Algeria: Current Issues
Alexis Arieff
Analyst in African Affairs
February 22, 2011
Congressional Research Service
7-5700
www.crs.gov
RS21532
CRS Report for Congress
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repared for Members and Committees of Congress
Algeria: Current Issues
Summary
The United States has increasingly viewed the government of Algeria as an important partner in
counterterrorism and the fight against Al Qaeda-linked groups in North Africa. The Algerian
economy is largely based on hydrocarbons, and the country is a significant source of natural gas
for the United States and Europe. Algeria receives little development assistance from the United
States, but its security forces benefit from U.S. security assistance and participation in bilateral
and regional military cooperation programs.
Algeria’s relative stability, always tenuous, has most recently been challenged by a series of riots,
strikes, and popular demonstrations that have occurred since early January 2011. The unrest
initially appeared to be motivated by discontent over food prices, but has turned more overtly
political since mid-January. The example of neighboring Tunisia’s “Jasmine Revolution” and the
ripple effects of ongoing unrest in Egypt may contribute to opposition activism, with further
protests anticipated in mid-February. The government has reacted both by attempting to assuage
the public through political and economic concessions and by using the security forces to prevent
and break up demonstrations. Across the region, other authoritarian governments have adopted a
similar approach with varying results.
Algeria’s political system is dominated by a strong presidency. The military is the heir to
Algeria’s long struggle for independence from France, and has remained the most significant
political force since independence in 1962. Following Algeria’s bloody civil war in the 1990s, the
military backed Abdelaziz Bouteflika for the presidency in 1999. He was reelected for a third
term in April 2009 and has no clear successor. The voice of the military has been muted publicly
since Bouteflika was first selected, but may be heard during a future presidential succession. Low
voter turnout in the May 2007 parliamentary election may have reflected general lack of public
faith in the political system in general and the weak legislature in particular. Authorities
specifically boasted of a higher turnout in the 2009 presidential election, though some observers
have questioned official turnout statistics.
Domestic terrorism perpetrated by violent Islamists remains Algeria’s principal security
challenge. Algerian terrorists also operate across the southern border in the Sahel and are linked
to terrorism abroad. The U.S. State Department lists two Algerian groups as Foreign Terrorist
Organizations. The more notorious and active is Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM),
which pledged allegiance to Al Qaeda in 2006 and may increasingly be described as a criminal-
terrorist mutation. Algeria, as the dominant economic and military power in the region, has
attempted to take the lead in developing a regional approach to counterterrorism in the Sahel. The
legacy of Algeria’s anti-colonial independence struggle contributes to Algerian leaders’ desire to
prevent direct foreign counterterrorism intervention and their residual skepticism of French
intentions. See also CRS Report R41070, Al Qaeda and Affiliates: Historical Perspective, Global
Presence, and Implications for U.S. Policy, coordinated by John Rollins.
President Bouteflika’s tenure has produced an energized foreign policy. Strains in ties with
neighboring Morocco continue, due mainly to the unresolved status of the Western Sahara, but
also to a rivalry for regional power. Relations with former colonial power France remain complex
and volatile. See also CRS Report RS20962, Western Sahara, by Alexis Arieff.
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Contents
Recent Developments: Political Unrest........................................................................................ 1
Issues for U.S. Policy ............................................................................................................ 2
Background ................................................................................................................................ 4
Government and Politics ............................................................................................................. 5
Terrorism .................................................................................................................................... 6
Counterterrorism......................................................................................................................... 8
Human Rights ........................................................................................................................... 10
The Economy............................................................................................................................ 11
Foreign Affairs.......................................................................................................................... 13
Morocco ............................................................................................................................. 13
France................................................................................................................................. 14
European Union .................................................................................................................. 15
U.S. Relations ........................................................................................................................... 15
U.S. Investment and Energy Issues...................................................................................... 17
U.S. Assistance ................................................................................................................... 18
Figures
Figure 1. Map of Algeria and Its Neighbors ................................................................................. 3
Tables
Table 1. Selected Bilateral Aid by Account and Type ................................................................. 19
Contacts
Author Contact Information ...................................................................................................... 19
Acknowledgments .................................................................................................................... 19
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Recent Developments: Political Unrest
Algerian citizens have carried out a series of riots, strikes, and protests, initially stemming from
discontent over high food prices, since early January 2011. The protests have turned more overtly
political since late January, with demonstrators calling for political reforms and using slogans that
directly reference the recent public uprising in neighboring Tunisia—dubbed the “Jasmine
Revolution”—that unseated Tunisian President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali.1 At least four Algerians
have died from self-immolation, a phenomenon that has echoed across the region after a
frustrated Tunisian street vendor helped spark the demonstrations there by setting himself on fire.
Urban riots and other civil disturbances, often led by unemployed youth, are common in Algeria
and are sometimes tolerated by the authorities. However, the Algerian government is taking a
defensive stance toward the recent unrest, despite official denials of potential “contagion” from
Tunisia, Egypt, and elsewhere in the region.2 Initially, the government attempted to address
economic grievances by lowering the prices of key food commodities. This is a frequent tactic in
Algeria, where oil and gas revenues may be used to buy off dissenters. On January 22, security
forces initiated a crackdown, forcibly breaking up a “pro-democracy” protest in Algiers, and the
Interior Ministry has since banned public demonstrations. A protest on January 29 in the eastern
city of Béjaïa, in the region of Kabylie, was nonetheless tolerated; security forces largely
withdrew from the area following an uprising in 2001 (see “Human Rights,” below). The
government has since taken further steps to assuage political opponents, notably by promising to
repeal Algeria’s “state of emergency,” which has been in place since the start of the civil war in
1992 and enables a range of restrictions on civil liberties. Draft legislation that would lift the state
of emergency was adopted by Algeria’s parliament on February 22, according to press reports.
On February 12 and February 19, public demonstrations were organized in Algiers and other
urban centers by a newly formed umbrella group of small opposition parties, civil society groups,
and non-official trade unions, dubbed the National Coordination for Change and Democracy
(CNCD). In the capital, several thousand demonstrators turned out on both dates, according to
witnesses, despite government attempts to preclude mass gatherings through the preventive
deployment of tens of thousands of police and other security officers. (Government officials put
the number of demonstrators in the hundreds.) Protesters were reportedly arrested and beaten by
police at both February rallies, and some clashed with pro-government demonstrators who
deployed at the same time. Still, security forces have so far shown greater restraint than in some
countries in the region, and have not opened fire on crowds. The CNCD has called for further
protests in the coming weeks. There have also been labor strikes, protests by the unemployed, and
student demonstrations across the country; for example, reports in the local press indicate that
security forces violently repressed a university student protest in front of the Ministry for Higher
Education in Algiers on February 21.3
The CNCD coalition, whose operational strength, mass appeal, and cohesion are uncertain, has
articulated several demands, including “greater democracy,” the lifting of the 1992 state of
1 See CRS Report RS21666, Political Transition in Tunisia, by Alexis Arieff.
2 Benoit Faucon, “After Riots, Algeria Considers a Reshuffle,” The Wall Street Journal, January 28, 2011; Lamine
Chikhi, “Interview—Tunisia Virus Won’t Reach Algeria: Presidential Ally,” Reuters, January 30, 2011.
3 El Watan, “Alger : Répression Féroce des Etudiants Devant le Ministère de l’Enseignement Supérieur,” February 21,
2011.
