Libya: Background and U.S. Relations
Christopher M. Blanchard
Acting Section Research Manager
Jim Zanotti
Analyst in Middle Eastern Affairs
February 25, 2011
Congressional Research Service
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Libya: Background and U.S. Relations

Summary
Major anti-government protests broke out in Libya on February 15, and reports indicate that they
have since developed into a major uprising against the regime of Muammar al Qadhafi, who has
ruled the country for over 41 years. The uprising has elicited violent government responses,
which have reportedly precipitated divisions within the military and the regime itself. World oil
prices have risen, and the United States and other international actors are considering responses.
Prospects for U.S. and international influence on developments in Libya is uncertain. There is
currently no U.S. ambassador serving in Libya. U.S.-Libya military ties and U.S. foreign
assistance to Libya are minimal, given that full diplomatic relations were restored only five years
ago. Although U.S. trade with and investment in Libya has expanded since the lifting of most
sanctions in 2004, it remains relatively small in scope when compared with Libya’s economic ties
with Europe. Some activists, analysts, and officials, however, along with Libyan diplomats and
groups opposed to Qadhafi, have called on the United States and the international community to
take steps to address the situation. Possible options that could involve action and/or oversight
from Members of the 112th Congress include the following.
• Humanitarian Assistance.
• Suspending Foreign Assistance.
• International Arms Embargoes.
• Investigation and/or Prosecution of International Human Rights Violations.
• Economic Sanctions and/or Travel Bans. Imposing or reimposing unilateral
and/or multilateral sanctions against Libya and firms that do business with or in
Libya, possibly including asset freezes and travel bans targeting the Qadhafis and
individuals and entities aligned with them.
• “No-fly Zones.” Establishing and enforcing these zones within Libya and/or at its
borders in order to (1) prevent the Qadhafi regime from using aircraft for attacks
against its people and (2) prevent the importation of mercenaries and arms from
other countries.
• Direct Intervention or Threats. Ranging from intervention narrowly targeted to
accomplish humanitarian purposes such as providing health care, delivering
supplies, or evacuating foreign nationals; to intervention or threats of
intervention aimed at supporting Libyan rebels, deterring or apprehending
individuals suspected of human rights violations, and/or ousting the Qadhafi
regime.
Many analysts are debating whether particular options should be carried out unilaterally,
multilaterally, or both. Choosing unilateral action over multilateral action could improve response
time at the expense of effectiveness, international legitimacy, and future prospects for multilateral
cooperation. Given ongoing turmoil across the region, any step taken regarding Libya is likely to
set a precedent for U.S. and international involvement in other current or future crises.
The State Department announced on February 25 that it is suspending operations in Libya—but
has not broken off diplomatic relations—and on the same day White House Press Secretary Jay
Carney revealed U.S. plans to impose unilateral economic sanctions against the Qadhafi regime,
without providing specific details.
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Contents
2011 Uprising and Violence ........................................................................................................ 1
Developments as of February 25 ........................................................................................... 1
U.S. and International Reactions ........................................................................................... 5
Possible U.S. and Congressional Responses .......................................................................... 8
The Uprising’s Origins ........................................................................................................ 10
Other Recent Developments ...................................................................................................... 11
Political and Economic Profile .................................................................................................. 12
Muammar al Qadhafi: A Profile........................................................................................... 12
Political Dynamics .............................................................................................................. 13
Government Structure ......................................................................................................... 13
The “Authority of the People” ....................................................................................... 14
Proposals for the Dissolution of State Ministries and Revenue Distribution ................... 14
Opposition Groups .............................................................................................................. 15
Exiles............................................................................................................................ 15
The Muslim Brotherhood .............................................................................................. 16
Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG).......................................................................... 17
Political Reform and Human Rights .................................................................................... 18
Legal and Institutional Reform ...................................................................................... 19
Human Rights Monitoring............................................................................................. 20
Fathi al Jahmi ............................................................................................................... 20
Libyan Foreign Policy......................................................................................................... 21
Energy and the Libyan Economy......................................................................................... 22
Oil Reserves and Production Capacity........................................................................... 22
Natural Gas................................................................................................................... 23
Military Profile and WMD Disarmament................................................................................... 24
The Libyan Military............................................................................................................ 24
Structure, Training, and Equipment ............................................................................... 24
Arms Sales.................................................................................................................... 25
WMD Programs and Disarmament ...................................................................................... 26
Nuclear, Chemical, and Ballistic Missile Programs........................................................ 26
Termination of WMD and Missile Programs ................................................................. 27
Motives for Disarmament.............................................................................................. 27
International Controls and Inspections........................................................................... 28
Background and Recent History ................................................................................................ 29
The Qadhafi Era.................................................................................................................. 30
The Green Book and Qadhafi’s Ideology....................................................................... 30
Terrorism and Confrontation with the United States....................................................... 31
Qadhafi’s Arab-Israeli Intransigence.............................................................................. 31
International Isolation and Signs of Change................................................................... 32
Issues in U.S.-Libyan Relations................................................................................................. 32
Comprehensive Claims Settlement Agreement .................................................................... 33
Settlement Details ......................................................................................................... 34
Settlement Eligibility and Adjudication ......................................................................... 35
Pan Am Flight 103 and Megrahi’s Release .......................................................................... 35
Lockerbie Appeal and Megrahi’s Release ...................................................................... 36
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BP plc and UK-Libya Prisoner Transfer Agreement ....................................................... 37
U.S. Foreign Assistance to Libya......................................................................................... 38
Funding for New U.S. Embassy Construction................................................................ 40
Counterterrorism Cooperation ............................................................................................. 40
Further Reading and Historical Resources ................................................................................. 41

Figures
Figure 1. Map Depicting Libyan Cities, Energy Infrastructure, and Conflict Areas....................... 4
Figure 2. Map of Libya ............................................................................................................... 7

Tables
Table 1. Libyan Military Personnel............................................................................................ 24
Table 2. Recent U.S. Foreign Assistance to Libya ...................................................................... 39

Appendixes
Appendix A. Libya’s Pre-Qadhafi History ................................................................................. 42
Appendix B. Normalization of Relations, Terrorism, and Related Claims .................................. 45

Contacts
Author Contact Information ...................................................................................................... 49

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2011 Uprising and Violence1
Developments as of February 25
Major anti-government protests broke out in Libya on February 15, intensified during and after an
organized “day of rage” on February 17, and have since developed into a major uprising against
the regime of Muammar al Qadhafi
(see “Muammar al Qadhafi: A
Military and Paramilitary Forces,
Profile” below), who has ruled the
Mercenaries, and Rebels
country for over 41 years. The
The relative weakness and disorganization of the Libyan military (see
uprising is taking place against a
“Political Dynamics” and “The Libyan Military” below)—particularly
backdrop of turmoil and political
in comparison to its more professional counterpart in Egypt—
change happening throughout the
arguably renders military defections reported during the February
Middle East and North Africa,
2011 uprising less relevant to the uprising’s outcome and the
country’s internal security than the continuing loyalty of Muammar al
particularly in Libya’s neighboring
Qadhafi’s numerous paramilitary forces and security services.
countries Egypt (to the east) and
According to a December 2010 report by Anthony Cordesman and
Tunisia (to the west). Libya is a
Aram Nerguizian of the Center for Strategic and International
major energy-producing country,
Studies, these forces seem to include, among others, a 3,000-man
responsible for nearly 2% of the
Revolutionary Guard Corps to guard Qadhafi with armored vehicles,
world’s oil production and
rocket launchers, and anti-aircraft weaponry; a 2,500-man Islamic Pan
containing Africa’s largest oil
African Legion; a people’s militia with a nominal strength of about
40,000; and a multi-layered apparatus featuring personal bodyguards
reserves, and the unrest has led to a
and various “committees” (i.e., people’s, revolutionary, purification)
sharp increase in world oil prices.
of regime loyalists.2
Because of tight government
According to the Washington Post, resources have traditionally flowed
controls, international media have
to loyalist units within military, paramilitary, and other security
not been able to monitor the
forces. For assistance in quelling the February 2011 uprising, some of
situation in Libya in the same way
these units, such as the “Khamis Brigade,” (named for Qadhafi’s
they have monitored uprisings in
youngest son, who commands it) have reportedly flown foreign
fighters into the Tripoli vicinity. Identity cards from Guinea, Niger,
other countries in the region.
Chad, Mauritania, and Sudan have reportedly been found on dead
Updates, which often do not provide
individuals clad in Libyan uniforms. Many analysts find it likely for
a clear or full picture of ongoing
foreign mercenaries detached from local conditions to be more
developments, have come largely
ruthless than indigenous forces.3
from amateur video footage and
Regime opponents—perhaps a mix of military defectors and
mobile communications, although
protestors—have in some cases reportedly successful y resisted and
some international media have
battled regime loyalists, gaining control of or disabling key cities,
accessed areas in eastern Libya
roads, airports, and border crossings. The overall extent of their
armed strength in western Libya is the subject of several anecdotes,
under opposition control. The
but remains unclear.
regime has periodically cut off at
least some Libyans’ access to
Internet, satellite television feeds, and phone and mobile communications.

