expatriates have fled to Tunisia and to Egypt,5 and Italy and
Greece are preparing for the possibility of Libyan refugees coming across the Mediterranean Sea.
Widespread reports indicate that security forces and “revolutionary committees” loyal to the
Qadhafi regime—possibly aided by mercenaries from other African countries—have used
increasing levels of violence to put down the uprising. Reportedly, this includes firing on crowds
from helicopters and sniper nests with live ammunition, including high-caliber automatic
weapons and anti-aircraft guns, as well as air bombardments from fighter jets.6 Violence
reportedly escalated on February 19 when security forces fired upon a funeral procession in
Benghazi. Reports indicate that the regime is concentrating its forces in an effort to retain control
of Tripoli, and that while armed rebels have pressed their insurrection in cities increasingly close
to Tripoli, regime opponents within Tripoli used mobile communications to organize Friday
protests after February 25 early afternoon prayers at mosques. Following the prayers, Qatar-based
news source Al Jazeera stated that heavy gunfire has been reported in various Tripoli
neighborhoods.7 As of February 25, the International Federation for Human Rights estimated that
at least 640 people have died in the violence, but some analysts and international officials believe
that the actual death toll is much higher, perhaps over 2,000.8
4 Benghazi, with an estimated population of 700,000, is a traditional center of anti-Qadhafi sentiment and has
experienced off-and-on unrest in recent years.
5 An estimated 1 to 1.5 million Egyptians live in Libya, most as expatriate workers.
6 See “Two Libyan fighter pilots defect, fly to Malta,” Reuters, February 21, 2011.
7 http://blogs.aljazeera.net/africa/2011/02/24/live-blog-libya-feb-25.
8 “Gaddafi blames al-Qaeda for revolt,” english.aljazeera.net, February 25, 2011.
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During the uprising, Muammar al Qadhafi and his son, Sayf al Islam al Qadhafi, have continued
to address the Libyan people via state television, seeking to rally supporters. In the early hours of
February 21, Sayf warned that civil war could engulf the country, and promised that the regime
would “fight to the last bullet.” On the evening of February 22, Muammar al Qadhafi appeared
alongside loyalists before a crowd of purportedly pro-regime demonstrators in Tripoli. He offered
the Libyan people “whatever form of government they want,” but insisted that he will not leave
Libya and that he will “die a martyr.” He compared the situation in Libya to that of China’s
Tiananmen Square in 1989, and said that he would “cleanse Libya house by house” if necessary.9
The Qadhafis have blamed Libya’s popular insurrection on foreign elements and Al Qaeda.10
Many military officers and conscripts have refused to follow orders to fire upon other Libyans,
and some have joined the insurrection, though to what extent is unclear. The regime’s violent
response also has led to public opposition from Libyan officials and diplomats. Longtime Qadhafi
confederates Abdul Fatah Younis al Abidi (Interior Minister) and Mustapha Abdul Jalil (Justice
Minister), and even one of Qadhafi’s cousins close to his inner circle, have resigned in protest of
the violence.11 Libya’s ambassador to the United States, Ali Adjali, along with Libya’s entire
delegation to the United Nations, except for its ambassador (who has claimed he is pleading with
the regime to stop violent reprisals), denounced the regime’s crackdown. Ibrahim Dabbashi,
Libya’s deputy ambassador to the United Nations, said of Qadhafi on February 21, “Either he has
to get out or the Libyan people will kick him out. It is the end of the game.”12 Dabbashi also said,
“We ask the international community to take the necessary steps to help the Libyan people and to
protect the Libyan people from the genocide it is facing now.”13 In addition, several tribal leaders
have reportedly withdrawn their loyalty from Qadhafi and have threatened to stop the flow of
Libya’s oil if regime-sponsored violence continues. Their threats may be particularly resonant
because over 75% of Libya’s oil exports reportedly come from the east, where the uprising has
been most vigorous.
9 http://blogs.aljazeera.net/africa/2011/02/22/live-blog-libya-feb-22.
10 Qadhafi’s February 22 speech was reportedly filmed in front of a portion of his Bab al Aziziya compound that was
damaged by the 1986 U.S. bombing of Tripoli, and he referred multiple times to past American aggression. He also has
blamed Qatar (headquarters of the Al Jazeera satellite television network that has been at the forefront of media
coverage of the region-wide political change). The Qadhafis’ reference to Al Qaeda is probably intended to attack the
legitimacy of the anti-regime uprising in eastern Libya. The area has links to Islamist groups and causes, and, according
to a Jamestown Foundation article, the eastern city of Darnah was the place of origin of the largest group of foreign
fighters (relative to its population size) that joined the Sunni Jihadist resistance in post-2003 Iraq. Many fighters also
came from Benghazi. Camille Tawil, “Is Libya Headed Toward a Prolonged Civil War?”, Jamestown Foundation,
available at http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=37546&
tx_ttnews%5BbackPid%5D=7&cHash=db5904030d687a9c14a7a6df346a5f90.
11 After his resignation, Jalil gave a February 23 interview to a Swedish newspaper in which he claimed that Qadhafi
personally ordered the 1988 bombing of Pan Am Flight 103 from London to New York, which killed 270 people over
and in Lockerbie, Scotland (including 189 Americans). Various issues related to the bombing are discussed later in the
report.
12 Sudarsan Raghavan and Leila Fadel, “Gaddafi appears in Tripoli as soldiers, government officials abandon regime,”
Washington Post, February 22, 2011.
13 Elizabeth Arrott, “Libyan Crackdown Continues, Officials Quit in Protest,” Voice of America, February 22, 2011.
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Figure 1. Map Depicting Libyan Cities, Energy Infrastructure, and Conflict Areas
Sources: Guardian (UK), Graphic News, U.S. Energy Information Administration, Global Security, The Making of Modern Libya (Ali Abdullatif Ahmida, State University of
New York Press, 1994). Adapted by CRS.
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Libya: Background and U.S. Relations
Some analysts believe that because of geographical and tribal differences within the country, the
end of the Qadhafi regime could result in a Libya with little internal unity or cohesion.14 The
country’s old colonial divisions (between the provinces of Tripolitania in the northwest, Fezzan in
the southwest, and Cyrenaica in the east) could become increasingly significant (see Figure 2
below), and the potential for lawlessness and disorder could raise international concerns about
Libya’s potential use by terrorist and criminal networks.15 If the regime does not fall quickly, a
prolonged civil war is possible.16 Such fighting might feature urban battles, as well as competition
over tribal loyalties and control of energy infrastructure, that pit the regime and its supporters
concentrated in Tripoli and western Libya against anti-regime forces concentrated in the east.
Another possible scenario would be for Qadhafi to retreat to a compound he maintains at Sebha
on the Saharan periphery in the southwest, although that might cede effective political, economic,
and military control of the rest of the country to the opposition. In the event Qadhafi succeeds in
quelling the uprising, the potential consequences are unclear given the magnitude of change that
has already occurred on the ground and within the regime and bureaucracy. Some speculate that
Libya would “revert back into a pariah state.”17 There are reports of concerns that Qadhafi might
use biological and/or chemical weapons against his people as a last resort, but the Organization
for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons said this would be unlikely because of evidence that
Libya has destroyed the potential delivery systems for such weapons (see “International Controls
and Inspections” below).18
U.S. and International Reactions
On February 23, President Barack Obama called the bloodshed in Libya “outrageous” and
“unacceptable” and said that his Administration was looking at the “full range of options we have
to respond to this crisis.”19 He also said that Secretary of State Hillary Clinton would be in
Geneva, Switzerland on February 28 for a session of the U.N. Human Rights Council (UNHRC)
to discuss the situation in Libya and elsewhere in the region. Senate Foreign Relations Committee
Chairman John Kerry and House Foreign Affairs Committee Chairwoman Ileana Ros-Lehtinen
both issued statements on February 22 denouncing the Qadhafi regime and its actions, calling on
the Obama Administration to consider reimposing economic sanctions on Libya, and calling on
the United Nations to remove Libya from the UNHRC.20 The U.N. Security Council (UNSC) met
on February 22 to discuss the situation in Libya, and its president issued a statement saying that
the UNSC’s members “called for an immediate end to the violence and for steps to address the
legitimate demands of the population,” as well as for international humanitarian assistance. The
UNSC and the UNHRC are both scheduled to meet February 25 to consider further action on the
14 See, e.g., Robert Danin, “Libya’s Leadership Crossroads,” Council on Foreign Relations, February 22, 2011,
available at http://www.cfr.org/libya/libyas-leadership-crossroads/p24173; Andrew Solomon, “How Qaddafi Lost
Libya,” newyorker.com, February 21, 2011.
15 See, e.g., Simon Henderson and David Schenker, “‘The Last Bullet,’: Qadhafi and the Future of Libya,” Washington
Institute for Near East Policy, PolicyWatch #1761, February 22, 2011.
16 Tawil, op. cit.
17 Ibid.
18 Oren Kessler, “Gaddafi keeps grip on capital as revolt spreads,” jpost.com, February 24, 2011.
19 See full text of President Obama’s remarks at http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2011/02/23/president-obama-speaks-
turmoil-libya-violence-must-stop.
20 See full text of both statements at http://foreign.senate.gov/press/chair/release/?id=390b4f5a-9aa4-457d-8552-
2173b1898eeb and http://foreignaffairs.house.gov/press_display.asp?id=1728.
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matter, and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has called an emergency meeting for
February 25 as well.
Similar denunciations of the violence in Libya, along with calls for international responses, have
come from leaders in the European Union and its member states, including the United Kingdom,
France, and Germany. European energy markets and firms have been most directly affected by the
(as of February 25) approximately 70%-80% reduction in Libya’s daily oil output. More than
85% of Libya’s oil exports go to Europe, with about one third of that amount going to Italy. Only
about 5% of oil exports from Libya go to the United States.21 On February 24, Saudi Arabia
indicated its willingness to attempt to stabilize world oil prices by making up the production
shortfall caused by the Libyan unrest. On February 22, the Arab League suspended Libya’s right
to participate in its meetings and the Secretary-General of the Organization of the Islamic
Conference characterized the Qadhafi regime’s crackdown as a “humanitarian catastrophe which
goes against Islamic and human values.” On February 24, the African Union condemned the
crackdown and said it would send a mission to Libya to assess the situation. On February 25,
Switzerland froze Qadhafi’s Swiss assets, as it had done earlier in the cases of Tunisia’s Zinedine
el Abidine Ben Ali and Egypt’s Hosni Mubarak. Venezuela’s Hugo Chavez, Cuba’s Fidel Castro,
and Nicaragua’s Daniel Ortega have all issued statements of support for and solidarity with
Qadhafi.
21 Clifford Krauss, “Why the Disruption of Libyan Oil Has Led to a Price Spike,” New York Times, February 23, 2011.
The article says that most of the rest of Libya’s oil exports go to Asia.
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Figure 2. Map of Libya
Source: CRS.
A ferry transported 183 U.S. citizens and 155 foreign nationals from Tripoli to the Mediterranean
island nation of Malta on February 25.22 On the same day, additional U.S. citizens were evacuated
on a chartered jet that flew from Tripoli to Istanbul, Turkey. Several other countries, (especially
Egypt, but also Turkey, Russia, China, Canada, Spain, Italy, France, and the United Kingdom)
have evacuated or are attempting to evacuate their citizens from Libya.
22 “Foreigners making dash out of Libya,” cnn.com, February 22, 2011. According to State Department spokesman P.J.
Crowley, approximately 5,000 U.S. citizens have been living in Libya (600 of whom are solely U.S. citizens).
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Possible U.S. and Congressional Responses
Prospects for U.S. and international
Impact of Uprising on Oil Production
influence on developments in Libya is
uncertain. There is currently no U.S.
As discussed below (see “Oil Reserves and Production
Capacity”), the Libyan National Oil Company (NOC) manages
ambassador serving in Libya.26 U.S.-
oil production activity and negotiates exploration and
Libya military ties and U.S. foreign
production agreements with foreign companies. As a result of
assistance to Libya are minimal, given
the February 2011 uprising, the United Arab Emirates news
that full diplomatic relations were
source The National reported on February 25 that the NOC
restored only five years ago. Although
“has declared force majeure on exports, a rare move for any
country and usual y a precursor to a total production shut-
U.S. trade with and investment in Libya
down.”23 Two NOC subsidiaries that control oil fields and
has expanded since the lifting of most
refineries in eastern Libya, Arabian Gulf Oil Company and Sirte
sanctions in 2004,27 it remains relatively
Oil Company, have reportedly broken with Qadhafi and
small in scope when compared with
pledged their loyalty to “the people.”24
Libya’s economic ties with Europe. Some
Two European companies with extensive operations in Libya,
activists, analysts, and officials, however,
Italy’s Eni and Spain’s Repsol, have largely halted production,
along with Libyan diplomats and groups
and Eni has temporarily shut down a pipeline transporting
natural gas to Italy. Other European companies with major
opposed to Qadhafi, have called on the
Libyan operations, including France’s Total, Norway’s Statoil,
United States and the international
Germany’s Wintershall and BWE, and Austria’s OMV, also
community to take steps to address the
have curtailed or halted production and begun evacuating staff.
situation. A prominent human rights
China National Petroleum Corporation also has reportedly
activist has asserted: “The absence of
relocated part of its workforce.
close military and diplomatic relations
Although Saudi Arabia has pledged to boost production to
can also free the United States to take
compensate for Libyan shortfal s, reports say that Libya’s
more decisive steps to support
“sweet” crude—particularly well-suited for the production of
gasoline, diesel, and jet fuel—cannot easily be replaced by Saudi
democratic change and restrain
Arabia’s more “sour” grades. If European countries seek
repressive regimes such as Libya.”28
greater supply from major U.S. sweet crude suppliers Algeria
Possible options that could involve action
and Nigeria, greater upward pressure on U.S. gasoline prices is
and/or oversight from Members of the
likely.25 European oil embargoes, greater Libyan nationalization,
112th Congress include the following.
and/or heightened instability in Algeria, if they ensue, also could
exert upward pressure.
• Humanitarian Assistance.
• Suspending Foreign Assistance (see “U.S. Foreign Assistance to Libya” below).
• International Arms Embargoes.
• Investigation and/or Prosecution of International Human Rights Violations.
23 Tamsin Carlisle, “Libya unrest unnerves oil markets as supplies seriously disrupted,” The National, February 25,
2011.
24 “Libya: Oil Companies Announce Break with Gadhafi,” STRATFOR, February 24, 2011.
25 Krauss, “Why the Disruption of Libyan Oil Has Led to a Price Spike,” op. cit.
26 Ambassador Gene Cretz was recalled in January 2011, possibly at least partly owing to leaks of internal U.S.
diplomatic communications about Qadhafi.
27 For more information, see the U.S. Commercial Service’s Libya page at http://www.buyusa.gov/libya/en/
doingbusinessinlibya.html.
28 Tom Malinowski, “Too Little, Not Yet Too Late,” foreignpolicy.com, February 22, 2011. See also Josh Rogin,
“Senators and experts call on Obama to take stronger measures against Qaddafi,” thecable.foreignpolicy.com, February
25, 2010.
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• Economic Sanctions and/or Travel Bans. Imposing or reimposing unilateral
and/or multilateral sanctions against Libya and firms that do business with or in
Libya, possibly including travel bans and asset freezes targeting the Qadhafis and
individuals and entities aligned with them.
• “No-fly Zones.” Establishing and enforcing these zones within Libya and/or at its
borders in order to (1) prevent the Qadhafi regime from using aircraft for attacks
against its people and (2) prevent the importation of mercenaries and arms from
other countries.
• Direct Intervention or Threats. Ranging from intervention narrowly targeted to
accomplish humanitarian purposes such as providing health care, delivering
supplies, or evacuating foreign nationals; to intervention or threats of
intervention aimed at supporting Libyan rebels, deterring or apprehending
individuals suspected of human rights violations, and/or ousting the Qadhafi
regime.29
Many analysts are debating whether particular options should be carried out unilaterally,
multilaterally, or both. Choosing unilateral action over multilateral action could improve response
time at the expense of effectiveness, international legitimacy, and future prospects for multilateral
cooperation.30 Given ongoing turmoil across the region, any step taken regarding Libya is likely
to set a precedent for U.S. and international involvement in other current or future crises. Even
confining international action to the delivery of humanitarian assistance could be dangerous and
trigger significant unintended consequences, particularly with thousands of U.S. citizens and
other foreign nationals still in Libya. Additionally, reactions to a potential U.S. or other Western
military deployment or to an international human rights investigation could be difficult to predict
among key actors within Libya, as well as among nearby regimes and populations.
