Guinea: Background and Relations with the
United States
Alexis Arieff
Analyst in African Affairs
February 22, 2011
Congressional Research Service
7-5700
www.crs.gov
R40703
CRS Report for Congress
P
repared for Members and Committees of Congress
Guinea: Background and Relations with the United States
Summary
The past two years have seen a series of dramatic changes in Guinea’s political landscape, a new
experience for a country that had only two presidents in the first 50 years after independence in
1958. In June 2010, Guineans voted in their country’s first presidential election organized by an
independent electoral commission and without an incumbent candidate. Longtime exiled
opposition leader Alpha Condé, who had previously never served in government, was declared
the winner after a much-delayed run-off poll in November. Condé’s inauguration in December
2010 brought an end to two years of military rule and, many hope, to over 50 years of
authoritarianism. Many Guineans, investors, and foreign diplomats also expect the election to
provide a stepping-stone toward reforming state institutions and implementing the rule of law,
which are considered prerequisites for private sector growth and increased respect for human
rights. At the same time, ethnic violence and reported abuses by security forces, both before and
after the run-off vote, point to underlying problems within Guinea’s security sector and exposed
socio-political divides that may prove challenging for the new administration to overcome.
A former French colony on West Africa’s Atlantic coast, with a population of about 10 million,
Guinea is rich in natural resources but its citizens are afflicted by widespread poverty. While
Guinea has experienced regular episodes of internal political turmoil since independence in 1958,
it was considered a locus of relative stability during much of the past two decades, during which
each of its six neighbors suffered armed internal conflicts. Still, democratic progress was limited,
and popular discontent with the government rose along with instability within the outsized and
fractious armed forces. International policymakers continue to view Guinea’s stability as key to
preserving security gains in neighboring Liberia and Sierra Leone, while a resurgence of violence
in neighboring Côte d’Ivoire in recent months threatens the sub-region anew.
Guinea has significant mineral deposits, notably comprising a quarter or more of global bauxite
(aluminum ore) reserves, and U.S. companies are involved in the extractive industries sector.
Chinese investment, though longstanding, appears to be on the rise and has sparked international
and internal controversy.
U.S. policy challenges in Guinea center on democratization and good governance;
counternarcotics issues; security sector reform; economic interests; regional peace and stability;
and socioeconomic and institutional development. Following the 2008 military coup, the United
States identified Guinea’s political transition as a key policy goal in West Africa and made
significant financial and diplomatic contributions toward the success of Guinea’s election process.
Selective U.S. bilateral aid restrictions, which were imposed in connection with the coup, have
been lifted in the wake of the successful transfer of power to a civilian-led administration. U.S.
policymakers have indicated support for the resumption of bilateral security assistance and for
security sector reform, but the levels and types of U.S. assistance may be weighed against other
regional and policy priorities. Congress may play a role in guiding U.S. engagement with Guinea
through the authorization, appropriation, and oversight of U.S. programs and policies. Guinea-
focused legislation introduced during the 111th Congress included H.Res. 1013 (Ros-Lehtinen)
and S.Res. 345 (Boxer).
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Guinea: Background and Relations with the United States
Contents
Overview .................................................................................................................................... 1
U.S. Interests in Guinea......................................................................................................... 2
Recent Congressional Actions ............................................................................................... 3
Background ................................................................................................................................ 4
The Rise of the CNDD Military Junta ................................................................................... 5
The September 28 Protests and International Criminal Court Investigation ...................... 6
Dadis Camara’s Exit and Growing Instability ........................................................................ 6
Formation of a Transitional Government ............................................................................... 7
Elections ..................................................................................................................................... 8
Election Administration......................................................................................................... 9
Election Violence .................................................................................................................. 9
The Economy............................................................................................................................ 11
Socioeconomic Conditions .................................................................................................. 12
Recent Mining Sector Developments................................................................................... 12
Security Issues and the Rule of Law .......................................................................................... 14
Drug Trafficking ................................................................................................................. 14
The Guinean Military: A Key Security Challenge ................................................................ 15
Foreign Relations ...................................................................................................................... 16
Relations with Neighboring States....................................................................................... 16
U.S. Relations ........................................................................................................................... 17
U.S. Assistance ................................................................................................................... 18
Elections-Related Assistance ......................................................................................... 18
Security Assistance and Counter-Narcotics Cooperation ................................................ 19
Multilateral Aid............................................................................................................. 19
Outlook..................................................................................................................................... 21
Figures
Figure 1. Map of Guinea ............................................................................................................. 4
Tables
Table 1. Selected Bilateral Aid by Account ................................................................................ 20
Contacts
Author Contact Information ...................................................................................................... 21
Acknowledgments .................................................................................................................... 21
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Guinea: Background and Relations with the United States
Overview
Guinea is a former French colony in West
Guinea at a Glance
Africa, about the size of Oregon, which has
Population: 10.3 million (2010 est.)
experienced regular episodes of political
Gross Domestic Product (GDP): $3.8 billion (2008)
turmoil. Despite its wealth in natural
resources, Guinea’s development indicators
GDP Per Capita: $350 (2008)
are poor even by regional standards, and living
Age Structure: 0-14 years 43%, 15-64 years 54%, 65+
conditions are among the worst in the world.1
years 3%
During much of the past two decades, Guinea
Ethnic Groups: Peul (Fulbe/Fulani) 40%, Malinké
was considered a locus of relative stability in a
(Mandingo) 30%, Soussou 20%, smal er ethnic groups
sub-region that has witnessed multiple armed
10%
conflicts. However, Guinea’s political outlook
Religions: Muslim 85%; Christian 8%; indigenous beliefs
plunged in late 2008, when a military junta
Languages: French (official); local languages
took power following the death of longtime
President Lansana Conté. Under military rule,
Life Expectancy at Birth: 57.6 years (2010 est.)
Guinea saw a rise in insecurity and suffered
Infant Mortality: 63 deaths/1,000 live births (2010 est.)
from the erratic leadership of junta leader
HIV/AIDS Adult Prevalence: 1.6% (2007 est.)
Capt. Moussa Dadis Camara. Dadis Camara
Adult Literacy: 29.5% (2003 est.)
was shot by a security aide in December 2009,
paving the way for a military-led transitional
Natural Resources: bauxite [aluminum ore], iron ore,
government and, eventually, elections.
diamonds, gold, uranium, hydropower, fish, salt
Major Trading Partners: India, China, France,
In June 2010, Guineans voted in the country’s
Netherlands, Spain, Russia, Germany, United States,
first presidential election organized by an
Belgium, Ukraine
independent electoral commission and without
Sources: CIA World Factbook; World Bank
an incumbent candidate. Longtime exiled
opposition leader Alpha Condé was declared the winner after a much-delayed run-off poll in
November. His inauguration in December brought an end to two years of military rule and, many
hope, to over 50 years of authoritarianism. Legislative elections are expected within the next year,
though an electoral timeline has not been set.
As Guinea’s first freely elected president, Alpha Condé faces tremendous expectations from
Guinea’s impoverished population as well as vast challenges. The pre- and post-electoral periods
were afflicted by violence, some of it ethnically tinged, which revealed latent tensions and
damaged the social fabric in Conakry and other ethnically mixed areas. State institutions,
including the judiciary, military, law enforcement agencies, and civilian bureaucracy, are in
disarray. Guinea’s economy, already very weak, has been severely impacted by political
instability and the suspension of multilateral financial assistance (now on its way to being
restored). Condé has identified security sector reform, agricultural development, mining sector
reform, and transitional justice as among his policy priorities. While observers view these goals
as laudatory, the capacity and political will of Condé’s administration remain untested. Some
analysts also point to the issue of justice as potentially divisive and destabilizing, particularly
when it comes to the potential pursuit of exiled former junta leader Dadis Camara and other
members of the military, who are potential targets of an ongoing International Criminal Court
investigation.
1 See e.g., U.N. Development Program (UNDP), Human Development Report 2010, at http://hdr.undp.org/en/.
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The United States, which played a key role in Guinea’s political transition by isolating the
military junta that came to power in 2008 and supporting the electoral process that led to the
successful 2010 vote, is now set to weigh further support for Guinea’s democratic and socio-
economic development against other policies and priorities. Congress may guide U.S.
engagement with Guinea through its authorization and appropriation of foreign assistance and its
oversight of executive branch policies and programs.