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emergency, the freeing of individuals detained during previous protests and riots, a loosening of
state controls over the media, greater opportunities for employment, and “social justice.”4 The
creation of the CNCD echoes other recent attempts by civil society activists to channel anti-
government grievances, including the March 19 movement (2009) and the National Front for
Change (November 2010). The political party that is most prominently involved in the CNCD is
the Rally for Culture and Democracy (RCD), a small, secularist, Berber-dominated party led by
longtime activist Saïd Sadi. Another key actor is the Algerian League for the Defense of Human
Rights (LADDH). Islamist political parties and activists do not appear to have played a
significant role in the recent unrest.
Political parties that support President Abdelaziz Bouteflika have portrayed recent protests as the
product of “foreign interference.”5 At the same time, and although major political parties have not
joined the CNCD, the protests have been accompanied by unusually critical, pro-reform
statements from individuals associated with Algeria’s independence struggle and therefore viewed
as benefitting from high levels of public esteem.6
The potential for a popular uprising to prompt genuine changes in Algeria’s status quo is difficult
to evaluate. Several factors may weigh in favor of political continuity. Key among them is the
role played by Algeria’s military, which is seen as the ultimate arbiter of domestic politics and
backed the political rise of President Bouteflika. Algeria’s political system is also relatively more
open, and the domestic press is subject to relatively fewer controls, than in several countries in
the region, such as Libya or Tunisia under Ben Ali. At the same time, there are many potential
vectors for instability. This is in part due to Algeria’s turbulent history of civil conflict and to the
security threat posed by Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), which seeks to overturn the
current Algerian regime and has carried out a number of attacks within the country. Popular anger
over perceived official corruption, unemployment, and urban housing shortages is also
widespread. Ethnic and regional identities remain strong, and some groups have opposed the
government, especially ethnic Berber communities (also known as Imazighen), concentrated in
the mountainous Kabylie region, in the northeast.7 Reports of divisions within the politico-
military elite, while difficult to substantiate, have repeatedly surfaced over the past year. Still,
although the “dark decade” of the 1990s was characterized by high levels of violence, some
observers contend that vivid memories of that time period have rendered many Algerians adverse
to perceived insecurity and therefore prone to reject widespread anti-government mobilization.
Issues for U.S. Policy
The United States has tried to balance appreciation for Algeria’s cooperation in counterterrorism
with encouragement of greater democratization (see “U.S. Relations” below). Algeria is viewed
as an important partner in countering Al Qaeda-linked groups, and plays an increasingly
significant role in the African Union (AU), which the United States seeks to empower in regional
security and conflict resolution. At the same time, the State Department continues to document a
4 Le Temps d’Algérie, “La CNCD Demande Aujourd’hui l’Autorisation : Marche du 12 Février à Alger,” February 1,
2011.
5 Agence France Presse (AFP), “Algérie: Les Partis de l’Alliance Présidentielle Condamnent ‘l’Ingérence Etrangère,’”
February 16, 2011.
6 E.g., Reuters, “One of Algeria’s Founding Fathers Urges Reform,” February 16, 2011.
7 See International Crisis Group, Algeria: Unrest and Impasse in Kabylia, Middle East/North Africa Report N°15, June
2003.
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wide range of human rights problems, including restrictions on freedom of assembly, expression,
and association, which impair political party activity and limit citizens’ ability to change the
government through elections. Other abuses reportedly include official impunity and limited
judicial independence (see “Human Rights,” below).
U.S. policy challenges in Algeria in some ways resemble those faced elsewhere in the region.
However, because of the limited nature of U.S. assistance (see Table 1) and Algeria’s famous
resistance to outside pressure, the U.S. government may find that it lacks well-developed levers
of influence needed to successfully encourage political reform.
Figure 1. Map of Algeria and Its Neighbors
Source: CRS.
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Background
Algerians fought a protracted independence
Algeria at a Glance
war against the French between 1954 and
Population: 34.6 million (2010 est.)
1962. The guerilla conflict was notable for its
GDP growth rate: 4.1% (2010 est.)
brutal tactics: the pro-independence National
Liberation Front (FLN) carried out urban
GDP per capita: $7,400 (2010 est.)
terrorist attacks while the French military
Inflation rate: 5.7% (2009 est.)
engaged in torture and other abuses. After an
Unemployment: 9.9%* (2010 est.)
independence referendum on July 1, 1962, the
Population below the poverty line: 23% (2006 est.)
FLN became the national ruling party, and
remained politically dominant for decades.
Life Expectancy: 74 years
The anti-colonial struggle remains a key
Exports: petroleum, gas, petroleum products
foundation of Algeria’s political identity.
Imports: capital goods, food, consumer goods
Algeria was a leader in the Non-Aligned
movement during the Cold War, and although
Major Trading Partners: France, United States, Italy,
China, Spain, Germany, Turkey, Canada (2009)
Algeria engaged in military cooperation with
the Soviet Union during that period, it never
Source: CIA, World Factbook, updated January 20, 2011.
allowed foreign bases on its soil and strongly
* Note: The unemployment rate for young Algerians is often
defended its independent status.
estimated at 25% to 50% or higher.
In 1965, Houari Boumediène seized power
through a military coup and served as revolutionary council chairman and president until his
death in 1978. Another military figure, Chadli Bendjedid, succeeded Boumediène. The 1980s saw
the rise of Islamist ideology, starting on university campuses and eventually escalating into the
most significant political challenge to the FLN since independence. In October 1988, mass
protests and riots erupted, revealing widespread discontent with the FLN’s leadership and altering
the political landscape. The government attempted to outflank Islamists, passing restrictions on
women’s socioeconomic rights, but it also initiated a process of political and economic
liberalization.8 In 1989, a new constitution (the country’s third) was adopted by referendum that
enabled greater political pluralism and paved the way for multiparty competition, while also
introducing explicit language about the Islamic nature of the Algerian state and society.
The same year, the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) was formed as a broad coalition of Islamist
groups. The government recognized the FIS as a legal political party and allowed it to compete in
local elections in 1990, in which it won over 50% of votes cast. In the first round of parliamentary
elections held in December 1991, the FIS again did well, and was expected to win a majority of
seats in a second round scheduled for early 1992. Before that round could be held, however, the
army intervened in January 1992, forcing Bendjedid to resign and canceling the election results.
The FIS was banned and many of its leaders imprisoned.
As channels for political competition were shuttered, the thwarted Islamist movement fractured,
with some factions turning to violence. A decade of civil war between security forces and Islamist
insurgents ensued, which resulted in an as many as 200,000 deaths. The conflict was
characterized by high levels of civilian atrocities, including massacres, murders, and extrajudicial
executions. While insurgents were responsible for or inspired much of the violence, questions
8 See John Ruedy, Modern Algeria : The Origins and Development of a Nation, Indiana University Press: 2005 (1992).
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remain about the government’s culpability in violence during the conflict. The government also
restricted freedom of the press, assembly, and movement. Relative stability was restored by the
early 2000s, aided by the introduction of an amnesty for former militants.
Government and Politics
The president has long dominated the domestic political system in Algeria, generally with strong
backing from the military. In 1999, former Foreign Minister Abdelaziz Bouteflika, a civilian with
vital military support, won the presidential election after all other candidates withdrew, charging
fraud. In April 2004, he was reelected with 83.5% of the vote in a multiparty contest during which
the military was officially neutral. International observers hailed that election as progress toward
democratization even though the bureaucracy and judiciary had manipulated the political process
to favor Bouteflika in the pre-election period. Many saw Bouteflika’s victory as an accurate
reflection of the popular will and an endorsement of his effort to decrease violence and for
continued political stability.9 Since 2005, there have been persistent rumors about the state of the
73-year-old president’s health, spurred in part by his repeated, intermittent absences from public
view, but no strong concern that he lacks a clear successor. Most analysts expect the military will
again play a determining role in the choice of Bouteflika’s replacement.