In the context of President Obama’s February 23 pledge to consider the “full range of options,”
the State Department announced on February 25 that it is suspending operations in Libya—but
has not broken off diplomatic relations—and on the same day White House Press Secretary Jay
Carney revealed U.S. plans to impose unilateral economic sanctions against the Qadhafi regime,
without providing specific details. Past U.S. sanctions specifically aimed at Libya included (1)
banning all U.S.-Libya trade, including oil imports (1986-2004), (2) freezing the U.S. assets of
the Libyan government and affiliated individuals and entities (1986-2004), and (3) prohibiting
U.S. airline flights to Libya (1992-2004).31 In addition, from 1996 to 2006, legislation known as
the Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996 (P.L. 104-172) authorized sanctions against firms doing
29 See “Turtle Bay to the Rescue,” Wall Street Journal, February 23, 2011, which argued: “Opposition forces need to
be able to communicate with each other and the outside world without having their signals jammed, and here too the
U.S. can help. And while the U.S. and its allies may not be prepared to intervene militarily, merely the threat of
destroying the Libyan air force if it continues to bombard civilians could persuade its airmen to defect to the side of the
opposition, thereby hastening the regime’s demise and bringing the killing to a halt.”
30 See, e.g., Ed Pilkington, “UN ambassadors clash over condemnation of Gaddafi,” Guardian (UK), February 23,
2011.
31 These sanctions were imposed pursuant to Executive Orders 12543, 12544, and 12801 under the authority of the
National Emergencies Act (P.L. 94-412) and the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (P.L. 95-223). In
1982, President Ronald Reagan initially banned Libyan oil imports to the United States pursuant to Proclamation 4907
under the authority of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 (19 U.S.C. 1862), and in 1985 expanded the ban to all
petroleum products pursuant to Executive Order 12538 under the authority of the International Security and
Development Cooperation Act of 1985 (P.L. 99-83).
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business with or in Libya.32 The United Nations (until 2003) and European Union (until 2004)
also previously maintained sanctions against Libya.
The Uprising’s Origins
The National Conference for the Libyan Opposition (NLCO, an umbrella organization of
opposition groups headed by the National Libyan Salvation Front (NLSF)—see “Exiles” below)
and Internet-based organizers called for a “day of rage” to take place on February 17.33 Similar
events had been organized by anti-government groups in many other countries in the Middle East
and North Africa over the previous month. On February 17, hundreds of protestors took to the
streets in Benghazi and in other cities in its vicinity.34 Additional protests were reported in Az
Zintan, approximately 100 miles southwest of Tripoli.
Reports indicate that at least 24 and possibly more than 50 people were killed on February 17
when Libyan government forces fired on crowds with live ammunition in an attempt to disperse
them.35 On February 18, demonstrators in Benghazi reportedly numbered in the thousands or tens
of thousands, and violent crackdowns by government security forces and affiliated “revolutionary
committees,” possibly including forces brought in from other parts of the country, reportedly
continued. While unrest intensified in Benghazi and other parts of eastern Libya, Tripoli and most
of western Libya reportedly remained under tighter government control until February 20. On
February 17, Libyan state television broadcast images of Muammar al Qadhafi driving through
Tripoli and rallying thousands of ostensible supporters. Other pro-Qadhafi rallies were reportedly
organized throughout the country.36
The ongoing unrest in Libya can be traced back to mid-January 2011, as part of the region-wide
wave of popular protests—beginning in Tunisia in December 2010—against repression, political
corruption, and poor and/or inequitable economic conditions. Although the Libyan government
announced housing benefits and price controls,37 and released 110 members of the opposition
Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (see “Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG)” below) in attempts
to placate popular discontent, grievances persisted. They were possibly fueled by the other
protests taking place throughout the region, particularly in Libya’s eastern neighbor Egypt, where
the military took power from President Hosni Mubarak on February 11. On the evening of
February 15, the demonstrations that led directly to the uprising began when several hundred
people gathered in front of the Benghazi police headquarters to protest the arrest of attorney and
human rights activist Fethi Tarbel. As the February 17 “day of rage” neared, protests escalated in
Benghazi and other cities despite reported police attempts at dispersion with water cannons, tear
32 P.L. 104-172 remains in force in amended form. Following the 1996 deletion of provisions relating to Libya, it was
renamed the “Iran Sanctions Act.”
33 See Khaled Mahmoud, “Gaddafi ready for Libya’s ‘Day of Rage,’” Asharq al Awsat (English), February 9, 2011.
The “day of rage” also commemorated anti-government protests held exactly five years before, on February 17, 2006.
On that date, demonstrations in Benghazi initially organized to protest the Danish cartoons depicting the Muslim
prophet Muhammad turned into anti-government protests and led to protestors setting fire to the Italian consulate.
Libyan security forces killed at least nine protestors.
34 These cities include Al Bayda, Darnah, and Ajdabiya.
35 Tahani Karrar-Lewsley, “Human-Rights Groups Say Dozens Have Died in Libya,” Wall Street Journal, February 18,
2011.
36 Ibid.
37 “Libya sets up $24 bln fund for housing,” Reuters, January 27, 2011.
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gas, rubber bullets, and batons. There were multiple reports of protestors setting government
buildings on fire.
Qadhafi reportedly had privately warned Libyan political activists and media figures that the
government would hold them responsible for any disturbance of the peace.38 Additionally, the
London-based, Saudi-financed Arab news source Asharq al Awsat reported on February 9 that
“Libyan activists have claimed that the Libyan intelligence service has been carrying out a large-
scale campaign to shut down Libyan websites based outside of the country due to their ongoing
coverage of the situation in Libya.”39
Other Recent Developments
The Obama Administration’s FY2011 foreign assistance request for Libya included the following
items: $250,000 in Foreign Military Financing (FMF), $350,000 for International Military
Education and Training (IMET), and $275,000 in counterterrorism and border security assistance
(Nonproliferation, Anti-terrorism, Demining, and Related Programs, or NADR). The
Administration has not published its specific requests for Nonproliferation Disarmament Fund
(NDF) or Global Threat Reduction (GTR) programs, Middle East Partnership Initiative programs,
or Trans-Saharan Counterterrorism Partnership programs involving Libya. The State Department
estimated during FY2010 that the U.S. government would spend at least $780,000 on Libya
programs that year.
In August 2009, Scottish authorities released convicted Pan Am 103 bomber Abd al Baset Ali al
Megrahi on compassionate grounds in light of his diagnosis with terminal prostate cancer and a
medical prognosis that reportedly projected that he would die within three months. His release
was highly controversial, and outrage among some parties in the United Kingdom and United
States grew after Megrahi was greeted publicly by a cheering crowd upon his arrival in Tripoli.
Megrahi remains ill, but has survived longer than the reported prognosis used to justify his
release, leading members of the Scottish parliament to demand that their government provide
further information about the medical advice it relied upon as well as about Megrahi’s current
medical condition. The U.S. Department of Justice Foreign Claims Settlement Commission
(FCSC) is currently accepting and adjudicating various categories of terrorism-related claims in
accordance with the 2008 U.S.-Libya Claims Settlement Agreement and State Department letters
of referral. This includes claims related to the Pan Am 103 bombing.
Megrahi’s disputed release immediately preceded the September 2009 visit of Muammar al
Qadhafi to New York for the United Nations General Assembly; that visit in turn fueled
controversy over the Libyan leader’s accommodation during his stay and his remarks at the
meeting. New scrutiny of the release emerged in July 2010, when four U.S. Senators wrote to
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton urging the State Department to investigate claims that BP plc
sought to influence the decisions of the governments of the United Kingdom and Scotland
concerning Megrahi’s release. Those claims and responses from the relevant parties are reviewed
below (see “BP plc and UK-Libya Prisoner Transfer Agreement”).
38 Mahmoud, op. cit.
39 Ibid.
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In October 2009, Qadhafi called for his relatively reform-oriented son, Sayf al Islam, to take a
leadership position in the country. Sayf subsequently was appointed General Coordinator of the
Popular Social Command, a position which, before the 2011 uprising, was set to give him
substantive executive and oversight authority as the equivalent of head of state. Sayf’s support of
the regime’s crackdown against the uprising is likely to undo the perceptions of some who may
previously have been open to accepting his reformist credentials.
The appointment followed months of speculation about whether or not Sayf had fallen irreparably
out of favor among his father’s more conservative supporters. Mutassim al Qadhafi, another of
the leader’s sons, visited Washington in April 2009 in his official capacity as his father’s national
security adviser. He appeared publicly with U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, with whom he
reportedly discussed security cooperation, among other issues.
Political and Economic Profile
Muammar al Qadhafi: A Profile
Muammar al Qadhafi was born in 1942 near the central coastal city of Sirte. His Arabized Berber
family belongs to the relatively small Qadhafa tribe, and his upbringing was modest. As a young
man Qadhafi identified strongly with Arab nationalist and socialist ideologies espoused by leaders
such as Egypt’s Gamal Abdel Nasser. Although he was excluded from the elite Cyrenaica Defense
Forces on a tribal basis during the Libyan monarchy period (see Appendix A), Qadhafi was
commissioned as a regular army captain following stints at the Libyan military academy in
Benghazi and the United Kingdom’s Royal Military Academy at Sandhurst. Following his return
to Libya, he led the September 1, 1969, overthrow of the Libyan monarchy with a group of fellow
officers. He was 27 years old.
Qadhafi has proven to be a controversial, complex, and contradictory political survivor during his
long reign in Libya, in spite of numerous internal and external challenges to his rule. He has
exercised nearly complete, if, at times, indirect political control over Libya over the last 30-plus
years by carefully balancing and manipulating complex patronage networks, traditional tribal
structures, and byzantine layers of national, regional, and local governance. Libya’s foreign and
domestic policies nominally have been based on his personal ideology. In the past, Qadhafi and
his supporters have imposed his theories with realistic purpose and precision, not hesitating to
crush coup attempts, assassinate dissidents abroad, or sponsor violent movements and terrorist
attacks against Libya’s perceived external enemies. He has apparently taken similar actions in
response to the 2011 uprising against his rule, as described above.
Personally, Qadhafi often is described as mercurial, charismatic, shrewd, and reclusive. He is
married and has eight children: seven sons and one daughter. An April 1986 U.S. air strike in
retaliation for a Libyan-sponsored anti-American bombing in Berlin hit one of his homes in
Tripoli, killing his adopted infant daughter and hospitalizing members of his immediate family.
The incident reportedly continues to be a source of personal anger and resentment for Qadhafi: he
has preserved the bombed-out ruins of the home in the military compound where it stood, and he
remarked on the death of President Ronald Reagan in 2004 that the former U.S. President had
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died before he could be prosecuted for the “ugly crime that he committed in 1986 against the
Libyan children.”40
Political Dynamics
Libya’s often contradictory political dynamics are a product of competing interest groups seeking
to influence policy within the confines of the country’s authoritarian political system and amid
Libya’s emergence from international isolation. Elements of Muammar al Qadhafi’s ideology
permeate political discourse on many security and foreign policy issues, while in other cases,
such as economic reform, new frameworks are being embraced to meet society’s current and
changing needs. The legacies of colonial occupation and Libya’s struggle for independence
continue to influence Libyan politics; rhetorical references to preserving sovereignty and
resistance to foreign domination are common in political statements. Most Libyans also accept a
prominent role for Islamic tradition in public life: Islam is the official religion and the Quran is
the basis for the country’s law and its “social code.”
Tribal relationships remain important, particularly with regard to the distribution of leadership
roles in government ministries and in political-military relations. Tribal loyalties remain strong
within and between branches of the armed services, and members of Qadhafi’s tribe, the Qadhafa,
have held many high-ranking government positions, reportedly including key positions in the air
force. Members of larger, rival tribes, such as the Warfalla, have opposed the regime on grounds
of tribal discrimination. Some Libyan military and security officials staged limited, unsuccessful
coup attempts against Qadhafi in 1993 and 1996 based in part on tribal and familial rivalries. The
Qadhafi government has performed periodic reassignments and purges of the officer corps to
limit the likelihood of organized opposition reemerging from within the military. However, these
political considerations have affected the military’s preparedness and war fighting capability.
Political parties and all opposition groups are banned in Libya under law number 71 of 1972.
Formal political pluralism is frowned upon by many members of the ruling elite, even as an
increasing number of regime figures advocate for greater popular participation in existing
government institutions. Prior to the 2011 uprising, opposition groups, most notably the Muslim
Brotherhood, appear to have shifted their political strategies toward gradual attempts to influence
national policy making in contrast to others’ confrontational efforts to change the makeup of the
regime. Prominent figures in Libyan politics include Muammar al Qadhafi’s son Sayf al Islam al
Qadhafi,41 General People’s Committee Secretary Al Baghdadi Ali al Mahmudi, National Oil
Company chief Shukri Ghanem, Foreign Minister Musa Kusa, and prominent members of the
security establishment, including army leader and original RCC member Abu Bakr Younis Jaber.
Government Structure
Libya has a unique political system composed of nominally decentralized and participatory levels
of government. Muammar al Qadhafi and his closest supporters exercise final authority over
40 Khaled El-Deeb, “Gadhafi: Regrets Reagan Died Before Being Tried for 1986 Air Strikes on Libya,” Associated
Press, June 6, 2004.
41 For a detailed profile of Sayf al Islam al Qadhafi and a discussion of questions about the possibility of his succeeding
his father, see Yehudit Ronen, “Libya’s Rising Star: Said Al-Islam and Succession,” Middle East Policy, Vol. XII, No.
3, Fall 2005, pp. 136-44.
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domestic and foreign policies by means of their control of the implementation mechanisms of the
national government—the sizeable military and security apparatus and a handful of powerful
ministries. Qadhafi’s ideological emphasis on “the authority of the people” is the stated basis for
the operation of Libya’s multiple levels of government. Although participation in these
institutions is mostly open and political leaders routinely encourage citizens to take part in their
deliberations, most external observers regard Libya’s political system as largely authoritarian and
undemocratic. The U.S. State Department’s annual human rights reports document ongoing
restrictions on political life and human rights in Libya (see “Political Reform and Human Rights”
below).
The “Authority of the People”
A hierarchy of “people’s congresses” make up Libya’s government and serve as venues for the
exercise of “popular authority” as defined by Muammar al Qadhafi’s ideology. At the local level,
citizens meet in Basic People’s Congresses to appoint representatives to regional and ultimately
the national General People’s Congress. Participation in the basic congresses is open to all Libyan
citizens, although participation rates are notoriously low and Qadhafi regularly makes public
statements expressing his disappointment with participation levels and urging broader popular
involvement in public affairs. At the March 1, 2000, session of the General Peoples’ Congress,
Qadhafi abolished the positions of 12 General People’s Committee (cabinet-equivalent)
secretaries and reassigned their duties to provincial committees. Secretariats of foreign affairs,
justice, public security, and finance remained under the authority of the centralized General
People’s Committee. Some experts have argued that the decentralization was designed to deflect
popular criticism from the central government and further dilute political opposition within the
country.
In March 2006, the Libyan government announced the replacement of Secretary (prime minister-
equivalent) of the General People’s Committee Shukri Ghanem by former Health Minister Al
Baghdadi Ali al Mahmudi. A cabinet reshuffle and the creation of seven new ministries also were
announced. The replacement of the reform-oriented Ghanem was interpreted by some observers
as an effort by conservative and hard-line elements of the Libyan political establishment to
reassert control over the speed and direction of Libya’s reform efforts. Ghanem now serves as the
director of the National Oil Company, where he is involved with ongoing international bidding
for oil exploration and production-sharing agreements. A further reshuffle in March 2009 elevated
longtime intelligence chief Musa Kusa to the position of Foreign Minister, and further changes in
the leadership of the General People’s Congress were enacted in January 2010.
Proposals for the Dissolution of State Ministries and Revenue Distribution
In March 2008, Qadhafi announced his intention to dissolve most government administrative
bodies and institute a Wealth Distribution Program whereby state oil revenues would be
distributed to citizens on a monthly basis for them to administer personally, in cooperation with
and via local committees.42 Citing popular criticism of government performance in a long, wide-
ranging speech, Qadhafi repeatedly stated that the traditional state would soon be “dead” in Libya
and that direct rule by citizens would be accomplished through the distribution of oil revenues.
42 BBC Monitoring Middle East, “Libyan leader says cabinet must be dismantled,” March 2, 2008; and, “Libyan Leader
Addresses Libyan People’s Congress; Dissolves Cabinet,” OSC Report GMP20080305864001, March 3, 2008.
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Defense, foreign affairs, security, and oil production arrangements reportedly would remain
national government responsibilities, while other bodies would be phased out. In early 2009,
Libya’s Basic People’s Congresses considered variations of the proposals, and the General
People’s Congress voted to delay implementation. Prior to the 2011 uprising, there was no
indication that action on the initiative was forthcoming.
Opposition Groups
As has been seen during the 2011 uprising discussed above, the government has dealt harshly
with opposition leaders and groups over the last four decades, establishing special “people’s
courts” and “revolutionary committees” to enforce ideological and political discipline and to
punish violators and dissidents. Abroad, Libyan intelligence personnel have monitored, harassed,
and, in some cases, assassinated expatriate dissidents, some of whom were referred to as “stray
dogs.” In past years, some in the Libyan establishment have reached out to opposition figures and
exiles, facilitating engagement and negotiating the return of some former regime opponents to
Libya.