Issues of interest to Congress may include:
• U.S. foreign aid programs, including aid for good governance and security
assistance and cooperation;
• Guinea’s democratic trajectory and prospects for institutional reforms;
• the role of Guinea’s military and prospects for security sector reform;
• counter-narcotics and transnational organized crime;
• Guinea’s natural resource wealth and related U.S. investments; and
• Guinea’s potential impact on regional stability.
Alpha Condé: Guinea’s Newly Elected President
Alpha Condé, 73, has spent most of the past forty years in exile, largely in France. Prior to his inauguration in
December 2010, Condé had never served government. A lawyer by training, Condé was an opponent in exile of
Guinea’s founding president, Ahmed Sékou Touré, and in 1971 was sentenced in absentia for seeking to overthrow
the state. He founded the Rassemblement du Peuple Guinéen (Ral y of the Guinean People, RPG)—Guinea’s first
registered opposition party—in the early 1990s, and chal enged then-President Lansana Conté in presidential
elections in 1993 (Guinea’s first multi-party vote) and 1998. He received 19% and 16% of the vote in these elections,
respectively; both elections were marred by reports of irregularities and fraud. Following the 1998 election, Condé
was arrested for trying to leave the country “illegally” and attempting to overthrow the government. He was
sentenced to five years in prison in 2000, but released in 2001 on a presidential pardon. Condé and the RPG
boycotted the 2002 legislative election and the 2003 presidential election. Condé is a member of the Malinké (Mande)
ethnic group, which is concentrated in Guinea’s northeast and is though to constitute the president’s base; Condé
also drew cross-ethnic support, notably from the Soussou and Forestier ethnic communities, during the campaign.
U.S. Interests in Guinea
U.S. interests and associated policy challenges in Guinea center on democratization and good
governance; counternarcotics issues; security sector reform; bilateral economic interests and
relations; regional peace and stability; and socioeconomic and institutional development.
Ensuring a transition to a democratically elected, civilian-led government was identified as a
primary focus of U.S. policy following the 2008 military coup. The United States also aims to
ensure that instability in Guinea does not spill over into fragile neighboring states, such as
Liberia, where the United States has invested heavily in that country’s post-war recovery and
security. Guinea’s extractive industry sector is also of financial and strategic interest to the United
States: in addition to gold, diamonds, uranium, and potential oil and gas reserves, Guinea
possesses an estimated 27% or more of global reserves of bauxite, a key component of aluminum,
and Guinea provided 16% of U.S. bauxite and alumina imports between 2004 and 2007.2 Several
U.S.-based resource firms operate in Guinea and face possible growing competition from other
2 U.S. Geological Survey, 2009 Bauxite and Alumina Survey.
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foreign investors in Guinea, notably from China.3 U.S. interest has also arisen over Guinea’s
identity as a historically moderate, majority-Muslim country in a region affected by violent
extremism.
Recent Congressional Actions
Several pieces of legislation related to Guinea were introduced during the 111th Congress. These
included H.Res. 1013 (Ros-Lehtinen), Condemning the violent suppression of legitimate political
dissent and gross human rights abuses in the Republic of Guinea, passed by the House on January
20, 2010; and S.Res. 345 (Boxer), A resolution deploring the rape and assault of women in
Guinea and the killing of political protesters on September 28, 2009, passed by the Senate on
February 22, 2010. Several Members criticized the CNDD following a violent military
crackdown in September 2009.4 In March 2007, the House Foreign Affairs Committee convened
a hearing on the political situation in Guinea following the eruption of mass anti-government
demonstrations earlier that year.5
The Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2010 (Section 7008, Title VII, Division F of P.L. 111-117,
signed into law on December 16, 2009), states that “none of the funds appropriated or otherwise
made available pursuant to titles III through VI of this Act shall be obligated or expended to
finance directly any assistance to the government of any country whose duly elected head of
government is deposed by military coup or decree,” with an exemption for “assistance to promote
democratic elections or public participation in democratic processes.” The prohibition covers
bilateral economic assistance, international security assistance, multilateral assistance, and export
and investment assistance; humanitarian aid is generally exempt. The Act (Section 7070) also
restricts International Military Education and Training (IMET) programs in Guinea to Expanded
IMET (E-IMET), which emphasizes respect for human rights and civilian control of the military.
These and other provisions have been carried over in subsequent continuing appropriations
legislation (P.L. 111-242, signed into law on September 30, 2010, and P.L. 111-290, signed into
law on December 4, 2010).
3 The large U.S.-based multinational aluminum firm Alcoa, for instance, is a major shareholder in the Compagnie des
Bauxites de Guinée, a bauxite mining and export partnership with the Guinean state, while a much smaller U.S energy
firm, Hyperdynamics, holds the largest single license for offshore oil exploration. Hyperdynamics, a Texas-based oil
prospecting firm, holds exploration rights in Guinea under a Production Sharing Contract (PSC) signed with the
Guinean government in 2006. The Guinean government later disputed the terms of the PSC, and in 2009
Hyperdynamics was forced to rescind all but 36% of its original acreage in exchange for confirmation of the validity of
its remaining concession. The firm has indicated it will continue oil exploration activities within the remaining area.
4 “Statement of Senator Russ Feingold on Guinean Soldiers Firing Into an Opposition Rally,” September 29, 2009;
Office of Congressman Howard Berman, “Guinea’s Military Leaders, Tarnished by Violence, Should Allow for Free
and Fair Elections, Berman Says,” October 8, 2009; Yvette D. Clarke, “Movement of Guinean Women in the United
States,” October 28, 2009, Congressional Record, Page E2648; Letter to Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, signed by
Senators Russ Feingold, Richard G. Lugar, Jeanne Shaheen, Johnny Isakson, Barbara Boxer, James M. Inhofe, Patrick
J. Leahy, Sam Brownback, Robert P. Casey Jr., Benjamin Cardin, Mary L. Landrieu, Sheldon Whitehouse, Bill Nelson,
and Roland W. Burris, October 15, 2009.
5 See U.S. Congress, House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on Africa and Global Health, Prospects for
Peace in Guinea, 110th Cong., 1st sess., March 22, 2007 (Washington: GPO).
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Background
Figure 1. Map of Guinea
Source: CRS
For 26 years following independence from France in 1958, Guinea was ruled as a one-party,
socialist “revolutionary” state under the charismatic but repressive leadership of Ahmed Sékou
Touré. Following Touré’s death in 1984, Colonel (later, General) Lansana Conté came to power in
a military coup d’état. Conté oversaw some economic and political reforms, but his critics
accused him of stifling Guinea’s democratic development while allowing corruption and
nepotism to flourish. The final years of Conté’s rule were marked by a decline in average living
standards, competition for influence among members of the senior bureaucracy and elite business
sectors, the disintegration of state institutions, and increasing signs of public dissatisfaction.
Conté’s supporters, however, argued that his leadership prevented Guinea from experiencing the
kind of brutal armed civil conflict that has afflicted many of its neighbors. While Guinea held
several general elections under Conté, democratic gains were limited, and power remained
concentrated in the hands of Conté and his shifting inner circle of businessmen and politicians.
A growing number of formerly rare strikes and demonstrations erupted starting in 2006. They
were spurred by growing public discontent with economic stagnation and high inflation, the slow
pace of promised democratic reforms, extensive corruption, and Conté’s semi-autocratic
leadership. These peaked with a general strike and nationwide anti-government demonstrations in
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early 2007 which nearly brought the country to a halt and pushed Conté to propose a series of
reforms, many of which were never implemented. Divisions and unrest within the military, often
over pay and slow rates of promotion, also grew. Particularly notable was a May 2008 uprising
led by junior army officers at Camp Alpha Yaya, the largest military base in Conakry and the
headquarters of the army’s elite commando unit, the BATA. In June 2008, military troops crushed
an attempted police mutiny over alleged non-payment of back-wages and a failure to implement
pledged promotions. This culminated in a bloody shoot-out at a police headquarters near
downtown Conakry.
Many analysts predicted a military coup if Conté were to die in office. However, it was unclear
what faction or individuals might prevail, as the military was reportedly deeply divided along
ethnic and generational lines. Analysts also debated whether Guinea risked significant ethnic
violence, which could potentially spread to neighboring states, or whether Guineans’ historically
strong sense of national identity and social cohesion meant that such a scenario was unlikely.
International concerns over potential instability heightened with reports that drug trafficking
activities were being facilitated or directly undertaken by government officials, members of the
military, and Conté associates.