In November 2008, a joint session of parliament adopted constitutional amendments that, among
other provisions, abolished presidential term limits and allowed Bouteflika to run for a third term.
A huge salary increase for legislators may have contributed to the amendments’ passage. Some
critics had argued that the constitutional changes required a national referendum, but the
Constitutional Court disagreed. On April 9, 2009, as expected, Bouteflika won another term as
president with more than 90.24% of the vote over five challengers, none of whom was seen as
having a remote chance of ending his leadership. The Interior Ministry claimed a 74% voter
turnout. Once again, the president’s rivals alleged fraud and added claims that the authorities had
inflated turnout figures. Some attributed the military’s acquiescence this time to their inability to
find an alternative to Bouteflika.10
Algerians refer to Le Pouvoir (the powers-that-be) to designate opaque politico-military elite
structures that are widely perceived as driving events and major political decisions—as opposed
to “le gouvernement” (the government), elected representatives and administrators who are
viewed as having little significant power.11 A series of anti-corruption inquiries since 2009,
including an investigation of the state energy company, SONATRACH, and another into a $12
billion, 927-kilometer east-west highway project, have been viewed by some analysts as revealing
latent divisions within the security establishment, and could signal potential fracture points if
national protests place increasing pressure on the government.12 (See “The Economy,” below.)
The president heads the Council of Ministers (cabinet) and the High Security Council, and
appoints the prime minister. On June 23, 2008, Bouteflika named National Democratic Rally
(RND) leader Ahmed Ouyahia, who had served as prime minister from 1995 to 1999 and from
2003 to 2006, and who is known to be close to the military, to the post again. After his re-election
9 Marwane Ben Yahmed, “Les Raisons D’Un Plebiscite,” Jeune Afrique Intelligent, No. 2258, 8-14 April 2004.
10 Africa Research Bulletin, April 1-30, 2009, p. 19732, citing Africa Confidential.
11 See, e.g., George Joffé, “Political Dynamics in North Africa,” International Affairs, vol. 85, no. 5 (Sept 2009).
12 See, e.g., Africa-Asia Confidential, “Algeria: Chinese Companies Named in Anti-Corruption Probe,” March 16,
2010; Reuters, “Interview—Algeria Corruption Case ‘Part of Political Struggle,’” February 8, 2010.
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in 2009, Bouteflika reconfirmed Ouyahia as prime minister. Ouyahia is considered a possible
successor to Bouteflika. Media reports suggest that Bouteflika’s younger brother, Said, also may
have presidential ambitions. Speculation about Bouteflika’s successor intermittently surfaces
along with the rumors about the president’s health.
The bicameral, multiparty parliament is weak. The president appoints the prime minister as well
as one-third of the upper house of parliament, known as the Council of the Nation. (The
remaining two-thirds are selected by indirect vote.) Although either the president or one of the
parliamentary chambers may initiate legislation, it cannot be passed into law without being
brought before both chambers, which requires the support of the presidency. The 380-seat
National People’s Assembly was last elected on May 17, 2007, with a voter turnout of 36.5%—
the lowest ever, reflecting lack of popular faith in the political system and common knowledge
that the legislature has little power. Parties in the governing coalition placed at the top: the
National Liberation Front (FLN) won 23% of the vote and 136 seats; the RND 10.3%, 61 seats;
and the moderately Islamist Movement for a Peaceful Society (MSP) 9.6%, 51 seats; 18 other
parties and 33 independents also won seats. The Council of the Nation has 144 seats, of which the
FLN has 29, RND 12, and MSP 3; independents and presidential appointees comprise the
remainder. The next parliamentary election is scheduled for 2012.
Terrorism
Up to 200,000 lives were lost during Algeria’s civil war between 1992 and 2000, most
attributable to terrorist acts by Islamist groups. The security situation has markedly improved
since then, but domestic terrorism has not been eliminated. The U.S. State Department lists two
Algerian groups as designated Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTOs).13 The Armed Islamic
Group (GIA) was most active from 1991 to 2001 and last attacked in 2006. Former GIA members
have accepted the government amnesty or joined other groups. The Salafist Group for Preaching
and Combat (GSPC) split from GIA in 1998, declared its allegiance to Al Qaeda in 2003 and,
after Abdelmalik Droukdel (aka Abu Musab Abdulwadood) became “emir” or leader, united with
it officially on September 11, 2006, taking the name Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM or
Al Qaeda in the Lands of the Islamic Maghreb, AQLIM).
AQIM seeks to replace the current Algerian regime with an Islamic state and calls for jihad
against the United States, France, and Spain.14 The practical meaning of the union with Al Qaeda
is uncertain, and analysts suggest that links between AQIM and Al Qaeda leaders in
Pakistan/Afghanistan are nominal, but mutually beneficial.15 Adopting the famous name may
have enhanced AQIM’s legitimacy among extremists and facilitated recruitment, while enabling
Al Qaeda to burnish its international credentials. Since “uniting” with Al Qaeda, AQIM’s rhetoric
against the West and governments in the region and its calls for jihad against the United States,
France, and Spain have increased. AQIM’s cohesiveness is questioned as it may be operating as
relatively autonomous and/or rival groups and has experienced defections. The U.S. State
13 U.S. State Department, Country Reports on Terrorism, 2009, released August 5, 2010, at http://www.state.gov/s/ct/
rls/crt/2009/index.htm.
14 See CRS Report R41070, Al Qaeda and Affiliates: Historical Perspective, Global Presence, and Implications for
U.S. Policy, coordinated by John Rollins.
15 Yaroslav Trofimov, “Islamic Rebels Gain in the Sahara,” Wall Street Journal, August 18, 2009.
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Department estimates AQIM’s strength at under 1,000 in Algeria, with a smaller number in the
Sahel to the south; other sources provide lower estimates.16
After Droukdel became leader, AQIM increased its attacks against the Algerian government and
security forces, and against foreign workers in the country.17 In 2007, it shifted tactics to more
frequent, “Iraqi style,” suicide attacks, with simultaneous bombings of the Government Palace
(the prime and interior ministries) and a suburban police station on April 11, 2007, and of the
Constitutional Council and the U.N. headquarters on December 11, among other attacks. In
addition, an AQIM suicide bomber unsuccessfully attempted to assassinate President Bouteflika
on September 6, 2007. All of these attacks resulted in many civilian casualties. After a relative
lull, AQIM again targeted security forces in the summer of 2008. That August, suicide bombers
perpetrated a particularly bloody assault on a police academy, resulting in more than 40 deaths.
Since 2009, AQIM has operated more outside of Algiers and other large cities where security
forces have made it difficult to operate, and it has continued to focus on the Berber region of the
Kabylie, in northeastern Algeria, where the security presence was reduced after civil unrest in
2005. In line with Droukdel’s regional ambitions and because of difficulties experienced in the
north, the group’s operations also have moved into the Sahelian countries of Mauritania, Niger,
and Mali, with aspirations to spread as far south as Nigeria.18 Activities along the Malian border
have manifestly increased and AQIM reportedly has agreements with tribes in northern Mali,
sometimes sealed by marriage and/or financial compensation. In May 2009, AQIM claimed
responsibility for executing a British hostage in Mali and, in June, it shot a U.S. aid worker while
attempting to kidnap him in Nouakchott, Mauritania. Also in June, terrorists killed 24 gendarmes
(paramilitary police) in an ambush about 218 miles east of Algiers. In July, they ambushed a
military convoy in Tipaza Province, 90 miles west of Algiers; at least 14 soldiers were killed.19 In
August, AQIM attacked the French Embassy in the capital. In October, terrorists killed seven and
wounded three security guards at a Canadian water project. In November, an AQIM cell
kidnapped three Spanish relief workers in Mauritania and unsuccessfully attempted to kidnap
U.S. embassy employees in Niger. In June 2010, a suicide bomber attacked a police barracks 60
miles east of Algiers, killing at least nine. In July 2010, AQIM claimed responsibility for
attacking a police convoy near the border with Mali, killing 11 gendarmes and seizing weapons.