Libya’s myriad opposition movements can be categorized broadly as Islamist, royalist, or
democratic in orientation. However, prior to the 2011 uprising, their activities and effectiveness
had been largely limited by disorganization, rivalry, and ideological differences. New efforts to
coordinate opposition activities had begun in response to Libya’s reintegration to the international
community and the emergence of a broader political reform debate in the Arab world, and gained
momentum with the outbreak of region-wide protests and political change in late 2010 and early
2011. Nevertheless, the extent of coherent organization or coordination among the anti-regime
forces involved in the 2011 uprising is unclear.
Exiles
In the past, government officials and intelligence operatives have monitored and taken violent
action against expatriate opposition groups and leaders, including in Europe and the United
States. Clandestine opposition groups also have carried out assassinations and attacks against
Libyan government officials abroad. Opposition groups in exile include the National Alliance, the
Libyan National Movement (LNM), the Libyan Movement for Change and Reform, the Islamist
Rally, the National Libyan Salvation Front (NLSF), and the Republican Rally for Democracy and
Justice. A royalist contingent based on the claim to the throne by Mohammed al Sanusi, the
grandson of the former king, is based in London. These groups and others held an opposition
conference—known as the National Conference for the Libyan Opposition (NCLO)—in July
2005 in London and issued a “national accord,” calling for the removal of Qadhafi from power
and the establishment of a transitional government.43 A follow-up meeting was held in March
2008.44 The NCLO reportedly helped lead the call for the February 17, 2011, “day of rage” that
helped catalyze protests into a full-blown uprising against the Qadhafi regime (see “The
Uprising’s Origins” above).
43 May Youssef, “Anti-Gaddafists Rally in London,” Al Ahram Weekly (Cairo), No. 749, June 30 - July 6, 2005; Al
Jazeera (Doha), “Opposition Plans to Oust Al Qadhafi,” June 25, 2005; Middle East Mirror, “Libya’s Fractured
Opposition,” July 29, 2005.
44 “Libyan Opposition Groups Meet in London To Reiterate Commitment To Save Libya,” OSC Report
GMP20080329825012, March 29, 2008.
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In a September 2005 interview, then-Foreign Minister Abd al Rahman Shalgam characterized
some of the regime’s expatriate opponents as individuals who fled the country after committing
economic crimes or collaborating with foreign intelligence services. He then invited any
expatriate dissidents who had not committed crimes to return to Libya.45 In August 2005, the
government announced the return of 787 exiles who agreed to reconcile with the Qadhafi
regime.46 Regional observers characterized the return of prominent dissidents in August 2006 as
evidence of an unofficial reconciliation program between the Libyan government and its
expatriate opponents.47 The Qadhafi Development Foundation reportedly facilitated the return of
a group of 33 exiles in January 2010.48
The Muslim Brotherhood
Like other political organizations and opposition groups, the Muslim Brotherhood is banned in
Libya under law number 71 of 1972. Since the late 1940s, when members of the Egyptian
Muslim Brotherhood first entered Libya following a crackdown on their activities, the Libyan
Muslim Brotherhood has existed as a semi-official organization. Hundreds of Brotherhood
members and activists were jailed in 1973, although the Brotherhood eventually reemerged and
operated as a clandestine organization for much of the following two decades. In 1998, a second
round of mass arrests took place, and 152 Brotherhood leaders and members were arrested.
Several reportedly died in custody, and, following trials in 2001 and 2002, two prominent
Brotherhood leaders were sentenced to death and over 70 were sentenced to life in prison. The
government announced a retrial for the imprisoned Brotherhood activists in October 2005, and in
March 2006, the group’s 84 remaining imprisoned members were released.49
The controller general of the Libyan Muslim Brotherhood, Suleiman Abdel Qadir, describes the
Brotherhood’s objectives as peaceful and policy-focused, and has called for the cancellation of
laws restricting political rights.50 Sayf al Islam al Qadhafi has reached out to the Libyan Muslim
Brotherhood by publicly characterizing the organization as nonviolent and non-seditious. Abdel
Qadir responded to political reform statements by Sayf al Islam al Qadhafi in 2007 with calls for
more inclusive, consultative decision making.51 In a November 2008 interview with Qatar-based
satellite television channel Al Jazeera, Abdel Qadir expressed appreciation for the younger
Qadhafi’s attempt, while noting that the fact that outreach has taken place under the auspices of
the Qadhafi Foundation and not through official state organs undermines their significance. He
also repeated calls for reform and reconciliation aimed at creating a constitution and protecting
civil rights for Libyans.52
45 “Libya’s Shalgam on Ties With US, S. Arabia, Opposition,” OSC Report GMP20050924512001, September 24,
2005.
46 UPI, “Libya Says Hundreds Return From Exile,” August 20, 2005.
47 Khalid Mahmoud, “Libya: Surprise Return of More Opponents Following Secret Contacts,” Al Sharq al Awsat
(London), August 19, 2006.
48 “Libyan Opposition Members Reportedly Return Home,” OSC Report GMP20100102950009, January 2, 2010.
49 Afaf El-Geblawi, “Libya Frees All Jailed Muslim Brotherhood Members,” Agence France Presse, March 3, 2006.
50 “Al Jazirah TV Interviews Libyan Muslim Brotherhood Leader on Current Situation,” OSC Report -
GMP20050803550006, August 3, 2005.
51 “Libyan MB Concerned Over Sayf al-Islam’s Statements Regarding New Constitution,” OSC Report -
GMP20070830282001, August 30, 2007.
52 “Libyan Muslim Brotherhood Official on Libya’s Foreign, Domestic Politics,” OSC Report - GMP20081111635001,
November 10, 2008.
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Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG)
The Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG) is a violent Islamist movement opposed to the
Qadhafi government. Its imprisoned leaders have been engaged in a dialogue with the Qadhafi
Foundation for several years, and over 200 LIFG members have been released, including 110 at
the outset of the 2011 uprising. In 2009, some of the group’s leaders issued a lengthy series of
writings, referred to as “the recantations,” outlining their rejection of the use of violence (see
below). However, Libyan and U.S. concerns about LIFG’s domestic and international activities
persist. According to the Department of State, the LIFG has attempted to assassinate Qadhafi,
most recently in 1996, and may have participated in the planning of the May 2003 suicide
bombings in Casablanca, Morocco.53 The group’s reported ties with Al Qaeda came under
scrutiny in July 2009 after group members based in Britain reportedly renounced the group’s
affiliation with Al Qaeda, and contrasted the LIFG with others who use indiscriminate bombing
and target civilians. In November 2007, Al Qaeda figures Ayman al Zawahiri and Abu Layth al
Libi announced the merger of the LIFG with Al Qaeda, which many terrorism analysts viewed at
the time as having political rather than operational relevance.54 Al Libi was killed in an air strike
in Pakistan in February 2008.
Al Qaeda Affiliation and Recantations
In a July 2009 statement, LIFG members in Britain characterized the November 2007 Al Qaeda
affiliation announcement from Al Libi as “a personal decision that is at variance with the basic
status of the group,” and sought to “clearly emphasize that the group is not, has never been, and
will never be, linked to the Al Qaeda organization.”55 The statement stressed that LIFG members
abroad support “the dialogue underway between the group’s leadership and the Libyan regime if
it should lead to an end to bloodletting, the release of prisoners, the spreading of security and
justice, the reunion of families, and to permitting preaching, educational, and political activities.”
The statement warned that the group would “preserve [its] lawful and natural right to oppose the
regime if it does not turn its back on its previous policy that has led to tension and deadlock.”
Sayf al Islam al Qadhafi oversaw an effort to engage with LIFG leaders in an effort to encourage
them to renounce violence and links with other violent groups. Reports on the dialogue suggested
it was similar to processes in other countries such as Egypt and Saudi Arabia. In 2009, the
government and the LIFG reached an agreement in which LIFG leaders renounced violence
against the Libyan state, and, later in 2009, the dialogue resulted in the issuance of written
“recantations” of the LIFG’s former views on religion and violence.56 In October 2009, over 40
LIFG prisoners were released, alongside other Islamists.
53 U.S. Department of State, “Libya,” Country Reports on Terrorism 2004, April 2005.
54 “Al-Zawahiri, Al-Libi: Libyan Islamic Fighting Group Joins Al-Qa’ida,” OSC Report - FEA20071104393586,
November 3, 2007.
55 “Libyan Islamic Fighting Group Abroad Issues Statement Supporting Regime Dialogue.” OSC Report -
GMP20090703825003, July 3, 2009.
56 “Report on ‘Seething Anger’ in Libya Over Dismantling Al Qa’ida-Linked Cells,” OSC Report
GMP20080630825001 June 30, 2008; “Libya: Jailed Islamic Group Leaders ‘Preparing’ To Renounce Armed
Violence,” OSC Report GMP20080706837002, July 6, 2008; “Libyan Islamic Fighting Group Source Announces
Ideology Revision Nearly Complete,” OSC Report GMP20090615825012, June 15, 2009; and OSC Reports,
GMP20090911452001, GMP20090911452002, GMP2009091145200, GMP20090910488004, GMP20090911452004,
GMP20090915452001, “Libyan Newspaper Publishes Libyan Fighting Group Retractions,” September 2009.
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The United States froze the LIFG’s U.S. assets under Executive Order 13224 in September 2001,
and formally designated the LIFG as a Foreign Terrorist Organization in December 2004. In
February 2006, the U.S. Department of the Treasury designated five individuals and four entities
in the United Kingdom as Specially Designated Global Terrorists for their role in supporting the
LIFG.57 On October 30, 2008, Treasury designated three more LIFG financiers.58 Some observers
characterized the designations as a U.S. gesture of solidarity with the Libyan government and
argued that the ability and willingness of the LIFG to mount terror attacks in Libya may have
been limited. Others claimed that some LIFG fighters were allied with other violent Islamist
groups operating in the trans-Sahara region, and cited evidence of Libyan fighters joining the
Iraqi insurgency as an indication of ongoing Islamist militancy in Libya and a harbinger of a
possible increase in violence associated with fighters returning from Iraq.59 Prior to the 2011
uprising that began in eastern Libya, reports suggested that the region could be a stronghold for
LIFG members and other extremist groups that might pose a threat to Libya’s security.
Political Reform and Human Rights
The 2009 U.S. Department of State report on human rights in Libya (released March 11, 2010)
characterizes Libya’s human rights record as “poor.”60 According to the report:
Continuing problems included reported disappearances; torture; arbitrary arrest; lengthy
pretrial and sometimes incommunicado detention; official impunity; and poor prison
conditions. Denial of fair public trial by an independent judiciary, political prisoners and
detainees, and the lack of judicial recourse for alleged human rights violations were also
problems.61
The report also stated that “security personnel reportedly routinely tortured prisoners during
interrogations or as punishment,” but added that reports of instances of torture had declined over
the last year according to foreign observers. The Qadhafi Development Foundation’s Human
Rights Society issued a report in December 2009 stating that the Society had “received a large
number of complaints regarding cases of torture, ill-treatment, unlawful and unjustified detention,
denial of freedom, and a clear premeditated violation of the law.”
Between 2003 and the 2011 uprising, Libyan political figures, including Muammar al Qadhafi
and his son Sayf al Islam al Qadhafi, made a series of public statements and policy
announcements in an effort to repair Libya’s reputation with regard to human rights practices.
Some tangible steps were taken, and Libyan authorities reported that legal reforms were
underway to possibly improve the protections and rights afforded to citizens. Judicial entities
associated with human rights abuses and political control in the past, such as “revolutionary
courts” and “people’s courts,” reportedly were dismantled. As a result, some observers expressed
cautious optimism that political, social, and religious freedom would improve in Libya. Others
57 U.S. Department of the Treasury, “Treasury Designates UK-Based Individuals, Entities Financing Al Qaida-
Affiliated LIFG,” JS-4016, February 8, 2006.
58 U.S. Department of the Treasury, “Three LIFG Members Designation for Terrorism,” HP-1244, October 30, 2008.
59 Alison Pargeter, “Militant Groups Pose Security Challenge for Libyan Regime,” Janes Intelligence Review, Vol. 17,
No. 8, August 2005, pp. 16-19.
60 U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, Country Reports on Human Rights
Practices, Libya - 2009, March 11, 2010.
61 Ibid.
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continued to warn that such reforms might have been merely cosmetic and meant to support the
government’s efforts to improve its domestic legitimacy and international standing.
A December 2009 Human Rights Watch report concluded that
the past five years have witnessed an improvement in the human rights situation, though far
less than promised or required. There are less frequent reports of arbitrary arrests and
enforced disappearances compared to the two previous decades. There has been greater
tolerance of freedom of expression and some progress in addressing gross violations of the
past, though this remains very unpredictable.62
As discussed above, a number of U.S. and international officials, human rights organizations,
media sources, analysts, and other eyewitnesses have alleged that the Qadhafi regime has violated
human rights laws and norms by reason of its violent crackdown against the 2011 uprising. Many
believe that outside intervention of some kind is advisable or necessary in order to prevent a
further escalation of violence, bloodshed, and human rights abuses.
Legal and Institutional Reform
Libyan law prohibits the activities of all political opposition groups and restricts the free exercise
of speech and the press.63 Since Qadhafi’s 1969 coup, little legal recourse has been available to
citizens accused of political crimes. Nevertheless, officials had announced plans to embark upon
a full review of the country’s Penal Code and Code of Criminal Procedure to eliminate restrictive
laws regarding political activity. Sayf al Islam al Qadhafi also had called for a constitution to
clarify the power of different legislative, executive, and judicial institutions in Libya and had
endorsed ongoing legal reforms as a means to “provide a free environment that is suitable for a
normal political life.”64 He renewed these calls in an August 2007 speech and indicated that a
constitutional drafting process would begin. The speech called for the guarantee of “independent
institutions,” including the central bank, the supreme court, the media, and civil society. He also
outlined four “red lines” to guide reform efforts: Islamic law, the territorial integrity of Libya,
security and stability, and “Muammar al Qadhafi.”65
In support of the reform efforts, some institutional changes had been instituted to improve
political and human rights conditions. In March 2004, the General People’s Committee
Secretariat of Justice and Public Security was split into two separate secretariats in an effort to
establish greater judicial independence. In January 2005, the General People’s Congress approved
a law abolishing judicial institutions known as “people’s courts” and “revolutionary courts” that
tried suspected regime opponents, sometimes in secret. International human rights organizations
62 Human Rights Watch, “Truth and Justice Can’t Wait: Human Rights Developments in Libya Amid Institutional
Obstacles,” December 12, 2009. Available at http://www.hrw.org/node/87097.
63 According to the U.S. State Department, Libyan law provides for freedom of speech “within the limits of public
interest and principles of the Revolution.” In practice, criticism of the government and Qadhafi are restricted and often
punished. By law, most print and broadcast media in Libya are owned and operated by government authorities, and the
activities of private newspapers and broadcasters have come under scrutiny since early 2009, when outlets that had
been given limited space to practice independent journalism were renationalized. Satellite television and Internet access
are limited and partially censored.
64 “Libyan Leader’s Son on Call to Reopen Human Rights Files,” OSC Report - GMP20050820537003, August 20,
2005.
65 “Libyan Leader’s Son Outlines his Version of Democracy,” OSC Report - GMP20070823950058, August 20, 2007.
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welcomed the abolition of the people’s court system as an “important step” and urged Libyan
authorities to grant new trials to prisoners convicted by the courts, including several who were
convicted in late 2004. In December 2009, the Qadhafi Development Foundation called for the
abolition of the State Security Court, which had in some instances assumed the former activities
of the people’s court system.
Human Rights Monitoring
The Libyan government has not permitted the establishment of independent human rights
organizations but invited international human rights groups Amnesty International and Human
Rights Watch to Libya for the first time in 15 years in 2004. In late 2004 and early 2005,
representatives from both organizations toured various security facilities and prisons and met with
selected imprisoned dissidents. A January 2006 Human Rights Watch report based on research
conducted during the visit concluded that “Libyan leader Muammar al Qadhafi and his inner
circle appear unwilling to implement genuine reform, especially in the areas of free expression
and association,” although the Libyan government had taken “some positive steps” to improve
human rights conditions since 2003.66 Sayf al Islam al Qadhafi had publicly supported a pro-
human rights agenda and created the Human Rights Society to operate under the auspices of the
Qadhafi Development Foundation.
Fathi al Jahmi
The death of Fathi al Jahmi, Libya’s most internationally recognized political prisoner, shortly
after his release from Libyan custody in May 2009, brought a negative end to a long-running
issue of contention in U.S.-Libyan relations. Al Jahmi was imprisoned in 2002 after publicly
calling for elections and press reforms and for criticizing Muammar al Qadhafi and the
government. President George W. Bush praised Al Jahmi’s subsequent release in March 2004
under a suspended sentence, but Al Jahmi was soon rearrested after he repeated his calls for
reform and expanded his criticism of Qadhafi in interviews with regional satellite channels,
including U.S.-funded Al Hurra. Al Jahmi subsequently was detained and remained in ill health
throughout his detention. Bush Administration officials repeatedly called for Al Jahmi’s release,67
and U.S. officials, including Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, reportedly raised the issue in
private with their Libyan interlocutors.68 On March 17, 2009, U.S. State Department spokesman
Robert Wood stated that the Obama Administration continued to call for Al Jahmi’s
“unconditional release, as well as his ability to travel and seek medical care where he wishes.” In
response to the news of his death, State Department spokesman Ian Kelly said, “we had
welcomed his release to Jordan. We regret that his poor state of health, however, did not allow
him to fully recover upon transfer.”