1 This section was prepared by Jim Zanotti, Analyst in Middle Eastern Affairs. All other sections were prepared by
Christopher M. Blanchard, Analyst in Middle Eastern Affairs.
2 Anthony Cordesman and Aram Nerguizian, The North African Military Balance: Force Developments & Regional
Challenges, Center for Strategic and International Studies, December 7, 2010, available at http://csis.org/files/
publication/101203_North_African_Military_Balance_final.pdf.
3 Similar dynamics may exist with the largely Pakistani security forces in Bahrain. Peter Finn, “Gaddafi said to use
paramilitary forces, foreign fighters in crackdown,” Washington Post, February 24, 2011.
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Opponents of the Qadhafi regime have reportedly taken over Benghazi, Libya’s second-largest
city, and much of the surrounding northeastern Mediterranean region of Cyrenaica (see Figure 1,
below).4 On February 20, large-scale unrest reportedly spread to Tripoli, Libya’s capital and
largest city (estimated population: 1.1 million). As of February 24, battles were reportedly
ongoing for control of cities in western Libya near Tripoli, including Misurata, Zuara, and
Zawiyah. Thousands of refugees and expatriates have fled to Tunisia and to Egypt,5 and Italy and
Greece are preparing for the possibility of Libyan refugees coming across the Mediterranean Sea.
Widespread reports indicate that security forces and “revolutionary committees” loyal to the
Qadhafi regime—possibly aided by mercenaries from other African countries—have used
increasing levels of violence to put down the uprising. Reportedly, this includes firing on crowds
from helicopters and sniper nests with live ammunition, including high-caliber automatic
weapons and anti-aircraft guns, as well as air bombardments from fighter jets.6 Violence
reportedly escalated on February 19 when security forces fired upon a funeral procession in
Benghazi. Reports indicate that the regime is concentrating its forces in an effort to retain control
of Tripoli, and that while armed rebels have pressed their insurrection in cities increasingly close
to Tripoli, regime opponents within Tripoli used mobile communications to organize Friday
protests after February 25 early afternoon prayers at mosques. Following the prayers, Qatar-based
news source Al Jazeera stated that heavy gunfire has been reported in various Tripoli
neighborhoods.7 As of February 25, the International Federation for Human Rights estimated that
at least 640 people have died in the violence, but some analysts and international officials believe
that the actual death toll is much higher, perhaps over 2,000.8










4 Benghazi, with an estimated population of 700,000, is a traditional center of anti-Qadhafi sentiment and has
experienced off-and-on unrest in recent years.
5 An estimated 1 to 1.5 million Egyptians live in Libya, most as expatriate workers.
6 See “Two Libyan fighter pilots defect, fly to Malta,” Reuters, February 21, 2011.
7 http://blogs.aljazeera.net/africa/2011/02/24/live-blog-libya-feb-25.
8 “Gaddafi blames al-Qaeda for revolt,” english.aljazeera.net, February 25, 2011.
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During the uprising, Muammar al Qadhafi and his son, Sayf al Islam al Qadhafi, have continued
to address the Libyan people via state television, seeking to rally supporters. In the early hours of
February 21, Sayf warned that civil war could engulf the country, and promised that the regime
would “fight to the last bullet.” On the evening of February 22, Muammar al Qadhafi appeared
alongside loyalists before a crowd of purportedly pro-regime demonstrators in Tripoli. He offered
the Libyan people “whatever form of government they want,” but insisted that he will not leave
Libya and that he will “die a martyr.” He compared the situation in Libya to that of China’s
Tiananmen Square in 1989, and said that he would “cleanse Libya house by house” if necessary.9
The Qadhafis have blamed Libya’s popular insurrection on foreign elements and Al Qaeda.10
Many military officers and conscripts have refused to follow orders to fire upon other Libyans,
and some have joined the insurrection, though to what extent is unclear. The regime’s violent
response also has led to public opposition from Libyan officials and diplomats. Longtime Qadhafi
confederates Abdul Fatah Younis al Abidi (Interior Minister) and Mustapha Abdul Jalil (Justice
Minister), and even one of Qadhafi’s cousins close to his inner circle, have resigned in protest of
the violence.11 Libya’s ambassador to the United States, Ali Adjali, along with Libya’s entire
delegation to the United Nations, except for its ambassador (who has claimed he is pleading with
the regime to stop violent reprisals), denounced the regime’s crackdown. Ibrahim Dabbashi,
Libya’s deputy ambassador to the United Nations, said of Qadhafi on February 21, “Either he has
to get out or the Libyan people will kick him out. It is the end of the game.”12 Dabbashi also said,
“We ask the international community to take the necessary steps to help the Libyan people and to
protect the Libyan people from the genocide it is facing now.”13 In addition, several tribal leaders
have reportedly withdrawn their loyalty from Qadhafi and have threatened to stop the flow of
Libya’s oil if regime-sponsored violence continues. Their threats may be particularly resonant
because over 75% of Libya’s oil exports reportedly come from the east, where the uprising has
been most vigorous.



9 http://blogs.aljazeera.net/africa/2011/02/22/live-blog-libya-feb-22.
10 Qadhafi’s February 22 speech was reportedly filmed in front of a portion of his Bab al Aziziya compound that was
damaged by the 1986 U.S. bombing of Tripoli, and he referred multiple times to past American aggression. He also has
blamed Qatar (headquarters of the Al Jazeera satellite television network that has been at the forefront of media
coverage of the region-wide political change). The Qadhafis’ reference to Al Qaeda is probably intended to attack the
legitimacy of the anti-regime uprising in eastern Libya. The area has links to Islamist groups and causes, and, according
to a Jamestown Foundation article, the eastern city of Darnah was the place of origin of the largest group of foreign
fighters (relative to its population size) that joined the Sunni Jihadist resistance in post-2003 Iraq. Many fighters also
came from Benghazi. Camille Tawil, “Is Libya Headed Toward a Prolonged Civil War?”, Jamestown Foundation,
available at http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=37546&
tx_ttnews%5BbackPid%5D=7&cHash=db5904030d687a9c14a7a6df346a5f90.
11 After his resignation, Jalil gave a February 23 interview to a Swedish newspaper in which he claimed that Qadhafi
personally ordered the 1988 bombing of Pan Am Flight 103 from London to New York, which killed 270 people over
and in Lockerbie, Scotland (including 189 Americans). Various issues related to the bombing are discussed later in the
report.
12 Sudarsan Raghavan and Leila Fadel, “Gaddafi appears in Tripoli as soldiers, government officials abandon regime,”
Washington Post, February 22, 2011.
13 Elizabeth Arrott, “Libyan Crackdown Continues, Officials Quit in Protest,” Voice of America, February 22, 2011.
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Figure 1. Map Depicting Libyan Cities, Energy Infrastructure, and Conflict Areas

Sources: Guardian (UK), Graphic News, U.S. Energy Information Administration, Global Security, The Making of Modern Libya (Ali Abdullatif Ahmida, State University of
New York Press, 1994). Adapted by CRS.

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Some analysts believe that because of geographical and tribal differences within the country, the
end of the Qadhafi regime could result in a Libya with little internal unity or cohesion.14 The
country’s old colonial divisions (between the provinces of Tripolitania in the northwest, Fezzan in
the southwest, and Cyrenaica in the east) could become increasingly significant (see Figure 2
below), and the potential for lawlessness and disorder could raise international concerns about
Libya’s potential use by terrorist and criminal networks.15 If the regime does not fall quickly, a
prolonged civil war is possible.16 Such fighting might feature urban battles, as well as competition
over tribal loyalties and control of energy infrastructure, that pit the regime and its supporters
concentrated in Tripoli and western Libya against anti-regime forces concentrated in the east.
Another possible scenario would be for Qadhafi to retreat to a compound he maintains at Sebha
on the Saharan periphery in the southwest, although that might cede effective political, economic,
and military control of the rest of the country to the opposition. In the event Qadhafi succeeds in
quelling the uprising, the potential consequences are unclear given the magnitude of change that
has already occurred on the ground and within the regime and bureaucracy. Some speculate that
Libya would “revert back into a pariah state.”17 There are reports of concerns that Qadhafi might
use biological and/or chemical weapons against his people as a last resort, but the Organization
for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons said this would be unlikely because of evidence that
Libya has destroyed the potential delivery systems for such weapons (see “International Controls
and Inspections” below).18
U.S. and International Reactions
On February 23, President Barack Obama called the bloodshed in Libya “outrageous” and
“unacceptable” and said that his Administration was looking at the “full range of options we have
to respond to this crisis.”19 He also said that Secretary of State Hillary Clinton would be in
Geneva, Switzerland on February 28 for a session of the U.N. Human Rights Council (UNHRC)
to discuss the situation in Libya and elsewhere in the region. Senate Foreign Relations Committee
Chairman John Kerry and House Foreign Affairs Committee Chairwoman Ileana Ros-Lehtinen
both issued statements on February 22 denouncing the Qadhafi regime and its actions, calling on
the Obama Administration to consider reimposing economic sanctions on Libya, and calling on
the United Nations to remove Libya from the UNHRC.20 The U.N. Security Council (UNSC) met
on February 22 to discuss the situation in Libya, and its president issued a statement saying that
the UNSC’s members “called for an immediate end to the violence and for steps to address the
legitimate demands of the population,” as well as for international humanitarian assistance. The
UNSC and the UNHRC are both scheduled to meet February 25 to consider further action on the