The AQIM organizational structure is hazy. Droukdel may be the spiritual leader or ideologue of
the group who sets broad directions, but Mokhtar Belmokhtar and Yahia Djouadi have gained
public prominence as (perhaps rival) leaders of AQIM regional commands or “emirates” in the
Sahel who oversee operations. Alternatively, they may be independent of Droukdel. Abdelhamid
Abu Zaid (aka Abid Hammadou) is associated with Djouadi and reportedly is heavily engaged in
16 State Department, Country Reports on Terrorism, op. cit.
17 An Algerian court sentenced Droukdel in absentia to life imprisonment for his membership in a terrorist organization
and involvement in kidnappings.
18 See Jean-Pierre Filiu, “Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb: Algerian Challenge or Global Threat?” Carnegie Papers,
No. 104, October 2009, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
19 Some attributed the second ambush to the Protectors of Salafi Call, which reportedly had split from the GSPC and,
therefore, is not considered part of AQIM. Others attributed the attack to a different regional command of AQIM or
suggested that AQIM is encroaching on the Protectors’ territory. “Algerian Army Launches ‘Large Scale’ Operations
an Al-Qaidah Maghreb,” El-Khabar website, August 2, 2009, BBC Monitoring Middle East, “Five Regions Reportedly
Designated for ‘Terrorist Deployment’ in Algeria, El-Khabar website, August 5, 2009, BBC Monitoring Middle East,
“Retreating of the Salafi Call Protectors,” Echourouk el Youmi website, August 17, 2009, BBC Monitoring Newsfile.
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money-making criminal activities. AQIM raises funds by kidnapping20 for ransoms and by
trafficking in arms, drugs, vehicles, cigarettes, and persons across that vast region. The Algerian
military claims that AQIM provides protection in return for cash for convoys smuggling drugs
from South America, across the Sahara, to Europe.21 All of these activities have led some to
describe it as a “hybrid terrorist-criminal organization” or a “criminal organization with an
attachment to Al Qaeda.”22 AQIM reportedly gets some small-scale funding from cells in
Europe.23 AQIM communicates with potential recruits via sophisticated internet videos.
Algeria is a major source of transnational terrorists and was the fourth-largest supplier of anti-
coalition fighters to Iraq.24 Some Algerians were captured in Afghanistan and, at one time, a total
of 26 were held at the U.S. Naval Base at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba; most have been repatriated.
The Bush and Obama Administrations sought assurances from Algiers that repatriated detainees
would not pose a future danger and would be treated fairly. Several were tried after their return
home and acquitted for lack of evidence.
Algerians have been arrested on suspicion of belonging to or supporting AQIM in France, Spain,
Italy, Germany, and Britain. In 2010, there have been unconfirmed reports of Algerians fighting
with Islamist terrorist groups in Yemen and Somalia. In addition, several major international
terrorist plots have involved Algerians. In December 1999, Ahmed Ressam, an Algerian trained in
Afghanistan was arrested after attempting to enter the United States from Canada; he was
convicted for the so-called Millennium Plot to carry out bomb attacks in Los Angeles. His
associates and other Algerians in Canada were linked to the GIA and Al Qaeda. In January 2003,
six Algerians were arrested in a London apartment with traces of ricin, a deadly poison with no
known antidote. In October 2009, two French brothers of Algerian origin, one a worker at the
European Organization for Nuclear Research (CERN) in Geneva, were arrested in France after
intelligence agencies came to suspect them of “criminal activities related to a terror group,” that
is, AQIM.25
Counterterrorism
After President Bouteflika took office, he sought to add peaceful means to the government’s
tactics to counter terrorism. In September 1999, a national referendum approved the “Civil
Concord,” an amnesty for those who had fought the government. In September 2005, another
referendum approved the Charter for Peace and National Reconciliation, including an amnesty for
all except murderers, rapists, and bombers, exemption for security forces from prosecution for
crimes of the 1990s, and compensation for families of victims of violence and the disappeared.
Critics charge that it has resulted in the freeing of recidivist terrorists or that it failed to provide
20 AQIM reportedly mostly purchases Western hostages from local criminal gangs and tribes in the Sahel. Center for
Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), Middle East Program, The Dynamics of North African Terrorism,
Conference Report, March 2010.
21 “Algeria Says Al Qaeda Guards Sahara Drug Smugglers,” Times of Oman, February 23, 2010.
22 CSIS 2010, op. cit.
23 See also, Michael Jonson and Christian Nils Larson, “Illegal Tender: Funding Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb,”
Janes Intelligence Review, October 2008.
24 Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, Harmony Project, “Al-Qaida’s Foreign Fighters in Iraq: A First Look at
the Sinjar Records,” January 2008.
25 Emily Andrews, “Big Bang Scientist Admits Plotting Al Qaeda Atrocity,” Daily Mail, October 12, 2009.
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accountability for the disappeared and for truth-telling about the role of the security forces. A
presidential commission determined that excesses of unsupervised security forces were
responsible for the disappearances of 6,146 civilians from 1992 to 2000 and recommended
compensation. Organizations representing victims’ families claim up to 20,000 disappeared. The
government has extended the amnesty period indefinitely and has controversially extended it to
some former GSPC leaders.
In 2008, the government began to recruit 100,000 new police and gendarme officers to reinforce
borders, augment security at airports, and increase the security presence in major cities. As noted
above, it has been mostly successful in impeding terrorist operations in cities. In addition, the
government deployed thousands of troops to Saharan provinces along Algeria’s borders with
Mali, Niger, and Mauritania to combat AQIM.
Algeria is the region’s dominant economic and military power and it has promoted a regional
approach in which it is the lead actor to counter terrorism. It recognizes the immensity of the
Sahara Desert-Sahel territory and believes that intra-regional cooperation is needed to fight
AQIM. In line with its anti-colonial creed, Algiers is wary of a potential foreign direct
counterterrorism role and seeks to prevent foreign, non-African (i.e., French and U.S.)
involvement/interference/intervention in the region. It fears that AQIM’s propensity to kidnap
Westerners for ransom might provoke direct foreign intervention and that Algeria’s weaker
neighbors might be vulnerable to great power influence, especially if exercised by France—their
former colonial ruler. In addition, Algiers seeks to impede AQIM’s ability to extract large
ransoms from Western governments and, thereby, to build up a treasury to pay more recruits and
buy more arms. While it opposes a foreign presence, Algiers welcomes other outside support for
counterterrorist operations.
In July 2009, the leaders of Algeria, Libya, and Mali agreed to work in concert against AQIM. In
August, the military chiefs of Algeria, Libya, Niger, Mali, and Mauritania met in the southern
Algerian town of Tamanrasset and agreed to cooperate more to counter terrorism and related
crime and developed the so-called “Tamanrasset Plan.” In April 2010, following this framework,
they began to set up a joint command center for security and military coordination in
Tamanrasset; Libya is not participating, while Burkina Faso is observing. Probably due to
strained bilateral ties (see “Foreign Affairs” below) and because Algiers argues that the security
of the Sahel does not concern Morocco, it has not invited its western neighbor to participate in
regional counterterrorism efforts—despite AQIM’s attempt to use Moroccan territory as a route to
smuggle drugs to Europe. Participating governments established several coordinating committees,
assigned countries specific missions, and reportedly agreed to increase the number of security
forces, gendarmerie, and soldiers deployed for counterterrorism in the Sahel from 25,000 (15,000
of whom were Algerian) to 75,000. Algeria already had increased its forces in the region to
25,000.26 Algeria is providing arms, ammunition, vehicles, fuel, and training to Mali, Niger, and
Mauritania and attempting to mount joint operations with their forces. Several additional high-
level counterterrorism meetings have been held.