The Rise of the CNDD Military Junta
On December 23, 2008, a military junta seized power after Conté died following a long illness.
The junta, which called itself the National Council for Democracy and Development (CNDD,
after its French acronym), appointed as president a previously little-known military officer, Capt.
Moussa Dadis Camara. A member of the southeastern Guerzé (also known as Kpelle) ethnic
group, Dadis Camara was a member of the elite BATA airborne commando unit and had served as
director of Army fuel supplies, a reportedly powerful position that helped him build a base of
support among the rank-and-file. Other powerful CNDD members included Gen. Sekouba
Konaté, former commander of the BATA, who was named defense minister, and Gen.
Mamadouba Toto Camara, the most senior CNDD officer in terms of rank, who was named
security minister. The CNDD’s composition was ostensibly multi-ethnic, but many key posts
appeared split between ethnic Malinké and “Forestiers,” a collective term for a constellation of
small ethnic groups (including the Guerzé) who tie their roots to Guinea’s rain-forested southeast
and have historically been politically marginalized at the national level.
Upon assuming power, the CNDD immediately took steps to assert its authority, for instance by
suspending civilian regional administrators and replacing them with military commanders. The
CNDD also created several new ministerial-level positions, headed by members of the military or
close civilian associates. Several key ministries, including security, defense, and finance, and the
governor of the Central Bank, were attached to the presidency. Signs of fault lines within the
military soon emerged, heightening concerns over potential intra-military violence. Several
military officers were purged from the junta or imprisoned in 2009 on accusations of plotting
against Dadis Camara or other leaders. In July 2009, Gen. Mamadouba “Toto” Camara, security
minister and the most senior CNDD officer, was assaulted by members of the presidential guard.6
Dadis Camara initially committed to overseeing free and fair elections and a “peaceful transition”
to a civilian-led government within a year, agreeing to a timetable set by a broad coalition of
6 BBC News Online, “Troops Crawl After Guinea Attack,” July 24, 2009; United Nations, Contingency Plan Conakry,
August 2009; AFP, “Guinée: Une ONG Redoute une ‘Dérive Dictatoriale,’ Dénonce la Torture,” August 12, 2009.
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political parties, trade unions, and civil society groups known as the Forces Vives (“Active
Forces”). He also promised that neither he nor any CNDD member would run for office.
However, elections were repeatedly postponed. Dadis Camara indicated that he might choose to
run for president, compounding suspicions that junta members were reluctant to leave power.
The September 28 Protests and International Criminal Court Investigation
On September 28, 2009, security forces opened fire on tens of thousands of protesters who had
gathered peacefully in and around an outdoor stadium in Conakry to protest repeated election
delays and Dadis Camara’s perceived intention to run for president. A Human Rights Watch
investigation concluded that the crackdown was “premeditated” and that soldiers and
gendarmes—including members of the Presidential Guard and of the CNDD’s anti-drug and anti-
crime unit, both of which ostensibly answered to the presidency—had directly fired on the
stadium crowd and stabbed those fleeing with knives and bayonets.7 At least 150 people were
killed and over 1,000 wounded in the crackdown, and several opposition leaders who had planned
to address the crowd were assaulted and threatened.8 According to numerous reports, soldiers also
assaulted and raped dozens of women, including in full view of military commanders. In the days
following the protests, lootings and abuses continued, and sporadic confrontations and
extrajudicial detentions were reported.
The report of a United Nations (U.N.) commission of inquiry confirmed 156 deaths, 109
instances of sexual violence, “hundreds of other cases of torture or of cruel, inhuman or
degrading treatment,” and dozens of extrajudicial arrests. The commission concluded that the
crackdown may have constituted “crimes against humanity” and recommended a referral to the
International Criminal Court (ICC).9 Although Dadis Camara condemned the violence, he denied
responsibility, contending that the opposition was at fault and that he was not in full command of
the armed forces.10 In October, the chief prosecutor for the ICC announced he was opening a
“preliminary examination” of the situation.11 The ICC examination remains ongoing.
Dadis Camara’s Exit and Growing Instability
The September 2009 violence presaged rising insecurity in Conakry and fears of a breakdown in
military command and control. International condemnation also catalyzed latent fractures within
the junta. On December 3, 2009, Dadis Camara was shot in the head by a commander in his
presidential guard, Aboubacar “Toumba” Diakité, who had been cited in the U.N. investigation as
7 Human Rights Watch (HRW), Bloody Monday: The September 28 Massacre and Rapes by Security Forces in Guinea,
December 2009.
8 Many believe the death toll to have been significantly higher, and reports indicate that the military engaged in a
systematic cover-up by removing bodies from the site and burying them in mass graves. See HRW, Bloody Monday,
op. cit.
9 Report of the International Commission of Inquiry Mandated to Establish the Facts and Circumstances of the Events
of 29 September 2009 in Guinea, December 29, 2009.
10 Agence France Presse (AFP), “Guinea Under Fire After Scores Killed in Opposition Crackdown,” September 28,
2009; Agence Guinéenne de Presse, “Discours A La Nation du Chef de l’Etat,” November 3, 2009; Jeune Afrique,
“Massacres du 28 Septembre: Dadis a-t-il été l’instigateur?” September 30, 2009; AFP, “Massacre en Guinée: Dadis
Camara Ne Se Reconnaît ‘Aucune Responsabilité,’” October 4, 2009 ; Adam Nossiter, “Guinea Seethes as a Captain
Rules at Gunpoint,” The New York Times, October 3, 2009.
11 ICC Office of the Prosecutor, “ICC Prosecutor Confirms Situation in Guinea Under Examination,” October 14, 2009.
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a key instigator of the September 28 violence. Dadis Camara was evacuated to Morocco to
receive medical care; he subsequently traveled to Burkina Faso, where he remains in exile.
The shooting and subsequent power vacuum coincided with reports of rising ethnic tensions and
instability within the CNDD and wider armed forces. Reports indicated that the CNDD was
recruiting and training irregular fighters as militias in camps located near Conakry, and referred to
rising arms imports and the presence of foreign mercenaries.12 Targeted killings were reported in
Conakry, including at least one government official. Fears of imminent conflict caused some
Guineans, rights advocates, and diplomats to call for a regional intervention force.
Formation of a Transitional Government
In January 2010, following weeks of uncertainty after the shooting of Dadis Camara, CNDD
Defense Minister Gen. Sekouba Konaté assumed executive powers as interim president. On
January 15, 2010, Dadis Camara, Konaté, and ECOWAS mediator Blaise Compaoré (president of
Burkina Faso) announced a new political agreement.13 The Joint Declaration of Ouagadougou
provided for the formation of a unity government headed by Konaté, with a prime minister
chosen from the civilian opposition. The signatories also agreed to hold a presidential election
within six months, in which members of the CNDD, the unity government, and the security forces
would be barred from running as candidates.14
Forces Vives spokesman Jean-Marie Doré was named prime minister on January 19, and in
February he appointed a 34-person cabinet composed of a mix of CNDD members and civilians.
In early March, a National Transition Council (CNT) was inaugurated as a quasi-legislative body,
with 155 members representing political parties, trade unions, civil society groups, and other
socio-economic demographics.15 The CNT drafted a new constitution and a new electoral code,
which were promulgated by presidential decree. Dadis Camara has declined to return to Guinea,
and he publicly supported the transitional government and progress toward elections.16
As interim president, Konaté moved to build donor and regional support, and made multiple state
visits to neighboring countries and to France. Using a combination of patronage and force, he also
consolidated power within the armed forces. He closed down militia training camps and arrested,
co-opted, or otherwise sidelined a number of military commanders seen as loyal to Dadis Camara
and other potential rivals. In early July, Konaté granted mass promotions to much of the military’s
officer corps, in what was widely viewed as a reward to soldiers for refraining from intervening
in the vote. Konaté received widespread praise for instituting greater discipline and control within
the military, and for stemming military abuses against civilians. However, his actions largely
12 Richard Moncrieff, “Repression and Violence Are a Danger to the Whole Region,” The Independent, September 30,
2009; Beeld (South Africa), “Secretive Mails Sent to Recruits,” October 18, 2009; HRW, “Guinea: September 28
Massacre Was Premeditated,” October 27, 2009; Reuters, “Foreign Gunmen Helped Guinea Crackdown—Witnesses,”
October 3, 2009; BBC, “‘Big Guns’ Herald Guinea’s Crisis,” October 31, 2009; Ed Butler, “Guinea’s Military Junta
Imports Millions of Dollars Worth of Arms Despite Embargo,” The Guardian, November 3, 2009.