14 See, e.g., Robert Danin, “Libya’s Leadership Crossroads,” Council on Foreign Relations, February 22, 2011,
available at http://www.cfr.org/libya/libyas-leadership-crossroads/p24173; Andrew Solomon, “How Qaddafi Lost
Libya,” newyorker.com, February 21, 2011.
15 See, e.g., Simon Henderson and David Schenker, “‘The Last Bullet,’: Qadhafi and the Future of Libya,” Washington
Institute for Near East Policy, PolicyWatch #1761, February 22, 2011.
16 Tawil, op. cit.
17 Ibid.
18 Oren Kessler, “Gaddafi keeps grip on capital as revolt spreads,” jpost.com, February 24, 2011.
19 See full text of President Obama’s remarks at http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2011/02/23/president-obama-speaks-
turmoil-libya-violence-must-stop.
20 See full text of both statements at http://foreign.senate.gov/press/chair/release/?id=390b4f5a-9aa4-457d-8552-
2173b1898eeb and http://foreignaffairs.house.gov/press_display.asp?id=1728.
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matter, and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has called an emergency meeting for
February 25 as well.
Similar denunciations of the violence in Libya, along with calls for international responses, have
come from leaders in the European Union and its member states, including the United Kingdom,
France, and Germany. European energy markets and firms have been most directly affected by the
(as of February 25) approximately 70%-80% reduction in Libya’s daily oil output. More than
85% of Libya’s oil exports go to Europe, with about one third of that amount going to Italy. Only
about 5% of oil exports from Libya go to the United States.21 On February 24, Saudi Arabia
indicated its willingness to attempt to stabilize world oil prices by making up the production
shortfall caused by the Libyan unrest. On February 22, the Arab League suspended Libya’s right
to participate in its meetings and the Secretary-General of the Organization of the Islamic
Conference characterized the Qadhafi regime’s crackdown as a “humanitarian catastrophe which
goes against Islamic and human values.” On February 24, the African Union condemned the
crackdown and said it would send a mission to Libya to assess the situation. On February 25,
Switzerland froze Qadhafi’s Swiss assets, as it had done earlier in the cases of Tunisia’s Zinedine
el Abidine Ben Ali and Egypt’s Hosni Mubarak. Venezuela’s Hugo Chavez, Cuba’s Fidel Castro,
and Nicaragua’s Daniel Ortega have all issued statements of support for and solidarity with
Qadhafi.

21 Clifford Krauss, “Why the Disruption of Libyan Oil Has Led to a Price Spike,” New York Times, February 23, 2011.
The article says that most of the rest of Libya’s oil exports go to Asia.
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Figure 2. Map of Libya

Source: CRS.
A ferry transported 183 U.S. citizens and 155 foreign nationals from Tripoli to the Mediterranean
island nation of Malta on February 25.22 On the same day, additional U.S. citizens were evacuated
on a chartered jet that flew from Tripoli to Istanbul, Turkey. Several other countries, (especially
Egypt, but also Turkey, Russia, China, Canada, Spain, Italy, France, and the United Kingdom)
have evacuated or are attempting to evacuate their citizens from Libya.


22 “Foreigners making dash out of Libya,” cnn.com, February 22, 2011. According to State Department spokesman P.J.
Crowley, approximately 5,000 U.S. citizens have been living in Libya (600 of whom are solely U.S. citizens).
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Possible U.S. and Congressional Responses
Prospects for U.S. and international
Impact of Uprising on Oil Production
influence on developments in Libya is
uncertain. There is currently no U.S.
As discussed below (see “Oil Reserves and Production
Capacity”), the Libyan National Oil Company (NOC) manages
ambassador serving in Libya.26 U.S.-
oil production activity and negotiates exploration and
Libya military ties and U.S. foreign
production agreements with foreign companies. As a result of
assistance to Libya are minimal, given
the February 2011 uprising, the United Arab Emirates news
that full diplomatic relations were
source The National reported on February 25 that the NOC
restored only five years ago. Although
“has declared force majeure on exports, a rare move for any
country and usual y a precursor to a total production shut-
U.S. trade with and investment in Libya
down.”23 Two NOC subsidiaries that control oil fields and
has expanded since the lifting of most
refineries in eastern Libya, Arabian Gulf Oil Company and Sirte
sanctions in 2004,27 it remains relatively
Oil Company, have reportedly broken with Qadhafi and
small in scope when compared with
pledged their loyalty to “the people.”24
Libya’s economic ties with Europe. Some
Two European companies with extensive operations in Libya,
activists, analysts, and officials, however,
Italy’s Eni and Spain’s Repsol, have largely halted production,
along with Libyan diplomats and groups
and Eni has temporarily shut down a pipeline transporting
natural gas to Italy. Other European companies with major
opposed to Qadhafi, have called on the
Libyan operations, including France’s Total, Norway’s Statoil,
United States and the international
Germany’s Wintershall and BWE, and Austria’s OMV, also
community to take steps to address the
have curtailed or halted production and begun evacuating staff.
situation. A prominent human rights
China National Petroleum Corporation also has reportedly
activist has asserted: “The absence of
relocated part of its workforce.
close military and diplomatic relations
Although Saudi Arabia has pledged to boost production to
can also free the United States to take
compensate for Libyan shortfal s, reports say that Libya’s
more decisive steps to support
“sweet” crude—particularly well-suited for the production of
gasoline, diesel, and jet fuel—cannot easily be replaced by Saudi
democratic change and restrain
Arabia’s more “sour” grades. If European countries seek
repressive regimes such as Libya.”28
greater supply from major U.S. sweet crude suppliers Algeria
Possible options that could involve action
and Nigeria, greater upward pressure on U.S. gasoline prices is
and/or oversight from Members of the
likely.25 European oil embargoes, greater Libyan nationalization,
112th Congress include the following.
and/or heightened instability in Algeria, if they ensue, also could
exert upward pressure.
• Humanitarian Assistance.
• Suspending Foreign Assistance (see “U.S. Foreign Assistance to Libya” below).
• International Arms Embargoes.
• Investigation and/or Prosecution of International Human Rights Violations.

23 Tamsin Carlisle, “Libya unrest unnerves oil markets as supplies seriously disrupted,” The National, February 25,
2011.
24 “Libya: Oil Companies Announce Break with Gadhafi,” STRATFOR, February 24, 2011.
25 Krauss, “Why the Disruption of Libyan Oil Has Led to a Price Spike,” op. cit.
26 Ambassador Gene Cretz was recalled in January 2011, possibly at least partly owing to leaks of internal U.S.
diplomatic communications about Qadhafi.
27 For more information, see the U.S. Commercial Service’s Libya page at http://www.buyusa.gov/libya/en/
doingbusinessinlibya.html.
28 Tom Malinowski, “Too Little, Not Yet Too Late,” foreignpolicy.com, February 22, 2011. See also Josh Rogin,
“Senators and experts call on Obama to take stronger measures against Qaddafi,” thecable.foreignpolicy.com, February
25, 2010.
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• Economic Sanctions and/or Travel Bans. Imposing or reimposing unilateral
and/or multilateral sanctions against Libya and firms that do business with or in
Libya, possibly including travel bans and asset freezes targeting the Qadhafis and
individuals and entities aligned with them.
• “No-fly Zones.” Establishing and enforcing these zones within Libya and/or at its
borders in order to (1) prevent the Qadhafi regime from using aircraft for attacks
against its people and (2) prevent the importation of mercenaries and arms from
other countries.
• Direct Intervention or Threats. Ranging from intervention narrowly targeted to
accomplish humanitarian purposes such as providing health care, delivering
supplies, or evacuating foreign nationals; to intervention or threats of
intervention aimed at supporting Libyan rebels, deterring or apprehending
individuals suspected of human rights violations, and/or ousting the Qadhafi
regime.29
Many analysts are debating whether particular options should be carried out unilaterally,
multilaterally, or both. Choosing unilateral action over multilateral action could improve response
time at the expense of effectiveness, international legitimacy, and future prospects for multilateral
cooperation.30 Given ongoing turmoil across the region, any step taken regarding Libya is likely
to set a precedent for U.S. and international involvement in other current or future crises. Even
confining international action to the delivery of humanitarian assistance could be dangerous and
trigger significant unintended consequences, particularly with thousands of U.S. citizens and
other foreign nationals still in Libya. Additionally, reactions to a potential U.S. or other Western
military deployment or to an international human rights investigation could be difficult to predict
among key actors within Libya, as well as among nearby regimes and populations.
In the context of President Obama’s February 23 pledge to consider the “full range of options,”
the State Department announced on February 25 that it is suspending operations in Libya—but
has not broken off diplomatic relations—and on the same day White House Press Secretary Jay
Carney revealed U.S. plans to impose unilateral economic sanctions against the Qadhafi regime,
without providing specific details. Past U.S. sanctions specifically aimed at Libya included (1)
banning all U.S.-Libya trade, including oil imports (1986-2004), (2) freezing the U.S. assets of
the Libyan government and affiliated individuals and entities (1986-2004), and (3) prohibiting
U.S. airline flights to Libya (1992-2004).31 In addition, from 1996 to 2006, legislation known as
the Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996 (P.L. 104-172) authorized sanctions against firms doing