The sometimes dissonant relations among the neighbors and their dependence on France have
limited implementation of Algeria’s regional approach and the Tamanrasset plan in practice. This
was apparent in July 2010, when French and Mauritanian forces carried out an unsuccessful raid
26 “Anti-Terrorism Troops in the Sahel Increased from 25,000 to 75,000,” El-Khabar website, April 24, 2010, BBC
Monitoring Middle East.
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into Mali, without Mali’s permission, to rescue a Frenchman reportedly held by Abu Zaid’s
group. The effort failed and AQIM later announced that it had executed the hostage. In August,
Mali, reportedly acting for Spain, negotiated with AQIM and secured the release of two Spanish
hostages in exchange for two AQIM members and perhaps a ransom as well.27 Mali thereby
angered its neighbors, including Algeria, who oppose the payment of ransoms. Algeria does not
seem able to compete with European power, influence, and assistance to Sahelian governments.
On occasion, Algiers has condemned its neighbors for releasing terrorists as ransom for hostages
kidnapped by AQIM. Algeria recalled its ambassador from Mali in February 2010 after its
government, under considerable pressure from Paris, released four terrorists in exchange for a
French hostage—an alleged aid worker who was later found to be an intelligence officer. Shortly
thereafter, President Bouteflika postponed a visit to France and Algiers refused to schedule a visit
by French Foreign Minister Bernard Kouchner to Algeria.
Human Rights
A state of emergency declared in 1992 at the outset of the conflict between the Algerian security
forces and Islamist terrorists remains in effect, although Algerian officials have recently signaled
that this may change. According to the U.S. State Department Country Report on Human Rights
Practices, 2009, human rights problems in Algeria include restrictions on freedom of assembly
and association which significantly impair political party activity and limit citizens’ ability to
change the government through elections, and failure to account for persons who disappeared in
detention in the 1990s. Other abuses reportedly include official impunity, abuse of pretrial
detention, poor prison conditions, limited judicial independence, and restrictions on freedom of
speech, press, and assembly. Reports of torture and abuse occur, but are fewer than in previous
years. There are limitations on religious freedom and problems with security-based restrictions on
movement, corruption and lack of government transparency, discrimination and violence against
women, and restrictions on workers rights.28 Algerian officials have criticized and disputed these
U.S. reports.
The State Department’s International Religious Freedoms Report, 2010 noted that “the status of
respect for religious freedom by the government improved marginally during the reporting
period.”29 However, it also stated that “the government’s National Commission for Non-Muslim
Religious Services did not establish an administrative means for non-Muslim religious groups to
register with the government as required by law,” and that “government officials also publicly
criticized evangelism and emphasized the dominant role of Islam in society.” Nonetheless, the
report recognized that “there were some positive changes in the government’s treatment of
religious minorities.” The government “ceased prosecutions of members of minority religious
groups; paid increasing attention to Christian groups’ concerns, including organizing a
symposium on religious worship; officially recognized the first official representative of the
Jewish community in the country; and allowed for the reopening of 25 synagogues. However, the
27 “Algerian Paper Says Mali Violating Regional Anti-terrorism Agreements,” Echourouk El Youmi website, August
19, 2010, BBC Monitoring Middle East, August 20, 2010.
28 U.S. Department of State, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices - 2009, Algeria, March 11, 2010, online at
http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2009/nea/136065.htm.
29 U.S. State Department, International Religious Freedom Report – 2010, November 17, 2010, online at
http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/irf/2010/148812.htm.
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government reportedly did not approve any other requests for registration by non-Muslim
religious associations, including Christian” requests.
The Department’s Trafficking in Persons Report places Algeria on the Tier 2 Watch List with
regard to human trafficking because it “does not fully comply with the minimum standards for the
elimination of trafficking; however, it is making significant efforts to do so.” In January 2009, the
government approved legislation that criminalizes trafficking in persons for the purposes of labor
and sexual exploitation. It later “helped formulate a training program for police, judges, and
prosecutors on its counter-trafficking law. Despite these efforts, the government did not show
overall progress in punishing trafficking crimes and protecting trafficking victims and continued
to lack adequate measures to protect victims and prevent trafficking.”30
The Berbers, natives of North Africa from before the seventh century Arab Muslim invasions, are
a group with specific human rights concerns. They seek language and cultural rights and an end
to government discrimination and neglect. In April 2001 (“Black Spring”), the death of a Berber
youth in custody sparked riots in which security forces killed 126 people. The government agreed
to compensate the victims and recognize Tamazight, a Berber language, as a national language,
but not an official language. Berber activists want national language status, but President
Bouteflika and others have opposed this change. The government engaged in a dialogue with
Berber representatives known as the Arouch. In January 2005, the government agreed to
rehabilitate protesters and remove security forces from Berber areas, and established a joint
committee to follow up. Berber areas are in the mountainous Kabylie region, which, with the
withdrawal of security forces, has become a focus for AQIM activity.
The Economy
Hydrocarbons (oil and gas) are the engine of the Algerian economy, providing about 60% of the
budget revenues, 30% of the gross domestic product (GDP), and 97% of export earnings.31 In the
past decade, high oil prices boosted foreign monetary reserves and economic growth, fueled a
construction boom, eased unemployment somewhat, and produced early repayment of foreign
debt. In 2009, however, the global recession resulted in a significant decline in hydrocarbon
exports and a concomitant drop in revenues. A recent International Monetary Fund (IMF)
evaluation concluded that the government’s expansionary fiscal policies (including high levels of
investment in public infrastructure) had nonetheless enabled Algeria to weather the crisis well. At
the same time, the IMF noted that Algeria remains “highly dependent on fluctuations of
hydrocarbon prices and on public expenditure,” and suggested that further structural reforms
remain necessary to “strengthen and develop the financial sector, enhance the business climate
and competitiveness, promote private investment and support economic diversification.”32
In October 2008, Finance Minister Karim Djoudi asserted that the global financial crisis would
not affect Algeria because it is not present in international banking, because it had sharply
reduced its national debt, relies increasingly on domestic financing to fund development, and has
rejected total convertibility of the dinar (the national currency). However, critics pointed out as
30 U.S. State Department, Trafficking in Persons Report, June 14, 2010, online at http://www.state.govg/tip/rls/tiprpt/
2010/142759.htm.
31 U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, Background Note: Algeria, updated August 2, 2010.
32 IMF, Algeria: Staff Report for the 2010 Article IV Consultation, December 23, 2010.
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weaknesses the absence of a modern financial market, an undeveloped stock exchange, an
underdeveloped banking system, and a failure to integrate in the world economy.33 Some
observers suggest that a continuing tide of illegal young Algerian immigrants to Europe is
evidence of the failure of the economy to serve the people before, during, and now after the
global crisis has begun to subside.
The state energy company, SONATRACH, accounts for 98% of Algeria’s foreign currency
receipts and employs 120,000. A 2005 hydrocarbon law diminished SONATRACH’s monopoly,
opening the sector for private and foreign investment. A 2006 law, however, required international
companies to give SONATRACH a 51% stake in new oil, gas, and related transport projects.