13 In October 2009, ECOWAS had appointed Compaoré to mediate between the CNDD and the civilian opposition
Forces Vives coalition.
14 “Joint Declaration of Ouagadougou,” State Department Office of Language Services, January 2010.
15 Guineenews, "Liste Complète des Membres du CNT," March 8, 2010.
16 Guineenews, “Moussa Dadis Camara S’Adresse au Peuple de Guinée Depuis Ougadougou,” June 14, 2010.
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focused on internal command issues and did not necessarily pave the way for greater civilian
oversight under an eventual elected government.
Elections
On June 27, 2010, Guineans went to the polls to select from among 24 presidential candidates.
The vote was historically significant because it was the first national election in Guinea’s history
organized by an independent commission, and the first not to feature an incumbent government
candidate. Campaigning was largely peaceful, though there were a few isolated incidences of
violent confrontations between supporters of opposing candidates.17 No candidate won more than
50% of the vote, necessitating a run-off election. The two candidates who won the most votes in
the June poll—making them adversaries in the run-off election—were Cellou Dalein Diallo of the
Union of Democratic Forces of Guinea (UFDG) party, who won 43.7% of the vote, and Alpha
Condé of the Rally of the Guinean People (RPG) party, who won 18.3%.
International and domestic election monitoring groups praised the June vote as an important step
in Guinea’s hoped-for democratic transition, though they also observed severe logistical
challenges—such as shortages of election materials, a lack of polling stations in some areas,
insufficient poll-worker training, and problems with the distribution of voter cards.18 In addition,
the Supreme Court nullified all votes cast in several major population centers. The U.S.-based
Carter Center, which fielded an election observation mission, stated it was “concerned by the
Court’s exclusion of these almost 900,000 votes with no justification of or explanation for doing
so”; the Center contended that this “resulted in a de facto disenfranchisement of approximately
one third of the electorate without adequate justification.”19 The final participation rate among
registered voters was 52%, compared to 77% reported in provisional results. Several candidates,
including Condé and third-place rival Sidya Touré, contested the results; these challenges were
overturned by the Supreme Court.
After a series of delays related to logistical challenges, politicized wrangling over election
administration, and a dispute over the leadership of the Independent National Electoral
Commission (CENI), a run-off vote between Diallo and Condé was held on November 7, 2010.
Election observers noted that many deficiencies recorded during the first round—such as
insufficient election materials, too few polling stations in some regions, and a lack of training for
many poll workers—were corrected prior to the run-off vote. However, there were still some
logistical deficiencies. International election observers were largely positive in their initial,
preliminary statements following the vote.20
The November poll represented a contest between two candidates with starkly contrasting
political histories and bases of support. Condé was a longtime opposition leader who had lived in
exile during most of Guinea’s post-independence history, while Diallo was a former prime
minister who was at one time seen as close to Guinea’s former president, Lansana Conté. The
17 See, e.g., AFP, “One Dead in Guinea Election Clash,” June 25, 2010.
18 The Carter Center, “The Carter Center Commends Guinea’s Historical Election,” op. cit.
19 The Carter Center, “Guinea’s Transitional Elections Marked by Peaceful Voting; Commitment to Transparency in
Final Results Is Important [Preliminary Statement], November 9, 2010.
20 Ibid; European Union (EU), “Statement by EU High Representative Catherine Ashton on the Presidential Elections
in the Republic of Guinea,” November 8, 2010.
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vote was nonetheless perceived by many, in part, as an ethnic contest between Guinea’s two
largest ethnic groups: the Peul (Fulbe/Fulani), who were seen as constituting Diallo’s base, and
the Malinké (Mandingo), seen as constituting Condé’s base. The run-off vote was preceded by
incidents of ethnic violence, reportedly including attacks against ethnic Peuls in several majority-
Malinké areas in northeastern Guinea. These attacks caused population displacements and led
Diallo’s party to contend that it was unable to field election observers in those areas out of
security concerns; this, in turn, became a bitter point of contention between the two candidates.
On November 15, the CENI announced that provisional results showed a victory by Condé, with
about 52.5% of the vote against 47.5% for Diallo. Participation was roughly 67% percent
nationally. Diallo initially challenged the results and claimed that they were tainted by fraud,
particularly in two districts affected by ethnic violence just prior to the vote. Unrest erupted in
Conakry and in areas that had supported Diallo’s candidacy, largely in the northern Fouta Djallon
region (see “Election Violence,” below). However, Diallo conceded to Condé after the Supreme
Court certified the results, and the security situation has since been relatively quiet.
Election Administration
Elections were organized by the Independent National Electoral Commission (CENI), which was
created in 2007 as an oversight body, part of a series of reforms agreed to under Conté. The
interior ministry (known in Guinea as the MATAP), which was previously responsible for
organizing elections, played a secondary role by assisting the CENI with logistics. The
presidential election cost an estimated $36.1 million, not including voter registration and related
costs.21 Major donors included the European Union, the United States, France, Japan, Germany,
and Spain; the U.N. Development Program played a coordinating role. China also reportedly
contributed, for example through the donation of motorcycles for the transportation of electoral
materials and other equipment.
The legal framework for the elections consisted of a new constitution and electoral law
promulgated by decree in April and May 2010. While both contained improvements over
previous frameworks—such as the institution of term limits, guarantees as to the CENI’s
independence, and the introduction of a single-ballot system—implementation was reportedly
inconsistent, in part due to the short time-line prior to the vote. In addition, several deadlines
required under the electoral law were not respected, for example, with regard to the determination
of polling station locations and the development of new voting procedures.22
Election Violence
Delays associated with the organization of the run-off vote provoked violence between party
supporters, at times along ethnic lines, in mid-September and mid-October. In October, a wave of
violence in urban centers across the country appeared to be sparked by allegations that Peul
vendors had poisoned RPG supporters at a political rally.23 In the northeastern towns of Siguiri
21 USAID responses to CRS query, November 2010.
22 The Carter Center, “The Carter Center Commends Guinea’s Historical Election; Urges Continued Calm in Post-
Election Period,” June 29, 2010.
23 AFP, “Guinée: Violences Contre des Peuls Dans la Ville de Siguiri (Témoins),” October 23, 2010. These allegations
were publicly repeated by senior RPG officials.
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and Kouroussa, witnesses characterized the violence as ethnically motivated, with majority-
Malinké populations (perceived as largely supporting the RPG) reportedly targeting Peul
residents and shopkeepers, resulting in thousands of displacements soon before the vote. (New
polling stations were later set up so that these displaced persons could vote in areas to which they
had fled.)
While the violence did not immediately escalate into wider reprisal attacks, the incidents in
Siguiri and Kouroussa became a central grievance of the UFDG party. Contending that its party
representatives were unable to observe the vote in those areas due to intimidation, the UFDG
called on the electoral commission to nullify the Siguiri and Kouroussa results—amounting to
some 200,000 votes, or more than the total separating Diallo from Condé in provisional results.24
Violence again erupted after the November 15 announcement of Condé’s victory, this time in
Conakry and the Diallo strongholds of Labé and Pita. Initially, violence was reportedly instigated
between civilians of (perceived) opposing political sympathies in ethnically mixed
neighborhoods. On November 17, interim president General Sékouba Konaté declared a “state of
emergency,” and the military joined in security patrols along with police and members of the
Special Force for the Security of the Election Process (FOSSEPEL), a newly created election
security force. Reports indicated that security forces engaged in abuses during the crackdown,
including targeted attacks against Diallo supporters and ethnic Peuls.25 The independent think-
tank International Crisis Group warned that “Guinea’s political and military leaders and the
international community must take urgent measures to halt widespread attacks against defenseless
civilians and to prevent political tensions from degenerating into large-scale ethnic violence and
regional instability.”26 The security situation has been relatively stable since November 19.
24 Guineenews, “Résultats Officiels Présidentielle 2010 (CENI),” at http://www.guineenews.org.
25 HRW, “Guinea: Witnesses Describe Security Force Excesses,” November 29, 2010; International Crisis Group
(ICG), “Conflict Risk Alert: Guinea,” November 18, 2010; U.N. Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights,
“Violence and State of Emergency in Guinea,” November 2010. As of November 18, at least seven people had been
reported killed in the post-election clashes.