29 See “Turtle Bay to the Rescue,” Wall Street Journal, February 23, 2011, which argued: “Opposition forces need to
be able to communicate with each other and the outside world without having their signals jammed, and here too the
U.S. can help. And while the U.S. and its allies may not be prepared to intervene militarily, merely the threat of
destroying the Libyan air force if it continues to bombard civilians could persuade its airmen to defect to the side of the
opposition, thereby hastening the regime’s demise and bringing the killing to a halt.”
30 See, e.g., Ed Pilkington, “UN ambassadors clash over condemnation of Gaddafi,” Guardian (UK), February 23,
2011.
31 These sanctions were imposed pursuant to Executive Orders 12543, 12544, and 12801 under the authority of the
National Emergencies Act (P.L. 94-412) and the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (P.L. 95-223). In
1982, President Ronald Reagan initially banned Libyan oil imports to the United States pursuant to Proclamation 4907
under the authority of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 (19 U.S.C. 1862), and in 1985 expanded the ban to all
petroleum products pursuant to Executive Order 12538 under the authority of the International Security and
Development Cooperation Act of 1985 (P.L. 99-83).
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business with or in Libya.32 The United Nations (until 2003) and European Union (until 2004)
also previously maintained sanctions against Libya.
The Uprising’s Origins
The National Conference for the Libyan Opposition (NLCO, an umbrella organization of
opposition groups headed by the National Libyan Salvation Front (NLSF)—see “Exiles” below)
and Internet-based organizers called for a “day of rage” to take place on February 17.33 Similar
events had been organized by anti-government groups in many other countries in the Middle East
and North Africa over the previous month. On February 17, hundreds of protestors took to the
streets in Benghazi and in other cities in its vicinity.34 Additional protests were reported in Az
Zintan, approximately 100 miles southwest of Tripoli.
Reports indicate that at least 24 and possibly more than 50 people were killed on February 17
when Libyan government forces fired on crowds with live ammunition in an attempt to disperse
them.35 On February 18, demonstrators in Benghazi reportedly numbered in the thousands or tens
of thousands, and violent crackdowns by government security forces and affiliated “revolutionary
committees,” possibly including forces brought in from other parts of the country, reportedly
continued. While unrest intensified in Benghazi and other parts of eastern Libya, Tripoli and most
of western Libya reportedly remained under tighter government control until February 20. On
February 17, Libyan state television broadcast images of Muammar al Qadhafi driving through
Tripoli and rallying thousands of ostensible supporters. Other pro-Qadhafi rallies were reportedly
organized throughout the country.36
The ongoing unrest in Libya can be traced back to mid-January 2011, as part of the region-wide
wave of popular protests—beginning in Tunisia in December 2010—against repression, political
corruption, and poor and/or inequitable economic conditions. Although the Libyan government
announced housing benefits and price controls,37 and released 110 members of the opposition
Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (see “Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG)” below) in attempts
to placate popular discontent, grievances persisted. They were possibly fueled by the other
protests taking place throughout the region, particularly in Libya’s eastern neighbor Egypt, where
the military took power from President Hosni Mubarak on February 11. On the evening of
February 15, the demonstrations that led directly to the uprising began when several hundred
people gathered in front of the Benghazi police headquarters to protest the arrest of attorney and
human rights activist Fethi Tarbel. As the February 17 “day of rage” neared, protests escalated in
Benghazi and other cities despite reported police attempts at dispersion with water cannons, tear

32 P.L. 104-172 remains in force in amended form. Following the 1996 deletion of provisions relating to Libya, it was
renamed the “Iran Sanctions Act.”
33 See Khaled Mahmoud, “Gaddafi ready for Libya’s ‘Day of Rage,’” Asharq al Awsat (English), February 9, 2011.
The “day of rage” also commemorated anti-government protests held exactly five years before, on February 17, 2006.
On that date, demonstrations in Benghazi initially organized to protest the Danish cartoons depicting the Muslim
prophet Muhammad turned into anti-government protests and led to protestors setting fire to the Italian consulate.
Libyan security forces killed at least nine protestors.
34 These cities include Al Bayda, Darnah, and Ajdabiya.
35 Tahani Karrar-Lewsley, “Human-Rights Groups Say Dozens Have Died in Libya,” Wall Street Journal, February 18,
2011.
36 Ibid.
37 “Libya sets up $24 bln fund for housing,” Reuters, January 27, 2011.
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gas, rubber bullets, and batons. There were multiple reports of protestors setting government
buildings on fire.
Qadhafi reportedly had privately warned Libyan political activists and media figures that the
government would hold them responsible for any disturbance of the peace.38 Additionally, the
London-based, Saudi-financed Arab news source Asharq al Awsat reported on February 9 that
“Libyan activists have claimed that the Libyan intelligence service has been carrying out a large-
scale campaign to shut down Libyan websites based outside of the country due to their ongoing
coverage of the situation in Libya.”39
Other Recent Developments
The Obama Administration’s FY2011 foreign assistance request for Libya included the following
items: $250,000 in Foreign Military Financing (FMF), $350,000 for International Military
Education and Training (IMET), and $275,000 in counterterrorism and border security assistance
(Nonproliferation, Anti-terrorism, Demining, and Related Programs, or NADR). The
Administration has not published its specific requests for Nonproliferation Disarmament Fund
(NDF) or Global Threat Reduction (GTR) programs, Middle East Partnership Initiative programs,
or Trans-Saharan Counterterrorism Partnership programs involving Libya. The State Department
estimated during FY2010 that the U.S. government would spend at least $780,000 on Libya
programs that year.
In August 2009, Scottish authorities released convicted Pan Am 103 bomber Abd al Baset Ali al
Megrahi on compassionate grounds in light of his diagnosis with terminal prostate cancer and a
medical prognosis that reportedly projected that he would die within three months. His release
was highly controversial, and outrage among some parties in the United Kingdom and United
States grew after Megrahi was greeted publicly by a cheering crowd upon his arrival in Tripoli.
Megrahi remains ill, but has survived longer than the reported prognosis used to justify his
release, leading members of the Scottish parliament to demand that their government provide
further information about the medical advice it relied upon as well as about Megrahi’s current
medical condition. The U.S. Department of Justice Foreign Claims Settlement Commission
(FCSC) is currently accepting and adjudicating various categories of terrorism-related claims in
accordance with the 2008 U.S.-Libya Claims Settlement Agreement and State Department letters
of referral. This includes claims related to the Pan Am 103 bombing.
Megrahi’s disputed release immediately preceded the September 2009 visit of Muammar al
Qadhafi to New York for the United Nations General Assembly; that visit in turn fueled
controversy over the Libyan leader’s accommodation during his stay and his remarks at the
meeting. New scrutiny of the release emerged in July 2010, when four U.S. Senators wrote to
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton urging the State Department to investigate claims that BP plc
sought to influence the decisions of the governments of the United Kingdom and Scotland
concerning Megrahi’s release. Those claims and responses from the relevant parties are reviewed
below (see “BP plc and UK-Libya Prisoner Transfer Agreement”).