66 Human Rights Watch, “Libya: Words to Deeds The Urgent Need for Human Rights Reform,” Volume 18, No. 1(E),
January 2006.
67 On March 31, 2008, the U.S. Department of State issued a statement urging “the Libyan government to fulfill their
promise to release without condition” prominent political activist Fathi al Jahmi. U.S. Department of State Deputy
Spokesman Tom Casey, Press Statement: Washington, DC, March 31, 2008.
68 Issues Related to United States Relations With Libya On-the-Record Briefing Washington, DC, May 15, 2006.
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Libyan Foreign Policy
Libyan foreign policy since the 1990s has been defined by a shift from engagement with other
Arab states to a greater focus on Africa. The prominent role played by Libyan leader Muammar al
Qadhafi has ensured that foreign relations remain personality driven, somewhat unpredictable,
and characterized by close relationships with non-state actors and opposition movements in a
number of neighboring states. As discussed above, in recent years, Qadhafi publicly maintained
his opposition to Arab engagement with Israel in the face of continued Israeli military occupation
and settlement activity in the West Bank. He also called for a “one state solution” based on
reconciliation between the Israeli and Palestinian people within a single state, which he proposes
be called “Isratine.” Qadhafi has criticized the Arab League’s Arab Peace Initiative, arguing that it
does not represent the views of all Arabs and would be detrimental to the interests of Palestinians.
Qadhafi’s diplomatic engagement in Africa remained active through early 2011, particularly his
efforts to mediate between governments and rebel factions in neighboring Sudan, Niger, and
Chad and his proposals for the establishment of an United States of Africa, which many African
leaders consider quixotic and regard with suspicion. Qadhafi’s term as chairman of the African
Union during 2009 created opportunities for him to advocate for greater African unity and for a
more powerful voice for the African Union in international bodies. However, his attempts to
extend his tenure as chairman were unsuccessful.
Prior to the 2011 uprising, Libyan defense officials informed their U.S. Defense Department
counterparts that the Libyan government opposed the potential introduction of non-African
military forces to the continent on a permanent basis. Libyan officials reportedly supported the
proposed security capacity building mission of the new U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM), if
only in general terms.69 The Arab Maghreb Union, of which Libya is a member, rejected the
presence of foreign military forces on its members’ territory at a 2007 summit in Rabat, a move
seen as underscoring Libya’s opposition to stationing of U.S. forces in North Africa under the
new command.70 AFRICOM’s Deputy for Military Operations, Rear Admiral Robert Moeller, has
stated that “U.S.-AFRICOM does not need to station large operational units across the African
continent,” and that “small numbers of forces will come to the continent to do a particular activity
and then ... depart.”71 AFRICOM Commander General William “Kip” Ward met with Qadhafi in
Libya in May 2009, and then-U.S. Ambassador to Libya Gene Cretz indicated during a March
2010 trip to Washington, DC, that U.S.-Libya military dialogue would begin in earnest in 2010.
U.S.-Libya military relations following the 2011 uprising will likely depend on the uprising’s
outcome and possibly a number of other factors within Libya, regionally, and internationally.
69 Testimony of Theresa M. Whelan, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Africa before the Africa and Global
Health Subcommittee of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, August 2, 2007.
70 Libyan Foreign Minister Abd al Rahman Shalgam stated, “The Arab Maghreb Union (AMU) will not allow the
presence of any foreign soldier on its soil, because people in this region object to that, the authorities are not thinking of
such presence and even others are aware of the fact that this region will not accept the presence of any kind of foreign
troops on its territory.” “Libyan Foreign Minister on Maghreb Union, US Military Command in Africa,” OSC Report
GMP20071201950028, November 30, 2007.
71 Voice of America, “U.S. Military Delegation in Nigeria for AFRICOM Talks,” November 29, 2007.
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Energy and the Libyan Economy
Until the discovery of oil in 1959, Libya’s economic viability was seriously questioned by many
outside observers. Foreign aid and subsidies largely supported the national budget, until the
introduction of massive amounts of oil revenue transformed the country’s economy and social
fabric. Following the September 1, 1969, military coup, Qadhafi and his government restructured
Libya’s economy along socialist lines, placing a heavy emphasis on national management of
industry and resource allocation. However, the economy remained highly dependent on oil
revenue and thus highly vulnerable to fluctuations in global oil prices.72 The government had
announced its intention to reverse state ownership trends associated with the country’s long
experiment with socialism. Economic diversification and resource management remain
challenges for the government and private sector as they seek to revive the economy and
capitalize on interest from foreign investors.
Oil revenue has been the lifeblood of the Libyan economy and government since exports began in
1961, constituting an estimated 80% of Libya’s government revenue73 and 55% of its gross
domestic product. Rising oil prices through mid-2008 spurred corresponding growth in the
economy. Libyan leader Muammar al Qadhafi stated that Libyans have been “very happy” with
higher price levels in the global oil market, although he underlined the importance of creating
alternative sources of revenue and economic growth in public statements.74 Maintaining
hydrocarbon exports and general economic stability amid and following the 2011 uprising—
particularly given the likelihood of substantial casualties, population displacement, disruption of
normal life, property damage, and possibly long-term political instability—could present a
significant challenge for Libya.
Oil Reserves and Production Capacity
According to Oil and Gas Journal, Libya’s proven oil reserves are estimated at 43.7 billion
barrels (ninth-largest in the world). The Libyan National Oil Company (NOC) manages oil
production activity and negotiates exploration and production agreements with foreign
companies. Oil exploration and production are carried out on the basis of a 1955 oil law, and
Libyan authorities reportedly are drafting a new law to govern production activities and reform
the foreign investment approval process. Foreign investment is regulated through exploration and
production agreements negotiated by foreign companies and the NOC. In September 2006, Libya
established a Council for Oil and Gas Affairs to regulate oil and gas exploration and production
and to approve decisions about the development of the oil and gas sector.75 Most of Libya’s oil is
exported to Italy, Germany, France, and Spain. However, following the resumption of crude oil
exports to the United States in June 2004, oil shipments to U.S. refiners have increased, from
72 See Dirk Vandewalle, Libya Since Independence, Cornell Univ. Press, Ithaca, 1998.
73 International Monetary Fund, Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya: 2009 Article IV Consultation—Staff
Report, IMF Country Report No. 09/294, September 2009.
74 “Libyan Leader Says ‘Problems Abroad’ Solved,” OSC Report GMP20050919710040, September 19, 2005; Reuters,
“Libya Very Happy With High Oil Prices - Gaddafi,” July 4, 2005.
75 The prime minister serves as the chairman of the Council. Other members include outside experts, the head of the
NOC, the ministers of economy, trade, employment, finance, and the central bank governor. Vahe Petrossian, “Libya
Sees Panel on the Fast Track,” Upstream, September 15 2006; and, Reuters, “Libya Oil Licensing Round Attracts
Many Offers - NOC,” September 26, 2006.
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56,000 barrels per day in 2005 to an average of 102,000 barrels per day in 2008.76 In 2009, the
average declined slightly to 77,000 barrels per day.77
Until recently, Libyan oil production had steadily declined from its peak of 3.3 million barrels per
day (b/d) in 1970 due to the deterioration of production equipment and infrastructure related to
strict investment controls and international sanctions. According to the U.S. Energy Information
Administration, Libya produced an average of 1.88 million barrels per day (b/d) in 2008, which
officials have stated is currently the sector’s maximum capacity. Since the termination of U.N.
and U.S. sanctions in 2003 and 2004, Libya has sought foreign investment to rehabilitate and
expand its oil production capacity and expects $11 billion in oil production related investment
from 2005 to 2015. Current government production targets are 2.3 million b/d by 2013.78
At the outset of the February 2011 uprising, Russia’s Gazprom acquired half of Italian company
Eni’s operations in Libya’s so-called “Elephant” oil field. The acquisition remains subject to
Libyan approval.
Natural Gas
Libya’s proven natural gas reserves are estimated to be 54 trillion cubic feet, although, like the
country’s oil reserves, Libya’s gas holdings may be significantly higher given the generally
under-explored status of Libyan territory. As with oil production, the development of natural gas
production and export capacity has been limited by restrictive investment policies and
international sanctions. Nevertheless, Libya has been able to use natural gas for some domestic
power generation and for limited exports to some European countries. Royal Dutch Shell is
currently exploring for natural gas deposits and has developed a plan to upgrade Libya’s aging
liquefied natural gas plant at Marsa al Brega.79 Libyan authorities also are reportedly pursuing
pipeline agreements with neighboring North African states to improve export access to European
markets. In May 2007 representatives from BP plc announced the signing of an extensive natural
gas exploration and LNG export agreement with Libya. In July 2008, representatives from
Gazprom visited Libya and expressed interest in purchasing Libya’s natural gas exports and
cooperating with Libya on new natural gas export pipelines to Europe. According to Gazprom,
Libya and Gazprom decided “to initiate the thematic negotiations on the purchase of the currently
available hydrocarbon volumes from the Libyan party.”80
76 U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA), Libya Country Analysis Brief, July 2009.
77 CRS calculation based on EIA U.S. Imports by Country of Origin data, Monthly-thousand barrels per day, available
at http://tonto.eia.doe.gov/dnav/pet/pet_move_impcus_a2_nus_ep00_im0_mbblpd_m.htm.
78 EIA, Libya Country Analysis Brief, July 2009.
79 WWP Report on Oil, Gas & Petrochemicals, “Libya: Multi-billion Dollar Joint Venture Agreement to Modernize
Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) Plant,” June 1, 2005.
80 Polya Lesova, “Gazprom seeks to buy all of Libya’s oil, gas exports,” MarketWatch, July 10, 2008.
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Military Profile and WMD Disarmament
The Libyan Military
Structure, Training, and Equipment
Libya’s mostly conscripted military forces are small relative to the large amount of weaponry at
their disposal (see Table 1 below). Most outside military analysts regard the training and
leadership of Libyan forces as poor and identify a lack of combined arms and joint service
planning as factors that limit their overall effectiveness. The Qadhafi government historically has
made the acquisition of weapons and equipment a higher priority than training or creating high-
quality military support infrastructure.
Table 1. Libyan Military Personnel
Service Personnel
Army (~ half conscript)
50,000
Air Force
18,000
Navy 8,000
Revolutionary Guard Corps
3,000
Reserve People’s Militia
40,000
Total 119,000
Sources: International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance, February 2010; Jaffee Center for
Strategic Studies, “Libya,” Middle East Military Balance, September 2007.
Libya’s army, navy, and air forces are equipped with a broad range of aging Soviet and Eastern
Bloc equipment, although the country’s poorly maintained inventories also include some U.S. and
Western European equipment, including French Mirage fighters and U.S. C-130 transports.81
Libya’s exorbitant military spending in the late 1970s and early 1980s yielded an unmanageable
crop of diverse weapon systems from various sources and manufacturers. Purchases declined
significantly during the 1990s because of international sanctions, which limited the revenue
available for defense spending. Libya’s current military leadership presides over a largely stored
and surplus catalog of weaponry with poor maintenance records.82 The military also lacks
sufficient numbers of trained personnel to operate the military equipment currently in its
possession.
81 Facts on File World News Digest, “U.S. Bars Libya Planes, Training,” September 20, 1975; and Washington Post,
“Libya’s Qaddafi Praises Carter, Urges Closer Ties,” June 13, 1977. In 2004, Libya sold 40 of its aging Mirage fighters
to Pakistan.
82 Senior Middle East security analyst Anthony Cordesman has described Libya as “the world’s largest military parking
lot.” For a more detailed profile of the Libyan military, see Anthony H. Cordesman, The Military Balance in the Middle
East, Center for Strategic and International Studies, March 15, 2004, pp. 79-85.
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Arms Sales83
The subject of renewed arms sales to Libya remains a sensitive subject in the United States and
some European countries whose citizens were killed in Libyan-sponsored terrorist attacks during
the 1980s. The European Union lifted its arms embargo against Libya in October 2004. The U.S.
ban on export of defense articles lapsed at the end of a 45-day congressional notification period,
on June 30, 2006. Prior to the 2011 uprising, Qadhafi reportedly had expressed interest in
procuring U.S., European, and Russian weapon systems. France, Spain, Ukraine, and Russia have
been among the countries reportedly interested in refurbishing and replacing Libya’s weapon
stocks.84 The United Kingdom’s Defense Export Services Organization (DESO) reportedly had
labeled Libya a “priority” market in documents promoting exports by UK arms manufacturers,
and press reports had detailed meetings between DESO representatives and Libyan authorities
since 2004.85
In August 2007, the European aerospace and defense group EADS signed a contract to provide
Milan anti-tank missiles to Libya in the wake of a visit by French President Nicolas Sarkozy to
negotiate the release of imprisoned Bulgarian medics. Both sides denied any quid pro quo
arrangement. France is upgrading several 1970s era Mirage F-1 fighters in Libyan possession.86
In conjunction with a state visit by then-Russian President Vladimir Putin in April 2008, a
number of potential arms sales were discussed by the Russian press, including fighter aircraft,
helicopters, submarines, and sophisticated air defense missiles.87 In return, Russia agreed to
cancel Soviet-era Libyan debt. A November 2008 visit by Muammar al Qadhafi to Russia did not
produce any publicly announced weapons sales, creating speculation that the Libyan leader was
seeking other sources of new military equipment. A January 2010 visit to Moscow by Libyan
military leader Abu Bakr Younis Jaber revived speculation about Libyan purchases of Sukhoi Su-
35 and Su-30 fighters, along with advanced air defense systems.
83 For a detailed account of Libya’s recent military procurement activities, see Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment -
North Africa, “Procurement – Libya,” June 22, 2009.
84 AFP, “French Defence Minister Holds Talks in Libya,” February 5, 2005; Andrew Borowiec, “Paris Strengthens
Military Ties with Libya,” Washington Times, February 17, 2005; and Flight International, “France Eyes Libyan
Deal,” August 1, 2006.
85 Antony Barnett, “MoD targets Libya and Iraq as ‘Priority’ Arms Sales Targets,” Observer (London), September 24,
2006; and, Independent (London), “MoD targets arms deals with Libya,” March 9, 2007.
86 “Under the negotiated deal, France would supply Libya with 14 Rafale aircraft as part of a larger arms package
valued at between $5.7 billion and $6.4 billion. Forecast International Defense Intelligence Newsletters, “Deadline for
Libyan-French Arms Package Negotiations Likely to be Extended,” June 12, 2008; Reuben Johnson, “Dassault denies
sale of Rafale to Libya is imminent,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, March 26, 2009.
87 Tor-M1 air defense missiles were reported as part of the potential package along with MiG-29SMT fighter
interceptors and Su-30MK multi-mission fighter aircraft. ITAR-TASS World Service (Russia), “Russia-Libya military
cooperation increasing,” April 17, 2008.
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WMD Programs and Disarmament88
Nuclear, Chemical, and Ballistic Missile Programs
Despite Libya’s membership in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), Libyan leader
Muammar al Qadhafi made several efforts to acquire nuclear weapons related technology
assistance, beginning in the early 1970s. The most renowned was his reportedly unsuccessful
request for a working nuclear weapon from China in the 1970s. Other unsuccessful attempts to
acquire nuclear energy technology useful to the development of nuclear weapons were
subsequently made through contacts with the Soviet Union, the United States, France, India,
Pakistan, Japan, and Argentina.89 Nonetheless, most experts agree that Libya never had a
dedicated indigenous nuclear weapons program. Over the next 25 years, Qadhafi made several
public statements in which he argued that Arab states were compelled to develop their own
nuclear weapons capability in response to Israel’s development of nuclear weapons.90 Libya
established a small nuclear research reactor at Tajura in 1979 with Soviet assistance, and entered
into several rounds of negotiations with Soviet and French authorities for the construction of large
nuclear power facilities that were never concluded.
According to several press accounts, Libyan officials reached an agreement with Pakistani
nuclear scientist Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan in 1997 for Khan and his illicit proliferation network to
provide the Libyan government with a nuclear weapons design and the uranium enrichment
technology it desired. These accounts and International Atomic Energy Agency reports describe
how, over the next six years, a complex network of companies and individuals in Malaysia,
Switzerland, Pakistan, Spain, Turkey, South Africa, Germany, the United Kingdom, and the
United Arab Emirates supplied Libya with uranium enrichment components.91
Libya’s chemical weapons programs were more advanced and independent than its nuclear
weapons development activities. In 1986 and 1987, U.S. officials suspected Libya of using
Iranian-supplied chemical weapons against military forces in neighboring Chad and provided the
Chadian military with protective equipment to guard against further Libyan attacks.92 During the
88 For a detailed discussion of Libya’s WMD programs and disarmament see CRS Report RS21823, Disarming Libya:
Weapons of Mass Destruction, by Sharon Squassoni.