26 International Crisis Group (ICG), “Conflict Risk Alert: Guinea,” November 18, 2010.
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The FOSSEPEL: A New Election Security Force
In May 2010, a new, 16,000-member Special Force for the Security of the Election Process (FOSSEPEL) was created
to protect polling stations and the tabulation of results, along with ensuring basic crowd-control functions. Members
were ostensibly recruited from existing police and gendarme personnel, and were commanded by the gendarmerie
chief of staff. They were equipped with riot gear but not permitted to carry firearms, though in practice, many
reportedly did. France and Spain assisted in training FOSSEPEL members, with participation from Mali. A State
Department-funded contractor also provided assistance (see “Security Assistance and Counter-Narcotics
Cooperation,” below).
Reports on the FOSSEPEL’s performance, particularly during the run-off vote, were mixed. In early November,
Human Rights Watch reported that it had received
numerous credible reports of misconduct by policemen and gendarmes serving with
FOSSEPEL, including beatings and assaults on party supporters.... Based on the reports,
some members of the security unit used the [election-related] unrest as a pretext to loot shops
and commit criminal acts, including theft of mobile phones, money, and other goods.27
At the same time, some observers noted that police and gendarmes were less likely to be implicated in abuses than
members of the military who had previously ensured urban security during times of unrest. The FOSSEPEL’s future
mandate and composition, following the completion of elections, is unclear.
The Economy
Guinea boasts bountiful natural resources, including over a quarter of the world’s reserves of
bauxite (aluminum ore) and sizable deposits of high-grade iron ore, diamonds, gold, and uranium.
Guinea may also have oil and gas reserves. It also has significant hydro-electric and commercial
agricultural potential. The economy relies heavily on mineral exports; joint-venture bauxite
mining and alumina operations have historically provided about 80% of Guinea’s foreign
exchange.28 Since late 2008, the global economic recession, political instability, and the
government’s erratic governance of and contractual interference in the mining sector have
negatively affected Guinea’s mining output and caused major investment projects to be delayed
or canceled.29 Still, a number of new mining agreements, albeit some that are controversial, have
been signed since 2008. As of late 2010, Guinea appeared to be enjoying a rise in mining
production and a slight economic recovery following negative growth in 2009.30
While Guinea’s economic potential is considerable, gross domestic product (GDP) per capita is
estimated at only $386.31 Over 70% of the workforce is employed in (largely subsistence)
agriculture.32 Limited national infrastructure, periodic labor strikes, corruption, and political
instability are considered to pose barriers to long-term growth. Lack of capacity and the poor
quality of education are also hindrances; the rate of children enrolled in school is reported to have
27 HRW, “Guinea: Ensure Restraint by Security Forces During Elections,” November 5, 2010.
28 State Department, “Background Note: Guinea.” The Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinea (CBG), for example, is a
joint venture in which 49% of the shares are owned by the Guinean Government and 51% by an international
consortium led by Alcoa and Rio Tinto-Alcan.
29 See EIU, Country Report: Guinea, June 2009; Lydia Polgreen, “As Chinese Investment in Africa Drops, Hope
Sinks,” The New York Times, March 25, 2009; Andrea Hotter, “Guinea Ruler Worries Miners,” The Wall Street
Journal, April 16, 2009; Reuters, “Guinea Bauxite Income Seen Down 60 Pct in 2010,” September 28, 2009.
30 Africa Mining Intelligence, “Conakry: Mining Output Climbing,” December 1, 2010.
31 World Bank development indicators database; CIA world factbook.
32 World Bank development indicators database.
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declined since 2007.33 Reports suggest government finances have been depleted in recent years
due to corruption and mismanagement, a drop in the collection of import duties, declining global
mineral commodity prices, misguided monetary policy, and the freezing of some donor budgetary
support after the 2008 military coup.34 Guinea’s external debt burden—$3.1 billion in 2008
according to the World Bank—is also considerable (see “Multilateral Aid,” below).
Socioeconomic Conditions
Guinea’s living standards are among the world’s worst: it was ranked 156 out of 169 countries
assessed on the U.N. Development Program’s (UNDP) Human Development Index for 2010.35
Access to running water and electricity is rare, including in Conakry and other urban centers;
shortages of basic goods, including petrol, cooking gas, and staple food commodities, are
common. Though agriculturally fertile, Guinea is periodically subject to food insecurity.
According to figures released by the United Nations in May 2009, the rate of chronic malnutrition
increased over the previous two years, from 34.8% to 36.2%; 8.3% of Guinean children are
thought to suffer from serious malnutrition.36 The adult prevalence rate of HIV/AIDS is estimated
at 1.6%.37 Annual health expenditures per capita amount to only $26, according to the World
Bank. The World Health Organization considers Guinea to be a “country under surveillance” with
respect to potential complex humanitarian emergency needs.38 The suspension of some non-
emergency donor assistance reportedly negatively affected the provision of humanitarian aid in
some parts of Guinea.39 Poor living conditions helped spark nationwide anti-government protests
in 2007, and some fear that continued economic decline could lead to further unrest.
Recent Mining Sector Developments
President Condé has identified mining sector reform as a policy priority, and has stated that he
will review certain mining contracts and seek to double Guinea’s stake in mining projects.40 A
number of new mining agreements were signed in the first half of 2010, during the transitional
government. Such deals have come under criticism from some Guinean politicians and civil
society groups who contend that the terms are opaque and that the transitional government did not
have the right to conclude significant sovereign agreements prior to elections.
In 2009, the government’s unpredictable actions under Capt. Dadis Camara, who publicly
threatened to close or nationalize various mining projects, sparked fears among international
investors concerned about the security of their assets.41 For example, in April 2009, the Guinean
33 VOA, “Overcrowding, Stalled Reform Keep Guinea’s Children Out of School,” May 13, 2010.
34 IMF and World Bank programs were suspended in early 2009 but are en route to being reinstated following the 2010
presidential election. Private sector analysts note that “the poor quality of fiscal reporting in Guinea makes it difficult to
estimate the size of the fiscal deficit” (EIU, Guinea: Country Report, March 2009: 8).
35 UNDP, Human Development Report 2010, at http://hdr.undp.org/en/reports/global/hdr2010/chapters/en/.
36 U.N. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), Information Bulletin May 2009.
37 CIA World Factbook.
38 World Health Organization, Africa Weekly Emergency Situation Update, February 8, 2010.
39 IRIN, “Guinea: Climbing Out of the Donor Funding Gap,” July 28, 2010.
40 Reuters, “Guinea Seeks to Double Share in Mining Projects,” January 24, 2011.
41 EIU, Guinea: Country Report, March 2009: 16; Andrea Hotter, “Guinea Ruler Worries Miners,” The Wall Street
Journal, April 16, 2009; Reuters, “Analysis-Guinea RUSAL Dispute Sends Warning Sign to Miners,” September 16,
(continued...)
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government reclaimed ownership of an alumina refinery that the Russia-based aluminum
producer RusAl had purchased from the state in 2006, reportedly for $19 million. Dadis Camara
accused RusAl and former government officials of corruption and declared the sale void, a
decision later upheld by a Guinean court. The junta subsequently valued the refinery at $257
million and accused RusAl of failing to pay significant taxes and royalties. RusAl has repeatedly
stated that the refinery was legitimately acquired; negotiations over its status are ongoing.42
Another case of disputed foreign asset ownership centers around the multinational mining
company Rio Tinto. In August 2009, Rio Tinto announced it would pull its equipment from an
anticipated $6 billion iron ore project in southeastern Simandou after the CNDD indicated it
would uphold a decision made under Conté to award half of Rio Tinto’s concession to another
company, BSG Resources Guinea, a subsidiary of Israeli businessman Benny Steinmetz’s BSG
Resources (BSGR). Rio Tinto has rejected the decision and pledged to fight it in court. In March
2010, Rio Tinto and China’s state-run mining firm Chinalco signed a $1.35 billion deal in which
Chinalco was said to acquire a 47% stake in the Simandou venture. However, Guinean
transitional authorities indicated they did not recognize the deal and warned Rio Tinto that it
risked incurring further losses.43 The warning may have stemmed from fears among some
officials who benefited from the transaction that a new elected government would revise the
decision.44 At the same time, the transitional government approved a joint venture between BSGR
and the Brazilian mining company Vale pertaining to the portion of the Simandou reserve claimed
by BSGR. The terms of the Vale deal reportedly remain opaque.45
In October 2009, the Guinean government announced a $7 billion mining and infrastructure
agreement with a Hong Kong-based firm, the China International Fund (CIF), in partnership with
the Angolan state-owned conglomerate Sonangol. Previously, following the December 2008
coup, China had appeared poised to abandon prior plans to invest in major infrastructure projects
in Guinea due to perceived political instability and weak global commodity markets.46 While the
CIF, which has been linked to multi-billion dollar deals in Angola and other African countries, is
ostensibly a privately owned company, an investigative report released in July 2009 by the U.S.-
China Economic & Security Review Commission found that “key personnel have ties to Chinese
state-owned enterprises and government agencies.”47 Chinese officials maintain that the
company’s “actions have no connection with the Chinese government.” The deal has been
criticized by donors and the Guinean opposition.