38 Mahmoud, op. cit.
39 Ibid.
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In October 2009, Qadhafi called for his relatively reform-oriented son, Sayf al Islam, to take a
leadership position in the country. Sayf subsequently was appointed General Coordinator of the
Popular Social Command, a position which, before the 2011 uprising, was set to give him
substantive executive and oversight authority as the equivalent of head of state. Sayf’s support of
the regime’s crackdown against the uprising is likely to undo the perceptions of some who may
previously have been open to accepting his reformist credentials.
The appointment followed months of speculation about whether or not Sayf had fallen irreparably
out of favor among his father’s more conservative supporters. Mutassim al Qadhafi, another of
the leader’s sons, visited Washington in April 2009 in his official capacity as his father’s national
security adviser. He appeared publicly with U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, with whom he
reportedly discussed security cooperation, among other issues.
Political and Economic Profile
Muammar al Qadhafi: A Profile
Muammar al Qadhafi was born in 1942 near the central coastal city of Sirte. His Arabized Berber
family belongs to the relatively small Qadhafa tribe, and his upbringing was modest. As a young
man Qadhafi identified strongly with Arab nationalist and socialist ideologies espoused by leaders
such as Egypt’s Gamal Abdel Nasser. Although he was excluded from the elite Cyrenaica Defense
Forces on a tribal basis during the Libyan monarchy period (see Appendix A), Qadhafi was
commissioned as a regular army captain following stints at the Libyan military academy in
Benghazi and the United Kingdom’s Royal Military Academy at Sandhurst. Following his return
to Libya, he led the September 1, 1969, overthrow of the Libyan monarchy with a group of fellow
officers. He was 27 years old.
Qadhafi has proven to be a controversial, complex, and contradictory political survivor during his
long reign in Libya, in spite of numerous internal and external challenges to his rule. He has
exercised nearly complete, if, at times, indirect political control over Libya over the last 30-plus
years by carefully balancing and manipulating complex patronage networks, traditional tribal
structures, and byzantine layers of national, regional, and local governance. Libya’s foreign and
domestic policies nominally have been based on his personal ideology. In the past, Qadhafi and
his supporters have imposed his theories with realistic purpose and precision, not hesitating to
crush coup attempts, assassinate dissidents abroad, or sponsor violent movements and terrorist
attacks against Libya’s perceived external enemies. He has apparently taken similar actions in
response to the 2011 uprising against his rule, as described above.
Personally, Qadhafi often is described as mercurial, charismatic, shrewd, and reclusive. He is
married and has eight children: seven sons and one daughter. An April 1986 U.S. air strike in
retaliation for a Libyan-sponsored anti-American bombing in Berlin hit one of his homes in
Tripoli, killing his adopted infant daughter and hospitalizing members of his immediate family.
The incident reportedly continues to be a source of personal anger and resentment for Qadhafi: he
has preserved the bombed-out ruins of the home in the military compound where it stood, and he
remarked on the death of President Ronald Reagan in 2004 that the former U.S. President had
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died before he could be prosecuted for the “ugly crime that he committed in 1986 against the
Libyan children.”40
Political Dynamics
Libya’s often contradictory political dynamics are a product of competing interest groups seeking
to influence policy within the confines of the country’s authoritarian political system and amid
Libya’s emergence from international isolation. Elements of Muammar al Qadhafi’s ideology
permeate political discourse on many security and foreign policy issues, while in other cases,
such as economic reform, new frameworks are being embraced to meet society’s current and
changing needs. The legacies of colonial occupation and Libya’s struggle for independence
continue to influence Libyan politics; rhetorical references to preserving sovereignty and
resistance to foreign domination are common in political statements. Most Libyans also accept a
prominent role for Islamic tradition in public life: Islam is the official religion and the Quran is
the basis for the country’s law and its “social code.”
Tribal relationships remain important, particularly with regard to the distribution of leadership
roles in government ministries and in political-military relations. Tribal loyalties remain strong
within and between branches of the armed services, and members of Qadhafi’s tribe, the Qadhafa,
have held many high-ranking government positions, reportedly including key positions in the air
force. Members of larger, rival tribes, such as the Warfalla, have opposed the regime on grounds
of tribal discrimination. Some Libyan military and security officials staged limited, unsuccessful
coup attempts against Qadhafi in 1993 and 1996 based in part on tribal and familial rivalries. The
Qadhafi government has performed periodic reassignments and purges of the officer corps to
limit the likelihood of organized opposition reemerging from within the military. However, these
political considerations have affected the military’s preparedness and war fighting capability.
Political parties and all opposition groups are banned in Libya under law number 71 of 1972.
Formal political pluralism is frowned upon by many members of the ruling elite, even as an
increasing number of regime figures advocate for greater popular participation in existing
government institutions. Prior to the 2011 uprising, opposition groups, most notably the Muslim
Brotherhood, appear to have shifted their political strategies toward gradual attempts to influence
national policy making in contrast to others’ confrontational efforts to change the makeup of the
regime. Prominent figures in Libyan politics include Muammar al Qadhafi’s son Sayf al Islam al
Qadhafi,41 General People’s Committee Secretary Al Baghdadi Ali al Mahmudi, National Oil
Company chief Shukri Ghanem, Foreign Minister Musa Kusa, and prominent members of the
security establishment, including army leader and original RCC member Abu Bakr Younis Jaber.
Government Structure
Libya has a unique political system composed of nominally decentralized and participatory levels
of government. Muammar al Qadhafi and his closest supporters exercise final authority over

40 Khaled El-Deeb, “Gadhafi: Regrets Reagan Died Before Being Tried for 1986 Air Strikes on Libya,” Associated
Press, June 6, 2004.
41 For a detailed profile of Sayf al Islam al Qadhafi and a discussion of questions about the possibility of his succeeding
his father, see Yehudit Ronen, “Libya’s Rising Star: Said Al-Islam and Succession,” Middle East Policy, Vol. XII, No.
3, Fall 2005, pp. 136-44.
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domestic and foreign policies by means of their control of the implementation mechanisms of the
national government—the sizeable military and security apparatus and a handful of powerful
ministries. Qadhafi’s ideological emphasis on “the authority of the people” is the stated basis for
the operation of Libya’s multiple levels of government. Although participation in these
institutions is mostly open and political leaders routinely encourage citizens to take part in their
deliberations, most external observers regard Libya’s political system as largely authoritarian and
undemocratic. The U.S. State Department’s annual human rights reports document ongoing
restrictions on political life and human rights in Libya (see “Political Reform and Human Rights”
below).
The “Authority of the People”
A hierarchy of “people’s congresses” make up Libya’s government and serve as venues for the
exercise of “popular authority” as defined by Muammar al Qadhafi’s ideology. At the local level,
citizens meet in Basic People’s Congresses to appoint representatives to regional and ultimately
the national General People’s Congress. Participation in the basic congresses is open to all Libyan
citizens, although participation rates are notoriously low and Qadhafi regularly makes public
statements expressing his disappointment with participation levels and urging broader popular
involvement in public affairs. At the March 1, 2000, session of the General Peoples’ Congress,
Qadhafi abolished the positions of 12 General People’s Committee (cabinet-equivalent)
secretaries and reassigned their duties to provincial committees. Secretariats of foreign affairs,
justice, public security, and finance remained under the authority of the centralized General
People’s Committee. Some experts have argued that the decentralization was designed to deflect
popular criticism from the central government and further dilute political opposition within the
country.
In March 2006, the Libyan government announced the replacement of Secretary (prime minister-
equivalent) of the General People’s Committee Shukri Ghanem by former Health Minister Al
Baghdadi Ali al Mahmudi. A cabinet reshuffle and the creation of seven new ministries also were
announced. The replacement of the reform-oriented Ghanem was interpreted by some observers
as an effort by conservative and hard-line elements of the Libyan political establishment to
reassert control over the speed and direction of Libya’s reform efforts. Ghanem now serves as the
director of the National Oil Company, where he is involved with ongoing international bidding
for oil exploration and production-sharing agreements. A further reshuffle in March 2009 elevated
longtime intelligence chief Musa Kusa to the position of Foreign Minister, and further changes in
the leadership of the General People’s Congress were enacted in January 2010.
Proposals for the Dissolution of State Ministries and Revenue Distribution
In March 2008, Qadhafi announced his intention to dissolve most government administrative
bodies and institute a Wealth Distribution Program whereby state oil revenues would be
distributed to citizens on a monthly basis for them to administer personally, in cooperation with
and via local committees.42 Citing popular criticism of government performance in a long, wide-
ranging speech, Qadhafi repeatedly stated that the traditional state would soon be “dead” in Libya
and that direct rule by citizens would be accomplished through the distribution of oil revenues.

42 BBC Monitoring Middle East, “Libyan leader says cabinet must be dismantled,” March 2, 2008; and, “Libyan Leader
Addresses Libyan People’s Congress; Dissolves Cabinet,” OSC Report GMP20080305864001, March 3, 2008.
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Defense, foreign affairs, security, and oil production arrangements reportedly would remain
national government responsibilities, while other bodies would be phased out. In early 2009,
Libya’s Basic People’s Congresses considered variations of the proposals, and the General
People’s Congress voted to delay implementation. Prior to the 2011 uprising, there was no
indication that action on the initiative was forthcoming.
Opposition Groups
As has been seen during the 2011 uprising discussed above, the government has dealt harshly
with opposition leaders and groups over the last four decades, establishing special “people’s
courts” and “revolutionary committees” to enforce ideological and political discipline and to
punish violators and dissidents. Abroad, Libyan intelligence personnel have monitored, harassed,
and, in some cases, assassinated expatriate dissidents, some of whom were referred to as “stray
dogs.” In past years, some in the Libyan establishment have reached out to opposition figures and
exiles, facilitating engagement and negotiating the return of some former regime opponents to
Libya.
Libya’s myriad opposition movements can be categorized broadly as Islamist, royalist, or
democratic in orientation. However, prior to the 2011 uprising, their activities and effectiveness
had been largely limited by disorganization, rivalry, and ideological differences. New efforts to
coordinate opposition activities had begun in response to Libya’s reintegration to the international
community and the emergence of a broader political reform debate in the Arab world, and gained
momentum with the outbreak of region-wide protests and political change in late 2010 and early
2011. Nevertheless, the extent of coherent organization or coordination among the anti-regime
forces involved in the 2011 uprising is unclear.
Exiles
In the past, government officials and intelligence operatives have monitored and taken violent
action against expatriate opposition groups and leaders, including in Europe and the United
States. Clandestine opposition groups also have carried out assassinations and attacks against
Libyan government officials abroad. Opposition groups in exile include the National Alliance, the
Libyan National Movement (LNM), the Libyan Movement for Change and Reform, the Islamist
Rally, the National Libyan Salvation Front (NLSF), and the Republican Rally for Democracy and
Justice. A royalist contingent based on the claim to the throne by Mohammed al Sanusi, the
grandson of the former king, is based in London. These groups and others held an opposition
conference—known as the National Conference for the Libyan Opposition (NCLO)—in July
2005 in London and issued a “national accord,” calling for the removal of Qadhafi from power
and the establishment of a transitional government.43 A follow-up meeting was held in March
2008.44 The NCLO reportedly helped lead the call for the February 17, 2011, “day of rage” that
helped catalyze protests into a full-blown uprising against the Qadhafi regime (see “The
Uprising’s Origins” above).