89 John K. Cooley, “Qaddafi’s Great Aim for Libya is a Nuclear Capability of its Own, Christian Science Monitor,
November 12, 1980; New York Times, “Nuclear Energy Aide And Foreign Adviser Appointed in Tripoli,” January 8,
1981; Joshua Sinai, “Libya’s Pursuit of Weapons of Mass Destruction,” Nonproliferation Review, Spring/Summer
1997, pp. 92-100; and Associated Press, “Japan Company Sold Atomic Plant to Libya,” March 12, 2004.
90 In 1987, for example, Qadhafi said that, “Now that the Israelis possess the atomic weapon, the Arabs have nothing
before them except to work day and night to possess the atomic weapon in order to defend their existence.” Reuters,
“Gaddafi Urges Arabs to Develop Nuclear Weapons,” September 2, 1987. See also San Francisco Chronicle, “Khadafy
Wants Arab A-Bombs,” June 23, 1987; and Agence France Presse, “Libya Urges Arabs to Get Nuclear Arms,” January
27, 1996. Qadhafi made similar remarks in a March 2002 interview: “We demanded the dismantling of the weapons of
mass destruction that the Israelis have ... Otherwise, the Arabs will have the right to possess that weapon.” John Bolton,
Remarks to the Heritage Foundation, Washington, DC, May 6, 2002.
91 The IAEA does not directly identify Dr. Khan or Pakistan as a source for nuclear weapons designs or enrichment
equipment disclosed by Libya. Leslie Lopez, “Libyans Got Nuclear Training at Malaysian Company, Police Say,” Wall
Street Journal, June 4, 2004; Stephen Fidler and Mark Huband, “Turks and South Africans ‘Helped Libya’s Secret
Nuclear Arms Project’,” Financial Times, June 10, 2004; Craig Whitlock and Shannon Smiley, “Germany Arrests Man
in Libyan Atomic Case,” Washington Post, October 12, 2004; Douglas Frantz and William C. Rempel, “New Find in a
Nuclear Network,” Los Angeles Times, November 28, 2004.
92 Elaine Sciolino, “U.S. Sends 2,000 Gas Masks to the Chadians,” New York Times, September 25, 1987.
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late 1980s and early 1990s, the Libyan government developed chemical weapons production
facilities at Rabta, Sebha, and Tarhuna with technology acquired from a number of Western
European and Asian firms.93 The plants produced large amounts of chemical weapons and
components, including 23 tons of mustard gas. Libya’s ballistic missile program relied on foreign
technical assistance to produce Scud-B and a limited number of Scud-C missiles but was limited
by a lack of indigenous technical skill and ineffective management.94
Termination of WMD and Missile Programs
In 1999, Libyan officials approached the Clinton Administration and offered to dismantle Libya’s
chemical weapons programs in exchange for a loosening of U.S. terrorism sanctions. The offer
was rejected in an effort to maintain pressure on Libya to comply with U.S. and United Nations
demands in the Lockerbie airliner (Pan Am Flight 103) bombing case. Following the Lockerbie
settlement, Sayf al Islam al Qadhafi and intelligence chief Musa Kusa re-engaged with U.S. and
British intelligence authorities beginning in March 2003 regarding Libya’s weapons of mass
destruction programs. The October 2003 naval interception of the freighter BBC China, which
was carrying centrifuge components to Libya, accelerated negotiations and led to assessment
visits by U.S. and British personnel later that month and in early December 2003.
On December 19, 2003, Foreign Minister Abd al Rahman Shalgam read a statement on Libyan
national television announcing the government’s decision to dismantle its weapons of mass
destruction and long range missile programs and to invite international inspectors to Libya to
remove materials and perform verifications. Qadhafi publicly endorsed the statement, paving the
way for the removal of weapons of mass destruction (WMD)-related equipment from Libya in
January and March 2004.95 Subsequent reviews of seized material and interviews with Libyan
officials indicated that Libya remained far from developing a nuclear weapons capability,
although A.Q. Khan sold Libya a crude nuclear weapon design and some components necessary
to begin a uranium enrichment program. However, as of late 2003, Libya had not obtained key
pieces of equipment, such as a sufficient number of high-precision rotors to power its enrichment
centrifuges.96
Motives for Disarmament
Officials and independent observers have attributed Libya’s decision to end its pursuit of weapons
of mass destruction to a number of factors. Administration officials have argued that U.S. military
action in Iraq in 2003 demonstrated to Libya the resolve of the Bush Administration to eliminate
93 Joshua Sinai, “Libya’s Pursuit of Weapons of Mass Destruction,” Nonproliferation Review, Spring/Summer 1997,
pp. 92-100; Anthony H. Cordesman, Weapons of Mass Destruction in the Middle East, Center for Strategic and
International Studies, 1999; Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) et al., “Educational Module on
Chemical and Biological Weapons Non-Proliferation: Case Study: Libya,” 1998-2001.
94 Andrew Koch, “Libya’s Missile Programme Secrets Revealed,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, August 18, 2004.
95 Statement of Assistant Secretary of State for Verification and Compliance Paula A. DeSutter Before the House
Committee on International Relations Subcommittee on International Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Human Rights,
September 22, 2004; and, Douglas Franz and Josh Meyer, “The Deal to Disarm Kadafi,” Los Angeles Times, March 13,
2005.
96 William J. Broad, “Libya’s Crude Bomb Design Eases Western Experts’ Fear,” New York Times, February 9, 2004;
David Crawford, “Libya Was Far From Building Nuclear Bomb,” Wall Street Journal, February 23, 2004; and William
J. Broad, “Arms Control Group Says U.S. Inflated Libya’s Nuclear Bid,” New York Times, March 25, 2004.
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perceived threats to U.S. security posed by states associated with terrorism and in pursuit of
weapons of mass destruction. In contrast, Libyan officials have denied that external pressure or
threats influenced their government’s decision making processes and have characterized the
decision as a sovereign initiative to restore Libya’s ties with the international community and
improve its security and economy. Most independent observers have argued that Libya’s decision
was a calculated move designed to extricate the country from the international sanctions regime
that was limiting its economic activity and contributing to the deterioration of its vital oil and
natural gas infrastructure. Libyan officials have pointed to the financial and economic rewards
associated with its international re-engagement, although, prior to and following the restoration of
full diplomatic relations with the United States, Qadhafi has stated his belief that Libya should be
more directly and substantively rewarded for its decision to disarm and re-engage.
International Controls and Inspections
Libya acceded to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1975. Libya’s nuclear research
facility at Tajura has been subject to IAEA safeguards since 1980. Since Libya announced its
intent to abandon its WMD programs, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the
Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) have monitored and assisted in
ongoing disarmament activities. Libya signed an “additional protocol” agreement in March 2004
granting IAEA inspectors greater access to its nuclear facilities. The IAEA continues to evaluate
Libyan disclosure statements related to the scope of its uranium enrichment and nuclear weapons
development activities, particularly with regard to the sources of the materials Libya acquired
from the proliferation network of Pakistani scientist Abdul Qadeer Khan. As a result of the 2003
WMD disarmament decision, Libya signed the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT)
and acceded to the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) in 2004. Libya also committed to
eliminating all its ballistic missiles beyond a 300-kilometer range with a payload of 500
kilograms and agreed to abide by Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) guidelines.
Libya, the United States, and the UK established a Trilateral Steering and Cooperation Committee
(TSCC) to oversee the elimination of Libyan WMD- and MTCR-related missile programs in
September 2004.
As of October 2005, all materials and components associated with Libya’s nuclear weapons
development program had been removed and all associated activities had stopped. Libya returned
highly enriched nuclear fuel assemblies weighing 17 kilograms from its Tajura research reactor to
Russia in 2004, and Russia replaced them with low enriched uranium fuel in December 2005 as
part of a program co-sponsored with the International Atomic Energy Agency and the U.S.
Department of Energy.97 During the summer of 2006, Libya returned a further three kilograms of
highly enriched uranium from the Tajura reactor to Russia.98
Libya has signaled its desire to continue its nuclear energy and materials development plans
under the supervision of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). France signed a
nuclear energy agreement with Libya in July 2007 that could result in the construction of a
97 International Atomic Energy Agency, Staff Report: Removal of High-Enriched Uranium in Libyan Arab Jamahiriya,
March 8, 2004; RIA Novosti (Moscow), “Russia Supplies 14kg of Low-Enriched Uranium to Libya,” December 23,
2005.
98 William C. Mann, “U.S. Says Libya Has Returned 20 Kilograms of Weapons-grade Uranium to Russia,” Associated
Press, July 27, 2006; U.S. National Nuclear Safety Administration, “NNSA Secures Nuclear Material from Libya,”
July 27, 2006; and Associated Press, “Oak Ridge Workers Assess Uranium in Libya,” July 29, 2006.
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nuclear reactor to fuel water desalinization plants. In August 2007, Libyan officials confirmed
that they were negotiating with unspecified foreign governments for the sale of 1,000 tons of
uranium yellow cake ore stored at a former nuclear facility in Sebha.99 Libyan officials also
reportedly have signed civil nuclear cooperation agreements with Russia and Canada.
Libya has submitted an inventory of its chemical weapons and related activities to the OPCW and
has destroyed over 3,600 munitions designed to disperse chemical agents. The OPCW has
verified Libya’s inventory of 23 metric tons of mustard gas and over 1,300 metric tons of
precursor chemicals and approved the conversion of a chemical weapons facility into a
pharmaceutical plant for the production of HIV/AIDS and malaria medication. In December
2009, the OPCW stated that only 2% of Libya’s chemical weapons stockpiles had been destroyed
as of December 31, 2008.100 Libya requested a stockpile destruction deadline extension in
August 2009, citing logistical, financial, and political challenges. In its request, Libya proposed to
begin its chemical agent destruction by October 25, 2010, following the addition of additional
equipment at its chemical weapons destruction facility.101 The OPCW Conference of State
Parties considered the Libyan request at its December 2009 meeting and amended Libya’s
intermediate deadlines, extending the new final deadline to May 15, 2011.102
Background and Recent History
The North African territory that now composes the Great Socialist People’s Libyan Arab
Jamahirriya103 has a long cultural history as a center of Phoenician, Carthaginian, Roman, Berber,
and Arab civilizations. Modern Libya’s distinct regions and tribally influenced society create a
complex political environment that is made up of diverse constituencies from northwestern
Tripolitania, northeastern Cyrenaica, and the more remote southwestern Fezzan (see Figure 2
above). Significant economic and political changes have occurred since Libya became
independent in 1951. These changes have been fueled by the country’s emergence from Italian
colonization, the discovery of vast oil and natural gas reserves, and the domination of political
life by the authoritarian government of Muammar al Qadhafi,104 who overthrew the Libyan
monarchy on September 1, 1969. The legacies of anti-Italian insurgency and World War II
combat, international pressures associated with the Cold War, and complex relationships with
99 Katherine Griffiths, “Libya Stalls on Pledge to Destroy Stock of Uranium,” Daily Telegraph (UK), August 13, 2007;
BBC Monitoring/Al Jazeera (Qatar), “Libyan Official Slams UK Paper’s Uranium Allegations, Says Supply ‘Known,’”
August 13, 2007.
100 According to the OPCW, “Destruction levels remained at 0% of Category 1 chemical weapons and 39% (551 metric
tonnes) of Category 2 chemical weapons.” Report of the OPCW on the Implementation of the Convention on the
Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction in
2008, Fourteenth Session C-14/4, December 2, 2009.
101 The facility is known as the “Rabta Toxic Chemical Disposal Facility and Ruwagha Chemicals Reloading System.”
The Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Request for Extension of the Intermediate and Final Deadlines for the
Destruction of its Category 1 Chemical Weapons, OPCW Executive Council, EC-58/NAT.5/Add.1, October 14, 2009.
102 OPCW Conference of State Parties, Decision: Extension of the Intermediate and Final Deadlines for the Destruction
by the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya of its Category 1 Chemical Weapons, C-14/DEC.3, December 2, 2009.
103 The Arabic word jamahirriya means “state of the masses” or “people’s authority” and was added to Libya’s official
name in 1978 by Col. Muammar al Qadhafi to reflect Libya’s nominally decentralized political system. The adjective
“great” was added in 1986.
104 Multiple spellings of Muammar al Qadhafi’s first and last names are used in the Western press. This report uses a
phonetic spelling; others reflect varying pronunciations.
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Arab and African neighbors have all shaped Libya’s development. See Appendix A for a
discussion of Libya’s pre-Qadhafi history, other background information, and a list of historical
resources.
The Qadhafi Era
On September 1, 1969, a cabal of Libyan military officers led by army Captain Muammar al
Qadhafi seized important government institutions in the eastern city of Benghazi and abolished
the Libyan monarchy. Facing negligible internal resistance, the leadership of the movement,
known as the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC), established authority and announced that
it would direct the activities of a new cabinet. The RCC also made statements affirming Libya’s
Arab and Islamic identity and its support for the Palestinian people. After renaming the country
the Libyan Arab Republic, the RCC announced the promotion of Captain Qadhafi to Colonel and
named him commander in chief of Libya’s armed forces.105 Like Qadhafi, the other members of
the RCC were pan-Arabist and socialist ideologues from rural and somewhat marginalized
communities. The United States did not oppose the 1969 coup, as the RCC initially presented an
anti-Soviet and reformist platform.
Colonel Qadhafi and the RCC focused intensely in their early years in power on taking steps to
safeguard “national independence” and consolidate their rule through populist and nationalist
political and economic programs. The members of the RCC were determined to secure the
immediate and full withdrawal of British and U.S. forces from military bases in Libya, which
occurred on March 28 and June 11, 1970, respectively. Italian expatriates were expelled and their
assets were confiscated on October 7, 1970. All three dates subsequently were declared national
holidays. The new government also pressured U.S. and other foreign oil companies to renegotiate
oil production contracts and cede a larger share of production revenues. Some British and U.S. oil
operations eventually were nationalized. In the early 1970s, the RCC gradually reversed its stance
on its initially icy relationship with the Soviet Union and extended Libyan support to
revolutionary, anti-Western, and anti-Israeli movements across Africa, Europe, Asia, and the
Middle East. These policies contributed to a rapid souring of U.S.-Libyan political relations,
although economic relations, particularly U.S. oil purchases from Libya, remained steady.
The Green Book and Qadhafi’s Ideology
Beginning in the early 1970s, Muammar al Qadhafi and his regime carried out drastic and
frequent reorganizations of Libyan political and economic life in line with his “Third Universal
Theory.” The theory, which blends pan-Arab, Islamic, and socialist values, is enshrined in
Qadhafi’s three-volume Green Book. The redistribution of land and wealth, the allocation of
fluctuating oil revenues, and a near total decentralization of political institutions reshaped Libya’s
social landscape in line with Qadhafi’s principles. These trends also helped Qadhafi and his
supporters maintain political control. Overseas, Qadhafi promoted his political and economic
“Third International Theory” as an alternative to the capitalist and communist systems of the
United States and the Soviet Union for the developing countries of the Third World. Qadhafi’s
confrontation with the United States was both a catalyst for and product of the Libyan
105 Over time, Qadhafi stopped using his military title and identifying himself with a formal government position.
Although he retains de facto control over Libya’s affairs, he is now commonly referred to as the “Guide of the
Revolution” or “Brother Leader.”
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government’s violent and destabilizing activities abroad, Qadhafi’s ideological fervor, and his
regime’s gradual drift into the Soviet sphere of influence.
Terrorism and Confrontation with the United States
In line with his ideological precepts, Muammar al Qadhafi long characterized Libyan backing for
anti-colonial, separatist, and Islamist movements and terrorist groups around the world as
legitimate support for parties seeking self determination. The United States and others
categorically and continuously rejected Libya’s policies as unacceptable sponsorship of
illegitimate terrorism and subversive violence. In the 1970s and 1980s, U.S. officials cited the
existence of training camps in Libya and other Libyan government support for a panoply of
terrorist groups, including the Abu Nidal Organization, the Red Army Faction, the Popular Front
for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command (PFLP-GC), and the Irish Republican Army.
Libyan-sponsored bombings and assassinations also drew sharp international criticism, especially
killings of Libyan dissidents and the bombings of Pan Am Flight 103 and UTA Flight 772 in the
late 1980s. In the 1990s, Libyan-trained individuals led brutal rebel movements across Africa,
including Foday Sankoh’s Revolutionary United Front in Sierra Leone and Charles Taylor’s
National Patriotic Front of Liberia.106
Qadhafi’s Arab-Israeli Intransigence
The Arab-Israeli conflict was another particularly pointed source of tension between the United
States and Qadhafi: Libya remained distinctly opposed to negotiation or reconciliation with Israel
throughout the Cold War era and the 1990s, promoting armed struggle as the only viable means to
end Israel’s occupation of territory it captured from neighboring Arab states in 1967. At times,
Qadhafi’s positions led to deep bilateral rifts between Libya and Egypt, particularly under Anwar
Sadat, as well as confrontations with PLO leader Yasir Arafat. Qadhafi and his security services
provided support, training, and safe harbor for Palestinian terrorist groups until the late 1990s.