Further restrictive foreign investment rules were enacted in 2009. Such changes have prompted
foreign investors, including U.S. businesses and government, to appeal for greater stability of
laws in Algeria. (See “U.S. Investment and Energy Issues,” below.)
In January 2010, nearly the entirety of SONATRACH’s senior management were removed from
their posts as a result of an official investigation into alleged corruption in the awarding of
contracts. Charges were brought against several executives, including the CEO, Mohamed
Meziane, and a number of government officials. The government provided few public comments
on the investigation, and some analysts viewed it as opaque and potentially politically
motivated.34 The shakeup had little visible impact on production and did not significantly disrupt
the company’s operations. However, it appeared to contribute to the president’s decision to
replace then-Minister of Energy and Mines Chakib Khelil, formerly a powerful figure, in May
2010. In November, SONATRACH published new anti-corruption guidelines for staff, partner
companies, and contractors.
In 2008, Khelil held the rotating presidency of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting
Countries (OPEC). At the time, he blamed the weak dollar, speculators, and geopolitical tensions
for rising oil prices, not the market.35 Khelil sought the formation of a “gas OPEC” to protect
exporters, but found little support among other suppliers.
Algeria has several pipelines supplying gas to Europe and plans for more. In July 2009, Algeria,
Niger, and Nigeria agreed to build an ambitious $10 billion Trans-Saharan pipeline to ship natural
gas to Europe. The aim of the project is to facilitate the economic development of the transit
countries and provide Europe with another source of energy security. Other new projects include
the TransMed pipeline to transport Algerian gas via Tunisia to Italy and the Galsi pipeline to
transport gas directly from Algeria to Italy. Algeria also is expanding its exploration and drilling.
The government is directing some of its hydrocarbon revenues for development. A $140 billion,
five-year plan that ended in 2009 invested in infrastructure, highways, ports, airports, and water
resources. Another $286 billion, five-year plan for the period 2010-2014 now follows. The plans
are intended to generate non-carbon related growth and employment, which the government has
been hard-pressed to achieve thus far. In September 2010, the government announced that it is
requiring foreign investors seeking to participate in infrastructure projects to form a joint venture
with an Algerian company.
33 William Maclean, “Algeria Shielded from Financial Turmoil,” Reuters, October 5, 2009.
34 Reuters, “Interview—Algeria Corruption Case ‘Part of Political Struggle,’” February 8, 2010.
35 Randah Taqiy-al-Din, “‘OPEC’ Decides to Maintain its Current Production,” Al-Hayat, March 6, 2008, via BBC
Monitoring Middle East.
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Despite the country’s considerable oil and gas income and investments, there are chronic
socioeconomic problems: high unemployment and underemployment; inadequate housing, health
services, and education; decaying infrastructure; great inequality of income distribution; and
government corruption.36 These conditions have sparked social protests in several areas of the
country. In August 2009, Chinese workers clashed with Algerians in Algiers. The incident was
attributed in part to unemployed Algerians’ resentment of the estimated 50,000 Chinese working
on development projects. There have been no subsequent reports of similar incidents. (China has
been awarded approximately $20 billion in contracts under the new development plan and has
surged to become second only to France as a supplier of imports to Algeria.37 It has yet to become
a major recipient of Algerian oil exports, but it is actively prospecting new fields.)
Algeria has applied to join the World Trade Organization, but has many problems to overcome
first. Among them is central control of the economy that is only easing slowly, with a very
selective privatization program. The government argues that its conditions for foreign investment
are needed to encourage domestic companies.
Foreign Affairs
After independence in 1962, Algeria was in the forefront of Third World politics, especially the
Non-Aligned Movement, and very active in the Arab world and Africa. It was considerably less
active in the 1990s, when it was preoccupied by domestic violence. Since Bouteflika became
president, Algeria has reemerged as a regional actor, especially in Africa. It has provided airlift
support for U.N. peacekeepers in Darfur and for African Union peacekeepers in Somalia. In
February 2010, President Bouteflika also promised to contribute 1,700 soldiers to the African
Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM).38
Morocco
Algeria and Morocco are the largest countries in North Africa and are neighbors, but they had
different colonial experiences and emerged with distinctly different forms of government and a
rivalry. Algeria achieved its independence via a bloody revolution and emerged as a republic with
military or military-influenced governments. Morocco, on the other hand, is a centuries-old
monarchy that made a more peaceful transition from French control. Shortly after Algeria became
independent, Morocco laid claim to some Algerian territory, and they went to war for about five
months in 1963-1964. The border was not demarcated until 1972.
Algeria’s current relations with Morocco are particularly strained because Algeria supports and
hosts the Popular Front for the Liberation of Saqiat al-Hamra and Rio de Oro (POLISARIO),
which seeks independence for the former Spanish Sahara, known as the Western Sahara.
Thousands of Saharoui (as the people of Western Sahara are known) occupy several refugee
36 Algeria is placed 105 out of 178 countries assessed on Transparency International’s 2010 Corruption Perceptions
Index, online at http://www.transparency.org.
37 Alfred de Montesquiou, “China Builds Up Support in Algeria; The Chinese are Aiding a Construction Boom in the
North African Nation, Eager to Earn Good Will and Oil,” Los Angeles Times, January 24, 2010; and Africa Research
Bulletin, July 16-August 15, 2009, p. 18335.
38 At the time of writing, they had yet to be deployed.
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camps in the Tindouf area of southwestern Algeria. The camps are under the purview of the
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), but are run by the POLISARIO.
Morocco also claims and largely occupies the Western Sahara. Algeria considers the problem of
the Western Sahara to be one of decolonization requiring resolution by the U.N., and it maintains
that it is not a party to the conflict. Algiers viewed with favor the direct, unconditional talks
between the POLISARIO and Morocco that began in June 2007 in response to a U.N. Security
Council call. However, no progress resulted from those talks. The U.N. Secretary General’s
Personal Envoy Christopher Ross held renewed, albeit “informal,” direct talks in December 2010
and January 2011, but has not disclosed any progress; he was quoted in the press as stating that
“Each party continues to reject the other as a sole basis for future negotiations.”39 The parties
continue to reiterate uncompromising positions and do not inspire optimism for achieving a
settlement.
Algeria had said that it would like to improve bilateral relations with Morocco by excluding the
Western Sahara issue from that equation. Yet, Algiers refuses to reopen the border with Morocco,
which it closed 15 years ago in retaliation for Moroccan accusations that Algerians were involved
in terror attacks in Marrakesh. Algiers maintains that smuggling, drug-trafficking, and illegal
immigration need to be dealt with before it opens the border and that an opening would endanger
Algeria’s national security.40 It also believes that Morocco has more to gain in trade and tourism
than Algeria if the border were reopened. Algerians note that Morocco continues to levy
accusations against Algeria on the Western Sahara issue at the same time that it seeks benefits
from Algeria.
France
Algeria and France, its former colonizer, have complex, unpredictable relations. France is
Algeria’s major trading partner. About 4 million Algerians and individuals of Algerian descent
live in France, but France has decreased visas for Algerians out of fear of terrorism and
absorption difficulties. Under Bouteflika, French-Algerian relations initially warmed
considerably. However, a planned treaty of friendship fizzled when France rejected Algeria’s
demand for an apology for the crimes of colonization. President Nicolas Sarkozy refuses to
apologize, but acknowledges that colonialism was “profoundly unjust.” He seeks to deepen
bilateral business and trade ties, advance civilian nuclear energy cooperation, and promote the
European Union’s Union for the Mediterranean (UfM), a community of states bordering the sea.