43 May Youssef, “Anti-Gaddafists Rally in London,” Al Ahram Weekly (Cairo), No. 749, June 30 - July 6, 2005; Al
Jazeera (Doha), “Opposition Plans to Oust Al Qadhafi,” June 25, 2005; Middle East Mirror, “Libya’s Fractured
Opposition,” July 29, 2005.
44 “Libyan Opposition Groups Meet in London To Reiterate Commitment To Save Libya,” OSC Report
GMP20080329825012, March 29, 2008.
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In a September 2005 interview, then-Foreign Minister Abd al Rahman Shalgam characterized
some of the regime’s expatriate opponents as individuals who fled the country after committing
economic crimes or collaborating with foreign intelligence services. He then invited any
expatriate dissidents who had not committed crimes to return to Libya.45 In August 2005, the
government announced the return of 787 exiles who agreed to reconcile with the Qadhafi
regime.46 Regional observers characterized the return of prominent dissidents in August 2006 as
evidence of an unofficial reconciliation program between the Libyan government and its
expatriate opponents.47 The Qadhafi Development Foundation reportedly facilitated the return of
a group of 33 exiles in January 2010.48
The Muslim Brotherhood
Like other political organizations and opposition groups, the Muslim Brotherhood is banned in
Libya under law number 71 of 1972. Since the late 1940s, when members of the Egyptian
Muslim Brotherhood first entered Libya following a crackdown on their activities, the Libyan
Muslim Brotherhood has existed as a semi-official organization. Hundreds of Brotherhood
members and activists were jailed in 1973, although the Brotherhood eventually reemerged and
operated as a clandestine organization for much of the following two decades. In 1998, a second
round of mass arrests took place, and 152 Brotherhood leaders and members were arrested.
Several reportedly died in custody, and, following trials in 2001 and 2002, two prominent
Brotherhood leaders were sentenced to death and over 70 were sentenced to life in prison. The
government announced a retrial for the imprisoned Brotherhood activists in October 2005, and in
March 2006, the group’s 84 remaining imprisoned members were released.49
The controller general of the Libyan Muslim Brotherhood, Suleiman Abdel Qadir, describes the
Brotherhood’s objectives as peaceful and policy-focused, and has called for the cancellation of
laws restricting political rights.50 Sayf al Islam al Qadhafi has reached out to the Libyan Muslim
Brotherhood by publicly characterizing the organization as nonviolent and non-seditious. Abdel
Qadir responded to political reform statements by Sayf al Islam al Qadhafi in 2007 with calls for
more inclusive, consultative decision making.51 In a November 2008 interview with Qatar-based
satellite television channel Al Jazeera, Abdel Qadir expressed appreciation for the younger
Qadhafi’s attempt, while noting that the fact that outreach has taken place under the auspices of
the Qadhafi Foundation and not through official state organs undermines their significance. He
also repeated calls for reform and reconciliation aimed at creating a constitution and protecting
civil rights for Libyans.52

45 “Libya’s Shalgam on Ties With US, S. Arabia, Opposition,” OSC Report GMP20050924512001, September 24,
2005.
46 UPI, “Libya Says Hundreds Return From Exile,” August 20, 2005.
47 Khalid Mahmoud, “Libya: Surprise Return of More Opponents Following Secret Contacts,” Al Sharq al Awsat
(London), August 19, 2006.
48 “Libyan Opposition Members Reportedly Return Home,” OSC Report GMP20100102950009, January 2, 2010.
49 Afaf El-Geblawi, “Libya Frees All Jailed Muslim Brotherhood Members,” Agence France Presse, March 3, 2006.
50 “Al Jazirah TV Interviews Libyan Muslim Brotherhood Leader on Current Situation,” OSC Report -
GMP20050803550006, August 3, 2005.
51 “Libyan MB Concerned Over Sayf al-Islam’s Statements Regarding New Constitution,” OSC Report -
GMP20070830282001, August 30, 2007.
52 “Libyan Muslim Brotherhood Official on Libya’s Foreign, Domestic Politics,” OSC Report - GMP20081111635001,
November 10, 2008.
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Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG)
The Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG) is a violent Islamist movement opposed to the
Qadhafi government. Its imprisoned leaders have been engaged in a dialogue with the Qadhafi
Foundation for several years, and over 200 LIFG members have been released, including 110 at
the outset of the 2011 uprising. In 2009, some of the group’s leaders issued a lengthy series of
writings, referred to as “the recantations,” outlining their rejection of the use of violence (see
below). However, Libyan and U.S. concerns about LIFG’s domestic and international activities
persist. According to the Department of State, the LIFG has attempted to assassinate Qadhafi,
most recently in 1996, and may have participated in the planning of the May 2003 suicide
bombings in Casablanca, Morocco.53 The group’s reported ties with Al Qaeda came under
scrutiny in July 2009 after group members based in Britain reportedly renounced the group’s
affiliation with Al Qaeda, and contrasted the LIFG with others who use indiscriminate bombing
and target civilians. In November 2007, Al Qaeda figures Ayman al Zawahiri and Abu Layth al
Libi announced the merger of the LIFG with Al Qaeda, which many terrorism analysts viewed at
the time as having political rather than operational relevance.54 Al Libi was killed in an air strike
in Pakistan in February 2008.
Al Qaeda Affiliation and Recantations
In a July 2009 statement, LIFG members in Britain characterized the November 2007 Al Qaeda
affiliation announcement from Al Libi as “a personal decision that is at variance with the basic
status of the group,” and sought to “clearly emphasize that the group is not, has never been, and
will never be, linked to the Al Qaeda organization.”55 The statement stressed that LIFG members
abroad support “the dialogue underway between the group’s leadership and the Libyan regime if
it should lead to an end to bloodletting, the release of prisoners, the spreading of security and
justice, the reunion of families, and to permitting preaching, educational, and political activities.”
The statement warned that the group would “preserve [its] lawful and natural right to oppose the
regime if it does not turn its back on its previous policy that has led to tension and deadlock.”
Sayf al Islam al Qadhafi oversaw an effort to engage with LIFG leaders in an effort to encourage
them to renounce violence and links with other violent groups. Reports on the dialogue suggested
it was similar to processes in other countries such as Egypt and Saudi Arabia. In 2009, the
government and the LIFG reached an agreement in which LIFG leaders renounced violence
against the Libyan state, and, later in 2009, the dialogue resulted in the issuance of written
“recantations” of the LIFG’s former views on religion and violence.56 In October 2009, over 40
LIFG prisoners were released, alongside other Islamists.

53 U.S. Department of State, “Libya,” Country Reports on Terrorism 2004, April 2005.
54 “Al-Zawahiri, Al-Libi: Libyan Islamic Fighting Group Joins Al-Qa’ida,” OSC Report - FEA20071104393586,
November 3, 2007.
55 “Libyan Islamic Fighting Group Abroad Issues Statement Supporting Regime Dialogue.” OSC Report -
GMP20090703825003, July 3, 2009.
56 “Report on ‘Seething Anger’ in Libya Over Dismantling Al Qa’ida-Linked Cells,” OSC Report
GMP20080630825001 June 30, 2008; “Libya: Jailed Islamic Group Leaders ‘Preparing’ To Renounce Armed
Violence,” OSC Report GMP20080706837002, July 6, 2008; “Libyan Islamic Fighting Group Source Announces
Ideology Revision Nearly Complete,” OSC Report GMP20090615825012, June 15, 2009; and OSC Reports,
GMP20090911452001, GMP20090911452002, GMP2009091145200, GMP20090910488004, GMP20090911452004,
GMP20090915452001, “Libyan Newspaper Publishes Libyan Fighting Group Retractions,” September 2009.
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The United States froze the LIFG’s U.S. assets under Executive Order 13224 in September 2001,
and formally designated the LIFG as a Foreign Terrorist Organization in December 2004. In
February 2006, the U.S. Department of the Treasury designated five individuals and four entities
in the United Kingdom as Specially Designated Global Terrorists for their role in supporting the
LIFG.57 On October 30, 2008, Treasury designated three more LIFG financiers.58 Some observers
characterized the designations as a U.S. gesture of solidarity with the Libyan government and
argued that the ability and willingness of the LIFG to mount terror attacks in Libya may have
been limited. Others claimed that some LIFG fighters were allied with other violent Islamist
groups operating in the trans-Sahara region, and cited evidence of Libyan fighters joining the
Iraqi insurgency as an indication of ongoing Islamist militancy in Libya and a harbinger of a
possible increase in violence associated with fighters returning from Iraq.59 Prior to the 2011
uprising that began in eastern Libya, reports suggested that the region could be a stronghold for
LIFG members and other extremist groups that might pose a threat to Libya’s security.
Political Reform and Human Rights
The 2009 U.S. Department of State report on human rights in Libya (released March 11, 2010)
characterizes Libya’s human rights record as “poor.”60 According to the report:
Continuing problems included reported disappearances; torture; arbitrary arrest; lengthy
pretrial and sometimes incommunicado detention; official impunity; and poor prison
conditions. Denial of fair public trial by an independent judiciary, political prisoners and
detainees, and the lack of judicial recourse for alleged human rights violations were also
problems.61
The report also stated that “security personnel reportedly routinely tortured prisoners during
interrogations or as punishment,” but added that reports of instances of torture had declined over
the last year according to foreign observers. The Qadhafi Development Foundation’s Human
Rights Society issued a report in December 2009 stating that the Society had “received a large
number of complaints regarding cases of torture, ill-treatment, unlawful and unjustified detention,
denial of freedom, and a clear premeditated violation of the law.”
Between 2003 and the 2011 uprising, Libyan political figures, including Muammar al Qadhafi
and his son Sayf al Islam al Qadhafi, made a series of public statements and policy
announcements in an effort to repair Libya’s reputation with regard to human rights practices.
Some tangible steps were taken, and Libyan authorities reported that legal reforms were
underway to possibly improve the protections and rights afforded to citizens. Judicial entities
associated with human rights abuses and political control in the past, such as “revolutionary
courts” and “people’s courts,” reportedly were dismantled. As a result, some observers expressed
cautious optimism that political, social, and religious freedom would improve in Libya. Others