After a temporary reconciliation with Arafat during the first Palestinian intifada in 1987, Qadhafi
returned to voicing complete opposition to the Oslo peace process and called for Arab leaders to
avoid further recognition of or negotiation with Israel.
In recent years, Qadhafi publicly has maintained his opposition to Arab engagement with Israel in
the face of continued Israeli occupation and settlement activity. He also has called for a “one state
solution” based on reconciliation between the Israeli and Palestinian people within a single state,
which he proposes be called “Isratine.” In a January 2009 opinion editorial in the New York Times
Qadhafi rejected the “tired rhetoric of partition and two-state solutions,” and argued that “the
compromise is one state for all, an ‘Isratine’ that would allow the people in each party to feel that
they live in all of the disputed land and they are not deprived of any one part of it.”107 Central to
106 See Paul Richards, “War as Smoke and Mirrors: Sierra Leone 1991-2,1994-5,1995-6,” Anthropological Quarterly,
Vol. 78, Issue 2, Spring 2005; Douglas Farah, Blood from Stones, Broadway Books, New York, 2004, pp. 23-25;
Economist, “Foday Sankoh,” Vol. 368, August 9, 2003, p. 73; Economist, “Qaddafi Says Farewell, Arabia, and Sets
His Sights on Africa,” Vol. 351, April 24, 1999; I. Abdullah and P. Muana, “The Revolutionary United Front of Sierra
Leone,” in C. Clapham (ed.) African Guerrillas, London: James Currey, 1998, pp. 179-193; Scott Anderson, “The
Makeover,” New York Times Magazine, January 19, 2003; and Douglas Farah, “Gaddafi ‘Meddling’ in Africa,”
Washington Post, August 16, 2003.
107Muammar Qaddafi, “The One-State Solution,” New York Times, January 22, 2009.
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Qadhafi’s position is “the right of return for Palestinian refugees to the homes their families left
behind in 1948,” which is rejected by the Israeli government.
More recent controversy has focused on reports that Qadhafi declined to meet with Palestinian
Authority President Mahmoud Abbas during his visit to Libya in February 2010; Qadhafi
received a telephone briefing from Hamas political bureau chief Khaled Meshaal days later.108
International Isolation and Signs of Change
Following the imposition of U.N. sanctions in the aftermath of the Libyan-sponsored airliner
bombings of the late 1980s, Libya entered a period of increasing international isolation. The
compounded effects of a loss of oil revenue, restrictions on the travel of senior officials, an
international air travel ban, and an arms embargo brought significant pressure on Qadhafi and his
government. Signs of change began to emerge in 1999 when Libya agreed to pay compensation
for the bombing of UTA Flight 772 and allowed two intelligence agents to stand trial for the
bombing of Pan Am Flight 103.
Qadhafi’s offers of counterterrorism and intelligence cooperation following the terrorist attacks of
September 11, 2001, and his late 2003 decision to dismantle Libya’s weapons of mass destruction
and long range missile development programs marked further steps toward new relationships with
the United States and the international community. Qadhafi pledged to end his government’s
support for violent political movements around the world in December 2003, and the Libyan
government has participated in peacemaking efforts in a number of African conflicts, including
hosting and subsidizing U.N. World Food Program aid flights to Darfur, Sudan, from Libyan
territory. New oil production agreements and improved relations with the United States and a
number of European and Asian countries demonstrated the tangible benefits of Libya’s apparent
new political orientation, although it is unclear how the 2011 uprising and regime crackdown
might affect Libya’s international profile. Libya was elected as a non-permanent member of the
U.N. Security Council in October 2007. Libya held the seat for 2008 and 2009, and held the
Council presidency in January 2008 and March 2009. In February 2009, Qadhafi was elected as
the chairman of the 53-member African Union (AU), giving him a new platform to pursue his
active foreign policy toward Africa. His attempt to extend his one-year tenure was unsuccessful.
Issues in U.S.-Libyan Relations
The relationship between the United States and Libya has been tense for much of the last 35 years
but normalized gradually between 2003 and 2011. The Libyan government’s past support for
international terrorism, its history of intervention in regional conflicts, and its now-abandoned
pursuit of weapons of mass destruction proved to be persistent points of contention with the
United States. The Libyan government has long taken issue with what it regards as unbalanced
U.S. military and financial support for Israel and what it describes as unwarranted U.S.
intervention in the affairs of Arab states. In the past, these differences led to a number of
confrontations and engagements between U.S. and Libyan armed forces, the imposition of
economic and diplomatic sanctions by the United States, and, reportedly, some limited, covert
108 U.S. Open Source Center (OSC) Report GMP20100305825009, “PA’s Abbas Reportedly Under Pressure From
Fatah, PLO To Boycott Summit in Libya, Al-Sharq al-Awsat, (London) March 5, 2010.
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U.S. efforts at regime change.109 As sanctions were removed in recent years, a number of U.S. oil
companies successfully bid for reentry into Libya’s energy market, and other U.S. businesses
resumed trade relationships with Libyan firms.
The restoration of full diplomatic relations between the United States and Libya in 2006 was
expected to open a new chapter in the bilateral relationship and bring a long period of U.S.-
Libyan confrontation to a close. However, until late 2008, U.S.-Libyan relations remained
clouded by mutual frustration. Libyan officials expressed dissatisfaction with the pace and scope
of normalization with the United States and alleged that Libya had not gotten what was promised
when it decided to abandon weapons of mass destruction and terrorism in 2003. Considerable
discontent also remained apparent in some U.S. quarters, including among some Members of
Congress. New terrorism concerns delayed Libya’s removal from the state sponsors of terrorism
list until 2006, and Libyan engagement with legal counsel and U.S. officials on terrorism cases
led to charges that Libya was not acting in good faith to resolve outstanding claims.
The Libyan government responded to congressional pressure with increasingly direct statements
warning that if its relations with the U.S. government and U.S. business community remained
complicated by outstanding terrorism claims, U.S. companies could miss opportunities to bid on
lucrative Libyan government contracts to refurbish and expand the country’s infrastructure. The
Administration and the U.S. business community supported normalization with Libya while
continuing to engage Libya on outstanding terrorism claims.
Throughout this period, some participants on both sides supported efforts to find an agreeable
formula for resolving outstanding issues so that the United States and Libya could reap the
potential benefits of a fully normalized relationship. Bilateral negotiations bore fruit in mid-2008
in the form of a Comprehensive Settlement Agreement (see below). Congress supported those
negotiations by authorizing the creation of an independent entity to manage settlement funds and
by opening the prospect of conditional legal immunity for Libya.
The Bush Administration viewed Libya as a model for potential rapprochement with other state
sponsors of terrorism and sought to establish and expand counterterrorism, military, and
economic cooperation with Libyans through foreign operations budget requests. The Obama
Administration embarked on an effort to more fully define the goals and scope of renewed U.S.-
Libyan relations. To date, the Obama Administration’s foreign assistance funding requests for
Libya programs have remained relatively limited and have not expanded significantly. Once the
outcome of the 2011 uprising becomes clearer, Members of the 112th Congress may influence
future developments through consideration of FY2011 foreign assistance requests for Libya,
oversight of security cooperation or other bilateral assistance programs, and through the possible
funding and oversight of preliminary plans to construct a new U.S. Embassy in Tripoli.
Comprehensive Claims Settlement Agreement
From January 2008 onward, the enactment by Congress of changes in terrorism liability
provisions and the awarding of significant monetary damages to the families and estates of U.S.
victims of the 1989 bombing of UTA Flight 772 heightened the intensity of U.S.-Libyan
109 Joseph T. Stanik, El Dorado Canyon: Reagan’s Undeclared War with Qaddafi, Naval Institute Press, 2003; Bernard
Gwertzman, “Shultz Advocates U.S. Covert Programs to Depose Qaddafi,” New York Times, April 28, 1986; and
Clifford Krauss, “Failed Anti-Qaddafi Effort Leaves U.S. Picking Up the Pieces,” New York Times, March 12, 1991.
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engagement on outstanding terrorism claims.110 Confidential negotiations began in early 2008 on
a comprehensive settlement, while the Bush Administration publicly underscored its desire “to
show the Libyans that they made the right decision” in abandoning weapons of mass destruction
and eschewing terrorism.111 Negotiations continued through mid-2008, and the prospect of
success led to collaboration between the Congress and the executive branch aimed at providing
potential relief for Libya from the liability changes in the event of a finalized claims settlement
agreement.
Settlement Details
On August 14, 2008, Libya and the United States signed a comprehensive Claims Settlement
Agreement.112 The agreement provides for the establishment of a humanitarian settlement fund to
receive donations sufficient to address the outstanding legal claims of U.S. terrorism victims and
Libyan claims related to U.S. military strikes.
• The agreement’s stated objective is to “reach a final settlement” of claims,
“terminate permanently all pending suits” and “preclude any future suits” arising
from personal injury, death, or property loss caused by certain defined acts113 that
occurred prior to June 30, 2006.
• The agreement calls for the establishment of a humanitarian settlement fund to
receive contributions. The agreement also directs the parties to open accounts for
the distribution of funding to their respective nationals from the central fund.
• Upon receipt of $1.8 billion in funding, the agreement calls for the central fund
account to distribute $1.5 billion dollars to the United States’ national account
and $300 billion to Libya’s national account. Thereafter, the agreement requires
each party to terminate any suits pending in its courts, preclude any new suits,
and restore “the same sovereign, diplomatic, and official immunity” to the other
party, its personnel, and property “as is normally provided to other states.”
• Further distribution of the funds from the national accounts is precluded until the
immunity restoration provisions are satisfied. Claimants’ suits also must be
terminated in order for them to be eligible to receive distributions from the
national accounts.
On October 31, 2008, the Administration, acting according to the terms of the Libya Claims
Resolution Act (S. 3370, P.L. 110-301), certified the receipt of $1.5 billion and stated the received
funding was sufficient to meet the claims requirements outlined in section 5(a)(2) of the act. An
accompanying memorandum of justification stated:
110 In January 2008, U.S. District Judge Henry H. Kennedy ruled that Libya was directly responsible for the bombing of
UTA Flight 772 and ordered the Libyan government and specific Libyan officials to pay $6 billion in damages to the
families and estates of six U.S. victims of the attack.
111 U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Jeffrey Feltman quoted in Jay Solomon, “U.S. Vies to Seal Libya
Settlement, Preserve Detente,” April 2, 2008.
112 Claims Settlement Agreement between the United States of America and the Great Socialist People’s Libyan Arab
Jamahiriya, August 14, 2008. Text and Annex provided to CRS by U.S. Department of State.
113 The acts defined in Article One of the agreement include “an act of torture, extrajudicial killing, aircraft sabotage,
hostage taking or detention or other terrorist act, or the provision of material support or resources for such an act” or
“military measures.”
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This amount is sufficient to ensure the remaining payment of $536 million for the Pan Am
103 Settlement and $283 million for the LaBelle114 settlement.... The remaining $681 million
is sufficient to ensure fair compensation for the claims of nationals of the United States for
wrongful death or physical injury in those cases described in the Act which were pending
against Libya on the date of enactment of the Act (August 4, 2008) as well as other
terrorism-related claims against Libya.115
The certification rescinded the applicability of several terrorism liability provisions to certain
cases involving Libya, including Section 1083 of P.L. 110-181, the National Defense
Authorization Act for FY2008 (see Appendix B for more information).
Settlement Eligibility and Adjudication
In December 2008 and January 2009, the State Department referred all eligible outstanding
claims to the U.S. Department of Justice Foreign Claims Settlement Commission for final
adjudication and certification. Claims for physical injury were referred in December 2008, and
six additional categories of claims were referred in January 2009. Claim forms and
documentation for the December 2008 referral were required to be submitted to the FCSC by July
23, 2009. Claim forms and documentation for the January 2009 referral were required to be
submitted to the FCSC by July 7, 2010. Information on the Libya claims settlement adjudication
process and awards to date is available at the commission’s website at http://www.usdoj.gov/fcsc/
libyaclaims.htm.
Pan Am Flight 103 and Megrahi’s Release
On December 21, 1988, a bomb exploded on Pan Am flight 103 en route from London to New
York, killing all 244 passengers and 15 crew on board and another 11 people in the town of
Lockerbie, Scotland. On November 14, 1991, the United States and Scotland indicted two Libyan
intelligence agents for their alleged roles in the bombing: Abd al Baset Ali al Megrahi and Al
Amin Khalifah Fhimah. Under a U.N.-negotiated agreement, Fhimah and Al Megrahi were tried
on murder charges under Scottish law in The Hague beginning in 1999. Fhimah was acquitted
and Al Megrahi was convicted: he was sentenced to serve a life sentence in a Scottish prison.
Al Megrahi appealed his conviction and the length of his 27-year sentence before the Scottish
Criminal Cases Review Commission (SCCRC). Some observers in the United Kingdom,
including lead Scottish Lockerbie investigator Lord Fraser of Carmyllie, questioned Al Megrahi’s
conviction and argued that the Lockerbie investigation should have been reexamined.116 Claims
periodically resurfaced that the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command
may have planned the bombing for Iran in retaliation for the downing of an Iranian airliner by the
U.S. Navy in 1988.117 In November 2006, the Scottish commission ruled that Al Megrahi’s
114 See Appendix B for a description of the La Belle case.
115 Certification Under Section 5(a)(2) of the Libyan Claims Resolution Act Relating to the Receipt of Funds for
Settlement of Claims Against Libya, with Memorandum of Justification, signed and transmitted to Congress October
31, 2008.
116 Sunday Times (London), “Focus: Was Justice Done?” October 23, 2005; Magnus Linklater, “It’s Time To Look
Again at Lockerbie,” The Times (London), October 26, 2005.
117 Derek Lambie, “Diplomat ‘Evidence’ May Clear Megrahi of Flight 103 Bomb,” Express on Sunday (UK),
September 24, 2006.
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appeals could be heard in Scottish courts, and in June 2007, the SCCRC granted Al Megrahi the
right to a second appeal of his conviction.118 (See below.)
In August 2003, Libya accepted responsibility “for the actions of its officials” and agreed to a
settlement agreement that called for successive payments to the families of Pan Am 103 victims
following the termination of U.N. and U.S. sanctions.119 As of October 2005, Libya had issued
payments of $4 million per victim following the termination of U.N. sanctions in September 2003
and a second payment of $4 million to each victim’s family following the termination of bilateral
U.S. sanctions in September 2004. The Libyan government withdrew funds for a final payment of
$2 million per victim from a designated escrow account after several deadline extensions because
of delays in the United States government’s rescission of Libya’s designation as a state sponsor of
terrorism.120 The previously negotiated final round of $2 million payments was worth over $500
million. Under the terms of the Comprehensive Settlement Agreement, the Bush Administration
certified that sufficient funds for the final Lockerbie payment were made available to settle the
remaining outstanding claims.
Lockerbie Appeal and Megrahi’s Release
Proceedings for the second appeal for Abd al Baset Ali al Megrahi opened in October 2007, and
preliminary hearings were held in an effort to determine the scope of his appeal. Defense
attorneys sought access to classified information regarding key pieces of evidence, reportedly
including classified intelligence documents related to the supply of timers by a Swiss company to
the Libyan intelligence service. The documents reportedly originated with a third country’s
government, and that government refused to grant permission for the documents to be made
available to the court by British authorities.121
In May 2008, the British government filed a Public Interest Immunity (PII) order with the
Scottish court seeking to keep the documents secret, but the court ruled that the government was
required to “produce for the court the documents in question ... subject to appropriate security
measures.”122 In June 2008, the prosecution reportedly argued to restrict the appeal to the original
terms under which the appeal was granted, while the defense reportedly argued that new evidence
should be considered. Megrahi’s appeal for release on bail on the basis of his diagnosis with
terminal prostate cancer was denied.
In July 2009, the Libyan government submitted an “application for compassionate release” to
Scottish authorities requesting that he be allowed to return to Libya. Under the terms of a prisoner
118 An executive summary of the SCCRC’s findings in support of further appeal is available online at
http://www.sccrc.org.uk/ViewFile.aspx?id=293.
119 Letter from the Great Libyan Arab Jamahiriyah to the President of the Security Council, reprinted in United
Kingdom Foreign & Commonwealth Office Release - “UK Calls for Lifting of UN Sanctions on Libya,” August 15,
2003.