(...continued)
2009.
42 Reuters, “Guinea Court Reclaims Friguia From RUSAL,” September 10, 2009; Ria Novosti, “Guinea Demands $430
Mln from Russia’s RusAl in Alumina Business Dispute,” January 27, 2010.
43 EIU, Guinea: Country Report, September 2010.
44 Africa Confidential, “Mine Not Yours,” June 25, 2010.
45 EIU, Guinea: Country Report, September 2010.
46 Lydia Polgreen, “As Chinese Investment in Africa Drops, Hope Sinks,” The New York Times, March 25, 2009.
47 USCC, The 88 Queensway Group. See also Africa-Asia Confidential, “Blood and Money in the Streets: China’s
Business Ties to the Loathed Camara Junta Could Quickly Backfire,” October 20, 2009; Christopher Bodeen, “China-
Guinea Deal Highlights Africa Business Ties,” AP, October 24, 2009.
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Security Issues and the Rule of Law
While Guinea was considered an anchor of regional stability during much of the past two
decades, it is now considered by most observers to be a potential vector of insecurity. Guinea’s
fractious military, periodic political unrest, poorly policed borders, endemic corruption, and weak
state institutions have fed concerns over the potential spillover of instability into fragile post-
conflict neighboring countries, such as Liberia, Sierra Leone, Guinea-Bissau, and Côte d’Ivoire.
A reported hub for illicit narcotics trafficking and other forms of transnational crime, Guinea is
also potentially vulnerable to transnational threats such as terrorist financing and maritime piracy.
Having been governed by authoritarian regimes since independence, Guinea has never
experienced the effective rule of law. It is among the world’s most corrupt countries, ranking 164
out of 179 countries assessed on Transparency International’s 2010 Corruption Perceptions Index
(tying with the Democratic Republic of Congo, Kyrgyzstan, and Venezuela). Judicial and law
enforcement capacity is reportedly very low and further compromised by corruption and political
interference.48 Such weaknesses have reportedly contributed to a high incidence of vigilante
justice, which was overtly encouraged under the CNDD.49 Security forces have frequently been
accused of looting homes and businesses in Conakry, carrying out extra-judicial arrests, targeting
perceived opponents, and other abuses of power.50
Drug Trafficking
Counternarcotics issues are a relatively recent area of concern to U.S. policy-makers, as Guinea,
among other countries in the region, has emerged as a reported transshipment hub for cocaine en
route from South America to Europe.51 Senior officials and members of the armed forces are
believed by Guineans and the diplomatic community to have ties to the drug trade.52 In June
2010, President Obama designated Ousmane Conté, a son of the late president, as a “drug
kingpin,” freezing any U.S. assets held by Conté and prohibiting any transactions with him by
persons subject to U.S. jurisdiction.53 Conté was arrested by the CNDD in February 2009, but he
was released from detention in July 2010.54
48 According to the State Department’s 2009 Human Rights Report, Guinea’s “judicial system was endemically
corrupt.... Budget shortfalls, a shortage of qualified lawyers and magistrates, and an outdated and restrictive penal code
limited the judiciary's effectiveness.”
49 Rencontre Africaine pour la Défense des Droits de l’Homme (RADDHO), Rapport d’Enquêtes sur les Evénements
de N’Zérékoré du Début 2010, February 23, 2010 (CRS translation from French); AFP, “Guinée: ‘Graves violations
des droits de l'Homme’ (ordre des avocats),” May 15, 2009; Reuters, “Burn Armed Robbers, Says Guinea Crime
Chief,” June 2, 2009.
50 HRW, “Guinea: Plan Elections and Hold Rights Abusers Accountable,” January 21, 2009; HRW, “Guinea: Rein in
Soldiers,” April 27, 2009; Guineeactu.com, “Perquisition Chez la SG de la CNTG : Le Capitaine Tiègboro et Raby
s’Expliquent,” March 5, 2009; HRW, “Guinea: Respect Rights of Opposition,” August 31, 2009.
51 See CRS Report R40838, Illegal Drug Trade in Africa: Trends and U.S. Policy, by Liana Sun Wyler and Nicolas
Cook.
52 Africa Confidential: “Guinea: A Popular Putsch, So Far,” January 23, 2009.
53 Conté, who had been imprisoned in Guinea on drug-related accusations since February 2009, was released by
Guinean authorities in mid-July 2010. Further details on the scope of the “kingpin” designation, made under the
Foreign Narcotics Kingpin Designation Act (Title VIII, P.L. 106-120), are discussed in U.S. Treasury, Narcotics: What
You Need to Know about U.S. Sanctions Against Drug Traffickers, July 15, 2010.
54 BBC Online, “Guinea: Ex-President’s Son Ousmane Conte Freed on Bail,” July 16, 2010.
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Soon after taking power, Dadis Camara initiated populist moves to crack down on drug
trafficking. These measures appeared designed to signal a break with the Conté regime, enhance
the junta’s popularity, and respond to international pressure. CNDD actions largely relied on the
“naming and shaming” of alleged wrongdoers, rather than advancing institutional reform. At least
20 high-profile individuals, including top Conté officials, senior police officers, the former chief
of the armed forces, and three sons and a brother-in-law of the late president were arrested in
2009 on drug trafficking allegations. Dadis Camara personally interrogated several alleged
traffickers on national television, in some cases eliciting detailed “confessions.” While many
Guineans welcomed the attempt to pursue powerful figures in the former regime, concerns arose
over a lack of due process, and some arrests appeared to be politically selective.
The CNDD’s anti-drug efforts concentrated power in the presidency and sidelined civilian-led
anti-drug agencies in favor of the military. Dadis Camara created a new agency, the State
Secretariat for Special Services, to focus on drug and human trafficking, money laundering, and
organized crime. A military officer, Moussa Tiegboro Camara, was appointed to head the agency,
with a corps of gendarmes and soldiers for enforcement. The agency’s legal mandate and
authorities were not clearly defined, notably vis-à-vis the judiciary or police. This raised further
due process and human rights concerns, and some troops participating in anti-drug efforts were
accused of abuses of power.55
The Guinean Military: A Key Security Challenge
Nearly all observers point to Guinea’s bloated and undisciplined military as a central cause of
political instability.56 The military has been implicated in high-level corruption, multiple coup
attempts, mutinies, and gross human rights abuses, including the violence of September 2009 (see
“The September 28 Protests and International Criminal Court Investigation,” above) and the
shooting of over 100 unarmed anti-government demonstrators in early 2007.57 Military officers
implicated in abuses are perceived as benefiting from near-complete impunity from judicial
sanction. The armed forces are also reportedly divided along ethnic, generational, and factional
lines; such divisions grew further entrenched under the CNDD.58 In the eyes of some, the armed
forces serve largely as a vehicle for corruption and patronage rather than national defense. At the
same time, military salaries and other benefits serve as a vital safety net for a deeply
impoverished population.
Following the CNDD coup and throughout 2009, abuses by security forces reportedly escalated,
while discipline and the effectiveness of the military chain of command deteriorated. While many
credit transitional leader Gen. Konaté with improving military discipline in 2010, the potential for
abuses remains high. Some contend that a broad-based truth and reconciliation process is needed
to address public perceptions of the armed forces and allegations of abuses stretching back to the
post-colonial period. However, repeated attempts by civil society groups to push for official
investigations into crimes and human rights abuses by members of the military have not
succeeded. In addition to perceived impunity from the law and lack of discipline, key factors seen
55 HRW, “Rein in Soldiers,” April 27, 2009.
56 See, for example, ICG, Guinea: Reforming the Army, Africa Report N°164, September 23, 2010.
57 See HRW, Dying for Change: Brutality and Repression by Guinean Security Forces in Response to a Nationwide
Strike, April 24, 2007.