57 U.S. Department of the Treasury, “Treasury Designates UK-Based Individuals, Entities Financing Al Qaida-
Affiliated LIFG,” JS-4016, February 8, 2006.
58 U.S. Department of the Treasury, “Three LIFG Members Designation for Terrorism,” HP-1244, October 30, 2008.
59 Alison Pargeter, “Militant Groups Pose Security Challenge for Libyan Regime,” Janes Intelligence Review, Vol. 17,
No. 8, August 2005, pp. 16-19.
60 U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, Country Reports on Human Rights
Practices, Libya - 2009, March 11, 2010.
61 Ibid.
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continued to warn that such reforms might have been merely cosmetic and meant to support the
government’s efforts to improve its domestic legitimacy and international standing.
A December 2009 Human Rights Watch report concluded that
the past five years have witnessed an improvement in the human rights situation, though far
less than promised or required. There are less frequent reports of arbitrary arrests and
enforced disappearances compared to the two previous decades. There has been greater
tolerance of freedom of expression and some progress in addressing gross violations of the
past, though this remains very unpredictable.62
As discussed above, a number of U.S. and international officials, human rights organizations,
media sources, analysts, and other eyewitnesses have alleged that the Qadhafi regime has violated
human rights laws and norms by reason of its violent crackdown against the 2011 uprising. Many
believe that outside intervention of some kind is advisable or necessary in order to prevent a
further escalation of violence, bloodshed, and human rights abuses.
Legal and Institutional Reform
Libyan law prohibits the activities of all political opposition groups and restricts the free exercise
of speech and the press.63 Since Qadhafi’s 1969 coup, little legal recourse has been available to
citizens accused of political crimes. Nevertheless, officials had announced plans to embark upon
a full review of the country’s Penal Code and Code of Criminal Procedure to eliminate restrictive
laws regarding political activity. Sayf al Islam al Qadhafi also had called for a constitution to
clarify the power of different legislative, executive, and judicial institutions in Libya and had
endorsed ongoing legal reforms as a means to “provide a free environment that is suitable for a
normal political life.”64 He renewed these calls in an August 2007 speech and indicated that a
constitutional drafting process would begin. The speech called for the guarantee of “independent
institutions,” including the central bank, the supreme court, the media, and civil society. He also
outlined four “red lines” to guide reform efforts: Islamic law, the territorial integrity of Libya,
security and stability, and “Muammar al Qadhafi.”65
In support of the reform efforts, some institutional changes had been instituted to improve
political and human rights conditions. In March 2004, the General People’s Committee
Secretariat of Justice and Public Security was split into two separate secretariats in an effort to
establish greater judicial independence. In January 2005, the General People’s Congress approved
a law abolishing judicial institutions known as “people’s courts” and “revolutionary courts” that
tried suspected regime opponents, sometimes in secret. International human rights organizations

62 Human Rights Watch, “Truth and Justice Can’t Wait: Human Rights Developments in Libya Amid Institutional
Obstacles,” December 12, 2009. Available at http://www.hrw.org/node/87097.
63 According to the U.S. State Department, Libyan law provides for freedom of speech “within the limits of public
interest and principles of the Revolution.” In practice, criticism of the government and Qadhafi are restricted and often
punished. By law, most print and broadcast media in Libya are owned and operated by government authorities, and the
activities of private newspapers and broadcasters have come under scrutiny since early 2009, when outlets that had
been given limited space to practice independent journalism were renationalized. Satellite television and Internet access
are limited and partially censored.
64 “Libyan Leader’s Son on Call to Reopen Human Rights Files,” OSC Report - GMP20050820537003, August 20,
2005.
65 “Libyan Leader’s Son Outlines his Version of Democracy,” OSC Report - GMP20070823950058, August 20, 2007.
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welcomed the abolition of the people’s court system as an “important step” and urged Libyan
authorities to grant new trials to prisoners convicted by the courts, including several who were
convicted in late 2004. In December 2009, the Qadhafi Development Foundation called for the
abolition of the State Security Court, which had in some instances assumed the former activities
of the people’s court system.
Human Rights Monitoring
The Libyan government has not permitted the establishment of independent human rights
organizations but invited international human rights groups Amnesty International and Human
Rights Watch to Libya for the first time in 15 years in 2004. In late 2004 and early 2005,
representatives from both organizations toured various security facilities and prisons and met with
selected imprisoned dissidents. A January 2006 Human Rights Watch report based on research
conducted during the visit concluded that “Libyan leader Muammar al Qadhafi and his inner
circle appear unwilling to implement genuine reform, especially in the areas of free expression
and association,” although the Libyan government had taken “some positive steps” to improve
human rights conditions since 2003.66 Sayf al Islam al Qadhafi had publicly supported a pro-
human rights agenda and created the Human Rights Society to operate under the auspices of the
Qadhafi Development Foundation.
Fathi al Jahmi
The death of Fathi al Jahmi, Libya’s most internationally recognized political prisoner, shortly
after his release from Libyan custody in May 2009, brought a negative end to a long-running
issue of contention in U.S.-Libyan relations. Al Jahmi was imprisoned in 2002 after publicly
calling for elections and press reforms and for criticizing Muammar al Qadhafi and the
government. President George W. Bush praised Al Jahmi’s subsequent release in March 2004
under a suspended sentence, but Al Jahmi was soon rearrested after he repeated his calls for
reform and expanded his criticism of Qadhafi in interviews with regional satellite channels,
including U.S.-funded Al Hurra. Al Jahmi subsequently was detained and remained in ill health
throughout his detention. Bush Administration officials repeatedly called for Al Jahmi’s release,67
and U.S. officials, including Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, reportedly raised the issue in
private with their Libyan interlocutors.68 On March 17, 2009, U.S. State Department spokesman
Robert Wood stated that the Obama Administration continued to call for Al Jahmi’s
“unconditional release, as well as his ability to travel and seek medical care where he wishes.” In
response to the news of his death, State Department spokesman Ian Kelly said, “we had
welcomed his release to Jordan. We regret that his poor state of health, however, did not allow
him to fully recover upon transfer.”

66 Human Rights Watch, “Libya: Words to Deeds The Urgent Need for Human Rights Reform,” Volume 18, No. 1(E),
January 2006.
67 On March 31, 2008, the U.S. Department of State issued a statement urging “the Libyan government to fulfill their
promise to release without condition” prominent political activist Fathi al Jahmi. U.S. Department of State Deputy
Spokesman Tom Casey, Press Statement: Washington, DC, March 31, 2008.
68 Issues Related to United States Relations With Libya On-the-Record Briefing Washington, DC, May 15, 2006.
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Libyan Foreign Policy
Libyan foreign policy since the 1990s has been defined by a shift from engagement with other
Arab states to a greater focus on Africa. The prominent role played by Libyan leader Muammar al
Qadhafi has ensured that foreign relations remain personality driven, somewhat unpredictable,
and characterized by close relationships with non-state actors and opposition movements in a
number of neighboring states. As discussed above, in recent years, Qadhafi publicly maintained
his opposition to Arab engagement with Israel in the face of continued Israeli military occupation
and settlement activity in the West Bank. He also called for a “one state solution” based on
reconciliation between the Israeli and Palestinian people within a single state, which he proposes
be called “Isratine.” Qadhafi has criticized the Arab League’s Arab Peace Initiative, arguing that it
does not represent the views of all Arabs and would be detrimental to the interests of Palestinians.
Qadhafi’s diplomatic engagement in Africa remained active through early 2011, particularly his
efforts to mediate between governments and rebel factions in neighboring Sudan, Niger, and
Chad and his proposals for the establishment of an United States of Africa, which many African
leaders consider quixotic and regard with suspicion. Qadhafi’s term as chairman of the African
Union during 2009 created opportunities for him to advocate for greater African unity and for a
more powerful voice for the African Union in international bodies. However, his attempts to
extend his tenure as chairman were unsuccessful.
Prior to the 2011 uprising, Libyan defense officials informed their U.S. Defense Department
counterparts that the Libyan government opposed the potential introduction of non-African
military forces to the continent on a permanent basis. Libyan officials reportedly supported the
proposed security capacity building mission of the new U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM), if
only in general terms.69 The Arab Maghreb Union, of which Libya is a member, rejected the
presence of foreign military forces on its members’ territory at a 2007 summit in Rabat, a move
seen as underscoring Libya’s opposition to stationing of U.S. forces in North Africa under the
new command.70 AFRICOM’s Deputy for Military Operations, Rear Admiral Robert Moeller, has
stated that “U.S.-AFRICOM does not need to station large operational units across the African
continent,” and that “small numbers of forces will come to the continent to do a particular activity
and then ... depart.”71 AFRICOM Commander General William “Kip” Ward met with Qadhafi in
Libya in May 2009, and then-U.S. Ambassador to Libya Gene Cretz indicated during a March
2010 trip to Washington, DC, that U.S.-Libya military dialogue would begin in earnest in 2010.
U.S.-Libya military relations following the 2011 uprising will likely depend on the uprising’s
outcome and possibly a number of other factors within Libya, regionally, and internationally.