France’s inclusion of Algerians on a list of persons subject to “meticulous inspection” for security
purposes at French airports prompted Algiers to demand that Algerians be removed from the list
and to cancel, or at least postpone, a January 2010 visit by French Foreign Minister Bernard
Kouchner to Algeria. An Algerian official later described UfM as a “Trojan horse for the
normalization with Israel” and said that Algeria is not interested in it “if its aim is to normalize
relations with the Zionist regime.”41
39 Gala Riani, “Morocco and Polisario Front Hold Western Sahara Talks Without Breakthrough,” Global Insight,
January 24, 2011.
40 “Zerhouni Responds to Call by Rabat, Algeria not in Hurry to Open Border,” El-Khabar, March 23, 2008, BBC
Monitoring Middle East, “Algerian President Advised by Military to Keep Border with Morocco Closed,” Al-Quds al-
Arabi website, August 1, 2009, via BBC Monitoring Middle East, August 3, 2009.
41 Minister of State and special representative of the President Abdelaziz Belkhadem, quoted in El-Khabar website,
June 18, 2010, via BBC Monitoring Middle East.
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AQIM has kidnapped several French citizens in the Sahel, and the group declared war on
President Sarkozy after the failed French attempt to free a hostage in July 2010 resulted in several
AQIM casualties. Algeria criticized the July action, and Foreign Minister Kouchner did not visit
Algeria when he subsequently tried to get increased Sahelian cooperation with Paris to fight
terrorism. President Sarkozy has declared that France is at war with AQIM and has made fighting
the group one of his highest priorities, dispatching military and intelligence forces and equipment
to the Sahel. He also said that France would no longer pay ransoms.42 If the French government
follows through on this pledge and consults Algiers about countering terrorism, then bilateral
relations and counterterrorism efforts may benefit. However, France has economic and other
interests (i.e., uranium mines) in the Sahel and may, on occasion, seek to further them
unilaterally, without consulting its former colony. Nonetheless, by October, the perception of a
common AQIM threat appeared to be fostering an improvement in bilateral relations as Algerian
Foreign Minister Mourad Medelci described them as “turning a new corner” and “strategic.”43
European Union
With France’s support, Algeria signed an association agreement with the European Union (EU) in
2001 and has participated in the Europe-Mediterranean Partnership (MEDA) since 1995. In
March 2009, Algeria enacted a law making it a crime to leave “the national territory in an illegal
manner” in order to address EU concerns about illegal immigration as well as to stop human
trafficking. At the same time, Algeria wants Europe to assist with development in order to strike
at the causes of emigration.
U.S. Relations
U.S.-Algerian ties date from a Treaty of Peace and Friendship in 1775. Algerians have fond
memories of President Kennedy’s support for their independence from France.44 Relations
suffered later due to Cold War ideological differences, as Algeria was a socialist republic with
close ties to the Soviet Union. They have been re-energized over the past decade, and Bouteflika
met with President George W. Bush several times. Bouteflika attended the June 2004 Group of
Eight (G-8) summit in Sea Island, Georgia.
U.S. policy has tried to balance appreciation for Algeria’s cooperation in counterterrorism with
encouragement of democratization. U.S. officials have urged Algiers to lift the state of emergency
and described the April 2004 presidential election as an important phase in a democratic process.
Algeria receives limited U.S. aid.
The U.S.-Algeria relationship is highly focused on security cooperation and counterterrorism. In
2005, the United States and Algeria launched a Joint Military Dialogue to foster exchanges,
training, and joint exercises. Algeria participates in the U.S. Trans-Sahara Counter Terrorism
42 Charles Bremner, “Sarkozy Wages Desert War on Terror,” The Times (London), September 21, 2010.
43 “Algerian Minister Discusses French Ties,” El-Khabar website, October 22, 2010, via BBC Monitoring Middle East.
44 As a U.S. Senator, John F. Kennedy expressed support for Algeria’s independence struggle. On July 3, 1962,
Kennedy congratulated Algerians on “the creation of a great new state [which] represents the courageous and devoted
work of the Algerian people and their leaders stretching over many years,” and likened Algeria’s war for independence
to America’s own.
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Partnership (TSCTP), a State-Department led interagency program that aims to improve regional
governments’ capacity and coordination to counter violent extremism, but Algeria prefers
bilateral activities with the United States that recognize its regional importance. As part of
TSCTP, U.S. Special Forces train, equip, and aid national forces in fighting the AQIM in southern
Algeria and the Sahel. U.S. intelligence also is shared.45 For their part, Algerian authorities have
shared information regarding terrorists of Algerian origin with the United States. To support
Algeria’s efforts to combat terrorism, the U.S. Treasury Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC)
has listed leaders of AQIM, including Droukdel, as Specially Designated Global Terrorists.
Algeria also participates in the NATO-Mediterranean dialogue and in NATO naval exercises.
On September 29, 2009, a U.S. State Department spokesman said that “Al Qaeda in North Africa
(sic) gave us an opportunity to boost our ties with Algeria” because “the presence of militant
groups represents a common challenge for both of us.” Assistant Secretary of State for Near
Eastern Affairs Jeffrey Feltman made his first visit to Algeria in October 2010 and saluted the
country as “an important voice” with “a great role to play in keeping peace in Africa.” With
reference to Algeria’s sensitivities, he stated that the United States “respects the sovereignty of
the countries of the region and its commitment in the fight against terrorism did not replace that
of the countries concerned.” With regard to counterterrorism, Feltman said, “We support Algeria’s
leadership in this operation, in particular as regards the plan adopted at the last Tamanrasset
meeting…. Our intention is not to replace the countries of the region. We are merely worried
about the stability of these countries.”46
After meeting President Bouteflika in November 2009, General William E. Ward, head of the
U.S. African Command (AFRICOM), reportedly told the Algerians that the United States is
determined “to strengthen and improve bilateral relations and work closely with Algeria in
several areas related to our mutual interests in security cooperation,” including the fight against
violent extremism. He also acknowledged Algeria’s regional power and ambition, stating, “we
appreciate Algeria’s leadership in dealing with regional questions related to security and the fight
against terrorism.” Ward said that “terrorist and criminal activities in the Maghreb and the Sahel
region remain a threat to the entire region and beyond it…. If the countries of the region have
decided to organize themselves, it means that they are aware of the proper measure of the threat.
We share their assessment of the situation and we support their efforts to secure and stabilize the
Sahel.”47 On a visit to Algeria in July 2010, U.S. State Department Coordinator for
Counterterrorism Daniel Benjamin echoed the tribute to his hosts, saying “We appreciate Algerian
efforts in the fight against terrorism, both in North Africa and the Sahel region or elsewhere, and
we are very grateful.”48 He also reassured the Algerians that Washington did not want to intervene
directly in the Sahel, but preferred to provide technical, intelligence, and political support to fight
Al Qaeda. Benjamin and Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International
Security Affairs Joseph McMillan later underscored that the United States opposed paying
45 Mhand Berkouk, U.S.–Algerian Security Cooperation and the War on Terror, Carnegie Endowment for International
Peace, June 2009.
46 “US Assistant Secretary Discusses US-Algerian ties, Counter-terrorism,” Liberté website, October 22, 2010, via
BBC Monitoring Middle East.
47 “AFRICOM Commander Strengthens US-Algerian Cooperation in Algiers Visit,” Liberté, November 26, 2009, via
BBC Monitoring Middle East, December 14, 2009; and “Africom Commander Says No US Bases to be Set Up in
Algeria,” El Watan website, November 26, 2009, BBC Monitoring Middle East.
48 “Algeria, ‘Leader’ and ‘Key’ Partner in Fight Against Terrorism,” Algeria Press Service, July 27, 2010.