58 La Lettre du Continent, “Un Chef, Une Armée, Des Clans!” October 8, 2009.
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as challenges associated with security sector reform include a lack of civilian control and
oversight; an overweening size (Guinea’s military, estimated at over 30,000 personnel, is one of
the region’s largest despite a population of only 10 million); an undefined mandate; and the
incomplete integration of irregular recruits.59
Foreign Relations
The successful conduct of elections in 2010 has opened the way for Guinea to renew its
relationships with donors and regional organizations. The 2008 coup caused Guinea’s
membership in the African Union (AU) and the Economic Community of West African States
(ECOWAS) to be suspended; membership in both organizations has now been restored. Guinea’s
membership in the Organization of Francophone Countries (OIF) has also been lifted. The
International Contact Group on Guinea (ICG-G), an ECOWAS- and AU-led entity that was
formed to coordinate international policy toward Guinea following the 2008 coup, disbanded in
mid-February 2011.
Many donors, including the United States (see “U.S. Relations”) and the European Union (EU),
suspended some bilateral assistance programs after the coup; these suspensions have now been
lifted.60 Relations with Russia, a longtime diplomatic partner, were negatively affected during
Dadis Camara’s leadership by a dispute over rights to an aluminum refinery claimed by RusAl
(see “Recent Mining Sector Developments”); there are some indications that the dispute may be
resolved under the current government.61 Economic and diplomatic ties with China, another
longtime partner, appear to be increasing, a continuing trend over the past several years.
Relations with Neighboring States
Engagement with neighboring governments will presumably evolve with the new administration
of President Alpha Condé. Guinea’s ties with many neighboring states were tense under former
President Conté, as Guinea played an active role in supporting various factions in the Sierra
Leone and Liberia civil wars. Conté also contributed troops to ECOWAS peacekeeping missions
in both countries as part of ECOWAS’ Military Observer Group (ECOMOG). Guinean relations
with Liberia deteriorated significantly after Charles Taylor was elected president of Liberia in
1997: Conté reportedly provided logistical support and rear bases to anti-Taylor rebels, while
Taylor-backed militia fighters launched attacks on Guinean border towns in 2000 and 2001.
Relations between the two countries have improved enormously since Taylor’s departure in
59 For further analysis on Guinea’s security sector, see CRS Report R41200, Guinea’s New Transitional Government:
Emerging Issues for U.S. Policy, by Alexis Arieff. See also Joint Mission of ECOWAS, the AU, and the United
Nations for Security Sector Reform in the Republic of Guinea, Rapport d’Évaluation du Secteur de la Sécurité en
République de Guinée, May 2010; and ICG, Guinea: Reforming the Army, op. cit.
60 The violent military crackdown of September 2009 also prompted attempts by donors to isolate members and key
associates of the CNDD junta: the EU and AU announced targeted sanctions, and the EU, AU, and ECOWAS imposed
an arms embargo. The United States announced targeted travel restrictions. The EU indicated in late 2010 that it would
lift sanctions and aid restrictions if the election was successful; the embargo is also reportedly likely to be lifted.
(Guineenews, “Guinea: EU Links Resumption of Aid to Democracy,” via BBC Monitoring, September 25, 2010; AFP,
“EU to Extend Guinea Sanctions Awaiting Vote,” October 21, 2010.)
61 Africa Mining Intelligence, “Conakry: Would-Be Suitors Eye Dian Dian Bauxite,” February 16, 2011.
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August 2003.62 Guinea also hosted hundreds of thousands of refugees from regional conflicts,
most of whom have now returned to their countries of origin, although a new influx of refugees
from Côte d’Ivoire has accompanied that country’s political crisis since late December 2010.
Conté’s government forged close ties with President Laurent Gbagbo of Côte d’Ivoire and the late
President João Bernardo Vieira of Guinea-Bissau. In 1998, Guinea and Senegal sent troops to
Guinea-Bissau to support Vieira against a military mutiny, while Guinea-Bissau reportedly sent
military reinforcements to support Conté during anti-government demonstrations in early 2007.63
U.S. Relations
The Obama Administration congratulated Guinea “on the successful completion of its first
democratic presidential election” and congratulated Alpha Condé on his victory, stating hopes
that “it is only the first step on the road to democratic transition and civilian rule.”64 President
Obama also expressed “appreciation for the way in which Cellou Dalein Diallo gracefully
accepted the outcome of the election.”65
Prior to the 2008 coup, the United States maintained cordial relations with Guinea. The
Administration subsequently condemned the coup and stated that the primary U.S. objective was
to assist “peaceful, democratic change” in Guinea.66 In response to the September 2009 military
crackdown, senior U.S. officials called for CNDD leaders to step down. The State Department
also imposed targeted travel restrictions on certain members of the CNDD, members of the
government, and associates.67 The U.S. Peace Corps program was suspended in October 2009; the
program had previously been halted for six months in 2007 due to insecurity in connection with
the January-February 2007 general strikes and anti-government protests. The Fulbright exchange
program was also suspended.
Following the formation of the transitional government in January, U.S. officials signaled
approval of Interim President Konaté’s leadership, and strongly praised the June elections as
peaceful and “historic.”68 In August, Konaté was granted a diplomatic visa to visit the United
States; however, the trip has yet to take place. The United States repeatedly called for elections to
take place according to schedule, amid multiple delays, and condemned the violence that erupted
62 Taylor stepped down amid a rebel assault on Liberia’s capital, Monrovia, and is currently on trial in The Hague
before the Special Court for Sierra Leone.
63 For background on Guinea’s involvement in neighboring conflicts, see Arieff, “Still Standing: Neighbourhood Wars
and Political Stability in Guinea,” Journal of Modern African Studies, 47, 3 (September 2009).
64 State Department, “U.S. Statement on Alpha Condé’s Presidential Victory in Guinea,” December 3, 2010.
65 AFP, “Obama Congratulates Guinea on ‘New Democratic Era,’” December 22, 2010.
66 FY2011 Congressional Budget Justification for Foreign Operations.
67 Adam Nossiter, “U.S. Envoy Protests Violence in Guinea,” The New York Times, October 7, 2009; U.S. Fed News,
“Guinea Violence ‘Vile Violation’ of Human Rights, Clinton Says,” October 9, 2009; Congressional Quarterly
Transcript, “Secretary of State Clinton Holds Press Conference with Pakistani Foreign Minister Qureshi,” October 6,
2009; State Department, “Guinea: Travel Restrictions,” October 29, 2009.
68 AFP, “Obama Calls for Peaceful Guinea Run-Off Vote,” July 7, 2010; U.S. Embassy Conakry press statement, via
Guineenews, July 8, 2010.
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in response to the November announcement of provisional results, calling on supporters of both
candidates to remain calm and exercise legal forms of redress for election-related grievances.69
U.S. Assistance
In January 2009, the United States suspended bilateral aid in response to the coup, with the
exception of humanitarian and democracy-promotion assistance. In practice, security assistance
was suspended, while most non-military aid fit into permitted categories. While this policy
broadly conformed to congressional directives included in annual appropriations legislation, legal
restrictions on assistance to post-coup governments were not triggered.70 Election assistance,
which was largely funded out of the Development Assistance account and exempted from the
restriction, increased in FY2009. (Correspondingly, the Obama Administration’s FY2012
Development Assistance request represents a decrease from FY2009 and FY2010 levels.)
A $32 million USAID-funded umbrella project initiated in 2007, Projet Faisons Ensemble, is
considered to be an innovative approach to development assistance in a fragile state. Faisons
Ensemble aims to bolster governance at the local level to achieve better outcomes in health,
education, agriculture, and other sectors.
It seems likely that many of the same goals that previously defined U.S. aid priorities will
continue to be pursued now that a transition to elected, civilian-led government has occurred. The
Obama Administration stated in its FY2011 Congressional Budget Justification for Foreign
Operations that “assuming a credibly elected, civilian government is in place … U.S. assistance
in FY2011 will focus on fostering more effective law enforcement and judicial systems, greater
democracy, good governance, better health services, and improved economic opportunity.” At the
same time, the Obama Administration’s FY2011 budget request, which included an increase in
several security assistance-related accounts, has been preempted by continuing appropriations
legislation that has largely kept aid funding levels flat. Under P.L. 111-322 (Continuing
Appropriations and Surface Transportation Extensions Act, 2011, signed into law on December
22, 2010), the Obama Administration can provide Guinea aid at FY2010 levels until March 4,
2011, or the passage of superseding FY2011 appropriations legislation.