120 On April 21, 2004, Libya extended its unilaterally set deadline for the recision and payment to the victims’ families
to July 22, 2004. Libya extended the deadline a second time to September 22, 2004. Lawyers and U.S. negotiators
secured a third extension to April 30, 2005; however, Libya froze the final round of $2 million payments (worth an
estimated $500 million) and reasserted its demand for removal from the U.S. state sponsors of terrorism list. Associated
Press, “Libyan Central Bank Takes Back Last Batch of Compensation Money Due to Lockerbie Victims,” April 9,
2005.
121 John Robertson, “Angiolini Rapped over Lockerbie File,” The Scotsman (UK), December 21, 2007.
122 Ian MacKenzie, “Scottish judges call for secret Lockerbie papers,” Reuters, May 29, 2008.
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transfer agreement signed between the United Kingdom and Libya, Megrahi could have been
eligible to serve the remainder of his prison term in Libya if he agreed to drop his pending appeal
in the Scottish court system. Families of some U.S. victims of the Lockerbie bombing stated their
opposition to his release in consultations with Scottish legal authorities. Megrahi did choose to
drop his appeal in August 2009, but was ordered released on compassionate grounds by Scottish
authorities outside of any arrangement involving the prisoner transfer agreement. His release,
return to Libya, and subsequent public welcome in Tripoli ignited severe controversy in the
United Kingdom, and several parties in the United States, including the Obama Administration,
criticized what they perceived as a “hero’s welcome” for Megrahi. Megrahi’s health and survival
have emerged as subjects of continuing scrutiny, amid reports that his release was agreed to partly
based on a prognosis that he would not survive longer than three months and that document his
continuing battle with cancer in Libya.
BP plc and UK-Libya Prisoner Transfer Agreement
In May 2007, then-UK Prime Minister Tony Blair visited Libya and met with Muammar al
Qadhafi. During the visit, BP plc and the Libyan National Oil Company (LNOC) announced a
planned $900 million energy exploration agreement, and Libyan and UK officials signed a
memorandum of understanding calling for the conclusion within 12 months of an agreement on
the bilateral transfer of prisoners. Some Scottish authorities protested that such an agreement
could be viewed as applicable to Megrahi and criticized the London government for failing to
consult with them prior to concluding the memorandum of understanding. UK officials denied the
pending transfer agreement would apply to Megrahi and stressed Scottish authority to deal with
all matters regarding Megrahi under the UK devolution of justice powers to Scotland.
In December 2007, reports indicated that the United Kingdom government had submitted a final
proposal for the prisoner transfer agreement to Libya. Subsequently, in late January 2008, Libyan
officials announced they had ratified the BP-LNOC deal. According to the Financial Times, “A
BP spokesman told the FT that the company’s deal was ratified and backdated to December 23.”
BP plc filed a Form 6-K (Report of Foreign Issuer Pursuant to Rule 13a-16 or 15d-16 of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934) with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) for
the period that ended February 5, 2008, stating that “in December, the Libyan General People’s
Committee ratified the exploration and production agreement between BP and Libya’s National
Oil Company, which we announced in May of 2007.” Although at the time many private
observers linked the ratification of the energy deal to the conclusion of the prisoner transfer
agreement, UK officials denied any such linkage.
In July 2010, four U.S. Senators wrote to the U.S. State Department urging the Administration to
investigate statements made by representatives of the UK-based international energy company BP
plc. The company reported that, in 2007, its representatives expressed concern to UK authorities
that delay in reaching a final UK-Libya prisoner transfer agreement could delay consideration of
a then-pending $900 million BP energy contract with Libya. In 2009, the company stated:
BP did bring to the attention of the UK Government in late 2007 our concerns about the slow
progress in concluding a Prisoner Transfer Agreement with Libya.… Like many others, we
were aware that delay might have negative consequences for UK commercial interests,
including ratification of BP’s exploration agreement.… However, in making that point to the
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Government, we were not talking about the Al-Megrahi case because we were fully aware
that this was solely a matter for the Scottish Executive and not the UK authorities.123
In response to recent controversy, UK officials have stressed that Megrahi was not released under
the auspices of the UK-Libyan prisoner transfer agreement and denied that commercial interests
were involved. Sir Nigel Sheinwald, UK Ambassador to the United States, said:
The British Government deeply regrets the continuing anguish that [Megrahi’s] release on
compassionate grounds has caused the families of Megrahi’s victims in the UK as well as in
the US. However under UK law, where Scottish justice issues are devolved to Scotland, it
fell solely to the Scottish Executive to consider Megrahi’s case. Under Scottish law, Megrahi
was entitled to be considered for release on compassionate grounds. Whilst we disagreed
with the decision to release Megrahi, we have to respect the independence of the process.124
Officials from BP plc stated that, “The decision to release Mr al-Megrahi in August 2009 was
taken by the Scottish Government. It’s not for BP to comment on the decision of the Scottish
Government. BP was not involved in any discussions with the UK Government or the Scottish
Government about the release of Mr al-Megrahi.”125 Scottish officials added:
The Scottish Government had no contact from BP in relation to Mr. Al Megrahi. The issues
being raised in the United States at present regarding BP refer to the Prisoner Transfer
Agreement negotiated by the governments of the U.K. and Libya, and therefore have nothing
to do with the decision on compassionate release which is a totally different process, based
on entirely different criteria. We were always totally opposed to the Prisoner Transfer
Agreement negotiated between the U.K. and Libyan Governments. The memorandum that
led to the PTA was agreed without our knowledge and against our wishes. Indeed, the Justice
Secretary rejected the application from Libya under the PTA specifically on the basis that the
US Government and families of victims in the US had been led to believe that such a
prisoner transfer would not be possible for anyone convicted of the Lockerbie atrocity.126
U.S. Foreign Assistance to Libya
Although U.S. sanctions on Libya were lifted in 2004 and terrorism-related restrictions on foreign
assistance were rescinded in 2006, Congress acted to limit the Bush Administration’s ability to
provide foreign assistance to Libya as a means of pressuring the Administration and the Libyan
government to resolve outstanding terrorism claims. The Bush Administration’s October 2008
certification (see “Settlement Details” above) ended standing restrictions on the provision of U.S.
foreign assistance contained in appropriations legislation for FY2008 and FY2009.127 Assistance
requests submitted by the Bush and Obama Administrations for FY2009 and FY2010 included
funding for programs to reengage with Libyan security forces after “a 35-year break in contact”
123 “BP warned UK of risk in delayed Libya prisoner deal,” Reuters, September 4, 2009.
124 “Lockerbie bomber’s release ‘a mistake’, says British ambassador,” Telegraph (UK) July 16, 2010.
125 Ibid.
126 Ibid.
127 The certification satisfied the requirement in Section 654 of the Consolidated Appropriations Act FY2008 (P.L. 110-
161, H.R. 2764, signed December 26, 2007) relating to the provision of foreign assistance to Libya. Under the terms of
Section 101 of H.R. 2638, the Consolidated Security, Disaster Assistance, and Continuing Appropriations Act, 2009
(P.L. 110-329, signed September 30, 2008), the provision of FY2009 foreign assistance funding for Libya was
prohibited prior to the certification issued on October 31, 2008.
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with their U.S. counterparts and to support Libyan efforts to improve security capabilities in areas
of common concern, such as border control, counterterrorism, and export/import monitoring.
Table 2. Recent U.S. Foreign Assistance to Libya
(Current U.S. $, thousands)
FY2008
FY2010
FY2011
Account
Actual FY2009
Actual Estimate
Request
Nonproliferation, Anti-terrorism,
1,000 750
300 275
Demining, and Related Programs (NADR)
Economic Support Fund (ESF)
-
2,300
-
-
International Military Education and
- - 330
350
Training (IMET)
Foreign Military Financing (FMF)
-
-
150
250
Annual Total
1,000
3,050
780
875
Source: U.S. State Department , Congressional Budget Justifications for Foreign Operations Appropriations,
FY2010 and FY2011. Available at http://www.state.gov/f/releases/iab/.
For FY2010, the Obama Administration requested $350,000 in International Military Education
and Training (IMET) funding for Libya to “support education and training of Libyan security
forces, creating vital linkages with Libyan officers after a 35-year break in contact.”128
Participation in the IMET program also makes the Libyan government eligible to purchase
additional U.S. military training at a reduced cost.129
The Obama Administration also requested Foreign Military Financing assistance for Libya for the
first time in FY2010, with the goal of providing assistance to the Libyan Air Force in developing
its air transport capabilities and to the Libyan Coast Guard in improving its coastal patrol and
search and rescue operations. FY2011 FMF assistance was requested to support Libyan
participation in a program that assists countries seeking to maintain and upgrade their U.S.-made
C-130 air transport fleets.
In both FY2010 and FY2011, the Administration’s request indicated that “additional funding will
be sought through the Trans-Sahara Counter Terrorism Partnership (TSCTP) initiative, focusing
primarily on anti-terrorism assistance, counterterrorism finance, terrorist interdiction, and de-
legitimizing terrorist ideology through educational, cultural, and information programming.”
Libya had been invited to join the TSCTP, but is not currently a participant.
128 U.S. Department of State, Congressional Budget Justification for Foreign Operations FY2010, Volume II, Request
by Region, p. 442. Available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/124072.pdf.
129 Section 21(c) of P.L. 90-629, the Arms Export Control Act (AECA), states that IMET recipient countries are
eligible to purchase non-IMET training at reduced cost. Section 108(a) of P.L. 99-83 amended the AECA to provide
this reduced cost benefit to IMET recipients. The U.S. Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) implements the
authority provided in P.L. 99-83 to apply a lower cost to U.S. military training purchased by IMET recipient countries
through the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program. At present, the “incremental rates” applied to the FMS training
purchases of IMET recipient countries are calculated according to the terms outlined in Department of Defense
Financial Management Regulation (FMR), Volume 15, Chapter 7 (Sections 0711 and 0712).
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Funding for New U.S. Embassy Construction
In conjunction with the restoration of full diplomatic relations, the United States upgraded its
Liaison Office in Tripoli to an Embassy, which has moved to an interim location. Libyan
demonstrators attacked and burned the former U.S. Embassy in December 1979. Plans to procure
property for a new U.S. embassy were placed on hold, after delays in securing funding and
approval complicated negotiations during 2007.130 The Bush Administration requested $109.9
million in FY2008 Embassy Security, Construction, and Maintenance (ESCM) funds for property
procurement and construction of a new U.S. Embassy in Tripoli. The Senate report on the
Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2008 (S.Rept. 110-128, H.R. 2764/P.L. 110-161) did not
include the requested ESCM funds. The State Department’s FY2009, FY2010, and FY2011
budget requests indicate that requested ESCM funds may support the acquisition of property for a
future new embassy compound (NEC) in Tripoli.
Counterterrorism Cooperation
Muammar al Qadhafi immediately condemned the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks as
“horrific and gruesome,” and his government took steps to improve U.S.-Libyan counterterrorism
cooperation and intelligence sharing afterwards. As evidenced by Qadhafi’s public remarks
during the 2011 uprising against his rule, the Libyan government has long perceived Al Qaeda as
a threat because members of Libya’s Islamist opposition have been linked to Al Qaeda and other
foreign jihadist organizations (see “Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG)” below). This
contributed to Libya’s willingness to expand counterterrorism cooperation with U.S. authorities.
Qadhafi has characterized members of Al Qaeda as “heretics” in prominent public statements and
has described his government’s intelligence and counterterrorism cooperation with the United
States as “irrevocable.” Libya has taken direct action to limit the activities of known Al Qaeda
associates within its borders, including elements of its own Islamist opposition allied with Al
Qaeda. Libya is a party to all 12 international conventions and protocols relating to terrorism,
including the International Convention on the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism.
According to the U.S. Department of State’s 2009 Country Report on Terrorism (issued August
2010), the Libyan government “has continued to cooperate with the United States and the
international community to combat terrorism and terrorist financing.” This included efforts to
support U.S. counterterrorism initiatives against the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG) and
Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM, formerly known as the Salafist Group for Call and
Combat, or GSPC).131 U.S. officials contemplated extending counterterrorism assistance to Libya
during FY2010 and FY2011, including potential assistance under the framework of the
interagency Trans-Sahara Counter Terrorism Partnership (TSCTP), which involves all of Libya’s
neighbors, except Sudan and Egypt.132
130 CRS Analyst consultation with State Department personnel, May 2008. Plans for the new Embassy compound
included an office building, support annex, and quarters for a Marine Security Detachment.
131 U.S. Department of State, Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, Country Reports on Terrorism - Libya,
April 30, 2007.
132 As noted above, the Obama Administration’s FY2010 foreign assistance request states that TSCTP funds may
support counterterrorism assistance programs for Libya once the government agrees to join the initiative. The Bush
Administration reportedly intended to extend TSCTP assistance to Libya, but Libya did not agree to participate in the
program. See Ann Tyson, “U.S. Pushes Anti-Terrorism in Africa,” Washington Post, July 26, 2005.
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Further Reading and Historical Resources
Ali Abdullatif Ahmida, The Making of Modern Libya, State Univ. of New York Press, Albany,
1994.
Lisa Anderson, The State and Social Transformation in Tunisia and Libya, 1830-1980, Princeton
Univ. Press, Princeton, 1986.
Scott Anderson, “The Makeover,” New York Times Magazine, January 19, 2003.
Mansour O. El Kikhia, Libya’s Qadhafi, Univ. Press of Florida, Gainesville, 1997.
Muammar al Qadhafi, Kitaab al Akhdar (The Green Book), Green Book World Center for
Research and Study, Tripoli, 1983.
Richard B. Parker, Uncle Sam in Barbary, Univ. Press of Florida, Gainesville, 2004.
Ronald Bruce St. John, Libya and the United States, University of Pennsylvania Press,
Philadelphia, 2002.
Ronald Bruce St. John, Libya: From Colony to Independence, Oneworld Publications, Oxford,
2008.
Joseph T. Stanik, El Dorado Canyon: Reagan’s Undeclared War with Qaddafi, Naval Institute
Press, 2003.
Dirk Vandewalle, A History of Modern Libya, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2006.
Dirk Vandewalle (ed.), Libya since 1969: Qadhafi’s Revolution Revisited, Palgrave Macmillan,
2008.
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Appendix A. Libya’s Pre-Qadhafi History
Libya’s Colonial Experience
The Ottoman Empire and Qaramanli Dynasty
Ottoman forces first occupied the coastal regions of the territory that now constitutes Libya in the
mid-16th century. However, Ottoman administrators faced stiff and near constant resistance from
tribal confederations and a rival independent state in the Fezzan region, all of which limited the
Ottomans’ political influence. Beginning in 1711, a semi-independent state under Turkish official
Ahmed Qaramanli emerged in Tripoli and established control over the Ottoman provinces of
Tripolitania and Cyrenaica, with Fezzan remaining contested. The Qaramanli family maintained
its power and independent rule until the early 19th century through naval privateers and pirates
under its control who were used to collect tribute and ransom from merchant vessels seized in the
Mediterranean Sea.
“The Shores of Tripoli”
The Qaramanli naval forces of Tripoli formed one component of a regional grouping commonly
referred to as “the Barbary pirates,” which played a pivotal role in shaping the foreign and
military policies of the young United States. Beginning in the late 1780s, a series of
confrontations between U.S. merchant ships and naval raiding parties from Tripoli and other
neighboring city-states such as Algiers and Tunis led to the destruction of U.S. maritime cargo
and the seizure of U.S. hostages. Subsequent negotiations between the United States and the
governments of the Barbary states concluded with the signing of some of the first bilateral treaties
in U.S. history, including U.S. agreements to pay tribute to Tripoli in exchange for the safe
passage of U.S. vessels off what is now the Libyan coast.
Disputes over the terms of this bilateral agreement and continuing attacks on U.S. merchant ships
impressed upon the U.S. government the need for a naval protection force to safeguard U.S.
commercial activity in the Mediterranean. This need eventually was satisfied by the creation of
the United States Navy by Congress in April 1798. An attack on the U.S. consulate in Tripoli in
1801 and further attacks on U.S. ships sparked open hostilities between the newly commissioned
light naval forces of the United States and the privateers of Tripoli. Frequent naval engagements
from 1801 to 1805 were often won by U.S. forces, but one skirmish in 1804 ended with the
grounding of the U.S.S. Philadelphia and the capture of her crew. The conflict culminated in the
overland seizure of the eastern Libyan city of Darnah by U.S. Marines and a team of recruited
indigenous forces in 1805—the basis for the reference to “the shores of Tripoli” in the Marine
Corps hymn. The fall of Darnah compelled the Qaramanli leadership in Tripoli to relent to
demands to ransom the U.S. prisoners and sign a “treaty of peace and friendship.” Efforts to
repatriate the remains of U.S. personnel killed in these early 19th century military engagements
with Tripoli are ongoing.133
133 See Veterans of Foreign Wars Magazine, “Return Oldest U.S. MIAs,” Volume 94, Issue 1, September 1, 2006; and
the Somers Point Historical Society, information available at http://www.richardsomers.org.