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ransoms to win the freedom of hostages as part of its “no-concessions policy,” which is the same
policy as Algeria’s.49
During a December 2009 visit to Washington to “strengthen the Algerian-U.S. partnership,”
Foreign Minister Mourad Medelci met Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton and other
officials, and commended Algerian-U.S. cooperation, especially in the military sector, which he
described as “very ambitious.” He said that the cooperation included “exchanging information
and training human resources.”50
Despite improving ties, Washington and Algiers strongly disagree about some U.S. Middle East
policies. Bouteflika condemned the use of force against Iraq and called for the early withdrawal
of foreign troops. He criticized U.S. charges against Syria for supporting terrorism and in
Lebanon, but Algeria only abstained from voting on a U.N. Security Council resolution calling on
Syria to withdraw from Lebanon. Algeria supports the Arab Peace Initiative, which promises full
normalization of relations with Israel after it withdraws from Arab lands. It roundly criticized
Israel’s military operation against Hamas in the Gaza Strip in December 2008-January 2009.
Algeria considers the situation in the Darfur region of Sudan to be the result of ethnic conflict and
poverty—not a genocide, as U.S. officials have maintained—and is concerned about its regional
implications. In particular, Algeria objects to the International Criminal Court’s warrant for the
arrest of Sudanese President Omar al Bashir because it finds unacceptable a trial of a head of state
by an international court and because it believes the warrant impedes a political solution to the
Darfur situation.51
In 2010, the Algerian government condemned the inclusion of Algeria on the list of 14
predominantly Muslim countries from which air travelers to the United States were subject to
heightened screening in the aftermath of a Nigerian’s failed attempt to bomb an airplane en route
from Amsterdam to Detroit on Christmas Day 2009. Algeria’s ambassador to Washington
complained, “This is a burden and discrimination against the citizens of Algeria who do not pose
any particular risk to the people of the United States.”52 The Algerian Foreign Ministry presented
an official protest on the issue to the U.S. Ambassador in Algiers and remonstrated repeatedly.
The United States Department of Homeland Security revised its procedures in April 2010 so that
Algeria and other countries are not listed, but their nationals may still be subject to more security
checks.
U.S. Investment and Energy Issues
The United States was first to invest in the Algerian hydrocarbon sector after the 2005
liberalization law opened it to foreigners. About 1,100 American citizens live in Algeria, most of
whom live and work in the oil and gas fields in the south.53 Economic ties have broadened
beyond the energy sector, where most U.S. investment has been made, to financial services,
pharmaceuticals, and other industries, although U.S. investors confront many bureaucratic and
49 “Ransoms Fuel Al-Qaeda in Northern Africa, Says US,” Daily News (Egypt), November 18, 2010; “US Assistant
Secretary Discusses Algeria Arms Deals,” El-Khabar website, November 11, 2010, BBC Monitoring Middle East.
50 “Algerian Foreign Minister Commends US Ties,” Algerian Radio, December 9, 2009, BBC Monitoring Middle East.
51 For background on the ICC’s involvement in Sudan, see CRS Report RL34665, International Criminal Court Cases
in Africa: Status and Policy Issues, by Alexis Arieff et al.
52 Eric Lipton, “Some Cry Foul as New Travel Rules Take Effect,” International Herald Tribune, January 5, 2010.
53 U.S. Department of State, “Background Note: Algeria,” updated August 2, 2010.
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policy obstacles. Algeria receives duty-free treatment under the Generalized System of
Preferences (GSP). In June 2007, Algeria and the United States signed an agreement to cooperate
in the peaceful use of nuclear energy, but other countries, and not the United States, have built or
plan to build reactors for Algeria. In June 2010, SONATRACH provided the oil company BP with
equipment to help fight pollution caused by the Gulf of Mexico oil spill.
The State Department’s 2010 Investment Climate Statement on Algeria noted that despite large
private sector interest in Algeria, recent government policy trends were relatively unfavorable to
foreign investment. The statement concluded:
U.S. firms continue to consider Algeria as an emerging export market that is expected to
grow in 2010. However, the climate for U.S. firms considering direct investments in Algeria
has worsened, particularly in the wake of a series of restrictive foreign investment rules
enacted in 2009. Algeria’s failures to join the WTO or to modernize its banking sector are
other factors that have prevented significant foreign investment outside the energy sector.
These new investment measures, along with statements by senior leaders critical of foreign
investors, reinforce the impression of a government turn in the direction of economic
nationalism.54
U.S. Assistance
Algeria receives little development aid from the United States, but benefits from military
cooperation and security assistance programs. In FY2009, for example, the U.S. Department of
Defense spent $35 million on military-to-military engagement with Algeria. Also in FY2009, the
U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) was allocated $2 million for an educational
program to counter violent extremism, as part of TSCTP.55 In FY2007, Algeria benefitted from
two Defense Department-administered “Section 1206” regional programs.56 Algeria received a
portion of a $1.1 million, 7-country regional Section 1206 package labeled as “Partner Nation
Intelligence Capability Aid,” and a portion of a separate $5.8 million, 15-country regional
maritime security package.
A provision included in annual appropriations legislation—most recently, Section 7086 (c) of the
FY2010 Consolidated Appropriations Act, P.L. 111-117, signed into law on December 16, 2009—
prohibits certain types of bilateral economic aid and security assistance “for the central
government of any country that fails to publicly disclose on an annual basis its national budget, to
include income and expenditures.” The restriction may be waived on a country-by-country basis
if the Secretary of State reports to the Committees on Appropriations that to do so is in the
national interest of the United States. Deputy Secretary of State for Management and Resources
Jacob Lew signed an FY2010 budget transparency waiver for Algeria on March 25, 2010.57
54 State Department, Bureau of Economic, Energy and Business Affairs, “2010 Investment Climate Statement –
Algeria,” March 2010.
55 Information provided to CRS by the State Department, 2010.
56 Section 1206 of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2006, as amended and regularly
extended, authorized the Defense Department to train and equip foreign military and foreign maritime security forces
for certain specific purposes. See CRS Report RS22855, Security Assistance Reform: “Section 1206” Background and
Issues for Congress, by Nina M. Serafino.
57 State Department, “Waiver of Restriction on Assistance to the Central Government of Algeria,” Executive Order
11423, as Amended, Federal Register: March 25, 2010 (Volume 75, Number 57).
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Algeria: Current Issues
Table 1. Selected Bilateral Aid by Account and Type
(in thousands of dollars)
FY2011
FY2012
FY2008 FY2009 FY2010 request
request
NADR
317 500 950 550 —
INCLE
198 0 0
870
870
IMET
696 898 950 950
1,300
ESF
400 0 0 0 0
DA
0 400 710 400 0
Food Aid (P.L. 480)
6,816
0
0
—
—
Total
8,427 1,798 2,610 2,770 To
be
determined
Source: U.S. Department of State Congressional Budget Justifications for Foreign Operations, FY2010-FY2012;
figures provided to CRS by the State Department, 2010.
Notes: NADR = Nonproliferation, Antiterrorism, Demining, and Related Programs, INCLE = International
Narcotic Control and Law Enforcement, IMET= International Military Education and Training, ESF = Economic
Support Fund, DA = Development Assistance.
This table does not reflect bilateral assistance appropriated to State Department or USAID regional accounts,
nor aid administered by other U.S. agencies such as the Defense Department.
Author Contact Information
Alexis Arieff
Analyst in African Affairs
aarieff@crs.loc.gov, 7-2459
Acknowledgments
This is an update of a report authored by Carol Migdalovitz, now-retired CRS Specialist in Middle Eastern
Affairs.
Congressional Research Service
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