Elections-Related Assistance
Programs supporting Guinea’s electoral process were not affected by the suspension of U.S. aid.
The Obama Administration’s FY2011 request for democracy and governance funding was for
roughly $5.53 million, and an estimated $8.639 million was appropriated for democracy and
governance programs in FY2010. U.S. support for Guinea’s electoral process was largely
implemented through the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). USAID
programmed roughly $6.85 million in FY2008 and FY2009 funds for electoral assistance
programs, making the United States the second-largest donor to the election process after the
69 State Department, “Post-Election Violence in Guinea [press release],” November 17, 2010.
70 The Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2010 (P.L. 111-117, Title VII, Division F, Section 7008) barred direct
assistance “to the government of any country whose duly elected head of government is deposed by military coup or
decree,” with the exception of democracy promotion assistance. Such provisions, which have been included in annual
appropriations legislation since at least 1985, are often referred to as “Section 508” sanctions. However, the State
Department determined that the December 2008 coup in Guinea did not trigger the provision because the deposed
government had not been “duly elected.” (State Department response to CRS query, March 2010.)
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European Union.71 U.S. programs included the provision of electoral equipment and materials;
training and technical assistance for Guinea’s National Independent Electoral Commission
(CENI), electoral agents and poll workers, and political parties and candidates; voter education;
civil society and media election monitoring and oversight; an international election observation
mission implemented by the Carter Center.
Security Assistance and Counter-Narcotics Cooperation
Security assistance was suspended in connection with the 2008 military coup. However, the
suspension was partially rolled back upon Gen. Konate’s assumption of power in early 2010, and
several new security assistance programs were initiated. In June 2010, the State Department
began training a new, 75-member presidential security detail, funded by approximately $1.6
million in Peacekeeping Operations (PKO) funds. The Department’s Bureau of International
Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) also funded a resident advisor to act as a
consultant on elections security and broader police reform issues, implemented through the
Department of Justice’s International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program
(ICITAP). The State Department funded two experts’ participation in an ECOWAS-led
assessment of Guinea’s security sector, and intends to obligate up to $200,000 in IMET funds for
courses for military officials and civilians on topics including civil-military relations, military
justice, human rights, and the rule of law.
The Obama Administration has indicated that the United States will resume security assistance
programs following the transition to democratic rule. In March 2010, a U.S. delegation
representing the State Department, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), and
the Defense Department met with Guinean officials in Conakry to discuss potential U.S. support
for security sector reform (SSR), and State Department officials indicate that SSR continues to be
viewed as a policy priority. State Department officials have also indicated the possibility of
assisting Guinean troops who may deploy to Somalia as peacekeepers.72
Prior to the 2008 coup, Guinea benefitted from IMET, Foreign Military Financing (FMF),
“Section 1206” programs, and other U.S. assistance aimed at enhancing security forces’
capabilities and professionalism. 73 Before aid was suspended, U.S. officials had informally
planned a wide range of programs, many focusing on maritime security and counter-narcotics. In
2002, the United States trained an 800-person Guinean Ranger unit to shore up border security
after Liberian-backed incursions in 2000-2001. Human rights concerns have periodically limited
military training programs, and Congress has restricted IMET assistance in Guinea to
“Expanded” IMET, which emphasizes human rights and civilian control of the military.74
Multilateral Aid
Multilateral development assistance, concessional loans, and anti-poverty programs were halted
by the coup. In 2009 the World Bank stopped disbursing roughly $200 million in outstanding
71 Information provided by USAID, November 2010.
72 CRS interview with State Department officials, July 2010.
73 Section 1206 of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2006 (P.L. 109-163), as amended
and extended, provides the Secretary of Defense with authority to train and equip foreign military and foreign maritime
security forces for counter-terrorism and other purposes.
74 Most recently, in the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2010 (P.L. 111-117, Division F, Title VII, Section 7070).
These provisions were carried over in subsequent continuing appropriations legislation.
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loans designated for programs related to health, transportation, education, and other sectors, due
to political uncertainty following the coup as well as Guinea’s subsequent failure to make
sufficient payments on its existing loans.75 The International Monetary Fund-led Heavily Indebted
Poor Countries (HIPC) initiative, which was due to provide additional government financing in
2009, was halted after Conté’s death.76 The IMF and other International Financial Institutions are
currently renewing their programs in Guinea; in January 2011, the World Bank and African
Development Bank, respectively, announced the renewal of loans and a new grant for rural
electrification.
Table 1. Selected Bilateral Aid by Account
$ thousands
FY2011
FY2012
FY2007 FY2008 FY2009 FY2010 (req.)
(req.)
DA
5,529 2,400
2,576 14,518 10,277 6,000
GHCS—
7,844 [Child
USAID
Survival and
8,458 8,200 7,500 7,500 7,500
Health]
Food Aid
(P.L. 480)
4,093
2,993
2,501 0 0 -
IMET 331
246 0
0
40
100
PKO
0
0
0
1,600 0 0
INCLE
0
0 100 0
500 0
Section 1206
5,800a
0b
0 0 - -
Notes: DA=Development Assistance; GHCS=Global Health and Child Survival; IMET=International Military
Education and Training; PKO=Peacekeeping Operations; INCLE=International Narcotics Control and Law
Enforcement; Section 1206=Defense Department funds authorized under Section 1206 of the National Defense
Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2006, as amended and regularly extended, for use in training and
equipping foreign military and foreign maritime security forces for certain specific purposes.
Source: State Department, Congressional Budget Justification for Foreign Operations, FY2009-FY2011 and
Executive Budget Summary FY2012; CRS Report RS22855, Security Assistance Reform: “Section 1206” Background
and Issues for Congress, by Nina M. Serafino.
a. Guinea received a portion of a $5.8 million maritime security assistance that was divided among 15
countries.
b. Guinea was initially intended to receive a portion of a $10.9 million regional maritime security package for
FY2008, but its allocation was redirected after the 2008 military coup.
75 Arieff interview with World Bank officials, May 2009 and February 2010. The World Bank classifies Guinea as one
of the world’s 78 poorest countries, which qualifies Guinea for loans through the Bank’s International Development
Association (IDA). IDA lends money (credits) on concessional terms, meaning that credits have no interest charge and
repayments are stretched over 35 to 40 years, including a 10-year grace period. IDA also provides grants to countries at
risk of debt distress.
76 The HIPC Initiative is a comprehensive approach to debt reduction for heavily indebted poor countries pursuing
IMF- and World Bank-supported adjustment and reform programs. At the time of the coup, the program was on track.
Reaching the HIPC “completion point” would grant Guinea an estimated relief of $2.2 billion and reduce debt service
by approximately $100 million the first year (Arieff interview with IMF official, May 2009).
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Outlook
Guinea is likely to continue to interest U.S. policymakers for its role in transnational security
issues and regional stability, its economic potential, and its recent democratic transition. The 2010
elections were viewed as a success by the international community (though they were
accompanied by significant domestic discord), and the country’s outlook has greatly improved
from a year ago, when Guinea was beset by deep political uncertainty and fears of imminent civil
conflict. However, the election period also exacerbated certain societal tensions and raised the
stakes for the electoral victor. Inter-ethnic relations—historically perceived as relatively
harmonious in Guinea though subject to political manipulation and occasional violent
confrontation—have deteriorated, and the full implications of recent violence have yet to be
assessed. Newly elected president Alpha Condé faces tremendous expectations from Guinea’s
impoverished population as well as vast challenges: the election did not alter the underlying
causes of Guinea’s instability, notably economic stagnancy, dysfunctional or near-nonexistent
institutions, and the military’s opaque structure and overweening size. The United States, which
played a key role in Guinea’s political transition, is set to weigh further support for Guinea’s
democratic and socio-economic development against other regional policies and priorities.
Author Contact Information
Alexis Arieff
Analyst in African Affairs
aarieff@crs.loc.gov, 7-2459
Acknowledgments
Nicolas Cook, CRS Specialist in African Affairs, contributed to this report.
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