69 Testimony of Theresa M. Whelan, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Africa before the Africa and Global
Health Subcommittee of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, August 2, 2007.
70 Libyan Foreign Minister Abd al Rahman Shalgam stated, “The Arab Maghreb Union (AMU) will not allow the
presence of any foreign soldier on its soil, because people in this region object to that, the authorities are not thinking of
such presence and even others are aware of the fact that this region will not accept the presence of any kind of foreign
troops on its territory.” “Libyan Foreign Minister on Maghreb Union, US Military Command in Africa,” OSC Report
GMP20071201950028, November 30, 2007.
71 Voice of America, “U.S. Military Delegation in Nigeria for AFRICOM Talks,” November 29, 2007.
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Energy and the Libyan Economy
Until the discovery of oil in 1959, Libya’s economic viability was seriously questioned by many
outside observers. Foreign aid and subsidies largely supported the national budget, until the
introduction of massive amounts of oil revenue transformed the country’s economy and social
fabric. Following the September 1, 1969, military coup, Qadhafi and his government restructured
Libya’s economy along socialist lines, placing a heavy emphasis on national management of
industry and resource allocation. However, the economy remained highly dependent on oil
revenue and thus highly vulnerable to fluctuations in global oil prices.72 The government had
announced its intention to reverse state ownership trends associated with the country’s long
experiment with socialism. Economic diversification and resource management remain
challenges for the government and private sector as they seek to revive the economy and
capitalize on interest from foreign investors.
Oil revenue has been the lifeblood of the Libyan economy and government since exports began in
1961, constituting an estimated 80% of Libya’s government revenue73 and 55% of its gross
domestic product. Rising oil prices through mid-2008 spurred corresponding growth in the
economy. Libyan leader Muammar al Qadhafi stated that Libyans have been “very happy” with
higher price levels in the global oil market, although he underlined the importance of creating
alternative sources of revenue and economic growth in public statements.74 Maintaining
hydrocarbon exports and general economic stability amid and following the 2011 uprising—
particularly given the likelihood of substantial casualties, population displacement, disruption of
normal life, property damage, and possibly long-term political instability—could present a
significant challenge for Libya.
Oil Reserves and Production Capacity
According to Oil and Gas Journal, Libya’s proven oil reserves are estimated at 43.7 billion
barrels (ninth-largest in the world). The Libyan National Oil Company (NOC) manages oil
production activity and negotiates exploration and production agreements with foreign
companies. Oil exploration and production are carried out on the basis of a 1955 oil law, and
Libyan authorities reportedly are drafting a new law to govern production activities and reform
the foreign investment approval process. Foreign investment is regulated through exploration and
production agreements negotiated by foreign companies and the NOC. In September 2006, Libya
established a Council for Oil and Gas Affairs to regulate oil and gas exploration and production
and to approve decisions about the development of the oil and gas sector.75 Most of Libya’s oil is
exported to Italy, Germany, France, and Spain. However, following the resumption of crude oil
exports to the United States in June 2004, oil shipments to U.S. refiners have increased, from

72 See Dirk Vandewalle, Libya Since Independence, Cornell Univ. Press, Ithaca, 1998.
73 International Monetary Fund, Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya: 2009 Article IV Consultation—Staff
Report, IMF Country Report No. 09/294, September 2009.
74 “Libyan Leader Says ‘Problems Abroad’ Solved,” OSC Report GMP20050919710040, September 19, 2005; Reuters,
“Libya Very Happy With High Oil Prices - Gaddafi,” July 4, 2005.
75 The prime minister serves as the chairman of the Council. Other members include outside experts, the head of the
NOC, the ministers of economy, trade, employment, finance, and the central bank governor. Vahe Petrossian, “Libya
Sees Panel on the Fast Track,” Upstream, September 15 2006; and, Reuters, “Libya Oil Licensing Round Attracts
Many Offers - NOC,” September 26, 2006.
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56,000 barrels per day in 2005 to an average of 102,000 barrels per day in 2008.76 In 2009, the
average declined slightly to 77,000 barrels per day.77
Until recently, Libyan oil production had steadily declined from its peak of 3.3 million barrels per
day (b/d) in 1970 due to the deterioration of production equipment and infrastructure related to
strict investment controls and international sanctions. According to the U.S. Energy Information
Administration, Libya produced an average of 1.88 million barrels per day (b/d) in 2008, which
officials have stated is currently the sector’s maximum capacity. Since the termination of U.N.
and U.S. sanctions in 2003 and 2004, Libya has sought foreign investment to rehabilitate and
expand its oil production capacity and expects $11 billion in oil production related investment
from 2005 to 2015. Current government production targets are 2.3 million b/d by 2013.78
At the outset of the February 2011 uprising, Russia’s Gazprom acquired half of Italian company
Eni’s operations in Libya’s so-called “Elephant” oil field. The acquisition remains subject to
Libyan approval.
Natural Gas
Libya’s proven natural gas reserves are estimated to be 54 trillion cubic feet, although, like the
country’s oil reserves, Libya’s gas holdings may be significantly higher given the generally
under-explored status of Libyan territory. As with oil production, the development of natural gas
production and export capacity has been limited by restrictive investment policies and
international sanctions. Nevertheless, Libya has been able to use natural gas for some domestic
power generation and for limited exports to some European countries. Royal Dutch Shell is
currently exploring for natural gas deposits and has developed a plan to upgrade Libya’s aging
liquefied natural gas plant at Marsa al Brega.79 Libyan authorities also are reportedly pursuing
pipeline agreements with neighboring North African states to improve export access to European
markets. In May 2007 representatives from BP plc announced the signing of an extensive natural
gas exploration and LNG export agreement with Libya. In July 2008, representatives from
Gazprom visited Libya and expressed interest in purchasing Libya’s natural gas exports and
cooperating with Libya on new natural gas export pipelines to Europe. According to Gazprom,
Libya and Gazprom decided “to initiate the thematic negotiations on the purchase of the currently
available hydrocarbon volumes from the Libyan party.”80

76 U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA), Libya Country Analysis Brief, July 2009.
77 CRS calculation based on EIA U.S. Imports by Country of Origin data, Monthly-thousand barrels per day, available
at http://tonto.eia.doe.gov/dnav/pet/pet_move_impcus_a2_nus_ep00_im0_mbblpd_m.htm.
78 EIA, Libya Country Analysis Brief, July 2009.
79 WWP Report on Oil, Gas & Petrochemicals, “Libya: Multi-billion Dollar Joint Venture Agreement to Modernize
Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) Plant,” June 1, 2005.
80 Polya Lesova, “Gazprom seeks to buy all of Libya’s oil, gas exports,” MarketWatch, July 10, 2008.
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Military Profile and WMD Disarmament
The Libyan Military
Structure, Training, and Equipment
Libya’s mostly conscripted military forces are small relative to the large amount of weaponry at
their disposal (see Table 1 below). Most outside military analysts regard the training and
leadership of Libyan forces as poor and identify a lack of combined arms and joint service
planning as factors that limit their overall effectiveness. The Qadhafi government historically has
made the acquisition of weapons and equipment a higher priority than training or creating high-
quality military support infrastructure.
Table 1. Libyan Military Personnel
Service Personnel
Army (~ half conscript)
50,000
Air Force
18,000
Navy 8,000
Revolutionary Guard Corps
3,000
Reserve People’s Militia
40,000
Total 119,000
Sources: International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance, February 2010; Jaffee Center for
Strategic Studies, “Libya,” Middle East Military Balance, September 2007.
Libya’s army, navy, and air forces are equipped with a broad range of aging Soviet and Eastern
Bloc equipment, although the country’s poorly maintained inventories also include some U.S. and
Western European equipment, including French Mirage fighters and U.S. C-130 transports.81
Libya’s exorbitant military spending in the late 1970s and early 1980s yielded an unmanageable
crop of diverse weapon systems from various sources and manufacturers. Purchases declined
significantly during the 1990s because of international sanctions, which limited the revenue
available for defense spending. Libya’s current military leadership presides over a largely stored
and surplus catalog of weaponry with poor maintenance records.82 The military also lacks
sufficient numbers of trained personnel to operate the military equipment currently in its
possession.

81 Facts on File World News Digest, “U.S. Bars Libya Planes, Training,” September 20, 1975; and Washington Post,
“Libya’s Qaddafi Praises Carter, Urges Closer Ties,” June 13, 1977. In 2004, Libya sold 40 of its aging Mirage fighters
to Pakistan.
82 Senior Middle East security analyst Anthony Cordesman has described Libya as “the world’s largest military parking
lot.” For a more detailed profile of the Libyan military, see Anthony H. Cordesman, The Military Balance in the Middle
East, Center for Strategic and International Studies, March 15, 2004, pp. 79-85.
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Arms Sales83
The subject of renewed arms sales to Libya remains a sensitive subject in the United States and
some European countries whose citizens were killed in Libyan-sponsored terrorist attacks during
the 1980s. The European Union lifted its arms embargo against Libya in October 2004. The U.S.
ban on export of defense articles lapsed at the end of a 45-day congressional notification period,
on June 30, 2006. Prior to the 2011 uprising, Qadhafi reportedly had expressed interest in
procuring U.S., European, and Russian weapon systems. France, Spain, Ukraine, and Russia have
been among the countries reportedly interested in refurbishing and replacing Libya’s weapon
stocks.84 The United Kingdom’s Defense Export Services O