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The decline of Qaramanli naval power following the confrontation with the United States
contributed to the dynasty’s steady loss of political power. Ottoman authorities reoccupied Tripoli
in 1835 and began a campaign to pacify and co-opt the region’s tribal confederations. The
Ottomans solicited the cooperation of the leaders of a conservative revivalist Sufi order known as
the Sanusiyah based in Cyrenaica, which they allowed to raise an independent militia and
participate in a tacit ruling partnership. Although the Ottoman administrative structure imposed in
the 19th century formed the basis for a centralized state, the penetration of Ottoman political
power remained incomplete and regional resistance to Ottoman reforms and central authority
persisted into the 20th century.
Italian Annexation and Post-War Uncertainty
Italy annexed Tripolitania and Cyrenaica in 1911, and the Ottoman Empire’s subsequent release
of its claim to its territory in 1912, marked the beginning of a violent 20-year period of resistance
to Italian rule led by the Sanussi order and local tribes. The Italian occupation authorities
dismantled the remaining Ottoman governing structures and disrupted the activities of social and
cultural institutions across Libya. Sanussi resistance fighters were defeated during World War I,
and the international community formally recognized Italian control over the territory in 1924. A
second round of anti-Italian insurgency spurred a violent crackdown by Italian forces under
Mussolini, who renamed the territory Libya in 1929. Resistance based in Cyrenaica was worn
down and ultimately crushed by 1931. In 1934, Italian peasant colonists began entering the
provinces, leading to the displacement of local farmers and the uprooting of established
agricultural communities across the country. The population of Cyrenaica remained hostile to
Italian rule and its Sanussi leaders allied themselves with British colonial forces in neighboring
Egypt.
During the Second World War, Libya served as a staging ground for Italian and German attacks
on French North Africa and British-held Egypt. Pivotal battles took place in Cyrenaica from 1940
to early 1943, when German and Italian forces were forced from Libya by British troops under
General Bernard Montgomery. British-organized Sanussi fighters played a role in supporting
allied operations against German and Italian forces. Following the war, Libya’s provinces were
divided under British and French protection until the disposition of Italy’s former colonies could
be negotiated. Protracted and complex negotiations continued for years. In November 1949, U.N.
General Assembly Resolution 289 declared that the three disparate regions would be united in a
single, independent state. The resolution also dispatched a United Nations Commissioner to assist
a national assembly representing the regions in creating institutions for a new state that was to
assume sovereignty no later than January 1, 1952. The strength of tribal and regional identities
complicated the subsequent negotiations and strongly influenced the new government following
independence.
Independence and Monarchy, 1951-1969
A constitution agreed to by the U.N.-assisted National Constituent Assembly in October 1951
established a federal system of government with central authority vested in King Idris As Sanussi
I and legislative authority vested in a Prime Minister, a Council of Ministers, and a bicameral
legislature. On December 24, 1951, the United Kingdom of Libya became one of the first
independent states in Africa. The first parliamentary election was held in February 1952, one
month after independence. Political parties were banned by the king shortly after independence
was declared, and Libya’s first decade of independence was characterized by continuous
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bargaining and rivalry among the provincial governments over taxation, development, and
constitutional issues. In 1963, King Idris replaced the federal system of government with a
unitary monarchy that centralized royal authority, in part to streamline the development of the
country’s newly discovered oil resources.
Prior to the discovery of marketable oil in 1959, the Libyan government was largely dependent on
economic aid and technical assistance it received from international institutions and through
military basing agreements with the United States and United Kingdom. The U.S.-operated air
base at Wheelus field outside of Tripoli served as an important Strategic Air Command base and
center for military intelligence operations throughout the 1950s and 1960s. Oil wealth brought
rapid economic growth and greater financial independence to Libya in the 1960s, but the
weakness of national institutions and Libyan elites’ growing identification with the pan-Arab
socialist ideology of Egyptian leader Gamal Abdel Nasser contributed to the gradual
marginalization of the monarchy under King Idris. Popular criticism of U.S. and British basing
agreements grew, becoming amplified in wake of Israel’s defeat of Arab forces in the 1967 Six
Day War. King Idris left the country in mid-1969 for medical reasons, setting the stage for a
military coup in September, led by a young, devoted Nasserite army captain named Muammar al
Qadhafi.
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Appendix B. Normalization of Relations, Terrorism,
and Related Claims
Background: La Belle and UTA Flight 772
Compensation claims for U.S. victims of the 1986 bombing of the La Belle nightclub in Berlin
and the 1989 Libyan-sponsored bombing of a French passenger aircraft also have been pending in
U.S. courts. Two U.S. servicemen, Sgt. Kenneth T. Ford and Sgt. James E. Goins, were killed in
the La Belle bombing, and 80 other U.S. servicemen and women were injured. Some were
permanently disabled.134 On September 19, 1989, a mid-air explosion killed 171 passengers and
crew of the French airline UTA flight 772 over Niger in western Africa, including seven U.S.
citizens. On March 10, 1999, a French court found six Libyans guilty in absentia for bombing the
DC-10 aircraft. In January 2008, U.S. District Judge Henry H. Kennedy ruled that Libya was
directly responsible for the bombing of UTA Flight 772 and ordered the Libyan government and
specific Libyan officials to pay $6 billion in damages to the families and estates of six U.S.
victims of the attack. Libya made payments to German and French victims for the two
bombings.135
Legal representatives of the La Belle victims and representatives the Libyan government met
several times in 2006 to discuss settlement terms, and reached an agreement in which the victims
and their families relinquished further claims against Libyan government in return for a Libyan
commitment to make specified settlement payments. The U.S. parties signaled their acceptance of
the agreement by signing and transmitting to Libyan government representatives legal documents
known as Release of Claims forms. The Libyan government did not make the payments described
under the terms of the agreement, and the U.S. parties filed a motion before the U.S. District
Court for the District of Columbia to enforce the settlement agreement.136 In early July 2007,
President Bush reportedly identified the resolution of the La Belle settlement as an issue of
importance for further consolidation of U.S.-Libya relations in a letter to Libyan leader Muammar
al Qadhafi.
Under the terms of the Comprehensive Settlement Agreement, the Bush Administration certified
that sufficient funds for the La Belle payments were made available to an independent entity
under the supervision of the U.S. Secretary of State. Reporting suggested that some UTA
plaintiffs have expressed dissatisfaction with the arrangements, stating, “The courts have decided
that Libya carried out the UTA 772 attack, and has awarded us compensation under the rule of
law. [S. 3370] will invalidate the court’s judgment, and allow Libya to avoid a court judgment.”137
134 See Robert Lee Beecham et al. v. Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 01 CIV 02243, District of Columbia
Circuit.
135 Libya paid a total of $33 million in compensation to the victim’s families in July 1999. France re-negotiated the
settlement in 2003 and received about $1 million for each victim. See Robert L. Pugh, et al. v. The Socialist People’s
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, et al., Civ. A. No. 02-2026, U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia.
136 At issue is the question of whether the Libyan representatives who participated in the meetings with the U.S. parties
when the terms of the agreement were outlined has “apparent authority” to represent the Libyan government and
commit to binding agreements on its behalf. See Robert Lee Beecham, et al. V. Socialist People’s Libyan Arab
Jamahiriya, et al., Civ. A. No. 01-2243 U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia.
137 Adam Graham-Silverman, “Congress Clears Measure Limiting Further Terrorism Lawsuits Against Libya,”
(continued...)
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Reestablishing Normal Bilateral Relations
The reestablishment of normal bilateral relations between the United States and Libya has
proceeded incrementally in the wake of Libya’s December 2003 decision to relinquish its
weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missile programs.
• On February 11, 2004, the United States opened a two-person interest section at
the Belgian embassy in Tripoli, which was expanded to a larger Liaison Office in
June 2004. The White House announced several measures on February 26, 2004,
including rescissions on bans on using U.S. passports to travel to or through
Libya, and U.S. citizen expenditures in Libya.
• On September 20, 2004, President Bush issued Executive Order 13357 that
ended most economic sanctions against Libya, allowed air flights between the
two countries, permitted Libyan purchases of U.S.-built aircraft, and released
approximately $1 billion in Libyan assets that had been frozen in the United
States.
• On September 28, 2005, President Bush issued two waivers of Arms Export
Control Act restrictions on the export of defense articles to Libya. The waivers
allowed U.S. companies to “possibly participate” in Libya’s efforts to destroy its
chemical weapons and precursor stockpiles, along with the refurbishment of
eight C-130 transport planes purchased by Libya in the 1970s that have been
withheld for the last 30 years. The President has not indicated when or if the
aircraft will be delivered.138
• On May 15, 2006, the Bush Administration announced its intention to restore full
diplomatic relations with Libya and to rescind Libya’s listing as a state sponsor
of terrorism and a country not fully cooperating with U.S. counterterrorism
efforts. Full diplomatic relations were restored on May 31, when the United
States upgraded its Liaison Office in Tripoli to Embassy status.
• On June 30, 2006, one day after the 45-day congressional notification period for
the rescission of Libya’s terrorism-related designations ended, the remaining
restrictions on U.S. trade with Libya were removed, including the ban on the
export of U.S. defense articles. Certain dual-use technology exports remain
restricted under revised U.S. Commerce Department national security
guidelines.139
• On September 30, 2006, President Bush signed the Iran Freedom Support Act
(H.R. 6198/P.L. 109-293), which removed Libya from the terms of the Iran and
Libya Sanctions Act (P.L. 107-24).
(...continued)
Congressional Quarterly, July 31, 2008.
138 The C-130s remain in storage at Dobbins Air Reserve Base in Georgia. They reportedly remain militarily useful, bur
will require technology upgrades and significant repair. The Administration reportedly has declined to release the
planes, but may plan to allow their sale and the return of the proceeds, minus repair and storage costs, to Libya. Atlanta
Journal-Constitution, “Bound to the Ground: Libyan C-130s Still Parked 30 Years After Purchase,” May 2, 2004; and,
Renae Merle, “After 30 Years, Libya Can’t Get Its Planes, Might Get Repair Bill,” Washington Post, August 18, 2006.
139 Inside U.S. Trade, “BIS Removes Libya’s State Sponsor-related Export Controls,” Vol. 24, No. 36, September 8,
2006.
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Prior to the announcement of plans to restore full diplomatic relations with Libya, some Members
of Congress vocally supported further U.S. engagement in response to Libya’s decision to rid
itself of its weapons of mass destruction and long-range missile development programs.140 Many
Members welcomed the announced changes, although some Members were vocal in calling for
the Administration to obtain assurances from the Libyan government that it would adequately
resolve the outstanding claims of some U.S. terrorism victims. The fulfillment of the Claims
Settlement Agreement and the signing of Executive Order 13477 officially recognized the
settlement of outstanding claims from the U.S. government’s perspective, although some
concerns may remain among private parties.
Congressional Efforts on Behalf of U.S. Terrorism Victims
Congressional concern over the outstanding legal claims of U.S. terrorism victims accompanied
efforts to restore full diplomatic relations between the United States and Libya for several years.
Congressional concerns related to a number of claims, including some related to prominent cases
such as the 1986 bombing of the La Belle nightclub in Berlin, the 1988 bombing of Pan Am
Flight 103, and the 1989 bombing of French airline UTA Flight 772 over Niger (For more
information on these attacks and related claims, see Appendix B).
From 2007 through mid-2008, an atmosphere of brinksmanship characterized U.S.-Libyan
engagement, particularly with regard to outstanding terrorism claims. Some terror victims’
families, associated legal counsel, and some Members of Congress sought to leverage remaining
symbols of diplomatic normalization and new U.S.-Libya economic ties to pressure Libya to
resolve pending cases. This included efforts to delay the construction of a new U.S. Embassy in
Tripoli and postpone the confirmation of the Administration’s nominee for the U.S.
ambassadorship to Libya. Congress also enacted legislation to prohibit U.S. foreign assistance to
Libya for FY2008 and to alter immunity and damage award provisions relating to Libyan-
sponsored acts of terrorism.
Liability Changes Under Section 1083 of P.L. 110-181
Legislation enacted in January 2008 altered the legal environment in which some outstanding
terrorism cases were being considered, and further complicated U.S.-Libyan relations. Section
1083 of P.L. 110-181, the FY2008 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA, H.R. 4986,
signed January 28, 2008) amends the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA) (28 U.S.C.§§
1602-1611) in order to provide a federal cause of action to sue foreign governments designated as
state sponsors of terrorism for damages (including punitive damages) arising from terrorist acts
committed or supported by that state.141 The provision includes measures designed to facilitate the
enforcement of judgments by allowing a claimant to subject foreign government assets to liens of
lis pendens as soon as a suit is filed and by permitting the attachment of indirectly held property
140 After an August 2005 visit to Libya, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations Chairman Lugar called Libya “an
important partner for [the United States] on the war against terrorism,” and indicated that he would “work
constructively on the assumption that it’s in our best interest to normalize the relationship, to get an embassy there, to
get an ambassador.” Representative Lantos introduced the “United States-Libya Relations Act of 2005” (H.R. 1453)
calling for the dispatch of a charge d’affaires to Libya, the negotiation of an agreement for the establishment of a full
U.S. Embassy in Tripoli, and a number of cooperative security, economic, and cultural initiatives. Sylvia Smith, “Libya
Wins Lugar, Souder’s Praise,” Fort Wayne Journal Gazette, September 25, 2005.
141 See CRS Report RL31258, Suits Against Terrorist States by Victims of Terrorism, by Jennifer K. Elsea.
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to satisfy a final judgment. It also permits the re-filing of certain dismissed cases, nullifying
certain legal defenses that might have been available to defend against them, and permits the
filing of new cases related to previously filed cases that would otherwise be time-barred.
As such, the provisions could have proven applicable to Libya because Libya was previously
designated as a state sponsor of terrorism and remained subject to lawsuits by victims of terrorist
acts that were committed or alleged to have been committed by agents of Libya. Nearly $1.7
billion had been awarded against Libya, with an additional $5.3 billion awarded against certain
named Libyan officials,142 with some twenty additional cases pending. As long as there were
pending claims or outstanding judgments against Libya under the terrorism exception to the
FSIA, U.S. companies doing business with Libya may have been subject to litigation by judgment
creditors who believed the U.S. company was in possession of Libyan property that is subject to
execution on a terrorism judgment.143 From January 2008 onward, legal representatives of U.S.
terrorism victims reportedly filed liens of lis pendens on Libyan assets related to current contracts
with legal and lobbying firms such as Blank & Rome, the Livingston Group, and White &
Case.144
President Bush vetoed the original version of the bill (H.R. 1585) on December 27, 2007, based
on concern that potential court proceedings related to Section 1083 of H.R. 1585 could tie up
billions of dollars in Iraqi government funds in the United States, thus undermining efforts to
rebuild Iraq and train Iraqi security forces. Conditional waiver authority for Iraq was included in
H.R. 4986 and subsequently exercised.145 However, no specific provisions were included to limit
the applicability of the provisions to Libya. In March 2008, the Administration proposed
amending Section 1083 to include a new waiver provision to permit an exception with respect to
all states whose designation as sponsors of terrorism have been rescinded if the President
determines that the waiver is in the national security interest of the United States.146 Under the
terms of the Libyan Claims Resolution Act (P.L. 110-301), the applicability of Section 1083
provisions to Libya was suspended once the Bush Administration certified the receipt of $1.5
billion in settlement funds and issued Executive Order 13477 stating that claims covered by the
agreement were settled.
142 For legal analysis, see CRS Report RL31258, Suits Against Terrorist States by Victims of Terrorism, by Jennifer K.
Elsea.
143 The new legislation addresses the rights of third parties who have an interest in property that may be subject to levy
in execution on a judgment. The conference report for H.R. 1585 (H.Rept. 110-477) applies to P.L. 110-181 and states
the conferees intention with regard to the application of Section 1083 was to “encourage the courts to protect the
property interests of such innocent third parties by using their inherent authority, on a case-by-case basis, under the
applicable procedures governing execution on judgment and attachment in anticipation of judgment.”
144 Kevin Bogardus, “Libya contracts targeted to fund terror victims’ compensation,” The Hill, June 4, 2008.
145 The waiver authority provided in Section 1083 of P.L. 110-181 requires the President to determine that a waiver for
Iraq is in the national security interest of the United States and will “promote the reconstruction of, the consolidation of
democracy in, and the relations of the United States with, Iraq.” The President also must determine that Iraq continues
to be a reliable ally in combating international terrorism. President Bush waived the application of Section 1083 of P.L.
110-181 to Iraq on January 28, 2008, by issuing Presidential Determination No. 2008-9.
146 Text of the Administration proposal was included in the correspondence from U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza
Rice, U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, U.S. Secretary of Energy Samuel Bodman, and U.S. Secretary of
Commerce Carlos Gutierrez to Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi, Senate Majority Leaders Harry Reid, et al., March
18, 2008.
Congressional Research Service
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Libya: Background and U.S. Relations
Author Contact Information
Christopher M. Blanchard
Jim Zanotti
Acting Section Research Manager
Analyst in Middle Eastern Affairs
cblanchard@crs.loc.gov, 7-0428
jzanotti@crs.loc.gov, 7-1441
Congressional Research Service
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